The relationship between China and Zimbabwe dates back to ‘over 600 years ago during the

Ming and Qing dynasty when the Chinese established relations with the Munhumutapa Empire

based on trade and cultural exchange’. China’s contemporary interactions with Zimbabwe began

with its support of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle against colonialism and racial oppression,

when China helped the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), one of the movements that

fought for the liberation of Zimbabwe in the early 1960s. This laid the foundations for the

current relationship between China and President Robert Mugabe’s government. Since then, the

China–Zimbabwe relationship has undergone three development phases. The China–Zimbabwe

relationship has at least three pillars, namely strategic and diplomatic relations; economic

relations; and social and cultural relations. This essay seeks to assess the China-Zimbabwe

relations and the development prospects in Zimbabwe. The paper will define the following

terms, development and Imperialism.

According to Youde, (2007), development prospects refers to mode of economic growth that

seeks efficient, intensive and recycled utilization of resources as well as low consumption, low

emission and high efficiency with the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable development.

Newfarmer and Pierola (2015) define development prospect as a growth of something like

industry or commerce of a nation. Therefore it is the act of or process off growing, progressing

or developing in the country.

Imperialism is a policy of extending a country’s power and influence through colonization, use

of military force or other means (Newfarmer and Pierola 2015). It is a policy of extending the

rule or authority of the empire or nation over foreign countries or acquiring and holding colonies

(Bhoroma 2018) Therefore imperialism can be defined as the expansion of nation’s authority

114/DSE/19 Page 1
over other nations through acquisition of land or having an economic and political control of

other weaker states

To begin with, the military relationship between China and Zimbabwe is the most controversial

aspect of China–Zimbabwe relations. Two examples can be used to exemplify these relations,

namely China’s arms sales to Zimbabwe and the An Yue Jiang’s cargo in 2008. China–

Zimbabwe military relations were forged in the twilight days of the liberation struggle, when

China supplied ZANU with training and weapons. Building upon these relations, China and

Zimbabwe increased their military co-operation in the sanctions era. Zimbabwe developed its

military force through the military relations form part of its ‘Look East’ policy, Zimbabwe has

bought a sizeable number of fighter jets, military vehicles and other equipment from China. The

major arms sales include 12 jet fighters and 100 military vehicles valued at $240 million in 2004;

six trainer/combat aircraft in 2005, (Stiftung, 2004). The military relationship extends beyond the

arms trade to personnel exchange and training. There are frequent training courses at the

People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University for Zimbabwean military officials, and

Chinese military officials present courses at Zimbabwe’s National Defense College. The role that

China has played in improving and maintaining the efficiency of the Zimbabwean Defense Force

cannot be underestimated, especially during Zimbabwe’s international isolation.

In addition, there is yet another dimension that is always ignored in general accounts of China–

Zimbabwe relations, namely China’s medical assistance to Zimbabwe through the supply of

medical personnel. These medical teams promote not only the health of the Zimbabwean

population but also China–Zimbabwe relations (Zafa, 2007). The first team arrived in 1985, five

years after the establishment of China–Zimbabwe relations. Beijing’s usual approach is to sign a

bilateral agreement and then to identify a province in China to provide the medical personnel,

114/DSE/19 Page 2
operating under the instructions of the Ministry of Health. The first such agreement was signed

in 1983, with Hunan province responsible for providing the medical team to Zimbabwe. From

1985 to 2013, Hunan province sent 13 medical teams, with 127 doctors and nurses, and currently

the team has 10 doctors and nurses. The Chinese medical team has helped to build a rural

hospital at Mahusekwa Growth Point in Marondera District, and has operated several ‘Brightness

Actions in Zimbabwe’ that were welcomed by the Zimbabwean government and population.

More so, since 2000, China and Zimbabwe have sought to augment their trading relationship.

Trade relations between the two countries have been strengthened through high-level visits by

government officials, sharing experiences in different sectors. China is now Zimbabwe’s third

largest trading partner after South Africa and the EU. Despite the repeated decrease in the value

of the country’s currency since 2000, China continued trading in a variety of commodities with

Zimbabwe. The recent trade between the two countries is reportedly based on China’s appetite

for Zimbabwe’s mineral resources and raw materials (Bhoroma, 2018). In February 2004, trade

relations between China and Zimbabwe were further deepened by the signing of an economic

and technical agreement. As part of this agreement China committed to helping Zimbabwe

improve its tobacco production, a sector adversely affected by the land reform process, by

providing the necessary resources. This agreement was expected to have mutual benefits for both

countries. Zimbabwe’s trade with China has steadily increased since the mid-1990s, this trend

continued under the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2012 and 2013, witnessing further

growth in bilateral trade with the figure reaching $1 billion in 2012 and $1.1 billion in 2013.

Much like the trading patterns between China and other African states, bilateral trade between

China and Zimbabwe has been characterised by the export of raw materials in return for

manufactured goods (including clothing, textiles and footwear), vehicles (cars, busses, tractors

114/DSE/19 Page 3
and aircraft), electrical machinery and other equipment. Exports from Zimbabwe to China have been

dominated by cash crops (tobacco, cotton) and minerals (particularly nickel and ferroalloys). Tobacco is

Zimbabwe’s main export product to China. Since the late 1990s there has been a gradual increase in

Chinese imports as a result of the number of loans China has extended to Zimbabwe to buy agricultural

and manufacturing equipment (Taylor, 2010). However, with the flood of Chinese goods into the

Zimbabwean market, the issue of low-quality Chinese goods, such as food, clothing, textiles and

electrical goods, has been raised by the local population. Customers complain about the quality of the

goods while local business people complain about being forced out of business. Although cheap Chinese

products have nonetheless become a source of relief to the majority who can only afford Chinese-made

products it is worth noting that some of these low-quality Chinese goods do not come directly from China

but rather from neighboring countries. The situation is, however, changing as the Chinese become aware

of the necessity for exporting higher quality goods, and the Zimbabweans understand that the price

determines the quality and that China is able to produce goods for all markets.

‘Furthermore, In the energy sector, China’s Sinohydro entered into a deal with the government in 2015 to

expand the Kariba South power plant at a cost of US$533 million and the project was commissioned early

this year. The expansion added 300 megawatts (MW) to the national grid, thereby partially reducing the

national power deficit. In June this year, China’s Import and Export Bank started releasing funds for the

US$1,4 billion expansion of Hwange Power Station by the same contractor (Bhoroma , 2018). According

to Zesa, the project is expected to take 42 months and add 600MW to the national grid. In addition, China

Africa Sunlight Energy has expressed interest in the 600MW coal-fired power plant in Gwayi. Other

projects of note include the three agreements signed between Zesa and CHINT Electrical of China to

construct solar plants with a generating capacity of 300MW in partnership with Intratrek

Zimbabwe. Whether these latest projects materialise or not, time will tell. However, their

implementation has potential to wipe out the country’s power deficit and place Zimbabwe back

on the energy self-sufficiency map.

114/DSE/19 Page 4
However, the involvement of China in Zimbabwe’s mining industry has had negative

repercussions. China, with the help of the Zimbabwean government, has played a significant role

in depleting Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth such as diamonds from the eastern part of the country,

where local diamond miners were forcefully removed to make room for Chinese companies,

resulting in little benefits (if any at all) for the locals ( Bhoroma 2018). The case of the Chiadzwa

diamonds is one classic example Chinese companies have failed to adhere to the principles of

good corporate social responsibility to the extent that the local community was left economically

worse off than it was before the discovery of diamonds, followed by the subsequent entry of

Chinese companies in the diamond extraction. Local diamond interests coupled with recent

outbursts by President Mugabe accusing Chinese mining companies of siphoning diamond

money and not banking with local Zimbabwean banks are pressuring Chinese diamond

companies to surrender more of their market share to local companies. In 2016, a total of US$ 15

billion was reported as ‘lost’ by Zimbabwe in the mining sector.

In conclusion, it is likely that China-Zimbabwe relations are continuing to be strong. This is not

withstanding, the fact that it is China that stands to benefit more from interaction with Zimbabwe

in terms of natural resource wealth extraction and trade, as compared to the little financial aid

being poured into Zimbabwe by Beijing. The evolvement of Sino–Zimbabwe relations will

however, remain a matter of strategic interests at play. In this regard, it is noteworthy to highlight

that the Chinese government has of late been reluctant to commit to financial investment given

the political climate in the country

114/DSE/19 Page 5
REFERENCES

Bhoroma, V. (2018 ). Chinese deals: Good or bad for Zim? - The Zimbabwe Independent. Available at

https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/11/09/chinese-deals-good-or-bad-for-zim/ [Accessed

on 01 April 2022]

Newfarmer, R. and Pierola, M.D. (2015), Trade in Zimbabwe: Changing Incentives to Enhance

Competitiveness, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.

Stiftung, F.E. (2004), “The ‘Look East Policy’ of Zimbabwe Now Focuses on China”, Policy

Briefing Paper, Harare: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Taylor, T, (2010) , “China’s new role in Africa, international Affairs 82(5) pp 937-959

Youde, J.R. (2007), “Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China”, Africa Today,

Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 3-19.

Zafar, A. (2007), “The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa:

Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and Aid Links”, The World Bank Research

Observer, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 103-130.

114/DSE/19 Page 6