Safety Duing Offshore Drilling Operation

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Safety During Offshore Drilling

Operation
Khaled ALNabhani1
Centre for Risk, Integrity and Safety Engineering (C-RISE), Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science,
Memorial University, St. John’s, NL, Canada
1
Corresponding author: e-mail addresses: khaledalnabhani@yahoo.com; ksnan2@yahoo.com
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Classification of Offshore Drilling Rigs 2
2.1 Bottom Support Rigs 3
2.2 Floating Rigs 4
3. General Procedures of Offshore Well-Drilling Operations 5
4. A Hypothetical Scenario Simulates Real and Safe Offshore Drilling Operation 8
4.1 Oman-1 Hypothetical Exploration Well 9
5. Common HSE Risk Assessment and Management System Adopted in Offshore
Drilling Operations 25
5.1 HSE Training Matrix 26
5.2 Emergency Responses Plans and Safety Drills 26
5.3 HSE Risk Assessment Matrix 29
6. Discussions 30
6.1 The World’s Most Catastrophic Offshore Drilling Operation Disasters 43
6.2 Common-Reported Occupational Accidents During Offshore Drilling
Operation 50
7. Quantitative Risk Assessment and Dynamic Accident Modeling Using SMART
Approach 50
7.1 The Working Principle of Dynamic Accident Modeling and Quantitative Risk
Assessment Using the SMART Approach 59
8. Conclusion 60
References 61
1. INTRODUCTION
Offshore drilling operations are dangerous and risky operations. Fatal
accidents, eloquent injuries, the loss of assets, and damage to the environment
are results of risks associated with offshore drilling operation that negatively
Methods in Chemical Process Safety # 2018 Elsevier Inc. 1

ISSN 2468-6514 All rights reserved.
https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.mcps.2018.04.007
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2 Khaled ALNabhani
influence the reputation of this industry. Despite all the efforts made by the
stakeholders in the oil and gas industry to prevent the occurrence of accidents
but have failed to eliminate the probability of operational or occupational
accidents occurring. The resulting impacts of these accidents pose a major
threat to the future of oil and gas industry due to the potential social, eco-
nomic, and environmental consequences associated with.
Reaching the primary goal of achieving better standards of occupa-
tional health, safety, and environmental protection will be developed by
strengthening safety measures with substantial better understanding of safe
operational procedures by following recommended safe operational guide-
lines. In view of developing a safe operational guideline and safety processes
to promote safety in the offshore well-drilling operations, it is very impor-
tant to get a good understanding of offshore drilling operations and learn
from past accident and develop a dynamic integrated safe system able to
update any change or deviation from the main system and its subsystem
components. Thus one of the fundamental objectives of this chapter is to scru-
tinize the sequence of the drilling operation that is backed up by a hypothetical
scenario regarding the existing offshore well-drilling operations. This scenario
will also examine various aspects of the operation that portray the typical prac-
tices used globally during the offshore oil and gas drilling operations and to
accurately depict an actual oil well-drilling process in view of unveiling the
necessary methods of carrying out a safer operational process. Although, off-
shore drilling operations are commonly similar in terms of the applied methods
but there might be variances depending on the characteristics of the oil well,
field, the type of drilling rig, formation type, geological features, operational
modification or deviation from the processes, technical specifications, rep-
lanning identified projects, or operations based on the contractual terms that
define the general operations such as well-trajectory changes.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFSHORE DRILLING RIGS

The design of offshore drilling rigs takes in consideration two impor-
tant features which are portability and the maximum water depths in which
they are being used as shown in Fig. 1.
Usually, offshore drilling rigs used in the oil and gas industry are the
rotary offshore drilling rigs that consist of six in-built systems as stated below:
1. Power system
2. Hoisting system
3. Rotary system
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Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 3
Fig. 1 Offshore drilling operations.
4. Drilling fluid circulating system

5. Well-control system and
6. Well-monitoring system
Accordingly, offshore drilling rigs used in the oil and gas industry fall under
two categories.
2.1 Bottom Support Rigs

1. Drilling barge: Is a barge where a complete drilling rig unit is fitted or con-
structed on it. Drilling barges are also called Mobile Offshore Drilling
Unit (MODU), which is moved to different locations using a tugboat.
Usually, drilling barrages are not designed to operate in deep seas, but
they are designed to drill on shallow waters with depth about 50 ft like
inland lakes and rivers.
2. Jack-up rigs: The Jack-up drilling rigs are the most common offshore
bottom-supported drilling rigs that are classified as a MODU. The fea-
tures of Jack-up drilling rigs are similar to the drilling barge rigs, which
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4 Khaled ALNabhani
are built on a floating body structure. The dimensions of the structure

play important role for the drilling rig to be moved from one location
to another with a tugboat. The Jack-up drilling rigs can be fitted with
varying lengths of leg support suitable for different offshore depths
and the process of installing a jack-up rig involves raising the rig above
water level on hydraulic legs that extend as far as the sea floor for balance.
The Jack-up drilling rigs are designed to operate in an open water and are
suitable to be used in shallow waters, and moderate waters with depths
are low as 450 ft.
3. Platform rigs: This type of drilling rigs is designed and built on a fixed plat-
forms that are permanently installed and are left there even after drilling
activities are over due to the fact that the cost of moving these platforms
or dismantling the rig is very costly. Therefore, rigs are left in the plat-
form after completing drilling operation and used later for any work over
activities.
2.2 Floating Rigs

1. Submersible rigs: The submersible rigs have similar properties to the drilling
barges; they are engineered for use in the open ocean waters that have
relatively shallow depths. Some features of the rig include a structure
supported by huge buoyant devices that are submerged and flooded. They
offer support during a drilling process by resting on the seafloor. When
the work is complete, the water is then pumped out of the buoyant devices
to restore the buoyancy of the vessel that is drawn to a different location.
This rig is classified as a MODU.
2. Semisubmersible rig: The semisubmersible drilling rigs are the most pop-
ular type of offshore floating drilling rigs. They are used for deep sea dril-
ling with depths of more than 6000 ft. They are moved between multiple
locations using their in-built engines; these rigs are classified as MODU.
When in use, the pontoons of this rig become partially flooded. They are
posted at locations by mooring lines that have been attached to the sea-
floor anchors or by the flexible propellers (thrusters); they are rotated to
keep the vessel stationary dynamically over the hole (this is referred to as
dynamically positioned).
3. Drillships: The drillships are larger ships that have been built for offshore
drilling operations in deepwater operations of depths as much as 13,000 ft.
They are built on traditional ship structure and moved between locations
by their engines. The drillships are not designed for use in turbulent waters
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like the semisubmersibles, but they have the advantage of a larger storage
capacity. The drillships are cheaper than the semisubmersibles, the modern
designs use the dynamic positioning system to remain positions over the
drilling site, this system adds to the high cost of the drillship. They are
adequate for drilling operations over long periods without the need for
logistic support because of their large size and bigger storage space. Drillships
move faster between locations than the semisubmersibles because of their
own engines. They are classified as Mobile.
3. GENERAL PROCEDURES OF OFFSHORE

WELL-DRILLING OPERATIONS
The offshore drilling operations in the oil and gas sector are done in
accordance with a set of steps that make up the entire process. The first step
in this process is drilling a large diameter hole; this is followed by running a
large diameter casing, which is called a conductor. As drilling progress
downward, there will be an increase in the downhole pressure, while this
takes place smaller holes are progressively drilled. The next step in this pro-
cess is the installation of smaller and stronger casings at the previous casing
shoe point. In the event of the casing extending back to the surface, it will be
referred to as liners. The liners are designed with the purpose of fortifying
the well. In line with this occurrence, it should be noted that each well has an
independent well design, different from the rest. This variation occurs as a
result of different criteria. During the process of drilling from a platform or in
drilling activities that involve the use of a jack-up rig, a conductor pipe is
installed. The conduction pipe is securely set on the seabed to permit a
circulation of the drilling fluid that is responsible for removing the cuttings.
These drilling processes also include the installation of blowout preventers
(BOPs) below the drilling rig to prevent any kicks during the drilling
process.
Spudding is one of the initial processes during a drilling process. Offshore
deepwater wells are spudded prior to the installation of a riser and then a
combined of seawater and sweeps are employed to drill the top hole section.
To achieve the most effective deepwater well designs, the first casing string is
positioned at a shallow depth that ensures the formation has an adequate
mechanical strength to prevent a collapse of the formation. This action also
fortifies the formation against the pressure that will be generated in the next
(deeper) interval. There is a limit to the number of casing strings that can be
applied in a well, and for this reason, the riserless drilling process which is
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6 Khaled ALNabhani
water based and uses weight drilling fluids is used to drill to a depth at which
the formations have the required strength, this process consequently causes
the discharge of weighted water-based mud in large volumes on the seafloor.
Drawing from insights in this field over the past decades has resulted in
the development of mechanical subsea systems that facilitate deepwater
riserless drilling with weighted mud permit the application of a dual-gradient
hydrostatic pressure.
The BOP and riser are installed on the wellhead system at the seafloor once
the section at the top of the hole is drilled. The primitive function of the drilling
riser is to calculate the drilling fluid (also referred to as the drilling mud) to expel
the cuttings. The wellhead system is run, while it is connected to the first string
of casing that has been fitted inside a conductor casing. Conductor casing is
commonly conducted as “riserless drilling,” without a riser connection hence
the fluid and cuttings are deposited directly on the seafloor.
In the process of drilling, the drilling bit (of an ideal size and specifications
referred as bit optimization) is rotated to penetrate certain geological forma-
tions mechanically or hydraulically or with the use of a downhole motor.
The hole is drilled into the subsurface formations using high-pressure drilling
fluid (mud) that is circulated down through the bottom-hole assembly
(BHA) to the bit nozzles. While circulating downward, drilling fluid (mud)
lifts the drilling cuttings upward through the casing annulus. The circulation
system of the drilling fluid starts at the mud tank, which holds a large volume
of mixed drilling fluid. The mud pumps used to draw the drilling fluid from
these tanks and pumps, the drilling mud back at a high pressure inside the
BHA to the drilling bit. This also generates hydraulic power to rotate the
bit through roller bearings inside the bit and penetrate geological formations
and circulate back the drill cuttings to the surface. Drilling mud also used to
cool down the drilling bit. This is the reason why pit optimization is crucial
to increasing the rate of penetration during a drilling process. The fluid and
drill cuttings channeled to the surface are separated at the surface by the
vibrating shale shakers. The shale shakers are fitted with fine screens of var-
ious microns that expedite the removal of drill cuttings from the drilling
fluid. The fluid is further processed by passing it through a degasser to elim-
inate gas; supplemental solids contained in it are separated with the use of
desanders, desilters, and centrifuges. Also, the drilling fluid is chemically
treated to retain the important properties that make it reusable. Currently,
the offshore drilling industry is delineated by common practices of waste
management deposal and management, which are employed depending
on the regulatory permits that apply and cost cuttings plans. In these
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processes, the drill cuttings may be discharged on the ocean water, or

retrieved and sent to land for disposal or converted into slurry if they are
found to containing radioactive hazardous materials that used to be
reinjected for hydraulic fracturing activities or for enhanced oil recovery
applications. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a clear system that con-
trols fluid management efficiently and ensures peculiar treatment because of
the high costs of the drilling fluid; this risk associated with it; and limitation of
storage capacity in drilling units.
The planning stages of a drilling process involve the evaluation and
design of the well’s depth interval; the results will determine the need for
a reevaluation and modification during the wellbore drilling and construc-
tion processes. This is a common practice in the case of an exploration well
due to a lack of correlated information in the new field. Factors such as the
length of each interval, the density of drilling fluid, the drilling BHA design,
the casting design, the type and quantity of cement that will be used, the
type of drilling fluid to be used, and many other considerations are decided
based on the magnitude of surface pressure anticipated, operational problems
encountered during drilling, formation evaluation results, and other drilling
parameters. Other determinants used in making these decisions include the
limitation of selected equipment, well cost optimization, the actual wellbore,
reservoir conditions, etc.
There are a variety of techniques used in the identification of potentially
promising formations or sometimes referred to as the pay zone within the
geological formations being drilled. The most basic techniques are mud log-
ging, well logging, and coring. Mud logging and coring processes for
instance involve the evaluation of drill cuttings and formation samples that
are collected during drilling process to determine the formation type and the
presence of hydrocarbons. Moreover, the sophisticated techniques referred
to as well logging or measurement, while drilling involves the use of special
electronic tools and sensors. These techniques are run either in the drill string
or on a wire line commonly at selected casing points. The aim of this process
is to evaluate the key rock and formation properties using spectral gamma
logs, porosity, resistivity, neutron logs, and other geochemical sensors. These
techniques could also be used to investigate the integrity of cement work
done for casing such as the cement bond logs (CBLs).
The establishment of well control is achieved by creating barriers to pre-
vent unexpected influxes of formation fluids into the wellbore that usually
known as a well kick. They are referred to as safety barriers. A drilling fluid
of sufficient density is used to generate the preeminent safety barrier; this
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8 Khaled ALNabhani
produces a hydrostatic pressure that restricts the influx of subsurface forma-

tion pressure. Radically, the density of drilling has varying properties that
range between light mud such as seawater or to heavy mud, which is in accor-
dance with the formation and wellbore conditions. It is vital to have in mind
that if the density of the drilling fluid is too high or the exposed formations
are too weak, it might result in the existence of fractures. This situation could
potentially hinder the circulation of drilling fluid. Consequently, it might lead
to a kink or a considerable damage to the formation.
Accordingly, the pay zone form the wire line logging will be identified
and subsequently perforated. Then based on the collected data from logging
and conditions of the reservoir, it may be fractured hydraulically and stim-
ulated using acids to enhance the production. Finally, based on certain com-
pletion program, the drilled well is completed in two phases called upper
and lower completion. The upper completion is made up of the production
tubing from the production tree to the subsurface safety valve and the pro-
duction tubing that connects with the production packer that is installed in
the production liner. The lower completion is made up of the gravel-pack
packer, sand control screens, and a lower sump packer. These parts are all
connected by the production tubing. Finally, the completion of the well
involves the installation of a production tree sitting on the seafloor that can
be either vertical or horizontal, electric or hydraulic.
4. A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO SIMULATES REAL

AND SAFE OFFSHORE DRILLING OPERATION
The Arabian Peninsula is one of the wealthiest regions in the world
in terms of wealth generated from oil. This region controls the largest
and most productive oil and gas fields in the world. For instance, the Ghawar
onshore field in Saudi Arabia is considered as the largest field in the world
(Sorkhab, 2007). Its dimensions are almost 280 km in length and it has a
width of 30 km. This oil field produces an estimated 6.25% of the world’s
oil (Sorkhab, 2007). The Arabian Peninsula regions are known to have
relatively similar geological formations, hence the oil and gas can be found
existing together in both the onshore and offshore fields. Worth mentioning
that, Sultanate of Oman own a very strategic geographical location in the
Arabian Peninsula with a coastline of 3165 km formed between the Arabian
Sea on the southeast and the Gulf of Oman connects with the Indian Ocean
at the northeast (International Business Publications, 2009). Oman’s strategic
geographic location increases the likelihood of Oman owning one of the
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largest oil and gas reservoirs in the region. This accomplishment will be deter-
mined by the outcome of ongoing explorations. Since, Oman is considered
as one of the preeminent countries that have successfully achieved the highest
standards of occupational health, safety, and environmental protection in rela-
tion to safe oil and gas drilling operations. Accordingly, a hypothetical scenario
was developed from Oman that simulates the operations of actual offshore
drilling explorations and exhibits a safe drilling operation presented here, so
that it can be used as an important reference for future academic studies or
as an important standard for the oil and gas industry.
4.1 Oman-1 Hypothetical Exploration Well1

4.1.1 Well Objective
The hypothetical scenario for drilling an offshore exploration well known as
Oman-1 and is scheduled to be drilled in block November 18 in the north-
east of Oman (Fig. 2). The Jack-up drilling rig will be used for this project
because of its capacity to drill in shallow waters in depths up to 400 ft. The
proposed duration for this project is 100 days as shown in Table 1.
The primary objective of the well is to facilitate the exploration of poten-
tial zones, where hydrocarbon reserves are suspected to exist in the Arab res-
ervoir. This is in accordance with the initial interpretation of the seismic
surveys conducted in 2015. The primary objective of Oman-1 is to use
source rock and secondary formations to explore the potential extension
of pay zones and to produce hydrocarbon by fracking the tight reservoir.
This will be done by drilling a vertical pilot hole to a depth of 12,000 ft then
to drill horizontally to a depth of 16,000 ft. The secondary objective of this
project is to collect geological data stored in reservoir rocks at vertical depths
of 6000 and 12,000 ft and at horizontal section of 12,000–16,000 ft, where
fracking horizontal section and kick point are planned to be at 137.3 degree to
enhance hydrocarbon production. This information will aid the future activ-
ities aimed at developing the fields in block November 18. Processes such as
mud logging, coring, and wire line logging proposed to be used to evaluate
the well. Finally, well will be completed according to the updated completion
program based on collected data.
In the course of drilling exploration well Oman-1 activity, only two sup-
ply and logistics vessels will be used to transport catering provisions, supplies,
casing/tubing, drilling, tools fuel, fresh water, mud, and chemicals, and
1
Geological formations and depths assumed in this hypothetical scenario may resemble or slightly differ
from one location to another due to geological faults.
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10 Khaled ALNabhani
Fig. 2 Oman-1 well schematic.
Table 1 Oman-1 Well Time Breakdown vs Depth

Hole Depth Accumulated
Section (in.) (TD/MD) (ft) Interval (ft) Casing (in.) Time (Days)
42 500 0–500 vertical 36 10
17½ 3800 500–3800 vertical 13⅜ CSG 27
12¼ 8000 3800–8000 vertical 9⅝ CSG 40
8½ 12,000 8000–12,000 vertical 7 LNR 60
6 16,000 12,000–16,000 horizontal 4½ LNR 100
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cementing materials to the drilling rig. Supply vessels will also be deployed to
transport used hazardous waste materials from the drilling rig in block
November 18 to Duqum disposal facility for onshore disposal. The drilling
unit will be fully operational at the well location, a temporary 500 m radius as
a statutory safety zone will be created around the drilling unit, and this means
no vessels will be permitted to enter this area with the exception of the dril-
ling units support vessels. For this purpose, the ports—Sultan Qaboos port,
Duqum port, and Sohar port—have been proposed to be used as the logistic
base for the mobilization of drilling vessels and equipment. Morever, a heli-
copter will be used to transport to facilitate crew change and to transport
visitors between the coast and the rig. For this purpose, a medium range heli-
copter will be exclusively made available for the duration of the drilling
activity to facilitate crew mobility using Muscat International Airport, Sohar
Airport, and Duqum Airport.
4.1.2 Well Plan

The hypothetical exploration well Oman-1 is planned to be drilled in
100 days as per below time breakdown vs depth.
Drilling operation program summary for well Oman-1
1. Drill top hole section to total depth (TD) 500 ft measured depth (MD)
2. Run and cement 3600 casing
3. Install 3000 diverter
4. Run 17½00 BHA and drill surface hole section to 3800 ft MD
5. Run and cement 13⅜00 surface casing (two cement stages)
6. Install 13⅜00 casing head housing (CHH)
7. Run 12¼00 BHA to drill intermediate hole section to 8000 ft MD
8. Run open hole logs
9. Run and cement 9⅝00 production casing (two-stage cement)
10. Install 13⅜00 well head-10 k BOP
11. Pull out of hole BHA and run coring tools
12. Plug and abandon 8½00 open hole
13. Kick off plug and sidetrack
14. Run directional 8½00 BHA to drill-targeted formation at TD 12,000 ft MD
15. Run and cement 700 liner
16. Run directional 600 BHA to drill to reservoir at TD 16,000 ft MD
17. Run open hole logs
18. Run and cement 4½00 liner
19. Complete the well according to completion program
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4.1.3 General Prespud Checklist

It is imperative that a prespud checklist is done on wells that have been mar-
ked to be drilled. The essence of this check is to ensure that all the conditions
to ensure the success of spudding is in place and drilling can be commenced.
These precheck processes are aimed at promoting a safe and economical dril-
ling processes as per the plan. Errors while drilling are not accepted because
they could potentially result in huge losses due to high daily rig rate as well as
cause production delay that will hinder the plans for daily oil production
from the wells, which is usually estimated at 30,000–80,000 barrels daily
depending on the reservoir. The below prespud checklist is proposed for
the exploration well (Oman-1) and can be used as an example of a typical
and systematical checklist. This checklist reminds drilling crew about impor-
tant steps required for a safe and economical drilling operations, which includes
but is not limited to:
1. Organize a prespud meeting with the entire workforce who has a role
to play in the well construction.
2. Confirm that all communication equipment and backups are fully
functional.
3. Determine the turbidity of the seawater.
4. Carry out a comprehensive rig acceptance testing and confirm the
functionality of other equipment on the checklist.
5. The drilling contractor should inform the operating company that all the
precheck conditions are done at least 24 h before the scheduled spudding.
6. A proper inspection of every item in the drilling rig should be done to
ascertain rig acceptance.
7. Inspect all sensors; calibration gages then proceed to complete the docu-
mentation for the entire process. Copies of the documentation should be
sent to the operating company before the commencement of spudding.
8. Inspect the supplied Barite and cement onboard to ensure that it is ade-
quate for the process. Arrangements must be made for an extra 50 tons
of these products as back up.
9. Inspect the materials provided for the initial top hole sections to ensure
the quantity at the rig is sufficient.
10. Create an inventory to access the drill pipes, heavyweight drill pipes,
drill collars, lifting subs, elevators, tongs, safety clamps, and slips, cross-
overs, BOP and fishing tools before the commencement of spudding
and are up to the prescribed industry standard.
11. Inspect the liners installed on the mud pumps liners stock and the relief
valves on mud pumps (set at 90% of pressure rating capacity).
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12. Ensure that the trip tank has been adequately calibrated and that all
lines, pumps, and related equipments are ready to be switched when
necessary.
13. Organize a prephase meeting, which should include the entire team
involved in the drilling process for the first top hole section.
14. Ensure that there is a prejob safety meeting (PJSM) organized before
any operation while drilling Oman-1.
15. Conduct a visual inspection of the conductor casing.
16. Inspect the wellhead equipment to ensure they are up to the standards
of the well specification. This inspection will also ascertain that they
are at the location.
17. Verify the positioning of the rig. This assessment should be profession-
ally vetted.
18. Obtain the approval from the operating company prior to well spudding.
4.1.4 Drilling 4200 Top Hole Section

4.1.4.1 Objective
The primary aim of drilling, the 4200 top hole section is to enable the posi-
tioning of a 3600 conductor to fortify the upper section. It is also meant to
prevent any occurrence of formation washout, improve stability of the well
against ocean waves, and it provides a topside support for the planned
platform.
4.1.4.2 Operation Summary

The process of drilling a 4200 -conductor hole will involve the use of a
3600 -mill tooth bit and a 4200 underreamer. The depth of the section TD
is 500 ft. Drilling of the vertical hole is done across the Aruma formation
groups, which are predominantly layers of dolomite, limestone, gypsum,
and claystone. The next phase is the expansion of the hole to 4200 at a landing
depth of 3600 casing, this is done with the underreamer. Finally, the 3400 bit is
applied through the surface to the section TD, the essence of this process is to
make sure that the hole is clean and smooth enough to accommodate the
3600 conductor casing. A cement stringer will be used to cement the conduc-
tor at designated points on the seabed. There is usually no trace of shallow gas
or hydrocarbons at this bearing formation, which occur in the surface hole
section, however, as a safety measure, it is recommended that a diverter is
installed. This diverter will be used also during the drilling of the next surface
hole section, hence a 3000 diverter which is suitable for the 17½00 BHA
surface hole section is installed.
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14 Khaled ALNabhani
Operational risks expected while drilling 4200 hole section

1. Excessive shocks and vibrations, which could cause accidents and inju-
ries due to dropping objects. In the event of this problem encountered
during drilling, a mud motor and a shock sub in BHA will be deployed.
The recommendations are to drill using controlled parameters (reduces
the RPM and increases the WOB, avoids neutral points in the shock sub,
and maximizes the application of soft torque). It is also imperative to
avoid running sensitive tools or BHA components that are known to
be vulnerable to shock and vibrations.
2. Spillage cement on the seabed. If the divers and cameras used at the loca-
tion indicate that cement has been spotted on the seabed, the pumping of
cement should be immediately stopped. The spacer will be mixed with a
dye to see any cement returns in the sea floor. The areas where cement
had been spotted should be properly cleaned.
Recommended safe drilling procedures
1. Hold PJSM. Discuss job data, procedures, contingency plans, safety,
environment, communication means, and assign responsibilities among
crew members.
2. Keep BHA for drilling 4200 hole section ready for operation.
3. Waite for low waves to spud the well.
4. Measure distance of conductor deck, air gap, and water depth.
5. Pick up 3600 BHA, start drilling. Avoid pulling bit out of seabed, while
drilling and making connection.
6. Drill to TD at 500 ft MD. Verify the stinger fits into the shoe.
7. At section TD, sweep the drilled section with Hi-Vis pill and circulate
hole clean.
8. Pick up 4200 underreamer BHA.
9. Wait for slack tide to reenter into the drilled hole and open it to 4200 .
10. At TD sweep Hi-Vis pill and circulate hole clean.
11. Pull out of hole 4200 underreamer BHA.
12. Hold PJSM for 3600 casing running job. Discuss job data, procedures, con-
tingency plans, safety, environment, communication means, and assign
responsibilities among crew members.
13. Pick up and run 3600 conductor casing.
14. Let subsea camera or divers at sea floor to ensure casing enters into
drilled hole. Wait for slack tide, if required.
15. In case of any problem, use slings/tuggers to maneuver casing into the hole.
16. Run in the hole with filling up every casing joint. Use theoretical
volume to fill conductor.
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17. Ensure verticality of conductor.

18. Fill up annulus volume between drill pipe and conductor.
19. Circulate at least two annular volumes. Verify there are no returns from
casing-drill pipe annulus during circulation.
20. Cementing crew to perform PJSM (discuss job data, procedures, safety,
environment, communication means, and assign responsibilities among
crew members).
21. While circulating, the cementing crew prepare for the cementing
job (mix cementing products and cementing lines to be rigged up to
the floor).
22. Pressure test cementing lines to 1500 psi.
23. Start pumping the cement and special care should be taken for pack off
which might cause the casing to collapse. Confirm final cementing
pressure.
24. Stop pumping cement as soon as the cement is seen at seabed. In case of
leaking cement stinger while cementing job, sting out and sting-in back
to stab-in shoe. Slack off drill string weight and continue pumping
cement.
25. Jet flush seabed of any cement to ensure area is clean of cement.
26. Rig down cementing lines and wait on cement.
27. Cut 3600 casing above the deck.
28. Nipple up and install 3000 500 psi diverter spool with diverter line and
hydraulic actuator valve.
29. Install bell nipple and flow line.
30. Function test diverter.
31. Fill up hole to surface and verify no surface leak in diverter system.
32. Pressure test the diverter/casing, to check if there is any leak in the
system.
4.1.5 Drilling 17½00 Surface Hole Section

4.1.5.1 Objective
The primary aim of drilling a 17½00 surface hole section is to isolate the loss
zones that may occur during the creation of the surface hole section from the
reactive shales. This will make it possible for the installed wellhead to pro-
gressively drill into the potential hydrocarbon deposits in the next sections.

Drilling the surface section will involve the use of a 17½00 bit to TD 3800 ft
(MD). Seawater will be used as the drilling fluid due to its adequate PH levels
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16 Khaled ALNabhani
tagged at between 9.5 and 10 for top hole section drilling. The hole will
be drilled across the black and blue shale formation, which is made up of
shale and limestone. The entire areas are swept clean to eliminate all traces
of seawater. The process of cleaning the hole is done by using prehydrated
Bentonite and Duovis Hi-Vi. Finally, a 13⅜ casing will be set inside the blue
shale to cover the total loss zone if any and at the same time isolating the
highly reactive shale. The 13⅜00 casing will be cast in cement in two stages.
Operational risks expected while drilling 17½00 hole section
1. Excessive shocks and vibrations, which could cause accidents and inju-
ries due to dropping objects. In the event of this problem encountered
during drilling, a mud motor and a shock sub in BHA will be deployed.
The recommendations are to drill using controlled parameters (reduces
the RPM and increases the WOB, avoids neutral points in the shock sub,
and maximizes the application of soft torque). It is also imperative to
avoid running sensitive tools or BHA components that are known to
be vulnerable to shock and vibrations.
2. Total losses that could cause a kick. In the event of this challenging
situation while drilling, the drilling process should reach an expected
total loss zone in Aruma and Wasia formations group (1000–2500 ft
MD/TVD). Increase the flow rate while drilling in total losses. Drilling
should continue to reach the casing point, and then it should be switched
to seawater. Spills should be cleared off while drilling.
1. Hold PJSM for drilling job. Discuss job data, procedures, contingency
plans, safety, environment, communication means, and assign respon-
sibilities among crew members.
2. Run in hole 17½00 BHA required to drill 17½00 hole section.
3. Wash down and tag top of cement of the previous section and drill out
stab-in shoe.
4. Continue drilling 17½00 hole section to expected loss zone 1000–2500 ft.
5. Circulate hole clean, to avoid loading of annulus at deeper depth while
drilling with losses.
6. Take survey every stand (three joints of drill pipe).
7. Use conventional spud mud to the depths of 1000–2500 ft, if no loss
occur, continue with spud mud to 3800 ft.
8. In case of losses encountered between 1000 and 2500 ft:
• Switch to seawater treated with lime or mix polysal with seawater to
suppress the shale reactivity and continue drilling.
• Pump in the annulus 10 ppg mud at 75 bbls/h with the trip tank.
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• If weighted mud is not able to catch up, pump around 10 barrel per
minute seawater at backside.
• If Hi-Vis pills are not working effectively and hole cleaning
becomes an issue (excessive drag/over pull in connections, high
break up torque), switch to high-density pills.
9. Continue to drill up to TD 3800 ft.
10. Perform wiper trip to the previous shoe and in case of full returns, while
drilling perform flow check, do not over pull. Ream all tight spots.
11. Hold PJSM for 13⅜00 casing job. Discuss job data, procedures, contin-
gency plans, safety, environment, communication means, and assign
12. Run in hole 13⅜00 surface casing.
13. Circulate hole clean to the loss zone.
14. Cementing crew perform PJSM prior any operation (discuss job data,
procedures, safety, environment, communication means, and assign
responsibilities among crew members).
15. While circulating, the cementing crew prepare for the cementing job.
Mix cementing products and cementing lines to be rigged up to the floor
(first stage tail should extend 500 ft above the 13⅜ casing shoe. Lead
slurry should extend to the total loss zone, or 100 ft above the cementing
stage tool if full circulation maintained through drilling operations. Fifty
percent excess for open hole should be consider in the cement volumes
calculation).
17. Mix and pump first stage lead slurry followed by first stage tail slurry at
constant rate.
18. Increase pressure and inflate the internal casing packer, then increase
pressure to open stage collar according to specification.
19. Circulate confirming full returns.
20. Mix and pump second stage slurry.
21. Drop manually the closing plug.
22. Displace with seawater.
23. Pressure up to close the stage collar.
24. Bleed off and confirm stage collar closed (no U-tube observed).
25. Perform 30 min flow check prior to lifting the diverter.
26. Lift up the diverter.
27. Perform top job to fill the annulus to conductor deck.
28. Install CHH and pressure test CHH welds to 2000 psi.
29. Install 13⅝00 10 K BOP stack, kill, and choke lines.
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18 Khaled ALNabhani
30. Pressure test Ram BOP with low/high pressure 300/4000 psi for
15 min, and annular BOP with low/high pressure 300/3500 psi using
test plug.
31. Keep lower valve in CHH open while testing BOP stack and install
wear bushing.
4.1.6 Drilling 12¼00 Intermediate Hole Section

4.1.6.1 Objective
The primary objective of the drilling this section is to seal and isolate any
unstable shale zones that are possibly discovered in the Wassia and Khamaha
formations group.

The drilling of intermediate hole section will be drilled using 12/1400 pdc bit
across Wassia and Khamaha formations group that usually include Fiqa,
Natih, Nahr Umr, Shuaiba, and Kharabib formations. The 9⅝00 intermediate
casing will be set at TD 8000 ft and cemented in two stages. The purpose of
using a 9⅝ intermediate casing is to effectively isolate the shale/unstable
zones in the formations indicated earlier, to provide an adequate control
of pressure while drilling the next 8½00 hole section.
Operational risks expected while drilling 12¼00 intermediate hole
section
1. One of the potential encountered during drilling 12¼00 intermediate hole
section is the experience of partial or total losses. This happens when the
drilling section is not properly monitored that may lead to a well-control
issue. The consequence of this is a loss of the first safety well-control bar-
rier (drilling fluid). In the event of this occurrence, the drilling parameters
should be closely monitored. Also, LCM should be added to the drilling
mud before it enters the Shuaiba zone (potential zone where losses occur
in between Wassia and Khamah). If losses are not cured, then proceed
with another attempt, the cement plug. Commence drilling with not less
than mud density of 11 ppg of mud cap in annulus.
2. Well control, this situation is one of the consequences of an controlled
“partial/total losses” which will consequently cause the formation pres-
sure to overwhelm hydrostatic pressure exerted by drilling fluid, keep
kill sheet ready. The surge and swab during pull out of hole/run in hole
should be closely monitored. If the problem with controlling the well
still persists, then proceed to using the “bull heading” killing method
or any appropriate well-killing methods.
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3. Poor cement job and a build-up annulus pressure. This will conse-
quently lead to difficulties to control the well, hence a formation integ-
rity test (FIT) and the use of LCM slurry is required to reduce any
potential losses. If the problem persists, the annulus should be isolated
with the use of two-stage cement layers with an inflatable casing packer.
Finally, an evaluation of the cement job should be done by means
of CBL.
4. The release of H2S gas is expected from any deeper formation is pene-
trated because of the lack of additional data from other offset well is
due to the fact that this well is first exploration well drilled in block
November 18. H2S gas is proven to be toxic to human beings even at
minute concentration. At higher concentrations, this gas is known to be
killer, flammable, and corrosive on contact with metals. Processes such
as maritime transportation, fishing, manned oil, and gas infrastructure in
the downstream sector could potentially be affected in the event of a blow-
out as a result of H2S gas explosion. The consequences of this event are
loss of life, interference in business activities, legal liabilities, compensation
claim, fines, and possibly legal prosecution. It is important that a surface
blowout of H2S gas is promptly taken care of and controlled to avoid
loss of life or injuries, fire or explosions at the location. Safety measures
to prevent this accident are the installation of sensors that must be tested
and ascertained to be fully functional. H2S drill and emergency escapes
drills should be regularly conducted at the location with identified master
points.
5. Exposure to different levels of radiation. This is due to unpredictable
emissions from technologically enhanced naturally occurring nuclear
radioactive materials, which are deposited with the return drilling fluid
and drilling cuttings. The workforce is at the risk of exposure to gamma
radiation emissions that are highly penetrative and have the ability to spread
as far as a 100 m as indicated by the API. There is also the risk of ingestion
and inhalation of alpha and beta particles. To prevent this catastrophe at a
location, the preventive measures stipulated by the TENORM safety
management made by ALNabhani, Khan, and Yang (2017a, 2017b)
should be adopted and strictly adhered to.
1. Hold PJSM for drilling job. Discuss job data, procedures, contingency
2. Run in hole 12¼00 BHA for drilling 12¼00 hole section.
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20 Khaled ALNabhani
3. Drill out cement plugs and float collar and float shoe of 17½00 surface
hole section and drill 10–20 ft of the new formation.
4. Perform a FIT (is a test of the strength and integrity of a new formation
as well as test strength of shoe and it is the first step after drilling a casing
shoe track) and a leak off test—LOT (pressure test shoe and formation
until formation breakdown to find the fracture pressure (fracture
gradient) of formation and shoe that help to manage drilling fluid den-
sity in drilling this section). Result of the test must be shared with oper-
ating company prior any further action to be taken in drilling further
this section.
5. Drill till top of Shuaiba, circulate and continue drilling up to TD 8000 ft
MD, take surveys every stand and optimize drilling parameters.
6. Sweep at TD with Hi-Vis pills, circulate, and clean the well.
7. Perform flow check.
8. Perform wiper trip to previous shoe.
9. Ream all tight spots and report if any.
10. Hold PJSM for logging job. Discuss job data, procedures, contingency
11. Rig up wire line tools and perform hole logging.
12. Retrieve wear bushing.
13. Secure the well and repressure test 9⅝00 casing ram using test mandrel,
test pressure should be to 80% of the collapse of the pipe, or the work-
ing pressure of the flanges.
14. Hold PJSM for 9⅝00 casing job. Discuss job data, procedures, contin-
15. Run in hole 9⅝00 production casing to casing point and wash down as
required if any obstruction.
16. Circulate hole clean to the loss zone.
17. Cementing crew perform PJSM prior cementing job. Discuss job data,
procedures, safety, environment, communication means, and assign
18. While circulating, the cementing crew prepare for the cementing job.
Mix cementing products and cementing lines to be rigged up to the
floor (first stage tail should extend 500 ft above the 9⅝00 casing shoe.
Lead slurry should extend to the total loss zone, or 100–200 ft above the
cementing stage tool if full circulation maintained through drilling
operations. Fifty percent excess for open hole should be consider in
the cement volumes calculation).
ARTICLE IN PRESS

20. Mix and pump first stage lead slurry and first stage tail cement slurry at
constant rate.
21. Inflate internal casing packer to open stage collar.
22. Wait on cement and circulate confirming full returns.
23. Flow check the well.
24. Lift up the 13⅜00 BOP stack and install 9⅝00 casing slip and rest BOP stack.
25. Mix and pump second stage slurry.
26. Nipple up and pressure test 13⅜00 -10 k BOP stack.
27. Use plug type tester and pressure test BOP for 5300 psi for 15 min.
4.1.7 Drilling 8½00 Hole

4.1.7.1 Objective
The primary objective of drilling 8½00 hole is to evaluate the reservoirs in
shale, and reservoir rock in Sahtan group formations such as Tuwaiq. This
will be achieved by drilling first a pilot vertical hole using 8½00 pdc bit then
sidetrack to create a secondary wellbore to collect more geological formation
from group formations using coring technique and finally to land 700 liner
prior the reservoir. NaCl polymer mud with mud weight between 10 and
11 ppg will be used to drill this section.

This hole will be drilled across the Sahtan formations group. The 700 liner
will be set at TD 12,000 ft MD. The 700 liner purpose is to provide struc-
tural support for the well.
Major expected operational risk while drilling 8½00 hole section
1. Well control, this situation is one of the consequences of uncontrolled
partial/total losses or lack of sufficient drilling fluid weight, which will
consequently cause the formation pressure to overwhelm hydrostatic
pressure exerted by drilling fluid, therefore, keep kill sheet ready. The
surge and swab during pull out of hole or during run in hole should
be closely monitored. If the problem with controlling the well still per-
sists, then you may proceed to using the “Bull heading” killing method
or any appropriate killing method.
2. The release of H2S gas is expected from any deeper formation is pene-
trated because of the lack of additional data from other offset well is
due to the fact that this well is first exploration well drilled in block
November 18. H2S gas is proven to be toxic to human beings even at
minute concentration. At higher concentrations, this gas is known to
be killer, flammable, and corrosive on contact with metals. Processes
ARTICLE IN PRESS
22 Khaled ALNabhani
such as maritime transportation, fishing, manned oil, and gas infrastruc-

ture in the downstream sector could potentially be affected in the event
of a blowout as a result of H2S gas explosion. The consequences of this
event are loss of life, interference in business activities, legal liabilities,
compensation claim, fines, and possibly legal prosecution. It is important
that a surface blowout of H2S gas is promptly taken care of and controlled
to avoid loss of life or injuries, fire or explosions at the location. Safety
measures to prevent this accident are the installation of sensors that must
be tested and ascertained to be fully functional. H2S drill and emergency
escapes drills should be regularly conducted at the location with identi-
fied master points.
3. Exposure to different levels of radiation. This is due to unpredictable
emissions from technologically enhanced naturally occurring nuclear
radioactive materials, which are deposited with the return drilling fluid
and drilling cuttings. The workforce is at the risk of exposure to gamma
radiation emissions that are highly penetrative and have the ability to spread
as far as a 100 m as indicated by the API. There is also the risk of ingestion
and inhalation of alpha and beta particles. To prevent this catastrophe at
a location, the preventive measures stipulated by the TENORM safety
management made by ALNabhani et al. (2017a, 2017b) should be adopted
and strictly adhered to.
1. Hold PJSMs for drilling operation. Discuss job data, procedures, con-
tingency plans, safety, environment, communication means, and assign
2. Run in hole 8½00 BHA for drilling 8½00 hole section.
3. Drill out stage tool, cement plugs, and float collar of the previous
section.
4. Drill to 10 ft above the float shoe, circulate bottoms up.
5. Perform casing pressure test to 5500 psi.
6. Continue drilling out float shoe and 10–20 ft of new formation,
circulate hole clean.
7. Hold PJSM and perform FIT and result must be shared with operating
company.
8. Continue drilling 8½00 pilot hole section to the coring points.
9. Sweep the hole and perform flow check.
10. Perform wiper trip to previous shoe.
11. Hold PJSM and perform coring operations.
12. Remove wear bushing and perform BOP pressure test.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
13. Continue drilling 8½00 pilot hole section to TD 12,000 ft MD.

14. Circulate hole clean.
15. Flow check and pull out of hole to surface.
16. Hold PJSM to start 8½00 hole logging program.
17. Perform wiper trip.
18. Hold PJSM then proceed 8½00 hole plug and abandonment to start the
sidetrack section.
19. Batch mix and pump the cement slurry and batch mix and pump of kick
off plug.
20. Rig down cement equipment.
21. Hold PJSM run in hole sidetrack BHA until tag top of cement and
initiate sidetrack hole.
22. Pull out of hole side track BHA and run in hole directional BHA and
deviate as per directional plan of 137.3 degree and set parameters to
finally have a horizontal well at 12,000 ft.
23. Pull out if hole directional BHA and circulate hole clean.
24. Spot Hi-Vis/high-density pill in open hole.
25. Flow check and pull out of hole to surface.
26. Hold PJSM and run in hole 700 liner.
27. Set the liner hanger and set hanger by slacking off the liner weight.
28. Bleed off pressure.
29. When liner weight has been lost (in deviated well may be not easily
clear) and the tool is released, set down again on top of the liner to com-
pensate for upward hydraulic forces.
30. The cement volume to be calculated based on the volume from the
caliper log data plus 50% excess.
31. Hold PJSM, rig up cement equipment and pump cement slurry for
700 liner as per cementing program.
32. Rig down cement equipment.
33. BOP stack will remain same, as was on previous section 10 k
arrangement.
34. Use plug type tester and pressure test BOP for 5500 psi for 15 min.
4.1.8 600 Hole Horizontal Section

4.1.8.1 Objective
The main objective of drilling this section is to drill horizontally from
12,000 ft and therefore have horizontal access through paying zone for more
production.
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24 Khaled ALNabhani

The plan is to drill horizontally of 4000 ft of 600 hole section to TD
16,000 ft MD across shale and reservoir rocks in Khuff and Gharief forma-
tion. Then 600 horizontal hole will drilled using salt polymer mud of 11.5 ppg
and be cased with 4½00 cemented liner. Finally, the well will be stimulated
with multistage fracturing equipment.
Major expected operational risk while drilling 600 hole section
1. Well control, this situation is one of the consequences of uncontrolled
partial/total losses or lack of sufficient drilling fluid weight, which will con-
sequently cause the formation pressure to overwhelm hydrostatic pressure
exerted by drilling fluid, therefore, keep kill sheet ready. The surge and
swab during pull out of hole or during run in hole should be closely mon-
itored. If the problem with controlling the well still persists, then you may
proceed to using the “Bull heading” killing method or any appropriate
killing method.
2. The release of H2S gas is expected from any deeper formation is penetrated
because of the lack of additional data from other offset well is due to the fact
that this well is first exploration well drilled in block November 18. H2S gas
is proven to be toxic to human beings even at minute concentration.
At higher concentrations, this gas is known to be killer, flammable, and
corrosive on contact with metals. Processes such as maritime transporta-
tion, fishing, manned oil, and gas infrastructure in the downstream sector
could potentially be affected in the event of a blowout as a result of H2S gas
explosion. The consequences of this event are loss of life, interference in
business activities, legal liabilities, compensation claim, fines, and possibly
legal prosecution. It is important that a surface blowout of H2S gas is
promptly taken care of and controlled to avoid loss of life or injuries, fire
or explosions at the location. Safety measures to prevent this accident are
the installation of sensors that must be tested and ascertained to be fully
functional. H2S drill and emergency escapes drills should be regularly con-
ducted at the location with identified master points.
3. Exposure to different levels of radiation. This is due to unpredictable emis-
sions from technologically enhanced naturally occurring nuclear radioactive
materials, which are deposited with the return drilling fluid and drilling cut-
tings. The workforce is at the risk of exposure to gamma radiation emissions
that are highly penetrative and have the ability to spread as far as a 100 m
as indicated by the API. There is also the risk of ingestion and inhalation
of alpha and beta particles. To prevent this catastrophe at a location, the pre-
ventive measures stipulated by the TENORM safety management made by
ALNabhani et al. (2017a, 2017b) should be adopted and strictly adhered to.
ARTICLE IN PRESS

1. Hold PJSM for drilling operation. Discuss job data, procedures, contin-
2. Ensure waste management—skip and ship system (transport of cuttings
to shore for disposal) is fully functional.
3. Run in hole 600 BHA for drilling 600 hole section.
4. Drill out landing collar and float collar to 10 ft above float shoe of
the previous section.
5. Perform casing pressure test to 4500 psi for 15 min.
6. Continue drilling out float shoe and 10–20 ft of new formation.
7. Hold PJSM and perform FIT.
8. Continue drilling 600 horizontal section to well TD at 16,000 ft. MD.
9. Perform flow check.
10. Perform wiper trip to the previous shoe.
11. Circulate hole clean, sweeping hole with Hi-Vis pill.
12. Pull out of hole to surface.
13. Hold PJSM and run in hole 600 wireline equipment.
14. Pull out of hole and rig down wireline tools.
15. Circulate hole clean.
16. Spot Hi-Vis pill on bottom.
17. Hold PJSM and run in hole 4½00 liner to the TD.
18. Set hanger by slacking off the liner weight.
19. Bleed off pressure to zero.
20. Circulate bottom up and hold PJSM for 4½00 liner cement job.
21. Rig up cement tools and pressure test lines to 6000 psi.
22. Cement 4½00 liner with 50% open hole excess.
23. Ensure well is static and rig down cement equipment.
24. Well to be finally completed as per completion program.
5. COMMON HSE RISK ASSESSMENT

AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ADOPTED
IN OFFSHORE DRILLING OPERATIONS
The following HSE tools are commonly used in the oil and gas indus-
try as a part of the HSE management system adopted also in offshore drilling
operations. They include:
• HSE training matrix
• Emergency responses, plans, and safety drills
• HSE risk assessment matrix
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26 Khaled ALNabhani
These techniques are characterized as classical in nature as can be explored

further in the following sections. Whereas, the uses of these techniques are
limited to certain types of identified risks and consequences for which
the professionals have proffered limited mitigating recommendations.
Unfortunately, these techniques are not able to dynamically integrate or
update any change or deviations that are commonly experienced with very
complicated systems and subsystems such as what is happening in the oil and
gas operations.
5.1 HSE Training Matrix

The HSE training program is widely recognized as the recommended stan-
dard in the offshore drilling industry. The program includes training every
staff involved in the drilling operations (workers, contractors, subcontrac-
tors, etc.). It is mandatory that every personnel involved in the project
undergo a comprehensive HSE competency assessment at different levels
of HSE training. It is practically impossible to commence a drilling operation
if the workforce has not been confirmed to possess the required certifications
that indicate they have completed the required HSE courses. HSE training
course is mostly merged with the induction courses newly employed staff go
through in the oil and gas industry. There are different levels of HSE training
requirements for offshore drilling operations; these classifications have been
made based on the competencies as illustrated in Table 2.
5.2 Emergency Responses Plans and Safety Drills

In the oil and gas industry, the primary aim of every drilling company is to
professionally conduct safe drilling operations without any of operational,
occupational, and environmental accidents. It is the priority of drilling com-
panies to conduct safe drilling operations with adequate emergency response
system that meets the offshore drilling specifications for safety and part of safe
HSE management system. These measures include but are not limited to
H2S gas leak response, environmental pollution response, as well as quick
responses to any failure in the communication system. Responses to fire
and incidences of explosion for instance are set up as part of the contingency
plans in the case of related emergencies during drilling operations. The man-
agement must endorse these plans and an adequate awareness must be cre-
ated at the project location among all workers levels. The safety measures are
focused on developing a safer drilling procedure, which includes but not are
limited to well spudding and other related operations; the emergency safety
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Table 2 Minimum HSE Training/Competency Requirements Training Matrix Intended as

Guidance Only for Safe Offshore Drilling Operation
S. No. HSE Training Course Required Workers Categories
1 Medical Fitness Examinations All
2 HSE Induction All
3 H2S Awareness & Escape All
4 Basic Offshore Safety Induction & Emergency All
Training (BOSIET)
5 Site HSE Induction All
6 Assigning a Mentor All
7 Operation Familiarization All
8 Equipment Familiarization All
9 Competency Assessment All
10 Life Support Training All
11 H2S All
12 Chemical Hazardous Material Handling Professional level
and Management
13 Fire Warden Professional level
14 Radioactive Management Professional level
15 Environmental Management Professional level
16 Health Risk Assessment Professional level
17 Process Safety Professional level
18 Well Integrity Professional level
19 Crane Rigger and Banksman Professional level
20 HAZOOP Professional level
21 Life Saving Rules Professional level
22 Injury Prevention Program Professional level
23 IT Security Professional level
24 Mobile Elevating Work Platform Operator Professional level
25 Overhead Traveling Crane Operator Professional level
26 Forklift Operator Professional level
Continued
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28 Khaled ALNabhani
Table 2 Minimum HSE Training/Competency Requirements Training Matrix Intended as

Guidance Only for Safe Offshore Drilling Operation—cont’d
S. No. HSE Training Course Required Workers Categories
27 Welder Certification Professional level
28 Engagement Alert Professional level
29 Confined Space and SCBA Professional level
30 Working at High Professional level
31 Gas Testing Professional level
32 Incident Investigator Professional level
33 Permit to Work Holder Professional level
34 Permit to Work Signatory Professional level
35 Permit to Work Auditor Professional level
36 High Voltage Safety Professional level
37 Environmental Hazard Identification Professional level
38 IWCF—Well Control Professional level
39 Stuck Pipe Prevention Professional level
40 DROPS Professional level
41 First Aider Professional level
42 Stuck Pipe Prevention Professional level
44 Dynamic Positioning Operator Professional level
45 Helicopter Landing Officer Professional level
46 Lifting Operations Professional level
47 Offshore Lifeboat Coxswain Professional level
48 Helideck Emergency Response Training Professional level
49 HSE Leadership Program Supervisory and
management level
50 Accident Investigation and Report Supervisory and
management level
51 Safety Leadership for Supervisors and Supervisory and
Managers management level
52 Safety for Executives Executives
53 Safety Leadership for Executives Executives
ARTICLE IN PRESS
responses that define safe gathering area outside 30-ppm rupture exposure
radius circle; inspection and calibration of all gas monitors and related equip-
ment, inspection of communications, and firefighting equipment’s and
prominently labeling safe areas within the location where the workforce
can gather in the event of an emergency.
Furthermore, it is a common practice during offshore drilling operations
as a part of HSE management system is to regularly organize safety drills tai-
lored to the different kinds of emergency situations that may occur. The aim
of this exercise is to ensure every member of the workforce knows the cor-
rect way to respond in the event of an emergency. These measures include
(but not limited to):
1. Well-control drills. Minimum frequency required is twice per week
per crew (four drills).
2. Rescue from confined space drill, minimum frequency required is once
per 12 weeks.
3. Casualty handling drill, minimum frequency required is once per 8 weeks.
4. H2S drill, minimum frequency required is once per week (two drills).
5. First aid drill, minimum frequency required is once per 12 weeks.
6. BOP drill, minimum frequency required is once per week (two drills).
7. Vertical rescue drill, minimum frequency required is twice per year.
8. Fire pump drill, minimum frequency required is once per week.
9. Oil spill equipment clean out drill, minimum frequency required is
once every 6 months.
10. Disaster drill, minimum frequency required is once every 6 months.
11. Fire-fighting/BA drill, minimum frequency required is once per 4 weeks.
12. Confined space rescue drill, minimum frequency required is once every
12 weeks.
5.3 HSE Risk Assessment Matrix

Theoretically, it is one of the main priorities of stakeholders in the oil and gas
industry to adopt and adhere to the adequate safety measures during explor-
atory and drilling explorations. While, practically and in reality, the situation
may be different, where some senior rig managers are paying more attention
to drill well faster and striving to achieve more cost saving for their compa-
nies. This could compromise adoption of safer practices that can result in
serious catastrophe. Most of accidents that have happened in the past were
as a result of negligence and wrong decision making. Other causes include
working at a quicker pace due to pressure to meet targets during a drilling
ARTICLE IN PRESS
30 Khaled ALNabhani
project, problems could also arise due to frequent modifications made to the
drilling processes and production plans, and also the high drilling contractors
rate especially in cases where the drilling project has been outsourced based
on cost per feet, cost per day, or well lump-sum conditions. It should be
noted that the safety measures and environmental risk assessment provision
currently being used in the oil and gas industry are basically classic and asso-
ciate with a lot of uncertainty. These safety provisions are also observed to be
static and void of the capacity to be applied dynamically under unforeseen
events or in cases where the standard processes of the normal integrated sys-
tem have been modified. For example, there are many techniques which are
used by in the oil and gas industry to establish safety management and risk
assessment plans as part of their HSE management system, such as the risk
assessment matrix, hazards and effects management process, hazard identifi-
cation (HAZID), hazards analysis (HAZAN), hazards and operability
(HAZOP), task risk assessment (TRA), quantitative risk assessment
(QRA), and job safety plan (JSP), which have been aligned with the scope
of work, risk scenarios within that scope of work. In many instances, risk
assessments are not scientifically based or developed by means of academic
expertise, for example, lack of aspects of psychology that is focused on the
science of behavior and the mind. This could provide an explanation for the
continued occurrence of accidents despite the efforts that have been put in
place to prevent accident and to improve safety measures in the industry.
Table 3 is an actual example of risk assessment that widely and commonly
used for offshore drilling operation that is scientifically discovered to be not
sufficient enough to provide enough protection to workers or safe opera-
tion. Hence the need for reevaluation before it is developed into a quanti-
tative dynamically applicable risk assessment that covers all possible
emergencies that could occur as an integration of abnormal events in the
drilling operation in both main system and its subsystem.
6. DISCUSSIONS
The International Labor Organization (2017) has reported that there
are a growing number of deaths in the industry after every 15 s due to acci-
dents or disease related to work. The overall index indicates that 153
workers are victims of work-related incidents. The daily reports show an
average of 6000 people who die as a result of work-related diseases or occu-
pational accidents, and more than 2.3 million deaths and 317 million acci-
dents are recorded annually. The consequence of work-related diseases or
Table 3 An Example of an Offshore Drilling Operation Risk Assessment Matrix
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Continued
Table 3 An Example of an Offshore Drilling Operation Risk Assessment Matrix—cont’d
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42 Khaled ALNabhani
occupational accidents occurrences in the industry is a loss of manpower rep-

resented as compromised productivity due to nonproductive time (NPT).
Whereas, NPT is usually a tool used to evaluate safety performance in the
industry. The consequences of these daily work-related accidents are alarming.
Economically, the low standards of occupational safety and poor health prac-
tices cause an estimated 4% loss in the global gross-domestic product (GDP)
annually. Moreover, factors such as human errors, injuries, fatalities, and envi-
ronmental damages are not considered as part of the assessments for classical
risk and safety measurement and therefore are associated with high levels of
uncertainty. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the safety stan-
dards and risk assessment practices in the oil and gas industry with the support
of academic experts in this field.
Oil and gas industry is known to be one of the leading industries as
shown by the global statistics and it is geared toward meeting the global
demands for energy. This industry has also employed a large number of
workforces. A good example in the United States is the Gulf of Mexico that
is acclaimed to have one of the world’s modest concentrations of offshore
rigs. It was tagged at about 213 units in 2015, where the average number
of employees in any offshore drilling rigs revolves an average of not less than
80 employees.
Several reports from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC, 2013) have indicated an increased morbidity and mortality rate in
the oil and gas industry. The weekly report that was published on April 26,
2013 reported that a significant increase in the fatality rate of 27.1 against
3.8 deaths per 100,000 from 2003 to 2010 in the oil and gas extraction industry
situated in the United States (onshore and offshore activities). On the contrary,
a report in 2010 showed 11 deaths that occurred in the deepwater horizon
explosion. The same year, it was reported that the UK offshore oil and gas
industry experienced a dramatic increase in the number of major accidents
that had occurred in the industry. All these figures are scary facts that act as
a reminder of the hazards that have been caused by offshore drilling.
Moreover, the Occupational Health and Safety study of Al-Rubaee and
Abdullah Al-Maniri (2011) reported that a majority of the work-related
injuries in the oilfield occurred as a result of foreign objects in the eyes. This
type of injury was commonly reported and made up to 27.6% of the total injury
reports. Next, were the cases of man falls or slips that made up to 11.8%. 38.8%
of the injuries occurred in the upper parts of the human anatomy and were
recorded as the largest incidences that have ever happened. The group that
was most affected by the injuries were workers aged below 30 years and this
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category made up of 52% of the reported cases. The average rate of injuries per
1000 exposed workers in this industry stood at 19.8% annually.
The maritime workers at offshore installation sites will be exposed pre-
dominantly to the hazardous conditions. This is because of a large number of
the workforce that operates within a small location that is surrounded by
large water bodies. For instance, the number of the workforce in the differ-
ent jack-up mobile offshore drilling locations falls between the range of
80 and 200 workers who have been trained professionally in their required
fields of expertise as well as the recommended safety measures. This work-
force operates daily for 12 h and works in shifts (day and night) with a shift
change occurring at 6:00 a.m./p.m. This rotation plan can only be nurtured
for periods between a month and a year and are based on the role played by
workers. Psychological studies have shown that workers who endure long
rotational patterns such as what is applied in the oil and gas industry are
prone to suffering from physical and mental exhaustion with high potential
of making an accident. In addition, more than a 100 people who work in the
offshore locations of drilling rigs are faced with different types of risks. This
workforce is drawn from the drilling crew of the contracting firm, the rep-
resentatives from operating company’s service contractors, and special crew
members who have various roles to play at these locations to accomplish well
drilling. Some of them include but are not limited to cementing services,
casing running services, logging while drilling, measurement-while-drilling
and wireline logging services, drilling tool services, fishing and milling ser-
vices, perforation services, H2S services, wellheads and well completion ser-
vices, and special downhole tools services.
Considering the facts mentioned earlier, later sections illustrate the
world’s most catastrophic offshore drilling operation disasters, as well as
the commonly reported occupational accidents occurred in the offshore
drilling industry.
6.1 The World’s Most Catastrophic Offshore Drilling Operation

Disasters
This section aims to create awareness about the accidents, how they have
happened and what are the causes behind them. Below are some examples
of the most catastrophic offshore drilling operations disasters.
1. BP Macondo well Deepwater Horizon blowout in-Gulf Mexico
Consequences level: Catastrophe
Frequency: Occasional
Accident summary
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44 Khaled ALNabhani
The BP Macondo well deepwater horizon blowout that happened in

the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was recorded as one of the worst accidents
in the history of offshore drilling operations. The involvement of BP, a rep-
utable oil company made it imperative that a critical analysis was conducted
to find out how the accident happened and the safety measures that should
always be in place to prevent a similar catastrophe from happening in the
future.
The causes identified for this particular case of a blowout were found
many after a critical investigation was done (Center for Catastrophic Risk
Management, 2010). However, the main cause of this accident was identi-
fied as a fault that developed in the cement barrier, which was set in the pro-
duction casing string. This was caused by negligence displayed by the
operators who failed to adhere to the safe operational procedures by making
wrong professional decisions.
The top management team in charge of this operation failed to observe
the regulations prescribed by the offshore safety authorities which function
as a part of BOEMRE, the body with governing authority over offshore
exploration.
Among the list of faults identified by the investigative panel into this inci-
dent include inadequate measures put in place for risk management, making
changes in the previous plans at the last minute, overlooking the important
indicators that signaled a potential disaster, poorly coordinated control
response in the event of an accident, and inadequate emergency bridge
response training by the companies and individuals in charge of the drilling
operations.
In this accident, a total of 11 members of the work staff lost their lives.
The oil spill that resulted from this accident was massive. It was put at 5 mil-
lion bbl of spilled oil in the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana.
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Overall, this accident was labeled as one of the worst catastrophes in the
offshore exploration industry; however, it is a rare occurrence, which
could only happen when important signals are overlooked and when
wrong decisions are made during drilling and oil exploration operations.
2. The sinking of the PETROBRAS-P36
Accident summary
The second offshore accident that will be addressed in this section is the
sinking of the PETROBRAS. The PETROBRAS was a P36 floating plat-
form that was located in the Brazilian Atlantic Coast before the accident
occurred on March 20, 2001. This P36 floating platform was designed to
function as a floating drilling unit, however, between 1997 and 1999
(Whelan, 2013); the PETROBRAS was modified to become a floating pro-
duction unit. The changes that were made included the addition of new
equipment and intensive structural upgrades to meet the requirements, its
new functions. It was shocking to hear that the PETROBRAS had capsized
and sank on March 20, 2001. This event happened after several explosions
were reported to have occurred aboard the structure.
Investigations revealed that a faulty alignment caused the first explosions
at the emergency drain tank with the production heater. A buildup of
hydrocarbons was made possible due to the close positioning of these two
structures. The resulting explosions created an outlet through which volatile
gases were released, and this caused multiple explosions, sinking the
PETROBRAS-P36.
The investigation reports of this accident were enlightening. It was
discovered that there were number of mistakes that led to this accident
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46 Khaled ALNabhani
were a failure in the mechanical component design, error in judgment,

poor training, and inadequate emergency response measures. It was a grave
accident that led to the death of 11 people and about 137 people injured.
The PETROBRAS-P36 sank due to critical structural damage caused by
the explosions. This accident was tagged as one of the worst in the offshore
exploration industry; it is however tagged as a potentially occasional accident
of occurrence.
3. The Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea
Accident summary
The Piper Alpha catastrophe occurred in the North Sea, United

Kingdom. This was an accident that could have been avoided; the inves-
tigations revealed that this accident happened as a result of a gas leak from
one of the condensate pipes located at the platform. During routine main-
tenance, day shift workers removed the pressure safety valve of the con-
densate injection pump and two blind flanges were installed to seal
temporarily. Unfortunately, the workers who resumed for duty in the
evening were not notified of changes made and the temporary measures
that had been put in place. One of the new workers switched on the con-
densate injection pump, and this caused the gas leak and consequently the
explosion.
The Piper Alpha catastrophe revealed that this catastrophe happened as a
result of poor communication (Chernov & Sornette, 2016), lack of profes-
sionalism handover during the shift change, negligence on the part of the
workers. As a result, 167 people lost their lives in this accident, and the loss
due to damaged assets was estimated to be $1.4 billion.
This accident was tagged as one of the most catastrophic events in the
offshore oil exploration globally, and the reports indicate that it could occa-
sionally occur if the adequate professional measures are not observed.
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4. The Destruction of the Alexander L. Keilland semisubmersible platform

Accident summary
This accident happened on March 27, 1980 in the North Sea, Norway
(Naess, Haagensen, Moan, & Simonsen, 1982). The Alexander L. Keilland
was a semisubmersible platform, which was used alongside the Edda oil rig
during oil and gas exploration in the North Sea. This platform was used to
accommodate the workers involved with the drilling operations. The
destruction was caused by strong winds and waves that reached as high as
12 m. The contact of seawater with the bracings caused one of the bracings
attached to one of the five legs, which supported the structure to malfunc-
tion, consequently causing a collapse of the platform.
This was a sad event, about 123 crew members lost their lives, and the damage
to assets ran into millions of dollars. This accident was classified as a catastrophe,
and the investigations indicate that it could occasionally happen in the future.
5. The Bohai-2 Jack-up oil rig disaster in the Gulf of Bohai
Accident summary
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48 Khaled ALNabhani
The Bohai-2 Jack-up rig disaster happened in the Gulf of Bohai, off the
Chinese coast in November 1979. The investigations conducted to deter-
mine the causes of this accident revealed that the deck equipment was
not properly stored away after use. Consequently, the severe weather con-
ditions damaged the ventilator pump installed on the platform. This caused a
hole on the deck resulting in excessive flooding.
Seventy-two crew members lost their lives in this accident. The esti-
mated losses due to damaged assets were massive. This accident was classified
as a catastrophe in the offshore oil and gas industry. The investigations also
revealed that measures must be put in place at offshore locations to prevent
similar accidents that could likely occur occasionally.
6. The Seacrest Drillship disaster
Accident summary
The Seacrest drillship disaster happened in 1989 in the South China Sea,
Thailand. The cause of this accident was reported to be severe weather con-
ditions, which caused the drill ship to capsize (Mannion, 2013).
The drillship was hit by Kavali Cyclone that caused strong waves as high
as 40 ft. The day the accident occurred, the pressure put on the drillship cau-
sed an unavoidable instability in the high-centered gravity on the drillship.
This instability was attributed to the heavy drillstrings made up of 12,500 ft
of drill pipe that was on the ship at the time of the accident. The drillship
capsized under the strength of the waves.
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Unfortunately, 91 crew members lost their lives in this accident, and

there were huge losses from damaged oil and gas exploration equipment.
This accident was classified as a catastrophe in the offshore exploration
industry and the companies involved suffered huge losses form damaged
assets. This accident was also classified as a potentially occasional event,
which should be prevented by adequate emergency response measures.
7. The Ocean Ranger oil drilling rig disaster in the North Atlantic Sea
Accident summary
The Ocean Ranger oil drilling rig catastrophe that happened in the North
Atlantic Sea just off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada, involved a semisub-
mersible mobile offshore drilling rig. This catastrophe happened on February
15, 1982. The semisubmersible mobile drilling rig was destroyed by a severe
North Atlantic cyclone (Wilcutt & Harkins, 2011). The storm was character-
ized by winds as fast as 190 km/h, and waves that rose as approximately 20 m
high where it caused the windows to break and the water entered the control
room. This was identified in the investigations as the cause of the tragedy at this
offshore location. A total of 84 crew members lost their lives on this day, and
valuable assets worth millions of dollars were destroyed. This accident was
classified as a catastrophic event in the offshore exploration industry, and
the investigation revealed that similar accidents could occur occasionally.
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50 Khaled ALNabhani
6.2 Common-Reported Occupational Accidents During

Offshore Drilling Operation
Table 4 illustrates the most common reported occupational accidents in off-
shore drilling operation.
7. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND DYNAMIC

ACCIDENT MODELING USING SMART APPROACH
Forty years’ worth of research has explored the fact that operational
and occupational misconducts pose significant risks to a number of people
involved in the oil and gas industry particularly in the drilling activities. It
is, however, feasible to mitigate accidents related to oil and gas drilling oper-
ations in its preliminary stages through preventive methodologies such as an
adequate maintenance of appropriate safety measures and the creation of
barriers to reduce the dangers of risks and life-threatening situations. Oper-
ational and occupational risks from offshore drilling operations are easy to be
identified in early stages, but physically this is a generally deficient practice in
the oil and gas industry. The situation could be improved by developing
adequate systems which aid the prediction of impending calamities, effective
control measures, and mitigating risks at the source, as well as propagating
the importance of incident prevention with the aim of making the drilling
inherently processes safer. It is important to carry out assessments and checks
to ascertain the efficiencies of safety barriers provided, confirming the ade-
quacy of these provisions will further prevent the occurrence of major oper-
ational and occupational accidents, thus promoting safety and health of the
workers. Thus, this section is developed and focused on the introduction of a
new approach toward dynamic accident modeling and quantitative risk
assessment in the typical oil and gas offshore extraction and production oper-
ations, this will be done by implementing the SHIPP (system hazard iden-
tification, prediction, and prevention) methodology and rational theory
(SMART approach) developed by ALNabahni et al. (2017b). The proposed
approach is characterized by the following unique features: (i) dynamic
modeling of operational and occupational accidents and risks considering
the effectiveness of the provided safety barrier, (ii) uncertainty reduction
by establishing a reliable system that facilitates the prediction of the likeli-
hood that the safety barriers might fail, and (iii) dynamic updating of any
abnormal event probability occurrence as new information becomes avail-
able from both integrated main system and its subsystems based on
ALNabhani’s SMART approach toward dynamic accident modeling and
Table 4 Common Reported Occupational Accidents in Offshore Drilling Operation
S. No. Accident Summary Root Cause Consequences Cons Level Frequency Photo
1 Injured party (IP) was Not following the safe A broken finger and the Accident High
working on the drill operational procedures. worker away from work (critical)
collars caused the tongs Lack of toolbox talk and for 2 weeks
to move toward the drill PJSM
collar. The IP’s fault was
Lack of training.
that he did not drip the
Inadequate supervision
tongs at the handle.
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Thus, the jaw came in Human error and poor
contact with the drill communication
collars, and it was
propelled backward
hurting his fingers
2 IP fell off the platform Human error caused by Broken wrist, away Accident High
lack of concentration from work for 3 weeks (critical)
for recuperating
Continued
Table 4 Common Reported Occupational Accidents in Offshore Drilling Operation—cont’d
3 IP lost his balance while Unprofessional and Fractured arm and Accident Medium
walking over a rotary improper housekeeping shoulder. Away from (critical)
table, his left foot was and human error (lack of work for 3 weeks for
caught in an uncovered concentration) recuperating
utility hole, and he
tripped over the rig
floor
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4 IP operating a tong and Negligence of the safety IP was hospitalized for Accident High
wrongly held the tong procedures, inadequate 2 weeks with a hairline (critical)
by its jaw instead of training, poor fracture in his finger
gripping the handle supervision, no PJSM
from safe position. The and tool box talk,
weight of the tool human error due to lack
caused the second jaw to of concentration, and
swing and close trapping poor communication
the worker’s right finger
in between
5 IP suffered injuries to his Poor safety awareness, Fractured right foot Accident High
foot when 3½00 drill pipe lack of toolbox training, little toe. 2 weeks not (critical)
landed on his foot poor supervision, poor attending work for
communication, human recuperating
error caused by poor
concentration
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6 A Floorman struck the Negligence of the IP stayed away from Accident High
finger of a helper who proper safety work for 4 weeks (critical)
was gripping the holder procedures, lack of recuperating from the
while the floorman was training, poor injury to his fractured
hammering the safety supervision, human finger
clamp to correctly reset error caused by lack of
the alignment in an 5½00 concentration and no
drill collar SPJM or toolbox talk
7 IP’s right hand got Negligence of the IP suffered a fractured Accident High
caught inside the tong’s professional safety finger and had to (critical)
jaw while breaking out measures, lack of undergo 3 weeks for
3½00 drill pipe training, inadequate recuperating
supervision, human
error due to lack of
concentration to hold
tong from safe positions,
inadequate
communication, and no
SPJM or toolbox talk
Continued
10 IP walking near to the Inadequate 4 weeks medical Accident High
rotary table where there housekeeping and recuperation for a (critical)
was some spillage of cleaning processes, the fractured right lower leg
OBM fluids as a result of absence of warning
connections breakout signs, and lack of
that caused his slipping, professionalism
he twisted his ankle
falling to the rig floor
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11 A 4½00 tubing fell from Negligence of the IP spent 4 weeks away Accident High
the edge of the pipe rack proper safety from work recuperating (critical)
on a roustabout’s left procedures, lack of from a fractured toe on
foot training, inadequate the left foot
supervision, human
error caused by lack of
concentration,
inadequate
communication. Lack
of PJSM and toolbox
talk and stoppers at the
end of the rack was not
in place
14 IP handled a slip by its Negligence of the IP spent 2 weeks away Accident High
handle while attempting proper safety from work recuperating (critical)
to set the drill pipe in a procedures, inadequate from the injury that
hole. The body of the toolbox talk, inadequate affected his fingers
elevator dropped down training, inadequate
the hole while the driller supervision, human
attempted to lower the error due to lack of
drill pipe and the concentration, and
elevator. The body of inadequate
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the elevator fell on the communication
handle of the slip
trapping the IP’s right
hand causing injury to
two of his fingers
15 There was a failure in Negligence of proper IP spent 4 months away Catastrophic Medium
the snake line on which safety measures, from work recuperating
the last wrap of the drill inadequate training, from a fractured wrist
line was spooled from inadequate and shoulder
the traveling block. The maintenance, and a poor
consequence of this was visual inspection
the drop of the 1½00 drill
line with a height of
10 m; it struck an IP on
the left arm causing
serious injury
Continued
16. IP in the process of Negligence of the IP spent 3 weeks away Accident High
removing the slips with proper safety from work for (critical)
his left hand and by procedures, inadequate recuperating from a
mistake he inserted his training, no toolbox or fractured thumb
right hand into one of training, inadequate
the jaws of a tong, and supervision, human
while lifting the slips, he error due to a lack of
pressed the jaws and the concentration, and
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tong shut in error. This inadequate
caused an injury to the communication
thumb on his right hand
17 IP in error activated the Negligence of the IP spent 4 weeks away Accident Medium
rotary belt of a washing proper safety procedures from work recuperating (critical)
machine gun while an in the workplace, from the injury on his
electrician held it. The inadequate training, fingers
rotary belt started to spin inadequate
pulling the electrician’s communication, human
finger into the pulley error due to lack of
concentration, and
inadequate supervision
18 IP with a tong, placed Negligence of the IP spent 3 weeks away Accident High
his right hand into the proper safety from work (critical)
tong’s jaws in error procedures, inadequate
while attempting to fit a training, inadequate
3½00 drill pipe into it. supervision, human
His little finger was error due to lack of
accidentally crushed concentration and
between the back of the inadequate
jaw and the support arm communication. Lack
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of toolbox talk and
PJSM
19 IP’s hand got trapped Negligence, inadequate IP spent 3 weeks away Accident High
between the elevator training, inadequate from work. His right (critical)
and the elevator links as supervision, human index finger was
he attempted to remove error due to poor crushed in this accident
the sling from the joint concentration, and
after hooking the casing inadequate
joint to the elevator communication. Lack
of toolbox talk and
PJSM
Continued
20 Mud tester was standing Not following the safe A deep cut exposing the Accident Low
on top of a working procedures. Lack of bone and resulting in (critical)
mud pump, performing toolbox talk multiple fractures to his
a cleaning job of piston ankle and foot
Lack of training
chamber using a wash
his right foot slipped Lack of supervision
inside the piston cavity
Lack of concentration
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(human error)
Lack of communication 10 weeks off work
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quantitative risk assessment. In this approach, ALNabhani considered the

occurrence of an accident as a result of interaction of many random, physical,
or latent components in the system or its subsystem in sequential or non-
sequential order, which will lead to system degradation and eventually to
an accident. The proposed approach creates an integrated framework that
aids the dynamic prediction and updating data related to abnormal events
or the introduction of new evidence, information, and deviation in the
operation process with the use of Bayes’ theorem. The essence of this
approach is to develop a system to aid the monitoring of operational and
occupational risks in a dynamic pattern. This will promote the development
of effective and protective measures to reduce the imminent risks related to
the oil and gas industry.
7.1 The Working Principle of Dynamic Accident Modeling

and Quantitative Risk Assessment Using the SMART
Approach
The SMART approach is a hybrid of SHIPP methodology and rational the-
ory. The SHIPP methodology is a generic framework used to identify, eval-
uate, and model process accidents (Rathnayaka, Khan, & Amayotte, 2011,
2013). The rational theory is used to model dynamically the behavior of the
possible root and passive causes that contribute to accidents. It is based on the
logical, inductive, and probabilistic analyses. The basic premise of rational
theory is that an accident occurrence is a result of joint conditional behavior
among different parameters. By integrating the SHIPP methodology and
rational theory, the SMART approach is able to: (i) determine the interac-
tions between different components in both the system and its subsystem,
and the identification of events that could potentially cause risks in the oil
and gas extractions and production processes; (ii) identify and analyze all pos-
sible operational and occupational hazards; (iii) create thousands of models to
represent different possible accident scenarios based on the effectiveness of the
safety barriers with the use of the Monte Carlo simulation; (iv) predict and
update the failure probabilities of the identified safety barriers; and (v) promote
the proactive management procedures in the oil and gas industry associated
with risks, this will be done by employing adaptive risk management or precau-
tionary principle methodologies. Fig. 3 depicts the SMART approach flow-
chart, which represents the oil and gas operational and occupational risk
modeling. A detailed representation of how this approach has been adopted
was demonstrated and validated by ALNabhani et al. (2017a, 2017b) using a case
study of TENORM occupational exposure scenarios in the oil and gas activities.
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60 Khaled ALNabhani
Fig. 3 Dynamic accident modeling and quantitative risk assessment using the SMART
approach.
8. CONCLUSION
Overall, the oil and gas operations are potentially a source of detri-
mental environmental and occupational that include but not limited to off-
shore drilling activities. It is rather unfortunate that the measures to facilitate
safety risk assessments and the deployment of the management tools in the
industry as earlier mentioned are not sufficient enough to mitigate, control,
and prevent accidents because they are classical and they have not been
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developed based on proper scientific evaluation. Therefore, a new method-

ology of dynamic modeling and quantitative risk assessment was proposed.
This model was based on the SMART approach that integrates the SHIPP
methodology and rational theory. This approach provided a systematic plat-
form and comprehensive risk assessment framework based on safety barrier
performance evaluation and dynamic updating of abnormal events in the
system and its subsystems. The SMART approach provides a systematic
framework for modeling, predicting, updating, and managing the risks dur-
ing oil and gas extraction and production phases.
Based on the available analytical studies and accident report, it is apparent
that there is a need to develop adequate safety measures that will prevent
operational and occupational risks during processes such as extractions
and production of oil and gas, while offshore drilling operations are being
carried out. It is equally important to find an effective scientifically based
solution to conduct studies on human behavior from the psychological per-
spective. It is necessary to promote the development of this effort because
occupational accidents are still happening and this will have negative impacts
on the society. Future studies should be carried out using advanced dynamic
modeling and quantitative risk assessments, which involve contributions
from academic and technical experts who should play active roles in the
oil and gas HSE management system.
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ARTICLE IN PRESS

Safety During Offshore Drilling

Methods in Chemical Process Safety # 2018 Elsevier Inc. 1

2. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFSHORE DRILLING RIGS

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 3

Fig. 1 Offshore drilling operations.

4. Drilling fluid circulating system

2.1 Bottom Support Rigs

are built on a floating body structure. The dimensions of the structure

2.2 Floating Rigs

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 5

3. GENERAL PROCEDURES OF OFFSHORE

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 7

processes, the drill cuttings may be discharged on the ocean water, or

produces a hydrostatic pressure that restricts the influx of subsurface forma-

4. A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO SIMULATES REAL

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 9

4.1 Oman-1 Hypothetical Exploration Well1

Fig. 2 Oman-1 well schematic.

Table 1 Oman-1 Well Time Breakdown vs Depth

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 11

4.1.2 Well Plan

4.1.3 General Prespud Checklist

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 13

4.1.4 Drilling 4200 Top Hole Section

4.1.4.2 Operation Summary

Operational risks expected while drilling 4200 hole section

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 15

17. Ensure verticality of conductor.

4.1.5 Drilling 17½00 Surface Hole Section

4.1.5.2 Operation Summary

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 17

4.1.6 Drilling 12¼00 Intermediate Hole Section

4.1.6.2 Operation Summary

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 19

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 21

19. Pressure test cementing lines to 3000 psi.

4.1.7 Drilling 8½00 Hole

4.1.7.2 Operation Summary

such as maritime transportation, fishing, manned oil, and gas infrastruc-

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 23

13. Continue drilling 8½00 pilot hole section to TD 12,000 ft MD.

4.1.8 600 Hole Horizontal Section

4.1.8.2 Operation Summary

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 25

Recommended safe drilling procedures

5. COMMON HSE RISK ASSESSMENT

These techniques are characterized as classical in nature as can be explored

5.1 HSE Training Matrix

5.2 Emergency Responses Plans and Safety Drills

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 27

Table 2 Minimum HSE Training/Competency Requirements Training Matrix Intended as

Table 2 Minimum HSE Training/Competency Requirements Training Matrix Intended as

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 29

5.3 HSE Risk Assessment Matrix

occupational accidents occurrences in the industry is a loss of manpower rep-

Safety During Offshore Drilling Operation 43

6.1 The World’s Most Catastrophic Offshore Drilling Operation