International Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology

“it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of urban displaced
people in Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.
--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number: IJAE-D-22-00074

Full Title: “it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of urban displaced
people in Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.

Article Type: Original paper

Funding Information:

Abstract: At the time of the writing (October 2022), five years had passed since extreme and
unending violence erupted in Cabo Delgado province and was unfolding to all
provinces of the northern region, forcing nearly 1 million people to flee. By July, reports
indicated that 13 000 people had returned to their hometowns, despite official reports
and (political) discourses discouraging early returns to some towns (e.g., Mocimboa da
Praia) (ACLEID, 2022). However, some urban displaced people were reluctant to risk
their lives by returning. This two-behavior tendency is and will continue to be the main
characteristic of returning and reconstruction, influencing the outcomes of the
government’s reconstruction plans and the lives of the displaced. The obvious question
is why and what particularities influence the return trends

Corresponding Author: Nelson Tivane, Master

Norwegian Refugee Council
Maputo, Mozambique MOZAMBIQUE

Corresponding Author E-Mail: tivanen@gmail.com

Corresponding Author Secondary

Information:

Corresponding Author's Institution: Norwegian Refugee Council

Corresponding Author's Secondary

Institution:

First Author: Nelson Tivane, Master

First Author Secondary Information:

Order of Authors: Nelson Tivane, Master

Order of Authors Secondary Information:

Suggested Reviewers: Gaye Thompson, PhD

Director, SCDS
gaye.thompson@scdshub.com
She has provided one of the first discussion on my master proposal

Stephan Van Wyk, PhD

Head of Dept, UNISA: University of South Africa
vawykjs@unisa.ac.za
He is my co-supersior

Joao Feijo, PhD

Researcher, OMR
joaofeijo@hotmail.com
He is one of the main researcher in this subject in Mozambique

Opposed Reviewers:

Additional Information:

Question Response

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Title Page

“it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of urban
displaced people in Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.

Nelson Tivane

Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of South Africa (UNISA)

98502: Master of Arts in Anthropology (specialization: space and place)
Supervisor: Dr G. Sauti
Co-supervisor: Dr. JS Van Wyk
October 2022

Author Note
Nelson Tivane works as Policy Specialist on Displacement in Mozambique and Southern Africa.
Correspondence concerning this article shall be addressed to Mr. Nelson Tivane, at Sommerschield. Street
Comandante Aurelio Manave, Nr 189, 1st Floor. Maputo. Mozambique.
Email: tivanen@gmail.com

Authors’ contributions. Nelson Tivane has the only authorship of this article. The author read and approved the
final manuscript.

Funding. I would like to thank for the output from the Overseas Development Institute’ (ODI) research project,
commissioned to CCS Social Research and Consulting, Lda – to conducted field semi-structured interviews with
the displaced and their host in and around the city of Pemba.

Availability of data and materials Not applicable.

Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable.
Consent for publication The author approves the translation and publication.
Competing interests The author declares that he does not have competing interests.

Acknowledgements I would like to extend thanks to Dr. Gloria Sauti and Dr Stephan Van Wyk for their critical
reading and valuable guides; and to Drs. Anthony Roland Brouwer, S. Gaye Thompson and Jeanne Marie
Penvenne for their critical reading of my Master’ proposal – which is the basis of this article. To Nickson Rafael
Amos for the map.
Blinded Manuscript Click here to view linked References

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6 “it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of
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8 urban displaced people in Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.
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14 Abstract
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16 At the time of the writing (October 2022), five years had passed since extreme and
17 unending violence erupted in Cabo Delgado province and was unfolding to all
18 provinces of the northern region, forcing nearly 1 million people to flee. By July,
19 reports indicated that 13 000 people had returned to their hometowns, despite
20 official reports and (political) discourses discouraging early returns to some towns
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(e.g., Mocimboa da Praia) (ACLEID, 2022). However, some urban displaced people
22
23 were reluctant to risk their lives by returning. This two-behavior tendency is and will
24 continue to be the main characteristic of returning and reconstruction, influencing
25 the outcomes of the government’s reconstruction plans and the lives of the
26 displaced. The obvious question is why and what particularities influence the return
27 trends. Authors and academists in Mozambique have stayed apart from the
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29 increasing interest and debate concerning the relationship between people and
30 place (Kibreab, 1999) in the context of displacement. Nevertheless, some have easily
31 argued that the drivers to return are various factors exerting multiple points of
32 pressure on households (Borges Coelho, 1993; Williams, 2010), particularly when
33 these (returnees) lack cultural bonds or other ties to “new” places. This essay's initial
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research position agrees with Brun (2001). It considers that culture is not rooted or
36 anchored to places but along routes. Predominantly, social relations are made, not
37 given. Cultural ties and social relations make sense when viewed in context. In the
38 context of conflict-related displacement, I suggest leaving culture (reflexivity again)
39 a bit out and closely looking at the (socioeconomic) experiences people have
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developed and carried with them through their displacement (and return) narratives
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42 as the main factors influencing the decision to or not to return. This paper argues
43 that displaced people perceive and place the ‘risk of life’ as central to their decision-
44 making regarding a return. The weight of their frustrated socioeconomic aspirations
45 forces them to return to their place of origin – not to resettle primarily, but to assess
46 the safety issue and sustain their decisions and possibilities to return. The corollary
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48 of this assertion is that where conflict persists but institutional, economic structural,
49 security and safety, and host attitude create an enabling environment for
50 socioeconomic integration of the displaced, returning would not even be considered
51 a possibility or option.
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54 Keywords: space; place; displacement; decision-making; return
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4 Abbreviations
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DTM. Displacement Tracking Matrix
7 INGD. Instituto Nacional de Gestão e Redução de Riscos de Desastre (transl. National Disaster
8 Management Institute)
9 IOM. International Organization for Migration
10 INE. Instituto Nacional de Estatística (transl. National Institute of Statistics)
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FDI. Foreign Direct Investment
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13 FRELIMO. Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (transl. Mozambique Liberation Front)
14 GPC. Global Protection Cluster
15 PEGDi. Política e Estratégia de Gestão de Deslocados Internos (transl. Policy and Strategy for
16 Internal Displacement Management - PSiDM)
17 ODI. Overseas Development Institute
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19 NRC. Norwegian Refugee Council
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24 Background for this study
25 In the last five years, Mozambique’s north-eastern province of Cabo Delgado has been inflicted by
26 natural disasters and armed conflict. The violence and conflict have unfolded to date. The nature and
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28 root of the conflict and its respective consequences have been widely documented (Feijó and Maquenzi,
29 2019; Feijó, 2021; Hanlon, 2021; Feijó, Maquenzi and Balane, 2022;). Some of these roots (e.g., poverty,
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ethnicity, and religion) were confirmed during the fieldwork. Locals explained that economic changes,
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32 political marginalization, and exclusion led to grievances. Due to the lack of inclusion of local processes
33 and mechanisms for negotiations and mediation, these grievances were expressed in attacks that
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35 escalated into violent conflict. In 2019, while the conflict was escalating, the province was hit by the
36 massive tropical cyclone Kenneth. The eye of the storm hit the districts of Ibo, Quissanga, and Macomia.
37 The smaller outer islands were severely struck and suffered major destruction on their precarious
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39 infrastructures. Field crops, fishing boats, and fishing equipment were lost or partially damaged. While
40 some people had managed to harvest some amounts of food before the cyclone, most crops and stocks
41 were damaged, destroyed, or lost. As a result, food security outcomes worsened in many of the
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43 Kenneth-affected areas in Cabo Delgado. More than 60,000 families were affected, many of them
44 female-headed households. Mercifully, the recent (2020 and 2021) rain seasons have not produced
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anything on the scale of Cyclone Kenneth. However, as climate change increases the intensity and
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47 frequency of storms, Cabo Delgado will soon experience major weather events. These events tend to
48 force many people to flee and find temporary refuge. The latest reports estimate that about 18,029
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50 people were displaced and sheltered in accommodation centers due to this weather event. It also bears
51 noting that the population was already displaced from internal conflict in some locations. Thus,
52 becoming vulnerable to risks of a second or third displacement.
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54 Throughout 2021, violent attacks increased in numbers and locations, with attacks in Mocimboa da
55 Praia, Macomia and Palma districts. It is argued that significant numbers of (young) people were joining
56 the extremist armed groups either to protest against increased poverty and sharply increased inequality
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58 (Hanlon, 2021) or to revenge for old quarrels and practice gangsterism acts (Decker and David, 2012). A
59 displaced female summed up these types of unlawful acts:
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4 “when we left Mocímboa, we came in a very large boat, but the owner of the boat
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6 could not make it with us here because he was killed in the middle of the sea. The
7 owner had a daughter who had previously been engaged to one of these men in the
8 village and later he (the owner of the boat) rejected this engagement … They were
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10 from there but when he saw how they were dressed, he thought it was not good
11 and decided not to give his daughter to that person…. and that cost his life while
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attempting to flee to Pemba… They killed him right there, slashed his throat and
14 told us to continue the journey if we had someone who knew how to sail a boat. We
15 were told to report that the person had been killed by them” (female interviewee)
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18 The protest against poverty and inequality is often linked with economic and investment growth. The
19 amounts mentioned in Foreign direct investment (FDI) are gigantic. However, until today, there is no
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21 nexus between the amount and the prevalence of poverty in the province. For instance, according to
22 TotalEnergies (2022, April 24), in 2019, over $20 billion (FDI) were invested in the Province for natural
23 resource exploitation by TotalEnergies. According to government estimates and investors' projections,
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25 that could lead to profits of more than $60 billion in the medium term. However, with violence, conflict,
26 and attacks expanding in the districts where most of these investments are located, most were
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interrupted and withdrawn; and poverty persists. The last two Surveys of the Budget of Families (IOF)1
29 have shown a trend of increasing consumption poverty rates in the province of Cabo Delgado, where it
30 reaches 44.8% (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2019). There are other dimensions of these roots, such as the
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32 frustration of expectations. It is largely argued that aspirations of jobs and access to schools and
33 hospitals have failed to materialize. The implementation of investment dragged on for years with
34 periods of absence of reliable and timely information, upsetting the population’s expectations and
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36 creating grievance (Hanlon, 2021). Hanlon adds that these grievances began to sustain local
37 fundamentalist preachers, who began to argue that the economic problems in Cabo Delgado were due
38 to a corrupt form of Islam and that only sharia law2 would bring equity and a fairer share of the
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40 province’s wealth. As of June 2022, violence and conflict were up sevenfold, escalating to southern Cabo
41 Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula (Hanlon, 2022). It is estimated that conflict alone forced over 900
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thousand people to flee to safe zones in and outside Cabo Delgado. Most of these Internally Displaced
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44 Persons or displaced are women and children. Around 71.1% of the displaced are in houses of their
45 relatives, acquaintances, and rented houses, 21.5% in resettlement neighborhoods, and 7.3% in
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47 accommodation Centres (UNICEF, 2022).
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49 Methodology of the study
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51 In June 2022, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) hired CCS Social Research and Consulting, Lda,
52 to conduct field semi-structured interviews with the displaced and their host in and around the city of
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55 Household Budget Survey, 2019/2020 & 2008/2009
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56 Sharia law is a religious law derived from the precepts of Islam, particularly the Koran and the Hadith. The
57 fundamentalists who lead the insurgency are Koranists who do not accept the Hadith and other Islamic precepts.
58 Their version of Sharia law is different from that of other Cabo Delgado Muslims. In general, the Islamic approach
59 has been to foster a society based on generosity and cooperation, values which are antithetical to greed, while
60 accepting a free market economy (Hanlon, 2021)
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4 Pemba. Those interviews were to build a paper, which is ‘part of a two-year, multi-country research
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6 project that seeks to build evidence and raise awareness of the myriad ways displaced people cope with
7 their displacement’ (Sturridge, Feijó, and Tivane., 2022). The ODI research is expected to create an entry
8 point to support communities affected by displacement in ways that reflect their lived experiences,
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10 personal preferences, and future aspirations. I used the unused part of these interviews to build the
11 case for this article. In the words of a close friend of mine, ‘let displaced people speak.’ These interviews
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aimed to gather in-person and direct lived experiences from displaced people and their hosts
14 throughout the course of displacement. A total of 35 displaced, five host families were conducted with
15 respondents residing across different neighborhoods in Pemba (table 1), who fled from the districts of
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17 Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Macomia, Muidume, and Quissanga (fig. 1)
18 Table 1: Summary of the number of interviewees and district of origin
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20 Neighbourhood # of interviewees District of origin
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22 Mahate 6 City of Pemba, Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Palma
23 and Muidumbe
24 Natite 5 Muidumbe, Quissanga and Mocimboa da Praia
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26 Chuiba 8 Macomia, Mocimboa da praia and Muidumbe
27 Muxara 7 Quissanga, Mocimaboa da Praia and Palma
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29 Paquitequete 14 City of Pemba, Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and
30 Quissanga
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These interviewees were added to 4 key-informant interviews (KII) conducted. In addition, these data
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36 were supplemented with other information collected through observation on the ground, informal
37 discussion with leaders of the bairros (neighborhood), and secondary data from different literature and
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reports.
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36 Fig. 1. Cabo Delgado. Recorded movement and origin of displaced in Pemba, according to our interviews. Creation date: 03 November 2022 |
37 Created by: Nickson Rafael Amos | Source base: DTM – IOM. ‘The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names, and related data shown
38 on maps are not warranted to be error-free nor do they imply a judgment on the legal status of any territory, endorsement or acceptance of
39 such boundaries by the author.’
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42 Government reports regarding conflict and violence, climate, and displacement were also used. It was
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expected that 10 KII would be conducted, but only in 4 cases was it possible to make an appointment
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45 with the selected informants. More than five requests for interviews were not responded. As for urban
46 Displaced and host families, respondents were identified through purposive and snowballing
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48 techniques.
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50 Displaced and memories of displacement: a perspective from urban displaced in Pemba
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52 The volatile situation of security has increased the number of displacements. The exact figures are hard
53 to come by and remain contested (Sturridge, Feijó, and Tivane, 2022), but IOM (2022) states that over
54 950,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced by the conflict alone. In June 2022, IOM/DTM
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56 estimated that some 12,364 new displaced people arrived in Pemba, adding to the existing caseload of
57 139,566 displaced to the found refuge. From our sample of interviews, the vast majority are women
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(head of household). They have their views on the origins of this gender imbalance. Some women whose
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60 husbands are not with them believe that they were killed, detained, or joined the insurgency. As for the
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4 percentage of children, many women fled with 5 or 7 children. During our field data collection for this
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6 study, we found situations of unaccompanied children who somehow have managed to escape the
7 conflict and violence. They left their houses in search of safety. They live with adoptive families. These
8 children and adults are subjected to hosting contributions, whether in money, work, or food for daily
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10 living onus.
11 “…if you have seventy percent of the population stuck in someone 's house, if a cousin from
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Mocímboa comes to you with the whole family, the first month is satisfied, the second month
14 starts to feel strange, the third month you are already saying, ‘look cousin, here, we have to
15 organize ourselves” (extract from key-informant)
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18 These contributions started to be demanded after 3 or 4 months of them living with a host. One of our
19 interviewees explained that the high cost of living in Pemba and limited livelihood sources restrict host
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21 families’ willingness to absorb more displaced for longer period.
22 Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s second-largest populated province (INE, 2017). According to data from
23 the Living Cost Organization, the price of city costs in Pemba is 5.8 times more than the average salary.
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25 Most displaced people have arrived by boat, bus, foot, or airplane (in some cases). Those who arrived by
26 bus were the ones who walked long distances, and therefore could not bring anything with them. Some
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have had two or three stops in different districts or villages, either to get to Pemba city or to find
29 transport (boat or car) to the city of Pemba. Other people had to walk miles to a place where they could
30 find a boat to take them to villages - or a vehicle. Vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, people with
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32 disabilities, and children, have struggled the most while fleeing and walking. Many interviewees
33 reported opportunistic charging of transport fees. The tariff of private operators raised from 50 meticais
34 ($0.7) to 1000 meticais ($15.5) for a single person, including children. I asked a 46-year-old man if
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36 anyone from his group or anything stayed behind when they fled. He said:
37 “it was a difficult situation. Very difficult. Then, the transporters were charging a lot of money …
38 we used to pay 200 mtn (more than $3) to come here tothe city. But they started to charge 350
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40 mtn, 900 mtn… They raised the price and doubled it. It was hard. We did not even manage to
41 bring anything. It wasn't easy... When they enter a village, it is difficult to take anything. What
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you can take is what you are waring. We knew that they are coming. They were burning other
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44 villages in the neighborhood, and [using] the telephones, they were telling us ‘they are coming,
45 they say now go to that village, there was a school there… 4 pm – 5 pm, they were entering the
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47 village to burn the school and then they came to the headquarter of the village….” (male
48 interviewee)
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51 Another interviewee stated:
52 “…after I was there, after that situation, after these bandits entered Palma, we left Palma
53 around 4 pm … on March 24th and we walked-passed some villages, others that I don't even
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55 remember the names, there is a village called Quionga, Kiuia, we passed all these villages and
56 went to an island that is in Palma called Suavo. We stayed there for three days, so, after
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spending these days in Suavo, we had to arrange mechanisms to leave Suavo reach Tanzania
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59 and then turn here to our country. Then we left Suavo, we went back to the village called
60 Quionga again, there we went with these sailing boats, we get off from Quionga to the
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4 Tanzania-Mozambique border … which I don't know how it is called and where it is – but close to
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6 the border…” (male interviewee)
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8 According to our interviewees, the circumstances drove the decision to leave the islands and other
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10 attacked districts. In districts where information about planned attacks came early, there are
11 households whose decisions were discussed within the family. This included deciding where they would
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move to next. In districts or villages where the attacks came by surprise, in the middle of the night or
14 daylight, the circumstances moved decisions, and these households would try to save whatever they
15 could:
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18 “… my mother always told us a story [about] war is like that. It's like that on the day they enter
19 here you can't think of taking something that can serve you, what you can do is just look for
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21 where your children are. Take them. Because children and household goods, as you have life, you
22 can have that there, but children are difficult to have. So, what should you do, that day when
23 these people come in, you have to take your children and leave the rest, if you have life (you are
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25 alive), you will achieve everything with the passage of time! In fact, on that day there, I only
26 managed to leave with my wallet, my wallet and my documents and that was it. I collected the
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children, we left that house around 5:00 am when the shooting started, from there it was every
29 man for himself and God for all, we couldn't take off any clothes, or bed, or anything…” (male
30 interviewee)
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33 “… Unfortunately, nothing, apart from, at least for me, I managed to leave with my documents
34 only, only documents, my BI, my school certificate, all this I managed to recover only and my
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36 agent card and like my phone, only. And if that's all that was inside, clothes, I came here with no
37 clothes with nothing” (male interviewee)
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40 During an interview with a local authority of one of the neighborhoods where this research took place,
41 he affirmed that for those who came to the city of Pemba, it was their final destination. When the
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Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Palma attacks happened, most displaced people found refuge in
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44 Pemba and Nacala. People knew where they could flee and why. These people migrated to the islands to
45 build their lives twenty or thirty years ago. They have families, relatives, or acquaitances in Pemba, who
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47 were born in, around the city, or born in the districts under attack but moved to Pemba. There are
48 families of relatives hosting more than 40 displaced people in just one house. As stated by one of our
49 informants:
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51 “I used to live with my wife and my 3 children, now if I want to count with the owners of the
52 house then I don't know, because there are many people…” (male interviewee)
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55 Some of these displaced people moved from Pemba to the island in search of a job in the 1990s and
56 were now forced to return because of the violence. All of our interviewees confirmed these mobility
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patterns and dynamics in the affected region, each with their particularities. For example, a 74-year-old
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59 man, born around the city of Pemba (in 1948), moved from Pemba to Mueda (in 1982) to work in a
60 formal job as a mason. He was not able to be precise but said that he continued to work as a mason
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4 during the civil war (Renamo and Frelimo), which found him in Muidumbe. They would move from the
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6 village to build water pump systems in the countryside. Then he moved to Mocímboa, where he married
7 and had eight children. Some of his children went to school around the city of Pemba. Like many others
8 in Mocimboa, his family fled from conflict and violence. He has lived in Pemba for two years in the same
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10 house he used to live in before moving to Mueda. While living in Mocimboa, he used to come to Pemba
11 to visit family members or when there was a situation of decease and ceremony – but just for a week or
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less. He also used to practice agriculture. During the harvest, his family from Pemba would go to
14 Mocimboa to help him and bring goods to Pemba:
15 “yes … when I went there, I used to work and practice agriculture. When [the time to]
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17 harvest would come, I would call [the family] to come and help me with harvest. They
18 then would bring the food here [in Pemba]” (male interviewee)
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21 In the city of Pemba, there is a strong sense of social network and humanity. It is estimated that 71.1%
22 are in houses of relatives, acquaintances and in rented houses, 21.5% in resettlement neighborhoods,
23 and 7.3% in accommodation centers (UNICEF, 2022). Our interviewees are living in host families who are
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25 their families, relatives, or acquaintances of those whom they have fled with from conflict zones. Some
26 have rented houses, borrowed rooms or houses. Those borrowing houses are also protecting and taking
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care of these houses. There are foreign business actors (from Tanzania) also giving their houses in the
29 same terms – lending for security or charity. In addition, local authorities in the neighbourhood are
30 helping to identify empty or abandoned houses and host the displaced, particularly in the
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32 neighbourhoods near the cost.
33 “… I was born in Namage, Chirumba, Quissanga district. This war found me in Mocimboa da
34 Praia, we went to work, my husband was a fisherman... we fled and came to Pemba, we were
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36 received [here] on the beach by Mr. Luis Salimo, he gave us tea and porridge there on the beach.
37 He received us and we stayed for two weeks there on the beach, [and] there was a porch where
38 people lived. Then, a man named Situmar took us to his house. As time passed, the man who was
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40 a mwanlimo diseased and after, the owner [his wife], because we didn't have the money to pay
41 the rent of that house, we left that house, and we are here … the owners live in the Bairro
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Expansão. They lent us so the house wouldn't be abandoned” (female interviewee)
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45 In the city of Pemba, all displaced live in urban or peri-urban settings - slums. Except for Paquitequete,
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47 these slums emerged from and were once called communal village (aldeias comunais). They are a result
48 of the post-independence urbanization policy, and the local power structure still working and with huge
49 influence in supporting the displaced (re) building their social network, distribution of aid, and
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51 identification of vulnerable groups. Mozambique has a long history of resettlement where these local
52 (structure of) authorities were used for the same different purposes: supporting population resettled in
53 communal villages, or settling in new compounds, distribution of local agriculture production, control of
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55 people’s movements, the context of civil war, and more. During the 1970s and 1980s, to rebuild the
56 country’ economy, FRELIMO opted for the strategy of creating communal villages. The concept of
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communal villages emerged in 1975, in part as a reaction to the crisis in the countryside in the
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59 immediate aftermath of the Portuguese settler exodus from Mozambique in 1974-1975. The first
60 communal villages were created in Cabo Delgado soon after independence. The province has a long
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4 history of migration and displacement or population mobility (Borges Coelho, 1993; Hall and Young,
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6 1997). They have been conflict-induced displacement (aldeamento, liberated zones, and more),
7 development-induced displacement (gas and tourism development projects), and climate-induced
8 displacement. The dynamic of population mobility in Cabo Delgado reflects the dichotomy of practice
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10 and theory of development. These historical processes of human mobility result from a traumatic
11 collective memory of forced or voluntary resettlement, invariably with negatively affecting the local
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socio-economic structure.
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15
Displacement, Place, and Livelihoods: discourses of a ‘revolving door’
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17 While denying the deterritorialization of identity as a result of the easy mobility in the era of the
18 globalization process, Kibreab (1999: 407) uses the experiences of refugees to state that ‘in a place in
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20 which many rights such as equal treatment, access to sources of livelihoods, access to land, rights of
21 freedom of movement and residence, are determined based on territorially anchored identities, the
22 identity people gain from their association with a particular country is an indispensable instrument to a
23
24 socially and economically fulfilling end…’. However, many of his arguments cannot be applied to those
25 who are forced to flee but did not cross the border. In our case, these people usually do not even cross
26 provinces or regions but districts. Moreover, these rights, e.g., access to sources of livelihoods, land and
27
28 equal treatment to opportunities, are supposed to be equal, by law and policies. Nevertheless, often,
29 there are not.
30
31
32 In the slums of the city of Pemba, displaced people have been living between coping and adapting over
33 the last three years. The long way from coping to adaptation is a situation of revolving doors. In their
34
35
attempt to build a sustainable source of livelihood, the vast majority of displaced people rely on
36 assistance from humanitarian actors, relatives (kinship), acquaintances, and host neighbors. This is
37 largely based on whether (i) displaced are equipped (level of literacy, skills, and other resources to
38
39 acquire livelihoods) and willing to be integrated or to 'imagine' themselves as being part of host
40 societies; (ii) ‘host populations accept or 'imagine' the displaced as their own members’; and (iii) ‘the
41 structural factors are favourable enough to enable the displaced to work towards self-sufficiency’
42
43 (Kibread, 1999, p. 389). The memories of fleeing war sustain the latter. Nobody would return to violence
44 or a place that brings memories of deaths and graves by choice. In Pemba, hosts are receptive (at least
45
while they can bear the cost of living), but the social and economic structure and government policy are
46
47 unfavourable to easy integration. As a result, the urban displaced cope with subsistence by improvising
48 resources for immediate family consumption. These struggles of integration were summed up by two
49
50 displaced:
51 “…. what influences is the part of being displaced, by-the-way, or rather because of all this
52 confusion that exists in our country, especially in our area of Cabo Delgado … when I arrived
53
54 here, I found (Mpesa) agents who were working and they claim that when they were there in
55 Palma working, they were working very well … in the end of the month, they used to make
56 deposits and transfer money to the family here. The economy was really good because money
57
58 was circulating, that's why even agents were able to have money, so if there is a lack of
59 customers now it's because the situation contributes” (male interviewee)
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4
5
6 “... We are [living] bad, here. We need support with food, jobs in [the] existing projects and other
7 things … because I could do anything to feed his children, anything, even illegal jobs’. I cannot go
8 back to [in Bilibiza]. How can I risk my life with those bandits? [to] return there, the government
9
10 has to declare that we are safe to go and provide us with means to return. Otherwise, I will stay
11 here with or without food to eat. I will stay…” (male (interviewee)
12
13
14 At the time of writing, conflict and violence caused massive destructions to the economy and erupted
15 the source of livelihood of the vast majority in Cabo Delgado. These events jeopardized years of hard-
16
17 won investment gains, particularly from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) developments. In 2017 the World
18 Bank estimated that strengthening prices for coal, aluminium, and gas, a post el Niño (drought) recovery
19 in agriculture and the progress in the peace talks would steer growth to 4.6 percent and towards 7
20
21 percent by the end of the decade. Now, growth is expected to accelerate in the medium term, averaging
22 5.5%, mainly reflecting natural gas (LNG) production (World Bank, 2021), arguably one of the key roots
23 of conflict and violence3. There are few opportunities outside of that sector, however, non-farming
24
25 activity tends to center on resource exploitation which demands high skills and labour experience. As a
26 result, the province has high illiteracy rates in the country, at 67 percent, and a high youth
27
28
unemployment rate estimated at 88 percent (UNICEF, 2021).
29 The World Bank says that a modest growth rebound in 2021 reflects a combined agricultural growth and
30 relatively strong service recovery. The growth prospects are positive, supported by the gradual global
31
32 recovery and LNG and agriculture developments. However, the effect of climate change and related
33 impacts (both sudden and slow onset) are projected to increase in the coming years. It will erupt the
34 agriculture sector and increase displacement risks. The Global Protection Cluster and Norwegian
35
36 Refugee Council (2022) note that more people will be forced to flee their homes because of floods,
37 tropical storms, droughts, and sea level rise, causing significant housing, land, and property (HLP)
38 challenges. The impacts of climate change worsen the situation and prospects for displacement-affected
39
40 people, limiting access to natural resources, restricting livelihoods, and exacerbating conflicts.
41
42
Subsistence agriculture and fishing are the primary sources of income for the vast majority of the
43
44 population in the province, including in and around the capital. In the province, over 86 percent of the
45 population relies on agriculture. It is estimated that the conflict has resulted in a 30 percent drop in
46
47 production compared with the previous agricultural season. In drought-affected areas – driven by
48 multiple natural disasters during the 2021/2022 season and conflict, a poor harvest, the depletion of
49 food reserves, and limited income-generating opportunities led to the persistence of crisis (IPC Phase 3)
50
51 and stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity outcomes.
52 “I have heard people who make machamba complaining about the fact that their food
53 has dried up, now there would have been a lot of production if it had rained, or a lot of
54
55 rain that flooded the machambas and so the crops don't grow” (female interviewee)
56
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58 3
“The perception of exclusion from the benefits of natural resources exploitation in the province amidst growing
59 poverty and lack of opportunity created a youth-led movement which started a relatively small rebellion in 2017”
60 (UNICEF, 2021. XI)
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5
6 Food insecurity varies between locations due to existing levels of poverty, crop damage, disruption to
7 fishing and other livelihoods, and whether humanitarian access is compromised by insecurity and access
8 issues. However, restoring livelihoods remains a priority for local authorities and the vast majority of
9
10 humanitarian actors.
11 The fisheries sector contributes significantly to poverty alleviation and socio-economic development.
12
13
Around 20% of the population relies on fisheries for part of their income and a larger proportion relies
14 on fishing for subsistence and food security. Nevertheless, the extensive reserves of gas and other
15 minerals discovered in Cabo Delgado and the beginning of their exploitation changed the structure of
16
17 (artisanal) finishing. Development-induced displacement led to limited access to the sea. Fishermen and
18 coastal communities in Mozambique depend mostly on fishery resources that are heavily influenced by
19 climate dynamics (Badjeck et al., 2010). However, in the last three decades, production has been falling,
20
21 due to the over-exploitation of resources and climate change (Blythe et al., 2014). The impacts of
22 climate change tend to be greater in tropical regions, where temperatures are higher, contributing to
23 the reduction of fishery productivity. Few studies bring the link between climate change in fisheries and
24
25 aquaculture in Mozambique, except some details that highlights the consequences of climate change
26 fisheries and aquaculture, creating problems for the sustainability of coastal communities (ibid), and
27
28
about the quality of life of this communities reduces due to the negative impacts that climate change
29 has on natural resources (Techera, 2018). In the urban setting, for most displaced people who live in or
30 around the city – particularly near the coast, a storm, cyclone or flood would rapidly exacerbate many of
31
32 the problems they are already facing. Within this scenario, we asked our interviewees how they cope
33 and adjust adaptative mechanisms to encounter livelihoods? To this question, a 46-year-old man from
34 Bilibiza (Quissanga) responded:
35
36 “I am just living. I am doing nothing…” (male interviewee)
37
38 While the conversation proceeded, Idiscovered that he does seasonal jobs (ganho-ganho or biscato) of
39
40 building latrines, farming one’s field (machamba), and more. Per month, it varies; he gets two or four
41 times these jobs which he uses immediately to buy food for family consumption. The production of his
42
few crops failed due to the type of soil, but he had some cowpea beans to eat. In Bilibiza, he was a
43
44 fisherman. He practiced agriculture and ran a small business selling cigarettes and more. In Pemba, he
45 said, it is difficult to find these biscatos because he is not from there and has to compete with locals who
46
47 know where to find these types of (informal) jobs and costumers:
48
49 Unfortunately, he and his family have not been registered to benefit from World Food Programme’s
50
51 voucher assistance. He has made several complaints, but there were no different results. He lives in a
52 house that belonged to his sister, with four children. He has eight children. Two of his daughters live in
53 the district of Chiure, over 150 km from Pemba. One of them married and moved to Chiure with her
54
55 young sister to relieve her father of family care duties by reducing the number of ‘mouths to feed.’
56
57
The burdens of living in the City of Pemba are worse for women (and children). They struggle to find jobs
58
59 and resume their activities before being forced to flee, move and even marry again. For example, I spoke
60 with a 43-year-old woman, from the district of Quissanga. She moved to Mocimboa da Praia during the
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4 2000s, where ‘the war found her family.’ While describing how she survived from 2019 up to now, she
5
6 said that her husband abandoned her and their children after their arrival in Pemba. Those women who
7 come without their husbands or those who are living in her condition are threatened with stigma by
8 men in Pemba:
9
10
11 “we cannot have a romantic affair with these women because they are IPSs. They are
12
13
not from Pemba” (female interviewee)
14
15 The impact of these struggles reflects on the coping strategies. Children are highly involved in child
16
17 labour and child marriage. Informal conversation with local authorities in the neighborhoods has
18 confirmed that they are involved in small businesses to feed themselves. Most of them work in informal
19 settings (markets, roads, and more) on behalf of their parents, relatives, and host families to obtain
20
21 some money and food for themselves or to pay for their living costs. During the interview with the 43-
22 year-old woman, she said:
23 “to have no idea if her girl (is 13-years old) is dating or going out with someone, but
24
25 she is the one running the family small business of cowpea beans, boiled banana and
26 cassava down the road” (female interviewee)
27
28
29 Child labour cannot be seen as not a direct consequence of conflict, climate, and displacement, but
30 these events have worsened the phenomena. However, reports from the government have confirmed
31
32 that natural disasters, conflict, and violence in Cabo Delgado, the armed attacks in the center and the
33 Covid-19 pandemic have hastened the entry into child employment of more than one million children
34 across the country. In addition, one of our key-informant confirmed the rising cases of child labour in
35
36 the market and roads, with the flux of displaced people in the city. Lack of livelihood options and limited
37 access to income-generating activities often make the displaced struggle to provide for those who might
38 have survived extreme violence or contribute with sharing food and shelter costs. This is the same for
39
40 the host community. For example, a 70-year-old woman, head of household, said:
41 “I cannot say if these changed my life in this or that manner – it is hard to say. But have to share
42
what we have here in-house to eat. We used to use 25kg of rice per month, now that serves only for
43
44 one week…” (female interviewee)
45
46
47 Furthermore, the burden is the same for men. For example, a 43-year-old man who is hosting the entire
48 family of his brother-in-law questioned:
49 “what I was supposed to do, abandon my brother-in-law? By doing this I would be abandoning my
50
51 own family. So, now we have to eat what we have … and it is only maize that we have here” (male
52 interviewee)
53
54
55 While displaced in an urban environment, the displaced endure and are normally prone to risks, which
56 can include loss of assets, inability to access secure housing, limited social network, separation from
57
family members, problems with documentation and poor access to services available, prostitution:
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4 “where do i have money? If you're lucky here, there are men who usually look at me and say they
5
6 want me and then they give me 100 mtn in exchange, as we have food here, I go in. With the
7 money I buy matapa (a type of vegetable), peanuts to put in the matapa and the 20 meticais I
8 leave to buy water. Ahh… I couldn't make it today, I go to my sister's house to ask for help and
9
10 she has been giving me water to wash clothes and shower... no, to find a man who likes me,
11 since man and woman are food, so find him, give me money so I can buy fish and water. I don't
12
13
have help from my family, if I want dry cassava, it's that lady who gives it to me, and I thank her,
14 she's the only one who helps me” (female interviewee)
15
16
17 In this context, the main objective of humanitarian action shall be to preserve or restore the ability of
18 households or communities to meet their essential needs. One of our key-informant stated that this
19 shift towards encouraging resilience demands alternative management and practices that facilitate
20
21 effective transition to durable and sustainable solutions. Proactive support and structures that consider
22 the affected populations’ experiences are needed, and these require an understanding of different
23 displaced resilience actions and displaced-led management approaches. These approaches can provide
24
25 vital information enabling supporting organizations to develop relevant programs that support the
26 displaced’ integration into local initiatives. Therefore, understanding the adopted management
27
28
processes would highlight factors supporting effective policies.
29
30 The fact that humanitarian funding is concentrated in rural (camps) settings suggests that the urban
31
32 displaced are seen as having greater livelihood prospects; and that they tend to have better access to
33 key social services and (economic) opportunities. The findings cannot confirm or deny these
34 assumptions. Nor can these findings state that the displaced in resettlement centers receive
35
36 more/better assistance than the urban displaced in Pemba. However, lacking aid assistance in urban
37 settings and almost all humanitarian actors interviewed not assisting the displaced in and around Pemba
38 can suggest that the displaced in resettlement centers receive more/better assistance than the urban
39
40 displaced in Pemba. Displaced people living in urban settings might have greater prospects in terms of
41 vulnerabilities but not in terms of livelihoods. Frequently, the urban displaced (originating from rural
42
areas) lack an urban skill set and cannot adapt to the urban labour market as there is limited access to
43
44 (training) opportunities. In urban settings, the assumption that displacement is a temporary condition
45 and that the displaced will return to their place of origin when the situation permits is not always the
46
47 case. The 78-year-old man we interviewed is already building his house – meaning he is settling in
48 around the city. However, it is important to underline that the will to remain in urban areas does not
49 necessarily indicate that the displaced have found durable solutions or sustainable conditions. This is
50
51 because they will not return. Conflict is perceived as the main threat to their lives and livelihood.
52
53 There are only a few options or available aid assistance for the urban displaced. Most of the
54
55 humanitarian actors only assisted in an urban setting at the peak of the flux of displacement in Pemba.
56 The assistance is concentrated at the district level, where the resettlement camps are located. It is
57 where the humanitarian funds are targeting aid due to the needs.
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4 ‘Where and when is home?’: place and the practices of un-'inhabitance'
5
6 Kabachnik (2010), in his article ‘Where and When is Home? ...’, identifies ‘home as a journey.’ This
7 implies that ‘home’ has multiple of meanings beyond those anchored in ‘house’, I argue. In a portrait of
8 Cresswell (2009: 5), in an ideal world, ‘home-place is a center of meaning and field of care – where we
9
10 feel safe, secure, and loved. This suggests that home can be anywhere if it manifests self-and-shared
11 meanings. Furthermore, I believe home situates us in a place, time or culture (Rodman, 1992). However,
12
13
my problem is, as I point out, to accept that culture shall be used to sustain the essentialist idea of a
14 natural relationship between people and places albeit its importance. Therefore, I would stand with
15 Kibread (1999) and argue that this assertation ‘has no objective existence outside the minds of its
16
17 proponents’.
18 There have been changes in the volume of investment in Cabo Delgado. It became a more industrialized
19 province, raising the cost of living which brought a different concept and relation with ‘money’. It may
20
21 have meant even less immediate and full relationships with place insofar. The industrialization of that
22 province (resulting from the expansion of natural and mineral exploitation) fragmented people’s time-
23 space relations, as they retained less local control over their physical and social landscapes. For people
24
25 who lived in Palma, development-related displacement meant ‘selling’ their land and being subjected to
26 a reallocation in a different space, where all of them were ‘forced’ to re-construct their lives:
27
28
economically, socially, culturally, relationally and practically. It meant that they were ‘forced’ to choose
29 between culture and the need for ‘money.’ Suppose we accept that ‘places are not inert containers.
30 They are politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and multiple constructions’ (Rodman,
31
32 1992, p. 641), which means that any space can gain the meanings of place – from the experiences lived
33 in time, routes, social and economic relations within a given space. As strongly appointed by Cresswell
34 (2009, p. 2), ‘space becomes a place when it is used and lived. Experience is at the heart of what place
35
36 means; places are continuously enacted as people go about their everyday lives: going to work, doing
37 their shopping, spending leisure time, and hanging out on street corners. The sense I get of a place is
38 heavily dependent on practice and, particularly, the reiteration of practice on a regular basis.’
39
40 Emphasis is on the agency of individuals and forces beyond individual control, such as enabling
41 environmental policies. In the words of Rodman (1992: 644), ‘it is time to recognize that places … are
42
local and multiple. For each inhabitant, a place has a unique reality, one in which meaning is shared with
43
44 other people and places.’ For the displaced from Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Palma, the city of
45 Pemba can have the meanings of their own place (as it had, for some, before they moved to those
46
47 districts), given a unique reality, if the policies are enabling to local integration.
48 It would be arrogant and naive to assume that places exist only as inert locations or houses. As
49 researchers, we have the obligation to discuss solutions. Rejecting the idea of ‘natural place’ does not
50
51 mean cutting one’s cultural ties with their places of origin, or where they end up giving sense of place.
52 On the contrary, we cannot deny fragments of a sustained nostalgia of the feelings and emotions a place
53 evokes. These meanings can be individual, or they can be shared - based on mediation and
54
55 representation. Nevertheless, ‘while meanings are shared, they are never fixed once and for all, and
56 always open to counter meanings produced through other representations’ (Cresswell, 2009, p. 2).
57
These representations are the results of practice and construction (place). ‘People do things in place.
58
59 What they do, in part, is responsible for the meanings that a place might have’ (ibid).
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4 Contrary to what Kibreab asserts, denying the importance of territorially based identity as critical to
5
6 human well-being makes sense. Not, of course, to deny its importance, but to position as Allen and
7 Turton (1996 as cited in Kibreab) postulates that the 'primary concern' of the displaced populations in
8 poor countries, particularly those affected by conflict, 'is to find a relatively secure space in which to
9
10 begin working towards rebuilding their life, often irrespective of where they located to. The sense of
11 attachment is determined by needs, such as security and access to means of livelihood.
12
13
In Cabo Delgado, people flee from North to South within their own borders. Some were resettled in
14 Nampula province (because the vast majority were from the districts of that province but migrated to
15 the islands), that culturally and ethnically does not sustain a distinct territorial location. However, I
16
17 cannot avoid standing with Kibread (1999: 404), affirming that ‘how people feel about their place of
18 habitual residence is also inextricably linked with the cause of displacement.’ If those who, twenty years
19 ago, moved to the islands (voluntarily) and found ‘(un)territorialized places’ that were readily available
20
21 for establishment without unfolding social conflicts, there was no reason to return (to Pemba, Nacala,
22 etc). However, in this case, conflict forced them to flee – abandoning their place of origin against their
23 will. To move to Pemba, where they cannot claim entitlement of land, or access to means of livelihood,
24
25 ‘the desire to return to one's place of origin is invariably powerful.’ It is not surprising, therefore, that
26 they perceived their displacement as temporary and their ability to return to their homelands as a
27
28
success. The yearning to return home, again perhaps not surprisingly, is also stronger where the
29 displaced cannot engage in economic activities, as Kibread stated and continued affirming that ‘the key
30 variable which determines how people perceive displacement and return to places or countries of origin
31
32 is dependent, on the one hand, on the conditions under which they leave their places of origin; and, on
33 the other, on the treatment they receive and opportunities existing at the destination.’ When the
34 displaced are treated on equal footing with the host or at least found an enabling ecosystem to
35
36 integrate into ‘imagined communities,’ return is not per se an option. But contrarily, it is rather a means
37 to an end, i.e., a ‘means of ridding oneself of spatial confinement, enabling opportunities by being
38 spatially anchored’. (ibid)
39
40 This one 32-year-old man went back to Macomia to see the situation. Although he believes that it is not
41 safe to live either in Pemba, from that one visit, he said that he is not convinced to return:
42
“I went in January of this year, I went to see the environment itself so far, [it] still haven't
43
44 convinced myself to go back... I went there, I was going to fence the place where I had
45 my house, I did it so that the space wouldn't [been took] away... that I can't say because
46
47 it even depends on the situation, if things go down, I'll intend to go back home, but if
48 they don't go down, I'd rather stay here because running with kids isn't easy... it's not
49 safe, it's not safe here [in Pemba], but hey, it's a little safe because it's not like there.
50
51 You've seen it once, so I don't say it's safe here but hey, I intend to stay here" (male
52 interviewee)
53
54
55 Some are willing to return but feel uncertain about how their lives will be when they return.
56
57
“I would like to go back to Mocimboa but I don't know where to stay, when I go back
58
59 there. I'll have difficulties where to live and what to live with. My grandmother lost her
60 life many years ago, my mother lived with her aunt (mother's older sister) and even her
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4 aunt lost her life, my mother doesn't know where she is, so even though I want to go
5
6 back to Mocimboa who will I stay with?” (male interviewee)
7
8 He has no job but said that he has sold a piece of his family’s land (for 80 000 meticais, around $1.350)
9
10 and is now building their new house:
11 “I will not go back to Mocimboa, while the Government does not give them guarantee
12
13
that the violence is over, clearly over” (male interviewee)
14
15 The lack of humanitarian funds and economic opportunities for the displaced in and around the city of
16
17 Pemba leaves the displaced with few options for coping strategies. Some of these options include
18 returning to their place of origin to access means of livelihood (agriculture and fisheries) and putting
19 themselves at risk. I could confirm with a few interviewees, but most of them have never even visited
20
21 their house or machamba since they left. One of our key informants stated:
22 “… for example, for extractive activities such as fishing, there are many people who are
23 leaving … going to Macomia, Quissanga, they fish for a few days, they stay hidden there
24
25 [and then] they come back here… that somehow guarantees that the family is safe,
26 children, wife, mother-in-law, cousin … In other words, he is taking the risk of looking for
27
28
money in his traditional sources. In the case of agriculture, it is a little different because
29 it has other temporary implications, but extractive activities such as fishing, people go
30 fishing, go to Quissanga or Macomia, fish and return” (extract from key-informant)
31
32
33 Historically, people in Cabo Delgado are used to these mobilities to find and exploit livelihood
34 opportunities. These mobilities express the linkages between internal migration and livelihoods and are
35
36 one of the embedded mechanisms that guide violence and climate-related displacement.
37 “… this is the reason why, first, their homes are precarious. Because they knew positively
38 that for an average of ten years they would have to move to another place. So, it
39
40 conditions a lot of hat we now call livelihoods, isn't it? The livelihoods in a traditional
41 historical way. Internal migrations from different areas of the province because of these
42
elements and others that came later, such as cotton policies, taxes, forced labor and
43
44 after that during practically everything is first the twentieth century as I said conditioned
45 the sedentarization of the population. then they saw other factors came the war to the
46
47 armed struggle and national liberation which was another disruptive element that
48 promoted many movements then came the other important element that conditioned a
49 lot and even today its conditions that it is the policy of communal villages …” (extract
50
51 from key-informant)
52
53
54
55 In-auspicious policy environment for the displaced: where does the hope lie?
56 In his concept of ‘home, Kabachnik et al (2010, p. 316) asserts that it is built and influenced by displaced
57
living conditions and ‘furthermore, government policy and discourse play a significant role in helping to
58
59 shape and profoundly influence IDPs’ conceptions of home.’ This confirms that the discussion concerning
60 the displaced and displacement solutions has come to terms with the importance of environmental
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4 policy. The existing international instruments and solutions relating to displacement are threefold:
5
6 return, local integration (where the displaced take refuge) and integration (in a third party of the
7 country). Similar solutions are grounded in refugees’ sustainable solutions. Of course, neither of these
8 three solutions has primacy over the other. But in practice, (voluntary) return whenever feasible is the
9
10 most desirable solution, particularly for the displaced (and refugees). This is important because it still
11 favors the displaced ‘choice’. But which choice and at what cost? i.e., what are the factors or how do the
12
13
existing factors influence these choices?
14 The vulnerability of Mozambique to disaster, the impact of Covid-19, and the escalating conflict
15 hastened the government’s efforts to build a concise disaster risk management framework. In 2020, a
16
17 new Law (Lei 10/2020) was approved to re-establish the legal regime for disaster risk management and
18 reduction, comprising the following sectors: risk reduction, disaster management, sustainable recovery
19 for the construction of human, infrastructural, and ecosystem resilience, as well as the adaptation to
20
21 climate change. However, the actions and provisions relating to displacement were barely mentioned.
22 But this is because, I assume, a displacement-specific instrument was being developed by the
23 government, with strong technical support from international Non-Government Organizations (NRC and
24
25 Oxfam South Africa) and UN agencies (UNHCR and IOM) using a consortium-based approach. In August
26 2021, the government of Mozambique approved the national Policy and Strategy for Internal
27
28
Displacement Management (PSiDM). Considering the main preparedness and preventions actions under
29 the Law (prohibition of inhabitants to fix them in risk zones), it can be concluded that for the case of
30 displacement, inter alia, the major considerations underlying this instrument to the provisions to
31
32 displaced include return and possibilities of spontaneous integration. Nevertheless, because the country
33 did not have a proper displacement instrument, these reception strategies usually included herding the
34 displaced in spatial resettlement sites with minimum opportunities for social and economic interaction
35
36 with their host. Their social lives are in danger due to the failure of economic structure and lack of
37 resources (to be shared between the displaced and host). In countries where such institutional,
38 structural, and attitudinal barriers constrain incorporation or integration of the displaced into host
39
40 societies, for the displaced, the only solution to the displacement problem lies in (voluntary) return -
41 where displaced would, whenever possible, inter alia, ‘reacquire’ their livelihood, including cultural
42
related. However, this solution is neither ‘a priority’ nor the best solution under all conflict
43
44 circumstances, because the institutional, structural and attitudinal constitute a barrier to the safe return
45 of the displaced, permanently.
46
47 In practice, it would be no surprise if rarely the government of Mozambique promote returning,
48 particularly for economic and political reasons. For example, freeing Palma and Mocimboa da Praia from
49 peasants’ settlements would benefit the province and country economically, by maximizing gas
50
51 exploitation. However, this development-induced displacement and resettlement shall be economic and
52 human-right based. I hereto further propound that because of this country' need and government
53 practice, the solutions to the displacement challenges conceptualize (voluntary) return only if reflects
54
55 the choice of displaced. Only when they choose to be re-rooted in the places of their origin, to ease their
56 choices of returning. The corollary of this argument is that if the economic conditions existed,
57
(voluntary) returning would not have been prioritized (Warner in Kibread, 1999) or would not even be
58
59 considered a solution to - displacement, because people have no need to belong to territorially
60 anchored communities or societies (ibid), but to be settled where there are livelihood opportunities that
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4 reflect, at least, their old lives or better off. Particularly in industrialized societies where there is a new
5
6 concept, practice and materialization of investment and money. For these societies, assuming the
7 existence of a natural connection between place and people equate to making no attempts to question
8 the relevance of other factors to the reality of being displaced, especially those who live in (or flee) a
9
10 conflict zone.
11 As discussed above, regarding displaced populations and returnees, the solutions concerning the two-
12
13
behavior tendency are greatly influenced by the idea of defendants of an ‘existent of a natural
14 connection between place and people.’ My argument is to emphasize how this discussion neglects the
15 policy environment that displaced people are part of, and their livelihood opportunities, to ‘culture –
16
17 which I located as less important, in these ‘post-modern days’. Because of diminishing resources,
18 income-generating opportunities and problems of unemployment, host populations are becoming
19 increasingly hostile to displaced people. Most displaced people see no future for themselves or their
20
21 children in these host societies or resettlement camps. This is common either in the case of disaster
22 (including conflict) or development-induced displacement. In the words of Anderson (1983 cited by
23 Kibread, 1999), the displaced do not 'imagine' themselves as part of the host societies. They make every
24
25 effort not only to maintain and develop their collective identities and transmit them to their children but
26 also to eliminate the factors that prompted their displacement so that they can return to their place of
27
28
origin in safety and dignity (Kibread, 1999). Instead of working to develop roots in the ‘new place’, their
29 aim becomes to return to their origin, from where they were forcibly uprooted (Ibid). The hopes to
30 change this thinking and practice lies in the Policy and Strategy instrument. It starts by defining
31
32 institutional coordination and management of displacement and by tasking each humanitarian actor
33 (public, private, and non-government) with their specific responsibilities to tackle displacement in a
34 manner that facilitates or acknowledges safe, dignified and durable solutions to displacement, including
35
36 return. As stated in many global standard legal instruments (e.g., in Kampala Convention), this
37 instrument also recognizes the vital role of the displaced and their host in responding to internal
38 displacement, including protection. It adopts an integrative approach via an ecosystem of knowledge
39
40 and actions.
41
42
43
44 Conclusion
45 To conclude, displaced people in Pemba intended to be temporary but are becoming permanent for the
46
47 vast majority – while the fear of war prevails. In their attempt to encounter sustainable livelihood, the
48 displaced are living in a situation of revolving doors, where they are able to cope but unable to adapt.
49 Their main attempts to adapt end in the same circle – relying on humanitarian aid to service. This is
50
51 derived from a failed economic integration. Often, it is expected that the displaced would return to their
52 place of origin because of the assumption that there are ‘natural’ places from which people derive their
53 identity. The study in Pemba shows that the displaced started to involve themselves in ‘home-practicing’
54
55 and settling due to fear for their lives. For the vast majority, the harsh economic environmental
56 constitute an impediment. Mapping particular meanings, practices, and identities to place shall help us
57
explore how places and their associated meanings have been implicated in processes of exclusion, thus,
58
59 changing the lives of the increasingly displaced people. Inerting place and people’s experience
60 throughout the course of displacement equate to limiting one’s ability to rebuild their lives in a safes
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4 pace or place. We shall no longer privilege our vantage point. The place is constructed in experience. In
5
6 context, such as Cabo Delgado, place should be seen in varying degrees, i.e., place is an economically
7 constructed product of others 'interests and as mnemonics of others' experiences.
8
9
10
11
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