International Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology

“... it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of urban displaced in
Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.
--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:

Full Title: “... it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of urban displaced in
Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.

Article Type: Original paper

Funding Information:

Abstract: At the time of the writing (October 2022), five years had passed since extreme and
unending violence erupted in Cabo Delgado province, and was unfolding to all
provinces of the northern region, forcing nearly 1 million people to flee. While official
reports and (political) discourses were calling to safety return, discouraging people
from returning to some towns (e.g., Mocimboa da Praia) and urging or appealing for
them to wait a little longer and be a little patience patient, it was reported that about
13,000 people had returned, as of July (ACLEID, 2022). But some urban displaced
people were reluctant to risk their lives by returning. This two-behaviour tendency is
and will continue to be the main characteristic of returning and reconstruction,
influencing the outcomes of the government’ reconstruction plans and the lives of
displaced. The obvious, but, yet not much explored quest is why and what are the
particularities influencing the trends of return.

Corresponding Author: Nelson Tivane, Master

Norwegian Refugee Council
Maputo, Mozambique MOZAMBIQUE

Corresponding Author E-Mail: tivanen@gmail.com

Corresponding Author Secondary

Information:

Corresponding Author's Institution: Norwegian Refugee Council

Corresponding Author's Secondary

Institution:

First Author: Nelson Tivane, Master

First Author Secondary Information:

Order of Authors: Nelson Tivane, Master

Order of Authors Secondary Information:

Suggested Reviewers: Gaye Thompson, PhD

Director, SCDS
gaye.thompson@scdshub.com
She has provided one of the first discussion on my master proposal

Stephan Van Wyk, PhD

Head of Dept, UNISA: University of South Africa
vawykjs@unisa.ac.za
He is my co-supersior

Opposed Reviewers:

Additional Information:

Question Response

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Title Page

“… it’s not a place of our own, but a safe ground”: the experience of
urban displaced in Pemba, Cabo Delgado province.

Nelson Tivane

Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of South Africa

98502: Master of Arts in Anthropology (specialization: place and place)
Supervisor: Dr G. Sauti
Co-supervisor: Mr JS Van Wyk
October 2022

Autor Note
Nelson Tivane works as Policy Specialist on Displacement in Mozambique and Southern Africa.
Correspondence concerning this article shall be addressed to Mr. Nelson Tivane, at Sommerschield. Street
Comandante Aurelio Manave, Nr 189, 1st Floor. Maputo. Mozambique.
Email: tivanen@gmail.com

Authors’ contributions. Nelson Tivane has the only authorship of this article. The author read and approved the
final manuscript.

Funding. I would like to thank for the output from the Overseas Development Institute’ (ODI) research project,
commissioned to CCS Social Research and Consulting, Lda – to conducted field semi-structured interviews with
displaced and their host in and around the city of Pemba.

Availability of data and materials Not applicable.

Ethics approval and consent to participate Not applicable.
Consent for publication The author approves the translation and publication.
Competing interests The author declares that he does not have competing interests.

Acknowledgements I would like to extend thanks to Drs. Anthony Roland Brouwer, S. Gaye Thompson, Gloria
Sauti, Stephan Van Wyk and Jeanne Marie Penvenne for their critical reading and valuable guides.
Blinded Manuscript Click here to view linked References

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9 At the time of the writing (October 2022), five years had passed since extreme and unending
10
11 violence erupted in Cabo Delgado province, and was unfolding to all provinces of the northern
12 region, forcing nearly 1 million people to flee. While official reports and (political) discourses
13 were calling to safety return, discouraging people from returning to some towns (e.g.,
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Mocimboa da Praia) and urging or appealing for them to wait a little longer and be a little
15
16 patience patient, it was reported that about 13,000 people had returned, as of July (ACLEID,
17 2022). But some urban displaced people were reluctant to risk their lives by returning. This
18 two-behaviour tendency is and will continue to be the main characteristic of returning and
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20 reconstruction, influencing the outcomes of the government’ reconstruction plans and the lives
21 of displaced. The obvious, but, yet not much explored quest is why and what are the
22 particularities influencing the trends of return. Authors and academists in Mozambique have
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stayed apart from the increasing interest and debate concerning the relationship between
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25 people and place (Kibreab, 1999) in a context of displacement, but some have easily argued
26 that the drivers to return are various factors exerting multiple points of pressure on households
27 (Borges Coelho, 1993; Williams, 2010), particularly when these (returnees) lack cultural
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29 bonds or other ties to “new” places. My initial research position is in agreement with Brun
30 (2001). It considers that culture is not rooted or anchored to places, but along routes.
31 Predominantly, the social relations are made, not given. Cultural ties and social relations make
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sense when viewed in context. In the context of conflict-related displacement, I suggest
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34 leaving culture (reflexivity again) bit out, and closely look at the (socioeconomic) experiences
35 people have developed and carried with them through their displacement (and return)
36 narratives, as the main factors influencing the decision to or not to return. This paper argues
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38 that displaced people perceive and place the ‘risk of life’ as central to their decision-making
39 regarding return. The weight of their frustrated socioeconomic aspirations forces them to
40 return to their place of origin – not to resettle in first place, but to assess safety and sustain
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their decisions and possibilities to return. The corollary of this assertation is that, where
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43 conflict persist but institutional, economic structural, security and safety, and host attitude
44 create an enabling environmental for socioeconomic integration of displaced, returning would
45 not even be considered as a possibility or option.
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48 Keywords: space, place, displacement, decision-making and return
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50 Abbreviations
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52
DTM. Displacement Tracking Matrix
53 INGD. National Disaster Management Institute
54 IOM. International Organization for Migration
55 INE. Instituto Nacional de Estatística
56 FDI. Foreign direct investment
57 FRELIMO. Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
58 GPC. Global Protection Cluster and
59 ODI. Overseas Development Institute
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4 NRC. Norwegian Refugee Council
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9 Background for this study
10 In the last 5 years, the Mozambique’s north-eastern province of Cabo Delgado has been inflicted to natural
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12 disasters and armed conflict. The violence and conflict have unfolded to date. The nature and root of the conflict
13 and its respective consequences have been widely documented (Feijó & Maquenzi, 2019; Feijó, 2021; Hanlon,
14 2021; Feijó, Maquenzi & Balane, 2022;). Some of these roots (e.g., poverty, ethnicity and religion) were
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confirmed during the field work. Locals explained that the economic changes, the political marginalization and
17 exclusion led to grievances. Due to lack of inclusion of local processes and mechanisms for negotiations and
18 mediation, these grievances were expressed in attacks that escalated into violent conflict. In 2019, while the
19 conflict was escalating, the province was hit by a massive cyclone – the tropical cyclone Kenneth. The eye of the
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21 storm hit the districts of Ibo, Quissanga and Macomia. The outer smaller islands were severely struck and suffered
22 from major destruction on their precarious infrastructures. Field crops, fishing boats and fishing equipment were
23 lost or partially damaged. While some people had managed to harvest some amounts of food before the cyclone,
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most crops and stocks were damaged, destroyed or lost. In many of the Kenneth affected areas in Cabo Delgado,
26 food security outcomes worsened. More than 60,000 families were affected, many of them women-headed
27 households. Mercifully, the recent (2020 and 2021) rain seasons have not produced anything on the scale of
28 Cyclone Kenneth, but as climate change increases the intensity and frequency of storms, Cabo Delgado will soon
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30 experience major weather event. These events tend to force massive amounts of people to flee and find temporary
31 refuge. The latest reports estimate that due to this weather event, about 18,029 people were displaced and
32 sheltered in accommodation centers, according to the National Disaster Management Institute (INGC). It also
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bears noting that in some locations the population were already displaced from internal conflict. Thus, subjected
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35 to risks of second or third displacement.
36 In the course of the 2021, violent attacks were increasing in numbers and locations, with attacks in the districts of
37 Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia and Palma. It is argued that significant numbers of (young) people were joining the
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39 extremist armed groups, either to protest against increased poverty and sharply increased inequality (Hanlon,
40 2021) or to revenge for old quarrel and practice gangsterism acts (Decker and David, 2012). These types of
41 banditism act were summed up by a displaced female:
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“when we left Mocímboa, we came in a very large boat, but the owner of the boat did not
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44 arrive with us here because he was killed in the middle of the sea. The owner had a daughter
45 who had previously been engaged to one of these men in the village and later he denied this
46 engagement … They were from there but when she saw the way they were dressed, he
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48 thought it was not good and decided not to give her daughter to that person…. and cost his
49 life when he tried arriving in the city of Pemba… They killed right there, cut the neck and
50 told us to continue the trip if we had someone who knew how to ride a boat. We were told to
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report that the person had been killed by them” (female interviewee)
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54 The protest against poverty and inequality is often linked with economic and investment growth. The amounts
55 mentioned in Foreign direct investment (FDI) are gigantic, but there seems to be no nexus - at least until today -
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57 between the amount and the prevalence of poverty in the province. For instance, according to TotalEnergies
58 (2022, April 24), in 2019, over $20 billions FDI were invested in the Province for natural resource exploitation by
59 the TotalEnergies. That could lead to profits of more than $60 billions, in the medium-term, according to
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4 government estimates as well as projections by investors. But with violence and conflict expanding and attacks in
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6 districts where most of these investments are located, almost all were interrupted and withdrawn; and poverty
7 persists. The last two Surveys to the Budget of Families (IOF)1 have shown a trend of increasing consumption
8 poverty rate in the province of Cabo Delgado, where it reaches 44.8% (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2019). There are
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other dimensions of these roots, such as frustration of expectations. It is largely argued that aspirations of jobs,
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11 access to schools and hospitals have failed to materialize. The implementation of investment dragged on for years
12 with periods of absence of reliable and timely information, upsetting the expectations of the population and
13 creating grievance (Hanlon, 2021). Hanlon adds that these grievances began to sustain local fundamentalist
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15 preachers, who began to argue that the economic problems in Cabo Delgado were due to a corrupt form of Islam,
16 and that only sharia law2 would bring equity and a fairer share of the province’s wealth. As of June 2022, violence
17 and conflict were up sevenfold, escalating to southern of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula (Hanlon, 2022). It is
18 estimated that conflict alone forced over 900 thousand people to flee to safe zones, in and outside of Cabo
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20 Delgado. The vast majority of these Internally Displaced Persons (Displaced) are women and children. Around
21 71.1% of Displaced are in houses of their relatives, acquaintances and in rented houses, 21.5% in resettlement
22 neighbourhoods and 7.3% in accommodation Centres (UNICEF, 2022).
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25 Methodology of the study
26 In June 2022, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) hired CCS Social Research and Consulting, Lda to
27 conduct field semi-structured interviews with displaced and their host in and around the city of Pemba. Those
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29 interviews were to build a paper, which is ‘part of a two-year, multi-country research project that seeks to build
30 evidence and raise awareness of the myriad ways in which displaced people cope with their displacement’. The
31 ODI research is expected to create an entry point to support communities affected by displacement in ways that
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33 reflect their lived experiences, personal preferences and future aspirations. I used the unused part of these
34 interviews to build the case for this article. In words of a close friend of mine, I ‘let displaced people speak’. The
35 objective of these interviews was to gather in-person and direct lived experience from displaced people and their
36 host, throughout the course of displacement. A total of 35 displaced, 5 host families were conducted with
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38 respondents residing across different neighbourhoods in Pemba (see table 1), who fled from the districts of
39 Mocimboa da Praia, Palma, Macomia, Muidume and Quissanga (see fig. 1)
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42 Table 1: Summary of the number of interviewees and district of origin
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44 Neighbourhood # of interviewees District of origin
45 Mahate 6 City of Pemba, Mocimboa da Praia, Macomia, Palma
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47 and Muidumbe
48 Natite 5 Muidumbe, Quissanga and Mocimboa da Praia
49 Chuiba 8 Macomia, Mocimboa da praia and Muidumbe
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51 Muxara 7 Quissanga, Mocimaboa da Praia and Palma
52 Paquitequete 14 City of Pemba, Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and
53 Quissanga
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56 Household Budget Survey, 2019/2020 & 2008/2009
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Sharia law is a religious law derived from the precepts of Islam, particularly the Koran and the Hadith. The fundamentalists
58 who lead the insurgency are Koranists who do not accept the Hadith and other Islamic precepts. Their version of Sharia law
59 is different from that of other Cabo Delgado Muslims. In general, the Islamic approach has been to foster a society based on
60 generosity and cooperation, values which are antithetical to greed, while accepting a free market economy (Hanlon, 2021)
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6 These interviewees were added to 4 key-informants’ interviews (KII) conducted. These data were supplemented
7 with other information collected through observation on the ground, informal discussion with leaders of the
8 bairros (neighbourhood) and secondary data from different literature and reports.
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Fig. 1 Cabo Delgado. Recorded movement and origin of displaced in Pemba, according to our interviews. Creation date: 03 November
2022 | Created by: Nickson Rafael Amos | Source base: DTM – IOM. ‘The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names, and related
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data shown on maps are not warranted to be error free nor do they imply judgment on the legal status of any territory, endorsement or
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acceptance of such boundaries by the author’.
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4 Government reports regarding conflict and violence, climate and displacement were also used. It was expected
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6 that 10 KII would be conducted, but only in 4 cases it was possible to make an appointment with the selected
7 informants. More than five requests for interviews were not responded. As for urban Displaced and host families,
8 respondents were identified through purposive and snowballing techniques.
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11 Displaced and memories of displacement: a perspective from urban displaced in Pemba
12 The volatile situation of security has increased the number of displacements. The exact figures are hard to come
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14 by and remain contested, but IOM (2022) states that over 950,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced,
15 by the conflict alone. In June 2022, IOM/DTM estimated that some 12,364 new displaced people arrived in
16 Pemba, adding to the existing caseload of 139,566 Displaced, to found refuge. From our sample of interviews, the
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vast majority of them are women (head of household). They have their own views on the origins of this gender
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19 imbalance. Some women whose husbands are not with them believe that they were either killed, detained, or
20 joined the insurgency. As of the percentage children, many women fled with 5 or 7 children. During our field data
21 collection for this study, we found situations of unaccompanied children who somehow have managed to escape
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23 the conflict and violence. They left their houses in search for safety. They live with adoptive families. These
24 children as well as adults are subjected to hosting contribution, whether in money, work or food for daily living
25 onus.
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“…if you have seventy percent of the population stuck in someone else's house, if a cousin from
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28 Mocímboa comes to you with the whole family, the first month is satisfied, the second month starts to feel
29 strange, the third month you are already saying, ‘look cousin, here we have to organize ourselves’. This
30 means that in some way the social networks of hosts have a support capacity… So, attacking these types
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32 of issues of how to facilitate not only the arrival, which is what the emergency at this moment facilitates,
33 right?” (extract from key-informant)
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These contributions started to be demanded after 3 or 4 months of them living at a host. One of our interviewees
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37 explained that the high cost of living in Pemba and limited sources of livelihoods restrict the willingness of host
38 families to absorb more displaced, and for longer periods.
39 Cabo Delgado is the second largest populated province in Mozambique (INE, 2017). According to data from the
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41 Living Cost Organization, the price of the city costs in Pemba is 5.8 times more than the average salary. Most of
42 displaced have arrived in boat, bus, foot, or by airplane (in some cases). Those who have arrived by bus are the
43 one who walked long distance; and there could not bring anything with them. Some have had two or three stops in
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different districts or villages, either to get to Pemba city or to find transport (boat or car) to the city of Pemba.
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46 Some of people had to walk for miles to a place where they could find boat to take then to villages where they
47 could find vehicle for transportation. Vulnerable groups, such as elderly, people with disabilities and children
48 have struggled the most while fleeing and walking. Many of interviewees reported opportunistic charging of
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50 transport fees. The tariff of private operators raised from 50 meticais ($0.7) to 1000 meticais ($15.5) for a single
51 person, including children. We asked to a 46 years old man if anyone from his group or anything stayed behind
52 when they fled. He said:
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“it was a difficult situation. Very difficult. Then, the transporters were charging a lot of money … we used
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55 to pay 200 mtn (over $3) to come to here in the city. But they started to charge 350 mtn, 900 mtn… They
56 raised the price, doubled it. It was hard. We did not even manage to bring anything. It was difficult. When
57 they enter in a village, it is difficult to take anything. What you can take is what you are waring. We knew
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59 that they are coming. They were burning other villages in the neighbourhood, and [using] the telephones,
60 they were telling us ‘they are coming, they say now go to that village, there was a school there… 4 pm – 5
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4 pm, they were entering the village to burn the school and then they came to the headquarter of the
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6 village….” (male interviewee)
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8 Another interviewee stated:
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“…after I was there, after that situation, after these bandits entered Palma, we left Palma, when it was 4
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11 pm … on March 24th and we passed in some villages and other villages I don't even remember the names,
12 there is a village called Quionga, Kiuia, we passed all these villages and went to an island that is in
13 Palma called Suavo. We stayed there for three days, so, after spending these days in Suavo, we had to
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15 arrange mechanisms on how to leave Suavo to stand out in Tanzania and we turn here to our country.
16 Then we left Suavo, we went back to the village called Quionga again, there we went with these sailing
17 boats, we get off from Quionga to the Tanzania-Mozambique border … which I don't how is called and
18 where – but already on the border…” (male interviewee)
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21 According to our interviewees, the decision to leave the islands and other attacked districts was driven by the
22 circumstances. In districts where information about planned attacks came early, there are households whose
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24 decision were discussed within the family. This included to decide to where they would move to. In districts or
25 villages were the attacks came by surprise, during the middle nights or in the daily light, decision was moved by
26 the circumstances and these households have tried to safe whatever they could:
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29 “… my mother always told us a story [about] war is like that. It's like that on the day they enter here you
30 can't think of taking something that can serve you, what you can do is just look for where your children
31 are. Take them. Because children and household goods, as you have life, you can have that there, but
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33 children are difficult to have. So, what should you do, that day when these people come in, you have to
34 take your children and leave the rest, if you have life (you are alive), you will achieve everything with the
35 passage of time. In fact, on that day there, I only managed to leave with my wallet, my wallet and my
36 documents and that was it. I collected the children, we left that house around 5:00 am when the shooting
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38 started, from there it was every man for himself and God for all, we couldn't take off any clothes, or bed,
39 or anything…” (male interviewee)
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“… Unfortunately, nothing, apart from, at least for me, I managed to leave with my documents only, only
43 documents, my BI, my school certificate, all this I managed to recover only and my agent card and like
44 my phone, only. And if that's all that was inside, clothes, I came here with no clothes with nothing” (male
45 interviewee)
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48 During an interview with a local authority of one of the neighbourhoods where this research took place, he
49 affirmed that for those who came to the city of Pemba, that was their final destination. When the Mocímboa da
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Praia, Macomia and Palma’ attacks happened, the vast majority of displaced found refuge in Pemba and Nacala.
52 People knew where they could flee to, and why. These people are those who migrated to the islands to build their
53 lives twenty or thirty years ago. They have families, relatives or acquittances in Pemba, who were born in or
54 around the city, or where born in the districts under attacks but moved to Pemba. There are families of relatives
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56 hosting more than 40 displaced in just one house. As stated by one of our informants:
57 “I used to live with my wife and my 3 children, now if I want to count with the owners of the house then I
58 don't know, because there are many people…” (male interviewee)
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4 Some of these displaced are people who moved from Pemba to the island in a search of job, in the 1990s and now
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6 were forced to return because of the violence. These mobility patterns and dynamics in the affected region were
7 confirmed by all of our interviewees, each with their particularities. There was this 74-years man, born around the
8 city of Pemba (in 1948), who moved from Pemba to Mueda (in 1982) to work, in a formal job as a mason. He
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was not able to be precise but said that he continued to work as mason during the civil war (Renamo and
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11 Frelimo), which found him in Muidumbe. They would move from village to build water pump systems in the
12 countryside. Then he moved to Mocímboa – where he got married and had 8 children. Some of his children went
13 to school around the city of Pemba. His family similar to many others in Mocimboa fled from conflict and
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15 violence. He lives in Pemba for two years now, in the same house he used to live before moving to Mueda. While
16 living in Mocimboa, he used to come to Pemba to visit family members, or when there was a situation of decease
17 and ceremony – but just for a week or less. He used also to practice agriculture. During the harvest, his family
18 from Pemba would go to Mocimboa to help him and bring goods to Pemba:
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20 “yes … when I went there, I used to work and practice agriculture. When [the time to] harvest
21 would come, I would call [the family] to come and help me with harvest. They then would bring
22 the food here [in Pemba]” (male interviewee)
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25 In the city of Pemba, there is a strong sense of social network and humanity. It is estimated that 71.1% are in
26 houses of relatives, acquaintances and in rented houses, 21.5% in resettlement neighbourhoods and 7.3% in
27 accommodation centres (UNICEF, 2022). Our interviewees are living in host families who are their families,
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29 relatives or acquaintances of those who they have fled with from conflict zones. Some have rented houses,
30 borrowed rooms or houses. Those who are borrowing house, they are also doing a service of security and care of
31 these houses. There are foreign business actors (from Tanzania) also giving their houses in the same terms –
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33 lending for security or charity. Local authorities in the neighbourhood are helping to identify empty or abandoned
34 house and host Displaced, particular in neighbourhood near to the cost.
35 “… I was born in Namage, Chirumba, Quissanga district. This war found me in Mocimboa da Praia, we
36 went to work, my husband was a fisherman... we fled and came to Pemba, we were received [here] on the
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38 beach by Mr. Luis Salimo, he gave us tea and porridge there on the beach. He received us and we stayed
39 for two weeks there on the beach, [and] there was a porch where people lived. Then a man named
40 Situmar took us to his house. As time passed, the man who was a mwanlimo diseased and after, the owner
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[his wife], because we didn't have the money to pay the rent of that house, we left that house, and we are
43 here … the owners live in the Bairro Expansão. They lent us so the house wouldn't be abandoned”
44 (female interviewee)
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47 In the city of Pemba all displaced live in urban or peri-urban setting - slums. With the exception of Paquitequete,
48 these slums emerged from and were once called communal village (aldeias comunais). They are a result of the
49 post-independence urbanization policy, and local structure of power still working and with huge influence in
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supporting displaced (re) building their social network, distribution of aid, identification of vulnerable groups.
52 Mozambique has a long history of resettlement where these local (structure of) authorities were used to the same
53 of different purpose – to support population resettled in communal villages to settle in new compounds,
54 distribution of local agriculture production, control of people movements, in the context of civil war, etc During
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56 the 1970s and 1980s, to rebuild the country’ economy, FRELIMO opted for the strategy to create communal
57 villages. The concept of communal villages emerged in 1975, in part as a reaction to the crisis in the countryside
58 in the immediate aftermath of the Portuguese settler exodus from Mozambique in 1974-1975. The first communal
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villages were created in Cabo Delgado, soon after independence. The province has a long history of migration and
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4 displacement or population mobility (Borges Coelho, 1993, Hall & Young, 1997). They have been conflict-
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6 induced displacement (aldeamento, liberated zones, etc), development-induced displacement (gas and tourism
7 development projects) and climate-induced displaced. The dynamic of population mobility in Cabo Delgado
8 reflects the dichotomy of practice and theory of development. These historic processes of human mobility result
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furthermore from a traumatic collective memory of forced or voluntary resettlement, invariably with negative
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11 effects on the local socio-economic structure.
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14 Displacement, Place and Livelihoods: discourses of a ‘revolving door’
15 While denying the deterritorialization of identity, as a result of the easy mobility in the era of globalization
16 process, Kibreab (1999: 407) uses the experiences of refugees to state that ‘in a place in which many rights such
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as equal treatment, access to sources of livelihoods, access to land, rights of freedom of movement and residence,
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19 are determined on the basis of territorially anchored identities, the identity people gain from their association with
20 a particular country is an indispensable instrument to a socially and economically fulfilling end…’. It is clear that
21 many of his arguments cannot be applied to those who are forced to flee, but do not cross border. In our case,
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23 these people usually do not even cross province or region, but districts. Here, these rights, e.g., access to sources
24 of livelihoods, land and equal treatment to opportunities are supposed to be equal, by law and policies. But, often,
25 there are not.
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In the slums of the city of Pemba, displaced people are living in between coping and adapting over the last three
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28 years. The long way from coping to adaptation is a situation of revolving doors. In their attempt to build a
29 sustainable source of livelihood, the vast majority of displaced ends on relying on assistance from humanitarian
30 actors, relatives (kinship), acquaintances and hosting neighbours. This is largely caused by on whether (i)
31
32 displaced are equipped (level of literacy, skills and other resource to acquire livelihoods) and willing to be
33 integrated or to 'imagine' themselves as being part of host societies; (ii) ‘host populations accept or 'imagine'
34 displaced as their own members’; and (iii) ‘the structural factors are favourable enough to enable displaced to
35 work towards self-sufficiency’ (Kibread, 1999: 389). The memories of fleeing war sustain the latter. Nobody
36
37 would return to violence or a place that brings memories of deaths and graves, by choice. In Pemba, host are
38 receptive (at least while they can bear the cost of living), but the social and economic structure and government
39 policy are not favourable to an easy integration. Urban displaced are coping for subsistence, by improvising
40
41 resource for immediate family consumption. These struggles of integration were summed up by two displaced:
42 “…. what influences is the part of being displaced, by-the-way, or rather because of all this confusion
43 that exists in our country, especially in our area of Cabo Delgado … when I arrived here, I found
44 (Mpesa) agents who were working and they claim that when they were there in Palma working, they were
45
46 working very well … in the end of the month, they used to make deposits and transfer money to the family
47 here. The economy was really good because money was circulating, that's why even agents were able to
48 have money, so if there is a lack of customers now it's because the situation contributes” (male
49
50 interviewee)
51
52 “... We are [living] bad, here. We need support with food, jobs in [the] existing projects and other things
53 … because I could do anything to feed his children, anything, even illegal jobs’. I cannot go back to [in
54
55 Bilibiza]. How can I risk my life with those bandits? [to] return there, the government has to declare that
56 we are safe to go and provide us with means to return. Otherwise, I will stay here with or without food to
57 eat. I will stay…” (male (interviewee)
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4 At the time of writing, conflict and violence has caused massive destructions on the economy and erupted the
5
6 source of livelihoods of the vast majority in Cabo Delgado. These events jeopardized years of hard-won
7 investment gains, particular from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) developments. In 2017 the World Bank estimated
8 that strengthening prices for coal, aluminium and gas, a post el Niño recovery in agriculture and the progress in
9
the peace talks would steer growth to 4.6 percent, and towards 7 percent by the end of the decade. Now, growth is
10
11 expected to accelerate in the medium term, averaging 5.5%, mainly reflecting natural gas (LNG) production
12 (World Bank, 2021), which is arguably one of the key roots of the conflict and violence3. There are few
13 opportunities outside of that sector, however non-farming activity tends to center on resource exploitation which
14
15 demands high skills and labour experience. The province has high rates of illiteracy in the country, at 67 per cent,
16 and a high youth unemployment rate estimated at 88 per cent (UNICEF, 2021).
17 The World Bank says that a modest growth rebound in 2021 reflects a combined outcome of agricultural growth
18 and relatively strong recovery in services. The growth prospects are positive, supported by the gradual global
19
20 recovery and LNG and agriculture developments. But the effect of climate change and related impacts (both
21 sudden and slow onset) are projected to increase in the coming years. To erupt agriculture sector and increasing
22 displacement risks. The Global Protection Cluster and Norwegian Refugee Council (2022) note that more people
23
24 will be forced to flee their homes because of floods, tropical storms, droughts, and sea level rise, causing
25 significant housing, land and property (HLP) challenges. The impacts of climate change worsen the situation and
26 prospects for displacement-affected people, limiting access to natural resources, restricting livelihoods, and
27 exacerbating conflicts.
28
29 The subsistence agriculture and fishing are the primary source of income for the vast majority of the population in
30 the province, including in and around the capital city. In the province, over 86 percent of the population relies on
31 agriculture. It is estimated that the conflict has resulted in a 30 percent drop in production compared with the
32
33 previous agricultural season. In drought-affected areas – driven by multiple natural disasters during the 2021/2022
34 season and conflict, a poor harvest, the depletion of food reserves and limited income-generating opportunities led
35 to the persistence of crisis (IPC Phase 3) and stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity outcomes.
36 “I have heard people who make machamba complaining about the fact that their food has dried
37
38 up, now there would have been a lot of production if it had rained, or a lot of rain that flooded
39 the machambas and so the crops don't grow” (female interviewee)
40
41
42
Food insecurity varies between locations due to existing levels of poverty, crop damage, disruption to fishing and
43 other livelihoods, and whether humanitarian access is compromised by insecurity and access issues. For local
44 authorities and vast majority of humanitarian actors, restoring livelihoods remains a priority.
45 The fisheries sector contributes significantly to poverty alleviation and socioeconomic development. Around 20%
46
47 of the population rely on fisheries for part of their income and a larger proportion relies on fishing for subsistence
48 and food security. But the extensive reserves gas and other minerals discovered in Cabo Delgado and the
49 beginning of their exploitation changed the structure of (artisanal) finishing. Development-induced displacement
50
51
led to limited access to the sea. Fishermen and coastal communities in Mozambique depend mostly on fishery
52 resources that are heavily influenced by climate dynamics (Badjeck et al., 2010). However, in the last three
53 decades, production has been falling, not only due to the over-exploitation of the resources but also due to climate
54 change (Blythe et al., 2014). The impacts of climate change tend to be greater in tropical regions, where
55
56 temperatures are higher, contributing to the reduction of fishery productivity. Few studies bring the link between
57
58
59 3
“The perception of exclusion from the benefits of natural resources exploitation in the province amidst growing poverty
60 and lack of opportunity created a youth-led movement which started a relatively small rebellion in 2017” (UNICEF, 2021. XI)
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4 climate change in fisheries and aquaculture in Mozambique, except some details that highlights the consequences
5
6 of climate change fisheries and aquaculture, creating problems for the sustainability of coastal communities (ibid),
7 and about the quality of life of this communities reduces due to the negative impacts that climate change has on
8 natural resources (Techera, 2018). In the urban setting, for the majority of displaced people who lives in or around
9
the city – particular near the cost, a storm, cyclone or flood would rapidly exacerbate many of the problems they
10
11 are already facing. Within this scenario, we asked our interviewees how are they coping and or adjusting
12 adaptative mechanisms to encounter livelihoods? To this quest, a 46 years old man from Bilibiza (Quissanga)
13 responded:
14
15 “I am just living. I am doing nothing…” (male interviewee)
16
17 While the conversation proceeded, we found out that he does seasonal jobs (ganho-ganho or biscato) of building
18 latrines, farm one’s field (machamba), etc. Per month, it varies, he gets two or four times these jobs which he uses
19
20 immediately to buy food for family consumption. The production of his few crops failed due to the type of soil,
21 but he has managed to have some cowpea beans to eat. In Bilibiza he was fisherman. He used to practice
22 agriculture and small business of selling cigarette, etc. In Pemba, he said, it is difficult to finds these biscato
23
24 because he is not from there and have to compete with locals who knows where to find these types of (informal)
25 jobs and/or costumers:
26 Unfortunately, him and his family have not been registered to benefit from World Food Programme’s voucher
27 assistance. He has made several complains, but there were no different results. He lives in a house that belonged
28
29 to his sister, with four children. He has 8 children. Two of his daughters live in the district Chiure, over 150 km
30 from Pemba. One of them married and moved to Chiure with her young sister, to relief her father on family care
31 duties by reducing the number of ‘mouths to feed’.
32
33 The burdens of living in the City of Pemba are worse for women (and children). Their struggle to find jobs,
34 resume their activities prior to being forced to flee to move and even to ‘marry’ again. We spoke with a 43-years
35 old woman, from the district of Quissanga. She moved to Mocimboa da Praia back to the 2000s, where ‘the war
36 found her family’. While describing how she survived from 2019 up to now, she said that her husband abandoned
37
38 her and their children, after their arrival in Pemba. Those women who come without their husbands or those who
39 are living in her condition are threatened with stigma by men in Pemba:
40
41
42
“we cannot have a romantic affair with these women because they are IPSs. They are not from
43 Pemba” (female interviewee)
44
45 The impact of these struggles reflects on the coping strategies. Children are highly involved in child labour and
46
47 child marriage. Informal conversation with local authorities in the neighbourhoods has confirmed that they are
48 involved in small business to feed themselves. The vast majorities of them work in informal settings (market,
49 roads, etc) on behalf of their parents, relatives, host families or to obtain some money and food for themselves or
50
51
to pay for their living cost. During the interview with the 43-years old women, she said:
52 “to have no idea if her girl (is 13-years old) is dating or going out with someone, but she is the
53 one running the family small business of cowpea beans, boiled banana and cassava down the
54 road” (female interviewee)
55
56
57 Child labour cannot be seen as not a direct consequence of conflict, climate and displacement, but these events
58 have worsened the phenomena. But reports from the government had confirmed that natural disasters, conflict and
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violence in Cabo Delgado, the armed attacks in the centre and the Covid-19 pandemic have hastened the entry
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4 into child employment of more than one million children across the country. One of our key-informant confirmed
5
6 the raising cases of child labour in market and roads, with the flux of displaced people in the city.
7 The reality is that the lack of livelihood options and limited access to income generation activities often make
8 displaced struggling themselves to provide for those who might have survived extremism violence; or even to
9
contribute with sharing food and shelter cost. This is the same for host community. A 70-years old women, head
10
11 of household said:
12 “I cannot say if these changed my life in this or that manner – it is hard to say. But have to share what we
13 have here in-house to eat. We used to use 25kg of rice per month, now that serves only for one week…”
14
15 (female interviewee)
16
17 And the burden is the same for men. A 43-years old man who is hosting the entire family of his brother-in-law
18 questioned:
19
20 “what I was supposed to do, abandon my brother-in-law? By doing this I would be abandoning my own
21 family. So, now we have to eat what we have … and it is only maize that we have here” (male interviewee)
22
23
24 While displaced in an urban environment, displaced endure and are normally prone to risks, which can include
25 loss of assets, inability to access secure housing, limited social network, separation from family members,
26 problems with documentation and poor access to services available, prostitution:
27
28
29 “where do i have money? If you're lucky here, there are men who usually look at me and say they want
30 me and then they give me 100 mtn in exchange, as we have food here, I go in. With the money I buy
31 matapa (a type of vegetable), peanuts to put in the matapa and the 20 meticais I leave to buy water.
32
33 Ahh… I couldn't make it today, I go to my sister's house to ask for help and she has been giving me water
34 to wash clothes and shower... no, to find a man who likes me, since man and woman are food, so find him,
35 give me money so I can buy fish and water. I don't have help from my family, if I want dry cassava, it's
36 that lady who gives it to me, and I thank her, she's the only one who helps me” (female interviewee)
37
38
39 In this context, the main objective of humanitarian action shall be to preserve or restore the ability of households
40 or communities to meet their essential needs. One of our key-informant stated that this shift towards encouraging
41
42
resilience demands alternative management and practices that facilitate effective transition to durable and
43 sustainable solutions. Proactive support and structures that consider the affected populations’ experiences are
44 needed, and these require an understanding of different displaced resilience actions and displaced-led
45 management approaches. These approaches can provide vital information which can enable supporting
46
47 organisations to develop relevant programmes, that include to support displaced’ integration in local initiatives.
48 Therefore, understanding the adopted management processes would highlight factors that can support effective
49 policies.
50
51
The fact that humanitarian funding is concentrated in rural (camps) setting suggests that urban displaced are seen
52 as having greater livelihood prospects; and that they tend to have better access to key social services and
53 (economic) opportunities. The findings cannot confirm or deny these assumptions. Nor either can these findings
54 state that displaced in resettlement centres receive more/better assistance than urban displaced in Pemba.
55
56 However, lacking aid assistance in urban settings and the fact that almost humanitarian actors interviewed are not
57 assisting displaced in and around Pemba, can suggest that displaced in resettlement centres receive more/better
58 assistance than urban displaced in Pemba. Displaced living in urban settings might have greater prospects in terms
59
60
of vulnerabilities, but in terms of livelihoods. Frequently, urban displaced (originating from rural areas) lack
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4 urban skill set and are unable to adapt to the urban labour market as there is limited access to (training)
5
6 opportunities. In urban settings, the assumption that displacement is a temporary condition and displaced will
7 return to their place of origin when the situation permits is not always the case. The 78-years man which we
8 interviewed is already building his house – which can mean that he is settling in around the city. However, it is
9
important to underline that the will to remain in urban areas is not necessarily an indication that displaced have
10
11 found durable solutions or sustainable conditions. This is because they will not return. Conflict is perceived as the
12 main threat to their lives and livelihood.
13 There are only couple of options or available aid assistance for urban displaced. The vast majority of humanitarian
14
15 actors only provided assistance in urban setting at the peak of the flux of displaced in Pemba. The assistance is
16 concentrated at the district level, where the resettlement camps are located. Apparently, it is where the
17 humanitarian funds are targeting the aid due to the needs.
18
19
20
21 ‘Where and when is home?’: place and the practices of un-'inhabitance'
22
23
24 In his article ‘Where and When is Home? ...’ Kabachnik (2010) identify ‘home as journey’. This implies that
25 ‘home’ has multiple meanings beyond those anchored in ‘house’, I argue. In portrait of Cresswell (2009: 5), in an
26 ideal world, ‘home-place is a center of meaning and field of care – a place where we feel safe, secure, and loved’.
27
28 This suggest that home can be anywhere, if it manifests self-and-shared meanings. Furthermore, I do believe that
29 home situate us in place and time or culture (Rodman, 1992), but my problem is, as I point, to accept that culture
30 shall be used to sustain the essentialist idea of a natural relationship between people and places, albeit its
31
32
importance. I would stand with Kibread (1999) and argue that this assertation ‘has no objective existence outside
33 the minds of its proponents’.
34 There has been changes in the volume of investment in the Cabo Delgado. It became a more industrialized
35 province, raising cost of life which brought a different concept and relation with ‘money’. It may have meant even
36
37 less immediate and full relationships with place, insofar. The industrialization of that province (resulting from
38 expansion of natural and mineral exploitation) fragmented people’s time-space relations, as they retain less local
39 control over their physical and social landscapes. For people who lived in Palma, development-related displaced
40
41
meant to ‘sell’ their land and be subjected to a reallocation in a different space, where all them were ‘forced’ to re-
42 construct their lives: economically, socially and culturally relations, in practice. It meant that they were ‘forced’ to
43 choose between culture and the need for ‘money’. If we accept that ‘places are not inert containers. They are
44 politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and multiple constructions’ (Rodman, 1992: 641), it
45
46 means that any space can gain the meanings of place – from the experiences lived in time, routes, social and
47 economic relations within a given space. As strongly appointed by Cresswell (2009: 2) ‘space becomes a place
48 when it is used and lived. Experience is at the heart of what place means… places are continuously enacted as
49
50
people go about their everyday lives: going to work, doing the shopping, spending leisure time, and hanging out
51 on street corners. The sense we get of a place is heavily dependent on practice and, particularly, the reiteration of
52 practice on a regular basis’.
53
54
55 Emphasis is on the agency of individuals and of forces beyond individual control, such us an enabling policy
56 environmental. In the words of Rodman (1992: 644), ‘it is time to recognize that places … are local and multiple.
57 For each inhabitant, a place has a unique reality, one in which meaning is shared with other people and places’.
58
For displaced from Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia and Palma, the city of Pemba can have the meanings of their
59
60 own place (as it had, for some, before they have moved to those districts), given a unique reality, if the policies
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4 are enabling to local integration. It would be arrogant and naive to assume that places exist only as inert locations
5
6 or houses. As researchers, we have the obligation to discuss solutions.
7 Rejecting the idea of ‘natural place’, does not, by any mean, imply to cut ones’ cultural ties with their places of
8 origin or where they ended giving sense of place. We cannot deny fragments of sustained sense of nostalgia of the
9
feelings and emotions a place evokes. These meanings can be individual, or they can be shared - based on
10
11 mediation and representation. But, nevertheless, ‘while meanings are shared, they are never fixed once and for all,
12 and always open to counter meanings produced through other representations’ (Cresswell, 2009: 2). These
13 representations are results of practiced and constructing (place). ‘People do things in place. What they do, in part,
14
15 is responsible for the meanings that a place might have’ (ibid).
16 Contrary to what Kibreab asserts, it does make sense to deny the importance of territorially based identity as
17 being critical to human wellbeing. Not, of course, to deny its importance, but to position with Allen and Turton
18 (1996 as cited in Kibreab), postulating that the 'primary concern' of displaced populations in poor countries,
19
20 particular those affected by conflict, 'is to find a relatively secure space in which to begin working towards
21 rebuilding their life, often irrespective of the where that is located. The sense of attachment is determined by
22 needs, such as security and access to means of livelihood.
23
24 In Cabo Delgado, people are fleeing from Northern to Southern, within their own borders. Some were resettled in
25 Nampula province (because the vast majority were from the districts of that province but migrated to the islands),
26 that culturally and ethnically does not sustain a distinct territorial location. However, I cannot avoid standing with
27 Kibread (1999: 404), affirming that ‘how people feel about their place of habitual residence is also inextricably
28
29 linked with the cause of displacement’. If those who twenty years ago moved to the islands (voluntarily) and
30 found ‘(un)territorialized places’ that were readily available for establishment without unfolding social conflicts,
31 there was no reason to return (to Pemba, Nacala, etc). But in this case, conflict forced them to flee – abandoning
32
33 their place of origin against their will. To move to Pemba, where they cannot claim entitlement of land, access to
34 means of livelihood, ‘the desire to return to one's place of origin is invariably powerful’. It is not surprising,
35 therefore, that they perceived their displacement as being temporary and ability to return to their homelands as a
36 success. The yearning to return home, again perhaps not surprisingly, is also stronger where displaced cannot
37
38 engage in economic activities, as Kibread stated and continued affirming that ‘the key variable which determines
39 how people perceive displacement and return to places or countries of origin is dependent, on the one hand, on the
40 conditions under which they leave their places of origin; and, on the other, on the treatment they receive and
41
42
opportunities existing at the destination’. When displaced are treated on equal footing with host or at least found
43 an enabling ecosystem to integrated into ‘imagined communities’, return is not per se an option. But in contrary, it
44 is rather a means to an end, i.e. a ‘means of ridding oneself of spatial confinement, enabling opportunities by
45 virtue of being spatially anchored’. (ibid)
46
47 This one 32-years old man went back to Macomia to see the situation. Although he believes that is not safe to live
48 either in Pemba, from that one visit, he said that is not convinced to return:
49
50
“I went in January of this year, I went to see the environment itself so far, [it] still haven't
51
52 convinced myself to go back... I went there, I was going to fence the place where I had my house,
53 I did it so that the space wouldn't [been took] away... that I can't say because it even depends on
54 the situation, if things go down I'll intend to go back home, but if they don't go down, I'd rather
55
56 stay here because running with kids isn't easy... it's not safe, it's not safe here [in Pemba], but
57 hey, it's a little safe because it's not like there. You've seen it once, so I don't say it's safe here but
58 hey, I intend to stay here" (male interviewee)
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4 There are those who have willing to return but there feel uncertain about their life will be when they
5
6 return.
7
8 “I would like to go back to Mocimboa but I don't know where to stay, when I go back there. I'll
9
have difficulties where to live and what to live with. My grandmother lost her life many years
10
11 ago, my mother lived with her aunt (mother's older sister) and even her aunt lost her life, my
12 mother doesn't know where she is, so even though I want to go back to Mocimboa who will I stay
13 with?” (male interviewee)
14
15
16 He has no job but said that he has sold a piece of his family’s land (for 80 000 meticais, around $1.350) and is
17 now building their new house:
18 “I will not go back to Mocimboa, while the Government does not give them guarantee that the
19
20 violence is over, clearly over” (male interviewee)
21
22 The lack of humanitarian funds and the economic opportunities for displaced, in and around the city of Pemba,
23
24 leaves them displaced with few options of coping strategies. Some of these options includes to return to their
25 place of origin to access means of livelihoods (agriculture and fisheries), putting themselves at risk. I could
26 confirm with few interviewees, but the vast majority of them have never even visited their house or machamba
27 since they left. One of our key informants stated:
28
29 “… for example, for extractive activities such as fishing, there are many people who are leaving
30 … going to Macomia, Quissanga, they fish for a few days, they stay hidden there [and then] they
31 come back here… that somehow guarantees that the family is safe, children, wife, mother-in-law,
32
33 cousin … In other words, he is taking the risk of looking for money in his traditional sources. In
34 the case of agriculture, it is a little different because it has other temporary implications, but
35 extractive activities such as fishing, people go fishing, go to Quissanga or Macomia, fish and
36 return” (extract from key-informant)
37
38
39 Historically, people in Cabo Delgado are used to these mobilities to find and exploit livelihood opportunities.
40 These mobilities express the linkages between internal migration and livelihoods and are one of the embedded
41
42
mechanisms that guide violence and climate related displacement.
43 “… this is the reason why, first, their homes are precarious. Because they knew positively that for
44 an average of ten years they would have to move to another place. So, it conditions a lot of hat
45 we now call livelihoods, isn't it? The livelihoods in a traditional historical way. Internal
46
47 migrations from different areas of the province because of these elements and others that came
48 later, such as cotton policies, taxes, forced labor and after that during practically everything is
49 first the twentieth century as I said conditioned the sedentarization of the population. then they
50
51
saw other factors came the war to the armed struggle and national liberation which was another
52 disruptive element that promoted many movements then came the other important element that
53 conditioned a lot and even today its conditions that it is the policy of communal villages …”
54 (extract from key-informant)
55
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4 In-auspicious policy environment for displaced: where does the hopes lies?
5
6 In his concept of ‘home’, Kabachnik (2010: 316) asserts that it is built and influenced by displaced living
7 conditions and ‘furthermore, government policy and discourse play a significant role in helping to shape and
8 profoundly influence IDPs’ conceptions of home’. This clearly confirm that, hitherto, the discussion with regard to
9
displaced and displacements’ solutions have come in terms with the importance of policy environmental. The
10
11 existing international instruments and solutions relating to displacement are threefold, namely: return, local
12 integration (where displaced take refuge) and integration (in a third party of the country). Neither of these two
13 solutions has primacy over the other. But in practice, (voluntary) return whenever feasible is the most desirable
14
15 solution, particular from displaced. This is important because in still favour displaced ‘choice’. But which choice
16 and at what cost?, i.e., what are the factors or how does the existing factors influence these choices?
17 The vulnerability of Mozambique to disaster, the impact of Covid-19 and the escalating conflict hastened the
18 government efforts to build a concise disaster risk management framework. In 2020 a new Law (Lei 10/2020) was
19
20 approved to establish the legal regime for disaster risk management and reduction, comprising the following
21 sectors: risk reduction, disaster management, sustainable recovery for the construction of human, infrastructural
22 and ecosystem resilience, as well as the adaptation to climate change. The actions and provisions relating to
23
24 displacement were barely mentioned. In August 2021, the government of Mozambique approved the national
25 Policy and Strategy for Internal Displacement Management. Considering the main preparedness and preventions
26 actions under the Law (prohibition of inhabitant to fix them in risk zones), it can be concluded that for the case of
27 displacement, inter alia, the major considerations underlying this instrument to the provisions to displaced include
28
29 return and possibilities of spontaneous integration. But, usually, because the country did not have a proper
30 displacement instrument, these reception strategies include herding of displaced in spatially resettlement
31 segregated sites with minimum opportunities for social and economic interaction with their host. Due to this
32
33 failure of economic structure and lacking resources (to be shared between displaced and host), the social live are
34 endangered. As in countries where such institutional, structural and attitudinal barriers constrain incorporation or
35 integration of displaced into host societies, the only self-solution to displacement problem lies in (voluntary)
36 return where displaced would, whenever possible, inter alia, ‘reacquire’ their livelihood – including cultural
37
38 related. This solution is however not ‘a priority’ neither the best solution under all circumstances, but because the
39 institutional, structural and attitudinal constitute a barrier to safe interaction of displaced in permanent basis.
40 In practice, it is not common to the government of Mozambique to promote returning, particular for economic and
41
42
political reasons. Freeing Palma and Mocimboa da Praia from peasants’ settlement would bring economic gain to
43 the province and country, by allowing maximization of gas exploitation. But these development-induced
44 displacement and resettlement shall be via economic and human-right based manner. I hereto further propound
45 that it is because of this government practice, the solutions to the displacement challenges conceptualize
46
47 (voluntary) return only if reflects the choice of displaced. When displaced they choose to be re-root in the places
48 of their origin. The corollary of this argument is that, if the economic conditions existed, (voluntary) returning
49 would not have been prioritized (Warner in Kibread, 1999) or would not even be considered a solution to the
50
51
displacement, because people have no need to belong to territorially anchored communities or societies (ibid), but
52 to livelihood opportunities that reflects, at least, their old lives or better off – particular in industrialized societies
53 where there is a new concept, practice and materialization of investment and money. For these societies, assuming
54 the existence of a natural connection between place and people, equate to make no attempts to question the
55
56 relevance of other factors to the reality of displaced, especially those who live in (or flee) a conflict zone.
57 As the discussion above follows showed, with regard to displaced population and return, the solutions concerning
58 the two-behaviour tendency is greatly influenced by the idea defendants of an ‘existence of a natural connection
59
60
between place and people’. My argument is to emphasize how this discussion neglects the policy environment
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4 that displaced people are part of, and their livelihood opportunities, to ‘culture – which I located as less important,
5
6 in these ‘post-modern days’. Because of diminishing resources, income-generating opportunities and problems of
7 unemployment, host populations are becoming increasingly hostile to displaced people. Most of displaced see no
8 future for themselves or their offspring in these host societies or resettlement camps. This is common in either for
9
disaster (including conflict) or development induced displacement. In worlds of Anderson (1993), displaced do
10
11 not 'imagine' themselves as part of the host societies. They make every effort not only to maintain and develop
12 their collective identities and transmit them to their children, but also to eliminate the factors that prompted their
13 displacement so that they can return to their place of origin in safety and dignity (Kibread, 1999). Instead of
14
15 working to develop roots in the new place, their aim becomes return to their origin, from where they were forcibly
16 uprooted (Ibid). The policy and strategy instrument lies in hope to change this thinking and practice. It starts by
17 defining institutional coordination and management of displacement, and by tasking each humanitarian actors
18 (public, private and non-government) with their specific responsibilities to tackle displacement.
19
20
21
22 Conclusion
23
24 To conclude, displaced people in Pemba intended to be temporary but is becoming permanent for the vast
25 majority – while the fear of war prevail. In their attempt to encounter sustainable livelihood, displaced are living
26 in a situation of revolving doors, where they are able to cope but not adapting. Their main attempts to adapt end in
27
the same circle – relying on humanitarian aid to service. This is derived from a failed economic integration.
28
29 Often, it is expected that displaced would return to their place of origin because of the assumption that there are
30 ‘natural’ places from which people derive their identity. The study in Pemba shows that due to fear of their live,
31 displaced started to involve themselves in ‘home-practicing’ and settling. For the vast majority, the harsh
32
33 economic environmental constitute an impediment. Mapping particular meanings, practices and identities to place
34 shall help us explore how places and their associated meanings have been implicated in processes of exclusion,
35 thus, change the lives of increasing numbers of displaced. Inerting place and people’ experience throughout the
36
course of displacement equate to limit one’s ability to rebuild their lives in a safety space or place. We shall no
37
38 longer privilege our own vantage point. Place are constructed in experience. In context, such as Cabo Delgado,
39 place should be seen as to varying degrees, economically constructed products of others 'interests and as
40 mnemonics of others' experiences.
41
42
43
44
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