Republic vs. Lazo 737 SCRA 1, September 29, 2014

2/21/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 737
CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
____________________
G.R. No. 195594. September 29, 2014.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Although the

direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) is discouraged when litigants may still resort to remedies
with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course
to a petition
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Lazo
for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion of

the court.—A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was filed in
the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari
with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to
remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of
due course to a petition for certiorari is generally addressed to the
sound discretion of the court because the technical provisions of
the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; The general
rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to
grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error
attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case; Exceptions.—The general rule is that a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an
opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it
by a reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid
down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for
certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001690c3a72bf88c058e3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/29
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or public interest is involved.
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 3

Republic vs. Lazo
Same; Docket Fees; Late payment of docket fees may be

admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the rules
through immediate payment of the required fees.—While it has
been stressed that payment of docket and other fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal
and that such payment is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure, the Court, in exceptional circumstances, has allowed a
liberal application of the Rules when the payments of the required
docket fees were delayed only for a few days. Indeed, late
payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party showed
willingness to abide by the rules through immediate payment of
the required fees.
Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is
committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment in
one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by
appeal or special civil action of certiorari.—Forum shopping is
committed by a party who, having received an adverse judgment
in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than
by appeal or special civil action of certiorari. It is the institution of
two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or
related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8975; Temporary Restraining
Orders; Preliminary Injunction; Republic Act (RA) No. 8975,
which took effect on November 26, 2000, is the present law that
proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions against government infrastructure
projects.—R.A. No. 8975, which took effect on November 26, 2000,
is the present law that proscribes lower courts from issuing
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against
government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious
and efficient implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects, its twin objectives are: (1) to avoid
unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance and/or repair
costs; and (2) to allow the immediate enjoyment of the social and
economic benefits of the project.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 8975
exclusively reserves to the Supreme Court (SC) the power to issue
injunctive writs on government infrastructure projects.—R.A. No.

8975 exclusively reserves to this Court the power to issue
injunctive

Republic vs. Lazo
writs on government infrastructure projects. A judge who

violates the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at
least sixty (60) days without pay, in addition to any civil and
criminal liabilities that he or she may incur under existing laws.
Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, We instructed all
judges and justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect
the prohibition.
Civil Law; Sales; Voluntary Offer to Sell; In general, a
property-owner has no right to unilaterally determine the extent of
his or her property that should be acquired by the State or to
compel it to acquire beyond what is needed, the conformity of a
higher authority like the Sanggunian Bayan notwithstanding.—In
general, however, a property-owner like respondents has no right
to unilaterally determine the extent of his or her property that
should be acquired by the State or to compel it to acquire beyond
what is needed, the conformity of a higher authority like the
Sanggunian Bayan notwithstanding. Similar to cases of voluntary
offer to sell (VOS) a property to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for coverage under R.A. No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Government cannot be
forced to buy land which it finds no necessity for considering that,
in the ultimate analysis, an appropriation of limited government
funds is involved. Like the DAR, the NIA has the power to
determine whether a parcel of land is needed for the BPIP. Truly,
due recognition must be made that the NIA is an administrative
body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized
jurisdiction. Presumption of regularity in the performance of its
official duty should be accorded.
Eminent Domain; Taking; The exercise of the power of
eminent domain does not always result in the taking of property.—
While the Court concurs with the trial court’s pronouncement
that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always
result in the taking of property as it may only result in the
imposition of burden upon the owner of the condemned property
without loss of title or possession, We do not agree with its
finding, after the conduct of a one-day hearing relative to the
prayer for provisional relief, that there is real necessity of
appropriating more of the respondents’ property by petitioner to
ensure the safety and security of operating the open irrigation
canal. The allegation that respondents will stand to suffer
damages by NIA’s non-acquisition of additional land in Monte
Vista is evidentiary in nature requiring full blown trial on the
merits. In

Republic vs. Lazo
the same vein, the CA likewise erred when it improperly took

judicial notice that “the construction and operation of an
irrigation canal scheme has serious and intricate environmental
impact on natural, ecological and socio-economic conditions, which
obviously includes lost of land use that would most certainly
affect the community where it is implemented” so as to sustain
the trial court’s ruling.
Local Government Code; Government Projects; Section 2(c) of
the Local Government Code (LGC) declares the policy of the State
“to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people’s organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.”—Section 2(c) of the
Local Government Code declares the policy of the State “to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people’s organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.” This provision
applies to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code requires prior consultations with the concerned
sectors and the prior approval of the Sanggunian. It was said that
the Congress introduced these provisions to emphasize the
legislative concern “for the maintenance of a sound ecology and
clean environment.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Nelson C. Delgado, Jr. for respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) seeks to
annul
6

Republic vs. Lazo
and set aside the October 22, 2010 Decision1 and

January 31, 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 107962, which affirmed the Order3
dated September 17, 2008 and Supplement to the Order4 of
September 17, 2008 dated September 19, 2008 of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, granting
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction in Civil Case No. 6798-V for Just
Compensation with Damages against petitioner.
The facts appear as follows:
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are
the owners and developers of Monte Vista Homes (Monte
Vista), a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing,
Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they
voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an

open irrigation canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump
Irrigation Project (BPIP). The consideration of the
negotiated sale was in a total amount of P27,180,000.00 at
the rate of P2,500.00 per square meter.5
Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr.
Donno G. Custodio, retired Chief Geologist of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau-Department of Environment and
Natural Resources,6 to conduct a geohazard study on the
possible effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio
later came up with a Geohazard Assessment Report
(GAR),7 finding that ground shaking and channel bank
erosion are the possible
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate

Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; Rollo, pp.
50-73.
2 Id., at pp. 74-76.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 28-39.
4 Id., at p. 40.
5 Rollo, pp. 79-80.
6 CA Rollo, p. 81.
7 Id., at pp. 57-81.

Republic vs. Lazo
hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation canal

traversing Monte Vista. He then recommended the
following:

Construction of a two (2) or double slope retaining walls

anchored to a reinforced foundation on both sides of the irrigation
channel within the Monte Vista Homes Subdivision Project
(Phases I & II). A buffer zone of at least 20 meters from the
embankment to the nearest structure should be strictly enforced.
Construction of a one (1) meter high concrete dike above the
retaining wall to prevent surface run-off during heavy rainfall
from flowing to the irrigation canal. Likewise, to prevent future
residents of the subdivision from accidentally falling into the
irrigation canal.
Construction of adequate draining system along the buffer zone
to prevent surface run-off during rainy season to percolate into
the irrigation canal embankment and/or scour the concrete dike
and retaining wall.
Planting of ornamental trees/plants and shrubs along the buffer
zone to prevent destabilization of the irrigation canal
embankment and for aesthetic reasons in the area.8
On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang Bayan of

Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved Resolution No. 34, which
adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR.9
Among others, it resolved that the GAR recommendations
should be observed and implemented by the concerned
implementing agency of the NIA BPIP.
Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s attention
Resolution No. 34 through his letters dated January 15,
2007,
_______________
8 Id., at p. 63.
9 Rollo, pp. 276-278.

Republic vs. Lazo
September 5, 2007, and November 1, 2007.10 He

specifically asked for the implementation of the GAR
recommendations and the payment of just compensation
for the entire buffer zone involving an aggregate area of
14,381 sq. m., more or less.
When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they
decided to file a complaint for just compensation with
damages against NIA on January 31, 2008.11 Prior to the
filing of an Answer, respondents filed an Amended
Complaint with application for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.12 They further
alleged that the BPIP contractor is undertaking
substandard works that increase the risk of a fatal
accident.
Per Order13 dated July 8, 2008, the trial court issued an
ex parte 72-hour TRO and directed the NIA to appear in a
summary hearing on July 9, 2008 to show cause why the
injunction should not be granted. Instead of a personal
appearance, the NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Manifestation and Motion14 praying
that the TRO be lifted and the application for preliminary
injunction be denied for being prohibited by Republic Act.
No. 8975.15 In the July 9, 2008 hearing, the trial court
ordered respondents to comment on the Manifestation and
Motion (which was later on com-
_______________
10 CA Rollo, pp. 85-88.

11 Rollo, p. 53.
12 Id., at pp. 82-94.
13 Id., at p. 81.
14 Id., at pp. 95-98.
15 R.A. No. 8975 is entitled as “An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by
Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes.”

Republic vs. Lazo
plied with)16 and extended the TRO for 20 days from its
issuance.17
During the July 23, 2008 hearing on respondents’ prayer
for provisional relief, the parties presented their respective
witnesses. Engr. Jerry Zapanta, the Technical Operations
Manager of the NIA BPIP, was petitioner’s sole witness,

while Rogelio Lazo and Engr. Custodio testified for
respondents.
Petitioner filed its Answer18 to the Amended Complaint
on August 22, 2008. After which, respondents filed a
Reply.19
On September 17, 2008, the trial court granted
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the application for

preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction by plaintiffs is
hereby GRANTED.
Defendant is hereby enjoined from continuing further
construction works on the irrigation canal particularly those
located inside the Monte Vista Homes until the issue in the main
case is resolved.
Further, defendant is ordered to comply with Resolution No.
34, Series of 2006 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Bantay Ilocos Sur, adopting the recommendations of the
Geohazard Assessment Report undertaken by Engr. Donno
Custodio, unless said Resolution has been revoked, superseded or
modified in such a manner that would negate compliance
therewith by defendant.
SO ORDERED.20
_______________
16 Rollo, pp. 101-105.

17 Id., at pp. 99-105.
18 Id., at pp. 106-112.
19 Id., at pp. 113-120.
20 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
10

Republic vs. Lazo
Two days later, the trial court issued a Supplement to

the Order of September 17, 2008, stating:
The dispositive portion of the Order of September 17, 2008 is

supplemented with a last paragraph to read as follows:
“The Court hereby fixes the injunction bond in the
amount of THREE MILLION PESOS (Php3,000,000.00).
Upon approval of the requisite bond, let the Writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issue.”
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court ruled that the instant case falls under
the exception of Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975, because
respondents’ demand for just compensation is by reason of
the property being burdened by the construction of the
open irrigation canal in Monte Vista which altered its use
and integrity. In declaring that the right of private
individuals whose property were expropriated by the State
is a matter of constitutional urgency, it opined:
While [petitioner] insists that [respondents] were fully paid for

the actual area where the irrigation canal is being constructed, it
refuses to compensate [respondents] for their property burdened
by the construction of the irrigation canal. “Taking” in the
constitutional sense may include trespass without actual eviction

of the owner, material impairment of the property or the
prevention of the ordinary use for which the property was
intended. Thus, in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez
(193 SCRA 1, as cited by J. Antonio B. Nachura in his Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, p. 37, 2002 edition), the Supreme Court
held that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not
always result in the taking of
_______________
21 Id., at p. 40.
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VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 11

Republic vs. Lazo
property; it may also result in the imposition of burden upon the

owner of the condemned property without loss of title or
possession.
It would indubitably appear in this case that there is really a
necessity of appropriating more of the [respondents’] property by
[petitioner] to ensure the safety and security of operating the open
irrigation canal. This could never be more true in the light of the
Sangguniang Bayan’s Resolution [34], Series of 2006[,] which
adopted the recommendations contained in the Geohazard
Assessment Report. Significantly, [petitioner] never refuted that
there was such a Resolution, and worse, [petitioner] never
explained why it never incorporated the recommendations in the
Resolution or even made an attempt to consult with the concerned
Sanggunian concerning the same.22
Also, the trial court found that petitioner violated R.A.

No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991. It said:
The Local Government Code embodies the policy of the State to

devolve the powers and authority of a former centralized
government. [Petitioner] seemed to have disregarded all deference
due to the local government of the Municipality of Bantay when[,]
despite the issuance of Resolution, it insisted that its design of the
open irrigation canal is adequately safe without consultation or
asking a formal audience with the Sangguniang Bayan and spell-
out the design of the open irrigation canal which could persuade
the latter to reconsider its Resolution.
Section 3(g) of the Local Government Code provides that:
“The capabilities of local government units, especially the
municipalities and barangays, shall be enhanced by providing
them with opportunities to participate actively in the
implementation of national programs and projects”;
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 32-33.
12

Republic vs. Lazo
Section 5 of the same Code leaves no doubt as to the

empowerment of local government units that it provides.
Section 5. Rules of Interpretation.—In the interpretation of
the provision of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
“(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall
be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned;” x x x
[Petitioner][,] by reason of its failure to abide by the required
consultation, had effectively deprecated the function, authority
and power of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bantay. Consequently, without the prior approbation of the
Sanggunian[,] [petitioner’s] irrigation project cannot be absolutely
declared as representative of the consent of the local government.
Hence, it must be enjoined until compliance by [petitioner] on
consultative requirement or clear and convincing proof of
incorporation of the Sanggunian Resolution in the project design
of the irrigation project has been adduced.23

Without moving for a reconsideration of the two Orders,
petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari24 before the
CA.
On May 14, 2009, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.25 In its May 27, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied
the motion and
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 33-34.

24 Id., at pp. 3-27.
25 Id., at pp. 217-224.
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VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 13

Republic vs. Lazo
directed the parties to submit their respective

memoranda.26 Accordingly, both parties filed their
Memorandum.27
Eventually, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed
the challenged Orders of the trial court on October 22,
2010.
On procedural matters, the appellate court resolved the
issues of whether petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and whether the petition should
be dismissed for lack of motion for reconsideration filed
before the trial court. The CA opined that the controversy
falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the regular courts
and not of the Sangguniang Bayan concerned, because
what petitioner seeks to nullify are the Orders of the trial
court allegedly rendered in violation of R.A. No. 8975 and
not the act or propriety of the issuance of Resolution No.
34. It agreed, however, with respondents that the petition
for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was filed
without seeking first the reconsideration of the trial court.
It was said that petitioner omitted to show sufficient
justification that there was no appeal or any plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As to the substantive merits of the case, the CA affirmed
that the payment of just compensation and the alleged
need to rectify the inferior construction work on the
irrigation canal are constitutional issues which are of
extreme urgency justifying the trial court’s issuance of an
injunctive writ. It held:
In the controversy below, what is put in issue is the consequent

just compensation as a result of the acquisition of a right-of-way
for a national infrastructure project. Hence, the application of
Republic Act No. 8974 which pertinently provides:
“Sec. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.—
Whenever it is necessary to ac-
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 226-228.

27 Id., at pp. 239-296.
14

Republic vs. Lazo
quire real property for the right-of-way or location for any

national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate
the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the
following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to
the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1)
one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on
the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof.
x x x x x x x x x
Applying the provision in the attendant circumstances
surrounding the issues in this petition, it is immediately apparent
that in acquiring right-of-way for purposes of implementing a
government infrastructure project and before any taking of the
expropriated property may be effected, it is indispensable for the
government to pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the
value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the
value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
through the guidelines provided by law.
And not merely by implication, petitioner cannot take over the
property to be expropriated and perform act of dominion over the
landowner’s property without the prerequisite full payment of just
compensation. The positioning of this Court takes precedence
from the ruling of the Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon.
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VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 15
Republic vs. Lazo
x x x x
Petitioner cannot seek solace to its claim that it did not
expropriate respondents’ property but rather purchased it
through a negotiated sale. This claim can only be true to the
original plan of the irrigation canal. With the issuance of
Resolution No. 34, petitioner is bound to expropriate more of
respondents’ property for sound and safety reasons, which, unless
they pay the full amount of just compensation, petitioner must be
enjoined from acting as de jure owner thereof.
Presently, the legal assumption would be that juridical
possession of the property expropriated remains with
respondents. Hence, injunction would be proper in this case.
[Respondents] have proven an unmistakeable right over the
property taken by NIA. They have shown, in conformity with Rule
58 of the Rules of Court which provides for the requisites before a
preliminary injunction may be issued; that they are entitled to the
relief absent the full payment of just compensation, and that the
relief asked for petitioners to refrain from doing act of ownership
over their property, and to improve the quality of the construction
work on the irrigation canal. NIA, as a government expropriating
agent, should refrain from continuing the acts complained of;
otherwise, grave and irreparable injury would result to the
prejudice of respondents.
Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be
issued, the Rules of Court do not require that the act complained
of be in clear violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what
the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant.28
Anent petitioner’s noncompliance with the requirements

of the Local Government Code, the CA sustained the trial
court’s finding:
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 65-70.
16

Republic vs. Lazo
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites

must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate
sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
project’s implementation is illegal.
We can take judicial notice that the construction and operation
of an irrigation canal scheme has serious and intricate
environmental impact on natural, ecological and socio-economic
conditions, which obviously includes lost of land use that would
most certainly affect the community where it is implemented. NIA
should have conducted prior consultations with the local
government in consonance with the foregoing provision of R.A.
7160. Strangely, it failed to make such consultation.
Petitioner suggests that the local government should have
conducted a separate investigation on the aptness of the matter
subject of the GAR or at least endorsed it to other appropriate
government agencies for confirmation in light of the fact that the

local government is dealing with NIA which is supposed to be an
expert on its field. However, this Court cannot sustain a stand
clearly borne out of neglect with its obligation to consult the
concerned local government prior to the implementation of the
irrigation project.
Petitioner never even cited any statute or law which mandates
the local government to conduct a separate investigation
pertaining to the feasibility, viability or ecological repercussion of
any government infrastructure project to be implemented within
its territorial jurisdiction. The Constitution and Republic Act
7160 [are] adequate [sources] of the autonomous authority of local
governments to determine, based on resources or references at its
disposal, the soundness of a particular measure for a particular
infrastructure project. It has the sole discretion to promulgate
enacting ordinances to execute such measure.
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Republic vs. Lazo
[Respondent] could not be persuaded to rely on the accuracy

and integrity of the Back to Office Report of NIA much more than
it could rely on the alleged credibility or expertise of the persons
who prepared the report. Records do not show that petitioner
exerted effort to present these people to establish their expertise;
nor did they [make] affirmation on the contents of the Back to
Office Report. Resultantly, the testimony of petitioner’s witness
and his allegations to support the veracity of the contents of NIA’s
[Back] to Office Report are mere self-serving statements and
inadmissible for being hearsay.29
On January 31, 2011, the CA denied petitioner’s motion

for reconsideration; hence, this petition that raises the
following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE JUSTIFIED
PETITIONER’S IMMEDIATE RESORT TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS WITHOUT FILING A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE
TRIAL COURT.
III
WHETHER REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7160 IS APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE.30
First off, the Court shall settle respondents’ procedural

objections, to wit: (1) petitioners did not follow the Rules
when it filed a petition for certiorari directly with the CA
without
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 71-72.

30 Id., at p. 22.
18

Republic vs. Lazo
seeking for a reconsideration from the trial court; (2) the

petition was filed out of time due to belated payment of
docket and other lawful fees; and (3) petitioner is guilty of
forum shopping.
The contentions are untenable.
A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was
filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of
petitions for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when
litigants may still resort to remedies with the trial court,
the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a petition
for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion
of the court because the technical provisions of the Rules
may be relaxed or suspended if it will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice.31
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a

condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its
purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a reexamination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case.
However, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid
down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition for
certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would
_______________
31 Tan v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 514 Phil. 307, 313; 478 SCRA 115, 121
(2005).
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Republic vs. Lazo
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or

the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest
is involved.32
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls

within instances (a), (b), (c), (d) and (i) above mentioned. As
will be elucidated in the discussion below, the assailed
Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having been
issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Also, the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those
already raised and passed upon in the lower court; hence,
filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless and
serve no practical purpose. There is likewise an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government. In
its petition and memorandum filed before the CA,
petitioner in fact noted that the BPIP is intended to cater
the year-round irrigation needs of 6,312 hectares of
agricultural land in Bantay, Caoayan, Magsingal, San
Ildefonso, San Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta. Catalina, and
Vigan in Ilocos Sur.33 Even Resolution No. 34 recognizes
this.
_______________
32 HPS Software and Communication Corporation v. Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), G.R. No. 170217 and G.R. No.
170694, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 426, 452-453.
33 Rollo, pp. 153, 227.
20

Republic vs. Lazo
Public interest is actually involved as the targeted

increase in agricultural production is expected to uplift the
farmers’ standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised — that
is, under the antecedent facts, whether the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondents’ prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction despite the mandate of R.A. No. 8975
— is one purely of law.
The CA and this Court unquestionably have full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume
jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorari filed
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition. We deem it proper to
adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.
Also, while it has been stressed that payment of docket
and other fees within the prescribed period is mandatory
for the perfection of the appeal and that such payment is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure,34 the Court, in
exceptional circumstances,35 has allowed a liberal
application of the Rules when the payments of the required
docket fees were delayed only for a few days. Indeed, late
payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party
showed willingness to abide by the rules through
immediate payment of the required fees.36
In this case, records show that petitioner timely filed its
motion for extension of time to file a petition on March 2,
2011.37 The petition, however, was not docketed because
the
_______________
34 D. M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No.

170728, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 369, 378.
35 KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc., 563 Phil. 1038, 1055; 538
SCRA 713, 731 (2007), citing Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Mangubat, 371 Phil. 393; 312 SCRA 463 (1999) and Villena v. Rupisan,
549 Phil. 146; 520 SCRA 346 (2007).
36 See Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, 515 Phil. 568, 577; 479 SCRA
594, 603 (2006), citing Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Mangubat, supra.
37 Rollo, pp. 2-5.
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Republic vs. Lazo
required fees were not paid based on petitioner’s belief

that it is exempt therefrom. Nonetheless, payment was
immediately made the following day, March 3, 2011.38 The
tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no significant
period of time elapsed.
Finally, respondents argue that the filing of a
Manifestation and Motion dated March 25, 2011 by
petitioner with the trial court should be considered as an
act of forum shopping. They assert that the prayer to
admonish them from closing or blocking the irrigation
canal that traverses their property is tantamount to asking
the trial court to lift the injunction order. Respondents
contend that instead of pleading for a restraining order
from this Court, petitioner, in effect, belatedly sought a
reconsideration of the Orders dated September 17, 2008
and September 19, 2008 before the trial court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having
received an adverse judgment in one forum, seeks another
opinion in another court, other than by appeal or special
civil action of certiorari.39 It is the institution of two or
more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same
or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs.40 In a fairly recent case,41 the Court
reiterated:
There is forum shopping “when a party repetitively avails of

several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 6-10.

39 Young v. Keng Seng, G.R. No. 143464, March 5, 2003, 398 SCRA
629, 636.
40 Id.
41 Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, February 17,
2014, 716 SCRA 175 (1st Division Resolution).
22
Republic vs. Lazo
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by

some other court.” Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is
prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and
abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice
and adds to the already congested court dockets. An important
factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars,
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in
the action under consideration.
Taking into account the surrounding circumstances, it

cannot be said that petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion
dated March 25, 2011 constitutes forum shopping. The full
text of which is quoted as follows:

MANIFESTATION AND MOTION

DEFENDANT, by counsel, to the Honorable Court, respectfully

states:
1. On March 20, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) received a facsimile letter dated March 10, 2011 from the
Administrator of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
seeking legal assistance to prevent the plaintiffs from blocking the
irrigation canal traversing their property which would unduly
disrupt the operations of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project
(BPIP).
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Republic vs. Lazo
x x x x
2. The above letter was precipitated by plaintiff Rogelio
Lazo’s threat to bar the operation of the section of the Banaoang
Irrigation Canal constructed within the Monte Vista Homes as
can be gleaned from the letter dated February 28, 2011 of Engr.
Santiago P. Gorospe, Jr., Project Manager of the BPIP to the NIA
Administrator x x x.
3. It may be recalled that the Honorable Court issued an
Order dated September 17, 2008, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
x x x x
4. It must be stressed that plaintiffs had been fully
compensated for that portion of their property at Monte Vista
Homes acquired by the NIA for its project; hence, the Republic of
the Philippines is already the owner thereof. Accordingly,

plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to restrain the Republic
through the National Irrigation Administration, to exercise any of
the attributes of its ownership. Moreover, the injunction order
does not authorize plaintiffs to close or block the irrigation canal.
5. It is respectfully informed that the BPIP is now irrigating
3,300 hectares out of the 5,200 hectares irrigable service area and
it is possible to irrigate the remaining area of about 1,900
hectares this next cropping season. Thus, it is very critical that
the canal traversing plaintiff’s property be allowed unimpeded
operation to [ensure] the continued irrigation services to the
farmers now depending on the BPIP.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that plaintiffs be
admonished from closing or blocking the irrigation canal
traversing their property for lack of authority to do so and to
await the final resolution of this case.
It is likewise prayed that defendant be granted such other
reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.
24

Republic vs. Lazo
Makati City, Metro Manila for Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, March 25,
2011.42

To note, the above pleading was followed by another
Manifestation and Motion dated September 5, 2011,
wherein petitioner further alleged:
5. In lieu of the hearing, defendant respectfully seeks

clarification on whether the Order dated September 17, 2008
granting plaintiff’s application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction grant them the power to close or block the
irrigation canal constructed by the defendant. Again, it should be
stressed that the construction of the irrigation canal was already
completed prior to the issuance of the Order dated September 17,
2008. More importantly, the portion of plaintiff’s land where the
irrigation canal was constructed is already owned by the
defendant prior to the institution of this case because plaintiff’s
had already been fully paid for it.
6. Although the import and coverage of the injunction order
dated September 17, 2008 is very clear, the said clarification is
imperative to put a stop to the on-and-off threat of the plaintiffs to
close or block the irrigation canal, a government property, on the
basis of said injunction order, to the prejudice of the farmers
dependent on it for irrigation services.43
After cautiously reading both pleadings, it appears

that petitioner honestly sought clarification from the trial
court the meaning of the writ it issued. To refresh, when
the trial court granted respondents’ application for
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction on
September 17, 2008 it enjoined petitioner from continuing
further construction works on the irrigation canal located
inside Monte Vista and ordered it to comply with
Resolution No. 34, which adopted the GAR rec-
_______________
42 Rollo, pp. 279-281.

43 Id., at p. 313.
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Republic vs. Lazo
ommendations. As petitioner pointed out, the injunction

order does not authorize respondents to close or block the
irrigation canal, the construction of which was, as alleged,
already completed prior to the issuance of the Order. In
filing the Manifestation and Motion, petitioner was just
protecting its property rights, claiming that it is already
the owner of the land where the irrigation canal was
constructed by virtue of the negotiated sale that transpired
prior to the institution of this case. According to petitioner,
respondents previously blocked the irrigation canal and it
was only through the initiative and efforts of the affected
farmers that the same was removed. Faced with another
threat of closure, it only exercised its legal right to seek
affirmative relief from the trial court.
Now, on the substantive merits of the case.
R.A. No. 8975, which took effect on November 26,
2000,44 is the present law that proscribes lower courts from
issuing restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring
the expeditious and efficient implementation and
completion of government infrastructure projects, its twin
objectives are: (1) to avoid unnecessary increase in
construction, maintenance and/or repair costs; and (2) to
allow the immediate enjoyment of the social and economic
benefits of the project.45 Towards these end, Sections 3 and
4 of the law provide:
SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary

Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions.—No court, except the Supreme
Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the gov-
_______________
44 The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, G.R. No.

180882, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 109, 119-120, citing GV Diversified
International, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 532 Phil. 296, 302; 500
SCRA 589, 596 (2006).
45 R.A. No. 8975, Sec. 1.
26

Republic vs. Lazo
ernment, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person

or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the
following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-

of-way and/or site or location of any national government
project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful
activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or
controversies instituted by a private party, including but not
limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights
through such bidders involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless
a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice
and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a
bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the
contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
SEC. 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders.—Any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction issued in vio-
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Republic vs. Lazo
lation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.

(Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8975 exclusively reserves to this Court the

power to issue injunctive writs on government
infrastructure projects. A judge who violates the
prohibition shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least
sixty (60) days without pay, in addition to any civil and
criminal liabilities that he or she may incur under existing
laws.46 Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, We
instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts to
comply with and respect the prohibition.47
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that the
Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project is a government
infrastructure project within the contemplation of R.A. No.
8975. Instead, the focal issue to be resolved is: Does this
case for just compensation with damages one of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless a
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction is issued
grave injustice and irreparable injury on the part of
respondents will arise? We hold not.
Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a
constitutional issue involved, much less a constitutional
issue that is of extreme urgency. The case aims to compel
the Government to acquire more portion of Monte Vista on
the bases of the GAR recommendations, which was
espoused by the Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur,
and of the alleged substandard works on the BPIP. The

findings in the GAR, however, are vehemently opposed by
petitioner. It asserted that the 20-meter buffer zone is
unnecessary because similar precautionary measures are
already sufficiently installed and that further acquisition of
respondents’ property would be grossly disadvantageous to
the Government as it would cost additional P68,370,000.00,
more or less. Petitioner also
_______________
46 R.A. No. 8975, Sec. 6.

47 Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 173, 183.
28

Republic vs. Lazo
counters that the claim of substandard works on the

BPIP is speculative, since the contractor has not yet
handed over the BPIP as completed and petitioner is yet to
inspect and approve the BPIP according to its design and
specifications. Considering that these issues are very much
disputed by the parties, it cannot be said that respondents’
constitutional right to just compensation was or has
already been breached at the time the complaint was filed
or even during the hearing on their application for
preliminary injunction.
As petitioner consistently argues, it has not taken any
property of respondents that is more than what was the
subject matter of the negotiated sale executed in 2006.
Quite the contrary, it is respondents who are obliging it to
purchase more than what it deems as necessary for the
implementation of the BPIP. In general, however, a
property-owner like respondents has no right to
unilaterally determine the extent of his or her property
that should be acquired by the State or to compel it to
acquire beyond what is needed, the conformity of a higher
authority like the Sanggunian Bayan notwithstanding.
Similar to cases of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) a property
to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage
under R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law,48 the Government cannot be forced to buy
land which it finds no necessity for considering that, in the
ultimate analysis, an appropriation of limited government
funds is involved. Like the DAR, the NIA has the power to
determine whether a parcel of land is needed for the BPIP.
Truly, due recognition must be made that the NIA is an
administrative body with expertise on matters within its
specific and specialized jurisdiction. Presumption of
regularity in the
_______________
48 See Land Bank of the Philippines v. Montalvan, G.R. No. 190336,

June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 380 and Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 614.
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Republic vs. Lazo
performance of its official duty should be accorded. As

this Court held in Republic v. Nolasco:49
More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public at

large are bound to respect the fact that official acts of the
Government, including those performed by governmental agencies
such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, and cannot be
summarily, prematurely and capriciously set aside. Such
presumption is operative not only upon the courts, but on all
persons, especially on those who deal with the government on a
frequent basis. There is perhaps a more cynical attitude fostered
within the popular culture, or even through anecdotal traditions.
Yet, such default pessimism is not embodied in our system of
laws, which presumes that the State and its elements act
correctly unless otherwise proven. To infuse within our legal
philosophy a contrary, gloomy pessimism would assure that the
State would bog down, wither and die.
Instead, our legal framework allows the pursuit of remedies
against errors of the State or its components available to those
entitled by reason of damage or injury sustained. Such litigation
involves demonstration of legal capacity to sue or be sued, an
exhaustive trial on the merits, and adjudication that has
basis in duly proven facts and law. x x x50
While the Court concurs with the trial court’s

pronouncement that the exercise of the power of eminent
domain does not always result in the taking of property as
it may only result in the imposition of burden upon the
owner of the condemned property without loss of title or
possession, We do not agree with its finding, after the
conduct of a one-day hearing relative to the prayer for
provisional relief, that there is real necessity of
appropriating more of the respondents’ property
_______________
49 496 Phil. 853; 457 SCRA 400 (2005).

50 Id., at pp. 883-884; p. 435. (Emphasis supplied)
30

Republic vs. Lazo
by petitioner to ensure the safety and security of operating

the open irrigation canal. The allegation that respondents
will stand to suffer damages by NIA’s non-acquisition of
additional land in Monte Vista is evidentiary in nature
requiring full blown trial on the merits. In the same vein,
the CA likewise erred when it improperly took judicial
notice that “the construction and operation of an irrigation
canal scheme has serious and intricate environmental
impact on natural, ecological and socio-economic
conditions, which obviously includes lost of land use that
would most certainly affect the community where it is
implemented” so as to sustain the trial court’s ruling.
Respondents cannot conveniently invoke the NAPOCOR
cases51 in order to support their prayer for preliminary
injunction. Therein, the Court consistently ruled that

expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real
property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession and that the right-of-way easement resulting in
a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit
of the term “expropriation.” In contrast, this case obviously
does not deal with the installation power lines, which has
different nature and effects on private ownership. The
perpetual deprivation of the normal and ordinary use of the
complainants’ proprietary rights, the danger to life and
limbs, and the tax implications which were uniformly
considered in the NAPOCOR cases are relatively not
palpable in this case.
_______________
51 See National Power Corporation v. Maruhom, G.R. No. 183297,

December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 198; National Power Corporation v. Co, 598
Phil. 58; 578 SCRA 234 (2009); National Power Corp. v. Vda. de Capin,
590 Phil. 665; 569 SCRA 648 (2008); National Power Corporation v. San
Pedro, 534 Phil. 448; 503 SCRA 333 (2006); NPC v. Manubay Agro-
Industrial Development Corp., 480 Phil. 470; 437 SCRA 60 (2004); and
National Power Corporation v. Spouses Gutierrez, 231 Phil. 1; 193 SCRA 1
(1999).
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Republic vs. Lazo
As regards petitioner’s alleged violation of the Local

Government Code, the same does not suffice to grant the
prayer for injunctive relief.
Section 2(c) of the Local Government Code declares the
policy of the State “to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate
local government units, nongovernmental and people’s
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented
in their respective jurisdictions.” This provision applies to
national government projects affecting the environmental
or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project.52 Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of
the Local Government Code requires prior consultations
with the concerned sectors and the prior approval of the
Sanggunian. It was said that the Congress introduced
these provisions to emphasize the legislative concern “for
the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean
environment.”53
Sections 26 and 27 provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the

Maintenance of Ecological Balance.—It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
depletion of nonrenewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland,
or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to
consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals
and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological

balance, and
_______________
52 Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, 513 Phil. 557, 589; 477

SCRA 436, 465 (2005).
53 Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, 453 Phil. 479, 496; 405 SCRA
530, 543 (2003).
32

Republic vs. Lazo
the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the

adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required.—No project or
program shall be implemented by government authorities unless
the consultations mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
The projects and programs mentioned in Section 27

should be interpreted to mean projects and programs
whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26
and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may
bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of
nonrenewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal
or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented.54 Preliminarily, it appears that
the present case does not fall under any of these instances;
ergo, there is neither a need for prior consultations of
concerned sectors nor prior approval of the Sanggunian.
In support of their entitlement to a preliminary
injunction, respondents insist that the nonobservance of
the buffer zones and other GAR recommendations will spell
calamitous consequences to the future occupants of Monte
Vista and tragic disaster to the community of the
Municipality of Bantay. Allegedly, the worst scenario of
such malfeasance, if not im-
_______________
54 Hon. Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño, 416 Phil. 438, 450; 364 SCRA 76, 87
(2001), as cited in Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No.
196870, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 555, 616-617; Supra note 52 at p. 590;
pp. 463-464; and Supra note 53 at pp. 497-498; p. 543.
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Republic vs. Lazo
mediately enjoined, is the “devastating irreversible

ecological and environmental effects to the community.”55
According to them, petitioner “opted to pursue a

treacherous task which could well endanger the community
and its people with threats of perishing through inundation
or deluge of mythical proportion, or through avalanche of
mud and soil.”56 Yet in spite of advancing these gruesome
depictions, it is surprising to note that respondents
apprised the Court that they “never really prevented
petitioner from finishing the construction of the BPIP canal
and even allowed its operation in deference to the broader
interests of the farmer-beneficiaries of the irrigation project
until the issues are finally adjudicated.”57 This admission
only proves that respondents’ arguments are mere
suppositions which, as of the time the provisional remedy
was heard and granted, are bereft of undisputed factual
moorings. Certainly, there is no clear and material right of
respondents to be protected. There are no rights in esse
since the allegations are merely contingent and may never
arise at all. These are not rights clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. There
is no ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their
complaint.
Respondents failed to satisfy even the basic
requirements of the Rules for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.58
_______________
55 Rollo, pp. 91, 270.

56 Id., at pp. 89, 185, 259.
57 Id., at p. 246.
58 The procedural and jurisprudential guideposts in the issuance of
preliminary injunction are amply discussed in Nerwin Industries
Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation (G.R. No. 167057,
April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 173, 186-190):
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is an ancillary or
preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or
interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is
established that:
34

Republic vs. Lazo
Therefore, the trial court gravely abused its discretion

when it granted their application for preliminary
prohibitory and
_______________
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for
a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is
indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting
System (CBS), Inc., the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz.:
“As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the
instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or
the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant
appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must
aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose
averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to
the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the
injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that
the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which
is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which
does not give rise to a cause of
35
mandatory injunction. In so doing, it prematurely decided

disputed facts and effectively disposed of the merits of the
_______________
action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited

by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.”
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not
demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of
Appeals, it is enough that:
“x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of
facts affording a present right which is directly threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing
of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to
justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be
conclusive or complete but need only be a “sampling” intended
merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the
preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the
merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction
and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial
court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the
private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint x x x.”
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial
courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual
determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.
Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the
issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds
and in the manner provided by law. When that is done, the exercise of
sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be
wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction
that tend to dispose of the
36
case without the benefit of a full-blown trial wherein

testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and
exhaustively presented, heard, and refuted by the parties.
_______________
merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in

disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible, for it is never the
function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a
case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a preventive remedy whose
only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the
ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision. Foremost in their
minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will
hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the
merits. It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary
injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and
irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and
thoroughly studied and adjudicated.
As to the requirements of a preliminary mandatory injunction, Heirs of Yu v.
Honorable Court of Appeals, Special Twenty-First Division (Twenty-Second
Division) (G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA 84, 95-96) has this to
say:
CA preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may
also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it
shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. To justify the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown
that: (1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been
violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial;
and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not
in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise since,
to be protected by injunction, the alleged right must be clearly founded on
or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. As this Court
opined in Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Juan Valdez:
A preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded than a mere
prohibitive injunction since, more than its function of preserving the status quo
between the parties, it also commands the performance of an act. Accordingly,
the issu-
37
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 37

Republic vs. Lazo
The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a

writ of preliminary injunction that would in effect dispose of the
main case without trial. Otherwise, there would be a prejudgment
of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof
since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are
inceptively bound to prove. Indeed, a complaint for injunctive
relief must be construed strictly against the pleader.59
The Court is more inclined to believe that respondents

filed the instant complaint merely to protect their own
private interests. The claim of alleged effects on the
environmental or ecological balance of Monte Vista and the
Municipality of Bantay is but a legal tactic to give an
impression that the case has urgent constitutional
repercussions. As a matter of fact,
_______________
ance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is

justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When
the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is improper. While it is not
required that the right claimed by applicant, as basis for
seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still
necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right exists and
is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.
Thus, a preliminary mandatory injunction should only be
granted “in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the
effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the
parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation.”
59 Phil. Ports Authority v. Pier 8 Arrastre & Stevedoring Services, Inc.,
512 Phil. 74, 90-91; 475 SCRA 426, 441 (2005). (Citations omitted)
38

Republic vs. Lazo
their pleadings unfailingly manifest their true intent.

Respondents vigorously contend that the BPIP would
jeopardize the entire development of Monte Vista, which
was earmarked for the development of a residential
subdivision; that when the BPIP commenced construction,
the suitability and marketability of Monte Vista already
seriously suffered; and that, in building the BPIP that has
substandard specifications, petitioner and its contractor
are likely converting the remaining areas of Monte Vista
not suitable and viable for subdivision project. Respondents
admitted that they are having difficulty selling all the
other lots in Monte Vista allegedly because of the people’s
awareness that the irrigation canal is unstable and does
not comply with the GAR recommendations as adopted by
the Sangguniang Bayan. They claim that prospective
clients either withdrew from the sale or veered away from
Monte Vista for fear of being considered as part of the
statistics if the subdivision is deluged by the overflow of a
substandard irrigation canal. As for those who already
purchased a lot, it is claimed that they now remonstrate to
be relocated as far as possible from the irrigation canal.
Respondents suppose that they deserve additional
compensation not only for the buffer zone to be allocated for
the stability and safety operation of the irrigation canal but
for the damage it has caused by rendering Monte Vista
perceived as less ideal for residential location.60 The just
compensation they are asking is for the actual area taken
by petitioner for the BPIP and those allegedly burdened
and rendered of no use to respondents as a consequence of
the required buffer zones and affected by the purported
substandard work of the irrigation canal. Respondents
believe that there is “taking” in the constitutional sense of
portions of Monte Vista which is more than that which
petitioner originally declared as required by BPIP. Again,

We do not think so.
_______________
60 Rollo, pp. 118-119.
39
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 39

Republic vs. Lazo
Nevertheless, this Court emphasizes that this Decision

is limited to the issue of propriety of the issuance of a writ
of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction as an
interim relief under the peculiar factual milieu of this case.
As the substantive issues presented and disputed by the
parties are not finally resolved, We leave them to the trial
court for resolution after trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The October 22, 2010 Decision and January
31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 107962 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Order dated September 17, 2008 and Supplement to the
Order of September 17, 2008 dated September 19, 2008 of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
which granted respondents’ application for preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction in Civil Case No.
6798-V for Just Compensation with Damages, are
DECLARED VOID AND OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Reyes and

Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—The purpose of a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the
property or rights involved from further injury, until the
issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.
(National Association of Electricity Consumer for Reforms,
Inc. [NASECORE] vs. Energy Regulatory Commission
[ERC], 653 SCRA 642 [2011])
Any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in violation of Section 3, Republic Act No. 8975,
shall suffer
40

Republic vs. Lazo
the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without

pay. (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng,
692 SCRA 109 [2013])
——o0o——
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Republic vs. Lazo 737 SCRA 1, September 29, 2014

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2/21/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 737

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 195594. September 29, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Although the

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

for certiorari is generally addressed to the sound discretion of

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 3

Same; Docket Fees; Late payment of docket fees may be

injunctive writs on government infrastructure projects.—R.A. No.

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

writs on government infrastructure projects. A judge who

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 5

the same vein, the CA likewise erred when it improperly took

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and set aside the October 22, 2010 Decision1 and

(NIA) a portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an

1 Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 7

hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation canal

Construction of a two (2) or double slope retaining walls

On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang Bayan of

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

September 5, 2007, and November 1, 2007.10 He

10 CA Rollo, pp. 85-88.

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 9

Manager of the NIA BPIP, was petitioner’s sole witness,

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the application for

16 Rollo, pp. 101-105.

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Two days later, the trial court issued a Supplement to

The dispositive portion of the Order of September 17, 2008 is

While [petitioner] insists that [respondents] were fully paid for

constitutional sense may include trespass without actual eviction

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 11

property; it may also result in the imposition of burden upon the

Also, the trial court found that petitioner violated R.A.

The Local Government Code embodies the policy of the State to

22 Id., at pp. 32-33.

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 5 of the same Code leaves no doubt as to the

23 Id., at pp. 33-34.

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 13

directed the parties to submit their respective

justification that there was no appeal or any plain, speedy,

In the controversy below, what is put in issue is the consequent

26 Id., at pp. 226-228.

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

quire real property for the right-of-way or location for any

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 15

Republic vs. Lazo

Anent petitioner’s noncompliance with the requirements

28 Rollo, pp. 65-70.

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites

government agencies for confirmation in light of the fact that the

VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 17

[Respondent] could not be persuaded to rely on the accuracy