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In Russia's Pivot to Asia, Economic Attraction Lags Hard Power

Russia held the fifth Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, its main Far Eastern city on its Pacific
coast, on Sept. 4-6. The forum has been held annually since 2015 to showcase Moscow's commitment to the
development of its vast Far Eastern areas and closer economic links with Asia. Apart from the forum's host,
President Vladimir Putin, this year's EEF was attended by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Mongolian President Battulga
Khaltmaa. China, South Korea and North Korea were represented by deputy prime ministers, while
Indonesia and Singapore sent minister-led delegations.
How the East Became Moscow's Priority

Russia's "turn to the East" began more than a decade ago. In December 2006, Putin convened a meeting of
the Kremlin's Security Council, where it was decided to prioritize the development of the Russian Far East, a
huge landmass stretching from the Trans-Baikal region to the Pacific Ocean. At this meeting, Putin invoked
Russia's perennial fear of losing its Asian periphery, stressing that the underdevelopment of the country's
sparsely populated but resource-rich Far East posed "a grave threat to our political and economic positions
in Asia and the Pacific, and to the national security of Russia as a whole." The 2008 global financial crisis
helped convince the Kremlin that the center of economic gravity was shifting to Asia, which made Russia's
eastern development agenda even more important. Then the Ukraine crisis of 2014 alienated Russia from the
United States and the European Union, dramatically raising the stakes for Moscow in Asia as the main
alternative to Western markets, finance and technology.
Since the late 2000s, Russia has taken a number of steps to boost the development of the Far East, as well as
increase trade and investment with Asian countries. In 2012, Russia launched the Eastern Siberia-Pacific
Ocean oil pipeline; in December, the Power of Siberia pipeline will come online to supply natural gas to
China. Moscow has spent significant funds on upgrading the infrastructure of Vladivostok, Russia's main
gateway to the Asia-Pacific. Putin created a dedicated ministry for Far Eastern development and a deputy
prime minister position responsible for the Far East. Yuri Trutnev, one of the most capable and energetic
managers from Putin's entourage, was appointed in 2013 as the Kremlin's man in charge of the Far East. On
Trutnev's watch, special laws and new regulations have been adopted to improve the business climate in the
Russian Far East and make it attractive for Russian and foreign investors. The centerpiece of this policy has
been the creation of special economic zones, modeled on Asia's best practices, to lure greenfield investors to
the Far East.
Global Investors Are Still Cautious About the Russian Far East
Despite Moscow's best efforts, the Far East has so far failed to become a magnet for foreign businesses and
remains heavily dependent on capital infusions from the government and state-affiliated companies.
Foreigners currently account for just 7 percent of the total investments into the Far East's economy. There
are few major projects with foreign investor involvement that have been completed in recent years or are
being implemented. The bulk of the Russian Far East's foreign direct investment was accumulated in the late
1990s and the 2000s thanks to the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 offshore oil and gas projects. Since then, no new
substantial foreign direct investment has come to the Far East.
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After 2014, Russia lifted informal and tacit restrictions on investments from China into the Russian Far East
that had been in place, in the hope of attracting Chinese money for the region's development. However, as of
now, there are just four relatively significant projects in the Far East with the involvement of Chinese capital,
whose total worth probably does not exceed $1 billion. These include a casino resort near Vladivostok, an
iron ore mining company, a gold mine and a coal mine.
Chinese money is not rushing to the Russian Far East partly because Russia is not a developing country, like
Angola or Laos, where Chinese companies can exploit natural resources with relatively little oversight and
few regulations, often bringing their own workers. Another factor discouraging Chinese investment into
Russia, and its Far East, is Moscow's reluctance to cede control to foreign entities over assets deemed
strategic, such as ports. Russia is not Greece, which sold a majority stake in its main port, Piraeus, to China's
Cosco. Unlike Greece, Putin's Russia has never been financially desperate enough to pawn off critical assets
in exchange for foreign money. And the Chinese know that even big investments into Russia will not buy
them any significant leverage over Moscow's foreign policy because Russia has a strong great-power identity
that values political sovereignty over economic profit. This differentiates Russia from some other countries, such
as in Southeast Asia or Central and Eastern Europe, that are often willing to adjust their foreign policies to suit
Beijing's wishes for the sake of Chinese money.
All of that helps explain why China has so far refrained from investing in the Russian Far East's transport and
energy infrastructure. It does not help that the Far East borders China's northeastern provinces (the
Dongbei), which form China's own "rust belt" and which have suffered from a prolonged economic
stagnation and depopulation.
Chinese money is not rushing to the Russian Far East partly because Russia is not a developing country where
Chinese companies can exploit natural resources with relatively little oversight and few regulations.
Other Asian investors also demonstrate a wait-and-see approach. Foreign businesses tend to see the risks of
entering the region as high, whereas profit margins are not sexy enough to offset the risks. To international
businesses, the Russian Far East has always been of interest mainly as a supplier of natural resources such as
minerals, hydrocarbons, timber and fish. However, most of these resources, perhaps except for Yakutia's
diamonds, are not unique and can easily be found elsewhere. The Russian Far East's freezing winter
temperatures, difficult terrain and the lack of transport and energy infrastructure often result in higher costs
to extract and deliver its natural riches, compared to competitors in Africa, South America or Southeast Asia.
Structural trends in the industrialized Asian economies do not look particularly promising for the Russian
Far East, at least if it continues with its traditional paradigm of resource-based development. Japan, which
historically has been a major consumer of the Russian Far East's natural riches, has passed the peak of
resource consumption due to its declining population and increasingly energy-efficient technologies. With
their imports of energy and raw materials steadily decreasing, the Japanese are now much less interested in
the Russian Far East than they were a few decades ago when Japan's industrial production was rapidly
expanding. South Korea, another major importer of the Russian Far East's staples, will soon be following the
same path of declining demand for natural resources.
The U.S.-led Western sanctions against Russia also deter many potential investors. According to
well-informed South Korean sources, sanctions concerns led the Export-Import Bank of Korea to withdraw
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from a project to finance the construction of a large fertilizer plant near the Russian Pacific port of
Nakhodka. As another example, Gazprom has been struggling to develop a large gas field,
Yuzhno-Kirinskoye, located off Sakhalin. Potential partners have been put off by U.S. sanctions, whereas
Gazprom itself does not currently possess the technology necessary for deep-water operation.
The agricultural potential of the Russian Far East is one area that has recently attracted a lot of attention,
especially given China's voracious appetite for soybeans and other foodstuffs. Yet, the Russian Far East is not
Argentina or the United States. In the east of Russia, there is not much available land suitable for growing
high-margin crops such as soybeans.
Could India Counterbalance China in the Russian Far East?

While the Eastern Economic Forum featured Chinese President Xi Jinping as the main guest in 2018, this year
Putin feted Narendra Modi of India as the guest of honor in Vladivostok. Though India is quite remote from
the Russian Far East, it has had a long-time interest in the region. After Vladivostok was officially opened to
foreigners in 1992, India was the first to establish its consulate there. In the 1990s, India's state-owned Oil and
Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC) acquired a 20 percent stake in the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project, which became
India's first major investment in the energy sector overseas. Unsurprisingly, what the Indian business
community covets from the Russian Far East is mainly its natural resources, in particular, coal,
hydrocarbons, gold, timber and diamonds. During Modi's visit to Vladivostok, Russia's leading private gas
company Novatek signed a memorandum of understanding to provide long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG)
supplies to India. The Indian Tata Group will develop coal deposits in the Kamchatka Peninsula. It was also
announced that a major LNG plant will be built in the Russian Far East, in which India's ONGC will be one of
the partners and co-investors, along with Russia's Rosneft, ExxonMobil and Japan's Sakhalin Oil and Gas
Development Co. There is also some talk of bringing Indian workers to the labor-deficient region.
India plays the geopolitical game of Go, aiming to increase its presence in countries and regions around China.
Of course, China plays the same game by building up its presence in South Asian and Indian Ocean countries.
Apart from seeking commercial opportunities in Russia, Modi's visit to the Russian Far East had a
pronounced geopolitical context. It was intended to demonstrate New Delhi's commitment to maintaining a
strategic friendship with the Kremlin, as Modi is aware that the Russian Far East's development is an
important priority for Putin. Modi's visit was also a message to Beijing, with New Delhi signaling that it can
raise Indian geo-economic presence in the areas close to and sensitive to China. The highlight of Modi's visit
to Vladivostok was his pledge to extend a $1 billion credit line for the development of the Russian Far East.
Modi previously offered similar $1 billion and $500 million loans to Mongolia, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and Vietnam. New Delhi plays the geopolitical game of Go, aiming to increase India's presence
in countries and regions around China. Of course, Beijing plays the same game with India, by keeping strong
ties with Pakistan and building up China's geo-economic presence in other South Asian and Indian Ocean
countries.
It remains to be seen whether Modi's newly launched "Act Far East" policy will be able to serve as a
counterbalance to Russia's growing dependence on China. In 2018, India's trade with Russia stood at a mere
$11 billion, while Russia-China trade was $107 billion. And, unlike Russia and China, India and Russia are
geographically separated, which complicates trade logistics. Also, India's strategic credit lines to
counterbalance China, similar to the one Modi pledged for the Russian Far East, are a complex and slow
process, especially given the well-known unhurriedness of Indian bureaucracy.

India's desire to counterbalance China aligns its interests in the Russian Far East with those of Japan. This
could lead to joint Indian-Japanese undertakings in Russia and its Far East, though none have been
announced so far.
Geopolitics Trumps Economics in Vladivostok

Although the Eastern Economic Forum's official agenda is primarily about trade and investment, it was not
the pursuit of business opportunities that brought Modi, Abe and other foreign leaders to Vladivostok.
Russia, whose stagnating economy teeters on the verge of recession and is under Western sanctions, is not a
particularly attractive business partner right now. It is geopolitics, rather than economics, that makes Asian
leaders seek meetings with Putin. Albeit lacking in economic weight, Russia's political-military power makes
it a crucial player in Eurasia and it will remain so well into the future.

With China, India must recognise power imbalance, liberate itself from prolonged illusions, false hopes
Delhi’s overestimation of its leverage with Beijing in the triangular relationship with Washington has
unfortunately meant India often chose to voluntarily limit its partnership with the US and its allies.
That India’s relationship with China is passing through a difficult moment is not hard to see, even amidst the
usual hype that surrounds meetings between leaders of the two countries. The rhetoric about India and China
changing the world has always masked the persistent structural problems that hobbled their ties. If managing
the relationship with China has become the biggest test for Indian foreign policy, the second informal summit
between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping is a good occasion to reflect on the trends in
Delhi’s diplomacy towards Beijing.
First is the danger of putting form above substance and betting that the higher the level of engagement, the
more significant the results. The novelty of the “informal summit” that dazzled everyone when Modi traveled to
Wuhan to spend two days in a relaxed setting with Xi last year has worn off. Like so many other mechanisms
before it, the informal summit, too, is proving to be inadequate to cope with the range of structural tensions
that have enveloped the bilateral relationship — from Kashmir to trade and multilateral challenges.
Since they sought to normalise relations more than three decades ago, when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
traveled to Beijing, the two sides have experimented with different mechanisms to address the basic
differences. They started with a dialogue at the level of foreign secretaries in 1988, elevated it to empowered
special representatives in 2003, and most recently, the informal summits. None of these have been able to
resolve the boundary dispute, trade deficit and China’s growing support to Pakistan in Islamabad’s
contestation with Delhi.
Second, the lack of enough contact at the highest levels is no longer a problem. In the 20th century it was but
rare when leaders of India or China traveled to the other country. In the 21st century, the Indian Prime
Minister runs often into the PM or President of China and has talks on the margins of such regional and
international settings as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Russia-India-China Forum,
BRICS and the G-20. Frequency of talks has not improved the ability to resolve the problems facing the
relationship.
Third, the current difficulties between India and China are not due to lack of mutual understanding. The
problem is the widening gap in the comprehensive national power of the two Asian giants. China’s aggregate
GDP, now at about $14 trillion, is nearly five times larger than that of India, hovering at $2.8 trillion. China’s
annual defence spending at $250 billion is four times larger than that of India. More than the size of the
spending, China has outpaced India in the much needed modernisation of its armed forces and higher defence
organisation.
This power imbalance translates into an unpleasant fact on the diplomatic front. That China is under no
pressure to please India. Or, more precisely, it can afford to displease India — whether it is the question of
blocking India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or opposing India’s Kashmir move and taking it
to the UNSC. That did not change at Wuhan nor will it alter in a big way at Chennai.

Fourth, is the persistent belief in Delhi that current tensions in US-China relations might encourage Beijing to
make nice to India. That expectation has turned out to be wrong. The deepening crisis in US-China relations
has made little difference to Beijing’s approach to Delhi. The movement has apparently been in the opposite
direction.
For China, the foremost strategic priority today is to cut a deal with the US. If Xi Jinping can’t fix the problem
with President Donald Trump in the next year, he would hope that Trump will be defeated in the elections at
the end of 2020 and his potential Democrat successor would be a lot easier to deal with in 2021. That the
Chinese priority is the US should not be surprising given the scale and intensity of the stakes involved in
Beijing’s ties with Washington.
Delhi’s overestimation of its leverage with Beijing in the triangular relationship with Washington has
unfortunately meant India often chose to voluntarily limit its partnership with the US and its allies. That has
not led to any strategic appreciation in Beijing of Delhi’s restraint or the need for neutrality in the disputes
between India and Pakistan. Viewed strictly in terms of power hierarchy, China’s strategy does look logical —
to keep India in play without giving up on any of its positions of concern for India.
Fifth is the long-standing presumption in Delhi that cooperation with China on global issues will create the
conditions for ameliorating bilateral contentions. This turned out to be wrong on three counts. India’s support
to China on global issues has not led to Beijing’s reciprocation on multilateral issues, such as Pakistan’s
cross-border terrorism, of interest to India, nor has it made it easier to resolve bilateral disputes. Worse still,
grand-standing on global issues with Beijing may have made India oblivious to China’s rapid regional
advance in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.
Finally, if there is one thing that distinguishes Modi’s diplomacy from that of his predecessors, it is the
appreciation of power and its centrality in international relations. When he took charge as PM, Modi seemed
confident about his ability to arrive at some kind of understanding with the Chinese leadership. His expansive
engagement with the Chinese during his tenure as the chief minister of Gujarat had warmed him to China.
In the last five years, much water has flowed under the bridge and has probably convinced Modi of the
difficulty of persuading Xi to demonstrate any significant flexibility towards India. Delhi’s new realism makes
it possible to approach the challenge of China without sentimentalism or unrealistic expectations. It should
also help prepare India to wrestle intelligently with a China that is in a higher weight class.
Recognising the power imbalance with Beijing should liberate Delhi from the prolonged illusions about strategic
parity with China and false hopes about building a new global order with it. That, in turn, should help focus
India’s effort at Chennai on small and pragmatic steps to narrow differences with China on bilateral issues —
especially the boundary dispute, trade deficit and the development of regional infrastructure. Thinking small
might offer a long overdue corrective to India’s diplomatic tradition of putting the China relationship in a
grandiose framework.
The Quad of India, Japan, Australia and the US: A Work in Progress
The recent statement by the Commander-in Chief of the US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral
Phil Davidson at a press conference in Singapore that the ‘Quad’ or the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue between the USA, Australia, India and Japan may need to be shelved was
met with a mixed reaction in the regional maritime security discourse. However, this was
not a fatalistic view but rather a tacit acknowledgement of the divergent views amongst the
Quad partners on certain fundamental issues. He made this statement based on his
discussions with Admiral Sunil Lanba, the Chief of the Indian Navy at the recent Raisina
Dialogue in New Delhi where Admiral Lanba said that there was not an immediate potential
for the Quad.
The idea of a Quad was first articulated by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during
the East Asia Summit in 2007; in the same year he spoke of the confluence of the two oceans
– the Indian and the Pacific- and introduced the term Indo-Pacific during an address to the
Indian Parliament. The first attempt to shape the Quad was the decision to enhance Exercise
Malabar — the annual bilateral Indo-US naval exercise into a quadrilateral construct.
However, China understandably expressed strong reservations about this as an anti-China
initiative. Australia succumbed but a trilateral exercise was nevertheless held between the
US, Japan and India. For the next decade, while the Quad was spoken of periodically at
various fora, very little was actually happening on the ground to give it concrete shape.
During this period, China embarked on its ambitious programme of shaping the maritime
geopolitical architecture of the Indo-Pacific, beginning with its domination of the South
China Sea, its assertiveness in the East China Sea, its territorial claims within the 9-Dash
line and its ruthless intimidation of the smaller countries with whom it had contentious
maritime issues including its utter disregard for international laws and conventions and
cocking a snook at the existing rules-based international order.
This also coincided with Donald Trump’s assumption of office as the President of the United
States and his assertive sledge-hammer approach to security challenges which contrasted
sharply with his predecessor’s more nuanced and statesmanlike approach (which in
hindsight seems to have been ineffective against China’s bullying tactics). It was therefore
inevitable that the USA will reassert its primacy in the Indo-Pacific. It was no coincidence
therefore that the revival of the Quad during the East Asia Summit in Manila in 2017
occurred during President Trump’s Asia tour. Subsequent to the discussions among mid-
ranking officials of the four countries, the statement that emanated from each of the four
reflected a common commitment to a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ but the Indian statement
made no mention of ‘Freedom of navigation and overflight’, ‘respect for international law’
or ‘maritime security, whereas Japan excluded ‘Connectivity ‘ from its statement.
Since then representatives of the four countries have met twice more in 2018 but the
divergence continues and therefore the Quad has achieved very little so far. In fact, the one
manifestation of the revival of the Quad should have been the participation of all four navies
in the 2018 Exercise Malabar. However, Australia was excluded from that exercise and it
ended up as a trilateral similar to 2007.
If indeed the Quad is a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as it is said to be, then what aspect
of security is it meant to address? As a military alliance, it’s very raison d’etre would be to
contain China in the Indo-Pacific. Militarily, each of the four Quad nations has a different
equation with China so convergence on that is unlikely. Firstly, India will not enter into any
military alliance in the region. India has very clearly stated its position to the USA on not
participating in any Joint patrols in the South China Sea. India will also not willingly
disturb the uneasy status quo with China on its disputed land border in the Himalayan
mountains. The Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean does concern India, but it is unlikely
to become an issue for confrontation in the near future.
In any case, China, much like it did a decade ago, will bring pressure to bear in its own
subtle and not-so-subtle ways to ensure that the Quad is not positioned as an anti-China
alignment. Therefore, if the Quad is not likely to become a military grouping, then what is
it meant to achieve? Perhaps a ‘rules-based international order’ to ensure a ‘free and open
Indo-Pacific’? But as China always says, – ‘Whose rules, and free and open for whom?’
At two successive Raisina Dialogues held in New Delhi in January 2018 and January 2019,
senior military personnel including the Chiefs of the four navies participated in a panel
discussion but were guarded in their responses to questions regarding the Quad.
While a ‘Security Dialogue’ cannot fully divorce itself from a military dimension, its scope
does widen considerably because it could include more universal aspects like SLOC
protection, combating asymmetrical non- traditional threats at sea, Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), etc. But these are the low hanging fruits that can
justify its creation but not its sustenance over a longer term, as it would not be addressing
‘security’ in its entirety. In the contemporary regional calculus, areas such as Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA), information sharing, greater interoperability, logistic support,
etc., would also get included. India has recently established an Information Fusion Centre
(IFC-IOR) near New Delhi and has invited countries of the Indo-Pacific to position liaison
officers there for better MDA. These countries could synergise the efforts of multilateral
naval mechanisms like the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS) towards a more common understanding and for developing joint
security solutions. Areas of convergence in cyber, space, AI, autonomous operations, etc.,
could be discussed and common areas of interest developed.
The Quad, or the Security Diamond, is primarily an Indo-Pacific construct and cannot
therefore ignore the geographical and strategic centrality of ASEAN which itself has fault-
lines being exploited by China. However, there has been little attempt to include ASEAN
and there has also been a distinct lack of enthusiasm from ASEAN itself about the idea of
the Quad. With the imminent arrival of France and the UK, with a carrier force, into the
Indo-Pacific, would this have to include their concerns and perceptions and could we then
be looking at a hexagon or an octagon? How would China then react? When will Russia
become more active in this region? These are questions that have not been addressed as yet
but will influence the future maritime security architecture of the region.
Amongst the countries comprising the Quad, there also still seems to be a lack of clarity on
the geographical extent of the Indo-Pacific and not all countries may be comfortable with
the geographical limits highlighted by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his
keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018. The USA itself, while re-designating
its Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command has not altered its geographical
boundary which still ends at the west coast of India. China, on the other hand, has actually
embraced the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic entity and done more than all other
countries put together. It has built its artificial islands and militarised them, staked a
territorial claim bounded by the 9-dash line, ignored the 2016 Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruling, and even gotten the Philippines to agree with it. It has driven a distinct
wedge into ASEAN over the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC), and the consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC). It has moved into the Indian
Ocean, established a base in Djibouti at the western extremity of the IO, is firmly positioned
in Gwadar, Pakistan, has taken over the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, sold submarines to
Bangladesh and Thailand (soon) and ships to Pakistan and Malaysia and is wooing the
strategically located SIDS in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean as strategic listening
posts. It continues to push it’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) relentlessly, recent setbacks
notwithstanding. It has established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
New Development Bank (NDB) to fund these initiatives and despite the threat of dept-trap
diplomacy, countries are flocking to it for investment. It is adding more than 20 large ships
and submarines to its fleet annually and has reorganised its military force structure into
theatre commands with the clear intent of operating in distant waters.
The lack of cohesion in the Quad on its future shape is often attributed to the level of
interaction which has yet been at the working level. Hence it will be fair to say that this is
still a work in progress and once discussions graduate to the political level, more clarity
and a clearer way ahead will emerge.
India in pivotal geographies: Indo-Pacific

The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ is gaining currency as a new construct in recent times, with various
countries using it in official statements. Despite having been in use in Indian policy circles
for years, the nomenclature gained a clear meaning and vision from Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018[1]. Further, he
highlighted that India has been an active participant in mechanisms like the Indian Ocean
Rim Association (IORA), the East Asia Summit, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, the Bay of Bengal
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, and Mekong Ganga
Economic Corridor. India also convenes the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. Through the
Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), India is moving towards engaging
with Pacific Island countries. India’s multi-layered engagement with China as well as its
strategic partnership with Russia is key to ensuring a stable, open, secure, inclusive, and
prosperous Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific provides a geographic and strategic expanse, with the two oceans being
linked together by the ten ASEAN countries. Inclusiveness, openness, and ASEAN unity,
therefore, lie at the heart of the notion of Indo- Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific
Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Security in the region must be
maintained through dialogue, a common rules-based order, freedom of navigation,
unimpeded commerce, and settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.
India supports a rules-based, balanced, and stable trade environment in the Indo- Pacific
region. Sustainable connectivity initiatives promoting mutual benefit should be continually
fostered. In this regard, India has been an important stakeholder in the New Development
Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
An emerging realisation in strategic circles has gained ground: that there are linkages
between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. For India, the geography of the Indo-Pacific
stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to Oceania (from the shores of Africa to those of
the Americas), which also includes the Pacific Island countries. For the purpose of this
article, however, the focus is on the ASEAN countries and Oceania (Australia, the Pacific
Island countries).
In recent times, beyond the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific has been identified as being
within the ambit of India’s security interests. The focus on maritime issues is evident from
the increase in maritime exchanges led by the Indian Navy with countries such as Vietnam,
Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan. India’s trade in this region is growing rapidly, with
several overseas investments being directed towards the East. India has Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Singapore; and Free
Trade Agreements with ASEAN and Thailand. The nation is also entering into negotiations
for the early conclusion of
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. India’s approach to the region is
exemplified by its evolving ‘Act East’ Policy, comprising economic engagement with
Southeast Asia and strategic cooperation beyond Southeast Asia to East Asia (Japan,
Republic of Korea), Australia, New Zealand, as well as the Pacific Island countries.
Nonetheless, the term lacks holistic acceptance in the region. While China is apprehensive
about its connotation, there is a lurking fear among ASEAN nations that they could be
marginalised if the Indo-Pacific concept takes on a more concrete relevance.
India’s efforts to advance its Indo-Pacific vision can be traced in the following spheres:
Maritime Domain Awareness: The induction of the P8-I long-range maritime patrol
aircraft in 2015 at INS Rajali, Arakkonam,[2] and the inauguration of the Information
Fusion Centre at Gurugram[3] in December 2018 clearly reflect India’s aims to collaborate
with partner countries and multinational agencies to develop maritime awareness, share
information on commercial cargo vessels, and strengthen inter-navy linkages through
training and professional interactions.
Operational outreach of the Indian Navy: In July 2018, the Indian Navy put forward “new
mission based deployment”[4] in the Indian Ocean, involving mission-ready ships and
aircraft along critical sea-lanes of communication. The access given to the port of Sabang
by Indonesia last year is already improving the outreach of the Navy. [5] The commissioning
of a new air base—INS Kohassa in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—by the Indian Navy
in January 2019 to expand operational presence in the Indian Ocean is also significant. [6]
Strategic coherence: In March 2015, Prime Minister Modi put forward the concept of
‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region)[7], a maritime initiative aimed at
enhancing a range of capacities, engaging with other countries, and fostering greater
cooperation in the littoral. Worth mentioning in this context are the dialogues that have
been conducted between India and other countries—like the 2+2 dialogues[8] with the US,
Japan, and Australia, the trilateral dialogues between India-Japan and US, India-Japan-
Australia (JAI),[9] Russia-India-China, India-Australia-Indonesia, and the Quadrilateral
meetings between India, Japan, Australia and the US. The signing of the Shared Vision
Statement of India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific during Modi’s first
visit to Indonesia in May 2018 is notable.[10] Modi also visited Myanmar and Malaysia in
2018. The invitation to the 2018 Indian Republic Day celebrations—extended to the leaders
of all ten ASEAN countries—underscored the significance of India’s Act East policy. In
April 2019, India set up an Indo-Pacific wing in the Ministry of External Affairs.[11] The
division will integrate the IORA, ASEAN region, and the Quad to the Indo- Pacific table.
Joint exercises for better interoperability: The Indian Navy has been part of coordinated
patrols with Indonesia (Ind-Indo CORPAT), and joint naval (AUSINDEX) and air (Pitch
Black) exercises with Australia. The first ever India-Myanmar bilateral joint military
exercise (IMBAX) took place in November 2017, and in 2018 the first bilateral naval
exercise (IMNEX) was held. The first bilateral naval exercise between India and
Indonesia—named Samudra Shakti—was conducted in 2018.
Capacity Building: In August 2018, India was given the status of STA-1 (Strategic Trade
Authorisation) from the US for hi-tech product sales, particularly in the civil space and
defence sectors. Furthermore, India will start defence component manufacturing for the F-
16 and C-130 aircraft. India has also provided training to Vietnamese combat pilots and
given technical support to the Myanmar Navy.
Maritime infrastructure: India is developing Sittwe port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State and
implementing the US$484 million Kaladan transport project to connect Rakhine State with
India’s northeast state of Mizoram.[12]
Trade: Trade and economic relations between ASEAN and India have seen a rise, and the
two-way trade between India and ASEAN has risen from US$35 billion in 2007 to US$65
billion in 2016. Both exports and imports almost doubled over the same period, from US$14
billion and US$21 billion respectively in
2007, to US$26 billion and US$38 billion respectively in 2016 (See Figure 13). India stands
as ASEAN’s 11th largest trading partner in the year 2016.
Figure 13: India’s Trade with ASEAN (USD billion)
Source: ITC, Geneva and Exim Bank Analysis

Besides the ASEAN, an upward trajectory in economic and trade relations can be seen with
countries like Australia. Two-way goods and services trade between Australia and India
totalled US$19.4 billion in 2015-16. Australian investment in India reached US$10.6 billion
at the end of 2015, and Indian investment in Australia was at US$11.6 billion. This shows
significant growth over investment levels a decade ago. With regard to increasing trade
with Pacific Island countries Prime Minister Modi, while speaking at the first FIPIC Summit
in November 2014, announced the setting up of a ‘Trade Office’ in India.
All these engagements portray India’s increasing involvement in the Indo-Pacific.
Emphasising “inclusiveness” in the Indo-Pacific framework, countries like China and
Russia are also being welcomed by India. Maintaining the delicate balance between the
interests of all stakeholders will be a key challenge. Moreover, it will be a difficult task for
India to make it clear to the US that there is a need to bifurcate the Quad and the Indo-
Pacific construct. Thus, India needs to carefully design its Indo-Pacific policy while keeping
its long-term strategic and economic interests in mind.
India has a unique strategic culture and

diplomatic style
Does India have its own strategic culture? It’s an overwhelming question, defying facile
answers and theorising. On a bright and crisp winter morning in New Delhi, India’s
National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon engaged with some of the finest
international relations experts and scholars to unravel issues that impinge on any
meaningful debate on India’s strategic culture. Rejecting the arguments of analysts like
George Tanham, Menon made a powerful case, arguing that India not only has a
strategic culture of its own, but has practised it consistently in its bilateral relations as
well as in the multilateral arena.
Backed by empirical evidence, Menon eloquently argued that "since independence India
has been an independent actor on the international stage with a role, a diplomatic style,
and a unique and recognisable personality all her own.”
Underlining that India has practised "the most frugal diplomacy, with a small band of
professional diplomats with minimum means to deliver all and more that much larger,
better equipped and well- funded foreign services do,” Menon argued that despite these
limitations Indian diplomacy has "resulted in India making quiet but substantive
contributions to the world in many ways.”
Against the backdrop of the oft-chanted plaint that India is a reluctant and diffident
power, Menon stressed that "India has been very economical in its foreign entanglements
but not engagements.”
"We have so far resisted siren calls for us to do what others want us to, in the name of
being "responsible” or "stepping up to the plate. This shows an acute awareness on our
part, but not others, of the extent and limits of India’s power and its potential uses, and
a clear prioritisation between our interests and between our goals.”
Menon, who served as India’s foreign secretary and the country’s envoy to China and
Pakistan, also exhorted the academic community to move beyond "the post-modern
emphasis on narrative and discourse” to integrate the theory and practice of international
relations.
"If India is to deal with the new issues of the twenty-first century, it is essential that we
further elaborate our own culture and tradition of strategic thought and build on it.”
Mr Menon stressed on the imperative need for India’s diplomatic-strategic-academic
community to formulate its own perspectives and forge its own vocabulary to
understand and expand India’s multi-faceted engagement with the world.
"To the extent that India’s situation and needs are unique, we need our own ways of
looking at developments, and our own strategic vocabulary and doctrines. Fortunately
for us, there is no isolationist streak in our strategic thought, and we have a rich tradition
to draw on.”
Notes towards building India’s strategic culture and Indian IR Theory
(Here is the text of the speech by India’s National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon
on Strategic Culture and IR Studies in India at the 3rd International Studies
Convention held at JNU Convention Centre, New Delhi Dec. 11)
I think my views on ‘strategic culture in India” are well known. There have been those,
like George Tanham, who deny that India has a strategic culture. My view is that this is
an impossibility for a self- conscious culture and civilisation such as ours, with our
heritage and sense of our own importance and role. Just as saying one is apolitical is
itself a political choice, saying that India has no strategic culture is only to say that it is
different from the strategic cultures one is used to.
Sadly many Indians have picked up Tanham’s refrain saying that India has no strategic
culture. I think what most of them mean is that they do not see the long term thinking and
patient planning that is often (rightly or wrongly) ascribed to other cultures.
This too seems untrue to me. India has shown remarkable consistency in the manner of
her engagement with the world, across different stages of her development, under
governments of divergent political persuasions, and in very varied international
circumstances. The record has been remarkably consistent.
But why is there an argument about this at all? One reason may be the nature of IR
studies in India. Let us be honest among ourselves. With a few individual exceptions, IR
studies in India are yet to benchmark themselves to the best in the world or to carve out a
place in IR studies globally. As an Indian, this pains me. As a practitioner, rather than
indulge in a theoretical discussion, which you scholars are much better qualified to do, I
would therefore like to speak today on "Strategic Culture and IR Studies in India” and to
suggest some issues for our future work.
Issues
Preparing for this talk, the first question that struck me as a practitioner was whether
what we do as India’s diplomats is studied; whether we diplomats recognise the reality
that we know and experience, or something like it, in the studies of Indian diplomacy and
foreign policy that we see. My honest answer, after over forty years in the field, must be
that there has actually been very little such scholarship. It is now beginning, as Srinath
Raghavan’s ‘1971’, and his previous book show, but there is very little of that quality
which is empirically based on the historical record and which suggests the real policy
dilemmas that we face. We are fortunate in having a considerable body of memoirs, some
of them like JN Dixit’s ‘Assignment Colombo’ of very high quality indeed, but little that
combines theoretical rigour with knowledge of the real world.
Blending Theory and Practice
I suppose that what I am asking for is a combination of theory and practice that is rare,
and difficult when we are so archivally challenged, to put it mildly. Even so, the
exceptions prove that the effort can be made successfully. IR is and must be a primarily an
empirical discipline, even though some of us are tempted by the ‘quants’ or by the desire
to be ‘scientific’.
To illustrate my point let me mention two issues in Indian foreign policy.
(i) India and her Neighbours: We are yet to find a paradigm to satisfactorily explain the
paradox of India having more in common than most countries with her neighbours in
terms of language, culture, economic complementarity, common history, and so on, but
still having difficult or complex relations with each of them. Instead our studies
concentrate on the day to day politics and compulsions that affect these relationships
rather than their drivers or explanations of why they are as they are.
(ii) India and China: Similarly, a simple realist theory is insufficient to explain or even
describe the complex course and state of India-China relations. If the balance of power
were all that mattered, how do we explain the development of the relationship in the last
twenty-five years?
When Rajiv Gandhi became the first Indian PM to visit China after Jawaharlal Nehru in
1954 we had a mono focal relationship. That is now transformed and it continues to
change before our eyes. We lack a theoretical basis for understanding this change.
The Gap between Theory and Practice
Why is there this gap between theory and practice, between theoreticians and
practitioners, between academics and diplomats in Indian IR studies? Let me suggest a
few reasons that my experience suggests:
(i) One reason is the post-modern emphasis on narrative and discourse. When I look at
your agenda some words leap out: "reimagining”, "imagining”, "subaltern reading”,
"binaries, silences and alternatives”, a view from nowhere”, "intellectual discourse”,
"contending discourses” and so on. These are no doubt useful in their place and are
academically fashionable concepts. It is useful to be self-conscious. The media, public
diplomacy and an entire industry have been built on these post-modern concepts that
other disciplines borrowed from literary criticism. When it comes to dealing with
international relations they are useful in explaining subjective perceptions, which do
affect policy choices. Methodological refinement and improving the tools available to the
discipline certainly have some value.
(ii) But the fact is that this is talking about talking. While it is useful to be self-conscious
there must be something to be self-conscious about, not just self- consciousness itself.
Process cannot substitute for substance. For the practitioner of international relations, it
is outcomes, the policy choices, and the objective realities that underlie them that is of
interest. The practitioner seeks theories that contribute to understanding them. The
post-modern vocabulary and discourse does not offer that. In my experience what
moves states and people who make decisions is not discourse but what they see as
choices and risks in objective reality. In short, the diplomat seeks outcomes. These are
not obtained in the real world by narratives and discourse though they can help. If IR
studies want the satisfaction that comes from having changed or explained reality post-
modern discourse does not provide it.
(iii) The dominant discourse in IR studies, journalism and the world as a whole today is a
Western metropolitan one. But that has not prevented the steady erosion of Western
dominance, as the activation of the G-20 and its role after the 2007-8 financial crisis
showed. (There will no doubt be push back as power seldom shifts smoothly from one set
of hands to another in the international system.) That shift was based on actual changes in
the global economy, with manufacturing and surpluses moving to the emerging world and
China. Changes in discourse and narrative followed the objective shift, and will change
again with push back.
(iv) Besides, as IR studies concentrate more and more on less and less, they are less able
to convey the complexity of the real world that we face, where what Game Theory calls
"minimax” solutions and choices are the rule, and every choice involves risks.
(v) Lastly, people are at the heart of what we diplomats do. Science deals with grand
unification at the same time as chemistry burrows down to the molecular and atomic level.
IR studies today are so concerned with being seen as "scientific” that they do not seem to
have room for the individual.
Problems of Plenty
We today have a problem of plenty. Scholars are under pressure to publish books and
articles in journals and newsmagazines, to comment on daily events, write blogs, tweet,
appear on TV, attend conferences, seminars and to teach. Frankly, I am amazed at the
multitasking skills of my academic friends. But many of them secretly admit that quality
suffers from this inflation of media and that the supply of ideas has not kept up with the
demand.
Integrating Academia and Government
What is the answer to the gap between theory and practice?
IR has been most effective where there is an interchange between academia and
government. (I say government only because for most recent history international
relations and diplomacy have been the province of states. Now they involve governments,
supra-governmental organisations, quasi-governmental and non-governmental
organisations.) But that does not affect the argument that value lies in the interchange
between academia and these institutions that make policy. That is the key to both being
more effective. Both academia and policy formulation benefit from such interchange.
Some of the best academic work in India on our foreign policy was done by those like S.
Gopal who had experience of both. When we had a Historical Division in MEA it was
possible for scholars to work in government of India and make these transitions. We
started these conferences because we wanted to create precisely this interchange in India,
which has sadly become rarer over time. And the government is the poorer for not having
the benefit of grounded academic advice.
What I am suggesting is that we try to build links between academia and policy, and that
this conference is a good place to start.
India’s Role in the World
My other suggestion would be for Indian IR scholars to look at the remarkable

consistency of the role that India has sought to play in the world, under governments of
different political persuasions and composition. India’s non-alignment, chosen levels of
engagement, the balance between multilateralism and bilateralism, and the demands we
place upon our negotiators are all unique.
All in all, our diplomatic engagement has been marked by circumspection, which may not
be what an age of 24X7 media and celebrity culture demands, but judged by outcomes it
has served us well. The modesty and patience that have marked Indian diplomacy so far
have resulted in India making quiet but substantive contributions to the world in many
ways.
India’s Diplomatic Style
This consistency is also a feature of India’s diplomatic style.
Since independence India has been an independent actor on the international stage with a
role, a diplomatic style, and a unique and recognisable personality all her own. I have
said elsewhere that:
For one, we have practiced the most frugal diplomacy that I know. We expect a small
band of professional diplomats with minimum means to deliver all and more that much
larger, better equipped and well- funded foreign services do. Judged by international
standards we have delivered. But as India’s interests abroad expand it will no longer be
possible to improvise and extemporise with what little we have.
We seem to use multilateralism for our values and bilateralism for our interests. We were
among the first and most persistent to raise decolonisation issues, apartheid in South
Africa, and nuclear disarmament in the UN. In the early years of the UN India played a
pivotal role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
fundamental human rights Covenants and Conventions. And India is a major contributor
to UN peacekeeping operations. But our experience of the UN’s reactions to Pakistani
aggression in Kashmir, the genocide in East Pakistan in 1971, and other cases taught us
to rely on our own resources when it came to defending our core interests.
India has shown a willingness to use force for clearly defined political ends when the
cause is just, once it is clear that diplomacy’s potential is exhausted, internally in Goa
and Hyderabad and externally in 1971, in Sri Lanka and the Maldives at the request of
their governments.
In the choice between the imperatives of domestic politics and the demands of external
engagement we have normally struck a balance which has stood the test of time. Think of
our international dealings on the Kashmir issue, or those with Sri Lanka on the Sri
Lankan Tamil issue.
Others tell us that the articulation of our policies is normative, moralistic and academic,
even in explaining acts of realpolitik. We have even been called ‘preachy’! This has not
changed much over time and seems to be a continuing cultural trait.
The Uses and Limits of Power
All strategic thinkers through the ages, whether Kautilya, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli or others,
have sought answers to similar questions: how to win without battle; how to deal with a
stronger power; how to choose between the risks associated with any course of action
(since every course of action in IR involves risks); and so on. And they have chosen to do
so empirically not normatively.
India has been very economical in its foreign entanglements but not engagements. We
have so far resisted siren calls for us to do what others want us to, in the name of being
"responsible” or "stepping up to the plate”. This shows an acute awareness on our part,
but not others, of the extent and limits of India’s power and its potential uses, and a
clear prioritisation between our interests and between our goals.
My own feeling is that the key to understanding India’s foreign policy practice so far is
the Indian understanding of the uses, limits and nature of power. But this is a
proposition that must be tested and proven with some academic rigour by you scholars.
What we practitioners can bring to the exercise is some experience and anecdotal
evidence.
An Indian Theory
Which brings me to the last issue that I would like to raise. If India’s practice and style of
foreign policy is so recognisably and so uniquely Indian why is there not an Indian theory
to explain it?
One way of developing such a theory is to look back. Chinese scholars have done this for
some time, like Yan Xuetong, reinterpreting and mining their own past to produce what
they see as a Chinese theory of international relations. In India too some people have
started this exercise. The IDSA has been sponsoring some truly valuable work on Kautilya
and the Arthashastra. It is interesting in showing how central the state was to strategic
thinking in India as early as the third century BC, long before other cultures stopped
speaking of a mysterious God and his ways as central to strategy.
This is extremely useful work, if nothing else to break the mental shackles of academic and
linguistic conditioning. But it has its limits.
The other way is to look at the present and forward. If India is to deal with the new issues
of the twenty-first century, it is essential that we further elaborate our own culture and
tradition of strategic thought and build on it. To the extent that India’s situation and
needs are unique, we need our own ways of looking at developments, and our own
strategic vocabulary and doctrines. Fortunately for us, there is no isolationist streak in
our strategic thought, and we have a rich tradition to draw on.
Conclusion
So there is plenty to be done to link our studies with our practice, to study ourselves and
our own practice and experience, and to elaborate an Indian approach to IR studies for
the twenty-first century. I would also conclude that the mere fact that we can set out such
an agenda for ourselves suggests that there is a strong strategic culture at work in India.
Tanham in Retrospect: 18 Years of Evolution in

Indian Strategic Culture
In 1992, RAND published an interpretive essay by Dr. George Tanham[1], an American
defense analyst, on the historicaland cultural factors that have shaped India’s strategic
thinking. The essay is important because it highlighted and reinforced particular sensitive
criticisms which continue to form the basis of significant Indian self-examination and self-
justification. This paper reviews Tanham’s major interpretive insights and examines them
in light of observed[2] contemporary Indian strategic culture.
India has had no shortage of external observers, travelers who come to India from afar to
pen their impressions of its tremendous richness of culture and experience. External
audiences have looked to sojourning scribes for help in understanding India’s behavior
from afar. Internal audiences have used these same impressions to better understand
themselves, to shape and define their identity, and to provide a diagnostic for reform.
Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed the emergence of India as a
significant actor on the global stage. As India grows in both prominence and capability,
there is increasingly a desire to understand, and even predict, how India will behave in
strategic matters—its military and foreign policy.
This paper provides the reader with the benefit of two external observations: one taken in
1992 and another in 2010. Both are interpretations seen through the lens of India’s
strategic culture. As such it may provide both audiences—those external seeking to
understand what is persistent and changing in Indian culture, and how to predict its
behavior, and those internal, seeking to diagnose what is stagnant and malleable for
reform in order to adapt its behavior—useful sources of insight, or “data points”.
The first data point comes from Dr. George Tanham, an America historian and specialist
in South Asian security affairs working for RAND, who, around 1992, over a period of
about four months, made numerous visits to India in an attempt to capture the outlines of
Indian Strategic Culture. The echoes of his criticism are still influential in the Indian
strategic community, and are parroted by both internal reformers and apologists.
The second data point is mine. Like Tanham, I came from an American defense analysis
background, and likewise came to India to learn about its strategic thinking. After having
spent over a year immersed in one of India’s think tanks, having had a chance to form my
own independent impressions, I was asked by a colleague to read Tanham and pen my
impressions, providing yet another diagnostic data-point from an external observer, but
this time nearly two decades later.
Implicit in such a request is a requirement to answer the following questions: What did
Tanham say? Was he right—or rather, where was he right and wrong? What did he miss?
His observations were taken in 1992: what, if anything was persistent and stood the test of
time over nearly two decades, and what has changed in the last 18 years? : What does his
description/diagnosis mean for the future of Indian Strategic Culture?
Tanham himself offers no definition of “Strategic Culture” preferring instead to say that
that his essay is an exploration of “the historical and cultural factors that have shaped
India’s strategic thinking.” However the term “Strategic Culture” had already been in
use and defined in the circle of American defense intellectuals since the 1970s[3] when
Jack Snyder introduced it to explain why leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave
according to rational choice theory[4] and defined it as, “the body of attitudes and beliefs
that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic
issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and perceptual parameters of strategic
debate.”[5] The number of definitions have since blossomed but the utility of the concept,
as proposed by Melanie Graham, is the opportunity to gain insight into those few elements
of the many that go into shaping a culture that specifically influence or shape perceptions
and response to threats and opportunities.[6]
This paper will review what I consider Tanham’s most important insights and assertions—
particularly those criticisms that seemed to me to have become part of the self-narrative of
the Indian Strategic community’s apologists and discontent reformers–and answer the
first four questions along the way. Then toward the end, I will summarize my thoughts on
the last question.
What did Tanham say?
Tanham attempted to examine what historical and cultural factors had affected Indian
strategic thinking; what were the evolving lines of security debate within the Indian
civilian and military leadership, as well as the technical, economic, and institutional
factors affecting the evolution of Indian military power.[7]
For someone who only spent four months on the task, he provided a surprisingly good first
and enduring answer. An important lacuna is that his list of interviews did not include any
significant sampling of the political class.
Tanham identified four principle factors[8] that have shaped and explain Indian views:
Indian geography, History, the Influence of the British Raj, and most importantly, Indian
Culture, and Tanham makes a convincing case for each.
He also ascribes importance to the lingering influence of an anti-colonialist mindset and
normative framework, and the coloration of the realities of cold-war power politics with
India’s investment in a non-status quo normative order that maximized freedom of action,
which continues to exert a strong (and in my view mismatched and dysfunctional)
influence on contemporary strategic culture[9]. Tanham mentions, but in my view
significantly underemphasizes the importance in contemporary Indian strategic thought of
strategic autonomy, independent foreign policy, Indianization/Indigenization and self-
reliance[10].
Tanham’s observations on the impact of geography and the British Raj are fairly common
sense and non-controversial. Both are useful in their explanatory power, and also not
worth further commentary. In short, there are land-centric, colonial obsessions that cloud
contemporary Indian strategic thought, offering few real insights, and distracting from
areas where the focus could be more functional and adaptive.
It is however, the third pillar of Tanham’s explanation of the condition of Indian strategic
thinking, the pervasive influence of “the larger Indian culture” that is most interesting,
and it is here that Tanham’s criticism made its deepest impact on the self-narrative of the
Indian strategic community. It is especially interesting because while the influence of
Geography and the British Raj do provide insight into the focus and content of Indian
strategic thought, it is Tanham’s observations on the effect of the larger culture which
appear to inform and constrain the outputs, methods, and vibrancy of Indian strategic
thought.
In 1992 Tanham noted that Indians had no writings that offered a coherent set of
articulated beliefs or operating set of principles for Indian Strategy. That is still true
today, nearly two decades later[11]. Moreover the deficit is interesting, especially in light
of the purported Indian negotiating style[12] that seeks to set out first principles from
which other things follow, and the fact that Indians seem quite able to divine and
articulate the operating principles of others[13].
While there are many Indians who see this as an unconscionable abdication[14] on the
part of India’s political leadership, there are is no lack of apologists[15] for having no
explicit policy. Raising the issue, a visitor is likely to hear such arguments as: “It is not
that important, and we have done pretty good without it so far”; “Its not necessary as
everything you would need to know is on public record” (in some public speech or
procurement document); “It is not necessary because the services know” (a wholly
debatable point) to “it would be impossible to achieve such a consensus” or “there is no
consensus on such things”; “it would be meaningless because in a parliamentary system
the government could fall at any time”; “articulating it might just bring down the
government”; “given our situation, a strategy of ambiguity is the wisest”; “it is best not
to reveal such things” or “it would be inflammatory and counter productive” to “we
should not ape the west and their militant foreign policy.”
Despite whatever is said in the manifold answers, (impossibility, durability, utility,
ambiguity, obviousness, and belligerency) the external observer is likely to sense a high
level frustration within the military officer corps over the lack of direction, as well as a
cageyness and insecurity amongst the strategic elites. An outsider is left with the distinct
impression that strategically speaking, today’s India does not yet know what she wants.
Further, one gets the sense that the structures and tools necessary to achieve a consensus
of direction–state bureaucracies, Parliament, military– are at present not sufficiently
coordinated to the task.[16]
While Tanham was unable to find a clear set of priorities for Indian security in an Indian-
authored document, based on his various interviews and observations, Tanham does an
exquisite job of setting forth what they likely would be if articulated[17], and his list
appears largely consistent with India’s contemporary sensitivities.
While clearly articulating the ad hoc strategies which India appears to have adopted,
Tanham notes that the Indian government has not succeeded in articulating or pursuing
these goals in a coherent, disciplined fashion. Nearly two decades later, this is still
disappointingly true (though there was an impressive amount of clarity in President

Patil’s inaugural address to Parliament[18] following the strong election of the Congress
party in 2009 which certainly hints at a consensus content for a National Security
Strategy).
The lack of a clear National Security Strategy class of document is only the most visible
element of what Tanham calls, “India’s relative lack of strategic thinking.”[19] Tanham
notes that while India has, over time, developed elements of defense strategy, it has
produced little formal strategic planning, and appears to be “reactive” rather than
“active” in its approach, even suggesting that Indians may not address their problems
seriously until a real crisis arises.
Tanham seems on target here. An outsider does not get the sense that there are well
thought through contingency plans[20], and plans with “branches and sequels,” that can
be represented to them. While one sees evidence of Chinese strategic planning to achieve
coordinated policies and actions with specific destinations and specific goal dates, with
rumors of planning timelines that span several centuries, a visitor could spend a very long
time in India and never witness a group of Indians working through action-reaction
chains of events aimed to secure a desired goal at a particular time even decades out.
It could be, of course, that such planning takes place in cloistered areas away from prying
eyes, and Tanham notes that with respect to some major security strategies, such as
nuclear doctrine, a small group of civilians may be developing its pre-requisite. However
Tanham also points to the perceived problems with such an approach, such as a situation
where the military brass is unaware of the larger overall strategy, can make no plans, and
is unaware of the status of forthcoming policy decisions. A modern observer might
generalize this concern to all defense planning, and in fact, some have.[21]
Current conventional wisdom about learning organizations notes the importance of
communicating overall vision[22]. Insights in the US and Europe have determined that
Defense Planning requires “many eyes”[23], from many different agencies and
interdisciplinary fields, in order to map a coherent and considerate path forward.
Tanham is certainly not the only foreigner to make an observation regarding “the relative
lack of strategic thinking” in India. In my own year there, I remember hearing various
foreigners make remarks such as “I’m amazed at what passes for strategic thinking here”,
“There is a lot of discussion of matters of strategic import, but very little strategy”,
“There is a lack of connecting the dots”, and that India’s foreign policy and strategic
“software” is underdeveloped.[24]
This means that someone within the strategic community would observe comparatively
little systematic thinking which asks and answers the following questions[25]:
• What are India’s desired outcomes?
• What are the tools available at India’s disposal?
• How well aligned are India’s current policies?
• How ought they to be amended?
Or asked differently:
• Where do we want to be at X time.
• What are the sequential steps we must take (or refrain from) to get from here to
there?
• What are the intermediate destinations and decision points to shoot toward?
• What branches can I foresee?
• How are other strategic actors likely to react?
• Who will oppose me…how will I check them?
• What are the tools at my command to influence their behavior?
• What other resources do we need?
• Where will we get them and how will we go about getting it?[26]
Answering these sorts of questions are typically codified in a series of strategic planning
methods and skills that build consensus and consistency and result in clear products that
communicate to the entire organization , service, and country an organizing direction.
A Paradox
This observation of the lack of “the relative lack of strategic thinking” creates a paradox,
as Tanham himself notes that Indians have a talent for analysis and conceptualization,
and seem admirably equipped for strategic thinking[27]. Why then, if so intellectually
equipped have their strategic concepts been developed in such an informal and haphazard
way? Tanham asks why it is that India has, for instance, never issued a white paper[28]
and does not appear inclined to do so? Part of the reason, Tanham suggests, is the lack of
well functioning organs to do this work, but his larger explanation is the lack of a
developed habit.
Tanham’s criticisms extend to what might today be called “Higher Defense
Management,” and these criticisms ring disappointingly true today. Tanham highlights
that India’s actual strategic planning, decisions, and military decisions are taken by the
Prime Ministers and their own small coterie of advisors[29] rather than civil servants,
government leaders, or the military. Tanham notes that major strategy and military
decisions are taken by the CCPA (now the CCS) rather than the military, that the Chiefs
of the services have no statutory power, and the dysfunctional power of the Finance
ministry to veto military expenditures. He notes the failure to achieve a Chief of Defense
Staff and Joint Staff (citing civilian concerns that a concentration of power might
encourage a coup). Tanham wrote at the time that the National Security Council (NSC)
was stillborn, not having been constituted in 1992. It is constituted today, but what power
and significance it has is, like the Integrated Defense Staff (IDS)[30], much disputed
within the Indian Strategic community. The problems observed by Tanham with respect to
the vibrancy of organs that should be equipped to do strategic thinking appear to still be
current today.[31]
Tanham explains that fear of a coup is one reason for holding back such defense reform,
but dismisses this as an unrealistic fear. He notes that the Indian Military plays only a
minimal role in decision-making on matters of national security, and that if allowed, many
well educated and thoughtful military officers could contribute to the formulation of
national strategy and defense plans, while remaining apolitical and strongly under
civilian control.[32] A contemporary observer would likely make the same observation—
that Indian officers are very committed to civilian supremacy and are principled in their
desire to secure India.
What was Tanham’s explanation for India’s lack of strategic thinking? Tanham lays a
small amount of the blame[33] on the British Raj, which while developing strategic ideas,
failed to articulate a written strategic plan, and kept Indian’s out of the discussions[34].
The larger blame for the “comparative lack of strategic thinking” falls on the tapestry of
broader Indian culture[35], an admittedly more abstract kind of criticism.
His overall cultural explanation falls into three basic points: First, that India rarely was a
politically unified entity that had to think about defense matters from the perspective of a
large, coherent state. Second, that India as a rural, agricultural, hierarchical society was
ruled by nature and had no tradition of long-range planning, or planning for social
change. And third, and most seductively to those that would justify or encourage this
condition, that Indian philosophical ideas, particularly as regarding time and human
agency, are not conducive to planning.
There is little to say on the first point, except that India is now politically unified, and will
find it necessary to think on those terms. Tanham’s second point–that India, as a largely
agricultural, largely rural society, has no tradition of long-range planning as nature
determines the important and unchanging sequence of when to plant and harvest—is
rapidly being undermined by India’s rapid industrialization and urbanization. In perhaps
2-3 decades more people will live in Cities than in rural areas, and cities require and
demand long-term planning. India is on a trajectory of development much like any other
country, and so it is not inconceivable that there will be a time when only 2% of its
workforce engages in agriculture. Tanham notes the “rigid and hierarchical structure of
Indian society” which, while not “completely stifling initiative, makes change and
individual initiative difficult” as individuals have few incentives to test the system, and
that if an individual is lost outside family or cast it is a calamity. But urbanization and
modernization erode such rigid separation and hierarchy. City life with its mobility favors
nuclear families, and requires social mobility. These aspects of the larger Indian culture
are not likely to be fixed or predictive of future Indian strategic thinking.
Tanham’s insights into contemporary India, particularly the importance of Indian culture
as a binding force to “Indianness” and identity[36] are valuable. His fixation, however,
on the shackling nature of Indian fatalism seems dated today, especially against the
backdrop of exploding creativity and entrepreneurialism.
Tanham’s critique suggests an almost overpowering wet-blanket effect of Indian culture
on strategic thought and innovation. While this may provide insight into why things are
the way they are, it should not be taken as a reason why things should or will be from here
on out. The point I want to make, observing India in the midst of rapid change, is that
these cultural artifacts are not static. While it is likely that, ”the basic social and cultural
patterns from early Greek & Chinese visitors still observable today[37]” will be
perceptible even in a century, they are likely have morphed to be adaptive to new realities.
Tanham’s third point essentially makes the case that Indian culture contains certain
philosophical concepts about time and human agency that are not conducive to planning.
Tanham emphasized the Hindu concept of time, which unlike the Western linear
conception, is non-linear, cyclic, and recurring, and in his view is not conducive to “a
sense of history”. He seemed to think this negated the idea of progress. He even proposed
that Indians understood time spatially rather than temporally. Closely linked with this is
Tanham’s assertion that the primary Indian cultural narrative is that life is mysterious,
largely unknowable, subject to fate, and not entirely under human control. The impact of
non-human / outside forces, be they natural, supernatural (as in the epics), or external to
one’s society & control (invaders) on the understanding of cause and effect, when linked
with an attitude of a non-urgency (change can wait, life may have many incarnations and
opportunities, appreciate that any benefit brings costs), is to reduce the perception of the
scope of human agency—which, however true in and of itself, serves to further constrain
human agency, by encouraging a learned helplessness through an external locus of
control, and by keeping focus on the circle of concern and deterring the expanding role of
human agency within a circles of influence[38].
Tanham also cited the Indian concept of duty—which seems to be position-in-society-
based[39] rather than agenda/outcome based[40], and the philosophical conceptions of
caste (and therefore an existing order of human affairs not made by the convention of
men) as positively stable, unchangeable, immutable, divinely ordained and fixed by god.
This contributes to a conservative and non-innovative mindset which deemphasizes the
need for a mental space to conceive of a future that is fundamentally different than the
present or past.
These, combined, in contrast to Western notions of linear time, progress, and human
empowerment, make the future appear less mutable, more uncertain, perhaps
indiscernible, and less subject to human manipulation[41]. This supports attitudes of
passivity, acceptance, and fatalism[42]. Tanham felt that these attitudes to the future and
the de-emphasis of human agency directly handicaps planning and impedes preparation
for the future[43]. A modern observer could certainly discern aspects of these
observations in listening to how Indians digest strategic problems and potential courses of
actions.
An observer might amplify Tanham’s observations by pointing out the overall religious-
cultural narrative common to strains of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist thought, that of “No
Destination”, values of acceptance of the world and its status-quo order (rather than
activist change), and an idealization of training the “observer” (meditative) orientation to
the world rather than the active. Further, a society that has been stable and seen little
change for generations at a time is less likely to have developed ideas regarding how to
cope and instigate such change.
Some of the other cultural traits examined by Tanham are less tied to economic means
and conditions and seem to reflect more habit and preference, and so would appear to
remain persistent unless there is a crisis.
Tanham notes, for instance, the comparative importance of status and symbolism[44] in
Indian Society, and their specific effect on military capabilities. He notes that Indians
seem to consider specific military capabilities–e.g., nuclear weapons, long range missiles
and aircraft, a large blue-water navy, a strong military industrial base–symbols of great
power status, and India must therefore have them[45]. A modern observer would note
India’s rapid acquisition of power projection capabilities (carriers, long-distance cargo
aircraft, air refueling and long-distance fighters) without any clear national consensus on
what they are for.
Tanham makes an interesting point, that Indians feel India has not been adequately
recognized as a great civilization and country, and that “indifference is worse than
hostility,” implying an emotional rather than rational urge. He suggests that the Indian
belief is that if India has the symbols of great power status it will be recognized as such.
His critique is that Indians sometimes have difficulty explaining their intentions and plans
for new weapons, especially missiles and for expanding the navy, suggesting that they
either hope to obscure their long-term strategic designs or, more likely, the new weapons
have not been integrated into a carefully developed strategic plan. A modern observer
would be no more satisfied today.
Tanham critiques further that Indian planners may need no additional justification or
rationale than that India’s greatness mandates having them (with not necessarily any
plans for actual employment toward some goal other than recognition). That would
contrast sharply with other nations who look at these items principally for their utility,
and would think this mistakes form for function, and that the symbolic value accrues as
much from the will to use (in boundary setting, hierarchy, competitive matters), and
proper integration as from the “having.” Such thinking might be folly, as an opponent or
would-be ally might be able to sense whether one has selected and carries a sword for
self-defense or conquest, and someone who carries it as a decoration.
Of course, the world is no longer indifferent, and India does have real defense problems.
India’s acquisition raises questions of the “cart” and “horse,” ; the inquiry for India’s
future strategists is whether India is putting the cart (symbols) before the horse
(requirements). Tanham mentions multiple times that modern military technology is
shaping India’s strategic policy, but that India’s modernization seems to be driven by
technological opportunism rather than systematic and consistent thought on the part of
Indian elites[46], and this appears no less true nearly two decades later. Tanham
suggested in 1992 that in particular, advanced armor, precision guided missiles, long-
range missiles, and modern aircraft will require Delhi to revise its defense concepts. It
would require an in-depth study to see if this has been the case over the last 18 years, but
an outsider certainly does not get the impression that such a revision has been as
profound or seriously undertaken as in its neighbor China, who is perceived to be a
relative innovator in these domains.
Laying the blame on culture though has its own problems if you are an administrative
change agent, because, as Tanham notes, Indians seem universally proud of their culture,
and see it as an organizing and unifying force. They are therefore unlikely to look at it
critically, and see the situation as self-justifying. This concern will be addressed below,
but first it is important to note a few more of Tanham’s interesting observations regarding
Indian culture.
Tanham cites the primacy of culture in Indian outlook and common identity formation,
which seems true if taken in the broadest sense of inclusive social attitudes, tolerance,
diversity, familiar myths, stories, familiar epics, and pride at their manifold incarnations.
And Indian culture has an interesting twist. While other cultures seem to also assume their
superiority which might seek to push their culture abroad in a masculine or proselytizing
way, Indian culture seems to assume a feminine, receptive quality, where the narrative
holds that others come to India as conquerors but are instead conquered by it. In this
narrative, Indian culture has a persistent, indomitable quality that attracts and seduces all
who come, and ultimately prove more powerful than military might.
Tanham notes that Indian’s have had little taste for conquest of expansion beyond the
subcontinent, and points out that historically to penetrate further North or West meant
leaving fertile warm areas to traverse more barren and chilly regions. Eighteen years and
significant military capability beyond his writing this seems no less true, with the
dominance of militant anti-expeditionary and anti-interventionist points of view in India
despite acquiring expeditionary capabilities.
One might note, however, that the United States was once a “city on a hill” isolationist
power, trying to steer an independent foreign policy outside entrapping European
geopolitics, with a modest goal of keeping the great powers out of its hemisphere. As India
grows more important and connected, and perceives the outside world increasingly
though the vista of television and travel, it will feel the temptation to exercise its emergent
capacity for power projection.
Strategists should anticipate that as India grows in wealth and stature, the expectations
and attitudes in the larger Indian culture will change. They should also anticipate that as
India’s businesses get exposed to and adopt best practices such as strategic planning,
open-planning, and web-sourcing, that the resistance to such planning and sharing of
information will become less common.
What is the Future of Indian Strategic Culture?
A judgment as to the direction and malleability of Indian strategic culture is important
both to those who feel that India is fixed, for better or worse, in some eternal condition,
and equally to those who feel that strategic culture is open to self-modification, and
believe diagnosis is the first step to remedy.
If one has a static or self-justifying concept of strategic culture, then there is no need to
look deeper, but if one looks at strategic culture from an operational, clinical point of
view, assuming that cultural preferences may endure but cultural skills are a mimetic soup
of best practices, then there are some additional shortcomings of interest to those involved
in self-diagnosis. What else would an outsider likely perceive at this moment in time about
the state of Indian strategic culture, and what might lead someone to notice “a relative
lack of strategic thinking.”
First, there is a disproportionately historical[47] and present focus to Indian strategic
analysis, with comparatively little focus on the future.[48] This saps a lot of time, and
focuses the best minds away from where things are going. Part of this may arise from the
local tendency to perceive India’s grandeur more in the past than in the future, but one
would expect this focus to shift to consider possibilities of the future. The obvious place to
start is to cultivate the skill set of disciplined scenario planning. While an appreciation of
complexity (and ability to see multiple sides) seems to be a natural strength in the Indian
intellect, the lack of disciplined skill sets seem to lead the thinker to discount any
particular approach rather than capture them into sound and useful products.
Second, there is an allied attitudinal deficit: an asymmetry where the questions Indian
analysts seem to ask themselves focus more on threat than opportunity. This absorption
and fear of the initiative of others leads to a comparative lack of focus on India’s own
agency and what leverages it enjoys.
Third, one particularly puzzling observation is the comparative weakness in the
development of strong conceptual tools to think from the point of view of other strategic
actors, and to give disproportionate weight to hidden motives and conspiracy theories
over more overt, obvious, and signaled motives. The obvious remedy for this is wargaming
where analysts get a chance to make decisions while role-playing other strategic actors.
Fourth, the Indian strategic community would do well to develop stronger focus and
capacities for sequential thinking (which again can be developed through scenario based
planning and wargaming), and on systems thinking (interconnections and causations),
which can again, be developed by scenarios and various diagramming methodologies.
Fifth, there is a lingering fear by some in the community of external ideas, and an
unfortunate Marxist-analytical suspicion that all ideas are weapons of some class or
interest rather than an earnest search for the truth[49]. This diminishes the freedom of the
individual analyst to assimilate the best ideas as India’s own.
Sixth, there is a habit in the Indian strategic community to be analytic rather than focus
on praxis and truly articulate options and paradigms for policymakers. There is a need to
sit with policymakers, find out what are their concerns and agendas, and attach
themselves to meaningful work with a market for action.
Seventh, Tanham suggests that it is India’s diversity that makes consensus difficult. That
seems too fatalistic—diversity is often strength, and there is actually a remarkable
consensus on a number of very important values. Rather it appears that Indian strategic
thinkers are underexposed to important tools of brainstorming and consensus building
that might allow them to bring out and synthesize their diverse viewpoints and arrive at
meaningful consensus. There seems to be a great deal of talking at each other, and
difficulty in turn-taking. This is not an uncommon cultural problem in many businesses,
and seems to find its remedy with some formal training in active listening, facilitation,
brainstorming and consensus voting.
Conclusion
Overall, a sympathetic outsider, observing India and reading Tanham, is likely to find a
great deal of consistency, and recognize many of the attributes, both good and bad, that
Tanham noted in 1992. Sadly, even after 18 years, an observer is likely to validate
Tanham’s fundamental criticism that there is still a “comparative lack of strategic
thinking” and paucity of a systematic articulation of Indian security principles, hinting at
a lack of evolution and dynamism over those years. It is worth asking why this is the case
and if it will ever change.[50] It is even possible to find Indians who proudly argue and
defend these attributes of strategic culture as preferable,[51] but more usually Indians
seem either frustrated or resigned to it.
But while I do think that the larger Indian cultural tapestry colors the way Indians digest
strategic events, I am unconvinced that this cultural tapestry fundamentally prejudices
Indians against strategic thinking or planning. Rather than some deep-seeded cultural
preclusion, my own observations suggest that no more is required than a change in
corporate culture within the organs of the strategic community (the planning staffs in the
military, paramilitary and external affairs, think tanks and academia) that is
underexposed to a very specific sets of practices. Changing corporate culture (in this case
the working norms and expectations related to planning) is hard, but hardly as daunting
as a change in background culture.[52] Direct experience during my time in the Indian
strategic culture in fact showed that Indians were well equipped to absorb the tools of
scenario planning and future studies, and a recent series of publications and projects
already hint that the Indian strategic community is increasingly focusing on the future and
seeking to be more explicit.[53]
Is there a future for Indian strategic planning and culture? In my view, the answer is
“yes”, and it is all upward. As India moves to become a mainstream player, the need to
act in such realms will put increasing pressure to further expand and develop the requisite
organs and their competencies.
I think Tanham is right in pointing out this shortcoming, and some of its causes, some of
which may exert a significant drag for some time yet to come. But strategic culture is not
fixed, and India’s own focus, outlook, and self-perception are changing significantly, and
it is difficult to imagine that as India re-opens and finds itself able to compete and flourish
in the world of business, that it will not adopt first there the conceptual toolkits that
enable clear strategic thinking. That, in turn, will proliferate into other realms; find
increasing pressure through politics, and eventually into government bureaucracy and
supporting civil society organs.
In closing, it would not surprise me if another external observer, another two decades
from now, noticed the same pervasive influence of Indian culture in identity formation, the
same importance of status, and the same basic attitude toward life and time, but I very
much doubt that an observer even ten years hence would notice “a comparative lack of
strategic thinking.
Appendix A:
A Few Important Changes:
A few important changes have occurred since Tanham wrote. In 1992, Tanham assessed
India’s power projection as quite limited. India was not then a declared nuclear weapons
state. It did not have a nuclear submarine. It did not have long range carrier aircraft and
a new carrier on the way. It had not demonstrated air-refueling its own fighters to Red
Flag. It had not demonstrated a number of ballistic and cruise missile technologies. One
must note that India has considerably more power projection capabilities than it
possessed 18 years ago. Tanham felt that India had not thought through the long-term
implications of advanced weaponry. That would deserve its own in-depth study. Tanham
also asserted that at the time, India did not seem to need to focus too far abroad because
it was largely self-sufficient in the necessities of life and could afford to live largely
oblivious to the outside world. That is certainly not true today. India is vitally dependent
on the outside world, particularly for its energy supply (oil, gas, uranium, even coal),
which is about 30% today and moving to above 40% in the next two decades. There are
indications that climate change may even mean it will not be self-sufficient on food. And
India is so vitally connected to the outside world in Trade. Right now India seems to have
a fatalistic attitude to what strategic actors do abroad, but the nature of democracy is
such that constituencies will expect their leadership to press harder in the abroad to serve
the interests here at home.
Threat Perception: In 1992, Tanham’s perceptions were that India seemed much less
concerned about Pakistan’s intentions than China, did not see the Chinese Naval threat as
serious, and that China is psychologically less of a threat to India’s vital interests than
Pakistan. That is not true today. The focus of Indian strategic thought has shifted to
China, even as the threat based on the ideology of a successful Pakistan has diminished.
Tanham notes that India lived with Chinese nuclear capability for some years without
much concern. The narratives I have heard would suggest that that was never the case
and that the nuclear program was initiated under Nehru with China in mind.
India’s Navy: Tanham observed that the Indian Navy, because it was unhindered by
conservative traditions of land defense and the restrictions that land frontiers impose, was
more likely than the Army to meet modern problems with modern technology, and face
future challenges with greater boldness. Eighteen years after his essay, though the Navy is
clearly perceived both inside and outside as the principle innovator in strategic thought,
the patterns of thought that are still primarily defensive and land-oriented are still quite
visible. At the time Tanham wrote, he noted that there was no authoritative government
statement on Indian Naval Strategy. One notes with satisfaction that the Navy at least has
offered a naval Strategy.
Fear of a Military Coup: Tanham devotes significant time to the fear of a military coup,
and suggests that this is a major reason for the lack of reform of higher defense
management. This is a disappointing fear that appears irrational in that there seems to be
little basis or evidence for it.[54] In fact, my impression is that the Indian military
evidences significant pride in its achievement of Civilian supremacy, and there is no hint
in the dialogue of challenge to civilian control—only a desire for a more direct voice and
more clear guidance. He suggests that any challenge is unlikely, and this prediction is
well supported over the last 18 years. Civilian and political interest in reform is quite
important, as inter-service coordination is an acknowledged problem. Jointness in
particular entails its own difficulties, and has always required a strong external civilian
forcing function to overcome the strong interests of the services. It must be recognized
that this continued fear of a coup has real and present costs to India, preventing the
formation of needed institutions for the development of national strategy and planning,
and perpetuating an organization that is perceived both internally and externally as
dysfunctional and hampering India’s larger comprehensive national power.
Fragile Coherence. Tanham’s impression in 1992 was that India had a fragile coherence
and national integration, and that a quest for personal and regional competition for
power diminished India’s claim to greatness. He seemed to think that Indian’s identity to
caste and family overshadowed their “Indianness”. That is not my general impression.
Certainly family is strong, and caste clearly plays a strong role in marriage, but at least in
my work environment, these did not match my preconceptions of their import. Certainly
there are areas I visited that have culturally distinct backgrounds that felt themselves
culturally alienated from larger India, but India’s coherence does not seem particularly
fragile to me, nor does the national Indian identity seem weak, despite obvious regional
interests and ongoing insurgencies.
Appendix B:
Additional Observations
Miscellaneous Notes on Content of Indian Strategic Thought:
Tanham notes that Indian Strategists disagree as to exactly what role India should play in
the world, and how to reach such a goal. Two decades later, that seems even truer.
Tanham notes India’s early emphasis on Idealistic Pan-Asianism, Peace, World
cooperation, anti-colonialism, racial equality. One still detects strains of this idealism,
though there is increasing sophistication and realism in Indian strategic discourse.
Tanham suggests that India’s ambitions are not territorial. That certainly seems true from
what I’ve observed.
Tanham suggests that Indian’s feel their claim on leadership needs to be based on moral
and spiritual values. That seems to be mostly true, with the exception of some Neoliberal
thought that would articulate future economic power first, and some hyperrealists that
would dismiss this.
Tanham suggests that India’s major defense thinking is land oriented. That is clearly true
from my observation, but:
• Tanham suggests that Indian’s look at and think of Defending the South Asian Sub-
Continent as a whole. I have never heard things expressed as such, and in fact,
contemporary thinking regarding the subcontinent seems to consider it rather as
fragmented.
• Tanham suggests that the British had a land-oriented forward strategy to contend
with Russia and China for the control of Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia and
Burma. It is not evident that India is following in those shoes.
Tanham articulates 3 concentric circles of Indian strategic concern. That continues to be
part of contemporary Indian discussion, but not formalized. Tanham asserts that the
Indian government has followed a policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear capability.
One might generalize that this continues to be the practice. It is less clear that this policy
is deliberate, or is rather the outcome of bureaucratic risk aversion.
Misc Cultural Observations
Tanham asserts that Indians are proud and extremely sensitive. That does agree with my
perceptions. The relevant impact on strategic culture and thinking is that the particular
form of pride seems to express itself in a suspicion of foreign ideas or “Western ideas”
that might “corrupt”and an unwillingness to take an apprenticeship role so as to adopt
best practices.
That matters particularly with regard to India’s choices in how to absorb technology.
India has initiated a vigorous military R&D program, but has had limited success in
producing advanced weapons systems. India’s unwillingness to enter alliances,
apprenticeship, or engineer an attractive investment environment mean it must try to come
from behind all on its own, or rely on outside suppliers.
Tanham devotes some discussion the Ideas that India’s history is interpreted through the
prism of nationalism, and to India’s conception as a world unto itself with isolated
evolution. This view contributes to the problem of openness to learning from outside as
listed above.
Tanham asserts that Indians are Suspicious, fearful of betrayal, and envious of their
neighbors, and believe in “other” powers at work (such as the CIA). It certainly is my
impression that Indian thinkers give disproportionate weight to hidden motives and seems
prejudiced to believe and give greater weight to covert actions than others might. Such
assertions don’t seem to recognize the complexity and hierarchy of motives, and seem to
be insufficiently self-consistent in terms of explaining strategic actor’s actions.
Tanham’s wonderful description of India’s important precursor civilizations, while
interesting to culture, does not seem to be part of the larger common contemporary
strategic dialogue. Contemporary Indian thinkers seem to be much more likely to cite
Western sources and post-independence history than any pre-cursor civilizations.
Tanham suggests that from Independence India has been on the Strategic Defensive [and
may have suffered several “strategic surprises”], and has seldom attempted a forward
strategy. That seems no less true today. Tanham notes the Indian Nationalist’s perception
that India historically has maintained a defensive posture and fought defensive wars. That
also seems persistent, and India seems to have a continued aversion to what today is
called “expeditionary operations.”
Tanham seemed to suggest that Indians see its culture itself as a tool of its security, almost
“whatever it is, it’s not so bad, our culture will persist and prevail and absorb it.” That
faith in the buffering quality of culture to stop any real threat to their way of life does
seem to prejudice Indian thinkers against an impatient or aggressive foreign policy.
Tanham notes that Indians are comfortable with complexity and contradiction. That is
certainly true. At present, it has not led to any particular approach, but in theory it could
be very valuable capacity, if the corporate culture of Indian strategic thinking adopted
systematic tools and methods to turn that into sound policy options, scenarios, branches
and sequels, and helps the community to “game out” possibilities and reason backward to
today.
Tanham notes the great diversity of India. That ought to be a strength today, again, if
India develops within its corporate culture of strategic planning the tools, and a higher
bar of overall expectations to “capture the wisdom of crowds” and synthesize things, and
draw out its manifold voices (rather than letting the powerful or privileged or senior
dominate the space).
External Observations
“No foreign power was going to send 40 wings to defend India.” Is that true today? Might
India be able to change that if it wanted to?
India mildly disapproved of the presence of the Soviet fleet but loudly protested the US
presence. Now it seems that India is mildly disapproving of the US fleet, but loudly
protesting China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean.
The Soviets believed India could be a helpful friend in world councils, particularly the
UN. Now that seems to be equally true of the US. The Services took the lead in developing
closer relations with US? Why? This is a very interesting question. Was it a strategy on
their part? Was it Peacekeeping experience? Was it based on respect for competence?
Ability to communicate (English)? Or some other fundamental affinity that points to
convergent values?
India insists on absolute equity, and refusal to serve under US command. India still will
not be under a US command, or in coalitions outside a UN framework. However, India’s
larger insistence on absolute equity is showing a more nuanced framework, particularly
with respect to its neighbors.
Indians are fiercely independent but their fear of encirclement almost demands that they
have powerful friends. That certainly seems true, and also necessary from a strategic view
given the actual balance of power. One notes though that if Chinese or Americans
inhabited the subcontinent, you might see a very different foreign policy. Indians may
have an appreciation for the need and an acceptance of the reality that violence is done,
but seem to have an extraordinarily strong distaste for doing violence themselves.
Indian Strategic Thought – An Interpretive

Essay
Please download the file from the link given.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R4207.pdf
Implications of BREXIT and the prospects of an India-UK

FTA
INTRODUCTION
The impending divorce between the UK and the European Union has snow-balled into a
Hollywood potboiler, with the essential elements of drama, suspense, bluster and a deep
sense of foreboding, adding to the already volatile and incendiary mix that is BREXIT. The
countdown has begun with 41 days to go before the UK exits the EU, unless of course a
further extension is sought by the UK and granted by the EU, a prospect that Prime Minister
Boris Johnson colorfully dismissed recently by saying that he would "rather be dead in a
ditch” than ask the EU for a delay. Subsequent developments in Parliament may not give
him much room for manouvre in this regard, unless a divorce deal is miraculously achieved
before the end of next month.
The fall out of the referendum in the UK, held on June 23, 2016 (51.9% voted to leave, while
48.1% voted to remain), continues to haunt the island nation and recent events have only
served to compound the crisis that Great Britain faces. To make some sense of BREXIT and
the complexities surrounding the negotiations between the UK and the EU so far is a
daunting task. Not only is the whole process imbued with uncertainty but is infused with
emotion, often at the expense of realism and ground realities. One needs to understand the
politics as much as the history of UK’s momentous decision to walk out of the EU.
BACKGROUND
While there has been a surfeit of reporting and analyses, on the reasons behind BREXIT, it
may be useful to briefly touch upon the European project itself and the traditional British
ambivalence towards it. With its genesis in the aftermath of the Second World War, the
European project was born out of a widely held belief that a more united Europe would not
again fall prey to the large scale destruction and devastation that visited the continent in
the wake of the two calamitous world wars of the 20th Century. However, the UK has always
portrayed itself, at least domestically, as a reluctant member of the EU. You may recall that
it declined to accept an invitation to join the European Coal and Steel Community, founded
in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris. Subsequently with the formation in 1957 of the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and European Economic Community (EEC) set up
under the Treaty of Rome the potential benefits of cooperation became apparent. This
coupled with the post-war recovery in Germany and France led to a rethink across the
channel.
Notwithstanding two failed attempts in 1963 and 1967, UK did succeed in its third attempt
in 1973 to join the EEC. By that time European cooperation had progressed to a customs
union, eliminating all custom duties amongst member states. Within a year of EEC
membership, UK started asking for major changes to agricultural and farm policies of the
EEC that were more beneficial for countries like France. At this point it may be useful to
recall that the Norwegians had through a referendum in September 1972 scuttled Norway’s
application for membership of the EEC. Hence the precedent of a referendum already
existed. This influenced Prime Minister Harold Wilson to hold UK’s first referendum on EU
membership on June 5, 1975 and even though the British public supported continued
membership of the EU with 67% voting to stay and 33% voting for exiting the EU, within
two years of entering the EEC, Britain was already exploring exit options. During the
course of its membership of the EU, it often sought opt outs over issues like single currency,
charter of human rights, justice and home affairs legislation etc.
BREXIT REFERENDUM
We now fast forward to the present decade. The idea of an EU Referendum was devised by
Prime Minister David Cameron in a ‘big EU speech’ (known as the Bloomberg speech) on
23 January 2013 to ward off the growing popularity of UK Independence Party (UKIP)
under Nigel Farage and unify the Eurosceptic Tory backbenchers ahead of the 2015
General Elections. David Cameron promised a referendum on UK’s membership of the EU
in the Conservative party manifesto for the 2015 General Elections. Cameron’s attempts to
address issues relating to unfettered migration from the continent fell foul of EU
regulations, notwithstanding the popular sentiment in the UK against perceived abuse of
free movement by EU nationals.
It is also important to note the growth of right wing and anti-immigration sentiments (both
from EU and non-EU) as seen in the outcome of general elections held in UK in 2010 and
2015.
It was the 2015 elections that brought forward issues with the potential of changing the
regional and domestic political landscape of the UK. The good performance of the SNP
meant the question of Scottish independence would continue to lurk despite the Scots having
decided to stay within the UK through the 2014 Scottish referendum. It may be recalled that
the results of the Scottish Referendum reflected a clear win for the Remain in UK (55%)
against the Independence vote (45%). The turnout for the vote was high at 83%.
Rising euro-sceptic and anti-immigration sentiments and the fear of losing out votes to
UKIP is believed to be the main reason for David Cameron promising to fulfill his
assurance of a referendum on UK’s membership of the EU.
I have referred to the outcome of the historic June 23, 2016 referendum earlier. It is
pertinent to note that England (53%) and Wales (53%) voted to leave the EU while Scotland
(62%) and Northern Ireland (56%) voted to remain in the EU. Citizens were also divided
with the young voting remain and the elderly voting leave with the turnout being high at
71.2%. The Leave side’s arguments of take back control” and fear of more immigration
clearly won over Remain side’s arguments of ‘economic catastrophe’ in the event of
BREXIT.
POST REFERENDUM NEGOTIATIONS
The results of the referendum took most by surprise and claimed an immediate casualty in
Prime Minister David Cameron. The new Prime Minister Theresa May, reportedly a
reluctant Remainer, struggled to come to grips with the momentous decision to upend links
with the EU. It was only after almost six months that the first thoughts of UK Government
policy on BREXIT implementation were revealed when Prime Minister Theresa May
outlined her Government’s vision of a post-BREXIT ‘Globalised Great Britain’ and
priorities for negotiations with the EU in a speech at Lancaster House on January 17, 2017.
Her objective included finalization of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU,
control of migration from the EU and maintaining the common travel area between UK and
Ireland. She confirmed that UK would leave the single market as well as the customs union.
She also insisted on parallel negotiations on the withdrawal agreement and a new free trade
agreement.
Britain formally triggered Article 50 on March 29, 2017 when a letter signed by PM May
was received by European Council President Donald Tusk. This was preceded by the
approval of the Article 50 Bill by both Houses of Parliament.
EU’s response to the BREXIT trigger was the issuance of draft guidelines for BREXIT
negotiations on 31 March, 2017 by the European Council. These guidelines or negotiating
directives lay down the core principles of maintaining a balance of rights and obligations,
ensure a level-playing field (to thwart UK becoming a quasi-tax haven), final financial
settlement of UK’s dues to the EU, preserving the integrity of the single market, the
indivisibility of the ‘four freedoms’ and that there could be ‘no cherry-picking’. It was also
underscored that negotiations under Article 50 would be carried out as a single package
and adoption of a phase-wise approach to agree on a withdrawal agreement first and then
conclusion of transitional arrangements leading to an agreement on the future relationship
between the EU and UK (as a third country).
Priorities for the EU reflected in the guidelines included conclusion of reciprocal

guarantees for the rights and status of EU citizens in UK and British citizens in the EU,
need for the avoiding a hard border in Ireland, settlement of British financial commitment
due to the EU, preventing a legal vacuum and uncertainties for EU businesses and
organizations trading with and operating in the UK and also the desire for EU to maintain
a close partnership with the UK after its formal departure on March 29, 2019.
I do not intend to dwell on the tortuous negotiations that ensued between the UK and the
EU, post the triggering of Article 50. However, it may be pertinent to briefly touch upon
some of the important developments in order to understand the present impasse in
negotiations.
The decision to go in for mid-term General Elections in June 2017 proved disastrous for
Prime Minister May, as she lost the majority that she had inherited from her predecessor.
This in turn adversely impacted on the state of play in negotiations with the EU and
ultimately left her struggling for support in Parliament to push through a deal.
The subsequent dilution of UK’s position in negotiations with EU, came to the fore with the
Chequers Plan in the summer of 2018, that laid out the type of future relationship between
UK and the EU that the UK sought to achieve in the BREXIT negotiations. The main
proposals included a free trade area for goods to maintain frictionless trade, supported by
a common rulebook and a new facilitated custom arrangement, but only for the rules that
are necessary to provide frictionless trade at the border. Apart from the resignations of
Brexit Secretary David Davis and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, May was confronted
with a rejection by the EU of her plan. The EU maintained that the integrity of the European
Single Market is not negotiable and there can be no cherry-picking of the market’s four
freedoms – free movement of people, goods, services and capital.
A critical issue in the negotiations between both sides was the post-Brexit treatment of the
Irish border. EU’s position is that the so-called "backstop option” for Northern Ireland was
a key part of December 2017 phase one agreement with UK and must continue to apply
"unless and until another solution is found”. May dismissed the EU backstop stating that
this would be unacceptable as it would effectively shift the existing land border to the Irish
Sea and compromise UK sovereignty. However, despite considerable divergence between
UK and EU positions in the areas of geographical indicators, personal data, governance,
implementation of a withdrawal agreement and post-Brexit treatment of the Irish border,
miraculously both sides reached common ground and the Withdrawal Agreement,
governing Britain’s departure from the EU was published in November 2018 and
subsequently endorsed by the European Council.
The passage of the Withdrawal Agreement in the British Parliament was a totally different
story altogether. An aborted vote in December 2018 materialised in January 2019 which
the Government lost by a colossal 230 votes. The next vote due in February 2019 was also
postponed to March and that resulted in a loss by 149 votes against the Government’s
motion. Meanwhile the House of Commons voted against a no-deal Brexit under any
circumstances but also against a second referendum. A series of votes in Parliament left the
Government floundering though eventually a vote on extension on Article 50 was passed.
It was apparent that Prime Minister May had inherited more than just a crown of thorns. A
divided Parliament and internecine strife within the Conservatives and Labour were a mere
reflection of an increasingly polarised nation. The Irish backstop proved to be one of the
insurmountable hurdles. May found herself in a precarious situation, between a rock and a
hard place. Her inability to convince her party and Parliament eventually led to her
stepping down as Tory Leader in June and resigning as Prime Minister in July 2019. A
leadership contest within the Conservative party led to the election of Boris Johnson as
Prime Minister. Brexit had already cost two Prime Ministers their jobs and a third is now
attempting the Herculean task of managing UK’s impending divorce from the EU with all
its attendant consequences. Mr. Johnson finds himself boxed into a corner after losing
critical votes in Parliament this month on a no-deal Brexit and his plans of announcing
snap elections in October, after controversially suspending the Parliament, a move that is
being challenged in the UK Supreme Court.
Notwithstanding his statements that he would find a way out of the impasse, it is clear that
his meeting with Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission in
Luxembourg on September 16 did not result in a meeting of minds. The next 41 days as
Brexit approaches are going to be critical in the annals of British and European history.
IMPACT OF BREXIT
The extent of impact of Brexit on the UK and indeed the EU will depend on whether UK
exits with or without a deal. A no deal Brexit would mean that there would be no transition
period after the UK leaves, and EU laws would stop applying to the UK immediately. Unless
countervailing measures are taken, this could have disastrous consequences for the UK,
while EU would not remain entirely unscathed.
There have been various doomsday scenarios envisaged, including in official documents in
the UK, about such an eventuality. I recall a report last year, while I was in London, about
official estimates of the dire situation that could confront the British people in the event UK
crashes out of EU without a deal. It was predicted that Dover port would close down in a
few days and there would be disruption in freight traffic links; pharmacies in Scotland
would run out of essential life-saving drugs in three days; food prices, especially of fresh
vegetables and fruits would increase and there could be empty shelves and higher prices in
supermarkets; air travel between the island nation and the continent would be disrupted in
the absence of an enabling agreement; UK students studying in the EU and EU students
studying in the UK would face a period of uncertainty; immigration controls at entry points
into the UK would need to be strengthened immediately, with the current long queues at
immigration counters in airports like Heathrow increasing manifold and so on. This is not
an exhaustive listing of the severe impact that a no deal Brexit would entail but, just an
indication of the disruption and chaos that could ensue.
No business can plan ahead when there is so much uncertainty surrounding a nation.
BREXIT without a deal could plunge the UK into chaos and even a recession. The voices of
concern of the CBI, Bank of England and others cannot be ignored. World leaders also have
been cautioning against a hard BREXIT.
Hundreds of multi-national companies, especially from India, Korea, Japan and China have
invested in UK because of free access to Europe. They are looking at relocating in order to
secure their future business and growth in Europe. Some already have. According to a
Bloomberg report earlier this year, 350 British companies were in advanced talks with the
Dutch Government to move their businesses to Holland in the event of a no-deal BREXIT.
Some Japanese, German, French and even British Banks were planning to move to
Frankfurt. Sony and Panasonic have moved their headquarters to Netherlands. All the
rhetoric of business with Europe under WTO rules does not take into account the additional
duties that would accrue on British exports.
IMPACT ON INDIA AND PROSPECTS FOR AN INDIA-UK FTA
BREXIT provides opportunities and also poses challenges to India. India-UK relations are
both wide ranging and robust, encompassing a broad vision for the future supported by a
concrete and comprehensive road map for bilateral and global engagement. High level
visits on both sides in recent times have provided an opportunity to further cement our
partnership.
While the EU is among India’s largest trading partners, accounting for around 13% of
India’s global trade in goods, the UK is ranked 17th in the list of India’s top 25 trading
partners with India’s merchandise trade with the UK in 2017-18 estimated at US$14.5
billion with an additional US$ 7 billion trade in services. India enjoys a favourable balance
of trade with UK. When it comes to investments, UK is ranked as the fourth largest inward
investor in India, after Mauritius, Singapore and Japan, with a cumulative equity investment
of US$26 billion since April 2000, accounting for around 6% of all foreign direct investment
into India. India also is a major investor in the UK (4th largest). Around 800 Indian
companies, with a total consolidated revenue of GBP 47.5 billion, have created over
105,000 jobs in the UK. The technology and telecom sector account for 31% of these
revenues, with the pharmaceuticals and chemical sector accounting for 24%.
Brexit will not only impact UK’s trade and investments with the EU but also its other trading
and investment partners. Indian companies, many of which have invested heavily in the UK
are likely to be quite severely impacted by a no-deal Brexit, particularly those companies
that use the UK as a gateway to the European Union and Europe. Even companies that do
not have a significant exposure to the EU will feel the impact as a no-deal Brexit will lead
to a perceptible economic downturn in the UK. Major investors like the TATA group are
already hedging their bets and exploring alternatives.
Irrespective of a hard or a soft Brexit, UK has clearly identified India as a major partner,
particularly in the post-Brexit era. The focus on India by successive British Prime Ministers
and other key ministers is a testimony to the value attached to India as a major trading and
investment partner. With the expiry of the Bilateral Investment Treaty in March 2017 and
the absence of a Free Trade Treaty, the imperative to conclude an India-UK FTA is
apparent particularly after Brexit. Both sides at the highest political level have committed
themselves to conclude an FTA as soon as possible. However, such an FTA can only be
signed after the UK leaves the EU and while both countries have their own wish lists, the
parameters of a bilateral FTA will be predicated on the terms and conditions of the UK’s
exit from the EU.
A Joint Working Group is already in place to explore the contours of a possible bilateral
FTA. The 13th meeting of the India-UK Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO)
was held in London in July this year. While both sides noted the expansion of bilateral trade
by 27% over the last three years, they looked forward to "exploring the building blocks that
would allow for more ambitious trade arrangements in the future”. A sector-driven
approach that identified key areas like advanced manufacturing, renewable energy, ICT,
life sciences, healthcare, food and drink, animal husbandry, dairy, fisheries and so on
imparts a more focused approach to the bilateral economic engagement. The progress made
on implementation of the recommendations of the India-UK Joint Trade Review agreed at
the 12th JETCO in London in January 2018 would help in identifying key areas and product
lines on both sides that would need to be pushed. The Review would also help in eliminating
any policy or procedural roadblocks that are identified. This would constitute an essential
building block towards an FTA.
Both economies rely substantially on their service sectors and while both countries will
focus on enhanced market access for their products and services, for India the importance
of greater and easier access for skilled professionals, as well as students, would be
important. The recent decision by the UK to revert to a two-year post study work visa for
international students is a welcome development. However, much more needs to be done
particularly with respect to easier access for Indian professionals such as doctors,
engineers, those in the ICT sector etc. India will continue to insist on Mode IV access in
negotiating an FTA with the UK. This would not be easy given UK’s priorities.
Key opportunities for Indian companies post-Brexit could arise in the food and agro
products sector, since the UK is a net importer of food and food products from the EU. It
produces about 25% of fruits and vegetables for domestic consumption. While 30% of its
fruit consumption comes from Europe, around 80% of vegetables consumed in the UK is
imported from Europe. Indian exporters would need to comply with the regulatory
framework and accompanying phytosanitary requirements, depending naturally on what
framework the UK adopts. I have already touched on the services sector, where Indian firms
could help in filling the vacuum that could arise after Brexit, particularly with the receding
European footprint.
While London is undoubtedly one of the leading global financial centres and Brexit is
unlikely to change that, it will face a huge challenge in case there is a flight of capital after
Brexit. A number of Indian companies, particularly PSUs, have raised rupee-denominated
bonds, popularly called masala bonds, in the London Stock Exchange. UK’s credit rating
has been cut, and given that most buyers of the bonds are from the EU, there is nervousness
around these bond issuances.
India businesses have presence in a wide array of sectors in the UK which include
automobiles, auto components, pharmaceuticals, gems and jewellery, education and IT
enabled services. Most of these sectors will be vulnerable to changes in demand and
currency values.
India is a major supplier of auto components to the EU region. The region accounts for
about 36% of India’s total auto component exports, while the share of UK is about 5%. The
UK passenger vehicle market is highly export oriented and the segment has close linkages
with the EU automotive market. The anticipated slowdown in the UK and the EU region
and disruption in the supply chain will have a dampening effect on the sector. Also, the
depreciating Pound will impact the revenue stream of companies over the near term.
India is one of the largest exporters of IT-enabled services and the sector has significant
exposure to the European market especially the UK. UK accounts for about 17% of India’s
total IT exports. IT companies thus are expected to face the heat in light of Brexit. Given
the risk of further moderation in growth in the UK and EU, there is an increased probability
that the companies lower their IT budgets (a discretionary spend). This would have an
impact on the domestic software companies. Many of the largest Indian employers operate
in the services sector, which will be seriously impacted. UK businesses would be treated as
third country service providers by the EU, with potential loss of market access and increase
in non-tariff barriers.
Britain’s exit from EU in 2019 could destabilize the steel industry which has enjoyed the
protection of EU labour law and safety standards, as well as barriers to unfair completion
from other countries. If a hard Brexit comes to fruition, those protections will no longer
apply.
Readymade garments are one of the key export items to the UK from India. It accounts for
about 20% of India’s total exports to the UK. The sector is expected to feel the pinch on
account of moderation in demand. Nonetheless, some of the garment exporters feel that they
might be insulated if a Free Trade Agreement is negotiated with the UK post Brexit.
While there are numerous challenges there are also huge opportunities for Indian
companies. A study carried out by the Commonwealth Secretariat after the Brexit vote has
identified 13 new products which India can export to the UK. It has estimated market access
of around $2 billion for these products. A well negotiated bilateral trade arrangement
between the UK and India has the potential to increase bilateral trade by 26%. In fact, the
report says that the UK and India can secure a far-reaching deal which will see the value
of British exports to India rise from GBP 4.2 billion to GBP 6.3 billion, an increase of GBP
2.1 billion, or 33%. Imports from India by the UK will rise by around GBP 1 billion. UK’s
balance of trade could improve even though it may still be in favour of India.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Brexit does provide an opportunity to expand
India’s trade and economic relations with the UK. Much will depend on the fine print of
Brexit and the ensuing negotiations. The challenges that Brexit throws up have to be
squarely addressed before an India-UK FTA becomes a reality. Even though the Indian
economy may be in better shape than a post-Brexit UK, we will need to leverage our
strengths so that the complementarities in our economies are harnessed. We need to work
towards a win-win situation for both countries so that we are able to translate adversity
into an opportunity for mutual prosperity.
The unfolding saga of Brexit will determine not only the contours of our future economic
engagement but also its pace and content. The resilience and resourcefulness of the British
people are well known and should never be underestimated. The next few weeks will be
crucial for the UK and also for all its partners.
A New India-France alliance?

Late last month, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to France for the annual
bilateral summit which lasted from August 22-23. He was also invited by the French
President Emmanuel Macron to the G-7 summit, which occurred from August 25- 26 at
Biarritz, a reflection of the growing depth of the partnership between India and France.
The consolidation of this strategic partnership could not have come at a better time for New
Delhi. India has just taken a major political gamble by removing the special status of the
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, a state that is the focus of a long dispute between India
and Pakistan. But India and France are also coming closer because of other common
interests, and because India is looking for more options when it comes to its international
partners.
India’s decision on Kashmir created some diplomatic difficulties, with Pakistan demanding
UN Security Council debate and China supporting that demand, putting in question the
slowly warming ties between India and China. Russia’s position also raised some concerns
in Delhi: Its support for India was lukewarm, with Russia clearly feeling squeezed between
China (with which Russia has increasingly become closer) and India (its traditional
friend). After Russia climbed on the fence and adopted a somewhat ambiguous stand, India
needed to nurture its relationship with other important strategic partners such as France
and the United States.
Despite India’s traditional discomfort with being an ally, Modi during his speech at
UNESCO in Paris said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say
that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”
Whether this play of words was important or not, India’s strategic engagements with France
has grown by leaps and bounds. Backing India within the UN Security Council was the
ultimate demonstration of France’s firm resolve to stand with India. Among the UN Security
Council members, France has remained one of the steadiest partners of India in recent
decades, a place that used to be reserved for the Soviet Union/ Russia in the past.
By contrast, UK-India ties have always been dodgy, given the old political baggage as well
as the influence of the Pakistani diaspora in the UK. The UK’s inability or unwillingness to
curb anti-India activities in the UK has always been a sore point in the relations. India’s
other partners do not have any clout in forums like the UNSC. For example, though
Germany has remained an important trading and even political partner to India, there is
very little Berlin can do in platforms like the UNSC. And the less said about groups like the
BRICS, the better.
All of this makes France’s strong support for India particularly welcome in New
Delhi. France and India already have a fairly multifaceted relationship spanning multiple
domains from defense, civil nuclear, and space, to climate change, clean energy, and
urbanization. During Macron’s visit to India last year, the two countries signed 14
agreements covering these areas.
Their vision and plan of action for maritime security and outer space stand out as
particularly important. With regard to maritime security (with a focus on the Indian Ocean),
India and France have reiterated the importance of respecting international law by all
states, in maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight, piracy, weapons and human
trafficking, illegal fishing and smuggling. There can be little doubt who they are referring
to.
The two countries also have a vision to use outer space assets in a proactive manner in
developing maritime domain awareness in addition to focusing on areas of cooperation
including high resolution earth observation, space domain and situational awareness,
satellite navigation, space transportation, and human exploration of space. Strengthened
space situational awareness and high-resolution earth observation imagery will have a
significant impact in their ability to monitor the Indian Ocean maritime space.
In addition, the two countries also have a Joint Action Plan on Indian Ocean. Their joint
plan envisages greater use of space assets to gain a more useful appreciation of the
maritime environment that the two countries operate in and the two have pledged to
strengthen information sharing on the emerging maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean.
Indian Ocean dynamics have undergone major shifts since the Modi Government came into
office in 2014. Making a significant departure from the erstwhile policy of opposing for
extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean, Modi asserted that “Indian Ocean Region is at
the top of our policy priorities” and New Delhi has also made it clear that it will be working
with all the friends in the region, especially those of the maritime neighbors and island
states. Modi added that “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and
security in our maritime region,” a space that India extends to partners like France and the
United States in ensuring a stable maritime order while strengthening their ability to
respond to natural disasters.
France, of course, also remains a vital source of arms supply to India. The French Rafale
fighter won India’s Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition. Though
India bought only about three dozen Rafale’s instead of the 126 originally envisaged, there
are continuing rumors that India will buy additional ones. India is also a customer for the
Scorpene submarines and a host of other items.
Clearly, the roiling of India’s strategic partnerships has increased France’s importance to
New Delhi. France is likely to remain important to New Delhi for some time to come,
irrespective of the chatter about the actual label that best applies to the growing ties
between the two countries.
What’s Right About France’s Overtures Toward Russia?

French President Emmanuel Macron's new policy of engagement toward Russia carries
significant risks – not least because Russia persists in the behaviors that caused its relations
with Europe to deteriorate in the first place. But seeking a rapprochement makes more sense
than persisting with failed Western efforts at containment.
PARIS – French President Emmanuel Macron is convinced that now is the right time to
reset relations with Russia. He has therefore made it a diplomatic priority to restore a
climate of trust between Paris and Moscow. Three compelling reasons underlie this move.
First and foremost, the international strategic context has changed dramatically. China is
rising, while the United States, although still the world’s dominant power, is distancing
itself from its global responsibilities. And Russia, with an aging, shrinking population and
a huge, largely uninhabited landmass, is a natural prey for China’s long-term
ambitions.European leaders should not resign themselves passively to seeing Russia,
lacking any other alternative, align with China. Instead, they should try to convince
Russians that their future is with Europe, and not as China’s junior partner in a deeply
unbalanced relationship. Russia’s destiny lies in the West, not the East. Moreover, although
Russia is no match for China, it has returned as a serious global actor. Many current
conflicts, from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, simply cannot be addressed without
involving Russia.This represents a triumph of sorts for Russian President Vladimir Putin,
who first came to power nearly 20 years ago pledging to restore his country’s geopolitical
clout. In particular, Putin wanted the US to treat Russia not as a mere object of history, as
it had done under his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, but as a real interlocutor. And while it
might be impossible to restore the bipolar world of the Cold War years, at least the US
would be forced to recognize the importance of a modernized and operational Russian army
that could intervene in the former Soviet sphere and beyond.
In other words, Russia is back. For Europe to deny this, or simply to try to contain Russia,
cannot be a satisfactory basis for a long-term strategic doctrine and realistic diplomacy.
The second reason for France’s new diplomatic initiative toward Russia is to fill a
leadership vacuum in Europe. The United Kingdom, which had lately been the most resolute
in denouncing Russia’s behavior, has simply put itself out of the game. Obsessed with the
Brexit tragicomedy that has led to the country’s worst political crisis since World War II,
the UK has faded from the scene as a serious diplomatic actor. Meanwhile, Germany, the
European power with the closest historical and cultural relationship with Russia, is at the
end of a political cycle. It is both dangerous and unfair to underestimate German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, but she no longer has the clout or the energy to lead Europe in
its dealings with the outside world, nor to rally Europeans themselves. With the UK and
Germany currently incapable of playing a major diplomatic role, and Italy, Spain, and
Poland in no position to be principal actors, the conclusion is quite simple: partly by
default, and partly because of the sheer energy and imagination of its young president, this
is France’s moment.
Finally, Macron’s attempt to reset relations with Russia is perfectly in tune with France’s
Gaullist tradition. Mediating between different systems, and looking beyond the current
incarnation of other countries, was Charles de Gaulle’s natural instinct. Behind the Soviet
Union or Mao Zedong’s China, the first president of France’s Fifth Republic saw eternal
Russia or eternal China. In dealing with another country, therefore, one should not be
paralyzed by the nature of its regime.
Reconnecting with that tradition also may fit with Macron’s domestic calculus. By reaching
out to the Kremlin, he can appease the economic sectors that are most affected by Western
sanctions against Russia, while challenging the traditionally pro-Russia parties of France’s
extreme right and left.
But it is one thing to explain the roots of a policy, or the rationale behind it, and another to
justify the decision fully. Central and North European governments in particular are
suspicious of France’s new diplomatic initiative. Why a rapprochement with Russia, they
ask, and why now?
Coming from secular France, such Christian charity – giving before having received
anything in return – seems either naive or Machiavellian. Furthermore, it seems to
contradict France’s emphasis on values in a European Union context. Surely, critics of
Macron’s Russia initiative say, the dichotomy between the defense of political principles
within the EU and the practice of diplomacy outside it should not be so great as to endanger
the cohesiveness of both. Furthermore, they argue, Macron is acting alone without having
really consulted his European partners and allies. He can hardly claim to speak in the name
of Europe if he keeps operating that way, always presenting the other EU members with
some kind of fait accompli.
Although I understand these criticisms (and share some of them), I nonetheless support
Macron’s effort. The West’s strict policy of containment has failed. A policy of engagement
may therefore be justified, provided it is not pursued naively or with complete disdain for
principle.
Moreover, Macron would be the last person to entertain false illusions about Putin’s Russia.
During the 2017 French presidential election, Russia actively campaigned for his far-right
rival, Marine Le Pen, by systematically spreading disinformation and fake news. Nor will
Macron want Putin to appear to be having his cake and eating it – not least because Russia
is persisting in the behaviors that caused its relations with Europe to deteriorate in the first
place.
France has made a bold first move to reset relations with Russia. The ball is now in Putin’s
court.
France Sees ‘New Atmosphere’ as Macron Seeks Better

Russia Ties
France’s foreign minister praised a “new atmosphere” that could help to resolve the long-
stalled Ukraine conflict as President Emmanuel Macron steps up efforts to repair strained
European relations with Russia.
“It’s a new atmosphere which we haven’t seen for many years,” French Foreign Affairs
Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told a news conference in Moscow on Monday after he and
the French defense minister met their Russian counterparts in the first such visit in five
years. “That’s why we welcome it.”
The negotiations in the Russian capital came after Macron hosted President Vladimir Putin
Aug. 19 at the French leader’s summer residence, just before the Biarritz G-7 meeting.
Macron has called for a summit of leaders of Germany, Ukraine and Russia that is due to
take place in the next few weeks in a bid to revive a peace deal for Ukraine reached in 2015.
“It’s not yet the time to lift sanctions,” Le Drian said. But he noted that there is a “window
of opportunity, an opening for calming down the situation.” The top French diplomat said
ahead of the trip that the punitive measures could “progressively be revised” if there is
progress toward stabilization in Ukraine.
Annual meetings between French and Russian defense and foreign ministers began in 2002
but were suspended in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in
eastern Ukraine, leading to rounds of sanctions from the European Union. Macron has
criticized Russia’s cyber-meddling in other country’s elections and its crackdown on
domestic opposition, but at the same time he and his aides have argued that working with
Russia is essential to solving foreign policy crises from Syria to Libya to Iran.
‘Strategic Error’
“Pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic error because it would isolate
Russia and only increase international tensions,” Macron said in an Aug. 27 speech to
France’s ambassadors, where he claimed a “deep state” within the foreign ministry was
hampering his outreach to Moscow. “At the same time, we can’t be weak with Russia and
forget all the past disagreements, the past conflicts. We must deeply rethink this structure.”
The London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs said in a Sept. 5 report that “there
is no world leader with a more contradictory attitude toward Russia than Emmanuel
Macron.”
The French ministers’ trip comes days after Russia and Ukraine agreed on a mass exchange
of prisoners that Le Drian said showed “the willingness to renew dialog” between the bitter
adversaries. French officials said other key subjects for the Moscow talks included the
Iranian nuclear accord, the war in Syria, and the military standoff in Libya.
On Sunday, Le Drian called for Russia to remove mines and heavy weapons in the eastern
separatist areas, and for Ukraine to start institutional reforms granting autonomy to the
rebel regions agreed in the so-called Minsk 2015 peace deal.
French Defense Minister Florence Parly met her U.S. counterpart Mark Esper in Paris
Saturday and said they discussed “the opening the president of the Republic wants to pursue
with Russia.”
Esper responded that “Russia needs to change its behavior,” and behave as a “normal
country,” listing its invasions of Georgia and Crimea, the intimidation of Baltic nations,
and its cyber attacks. “Our aim would be to try to get them on a better path.”
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, asked about the U.S. official’s comments, retorted,
“We’ll be ‘not normal’ for the time being.”
In Modi Era, France has Replaced Russia as India’s New

Best Friend
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting France for his third state visit and fourth
trip. Modi and French President Emmanuel Macron are expected to discuss a gamut of
issues ranging from trade and economics to energy security, counter-terrorism, defence and
security cooperation and collaboration in the Indo-Pacific.
France seems to have replaced Russia as India’s trustworthy friend and partner in the
Western world.
France’s stock is currently high in Delhi after it supported India’s stand on Kashmir at the
UNSC closed-door meeting called by China. The French have also previously backed
the UNSC resolution on global terrorist Masood Azhar and pushed for stronger
FATF sanctions on Pakistan.
Filling in Russia’s vacuum
During the Cold War, the erstwhile Soviet Union was India’s veto-providing friend in the
UN Security Council. It was the country who understood India’s national security interests,
especially with respect to Pakistan and Kashmir. Soviet Union also provided India with
economic assistance and defence equipment.
India and France have built a deep economic, security and diplomatic relationship over the
last few decades that has spanned the Cold War era and strengthened in the last decade or
two. France has become the new Russia – the new best friend.
For a country that values symbolism as much as India does, the importance of France is
noticeable in that it is the only country whose presidents have been chief guests at India’s
Republic Day Parade for a record five times (1976, 1980, 1998, 2008 and 2016). Both old
ally Russia/Soviet Union and close neighbour Bhutan come second, and only one US
President has ever been a Republic Day guest – Barack Obama, in 2015.
As a post-colonial country, India’s relationship with former colonial power, The United
Kingdom, is conflicted. While there is a strong diaspora linkage as well as an economic and
security relationship, New Delhi is often sceptical about London understanding Indian
concerns especially when it comes to issues like terrorism, Pakistan and Kashmir.
So, throughout the Cold War years, India needed an ally – with veto power- on the Security
Council – and that was Soviet Union. Today, Russia has closer relations with China and is
not as cognisant of India’s interests especially when it comes to Pakistan, Afghanistan and
terrorism. France appears to have moved into the Russian vacuum.
A friend at the UN and NSG
India’s relationship with France, another former colonial power, has less baggage. France
established diplomatic relations with India in 1947, the two countries signed a treaty in
1956 under which in 1962 France ceded full sovereignty over its colonial
territories. From 1963 onwards, Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam became part of
the Union Territory of Pondicherry (now Puducherry). This was in sharp contrast to
France’s European neighbour Portugal, which was reluctant to cede its colonies (Goa,
Daman and Diu) resulting in an acrimonious relationship ending in the Indian military
takeover of Goa in 1961.
Among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, France has been consistent in
supporting India’s bid for permanent membership of the UNSC. The two also share a
similar goal on issues like climate change. India is a signatory to the Paris agreement of
2015.
France was also among the few countries that did not condemn India’s nuclear tests in 1998
and instead chose to start a strategic dialogue with India that resulted in a strong strategic
partnership in the areas of space, security, defence and civil nuclear cooperation. Going
back to the Cold War era, when in response to India’s nuclear explosion of 1974 the US
suspended delivery of nuclear fuel to the Indian atomic power station
at Tarapur, France stepped in to supply enriched uranium.
In September 2008, three weeks after India received a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) to conduct civilian nuclear trade and two days after the US-India civil nuclear
deal was ratified by the US Congress, France and India signed an agreement for civil
nuclear cooperation. France has also supported India’s bid to be a member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
Partners in defence
Defence cooperation between the two countries is multi-dimensional with institutional
exchanges, joint production, joint military exercises and training. The three Indian services
hold regular annual military exercises with their French counterparts. In July 2009, a 400-
strong Indian armed force contingent participated in the Bastille Day Parade, France’s
national day parade, with then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in attendance. This
was the first time Indian troops had participated in the national day parade of another
country.
France is one of the leading suppliers of military equipment to India with the Dassault
Mirage 2000 fighter, a squadron of DCNS Scorpène-class submarines (called Kalvari-
class submarines) and 36 Rafale jets being at the top of the list.
At the end of the day, however, India’s goal is to build its domestic defence industry and for
that, the United States or Russia are still India’s partners of choice, especially from the
point of view of high-end technology and foreign investment.
Bilateral trade between India and France stands at €10.7 billion, with over 1,000 French
companies in India amassing a turnover of US$ 20 billion and 120 Indian companies in
France with an investment stock of €1 billion. While the two countries are strong economic
partners, when India sees France, it views it as a part of Europe. The European Union is
India’s largest bilateral trading partner with €115 billion traded annually in goods and
services.
The two countries are also collaborating in the Indo-Pacific where France has overseas
territories and an exclusive economic zone. Eight thousand French soldiers are stationed
in the Indo-Pacific and France has many military facilities, including in Réunion.
In March 2018, India and France signed a logistics agreement whereby the two countries
would open their naval bases to each other’s warships for refuelling, repair and birthing
facilities. The two countries are also collaborating in Francophone Africa with the aim of
identifying developmental activities that the two could work on together.
Like Japan, France is another country India is comfortable working with as there is no
baggage or mistrust.
The two countries share a similar strategic outlook. Both have a strong sense of national
pride in their civilisational and cultural heritage. Both share a healthy scepticism of
American policies, and while both are American partners, both believe in issue-based
agreement or disagreement. Independence in foreign policy decision making – or strategic
autonomy as India refers to it – is something that France is comfortable with.
India and France have an old relationship and their strategic partnership will be
strengthened during PM Modi’s current visit. However, it is the military and economic rise
of China and the fear of an isolationist America that underlines each country’s search for
friends and allies around the world.
Signing the RCEP agreement would have given

more substance to India’s Act East policy
Not being part of the RCEP does not mean we will not get targeted by exports from the
group’s members which are now likely to attract more investments. Vigilant monitoring will
be required to avoid circumvention.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his statement, said “neither the Talisman of Gandhiji
nor my own conscience permit me to join RCEP”.
After seven long years of negotiations, India has decided not to join the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The final statement after the RCEP
summit in Bangkok has left the matter somewhat open. It says that all RCEP countries will
work towards resolving the significant outstanding issues that India has with the agreement.
But Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement leaves no room for rethinking or further
negotiation.
Two key reasons have been cited for India’s decision. One, the current international context
has been seen as unhelpful. The China-US trade war and the challenges of the multilateral
trading system brought added pressure for quickly concluding the RCEP negotiations. This
shifted the focus somewhat from crafting an agreement that worked for all. Second, the
RCEP final package was seen as lacking balance and fairness. India, it appears, was not
able to get several of its key concerns addressed. These, reportedly, are related to possible
surge in imports, particularly from China, addressing non-tariff barriers, protection to
certain sectors in agriculture, dealing with possible circumvention of the rules of origin,
and securing better access in the services sectors.
What has not been mentioned but may also have contributed to the decision was the
economic slowdown and a sombre mood within the country that inter alia has seen exports
stagnating. There has also been opposition to the RCEP in recent weeks from several
quarters in the country. Politically, while the RCEP received no mention in the election
manifestos of the 2019 elections, they have risen to a fever pitch in the last few weeks.
This writer had argued for India to join the RCEP but for negotiating hard to get a
favourable outcome. An opportunity of this nature comes rarely. This writer had also
proposed in a detailed RCEP study he led for the CII that India should try and get a more
backloaded agreement for tariff commitments so that it gained space of a few years — by
2025. This would have enabled India to become competitive. After all no RCEP member
runs as high a trade deficit with most members of the grouping.
The CII study had also outlined elements of a time-bound action plan till 2025 — and
beyond. India should have had such an action plan in place to be RCEP ready. Such an
action plan would have had a higher rate of success if there was external pressure — for
example from the RCEP — to reform within a fixed timeframe.
Twenty years ago India gave up its quantitative restrictions on imports after we lost a case
in WTO. There were fears that the country will be flooded with imports. At the commerce
ministry, a “war room” was set up in the Commerce Ministry to monitor imports. Import
surges were contained. Liberalisation helped in industry restructuring. A reform of our
export incentive schemes is now underway after losing another WTO dispute. Mobilising
public and political support for difficult reforms is never easy. Sooner or later we have to
fall in line with international practices and not get isolated.
It does appear that India negotiated hard in the RCEP meet. Other countries were, in the
end, unwilling to be accommodative of India’s concerns. A more flexible stand by them
would have enabled India to grow rapidly and the country could have been a larger market
for all members of the grouping to benefit from. We have, therefore, decided to disembark
from the RCEP bus.
India was no doubt economically, from the beginning, an outlier of sorts in the RCEP since
all other countries (barring Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar which, in any case, are least
developed countries and would have got a soft treatment) are members of the APEC and
are participants in its various initiatives. In particular, the trade and investment facilitation
action plans of the APEC have seen transformational results. Peer pressure among others
significantly helped these economies in reducing transaction costs and improving their
position on indices such as logistics or in ease of doing business. Even their negotiators are
far more familiar with each other’s policies and practices. The APEC annually holds over
300 technical meetings that have helped changing mindsets. For this very reason, a closer
association such as through the RCEP could have been of help to India in playing catch up
with countries which are members of the group. It could have also promoted formation of
supply chains and facilitated participation in mutual recognition agreements.
One hopes that India’s decision to not join the RCEP will not detract the country from
mounting a focussed effort in enhancing its competitiveness and expanding its export base.
India’s burgeoning imports demand no less.
It will also be essential to regulate imports in conformity with domestic and international
standards, an aspect that has received inadequate attention. Not being part of the RCEP
does not mean we will not get targeted by exports from the group’s members which are now
likely to attract more investments. Vigilant monitoring will be required to avoid
circumvention.
The WTO has now become unreliable for securing and enhancing the country’s market
access. We therefore need to explore other means for this purpose. Bringing the ongoing
trade negotiations with the US, our largest export destination, to a successful conclusion
should be a priority.
On free trade agreements (FTAs), we have focussed far more on the East. We do not have
a single FTA with countries in the West. Based on the RCEP negotiation experience, a
realistic yet meaningful FTA strategy needs to be formulated for the next five years. Further,
getting more from the existing FTAs is critical; for this, the ongoing reviews need to be fully
utilised. Mobilising stakeholder support for signing more FTAs will be difficult if we cannot
get the existing FTAs to work for us better.
Joining the RCEP would have given more substance to our Act East policy. The economic
pillar of this policy has remained weak compared to those pertaining to political ties,
strategic and security aspects and people to people relations. Opting out of the RCEP
implies there is need for greater exertion now on strengthening connectivity, trade and
investment bilaterally. Concepts like Indo-Pacific will otherwise lose traction for us.
The reality behind India-Saudi Arabia's

growing ties
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week — his second in three years
— was important both symbolically as well as substantively. Ostensibly, this visit was about
Modi delivering a keynote at the high-profile Future Investment Initiative Summit, dubbed
“Davos in the desert,” an initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
But the visit turned out to be about much more. There is a substantive shift happening in
India’s approach to the Middle East policy and this visit further reinforced those trends.
Since coming to office in 2014, Modi has pushed an aggressive strategy of partnering with
key regional powers like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel in a bid to
attract investments and forge deeper security partnerships. In doing so, he has largely
ignored Iran and broken with India’s Cold War-era legacy in the region of merely
“balancing” between key actors.
Despite the complexity of governing a country the size of India and navigating its dizzying
domestic politics, Modi has managed to visit eight Middle Eastern countries and territories
since 2014, more than his four predecessors combined. As so often is the case in the Middle
East, the big driver is oil.
India is likely to overtake China as the top driver of growth in oil demand by 2024. During
his maiden trip to New Delhi in February, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said
he saw over $100 billion worth of investment opportunities in India over the next two years.
India has also shored up its energy investments in the region. India’s ONGC Videsh has
acquired a 10% stake in an offshore oil concession in Abu Dhabi, UAE, for $600 million.
The new interest comes against a background of historical indifference. Despite large
volumes of trade and a massive presence of Indian expatriates in the Arab monarchies of
the Gulf, cross-border investments between the Gulf monarchies and India have remained
low for decades. With Modi in office, however, things seem to be changing. Over the past
four years, he has built close bonds with young Gulf leaders, including with the crown
princes of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.
India is also showing signs of finally overcoming its reluctance to forge security
partnerships with the Gulf states whose security apparatuses had long been closely
associated with Pakistan. Such efforts seem to be paying off.
In 2018, the UAE extradited three individuals wanted in India on corruption charges. In
2018, India signed a pact with Oman that allows the Indian Navy to use the strategic port
of Duqm, overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. During Prince Salman’s visit
to New Delhi earlier this year, Saudi Arabia promised to share more intelligence to boost
counterterrorism cooperation with India, a powerful message considering the then ongoing
India-Pakistan confrontation over a militant attack in February that killed 40 paramilitary
troopers in Kashmir.
Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week happened against the backdrop of India’s decision
to abrogate Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s desperate attempt to
internationalise the issue. Unlike Turkey and Malaysia, Saudi Arabia has taken a positive
approach vis-a-vis India and has cautioned Pakistan against escalating the crisis.
Despite Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Riyadh and the traditionally close
Saudi-Pakistan ties, Saudi Arabia has signalled that it understands Indian concerns and
sensitivities on the Kashmir issue. Pragmatism is dictating Saudi posture as the very future
of the kingdom’s economic model is at stake. It needs new partners like India. It is not
without significance that within a week of India’s move in Kashmir in August, one of the
biggest foreign investments in the country was announced.
Reliance Industries’ decision to sell a 20% stake in its oil-to-chemicals business to Saudi
Aramco at an enterprise value of $75 billion made it one of the biggest foreign direct
investment deals in the country. India’s trade ties with Saudi Arabia have been growing and
the relationship is no longer merely a buyer-seller one, though energy remains the driver
of the engagement.
Saudi Arabia is India’s second biggest supplier of oil after Iraq. It is also now India’s fourth
largest trading partner with bilateral trade at $27.48 billion in 2017-18 and Saudi
investment of around $100 billion is in the pipeline in areas ranging from energy, refining,
petrochemicals and infrastructure to agriculture, minerals and mining. This is a
partnership which is becoming truly strategic as Modi himself underscored in his remarks
in Riyadh.
During Modi’s visit, two important pacts were signed: while the first was a preliminary
agreement between Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Ltd and Saudi Aramco that will
result in a greater Saudi role in setting up a second fuel reserve facility in Karnataka, the
second was between Indian Oil’s West Asia unit and Saudi Arabia’s Al Jeri company for
downstream sector cooperation. Modi also announced the formation of the India-Saudi
Strategic Partnership Council that will be led by the leaderships of both the countries to
“help India address its expectations and aspirations.”
As New Delhi and Riyadh reassess their foreign policy options in a world that is rapidly
evolving, Modi’s energetic engagement with Middle Eastern states will enhance India’s
footprint in a region critical to the country’s vital interests.
Substance across the Arabian Sea

Even by its volatile standards, our Southwest Asian sub-region has lately been unusually
turbulent, as reflected in issues ranging from India-Pakistan tensions to the approaching
denouements of crises in Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan. The oil market, too, has been
inclement. Against this disorderly context, it is no small wonder that India-Saudi Arabia
relations have not only remained steady, but kept their positive trajectory. Indeed, following
their third summit in as many years earlier this week, the respective leaderships should be
complimented for their sagacity in focussing on leveraging their intrinsic bilateral synergy
instead of chasing the various wild geese. It demonstrates their maturity and strategic
construct.
This is not to claim perfect bilateral harmony: the joint statement was significant not only
for covering areas of agreement of the two parties, but circumscribing their well-known
differences. Nevertheless, both sides believe that what joins them bilaterally is far more
significant. They also realise that this entente cordiale does not only help them attain their
bilateral potential, it also widens their respective geostrategic options.
Acknowledging core interests

Politically, New Delhi and Riyadh acknowledged each other’s core interests and
accommodated them. Thus, Saudi Arabia showed an “understanding” of recent Indian
actions in Jammu and Kashmir and India “strongly condemned” the various attacks on
Saudi civilian facilities. Their bilateral defence, security and anti-terror cooperation has
intensified and the first naval exercise is to be held soon.
The Riyadh Summit acquired added importance as it coincidentally preceded two domestic
developments in India with considerable traction in the Islamic world: the conversion of
Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories that happened on Thursday and the
Supreme Court verdict on the Ayodhya dispute.
Despite vigorous efforts, the bilateral commercial and economic ties have still remained
range-bound. Trade has drifted downwards largely due to lower crude prices. According
to the latest Indian data, the bilateral trade in the first nine months of 2019 stood at $22,416
million, having fallen by 9.2% over the corresponding figure in 2018. It was 5:1 in
kingdom’s favour and was dominated by the traditional commodities, revealing the need
for greater Indian export promotion efforts.
The Saudi investment in India, too, remains far below potential. The kingdom’s cumulative
investments in India are only $229 million, or 0.05% of the total inbound FDI. Though the
kingdom’s Indian community has come down marginally to 2.6 million, they, nevertheless,
are still the largest foreign community and their annual homeward remittances remain
steady at $11 billion.
There is growing room for optimism, however. The kingdom’s Vision 2030, a strategic
document, lists eight major partner countries including India, the world’s third largest oil
importer. Saudi Aramco is to be one of the two strategic partners in the proposed $44
billion, 1.2 mbpd PSU refinery at Raigarh on India’s west coast. It is also to acquire a fifth
of the Reliance refinery at Jamnagar and to participate in India’s Strategic Petroleum
Reserves. If realised, these investments could total nearly $30 billion, catapulting the
kingdom to fourth position among countries investing in India.
Earlier, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had committed to investing $100
billion in India. As the 12 bilateral documents signed in Riyadh Summit show, India and
Saudi Arabia have already commenced leveraging opportunities across a vast eco-space,
from energy to agriculture and from fintech to skilling. In his keenly awaited speech at the
Future Investment Initiative forum in Riyadh, Prime Minister Narendra Modi listed five
“trends” in India with global investors’ remit: technology and innovation, infrastructure
development, human resource development, environment and business-friendly
governance. His persuasive narrative is likely to win converts, particularly in the Saudi
private sector.
New bilateral council

Setting up of a bilateral Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) to be co-chaired by the Indian
Prime Minister and the Saudi Crown Prince is a defining development. Given the
centralised nature of executive at both ends, it would, hopefully, expedite the decision-
making process. The SPC would be a permanent bilateral platform with two verticals jointly
serviced by the two Foreign and Trade and Industry Ministries.
Among the potential areas for next stage of bilateral cooperation could be greater bilateral
synergy in Indian infrastructure, agriculture, start-ups, skilling and IT. Shifting some
labour-intensive establishments from Saudi Arabia to India would serve the respective
national priorities by reducing the kingdom’s expatriate population and boosting ‘Make in
India’.
The World Bank’s recently published “Ease of Doing Business” rankings included both
India and Saudi Arabia in its ten “most improved economies”. Indian ecstasy at a 14-place
jump to the 63rd rank this year would have to be tempered by the knowledge that Saudi
Arabia was at the top of the “most improved” economies having leapfrogged 34 places to
stand at 62nd rank, one ahead of India. When the sub-region’s two largest, top-performing
and complementary economies join hands, shouldn’t the sum be greater than the total of
the parts? After the Riyadh Summit, hopes have risen for an emphatic affirmative answer.
Raja Mandala: MBS’s reform-driven Saudi

offers India room to strengthen bilateral ties
The ambition of MbS is to diversify the Saudi economy from its historical reliance on the
oil business and develop manufacturing and service sectors through liberalisation at
home, and deeper integration with the world.
The first order of business for Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Saudi Arabia this week is
business. But the PM should also be interested in the wide-ranging social and religious
reform initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the last few years. Saudi
Arabia’s economic transformation envisaged by Prince Mohammed, also known by his
initials MbS, opens up huge new opportunities for India’s economic cooperation with the
kingdom that has been limited for far too long to the import of oil and export of manpower.
Even more consequential over the long term is Prince Mohammed’s ambitious agenda to
modernise the Saudi society that has come under the domination of religious conservatism
since 1979, when Islamic radicals came close to destabilising the kingdom.
Given the deep interconnections between the Gulf and the Subcontinent, the drift towards
conservatism in the Arabian peninsula has had multiple negative effects on India and its
neighbours, especially in altering the balance between religion, politics and the state.
The reform of the Saudi society, at the very heart of the Islamic world, will hopefully help
to reverse some of these negative effects. Western liberals are dismissing the MbS agenda
as cosmetic while some religious conservatives in the Middle East are denouncing it as
radical. Meanwhile, the regional rivals of Saudi Arabia, especially Turkey and Iran, are
mounting relentless pressures against MbS.
India, however, has a huge stake in the successful economic and social modernisation of
Saudi Arabia. For a modern and moderate Arabia will reinforce similar trends in the
Subcontinent. Prime Minister Modi has every reason, then, to extend strong political
support to Prince Mohammed’s reform agenda during his visit to Saudi Arabia.
Modi will be joining Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, President Donald Trump’s senior
adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner and many other leading international figures at the
annual international forum popularly known as “Davos in the Desert”.
The forum, formally called the Future Investment Initiative, seeks to elevate Saudi Arabia’s
international economic engagement and was launched in 2017. It is part of Prince
Mohammed’s efforts to rapidly transform Saudi economy under the “Vision 2030” that he
unveiled in 2016.
The ambition of MbS is to diversify the Saudi economy from its historical reliance on the
oil business and develop manufacturing and service sectors through liberalisation at home,
and deeper integration with the world. It is founded on a tripod — the kingdom’s special
status in the Arab and Islamic worlds, its strategic location at the trijunction of Africa,
Europe and Asia, and its expansive investment capability. The objective is to generate
significant and sustainable benefits for the young and rapidly growing Saudi population.
The last few years have seen some important initiatives, including the attempt to turn Saudi
Aramco, the national oil producing company, into a global conglomerate. Other reforms
include easing the restrictions on foreign direct investment, promoting tourism and the
entertainment industry, development of the debt market, a bankruptcy law, introduction of
VAT to enhance non-oil revenue generation, cuts in water and power subsidies, cash
handouts to the needy, and a massive anti-corruption campaign.
The World Bank, in its latest report on the ease of doing business, offered praise for Saudi
Arabia’s economic reforms and named the kingdom one of the top ten “global business
climate improvers” in 2019. Saudi Arabia is now ranked 62 in the global rankings, just
above India.
An important element of Vision 2030 is the idea of strategic partnerships with select
countries like the US, China, Japan, India, South Korea, Germany, France and the UK.
The MbS impact on Saudi Arabia’s international policies is already evident in the growing
Saudi interest to deploy massive capital into India. Aramco’s decision to take a large stake
in the oil business of Reliance could be the beginning of a new economic era in bilateral
relations if Delhi can create the conditions for rapid growth in Saudi investments in India.
Even more interesting, from the South Asian perspective, is Prince Mohammed’s
commitment to strengthen the moderate trends in Islam. At the first round of the FII summit
in 2017, MbS declared that, “We are returning to what we were before — a country of
moderate Islam that is open to all religions, traditions and people around the globe”. The
crown prince further added that, “We want to live a normal life. A life in which our religion
translates to tolerance, to our traditions of kindness”.
Some of the social reforms implemented in the last three years include limiting the power
of the religious police in public places, granting more rights to women, lifting the 35-year-
old ban on cinema halls, letting restaurants play music and permitting large music concerts.
For many outside, this may look for trivial: But for those who live in Saudi Arabia, it’s a
big deal. Ask, for example, the 20,000-odd Pakistanis and Indians who were thrilled to be
at a musical evening last week in Riyadh with Pakistani singers Atif Aslam and Rahat Fateh
Ali Khan. Yoga schools are now flourishing in Saudi cities. For MbS, the agenda is about
mobilising the Saudi youth with the prospect of a different and a little more liberal future.
Ending the severe austerity of social life in Saudi Arabia is only one small part of Prince
Mohammed’s effort to restore the equation between god and Caesar in favour of the latter.
A more important part of his strategy is to strengthen the “nationalist” themes of the
kingdom’s narrative about itself. Nationalism is by no means seen as a counter to the deep
religiosity of the people, but is seen as important to bring a much-needed balance into the
Saudi worldview.
Developing stronger ties with Saudi Arabia has been an important diplomatic achievement
in Modi’s first term. The reform agenda of Prince Mohammed offers an opportunity for the
PM to lend the relationship a durable strategic dimension.
Raja Mandala: Rearranging the BRICS

The forum is less about ideological posturing, more about repositioning India in changing great power
equations.
For more than two decades, building a multipolar world has been one of the central themes of India’s
foreign policy. For nearly a decade, the BRICS, the forum that brings together Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa, has been the main forum for the pursuit of that objective. But China’s rapid rise
has compelled India to rethink the virtues of a multipolar world.
As Beijing squeezes India’s space in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and becomes a lot more
assertive in the bilateral disputes with Delhi, the construction of a “multipolar Asia” — or balancing
China — is turning out to be as important as the search for a “multipolar world”, for long the code
words for hedging against American unilateralism. That Washington has become more empathetic to
India’s regional and global concerns — ranging from terrorism in Pakistan to Delhi’s membership of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group — has made a recalibration of India’s great power relations inevitable.
After the Cold War, India faced a twin challenge. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the logic of
adapting to a globalising world saw Delhi re-engage the United States and the West. Even as India
reached out to the West after the Cold War, it was deeply wary of its interventionist policies on a range
of issues — including human rights, Kashmir and nuclear non-proliferation. To insure against the
negative fall-out from the unipolar world, Delhi chose to line up under Moscow’s banner for a great
“strategic triangle” of eastern powers, involving Russia, China and India, to blunt America’s edge in
the post-Cold War world.
This saw a significant tension in India’s engagement with the great powers. Indian leaders would stand
up in Washington and talk of a “natural alliance” with the sole super power, America. At the same time,
India would sit down with Russia and China to call for a “multipolar world”. This was not about
hypocrisy — which is quite common in the brutal world of international relations — but of managing
multiple contradictions that confronted India after the Cold War.
The strategic triangle involving India, China and Russia eventually expanded into the BRICS with the
inclusion of Brazil and South Africa. But the internal changes within the BRICS and external environment
altered the dynamics of the BRICS and posed new challenges for India’s engagement with the forum.
For one, the rise of China dramatically altered the orientation of the BRICS. China’s massive economic
weight in the forum — its GDP at nearly $12 trillion is now more than twice that of the other four
members put together — has meant the internal balance in the BRICS has changed in favour of Beijing.

Second, if Moscow saw the BRICS as a way of creating political leverage against the United States and
the West, Beijing saw it as an instrument to expand China’s own global economic influence.
Apprehension about US-led globalisation was one of the motivations behind India’s quest for a
multipolar world in the past. Delhi is now struggling to come to terms with China-led globalisation.
As resistance to globalisation gains ground in the US and the West, it is Beijing that now claims to be
the champion of free markets. India has a hard time endorsing that claim as it battles a massive annual
trade deficit of nearly $50 billion with China. President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative, which has
become the main vehicle for Beijing’s economic power projection, has added to India’s concerns about
China’s rise.
Third, India’s play with the BRICS while deepening the strategic partnership with Washington and Tokyo
looked quite cute so long as there were no major tensions between the great powers — US, Russia, China
and Japan. But India’s “multi-alignment” has become harder as the great power harmony was followed
by renewed tensions between them. In the past, India was tempted to privilege the BRICS over the
partnership with the West. Today, Delhi seems more inclined towards judging issues by their implications
for India’s national interest rather than the metric of a presumed ideological correctness.
Many in India see the BRICS forum as a continuation of the past attachment to non-alignment and third
worldism. But Delhi is acutely conscious of the fact that the BRICS is not about North-South politics.
Nor is it about staying away from the great powers and maintaining equidistance between them — for it
involves two of them, China and Russia, as members of the forum.
That India now faces relentless pressure from the Middle Kingdom on a range of issues, must cope with
the new strategic warmth between Moscow and Beijing, and the willingness of both Russia and China to
cut deals with the US (on their own terms), makes the BRICS less about ideological posturing, more
about repositioning India in changing great power equations.
This would mean India standing up to China where necessary and cooperating with it where possible,
salvaging the essence of the long-standing partnership with Russia but recognising Moscow has its own
imperatives, and deepening the strategic ties with Washington but acknowledging America’s sharp
internal divisions and the enduring compulsions to find compromises with a rising China. This transition
in India’s worldview towards unsentimental realism has been in the making for a while, but has become
the defining feature of the current government’s foreign policy.
India and its BRICS dilemmas

The five-country group faces challenges arising from bilateral differences and diverse political systems.
The 11th BRICS summit concluded in Brazil on Friday with customary calls for strengthening
multilateralism and reforming global institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), World Trade
Organisation, World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Initially, BRICS mainly had

an economic agenda but gradually, the scope has widened to include security, health, science and
technology, culture and civil society. Under the chairmanship of Brazil, more than a hundred meetings
relating to BRICS were held in 2019.
From an Indian perspective, two major developments happened at the summit. One, the grouping decided
to open a regional office of the New Development Bank (NDB) in India. This hopefully will give impetus
to financing of projects in India’s priority areas. Second, terrorism was one of the priority areas for
BRICS 2019, set by Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. The BRICS joint working group on counter-
terrorism decided to constitute five sub working groups — one each focusing on terrorist financing, use
of the internet for terrorist purposes, countering radicalisation, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters,
and capacity-building.
In 2012, India, as the chair of BRICS, introduced security on the agenda, as the theme of the New Delhi
summit was “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”. Terrorism is now a key
concern of all member states, and India made good use of this opportunity as Prime Minister Narendra
Modi highlighted the fact that the world loses $1 trillion due to terrorism each year. India has been
facing state-sponsored cross-border terrorism from Pakistan for decades now but in BRICS, China has
been shielding Pakistan and has been uneasy discussing the issue of terrorism on this platform. India
hopes to continue to work with other BRICS countries to reach an understanding with China on the issue
of cross-border terrorism.
Overall, while the BRICS grouping may have completed a decade, it continues to face the challenges of
the lack of a binding ideology, bilateral differences, diversity in terms of socio-cultural and political
systems, and China’s overwhelming presence, which reduces the space for other countries in the
grouping. Given these challenges, New Delhi’s continuing engagement with BRICS has generated mixed
responses.
As China rises and positions itself as the sole challenger to American hegemony, there is a growing
discussion about the possible Kindleberger Trap, a situation where China may fail to provide global
public goods like a clean environment and financial stability, despite being a superpower. Small
countries have little incentive to contribute to global public goods and it is generally the responsibility
of great powers to provide global governance. The idea of the Kindleberger Trap is also applicable to
rising powers like India, which have global ambitions.
A close examination of India’s record in BRICS reveals that New Delhi has used its membership to make
a substantial contribution to the international financial architecture, while also making efforts to address
glaring gaps in areas such as counter-terrorism, the fight against climate change and UNSC reform.
India is not a free-rider in a system of global governance dominated by the West, and continues to provide
a vision of global governance.
India was the main BRICS country behind the establishment of the NDB and proposed the idea at the
fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi. The NDB was established in 2014 with all five BRICS members
contributing equal amounts of economic capital and having equal voting rights, with no provision of veto

power. The NDB also intends to provide non-conditional financing, unlike the WB and IMF. This reflects
true equality in a global financial institution, and the NDB attempts to rectify the North-South divide that
exists in the governance of the WB and IMF to make it more inclusive.
While it might be tempting to position the NDB as a challenge to the West, New Delhi seeks reforms in
global governance through BRICS and does not have an anti-West agenda. As External Affairs Minister
S Jaishankar recently suggested, India could be viewed as a south-western power, a blend of the West
and the developing world. Through BRICS, India seems to be mediating between the two identities.
India’s efforts to seek changes in international financial governance through BRICS have been
successful, as China also shares this objective with India. The story has been one of missed opportunity
in areas like UNSC reform, counter-terrorism and the fight against climate change. BRICS may have
raised the issue of UNSC reform but this is more declaratory in nature than a serious attempt to overhaul
the UNSC. This reflects that BRICS is interested in selective reform of the system, as its members have
developed vested interests in the existing system. That is why the grouping seeks to reform global
financial governance but is divided over UNSC reform. On the issue of terrorism, India has tried to
project its unique approach, in which New Delhi is not selective and does not differentiate between good
terrorists and bad terrorists, since they all pose a threat to humanity.
Climate governance too has been highlighted as an area where BRICS members have a lot of potential
to contribute, but so far, that has not happened. Russia has been ambivalent towards climate change and
has recently joined the Paris Agreement. India has taken initiatives outside the grouping to project itself
as a leader in the fight against climate change, such as the launch of the International Solar Alliance in
2015 with France. Apart from the global agenda, BRICS allows New Delhi to send out messages about
its foreign policy priorities, underscoring its desire to be part of issue-based coalitions.
At a different level, BRICS membership elevates India’s global profile. China may still not be interested
in de-hyphenating India and Pakistan, but India’s BRICS membership automatically de-hyphenates India
and Pakistan, while it casts India and China as equals. So, even as challenges abound in the BRICS
trajectory, the grouping will continue to be of some instrumental value to India in the years ahead
BRICS matters
India’s persistence with it speaks about Delhi’s strategy to hedge against the great global uncertainties
of the moment.
The only thing remarkable about this year’s summit of the BRICS forum in Brasilia is that it took place
at all. During his campaign for the presidency in 2018, Jair Bolsonaro made no secret of his distrust of
China and the strategic enthusiasm for President Donald Trump. If his recent predecessors promoted
the BRICS as part of their left-wing agenda for Brazil, conservative Bolsonaro seemed ready to
dissociate Brazil from that tradition. That he has chosen, instead, to stay with the BRICS, underlines the

power of inertia in the conduct of foreign policy. Each member of the very diverse and geographically
dispersed group finds some value — even if it is merely diplomatic — in staying with the BRICS. But the
internal contradictions among the five member states — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
— are real and not easily overcome. None of them are sharper than the contradictions between India
and China.
It was Russia that helped develop the forum and sustain it. The Russian objective was to mount
international opposition to the United States in the unipolar moment that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. As China rose in the 21st century and found new tensions rocking its ties with the
US, Beijing found much in common with Russia in limiting US dominance of the world. Beyond
geopolitics, Beijing also found the BRICS a useful forum to promote a global economic agenda that is in
sync with its emergence as the world’s biggest exporter and the second largest economy all set to replace
the US as number one. For both Russia and China, having three large developing nations — India, Brazil
and South Africa — as partners in their enterprise makes eminent political sense.
But India’s gains from the BRICS are not obvious. Nor is it evident if India’s interests are in alignment
with the declared policies of the BRICS. Consider, for example, the thundering BRICS declaration on
defending multilateralism. Many of India’s problems in the multilateral domain are rooted in Beijing’s
opposition — it stalled efforts to join the UNSC as a permanent member and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. On trade, while it is easy to demonise President Trump’s protectionist policies, Delhi’s biggest
trade deficit is with China. India has cited China’s economic threat for not joining the Asian trading
bloc — RCEP. On countering terrorism, which is a major foreign policy priority for India, China views
the problem through Pakistani eyes. Delhi is also acutely conscious of two other factors. One is the
eagerness of Beijing and Moscow to do bilateral deals with Washington. It is also aware of the profound
imbalance of power within the BRICS. For, the Chinese economy is twice as large as the other four put
together. India’s persistence with the BRICS says less about its ideological convictions. It is more about
Delhi’s strategy to hedge against the many great global uncertainties of the moment.
Sri Lanka: A centre for Sino-Indian strategic competition

The delivery of a Chinese frigate to Sri Lanka reinforces China’s role within competition between the
two Asian giants.
Last week, China donated a frigate to the Sri Lankan Navy. While the development itself was hardly
surprising, it nonetheless highlighted the continuing contest between India and China in India’s
neighbourhood in spite of ongoing efforts by both sides to manage their wider relationship.
The frigate arrived in Colombo Port earlier this week. The Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, Vice
Admiral Piyal De Silva, thanked China for the gift and said that this reflected the “good friendship
between the two countries.” Commander De Silva went on to add that Sri Lanka faces many maritime
challenges and that the frigate, now designated ‘P 625’, will be mainly used for offshore patrol,
environment monitoring and anti-piracy efforts.

The vessel reportedly comes with a main turret holding dual Type 79 100 mm cannons and two Type 76A
dual-37 mm Anti-Aircraft Guns at the aft. It also has a helipad and hangar to store and operate a
medium-size helicopter. A statement from the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka said that in addition to the
donation, the PLA Navy had also conducted a two-month professional training for more than 110 Sri
Lankan naval officers and sailors in Shanghai, China.
The donation of the frigate comes against the backdrop of a major Chinese aid to Sri Lanka to fight
terrorism. In May, China decided to provide Sri Lanka with aid to the tune of $14 million for Colombo
to procure China-made counterinsurgency equipment. The decision was taken during President
Maithripala Sirisena’s visit to Beijing in mid-May, and the president’s office stated that this will be
important in enhancing the wherewithal of the Sri Lankan security forces. Reports suggest that China
will also be providing the Sri Lankan police with 150 vehicles.
Much like Beijing’s interest in other of India’s neighbours including the Maldives, China’s interests
in Sri Lanka are more strategic than economic. Developments such as the visit of a Chinese nuclear
submarine to Colombo during the Rajapaksa tenure was a wakeup call as well as a reminder to India
of the extent of China’s strategic in roads in Sri Lanka. The China-Sri Lanka relationship reached a
peak during the final phase of the Sri Lankan war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE).
Much like Beijing’s interest in other of India’s neighbours including the Maldives, China’s interests in
Sri Lanka are more strategic than economic. Developments such as the visit of a Chinese nuclear
submarine to Colombo during the Rajapaksa tenure was a wakeup call as well as a reminder to India of
the extent of China’s strategic in roads in Sri Lanka. The China-Sri Lanka relationship reached a peak
during the final phase of the Sri Lankan war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The
political and defense support extended by China to Colombo, in the face of international condemnation
on account of the extensive human rights abuses, was significant.
New Delhi has not been sitting still, however. Indeed, the fact that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
began his second tenure in office with a stop in Sri Lanka on his way back to a visit to the Maldives was
no coincidence. New Delhi has no doubt been aware that domestic political shifts in Sri Lanka have
continued to put it in the balance, with it perceived to have moved towards China under former
president Mahinda Rajapaksa, and, after the election of Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil
Wickremasinghe, shifting back towards India. It has also been aware of the risks of Sri Lanka getting
entangled in the risks of Chinese engagement, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the
example of the Hambantota Port.
This continues to play out even today. Even though the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe political dispensation
has been quite favorable to India, the internal squabble between the two leaders has cast a shadow in its
dealings with India. This has affected the manner in which even terrorism issues were dealt with by the
two leaders. Despite the fact that India had provided intelligence on the Easter terror attacks in Sri
Lanka, it was not given adequate credit due to the continuing row between Sirisena and Wickremasinghe.

Even though the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe political dispensation has been quite favorable to India,
the internal squabble between the two leaders has cast a shadow in its dealings with India. This has
affected the manner in which even terrorism issues were dealt with by the two leaders. Despite the fact
that India had provided intelligence on the Easter terror attacks in Sri Lanka, it was not given
adequate credit due to the continuing row between Sirisena and Wickremasinghe.
The India-China competition in Sri Lanka is quite evident more broadly. India had earlier given Sri
Lanka advanced off-shore patrol vessels (AOPVs) — SLNS Sayurala (P623) and SLNS Sindurala (P624)
in 2017 and 2018 respectively. But India’s overall capacity to deliver what Sri Lanka needs is
questionable. This has been the case even during the war against the LTTE (though that was at least
partly because New Delhi was hobbled by the needs of domestic politics) to the extent where China
emerged as one of the key trading partners, even setting up a NORINCO small arms factory in Kandy.
The delivery of a Chinese frigate to Sri Lanka is nonetheless evidence that strategic competition in
India’s neighbourhood will only continue to intensify. Unless India does more for its neighbours and
enlists other partners as well, China will continue to present a significant strategic challenge for New
Delhi in this regard in the coming years.
Will Gotabaya Rajapaksa make peace with India?

Given his polarised mandate, Sri Lanka president-elect may need New Delhi’s help in Tamil regions.
For many in South Block, the election in Sri Lanka will bring relations around full circle from five years
ago. In October 2014, during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi, when he was Defence Secretary
to his brother, President Mahinda Rajapaksa, both the Ministry of External Affairs and the National
Security Advisor Ajit Doval delivered him a tough message: that the Modi government took a stern view
of Sri Lanka allowing Chinese naval warships into Colombo harbour.
The message clearly didn’t go down well with Mr. Gotabaya, and a week later, the PLA-Navy’s
submarine Changzheng-2 and the warship Chang Xing Dao arrived at Colombo on a five-day visit
anyway. Sri Lanka insisted it had informed Indian officials about the plan in advance, and that the
docking was routine, but the event put the Rajapaksa regime and the Modi government on collision
course. Matters came to a head shortly after, when an Indian diplomat based in Colombo was accused
of conspiring with the opposition leaders to defeat President Rajapaksa, and subsequently returned to
Delhi. In the elections that followed, Mahinda Rajapaksa lost to Maithripala Sirisena, who was warmly
welcomed by the Modi government.
A lot has changed between the government and the Rajapaksas since that fraught period five years ago.
The Rajapaksas are now back in power, although it is Mr. Gotabaya who is President, not Mr. Mahinda,
because of two-term limits on the presidency. For its part, New Delhi has worked on building ties on
both sides of the political aisles, and carefully sidestepped situations where it was expected to take sides,

including during the short period last year when Mahinda was sworn in as Prime Minister. In September
2018, Mr. Mahinda told The Hindu in an interview during a visit to Delhi that it was “time to move
on” from the misunderstandings of the past. Nonetheless, with Mr. Gotabaya now in charge, New Delhi
will have several apprehensions.
Past tensions
While his brother, a life-long politician has been able to make his peace with New Delhi, the question
remains about whether Gotabaya, a more stentorian military man, has done the same. Speaking to
journalists in 2017, Gothabaya accused the Indian government of having effected “regime change”
because it had a “bee in its bonnet” about China. In an interview in 2018, he repeated that charge, and
also said that the Indian government had shunned his party, and had refused to engage with the Sri
Lankan opposition.
China card
At a rally last month, Gotabaya said that his government’s foreign policy would be “neutral” and stay
out of “regional power struggles”. However, many worry that a tilt towards China will be inevitable,
given the Rajapaksa’s past preferences as well as Gotabaya’s acrimonious relationship with the United
States, which has often raised Gotabaya’s role as defence chief during the war against the LTTE in 2009
amidst allegations of human rights violations. Sri Lanka’s debt situation will also mean a greater role
for China, which is the island’s biggest investor and creditor. “Even the Sirisena government was unable
to keep Chinese influence at bay, despite some efforts. Under Gotabaya, that influence is expected to be
much more evident,” says former diplomat in the Indian High Commission in Colombo and now
Executive Director of the South Asian Institute of Strategic Affairs (SISA) Prabha Rao.
Minority report
The most sensitive issue for New Delhi in dealing with Gotabaya will be dealing with the Tamil-speaking
areas of Sri Lanka’s North and Muslim-dominated East, that Tamil Nadu has the closest links with.
Gotabaya, who is unpopular for his role in the war against LTTE in these areas, was defeated in all of
the Northern Province's five districts and in three districts in the Eastern Province in Sunday’s election.
“Given his polarised mandate, Gotabaya should actually want India’s friendship in resolving tensions
with the North and East region, and India should move in quickly to ensure more development projects
in those areas,” advised Ms. Rao.
Government officials say that contrary to public perception, however, local diplomats have been meeting
with both Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the recent past, and they expect to build on traditional
ties between New Delhi and Colombo and bonhomie between Narendra Modi-Gotabaya Rajapaksa. A
first step was made with PM Modi’s early tweet congratulating President-elect Rajapaksa, and Mr.
Rajapaksa’s quick reply thanking him, they add.

How India should deal with Gotabaya’s Sri Lanka
In its engagement, Delhi must deepen economic and security cooperation, and balance pragmatism
and values
After the positive political developments in Bangladesh and the Maldives last year, Gotabaya
Rajapaksa’s significant victory in Sri Lanka poses a new challenge for India’s efforts to reconnect with
the region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ambition to shape the Indo-Pacific great game will fail
unless he gets Gotabaya to play ball and keep China at bay.
For all the critiques of India as a reactionary power lacking in realism, one must guard against two
simplistic readings of the bilateral relationship and political context. The first erroneous assumption is
that India was caught by surprise by Gotabaya’s election, and that Delhi will struggle to re-engage with
a reincarnated Rajapaksa regime. Over the last two years, India silently rebuilt bridges with the various
constituents of the Sinhala populist wave. The various meetings between Modi and Mahinda Rajapaksa,
the most recent one in June this year, ensure that India does not have to start from scratch now.
The second fallacy is to assume that Gotabaya is fatalistically pro-China, and thus also bound to be anti-
India. His election manifesto promises to renegotiate the Chinese lease of the Hambantota port, and he
repeatedly emphasised the foreign policy principle of equidistance and geostrategic neutrality. Nothing
less would be expected from a shrewd follower of small State realism who recognises the benefits of
hedging between India and China. Gotabaya will thus only seek in Beijing what he is unable to get from
New Delhi, just as during the final phase of the civil war.
This does not mean that India will have it easy. To make Sri Lanka pursue an India-first policy, both in
letter and spirit, New Delhi will have to deliver even more on economic and security cooperation. At the
same time, beyond this positive agenda, India must also draw clear red lines and enforce them, even
through coercion, if needed, as a last resort. Four critical challenges emerge on the immediate horizon.
India’s first challenge is to deepen economic interdependence with Sri Lanka, and expand its connectivity
initiatives. As with so many of India’s other neighbours, Sri Lanka will continue to welcome China’s
enthusiastic, generous, and reliable financing for critical infrastructure and developmental goals. In
2016, China became the largest source of Sri Lankan imports, and its foreign investment stock now
surpasses India’s. Beijing is also the island’s largest lender, with a variety of loans to develop road, air,
and port infrastructure. India will have to focus on its connectivity strategy, and keep the positive
momentum, including the new airline link with Jaffna, the Colombo port project with Japan, and more
investments in the railway, energy and housing sectors. Most important, for long-term interdependence,
India must urgently finalise the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, which has been
delayed repeatedly.
Second, India will have to deepen security cooperation with Sri Lanka without further escalating
geostrategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Despite its continued military capabilities, for example in

Diego Garcia, the United States is still seen as an extra-regional power, which may explain New Delhi’s
apprehensions about a recent defence cooperation agreement between Washington and Colombo. But
winning over Sri Lanka will require India to invest in greater security and defence cooperation with like-
minded Indo-Pacific powers, including Japan, Australia, France and the European Union. At the same
time, India will also have to open communication channels with China to reduce Sri Lankan temptations
to play off New Delhi and Beijing against each other.
Third, in a remake of the 2011-14 period, India will be torn between the normative approach of the West
and the win-win focus of China. The United States and Europe are expected to increase pressure and
make assistance conditional on the Rajapaksas’ willingness to deliver on transitional justice,
reconciliation, and human rights. This will, once again, embolden Beijing to come to the Rajapaksas’
rescue with new investments to bolster the regime’s economic modernisation agenda. As with the
Madhesi issue after the communists consolidated power in Nepal, New Delhi is thus expected to put the
Tamil issue and constitutional issues on the backburner to keep Colombo satisfied. Such pragmatism is
understandable in the short-run, but may come at the cost of the “democratic values and the
constitutional process”, which India appealed to during Sri Lanka’s 2018 constitutional crisis.
Finally, India will also have to incentivise Sri Lanka to play a more proactive role in regional institutions.
Colombo currently holds the chair of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation (Bimstec) and is also a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). In the interest
of expediency, New Delhi is often tempted to engage Sri Lanka bilaterally and bypass the slow, complex,
and technical dialogues of multilateral settings. As emphasised in PM Modi’s tweet greeting the new Sri
Lankan president, New Delhi and Colombo will have to work together to ensure “peace, prosperity as
well as security in our region”. While it is uncertain whether Modi was referring specifically to South
Asia, the Bay of Bengal or the Indian Ocean, one thing is clear: China is not part of this common region
shared by India and Sri Lanka.
The Role of BRICS in Global Politics
Olga Kolesnichenko, Alexander Rozanov, and Liu Debin
BRICS has evolved from an abstract format into an influential forum in the inter-
national arena. BRICS framework is a new experience of collective leadership that
civilization develops within globalization environment. In this article we highlight
the issues addressed by various stakeholders within and outside BRICS. This, in
turn, will feed the overarching aim of creating a stable operating framework for
BRICS for the coming decades and simultaneously lead to expected cooperation
and collaboration which can be developed within the BRICS framework.
Keywords: BRICS, partnership, globalization, cooperation, leadership.
BRIC, and now BRICS, has evolved from an abstract format into an influential forum in
the international arena and it has become not just a manifestation of globalization, but in-
creasingly a key control lever of global processes. The idea of uniting the world largest
developing economies under the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) belongs to
James O'Neill, a well-known analyst in the field of global economic research from the
leading US investment bank Goldman Sachs. In 2001, O'Neill wrote an article, ‘Building
Better Global Economic BRICs’, in which he introduced a grouping acronym BRIC (by
taking similarity to the English word ‘brick’ – brick). Following the logic of the abbrevia-
tion, Kazakhstan that possesses a huge growth potential could beсome a new member of
the BRICs ‘to complete the whole picture’. But firstly the Republic of South Africa joined
the alliance, giving the organization a transcontinental character.
During the years of existence and development, BRICS is in a constant process of
transformation. However, we must emphasize the essence of the creation of this format –
the consolidation of the countries which are projected by leading analysts of the world to
become the world most powerful economies in the 21st century. This also brings the un-
derstanding of the critical role of the BRICS in global processes of building a new world
order through the consolidation of international efforts. Such format fulfils the function of
an ‘architect of globalization’, laying the foundation for a new global consturction, made
of ‘bricks’, whose strength will depend on how long our common planetary home will
stand. Thus, the BRICS format cannot operate in the logic of isolation of the developing
world from the developed Western countries. The power of the BRICS and its civilization-
al mission consists in tbringing the consolidated global efforts to a new level of ‘strong
wave’ of rapidly growing economies.
Collective leadership is a new experience that civilization realises within the BRICS
framework in the face of globalization. The challenge for the BRICS consists in the devel-
opment of a new global model of governance which should not be unipolar but consolidat-
ed and constructive. The goal is also to avoid a negative scenario of unfolding globaliza-
tion and to start a complicated merging of the global growing economies without dis-
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 2016 277–282
278 Globalistics and Globalization Studies
torting or breaking the single financial and economic continuum of the world. It is im-
portant to continue following this path, and not to hamper the growing potential of the
BRICS by the pole confrontation with the West.
How can one characterize the contemporary world? In the recent decade there have
been numerous debates in the international academic community about the contemporary
world and current world order. Some experts believe that although the US power is declin-
ing the world order remains the same since the international order is a liberal one and is
based on the US leadership which is still working well. It can assimilate the rising powers,
such as China, India, and Brazil. Thus, the struggle among the existing and newly-rising
powers is not for its fundamental principles but for more leadership advantages within its
framework. Professor from Princeton John Ikenberry, one of the leading strategist in the
West, is one of the major supporters of this idea (Ikenberry 2011).
But some others believe that the world is in chaos, and anarchy is coming to Eurasia.
Thus, Robert D. Kaplan, a leading figure of geopolitics in the USA, published the paper
where he advises the USA and the West to get tough on China and Russia, and to prepare to
engage anarchy in Eurasia. Mr. Kaplan believes that both China and Russia are revisionist
powers, and they show their muscles not because they are powerful but because they are
weak. At the same time, the social situation in Central Asia may bring a kind of an Arabic
Spring in the near future. Thus, the Eurasian continent is in danger! (Kaplan 2016: 3–4)
So what is actually happening in the world?
1. The collapse of regional order in the Middle East and spread of terrorism all over
the World. The lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unrest in Iraq and Syria, the rise of ISIS
(an organization banned in Russia), the Middle East order is also collapsing and will be
difficult to restore. There is no clear future over the longer term.
2. The European counties are in troubles resulting from their domestic and interna-
tional policies. Europe has been the strong advocate of Arabic Spring but now is trapped in
the refugee crisis. Besides, the Muslim population in Europe is growing and Europe sud-
denly turned the weakest region for terrorist attacks, which further worsens the economic
recovery and challenges the European social system.
3. The slowdown of world economy continues while the way out has not been found
yet. This slowdown has spread from the developed world to emerging economies, and
brings about numerous social upheavals. There is no means to stop the increasing chaos
around the world in the future.
4. Diverging of great powers' strategies for the world order. The USA has found that
Europe is hardly the best partner, unlike Japan and others in Asia. The European countries
have no will or ability to follow the USA who, in its turn, seems to have lost its grand
strategy at the moment.
5. The coming of a turning point for BRICS in the current situation. BRICS is no more
a group in the original meaning and it needs to redefine its identity and objectives.
On the surface, the five BRICS nations, as a multilateral grouping, seem to have little
in common. They are essentially different and this fact must be taken into account before
making an attempt to converge. The five countries represent largely differing political sys-
tems: China is a one-party state; Russia's governance is highly centralized; Brazil, India,
and South Africa are democracies with significant corruption levels and/or ethnic strife
still to deal with. They have also reached different levels of economic development; thus,
China outpaces the group in economic terms, including trade. Furthermore, the member
Kolesnichenko et al. • The Role of BRICS in Global Politics 279
states differ in terms of available resources, absolute consumption, and energy intensity
and have different demographic trends. Brazil has a predominantly urban population,
while India is still largely rural. Russia has an ageing population while India is relatively
young. Yet, in general, the five nations will greatly contribute to the growth of the world's
middle class. BRICS members have essentially different statuses within the current global
order. Thus, Russia and China are established global powers and have permanent member-
ship on the UN Security Council, while India, Brazil, and South Africa only aspire to
global influence and are currently qualified as regional powers.
With account of different power and national interest, a certain geopolitical diver-
gence in a number of issues is not surprising. Thus, the broadly shared commitment of all
BRICS members to the principle of non-interference has not translated into a uniform po-
sition on many international issues. For example, Russia and China oppose external inter-
vention in Syria. On the other hand, Brazil and India have taken more nuanced positions,
including voting to condemn the Syrian government's violent crackdowns on protesters.
BRICS possesses immense natural resources in some regions along with scarcity of
resources in others, it also has diverse ecological environments, a large and young popula-
tion base and faces myriad of socio-economic challenges. Taken together, these factors
emphasize the necessity of a sustainable and inclusive growth trajectory which must be
implemented through focused efforts both at the domestic and external arenas. In this con-
text, two factors of particular relevance are globalization and climate change. Indeed, to
effectively deal with both trends within the broader context of developmental challenges
will require adequate and sustainable responses. At the Conference of Parties Summits,
hosted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), one
can observe trends which point to the necessity to re-think the multilateral frameworks for
coordination and collaboration on climate change, sustainable development and inclusive
growth. In fact, every member of the BRICS must cooperate within the BRICS format and
beyond it in multilateral fora in order to better articulate the fundamental current require-
ments to enable the domestic socio-economic transformations. These steps will help effec-
tively cope with the critical interplay described above. In turn, equity must be central to
the foundations of any new framework for change, rather than an afterthought.
In an increasingly globalizing world, it is difficult for any nation to stay isolated.
Some developments have cross-border ripple effects, as recently seen in both Libya and
Syria. The BRICS members tend to share a apprehension of interventionist or hegemonic
tendencies. Political intricacy is aggravated by the emerging important non-state actors
threatening international security. A number of organizations, groups and even individuals
start to significantly impact the world, and BRICS countries must position themselves as
anchors of political conversations at the global high-level meetings. The political signifi-
cance of BRICS is reinforced by the active participation of its five members both in inter-
national organizations (including the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank), informal as-
sociations (like the Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77, G20 and APEC), and in region-
al organizations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Thus, there are objective op-
portunities for ‘co-participation’ with other countries in building a fair world order and
exerting a systemic influence for setting the agenda on a wide range of issues – from glob-
al to regional, from the well-established to the relatively new.
The BRICS nations should provide a viable leadership alternative for developing na-
tions. In order to move towards developing a meaningful role in world affairs and a more
active role in conflict resolution, BRICS should create a platform for appropriate policies
and response mechanisms to address local, regional, and international political and social
turbulence, as recently observed in the situation with the so called ‘Arab Spring’. While
the emerging multi-polar world may place the developing and ‘Western’ nations against
each other, BRICS members do not intend to ascend to leadership of an oppositional bloc.
BRICS represents a collective aspiration to influence and manage institutions of global
political and economic governance, so that they reflect demographic and economic reali-
ties and not merely post World War II agreements. In the sphere of international relations,
this preference translates into a fundamentally different way of operating. The Western
construct of ‘universal responsibility’ is sometimes interpreted in a very different way in
non-Western parts of the world. The BRICS nations can use their collective voice to help
preserve a respect for international sovereignty in international affairs. The desire of the
developed world to intervene in the domestic domain of other nations can be restrained by
the creation and fostering of regional cooperative networks, which may reduce conflict
and quell crises. The urgent UN Security Counciil reforms must be prioritized on the
BRICS agenda.
In this article we highlight the issues addressed by various stakeholders within and
outside BRICS which means that a substantial interest and momentum will be generated
by the grouping. This, in turn, will feed the overarching aim of creating a stable operating
framework for BRICS for the coming decades and simultaneously lead to expected coop-
eration and collaboration in other spheres of interest, which can be developed within the
intra-BRICS cooperation. While these areas must not qualify the primary BRICS agenda,
there must be an organically created momentum once the five focus areas as highlighted in
the executive summary are addressed. Some of these spheres for cooperation are listed
below.
 Institutional flexibility
While the BRICS nations may have different visions of the group's role and what it
may mean to each of them, it stands to reason that any agreed upon agenda can best be
realized if BRICS develops a coherent and sustained framework for continuous engage-
ment. At the same time, the mechanisms of policy formulation should be dynamic and
inclusive. It is crucial that flexibility should be maintained and kept central to the very idea
of BRICS. The role of nodal research organizations and think tanks is essential in this re-
spect.
 Reviving traditional knowledge systems and practices
Quite too often, the terms ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ are torn out of their
strictly economic context and given an unjustifiably broad connotation. This bias is symp-
tomatic of a larger gap between Western knowledge and cognitive systems and the com-
plex realities of the developing world. It is critical for BRICS to focus on reviving indige-
nous knowledge and practices in a range of domains – such as traditional medicines,
healthcare, agriculture and water management, and design and construction practices.
 Sharing developmental knowledge and experience
The knowledge and experience that BRICS accumulates in individual development
journeys can be consolidated and better leveraged if actively shared and adapted through-
out the whole grouping. Formal knowledge sharing institutions could be put in place. This
could occur through structured knowledge banks or mutual scholarships and training pro-
grams. More pervasive channels of communication at all levels should be developed.
Kolesnichenko et al. • The Role of BRICS in Global Politics 281
 Sharing technologies and innovations

BRICS should be more proactive in bolstering research and in, funding innovations
and technology. Exchanging information on scientific and technological policies and pro-
grams, and formulating joint long-term problem oriented cooperation projects could be the
first useful steps here. Joint research provide substantial opportunities in such priority
fields as aeronautics and outer space research, high-speed vehicles, microelectronics and
information technology, nanotechnologies, food security and sustainable agriculture, bio-
technologies, medicine, finance and insurance for hedging risks, exploration of mineral
resources, remote sensing, climate change, water resources and water purification technol-
ogies. BRICS must collectively foster better organizational, legal, financial, and personnel
support for scientific, technical, and innovation cooperation. Starting with establishing
high-tech areas/science parks and incubators, creating common technological platforms,
stimulating joint investments in the development of high technologies, research and inno-
vation centres, BRICS can create conditions to smooth the transfer of technologies to pro-
duction of advanced industrial goods. At a minimum, the BRICS members can mutually
benefit from documenting, standardizing, and sharing information regarding innovative
practices. Similarly, members can benefit from learning the efficacy of varying financial
and non-financial policy instruments now used to incentivise innovation activity. At the
same time, there are already significant inward flows of technology and expertise occur-
ring via the activities of multinational firms. The BRICS nations must collaborate in order
to accelerate cross-border technology sharing and transfer. In addition to private R&D and
innovation, BRICS nations can also share experiences of building links between industry
and universities. They should exchange information regarding intellectual property laws,
which protect IP and at the same time encourage the adoption and diffusion of new tech-
nologies. Apart from the economic benefits of such actions, BRICS can also leverage col-
laborative understanding and strength for shaping the TRIPS regime under the auspices of
the WTO.
 Relevant and bias-free benchmarks
The BRICS nations need to contextualize the dominant benchmarking and ratings sys-
tems/agencies, which are Western in origin. These systems are geared towards products
and services emanating from a particular context. The grouping needs to develop and pop-
ularize BRICS rating systems and benchmarks ranging from corporate governance per-
formance assessments to capital market standards. Such benchmarks and normative guide-
lines could also be applied in other spheres – such as agricultural production, pharmaceuti-
cals and corporate governance – in the context of developing economies.
 Regional frameworks
The BRICS nations are leaders within their own regions and surrounded by a cluster
of smaller neighbours. At the geopolitical level, this discrepancy can sometimes lead to
regional tensions. However, this also provides significant opportunities for the smaller
neighbours to benefit from external growth and development. Synergistic regional eco-
nomic and developmental frameworks should be developed, which accommodate sover-
eignty within a broader growth paradigm.
 Cultural exchange
It is now widely accepted that BRICS needs to move beyond an annual leaders meet-
ing. This can be achieved by instituting a variety of events and people-to-people exchang-
es. These can be in the sphere of cultural exchanges and conducted either at the BRICS
platform or on larger international platforms, like UNESCO. In the slightly longer term,
the BRICS nations need to collectively work towards a degree of standardization in educa-
tional programs and, if possible, to explore issues surrounding mutual recognition of each
other's accreditation. The enhanced cooperation in sports could also provide avenues for
improving cultural understanding. Formal engagement should be instituted with already
existing leadership programs and bodies, like youth leadership programs and parliamen-
tary teams. BRICS must support multilateral projects of member states' youth organiza-
tions and attempt to establish a Young Leaders Forum with regular exchanges between
parliamentarians. A similar forum for media professionals and journalists could also be
envisaged. Attention should be paid to travel and tourism between the member countries.
Visa and travel processes could be made easier and quicker. Over time, such actions could
build ‘soft’ links between the BRICS nations that will help bolster cooperation and collec-
tive attainment of the long-term vision.
References
Anheier, H. K., Juergensmeyer, M. (Eds.). 2012. Encyclopedia of Global Studies. 1st ed. Los
Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.
Ikenberry G. J. 2011. The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America.
Foreign Affairs, May / June 2011.
Kaplan, R. D. 2016. Eurasia's Coming Anarchy: The Risks of Chinese and Russian Weakness.
Foreign Affairs 3–4.
Kwang Ho Chun. 2013. The BRICs Superpower Challenge: Foreign and Security Policy
Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Ashgate Publishing Co.
O'Neill, J. 2001. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Goldman Sachs.
The power thinker - Foucault
Original, painstaking, sometimes frustrating and often dazzling. Foucault’s work on
power matters now more than ever
Imagine you are asked to compose an ultra-short history of philosophy. Perhaps you’ve
been challenged to squeeze the impossibly sprawling diversity of philosophy itself into just
a few tweets. You could do worse than to search for the single word that best captures the
ideas of every important philosopher. Plato had his ‘forms’. René Descartes had his ‘mind’
and John Locke his ‘ideas’. John Stuart Mill later had his ‘liberty’. In more recent
philosophy, Jacques Derrida’s word was ‘text’, John Rawls’s was ‘justice’, and Judith
Butler’s remains ‘gender’. Michel Foucault’s word, according to this innocent little parlour
game, would certainly be ‘power’.
Foucault remains one of the most cited 20th-century thinkers and is, according to some
lists, the single most cited figure across the humanities and social sciences. His two most
referenced works, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975) and The History
of Sexuality, Volume One (1976), are the central sources for his analyses of power.
Interestingly enough, however, Foucault was not always known for his signature word. He
first gained his massive influence in 1966 with the publication of The Order of Things. The
original French title gives a better sense of the intellectual milieu in which it was written:
Les mots et les choses, or ‘Words and Things’. Philosophy in the 1960s was all about words,
especially among Foucault’s contemporaries.
In other parts of Paris, Derrida was busily asserting that ‘there is nothing outside the text’,
and Jacques Lacan turned psychoanalysis into linguistics by claiming that ‘the unconscious
is structured like a language’. This was not just a French fashion. In 1967 Richard Rorty,
surely the most infamous American philosopher of his generation, summed up the new spirit
in the title of his anthology of essays, The Linguistic Turn. That same year, Jürgen
Habermas, soon to become Germany’s leading philosopher, published his attempt at
‘grounding the social sciences in a theory of language’.
Foucault’s contemporaries pursued their obsessions with language for at least another few
decades. Habermas’s magnum opus, titled The Theory of Communicative Action (1981),
remained devoted to exploring the linguistic conditions of rationality. Anglo-American
philosophy followed the same line, and so too did most French philosophers (except they
tended toward the linguistic nature of irrationality instead).

For his part, however, Foucault moved on, somewhat singularly among his generation.
Rather than staying in the world of words, in the 1970s he shifted his philosophical attention
to power, an idea that promises to help explain how words, or anything else for that matter,
come to give things the order that they have. But Foucault’s lasting importance is not in his
having found some new master-concept that can explain all the others. Power, in Foucault,
is not another philosophical godhead. For Foucault’s most crucial claim about power is
that we must refuse to treat it as philosophers have always treated their central concepts,
namely as a unitary and homogenous thing that is so at home with itself that it can explain
everything else.
Foucault did not attempt to construct a philosophical fortress around his signature concept.
He had witnessed first-hand how the arguments of the linguistic-turn philosophers grew
brittle once they were deployed to analyse more and more by way of words. So Foucault
himself expressly refused to develop an overarching theory of power. Interviewers would
sometimes press him to give them a unified theory, but he always demurred. Such a theory,
he said, was simply not the goal of his work. Foucault remains best-known for his analyses
of power, indeed his name is, for most intellectuals, almost synonymous with the word
‘power’. Yet he did not himself offer a philosophy of power. How could this be possible?
Herein lies the richness and the challenge of Foucault’s work. His is a philosophical
approach to power characterised by innovative, painstaking, sometimes frustrating, and
often dazzling attempts to politicise power itself. Rather than using philosophy to freeze
power into a timeless essence, and then to use that essence to comprehend so much of
power’s manifestations in the world, Foucault sought to unburden philosophy of its icy gaze
of capturing essences. He wanted to free philosophy to track the movements of power, the
heat and the fury of it working to define the order of things.
To appreciate the originality of Foucault’s approach, it is helpful to contrast it to that of
previous political philosophy. Before Foucault, political philosophers had presumed that
power had an essence: be it sovereignty, or mastery, or unified control. The German social
theorist Max Weber (1864-1920) influentially argued that state power consisted in a
‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the
English philosopher and original theorist of state power, saw the essence of power as state
sovereignty. Hobbes thought that at its best and purest power would be exercised from the
singular position of sovereignty. He called it ‘The Leviathan’.
Foucault never denied the reality of state power in the Hobbesian sense. But his political
philosophy emanates from his skepticism about the assumption (and it was a mere

assumption until Foucault called it into question) that the only real power is sovereign
power. Foucault accepted that there were real forces of violence in the world, and not only
state violence. There is also corporate violence due to enormous condensations of capital,
gender violence in the form of patriarchy, and the violences both overt and subtle of white
supremacy in such forms as chattel slavery, real-estate redlining, and now mass
incarceration. Foucault’s work affirmed that such exercises of force were exhibits of
sovereign power, likenesses of Leviathan. What he doubted was the assumption that we
could extrapolate from this easy observation the more complex thought that power only ever
appears in Leviathan-like form.
Power is all the more cunning because its basic forms can
change in response to our efforts to free ourselves from its grip
In seeing through the imaginary singularity of power, Foucault was able to also envision it
set against itself. He was able to hypothesise, and therefore to study, the possibility that
power does not always assume just one form and that, in virtue of this, a given form of
power can coexist alongside, or even come into conflict with, other forms of power. Such
coexistences and conflicts, of course, are not mere speculative conundrums, but are the sort
of stuff that one would need to empirically analyse in order to understand.
Foucault’s skeptical supposition thus allowed him to conduct careful enquiries into the
actual functions of power. What these studies reveal is that power, which easily frightens
us, turns out to be all the more cunning because its basic forms of operation can change in
response to our ongoing efforts to free ourselves from its grip. To take just one example,
Foucault wrote about the way in which a classically sovereign space such as the judicial
court came to accept into its proceedings the testimony of medical and psychiatric experts
whose authority and power were exercised without recourse to sovereign violence. An
expert diagnosis of ‘insanity’ today or ‘perversity’ 100 years ago could come to mitigate or
augment a judicial decision.
Foucault showed how the sovereign power of Leviathan (think crowns, congresses and
capital) has over the past 200 years come to confront two new forms of power: disciplinary
power (which he also called anatomo-politics because of its detailed attention to training
the human body) and bio-politics. Biopower was Foucault’s subject in The History of
Sexuality, Volume One. Meanwhile the power of discipline, the anatomo-politics of the
body, was Foucault’s focus in Discipline and Punish.

More than any other book, it is Discipline and Punish in which Foucault constructs his
signature, meticulous style of enquiry into the actual mechanisms of power. The recent
publication of a now nearly complete set of Foucault’s course lectures at the Collège de
France in Paris (probably the most prestigious academic institution in the world, and where
Foucault lectured from 1970 to 1984) reveals that Discipline and Punish was the result of
at least five years of intensive archival research. While Foucault worked on this book, he
was deeply engaged in its material, leading research seminars and giving huge public
lectures that are now being published under such titles as The Punitive Society and
Psychiatric Power. The material he addressed ranges broadly, from the birth of modern
criminology to psychiatry’s gendered construction of hysteria. The lectures show
Foucault’s thought in development, and thus offer insight into his philosophy in the midst
of its transformation. When he eventually organised his archival materials into a book, the
result was the consolidated and efficient argumentation of Discipline and Punish.
Discipline, according to Foucault’s historical and philosophical analyses, is a form of
power that tells people how to act by coaxing them to adjust themselves to what is ‘normal’.
It is power in the form of correct training. Discipline does not strike down the subject at
whom it is directed, in the way that sovereignty does. Discipline works more subtly, with an
exquisite care even, in order to produce obedient people. Foucault famously called the
obedient and normal products of discipline ‘docile subjects’.
The exemplary manifestation of disciplinary power is the prison. For Foucault, the
important thing about this institution, the most ubiquitous site of punishment in the modern
world (but practically non-existent as a form of punishment before the 18th century), is not
the way in which it locks up the criminal by force. This is the sovereign element that persists
in modern prisons, and is fundamentally no different from the most archaic forms of
sovereign power that exert violent force over the criminal, the exile, the slave and the
captive. Foucault looked beyond this most obvious element in order to see more deeply into
the elaborate institution of the prison. Why had the relatively inexpensive techniques of
torture and death gradually given way over the course of modernity to the costly complex
of the prison? Was it just, as we are wont to believe, because we all started to become more
humanitarian in the 18th century? Foucault thought that such an explanation would be sure
to miss the fundamental way in which power changes when spectacles of torture give way
to labyrinthine prisons.
The purpose of constant surveillance is to compel

prisoners to regard themselves as subject to correction

Foucault argued that if you look at the way in which prisons operate, that is, at their
mechanics, it becomes evident that they are designed not so much to lock away criminals
as to submit them to training rendering them docile. Prisons are first and foremost not
houses of confinement but departments of correction. The crucial part of this institution is
not the cage of the prison cell, but the routine of the timetables that govern the daily lives
of prisoners. What disciplines prisoners is the supervised morning inspections, the
monitored mealtimes, the work shifts, even the ‘free time’ overseen by a panoply of
attendants including armed guards and clipboard-wielding psychologists.
Importantly, all of the elements of prison surveillance are continuously made visible. That
is why his book’s French title Surveiller et punir, more literally ‘Surveil and Punish’, is
important. Prisoners must be made to know that they are subject to continual oversight. The
purpose of constant surveillance is not to scare prisoners who are thinking of escaping, but
rather to compel them to regard themselves as subject to correction. From the moment of
morning rise to night’s lights out, the prisoners are subject to ceaseless behavioural
inspection.
The crucial move of imprisonment is that of coaxing prisoners to learn how to inspect,
manage and correct themselves. If effectively designed, supervision renders prisoners no
longer in need of their supervisors. For they will have become their own attendant. This is
docility.
To illustrate this distinctly modern form of power, Foucault used an image in Discipline
and Punish that has become justly famous. From the archives of history, Foucault retrieved
an almost-forgotten scheme of the canonical English moral philosopher Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832). Bentham proposed a maximal-surveillance prison he christened ‘The
Panopticon’. Central to his proposal was that of an architecture designed for correction.
In the Panopticon, the imposing materiality of the heavy stones and metal bars of physical
imprisonment is less important than the weightless elements of light and air through which
a prisoner’s every action would be traversed by supervision.
The design of the Panopticon was simple. A circle of cells radiate outward from a central
guard tower. Each cell is positioned facing the tower and lit by a large window from the
rear so that anyone inside the tower could see right through the cell in order to easily
apprehend the activities of the prisoner therein. The guard tower is eminently visible to the
prisoners but, because of carefully constructed blind windows, the prisoners cannot see
back into the tower to know if they are being watched. This is a design of ceaseless

surveillance. It is an architecture not so much of a house of detention as, in Bentham’s
words, ‘a mill for grinding rogues honest’.
The Panopticon might seem to have remained a dream. No prison was ever built according
to Bentham’s exact specifications, though a few came close. One approximation, the
Stateville ‘F’ House in Illinois, was opened in 1922 and was finally closed down in late
November 2016. But the important thing about the Panopticon was that it was a general
dream. One need not be locked away in a prison cell to be subject to its designs of
disciplinary dressage. The most chilling line in Discipline and Punish is the final sentence
of the section entitled ‘Panopticism’, where Foucault wryly asks: ‘Is it surprising that
prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?’ If
Foucault is right, we are subject to the power of correct training whenever we are tied to
our school desks, our positions on the assembly line or, perhaps most of all in our time, our
meticulously curated cubicles and open-plan offices so popular as working spaces today.
It was a bio-power wielded by psychiatrists and

doctors that turned homosexuality into a ‘perversion’
To be sure, disciplinary training is not sovereign violence. But it is power. Classically,
power took the form of force or coercion and was considered to be at its purest in acts of
physical violence. Discipline acts otherwise. It gets a hold of us differently. It does not seize
our bodies to destroy them, as Leviathan always threatened to do. Discipline rather trains
them, drills them and (to use Foucault’s favoured word) ‘normalises’ them. All of this
amounts to, Foucault saw, a distinctly subtle and relentless form of power. To refuse to
recognise such disciplining as a form of power is a denial of how human life has come to
be shaped and lived. If the only form of power we are willing to recognise is sovereign
violence, we are in a poor position to understand the stakes of power today. If we are unable
to see power in its other forms, we become impotent to resist all the other ways in which
power brings itself to bear in forming us.
Foucault’s work shows that disciplinary power was just one of many forms that power has
come to take over the past few hundred years. Disciplinary anatomo-politics persists
alongside sovereign power as well as the power of bio-politics. In his next book, The History
of Sexuality, Foucault argued that bio-politics helps us to understand how garish sexual
exuberance persists in a culture that regularly tells itself that its true sexuality is being
repressed. Bio-power does not forbid sexuality, but rather regulates it in the maximal
interests of very particular conceptions of reproduction, family and health. It was a bio-

power wielded by psychiatrists and doctors that, in the 19th century, turned homosexuality
into a ‘perversion’ because of its failure to focus sexual activity around the healthy
reproductive family. It would have been unlikely, if not impossible, to achieve this by
sovereign acts of direct physical coercion. Much more effective were the armies of medical
men who helped to straighten out their patients for their own supposed self-interest.
Other forms of power also persist in our midst. Some regard the power of data – that is the
info-power of social media, data analytics and ceaseless algorithmic assessment – as the
most significant kind of power that has emerged since Foucault’s death in 1984.
Those who fear freedom’s unpredictability find Foucault too risky

For identifying and so deftly analysing the mechanisms of modern power, while refusing to
develop it into a singular and unified theory of power’s essence, Foucault remains
philosophically important. The strident philosophical skepticism in which his thought is
rooted is not directed against the use of philosophy for the analysis of power. Rather, it is
suspicious of the bravado behind the idea that philosophy can, and also must, reveal the
hidden essence of things. What this means is that Foucault’s signature word – ‘power’ – is
not the name of an essence that he has distilled but is rather an index to an entire field of
analysis in which the work of philosophy must continually toil.
Those who think that philosophy still needs to identify eternal essences will find Foucault’s
perspective utterly unconvincing. But those who think that what feels eternal to each of us
will vary across generations and geographies are more likely to find inspiration in
Foucault’s approach. With respect to the central concepts of political philosophy, namely
the conceptual pair of power and freedom, Foucault’s bet was that people are likely to win
more for freedom by declining to define in advance all the forms that freedom could possibly
take. That means too refusing to latch on to static definitions of power. Only in following
power everywhere that it operates does freedom have a good chance of flourishing. Only
by analysing power in its multiplicity, as Foucault did, do we have a chance to mount a
multiplicity of freedoms that would counter all the different ways in which power comes to
define the limits of who we can be.
The irony of a philosophy that would define power once and for all is that it would thereby
delimit the essence of freedom. Such a philosophy would make freedom absolutely unfree.
Those who fear freedom’s unpredictability find Foucault too risky. But those who are
unwilling to decide today what might begin to count as freedom tomorrow find Foucault, at
least with respect to our philosophical perspectives, freeing. Foucault’s approach to power

and freedom therefore matters not only for philosophy, but also more importantly for what
philosophy can contribute to the changing orders of things in which we find ourselves.
Review of History and Political Science

June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 149-167
ISSN: 2333-5718 (Print), 2333-5726 (Online)
Copyright © The Author(s). 2014. All Rights Reserved.
Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development
Power and Ideology in Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci: A Comparative

Analysis
Asli Daldal1
Abstract
In devising their theories of power and ideology both Gramsci and Foucault make
use of Machiavelli's notion of "relations of force". They therefore diffuse the power
relations to the complex mechanisms of society. Power in Gramscian analysis
resides in ideology. Or in other words, to be conscious of the complex social
network-hegemonic forces-within which an individual realizes himself already
generates power. Once a social group is able to modify the ensemble of these
relations and make it "common sense", it is creating a hegemonic order. The
concept of power is everywhere in Foucault's analyses as well as in his theory.
Power is "omnipresent". It comes from everywhere and is produced every moment.
Similar to Gramsci, Foucault also sees power as a relation of force that only exists in
action. Foucault's basic difference from Gramsci is that the latter saw power
relations in terms of binary oppositions(such as the leaders and the led, the rulers
and the ruled etc.). For Foucault though, power, as well as the resistance it
generates, are diffused and not localized in some points.
Keywords: Ideology, Power, Political Philosophy, Social Analysis
Introduction
For those analysts interested in making sense of the complexities of modern

forms of social life, both the French philosopher Michel Foucault and the Italian
Marxist thinker Antoni Gramsci are invaluable sources. For Foucault, “power is
everywhere”, and power relations are embedded in social life. Life in society, literally
from the craddle to the grave, inevitably involves actions being exercised on others
actions (Smart, 2002).
1 Assistant Professor, Istanbul Yıldız Technical University, Dept. of Political Science, Barbaros Bulvari
Istanbul Turkey. Part-time Instructor, Istanbul Bogazici(Bosphorus University) Dept of Literature, PK
189 Beyoglu Istanbul. E-mail: asli.daldal boun.edu.tr, Telephone: 905324060673
150 Review of History and Political Science, Vol. 2(2), June 2014
Antoni Gramsci on the other hand had a “nuanced” notion of power and
believed that power operated mostly at the level of mutual interactions of culture
economy and politics within the realm of a “hegemonic” discourse (Jones, 2006). In
this paper, a comparative analysis of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci's
conceptions of "power and ideology" will be attempted. In the first part of the paper
Gramsci's philosophy will be elaborated with special reference to Machiavelli and
Althusser. In the second part the Foucauldian perspective will be analysed with the
aim of finding the major points of convergence and divergence between the two.
I. GRAMSCI
Gramsci was a devoted Marxist and the founder of the Italian Communist
Party (PCI). He was, thus, literally "a man of action". As an intellectual leader he
participated in the mass proletarian movements during the first world war, and
afterwards he involved heavily in Italian politics as a member of the PCI. It is not
surprising therefore to find in Gramsci an action oriented political philosophy based
mostly on the political developments of his era. He was concerned with the empirical
as well as theoretical problems of communism; especially with its failure or non
realization in the western world. In that sense the questions of power and ideology
also have an empirical basis in Gramsci and can be found in the realm of "politique
reelle". Here comes the influence of Machiavelli for Gramsci and the basis of his
conception of power embedded in "the relations of force". Power resides in the
complex relations of force within society. It is present and observable; it is real. This
power is mainly exerted by the dominant bourgeois class through the medium of
ideology: by working on the popular mentality via the institutions of civil society and
thus establishing a hegemony using the State apparatuses. In Gramsci's conception
then power, ideology and the philosophy of action(praxis) are inseparable.
A. Machiavelli and the Relations of Force
Gramsci’s admiration of Macchiavelli stems primarily from the fact that the
latter theorized no utopia. Gramsci says that Macchiavelli combined the utopias of his
time and scholarly treatise in an artistic and imaginative fashion in the person of a
Prince (condottiore) which represents the collective will (Gramsci 1980, 125).
Machiavelli simply represents the processes to direct this collective will into political
action. In his book, Macchiavelli discusses how a Prince should be if he really existed,
to lead its people and found a new State.
Asli Daldal 151
This Prince is of course a symbolic construct and can be replaced by any

modern formation (such as the political party in Gramsci’s conception) to fulfill its
tasks. According to Gramsci the modern Prince-the political party-has two main
functions: First to formulate a national-popular collective will which he organizes and
expresses at the same time and to realize intellectual and moral reforms (Gramsci,
133). Thus for Gramsci, the modern Prince’s basic task is to formulate and guide a
“collective will” in the autonomous activity of politics.
The concept of will is recurrent in the writings of Gramsci. This will is the
basis of all political action and can be meanigful only when it is the will of the many
or in other words, the collective will. He says that will is the operative awareness of
historical necessity, a "protagonist of a real and effective historical drama"(Gramsci,
130). This means that history evolves through meaningful and willful acions of men.
Gramsci has a peculiar voluntarism which puts voluntary actions of men before
scientific laws and "positivist fatalism". Gramsci is very much against this philosophic
positivism which he thinks,"makes social energies abstracted from man and from
will, incomprehensible and absurd"(Gramsci 1975, 41). But Gramsci's voluntarism-if
it is approriate to call it as such-is only meaningful when this will is a collective will.
Gramsci clearly rejects the kind of voluntarism advanced by Thomas Carlyle who
talks about “heroes or supermen that make history”(Bossche, 2002).Voluntarism or
Garibaldism-as Gramsci uses it-is in fact a word with negative connotations for
Gramsci. He says that one must struggle against the “false heroisms” and "pseudo-
aristoracies", and stimulate the formation of homogeneous, compact social
blocs(Gramsci 1980, 204). In one of his articles in "II Grido del Popolo" he puts his
vision of voluntarism and collective action as such:
"Voluntarism? The word is meaningless, or it is used to mean arbitrariness.

Will, in the marxist sense, means consciousness of the ends, which in turn means an
exact notion of one's own power and the means to express this in action. Thus it
means, first of all, making a distinction, the identification of a class. It means a
political life independent from the other class: a compact organization disciplined
towards its own specific goals, without deviation or hesitation."(Gramsci 1975, 11)
Thus for Gramsci, voluntary action and the will of man is only meaningful when it is
the collective will of the many or more precisely, it is the compact will of a class. The
will generates power of action only when it is the united, coherent will of a class.
Going back to Machiavelli, Gramsci saw in him a strategist who talks about
immediate political actions devoid of moral or religious preoccupations. Machiavelli
bases itself on the concrete, observable action of man. "Machiavelli brings everything
back to politics, the art of governing men, founding Great States"(Gramsci, 249). For
Gramsci though, the first element of politics is that there are always rulers and ruled,
leaders and led. "The entire science and art of politics are based on this primordial
and irreducible fact"(Gramsci, 144). Thus Gramsci is not after doing away with
power relations in the political life of men. Neither does he conceive of politics as
being capable of perfect equality. Some will always dominate; a binary relation of
power will always persist.
Gramsci borrowed from Machiavelli the idea that power relations are
embedded in the relations of force. He developed this conception to arrive at a three-
dimensional power relations that can be distinguished in those relations of force in
the society:
1. A relation of social forces independent of human will i.e. social classes which have
specific functions in the production process.
2. A relation of political forces. This refers to the degree of homogeneity, self-
consciousness, and politicization of the social classes. There are various degrees of
this self-consciousness from simple awareness of subjective and immediate
interests to the point where one becomes conscious of his objective, class interests.
Nevertheless this is not automatic and requires an intellectual and moral unity
(primary problematique in Gramsci's theory of hegemony).
3. A relation of military forces. Gramsci also terms it "politico-military" forces as he
gives it the example of State's military forces. This refers to the oppressive
apparatus of the State (Gramsci 1980, 180-183).
Thus Gramsci posits in his power conception a three-dimensional network

within the society which consists of relations of force between social classes, upon
and around man's self-awareness, and against State's politico-military apparatuses.
B. Philosohy and Ideology
"All men are philosophers". That's how Gramsci starts his analysis of
philosophical thinking. All men are "spontaneous philosophers" as long as they have
specific categories to express themselves in their daily lives.
Asli Daldal 153
But some people may reach the most advanced thought in the world if they can
differentiate between "common" and "good" sense. This differentiation between
common and good sense is present in most of Gramsci's work. Roughly speaking,
"common sense" means for Gramsci" the incoherent set of generally held assumptions
and belief common to any society"(Gramsci, 323), while "good sense" is "the
philosophy of criticism and the superseding of religion and common sense"
(Gramsci,326). How can one reach this "good sense" and the most advanced thought
in the world? According to Gramsci one must learn to think coherently and critically.
In other words, the episodic and haphazard way of producing mental labour is a waste
of man's intellectual energy. Gramsci insists on coherence and criticism as the only way
for avoiding conformism. The emphasis Gramsci puts on "unity and coherence''(as in
the case of formation of the collective will) in philosophical thought is apparent here.
An other important aspect of philosophy for Gramsci is that philosophy and

politics-political action-are inseparable. He says that philosophy cannot be divorced
from politics because,
"...a social group may have its conception of the world...but this same group
has for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception
which is not its own . and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be
following it, becaue this is the conception which follows in normal times...This is
when the conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and
subordinate"(Gramsci, 327).
This passage also throws some light on Gramsci's conception of "common

sense'. It is basically an ideological construct which is accepted by all-even
contradictory-segments of the society because it is the discourse that follows in
“normal times".
The diagnosis and the critique of the"common sense” is at the heart of

Gramsci's "philosophy of praxis". "It must be a criticism of the common sense
basing itself however initially on common sense to demonstrate that all men are
philosophers. . .and making critical an already existing activity"(Gramsci, 331). We
said at the beginning that Gramsci is a man of action and is mainly concerned with
the empirical as well as theoretical problems of communism.
The philosophy of praxis can be seen as an extension of Marxist-Leninist

tradition which tried to put socialism on a non-utopian, materialist basis. Gramsci's
theories are formulated to be put into action. In otherwords there must be a unity of
theory and practice which he terms as "praxis". Unification of theory and practice
can be realized only in the sphere of ideologies. One must be able to develop a
critical understanding of self, must be aware of his being part of a hegemonic force
to "arrive to a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice
will finally be one"(Gramsci, 333). Thus the philosophy of praxis is practicable only
in the sphere of relations of political forces; in otherwords only with the condition of
an advanced political consciousness. The aim of political philosophy (action) is to
lead a cultural battle "to transform the popular mentalities and to diffuse the
philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be historically
true"(Gramsci, 348). This shows that the battle the intellectual should lead must be
upon the mentality of average men; his way of conceving the truth. The existence of
an objective and absolute truth in a Platonic sense that is to be discovered and taught
to the masses is apparent in Gramsci. The test for the objectivity of the truth is the
extent that it becomes historically and socially universal.
Gramsci owes certainly much of his insights to previous Italian thinkers. One
of them is Croce and the position taken up by Croce in analysing philosophy and
ideology is duplicated in Gramsci's work. In both analysis "philosphy and ideology
finally become one and philosopy is revealed as nothing other than a practical
instrument for organization and action"(Gramsci, 270). In Gramsci ideology was
historically an aspect of "sensationalism". The origins of ideas could only be
sensations. But sensationalism could easily be associated with religious faith and
extreme beliefs in the "power of the Spirit". Thus the"science of ideas" shifted its
meaning to "system of ideas".
For Gramsci ideology itself must be analysed historically, in the terms of the
philosophy of praxis, as a supestructure (Gramsci, 376). At this point Gramsci goes on
to elaborate the Marxist conception of ideology while at the same time criticizing it.
He mainly criticizes the negative meaning assumed by the marxists in terms of the
potentials of ideology, that ideology is useless and it can have no determining effects
on structural relations. On the contrary, as long as ideologies are accepted as
historical necessities to organize and direct human masses, they have a psychological
validity and determine the consciousness of men and this determination may have a
long lasting effect vis a vis the structural relations. This can be accepted as a major
contribution of Gramsci to traditional Marxism.
Asli Daldal 155
He systematized what Marx put forward when he talked about the forces of
popular beliefs and saw the ideology and the superstructural relations as more or less
independent arenas of struggle; or in other words not easily reducible to the conflicts
at the structural level.
To throw some light to the power and functioning of ideology in Gramsci, it

may be useful to consider briefly Gramsci's conception of man which can give us
some clues on the ontological basis of his theory. For Gramsci there is no definite
human nature. Man is the "complex of social relations". Thus man is not static, it
changes with the social relations, it becomes. This becoming does not start from unity
but goes towards unity. The humanity found in each individual is composed of three
elements: l.the individual himself; 2.other men; 3.the natural world. These are not
mechanical; they are active and conscious:
"One can change himself, modify himself to the extent that he changes and
modifies the complex relations of which he is the hub. In this sense the real
philosopher cannot be other than the politician who modifies the ensemble of these
relations...To create one's personality means to acquire consciousness of them...But
this is not simple.To be conscious of them already modifies them. Even the necessary
relations in so far as they are known to be necessary take on a different aspect. In that
sense knowledge is power (Gramsci, 352-53).2 Power in Gramscian analysis resides in
ideology. Or in other words, to be conscious of the complex social network-
hegemonic forces-within which an individual realizes himself already generates power.
Once a social group is able to modify the ensemble of these relations and make it
"common sense", it is creating a hegemonic order.
C. Hegemony and the State
Life experiences played an important role in the making of Gramsci's political

philosophy. The experience of fascism supported by much of the working-class is one
of those important experiences which pushed him to revise the Marxist-Leninist
theory of State, adding some new concepts such as "the bourgeois hegemony in civil
society".
2Here we find again some traces of Plato. Gramsci has a conception of unity and coherence of the
social totalities paraliel to the man's soul, akin to Plato's justice in the State.
Gramsci defines the State as "the entire compex of practical and theoretical
activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains it dominance, but
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules"(Carnoy 1986, 65).
For Gramsci the State has basically an "educative" and "formative" function. This
educative function of the State-later adopted and expanded by Althusser-serves to
create new and higher types of civilzations. It trains people to adapt the morality and
mentality of the masses to the logic of the production process. The main
problematique of the State is to incorporate the will of each single individual into the
collective will turning their necessary consent and collaboration from "coercion" to
"freedom"(Gramsci 1980, 242). This means that the State functions so as to create
"conformist" citizens who internalize the most restrictive aspects of the "civil life",
and accept them as their natural "duties" without having any resentment. The major
instrument of the State in creating the new type of civilization and disseminating
certain attitudes is the Law.
But this Law -in a Foucauldian terminology- does not only repress and restrict
but also produces and rewards. It reinforces those "praise-worthy" activities of the
citizens just as it punishes criminal actions. In that sense the Law operates mostly at
the supertructural level. (Gramsci, 247). From this positive, productive conception of
Law stems the importance of the "civil society" and its relatedness to the public
sphere. Those instiutions of "civil society" (i.e. school, church, cultural media etc), do
not fail within the restrictive domain of the Law. Neverheless they are still operated
by the Law as the quality and the range of their activities, in other words their "raison
d'etre" is determined by it.
Gramsci classifies the activities of those civil instiutions as "legally neutral".

But nevertheless he goes on to assert that, "they operate without sanctions or
compulsory obligations but still exerts a collective pressure...and obtains objective
results in the evolution of customs, ways of thinking, morality etc."(Gramsci, 242).
According to Gramsci, the evolution of the civil society coincides with the
colonial expansion of Europe. After 1870 internal and international mechanisms of
State became more complex and massive and the classical weapons of the oppressed
classes became obsolete. The element of movement (the takeover of the restrictive
State apparatus) is now only partial with respect to the massive sructures of the
modern democracies and associations of civil society. The bourgeoisie did something
that other dominant classes in previous historical stages did not: to expand and
enlarge its sphere of domination ideologically.
Asli Daldal 157
It assimilated the entire social network to its cultural and economic ideology.
The bourgeoisie used the State apparatus to realize this ideological domination. But
the State apparatus, this time, did not only serve to protect and promote the
economic interests of the dominant class as is constantly assumed by the orthodox
Marxists. It operated on the superstructural level to create a "common sense" in
congruence with the necessity of the new production system. Although at the last
instance all of these opeartions have material basis in the necessities of the capitalist
production process, the State through the bourgeois hegemony in civil society
launched an independent ideological "war" (very successful indeed) to penetrate the
consciousness of ordinary man.
To repeat, this hegemony in Gramscian terms means "the ideological

predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes which
accept them as “normal"(Carnoy 1986, 66). In analysing the concept of hegemony, we
have to differentiate between two levels of the State: the civil and political society.
The civil society refers to those institutions which seem to be private(outside the
sphere of the State control) and political society is what we ordinarily calls the
State(with all its juridico-military repressive apparatuses). But as it was said above the
civil society in fact is not outside the domain of the State, because it is created and
operated by the same bourgeois Law. The only difference is that the institutions of
the political society fail within the "coercive", "punitive" aspectsof the Law, whereas
the organisms of civil society constitutes in a Foucauldian terminology the "positive",
"productive" aspects of the same bourgeois Law.
To put it in an other way, the civil society is the mecanism of domination

which functions through "consensus" whereas the political society functions through
"force". The major contribution of Gramsci to Marxist thought is that he developed
the idea that without having the consensus of the masses, inother words, without
winning “the ideolgical battle", the control of the means of production or the
repressive apparatus of the State is futile.
"Gramsci raised man's thought(consciousness) to a newly prominent place in

the philosophy of praxis. Control of consciousness is as much or more an arena of
political struggle as the control of the forces of production"(Carnoy, 75). Three words
can be said to summarize Gramsci's notion of power: Power is ideology.
D. A Materialist Conception of Ideology: Althusser
Gramsci's notion of the relative independence of ideology as an arena of

struggle and its determining effects on man's political consciousness was later taken
up and elaborated by Althusser. Althusser, in a way, systematized what was implicit in
Gramsci. He based ideology on social formations and the dissemination of the
particular bourgeois ideology on the Ideological State Apparatuses(a more broadened
and massive conception of civil society).
Althusser developed the most essential points of his analysis in his famous
essay "Ideology and The State's Ideological Apparatuses". For Althusser, in order to
perpetuate a mode of production, it is not sufficient to renew the means of
production; what is necessary indeed, is a reproduction of the conditions of
production. A social formation must in the first instance create the conditions for the
reproduction of: a. the forces of production and b.the relations of production. In
other words, the material reproduction of the tools to transform the nature is not
sufficient; there must be a "material reproduction of those" who use the tools as well.
That means "reproduction at the domain of ideas", ideological reproduction.
Althusser's most important contribution-if we can call it as such-to

Gramscian concept of ideology and his biggest originality as a philosopher is this
"materialization" of ideology.
Ideology is not what Marx called in his "German Ideology" a dream-like

concept which is meaningless and negative vis a vis the relations of production.
Ideology is real, it determines the way a human being acts, thinks, produces. That is
the reason why ideology is "material"; it is directly linked to the production process. It
is the moral, mental incitement of men to produce in a certain fashion. Those means
through which an ideology is materialized are what Althusser calls "Ideological State
Apparatuses". An ideology is always present both at the level of apparatuses and their
practices; this presence, is as we said, material (Althusser, 2014).
The concept of "Ideological State Apparatuses"-where and by means of

which an ideology is materialized-is similar to Gramscian notion of civil society. But
Althusser analyses them in a more rigorous and schematic fashion and assigns to
them "the" most important function in the reproduction of the system. Parallel to
Gramsci, Althusser explicitly differentiates beetwen State's repressive and ideological
apparatuses.
Asli Daldal 159
The repressive apparatus of the State-which was wrongly conceived as the

only form of State by Marx-consists of what Gramsci called "political society" i.e. the
Government, Army, Police, Courts, Prisons ete. They have "coercive" power over
masses. The Idelogical State Apparatuses on the other hand uses "ideological" power
to voluntarily submit masses. This voluntary submission requires the use of the
"mechanisms of discipline" in a Foucauldian sense to assure the "docility" and
"conformity" of people. These mechanisms of internal discipline are mostly used
within the school system and the family. Those are in fact the most important
ideological apparatuses of the State. Althusser sees the educational system -again in
line with Gramsci-as the most powerful ISA. The novelty of Althusser in formulating
his theory of "ISA" is his strong emphasis on "family" as an ideological apparatus of
the State. This can be partly explained by the importance Althusser accords to the
family in the ideological subjugation of individuals through "disciplinary
mechanisms"(child education as they call). An other reason for Althusser's emphasis
on family may be the role of the latter-together with the school and other ISA-in the
"subjectification"(mental enslavement) of individuals: the metaphysical death of man.
In contrast to Gramsci's emphasis on will as the basis of all philosopical

actions, Althusser totally rejecs the existence of an independent human will that can
function outside the superstructural(ideological) determinants. In that sense, he
metaphorically kills the man-a century after Nietzche had killed "the God".
Althusser's rejection of humanism stems from his conception of ideology.
Ideology is not the mental reflection of man's interacion with the reality. It is
the mental reflection of only man's fictious interaction with the reality. Thus man is
constantly living-in a Platonic sense-in a world of "doxas" and is not capable of
grasping the truth as in Plato's "allegory of the cave". But for Althusser this
imprisonment in the cave of doxas(ideologies) is perpetual as "man by his nature is an
ideological animal". Man can never be a free individual; by his nature he is bound to
remain a "subject" of some ideology. The ideas of man as he conceives and expresses
them are the material contructs of some ideological apparatus and are defined by the
rituals of that apparatus (Althusser, 2014). In Martin Carnoy's words: "Ideology
recognizes individuals as subjects, subjects them to the "subject" of ideology itself (i.e.
God, Capital, the State ete.), guaantees that everything is "really" so, and that on the
condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly,
everything will be all right"(Carnoy 1986, 92).
In a Foucauldian terminology then-though very antithetical to Foucault-

"ideology is everywhere" for Althusser.
II. Michel Foucault
Gramsci was basically coming from the Marxist tradition which would "at the
last instance" take everything back to the production relations. Eventhough he
assigned a relative independence to the superstructural elements and put the
hegemony of the bourgeois civil society at the core of his analysis, he was
nevertheless a follower of Marx in the sense that he tried to base his analysis on a
broader political theory; to that of Marx's. Michel Foucault, the "unclassifiable"
famous french historian, on the other hand, chose Nietzche rather than Marx as his
point of departure. Foucault mainly borrowed from Nietzche his "genealogy of
morals". For Foucault, Nietzche "is the philosopher of power, a philosopher who
managed to think of power without having to confine himself within a political
theory"(Foucault 1980, 53). Foucault rejected the notion of a centralized scientific
discourse. Through the use of "genealogy" (deconstruction of the theoretical, formal,
unitary scientific discourse), he tried to eliminate the scientific hierarchization of
knowledge and promote what he calls "local knowledge".
Foucault's main question was to "theorize power". Paraphrasing Giddens we

can say that Foucault, like Nietzche, "put power before truth".
Power is everywhere and man cannot escape from the complex relations of
power that make up the society. In the following paragraphs I will try to elaborate
Foucault’s conception of power and ideoloy vis a vis Gramsci and try to find their
points of convergence-if there are any. Suffice is to say at the beginning that both
were admirers of Machiavelli. Foucault like Gramsci adopted Machiaveli's concept of
"relations of force" to do away with the system of Law-and-Sovereign. But Foucault
went one step further. He tried to eliminate all conceptions of "fundamental source
of power" Says Foucault:
"It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the
mechanisms of power… And if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few who
conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to
go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power
mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force
relationships"(Foucault 1978, 97).
Asli Daldal 161
This is the basic difference between Foucault and Gramsci that we should
keep in mind in starting our analysis: Gramsci is a Marxist and does in fact locate
power in some centralized agency while Foucault "dares" to follow the Nietzchean
tradition and diffuses power relations into the "very grains of individuals".
A. Why Study Power? The Subject and Power
Foucault hardly talks about the "why" of power. He is generally concerned

with the "how" of power and concentrates on "bringing to light power relations,
locating their position, finding out point of applications and methods used"
(Foucault, 211). Nevertheless all his laborius research on power has a goal: to
decipher the way man is being turned into a subject through power relations.
Contrary to Althusser's almost totalizing view of human nature which makes man a
perpetual subject of some ideological construct, Foucault tries to locate the "modes
of objectification which transforms human beings into subjects"(Foucault, 208) to
formulate some points of resistance. Those three modes of objectifications which
forms the basis of Foucault's inquiry are:
1. The objectification of man in the so called scientific paradigms. That includes the
objectification of the producing subject; i.e. the man who labours as a locus of
scientific analysis.
2. The objectification of man in "dividing practices" such as the mad and the sane,
the criminal and the innocent etc.
3. The self-subjectivizing of man. How man learns to call himself as the subject of
some practice (i.e. sexual subject). This mode of objectivizing is very similar to
Althusser's general theory of "ideology-subject":
"This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which

categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his
own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which
others have recognized in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals
subjects"(Foucault, 212).
The forms of resistance against those objecivizing power relations are

generally in the form of "anti-authority" struggles.
These resistances (which are everywhere just like the power relations) aim at
asserting to man the right to be different. For Foucault, man can become an
"individual". As long as he can be conscious of those power relations (which he
generally is, as consciousness is not a major concern for Foucault) he can resist them.
In that sense, Foucault is a "humanist" -in an Althussserian perspective-as he gives
weight to human will, and the capacity to avoid those objectivizing power relations.
According to Foucault, there are historically three types of struggles: struggle

against exploitation, domination, and subjection. Although all of them are present in
today's social system, struggle against subjection has become more important. The
reason why this kind of struggle emerged in the society can be explained by the
emergence of the Bourgeois State in the 16th century. Obviously, Foucault separates
the struggle against domination and subjection from the "major contradiction" in
society, that is exploitation. He treats them as if they were completely independent
categories. In his analysis of struggle against subjection, Foucault for the first-and the
last- time defines the State as a central source of power. He maintains that today the
State has both totalizing and individualizing power. Similar to Gramscian theory of
hegemony, Foucault says that the Western State has integrated old techniques of
power from Christianity.
One of the most important aspects of this-as Foucault calls-"pastoral" power

is that "it cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without
exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It is linked
with a production of truth, the truth of the individual himself"(Foucault, 214).
In fact Foucault implicitly follows the same line of argument in the "History
of Sexuality" where he shows how a new political ordering of life was possible
through the medicalization of sex as it became a concern for the State because of the
need for "infinitestimal surveillance" of individuals and a particular "economy" of the
body. Conscious or not, when he talks about this "totalizing" power of the State
which tries to produce a peculiar regime of truth, Foucault almost duplicates
Gramsci's theory of Hegemonic civil society and Althusser's "ISA". What he talks
about is mere "ideology"- although Foucault would definitely not call it as such-
centered around the State's non-repressive apparatus. I believe that Foucault's
deliberate choice of avoiding such terminology is linked to his wish to break up with
the "all pervasive" para-Marxist approaches of his era and his confusion and/or lack
of an adequate political theory concerning the State.
Asli Daldal 163
B. The Repressive Hypothesis and the State
What is said above needs some elaboration. Leaving the question of ideology
aside for the time being, let's focus on Foucault's conception of State. First of all
Foucault is not a "political scientist" in the Gramscian sense. It means that he is not
particularly interested in devising an all comprehensive theory of State. Nevertheless
one can see in almost all the works of Foucault some concern with the State. He
often remarks-as we will see below-that it is wrong to locate power in the State
apparatus, meaning that power shouldn't be equated with "Law and repression". This
means that the "State" as such means for Foucault in a Weberian sense an entity with
a legitimate power of coercion.
What Foucault describes here is what Gramsci would call "political society".
At the "discursive level" Foucault seems to equate the State only with the "political
society" and thus rejects the notion of repressive power located in the State.
But as we showed at the end of the previous section, when one carefully reads
Foucault, it becomes obvious that the State has some other kinds of power (as he
calls "pastoral") in the society to assure the disciplinary normalization of individuals,
establishing a network of control through the medicalization of the body and so
forth, that Foucault for some obscure reason, prefers not to explicitly include in his
"treatment" of State.
Thus, when Foucault says that “to put it (power) in terms of the State means
to continue posing it in terms of Law and sovereignty" what he has in mind is only
the repressive apparatus of the State(i.e. Army, police, penal institutions etc).But it is
apparent from Foucault's own writings that the State is much more than this: it needs
the soul of its citizens to create a regime of truth that can not be done through
coercion. Therefore we shouldn't think that what Foucault says is basically different
from that of Gramsci. Gramsci is also against the mere use of "the repressive
hypothesis" that is the political society as a locus of power. But he explicitly includes
in his description of the State those institutions of civil society that truly diffuse
power and creates regimes of truth... This subtile analysis is delibarately lacking in
Foucault. Thus we should see that as long as "the repressive hypothesis" is concerned
Foucault and Gramsci converge. The difference is not one of content but only of
terminology.
The repressive hypothesis for Foucault has to do with equating power only
with repression, punishment, coercion; with the sovereign person of the King-whose
head hadn't been cut off yet. This juridico-discursive conception of power only
establishes negative power relations. It insists on the rules, it prohibits, and
censors(Foucault 1978, 83-85). Foucault says that as long as power is located in the
State apparatus(see the remarks above) it will be conceived as negative and repressive:
"To pose the problem in terms of the State means to continue posing it in
terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law. If one describes all
these phenomena of power dependent on the State apparatus, this means grasping
them as essentially repressive… State is superstructural in a whole series of power
networks (what then creates them? Shall we take them as God-given?) that invest the body,
sexuality, the family, knowledge, technology etc.."(Foucault 1980, 122).
Foucault rejects the idea of concentration of power in the State. He says that
the "spirit of Hobbes' Leviathan is dead". Power is not localized in the State apparatus
and "that nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function
outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and
everyday level are not also changed"(Foucault, 60). That's what Gramsci also means:
the control of the political society changes nothing, the hegemonic institutions within
the civil society (what Foucault calls "mechanisms of power on a much more minute
and everyday level") must also be done away with.
C. Power and Ideology
The concept of power is everywhere in Foucault's analyses as well as in his

theory. He defines power as "the name that one attributes to a complex strategical
situation in a particular society; power is not an institution, and not a structure;
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with... "(Foucault 1978, 93). Power is
"omnipresent". It comes from everywhere and is produced every moment. Similar to
Gramsci, Foucault also sees power as a relation of force that only exists in action.
Power intrinsic to those relations of force has some basic features:
1. Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared; it is exercised from

many different points.
2. Power relations are not exterior to other relations(i.e. economic). Relations of
power are not superstructural.
Asli Daldal 165
3. Power comes from below; there is no binary opposition between the rulers and
the ruled.
4. Power relations are both intentional and non subjective. There is no power
without aim and objective but there are no "headquarters" of power either
(Foucault, 94).
Foucault's basic difference from Gramsci is that the latter saw power relations
in terms of binary oppositions(such as the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled
etc.). For Gramsci as well, power can only be discovered in the relations of force
within the society bu it is localized in some points(in the symbolic persona of the
Prince). For Foucault though, power as well as the resistance it generates are diffused
and not localized in some points.
In formulating his "theory of power" Foucault sets for himself some

methodological constraints. He prefers to start analysing power from the points
where it produces its real effects. In other words he engages in an "ascending"
analysis of power. Foucault separates ideology from the analysis of power. He
maintains that power puts into circulation apparatuses of knowledge which are not
ideological constructs (Foucault, 102). This is the major point of divergence between
Gramsci and Foucault: While Gramsci sees power as directly linked to the ideological
hegemony of the dominant classes, Foucault separates the apparatuses of knowledge
that power creates from ideology. We will now try to elaborate this point.
We should first start by analysing what Foucault means by "ideology".

According to Foucault, ideology is a level of "speculative discourse" that cannot
explain the great technologies of power:
"....The philosophy of the ideologists as a theory of signs and the individual

genesis of sensations, but also a theory of the social composition of interests-ldeology
being a doctrine of apprenticeship, but also a doctrine of contracts and the regulated
formation of the social body-no doubt constituted the abstract discourse in which
one sought to coordinate these two techniques of power in order to construct a
general theory of it. In point of fact however, they (bio-power and discipline) were
not to be joined at the level of a speculative discourse, but in the form of concrete
arrangements..."(Foucault, 140).
Ideology for Foucault is not in the realm of material realities. It is an

abstraction. Foucault sees ideology in an "anachronic" way; he delibaretly uses the
categories of the 18th century thinkers who defined ideology as the "siences of ideas".
It is drastically different from Althusser's conception of ideology as having material
roots within the social formations. Thus for Foucault an abstract notion such as
ideology can not explain the real effects of power relations in the society.
An other important point in Foucault's treatment of ideology is the

importance he accords to the effects of power on the body. The power exerted over
the body is more real than the power to transform-in theGramscian sense- the
popular mentalities. Says Foucault:
"...As regards Marxism, l'm not one of those who try to elicit the effects of
power at the level of ideology. Indeed I wonder whether before one poses the
guestion of ideology, it wouldn't be more materialist to study first the question of the
body and the effects of power on it. Because what troubles me with those analyses
which prioritise ideology is that there is always a presupposed human subject
endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize on" (Foucault
1980, 58).
Thus for Foucault there is no human subject whose consciousness is more

prone to the effects of ideological power than is his body to the effects of physical
force. The production of the "knowledge" of the body is more of a mastery for
conquering the individual. What Foucault calls the "political technology of the body"
operates micro-physics of power around the bodies to subjugate man(Foucault 1995,
26). The road to man's soul passes from his flesh and bones rather than his mind.
Conclusion
In this paper I tried to analyse Foucault's and Gramsci's conceptions of power

and ideology on a comparative perspective. The major points of this comparative
analysis can be summarized as follows:
Both Gramsci and Foucault make use of Machiavelli's notion of "relations of

force".They therefore diffuse the power relations to the complex mechanisms of
society. They try to implement a "positive analysis" of power. Power is not only a
negative conception; power produces. In the case of Gramsci power produces
ideology(and vica versa) and for Foucault power produces apparatuses of knowledge.
Asli Daldal 167
Therefore they both minimizes the hypothesis that State's mechanisms of

repression are the only generator of power. Although Foucault, in his explicit analysis
totally rejects the State as a source of power, he still talks about the pastoral power of
the State as a form totalizing power. In that sense his treatment of the State is not
remote to that of Gramsci's civil society.
Gramsci and Foucault basically diverge at their treatment of ideology. While

for Gramsci to have access to people's consciosness is an enormous power and in
that sense power is ideology, for Foucault ideology is an "abstraction" that cannot
explain the real effects of power in society.
Foucault gives almost no importance to the mental enslavement of people.

What counts in objectivizing individuals is the power exerted on people's bodies.
Contrary to Gramsci, Foucault puts emphasis to the particular technology of power
that produces knowledge on people's body.
References
Althusser, Louis (2014). On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses. London: Verso Books.
Carlyle, Thomas. (2002) Historical Essays ed. by Chris Vanden Bossche University of
California Press.
Carnoy, Martin.(1986) The State and Political Theory. Cambridge Univ Press.
Gramsci, Antonio. (1975) History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci ed. by
Pedro Cavalcanti and Paul Piccone. Telos Press.
Gramsci, Antonio.(1980) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 6th ed. London: Wishart
Publications.
Foucault, Michel. (1995). Discipline and Punish 2nd ed. New-York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, Michel. (1980) Power/Knowedqe ed. by Colin Gordon. New-York: Pantheon
Books.
Foucault, Michel. (1978) The Historv of Sexuality. New-York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, Michel. (1983) " Subject and Power" in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainow Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Steven. (2006) Antonio Gramsci. London: Routledge.
Smart, Barry. (2002) Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments. Routledge.
ISSN: 2349-2147
Modern
Research
Studies
Editor-in-Chief
Gyanabati Khuraijam
An International Title: Perspectives of Kautilya’s Foreign Policy: An

Journal of Ideal of State Affairs
Humanities and Social
Sciences Author/s: SATISH KARAD
An Indexed & Refereed e-Journal
www.modernresearch.in
Volume 2, Issue 2
pp. 322–332.
June 2015
Disclaimer: The views expressed in the articles/contributions published in the journal are
solely the author’s. They do not represent the views of the Editors.
Email: editor@modernresearch.in
mrsejournal@gmail.com Managing Editor: Yumnam Oken Singh
ISSN: 2349-2147
Modern Research Studies:
An International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
Perspectives of Kautilya’s Foreign Policy: An Ideal of

State Affairs
SATISH KARAD
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Indraraj Arts Commerce and Science College
Aurangabad, India
Abstract: Arthashastra is one of the prototypical treatises on the

political science and ‘realpolitik’. It offers a very comprehensive and
detailed account of foreign policy in order to conquer the world. Author
of this great text is Kautilya the wise minister and key political adviser
of Chandragupta Maurya and also of his son Bindusara in ancient India
at about 300 B.C.E. His doctrine of foreign policy deals with the desire
of an ambitious king to become world conqueror or world emperor. He
reproduced the ancient political wisdom of India in the more pragmatic
fashion. The Mandala theory is at the core of Kautilya’s
conceptualization of state affairs, which is the theory of omnipotence.
The fascinating discussions on Rajmandala i.e. ‘the circle of
kingdoms’, on the theory of Shadguna, i.e. sixfold policy or six
measures, and on diplomacy, amazingly encompasses almost all of the
aspects of foreign policy, which can be found relevant even today.
Keywords: Kautilya, foreign policy, Mandala, Shadguna, realpolitik.
Introduction
Kautilya’s Arthasastra is one of the greatest compositions on
political science in ancient world. It is the book of political realism
which explains how the political world works actually, than that of it
ought to be. It continues to recommend even immoral, burtal and cruel
Modern Research Studies: ISSN 2349-2147

http://www.modernresearch.in Vol.2. Issue 2 / June 2015 322
Satish Karad – Perspectives of Kautilya’s Foreign Policy: An Ideal of State Affairs
means to preserve own state and the prosperity of its subjects. At Long
before the realistic discussions of Machiavelli, Kautilya as the first
great political realist (Boesche 2003, 5) who was the chief adviser to the
Chandragupta Maurya, who united the India and subcontinent in the
form of great empire at around 300 BCE?, and at the same time
Kautilya wrote his Arthasastra, rendered as a “science of politics”
(Kangle 1965, 1). Kautilya had admitted the sources, meaning and
content of this shastra in the very beginning lines of book as,
“Arthasastra is composed by the earlier teachers for the acquisition and
protection of the earth and this book is nothing but the compilation of
the knowledge of those predecessors” (1.1.1).1 It is quite clear from this
verse that Arthasastra has two fold aims: (1) Preservation of state
means internal security and general wellbeing of subjects by good
governance and by the law and order; (2) Acquisition of the territories
from others by expansion through excellent code of foreign policy. This
text contains 15 books, 150 chapters and 180 sections, along with 6000
slokas. Out of these books, the first 5 books deal with internal
administration i.e. Tantra; and the next 8 books are concerned with the
foreign policy i.e Avaap; while remaining two are miscellaneous in
nature. As per some modern realists foreign policy is “unregulated
competition of states in which the parameter of the success is
strengthening the state” (Waltz 1979, 117); also it is “struggle for
power” (Morgenthau 1985, 195). It is often to very fair to say, in the
sphere of international politics, end justifies the means where the
ultimate end is self-interest of the state. These basic principles of
political reality are grown side by side with the idealism at every stage
of development of political science. Idealism and realism are coincides
of the subject. Whereas the Greeks are pioneer of political philosophy,
Kautilya stands there as a first political realist.
Kautilya is an expansionist who advised not only the preservation of

the state but also to conquer territories of others. It is the Mandala
theory which is the basis of Kautilya’s foreign policy. In other words it
is a theory of world conquest. He has paved the way for Vijigishu i.e.
“the king who is desirous or aspirant to world conquest,” how to be a
1
All verse references are to The Kautilya Arthashastra, translated and edited by R.P.
Kangle.

Chakravartin i.e. world conqueror. This concept contemplated in this

Shastra does not necessarily imply the conquest of the whole world but
the region lying between the Himalaya in the north and the sea from
required sides (9.1.17-18). It denotes India. The Mandala theory is
based on the geopolitical and geo-strategic assumption that all
neighboring states are enemy and the enemy’s enemy is the natural ally.
This circle of kingdom includes 12 kings with explanations for their
probable types of interrelations.
In this text, foreign policy is mainly discussed from the standpoint

of Vijigishu and world conquest, and it is summed up with the
Shadguna theory i.e. “six fold policy or six measures of foreign policy.
Actually, this is like a formula to secure the competency of Vijigishu for
world conquest. This formula is associated with presupposed Mandala
theory. Shadguna theory consists of six strategic stances those can be
employed as per the demand of situation, and one who will use them
properly as right stance on the right time, would become a world
conqueror” (7.18.41-44). Along with these two core concepts Kautilya
suggested four more Upayas i.e. tactics, to overcome the enemy.
Kautilya argued that at any given moment a kingdom is in a state of
“decline, stability or advancement” and in the first two stages it has to
focus on defending itself by making alliances, solving internal
problems….in the last stage, if, however, a kingdom has a prosperous
economy, well populace, no calamities, strong leadership, is in a
position to conquest the neighboring states (Boesche 2003, 4).
Kautilya’s concept of state: a brief account

A.B. Keith is of the opinion that Kautilya “offers nothing that can
be regarded as serious theory of politics ….but there was intensive
study of the practical aspects of the government and of relations
between the states” (Keith, 1921, v). However, Arthashastra is not
about theoretical descriptions of the state, its origin, its functions, ideal
state, etc. even though it has some theoretical assumptions about the
state. Kautilya accepted the theory of origin of the state of his
predecessors that it is created by humans by contract (1.13.5-7). He has
provided some sort of speculation about the nature of the state, not
literally, but by indications, that, the state is a “socialist monarchy” with
centralized economy, good governance, welfare state and very

disciplined by law and order (Bosche 2003, 65). Kautilya also gives
primacy to religion (3.1.38-45); he even used religion as a mean to
accomplish political ends (10.3.30; 10.3.43; 13.1.7-8). To deal with
internal security problems and corruption he suggested establishing a
‘spy state’. Despite of all the realistic means or art of government he
preaches, his ultimate aim is the prosperity and well-being of the
subject. Thus he stated a very detailed account of duties of the king
toward its subjects; as a part, he proclaimed the king should be the kind
father of people and all his interests, happiness is not separated from
those of the subjects (1.19.34-47). This assumption is also in favor of
the king because it is necessary for legitimacy.
According to Ghoshal (1923), “Kautilya recognized the social

justice as also a mean to strengthen the state …which is in the king’s
interests” (144-145). At the starting of Book VI, Kautilya mentioned the
seven constituents of the state – The king, minister, country, fortified
city, treasury, army and the ally (6.1.1), out of which the king is of
highest importance but all are supposed to be functioning like different
limbs of an organism. They should work efficiently with highly
maintained co-ordination, because these are the fundamental elements
of the state’s power and of course, plays wide role in external affairs as
a “wise king who possesses the personal qualities, though ruling over
the small territories being united with the excellence of the constituent
elements (Prakritis) and conversant with Arthasastra does conquer the
entire earth, never loses” (6.1.18).
Foreign Policy
As a practical statesman and a realist, Kautilya realized that every
state acts in order to enhance its power and self-interest; therefore
moral, ethical or religious obligation does not have any scope in the
international politics. “War and peace are considered solely from the
point of view of the profit” (Dikshitar 1987, 15). Kautilya assumes that
every move of the king desirous for victory towards its ally or enemy
should have to be based on its own interests. As Bruce Rich says,
“Kautilya’s foreign policy was the ruthless realpolitik, intrigue and
deception… Kautilya cold blooded realism and treachery with some
remarkable enlightened policies” (121). Most scholars of political
history, especially Westerners, blame Kautilya for his so called immoral

recommendations in foreign policy. But at least he is honest with his

arguments and teachings, unlike those who are the idealist of daylight
and opportunist in the dark. The fault of Arthasastra, as that of
Machiavelli, lies in openly saying something that has always been
actually practiced by states everywhere” (Kangle 1965, part III, p. 282).
Was Kautilya immoral? The answer is obviously no! He just followed
principles which were actually in practice at inter-state level at that
time, and it is still being followed now. He “was unmoral not immoral;
unreligious, not non-religious, in his political teachings” (Sen 1920,
17).
Kautilya set the goal of foreign policy before the Vijigishu that it is
not mere preservation of the state but its expansion as well. It is the goal
of world conquest and pertaining to this goal he propounded the theory
of Mandala or circle of the states along with the six fold policy. The
king is suggested to follow the right means at the right time with the
flexible planning and complete determination. Kautilya preaches that
there is nothing like ethics and moral in foreign policy but the goal and
self-interest only; after all, end justifies the means.
Theory of Mandala i.e. Rajmandala i.e. Circle of the States

“For Kautilya, this principle of foreign policy – that nations act in
their political, economic and military self-interests was a timeless truth
of his science of politics or Arthshastra” (Bosche 2003, 78). Kautilya is
most famous for outlining the Mandala theory or the circle of the states
which consists of 12 kingdoms as –
1) Vijigishu: Desirous for or would be, world conqueror

2) Ari: whose territory is contagious to Vijigishu, is a natural enemy.
3) Mitra; it is ally of Vijigishu whose territory is immediately beyond
the enemy or ari.
4) Arimitra; enemies ally indirectly is enemy, who is immediate
beyond ally.
5) Mitra-Mitra : It is ally immediately beyond the enemy’s ally.
6) Ari Mitra-Mitra: It is ally of enemy’s ally situated at immediate
beyond Mitra –Mitra.
7) Parshnigraha: The enemy, in the rear of the Vijigishu. Means
Heal catcher when Vijigishu would be on the expedition in front.

8) Akranda: Vijugishu’s ally in the rear behind that of Parshnigraha.

9) Parshnigrahasara: enemy’s ally, The ally of Parshnigraha
behind Akranda .
10) Akrandsara: The ally of Akranda behind Parshnigrahasara,
ultimately an ally.
11) Madhyama: the Middle king with territory adjoining those of
Vijigishu and Ari and stronger than both.
12) Udasina: the kingdom lying outside or neutral and more powerful
than that of Vijigishu, Ari, and Madhyama. (6.2.13-22)
Kautilya explained further that there are four principal states –

Vijigishu, Ari, Madhyama and Udasina, each of these has an ally and
ally’s ally along with 5 material constituents each, thus making 12 kings
and 60 material constituents, conforms the circle of 72 elements in all
(6.2.24-27). These schemes are based on assumptions derived from the
practical experiences found everywhere that two neighboring states
sharing their borders are hostile to each other. And the hostile state to
the enemy i.e. the enemy’s enemy is a natural ally. The Vijigishu is
situated at exactly the centre of this circle. It does not give the fixed
account of the numbers of the kingdom in this mandala, but refers to a
number of possible relationships that may arise when Vijigishu would
be in the quest of suzerainty.
The neighboring princes, samantas may normally be supposed to be

hostile but it is possible that some may have friendly feeling toward the
Vijigishu, while others may even be subservient to him. Neighboring
states of this kind falls in three categories – Aribhavin, Mitrabhavin and
Bhrytbhavin the lasts are of course, vassals of vijigishu (Kangle 1965,
part III, p.250).
Mandala theory is the plan, the blueprint of the expedition with the
intention of world conquest because Kautilya believes in strength and
power. For him, “Power is the possession of strength” (6.2.30) and it is
in three forms: 1) Mantrashakti: power of Knowledge i.e. power of
counsel; 2) Prabhu shakti: Power of might i.e. power of treasury and
army; and 3) Utsaha shakti: power of energy i.e. power of valor
(6.2.31). Likewise, success is also of three fold. By this theory Kautilya
indicates towards reality, and made alert to the king to be a conqueror

or suffer conquest. All his discussion is revolving around the desire of

victory over enemy and world conquest to establish unified, sovereign
world empire that is the concept of Chakravarti – imperatively the
Indian territories in between the Himalaya and the sea (9.1.17). G.P.
Singh argues that the Mandala theory is ancient India’s most notable
contribution to political theory (115-130). Singh analyzed the mandala
theory as a ‘Balance of power’ but Bosche contradicted this statement
by stating that “it was not offering modern balance of power arguments
where the ultimate status quo and peace is the purpose of such interstate
activities in modern time” (Bosche 2003, 79). Moreover this theory
provides Geo strategic analysis of interstate relations, therefore, it is the
theory of geopolitics.
Shadguna Sidhanta i.e. Six measures of foreign policy

This doctrine is about the six principles of foreign policy like a
formula for attainment of one’s national interests and goals at the level
of international politics based on political reality. It is the archetype of
foreign policy acting as a guiding force for the Vijigishu to become a
world conqueror. It contains six basic principles as follows:
1) Sandhi: (making treaty containing terms and conditions)

The general principal in foreign policy is that, when the one is
comparatively weaker than that of his enemy, the policy of peace i.e.
Sandhi should be employed. When making a treaty one may be
required to surrender troops or treasury or territory, called
Dandopanta sandhi, Kosopanta sandhi and Desopanta sandhi,
respectively. Kautilya advised the king to enter in to the treaty, thwart
the strong enemy when fulfilling the conditions of the treaty and after
bidding his time till he get strong to overthrow the strong enemy
(7.3.22-35). It means this is the policy to seek or spare the time to
become strong and waiting for weakening of enemy, till then one
have to hold patience for right opportunity. It is practical
opportunism.
2) Vigraha: ( Policy of Hostility)

If one is stronger than the enemy, policy of hostility should be
adapted. This policy has two dimensions- i. Defensive ii. Offensive,
while in first case, one who is sure about its strength to repel attack of

enemy, should resort Vigraha. And in the second case, that, one who
feels from the secured position can ruin the enemy’s undertakings or
can seize enemy’s territories, because he is engaged in the war on
another front, can go for Vigraha. But Kautilya is very anxious about
the profit and loses as he recommends sandhi instead of Vigraha
when both, supposed to be lead the same result. Obviously, there are
comparatively more loses, expenses and troubles in hostility (7.2.1-2).
3) Asana: ( A policy of remain quite, not planning to march)

Asana is the state in which one is to wait in the hope that the enemy
would get weaker or find himself in difficulties or in calamities, get
involved in war on other front and one would be strong than enemy
(7.1.34). Naturally this policy is often a concomitant of the policy of
the sandhi.-But at the same time it can be corroborated with the policy
of vigraha. For example, by seducing enemy’s subjects from their
loyalty by the means of dissension and propaganda, one will try to
weaken enemy secretly (7.4.5-12).
4) Yana: (Marching on an expedition)

The policy of yana is much clear and explicit among all of others,
which can be persuade in the situation when one is surely strong than
his enemy. “Normally, yana and vigraha are parallel but in yana, one
is expected to be completely dominant in the strength” (7.4.14-17).
However, even sandhi- yana is recommended, (7.14.18). This is to be
obvious; it involves a downright breach of faith with one with whom
one is at peace having entered in to treaty with him. “The joint
expedition would be based on sharing benefits is also recommended
in this policy” (7.4.19-22).
5) Sansraya: (seeking shelter with another king or in a fort)

This policy is particularly recommended for a weak king who is
attacked or threatened to be attacked by powerful enemy. The
discussion about the king with whom the shelter should be sought is
included in book 7, chapter 2, verse 6-25 and 7.15.1-8. Sansraya
conforms to the status of Protégé, one’s protection is assured thereby.
It is also implied that the king would be making continuous efforts to

recoup his strength and independence. The shelter at one’s own fort is
also a suggestion. But if none of these remedies would help then the
weak king should resort the last mean of surrender, this is vassalage
(7.2.9). And he should be watchful for opportunity to strike back and
obtain his previous position (7.2.10-12).
6) Dvaidhibhava: (The double policy of Sandhi with one king and
Vigraha with Another at a time)
It is obviously a policy of dual purpose, where Sandhi is for seeking
help in the form of treasury and troops from one king to wage
hostility toward another king. This policy is referred for the king who
is equally strong to enemy and he cannot win the battle without
additional strength of his ally (7.1.13-18).
The aim of provisions of these policies is to grow stronger in the

long term competition than the enemy, though sometimes one may have
to tolerate temporarily, the great strength of enemy. The expansion of
ones power and state at the cost of its natural enemy’s the motive
behind this doctrine. While moving toward the ultimate aim of world
conquest, the interests of one’s own state is the supreme criterion for
the external affairs. So the appropriate use of these means with deep
regard for time, make Vijigishu enable, to play with the other members
of Mandala as he please; they become as it were tied to him by the
chains of intellectual power (7.18.44).
Four Upayas:
These are the tactics or means of overcoming opposition mentioned
as:
1) Saman: Conciallation
2) Dama: Gifts
3) Bheda: Dissension
4) Danda: Force.
First two are suggested to be used with subjugate weak king and last
two are to overcome strong kings. Gunas are concerned only with
foreign policy while upayas are having wide applications.

Diplomacy
Kautilya finds the diplomacy also as an apparatus of war. “For
Kautilya, all ambassadors were potential spies with diplomatic
immunity” (Mujumdar 1960, 64). He argued that diplomacy is really
subtle act of war, a series of consistent actions taken to weaken an
enemy and get advantage for oneself all with an eye towards eventual
conquest “and in entire circle he should ever station envoys and secrete
agents becoming a friend of the rivals, maintaining secrecy when
striking again and again” (Bosche 2003, 79-80).
Geopolitical analysis
American scholar Bruce Rich compared Kautilyas geopolitical
analysis in modern perspectives, with the concept of groupings of
civilizations by Samuel Huttington and Brzvenski’s explanation of the
changing geo strategies of world powers, especially Eurasian. In his
view he explained, after cold war world politics is divided among nine
geopolitical groups, lie the elements of Mandala in Kautilya’s theory.
And on this basis we would be able to analyze the current problems at
international level. “A number of treatise on post cold war geopolitics
published in 1990’s and in early 2000’s,uncounsciously evoke
Kautilya’s anlysis, except that the entire planet is now the arena of play
for the Mandala of states rather than as in Kuatilya’s time, the Indian
subcontinent” (Rich 2008, 125).
Conclusion
Kautilya is the classis proponent of the political realism; of the
foreign policy; of a craft of obtaining and increasing the power, without
moralistic illusions. His discussion about national interest and national
power are purely rational as well as practical. He set the ideal of world
conquest and its measures have to be employed by a prosperous
kingdom and discussed the ruthless realities of international politics
through Mandala and Shadguna theory. He enumerated systematic
ways to seek the power and dominance and according to him
international politics is the lawless struggle among strong and weak
states, for this purpose. Kautilya did not care about glory and fame, he
just believed in basic principle of ‘end justifies the means’ His geo
strategic analysis is amazingly advanced in nature, moreover it is
relevant to the present day. Kautilya’s foreign policy is still valid in the

sphere of world politics, because the basic principles of foreign policy

stated by him, like struggle for power, national interests, alliances,
hostility and diplomacy are remain unchanged unto the end of the
world. Therefore, he is relevant even in the age of ‘trans-modern global
society’.
References:
Boesche, Roger. 2003. The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and
his Arthashastra. New York: Lexington Books
Dikshitar, V.R. Ramchandra. 1987. War in Ancient India. New Delhi:

Motilal Banarasidas.
Ghoshal, Upendra Nath. 1923. A History of Hindu Political Theories.

London: Oxford University Press.
Kangle, R.P, trans. & ed. 1965. The Kautilya Arthashastra: Part I, II &
III. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010.
Keith, A.B. 1921. Foreward to Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity. Edited

by N.N. Law, v-vi. London: Oxford.
Morgenthau, Hans. 1985. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for

Power and Peace. 6th ed. New York: Knopf.
Mujumdar, B.K. 1960. The Military System in India. Calcutta: Firma

KLM.
Rich, Bruce. 2008. To Uphold the World: The Message of Ashoka &
Kautilya for 21st Century. New Delhi: Viking.
Sen, A.K. 1920. Studies in Hindu Political Thoughts. Calcutta: Oxford

University Press.
Singh, G.P. 1993. Political Thought in Ancient India. New Delhi: D.K.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Relations. New York:

McGraw Hill.

How India can beat China in Nepal

New Delhi must be hopeful that this successful visit will undo the damage done by the
“unofficial blockade” of 2016.
Nepal’s newly elected Prime Minister, K.P. Sharma Oli, in keeping with tradition, made his
first foreign trip to India last week. Considering that he is generally considered “pro-
China,” this must come as a relief to the Indian government.
Moreover, going by his press briefing after his return, it appears that the visit went well,
which is yet another surprise. He said that the visit “has increased confidence between
India and Nepal and bilateral relations will move forward in a new direction on the basis
of equality, mutual respect and interest and enhance cooperation.” He also claimed that
the visit has “helped in clearing misunderstanding and mistrust and strengthening mutual
trust and understanding.”
The optics during the meeting were also suggestive of a successful meeting. Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, congratulating Oli on the successful elections in recent
months, said that his principle of “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (Together with all,
development for all) and Oli’s vision of “Samriddha Nepal, Sukhi Nepal” (Prosperous
Nepal, Happy Nepal) were complimentary in nature. Modi went on to say that, India will
cooperate with Nepal in its journey towards greater prosperity but also thoughtfully added
that such cooperation “will be based on the priorities and requirements set by the
Government of Nepal.”
The multi-month blockade resulted in significant hardships for the people of Nepal — it
affected everything from petroleum to medicines and earthquake relief material, leading
to huge price rise for basic commodities in Nepal.
New Delhi must be hopeful that this successful visit will undo the damage done by the
“unofficial blockade” of 2016. The multi-month blockade resulted in significant hardships
for the people of Nepal — it affected everything from petroleum to medicines and
earthquake relief material, leading to huge price rise for basic commodities in Nepal. The
Indian government, taking up the cause of Madhesis in an aggressive manner and asking
Nepal to amend the constitution, created huge resentment towards New Delhi.

Complicating this complex relationship is the China factor. In the face of rising anti-India
sentiment, China has only been too happy to step into the role that India played earlier.
Further, Nepal’s support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative widened the trust gap between
Kathmandu and New Delhi.
Nevertheless, Oli’s visit may be the first step towards repairing the damage generated in
the last few years. Oli’s second tenure in office is also seeing a far stronger leader who has
been able to consolidate his power, although traction was initially gained on an anti-India
platform. Since coming to office, he has taken some populist and smart decisions that affect
the people, for instance on the power situation within the country. Parts of Nepal used to
witness 16-20 hours if power cuts everyday, but Oli was able to take action on this and
improve the situation. If India wants to win over Nepal and let it not slip into China’s grasp
entirely, this is the time and Oli might be the man to deliver, despite his alleged pro-China
leanings.
Oli’s visit may be the first step towards repairing the damage generated in the last few
years. Oli’s second tenure in office is also seeing a far stronger leader who has been able
to consolidate his power, although traction was initially gained on an anti-India platform.
Unlike Oli’s previous visit to India when no joint statement was issued, this time around,
not only was one issued but it outlines a bilateral cooperative agenda across three key
sectors of rail connectivity, developing inland waterways, and agriculture. There were
three separate joint statements issued on each laying out in detail the tasks ahead. Cross-
border rail connectivity in particular will be significant in strengthening people-to-people
and economic linkages between the two countries. During Oli’s visit, the two prime
ministers decided to construct a new electrified railway line, linking Raxaul in India and
Kathmandu in Nepal. India has agreed to finance this project.
Similarly, the agreement on inland waterways is vital in establishing access to sea for the
landlocked Nepal. The joint statement specifically noted the two prime ministers’ agreement
“to develop the inland waterways for the movement of cargo … providing additional access
to sea for Nepal.” The third key sector, agriculture, also offer big promises, with
collaborative ventures in a number of areas. The two sides have also agreed to encourage
exchanges between the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the Nepal
Agricultural Research Council (NARC).
New Delhi is clearly concerned about China’s growing clout in Nepal. It must be noted that
Beijing has also focused on regional connectivity and hydropower projects in its dealings

with Kathmandu, and therefore India’s ability to deliver on the three key sectors will be
assessed against those of China, however fair or unfair that might be. China’s involvement
for a couple of decades in mini hydropower projects is noteworthy.
To China, Nepal is a strategic buffer. Nepal’s importance to China comes more from the
thousands of Tibetans living in the country.
To China, Nepal is a strategic buffer. Nepal’s importance to China comes more from the
thousands of Tibetans living in the country and therefore, “controlling Tibetan activism
there is a priority for Beijing.” The India angle comes as a close second political objective,
even though it is often presented as a singular or the dominant one.
Oli’s visit offers India an opportunity to repair the damage it caused in recent years. India
has to focus on implementation and delivery on the three key sectors identified during the
visit. That means India must rectify the terrible track record that it suffers in project
implementation. The four Integrated Check Posts (ICP) on the India-Nepal border is a case
in point. Several problems from both sides may have caused the delays, but India’s overall
record in completing projects does not bode well. If it wants to truly address growing
competition from China in its neighborhood in general and Nepal in particular, India will
have to perform better this time around.
India’s development partnership with Nepal:

The paradigm shift and future prospects
While development cooperation has a crucial role in shaping political relations between
countries, political relations should not undermine the effectiveness of aid.
Nepal is one of the earliest recipients of India’s development cooperation initiatives and
today, India is among its top bilateral partners. According to the Development Cooperation
Report 2019, India ranked fifth amongst the top bilateral development partners of Nepal for
the financial year 2017-18, with USD 56.7 million in official development assistance (ODA)
disbursements. [1] With assistance from India since 1951, over 559 large, intermediate and
small-scale projects at an estimated cost of NPR 76 billion have been implemented across
Nepal.
The design of the development partnership programme has been key to the India-Nepal
relationship. In the year 2003, to facilitate the development of small projects in Nepal, the

two countries entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for the Small Development
Projects (SDP) scheme. It was a tripartite agreement between the local community, the
Indian embassy and the District Coordination Committee, which is local government
authority. The scheme started with the commitment to provide assistance at the grass-root-
level, particularly for social sectors. An interesting feature of the scheme was that anybody
in Nepal who felt that there was a need for a project could approach the embassy either
directly, or by contacting the local body. The scheme enabled the Indian embassy to
increase its outreach in Nepal.
With assistance from India since 1951, over 559 large, intermediate and small-scale
projects at an estimated cost of NPR 76 billion have been implemented across Nepal.
However, in the year 2017 there were certain administrative and constitutional changes in
Nepal. The SDP scheme was not renewed. Instead, in July 2018, the Nepali Cabinet had
tightened norms for the inflow of Indian grants for SDPs. As per the new engagement, the
role of the central government of Nepal was strengthened, while the power of Embassy of
India was abrogated. Development aid from India had to be routed through the Central
Government.
It is worth mentioning that the experience of other countries [2] highlights that the design of
aid is crucial in determining its success. In most developing and least developed countries,
since institutional and governance mechanisms are not strong in most developing and
underdeveloped countries, the cases of corruption and misutilisation of development aid
are high. In such a scenario, it is important to design the aid structure in such a way that it
reaches the beneficiaries rather than being diverted to unintended purposes.
The ICRIER working paper 377 titled, “The Role and Changing Paradigm of India’s
Assistance to Nepal: Case of the Education Sector”, found that through the SDP scheme,
the Indian Embassy has been successful in directly reaching the beneficiaries. The fact that
it was a demand driven, performance-based scheme — wherein no direct cash transfer was
involved — were all instrumental factors. Funds release was contingent on the progress of
the project and therefore, the scheme was successful in not only creating infrastructure but
also creating an impact at the grassroot level.
Considering that central government and line ministries in Nepal had concerns with the
design of the SDP scheme, the study made a few recommendations for future development
partnership between India and Nepal. The first is that the Indian Government may discuss
and rework the design of the SDP scheme to ensure greater involvement from the Ministry

of Finance and the line ministries. During the previous engagements under the SDP scheme,
the Government of India allocated a stipulated amount (INR50 million) every year. Going
forward, the scheme can be re-designed so that the Embassy of India can decide the sectors
where the amount will be allocated every year — rather than directly inviting applications
— in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Based on the sectors selected for grant, the
Embassy can invite applications; recommendations should be made by both line ministries
and local bodies.
The Indian Government may discuss and rework the design of the SDP scheme to ensure
greater involvement from the Ministry of Finance and the line ministries. During the
previous engagements under the SDP scheme, the Government of India allocated a
stipulated amount (INR50 million) every year. Going forward, the scheme can be re-
designed so that the Embassy of India can decide the sectors where the amount will be
allocated every year — rather than directly inviting applications — in consultation with the
Ministry of Finance.
Further, for a few key projects in certain districts, a panel may be constituted for directly
taking concurrence or seeking advice on projects from specific ministries and governmental
departments. The panel may comprise relevant representatives from the line ministries,
municipal authorities or local bodies, civil engineers and relevant sector experts
representing the Government of India.
Secondly, there is a need for data transparency on the Indian Embassy website. The Indian
government is doing a lot of work in Nepal and large grants are channelled into socio-
economic projects. The data and progress reports of key projects should be made available
on the embassy website.
Three: there is a need for improved outreach with respect to India’s work in Nepal. While
some work gets reported in the local media, a large number of projects do not get adequate
coverage. Social media can be used as an effective medium for spreading information.
While development cooperation has a crucial role in shaping political relations between
countries, political relations should not undermine the effectiveness of aid. Development
aid must meet its core objective of achieving social and economic development. Through
dialogues, countries must confirm that their schemes and policies are being utilised for the
core, outlined purposes.

India, Nepal must seek mutually acceptable solutions to controversy
over new map
The India-Nepal border is unique in that neither country has allowed a political boundary
to interrupt the age-old traffic of people who share ties of kinship, religion and culture.
The notion of boundaries as lines drawn on a map is a recent concept — as is the nation
state. This is particularly true in the Subcontinent, where empires and kingdoms shaded into
one another across ambiguous frontiers rather than be separated by boundaries marking
sovereign jurisdictions. The India-Nepal border is unique in that neither country has
allowed a political boundary to interrupt the age-old traffic of people who share ties of
kinship, religion and culture. This is now being threatened by territorial nationalism on the
Nepali side and an emerging security state on the Indian side.
It is easy to trigger anti-Indian sentiment in the Kathmandu Valley, which remains the
crucible of Nepali politics and the arbiter of its domestic and foreign policies. As we witness
in our own country, nationalist sentiment can be a potent instrument for political
mobilisation, but its orientation could be positive or negative. This depends on the political
leadership but equally on how aware and enlightened a citizenry is. In Nepal, political
groupings of every persuasion have been unable to resist the temptation to conjure up a
bullying and overbearing India to present themselves as the fierce custodians of national
interest. This is what we saw at play in the demonstrations held recently on the streets of
Kathmandu. Residual revolutionaries of the Left competed with the supposedly pro-India
Nepali Congress to castigate India for releasing maps which showed Kalapani at the India-
Nepal-China trijunction to the north and Susta to the south as Indian territory.
These latest maps have nothing to do with Nepal. They were published to reflect the recent
bifurcation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into the two new Union Territories of
J&K and Ladakh. There was no change in the depiction of India-Nepal boundary. Yet, the
perception was created that the publication of the new map was a departure from the past
and constituted pernicious cartographic aggression. It is true that Nepal has, in the past,
claimed territory in the Kalapani area and Susta as its own. The two sides agreed that these
differences should be resolved though friendly negotiations and their foreign secretaries
were mandated to undertake this exercise. As far as one is aware, these talks are yet to take
place. If this is an issue with the potential to arouse such strong public sentiment on the
Nepali side, then such inaction is inexplicable. My own experience has been that the Nepali
side raises such issues for rhetorical purposes but is uninterested in following up through
serious negotiations. This is what happened with Nepali demands for the revision of the

India-Nepal Friendship Treaty. The Indian side agreed in 2001 to hold talks at the foreign
secretary level to come up with a revised treaty — one that, in the Nepali eyes, would be
more “equal” with reciprocal obligations and entitlements. Only one such round of talks
has taken place.
While I was in Nepal as ambassador, a request was made to put the issue on the agenda of
the foreign secretary level talks held in 2003 but without any expectation of actual
discussion. When we conveyed our readiness to have a substantive discussion on the treaty
revision, the agenda item was dropped by the Nepali side. The purpose was to merely show
that the Nepali side was taking up the issue seriously with India. I believe it would be a
good policy on the part of India to regularly offer to take up such outstanding issues
bilaterally even though the Nepali side may wish to side-step. If efforts are made to rake up
such issues for political gain, then India would be able to list publicly the occasions when
it has offered to resolve them through friendly negotiations. At the moment, raising these
issues as means of hoisting their nationalistic colours is of little risk to the Nepali political
parties.
It is not widely known that the two countries have managed to settle about 98 per cent of
their common border and these are reflected in the 182 strip maps initialed by them. More
than 8,500 boundary pillars have been installed reflecting the agreed alignment.
The Kalapani controversy has arisen due to a difference of perception as to the real and
primary source of the Mahakali river. The Treaty of Sugauli concluded in 1816 locates the
river as the western boundary with India but different British maps showed the source
tributary at different places. This is not unusual given the then state of cartographic science
and less-refined surveying techniques. We have similar problems regarding the alignment
of the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the India-China border. With regard to Susta,
the problem has arisen as a result of the shifting of the course of the river, again a frequent
occurrence in rivers shared by neighbouring countries. There are only two ways to deal
with this challenge — either to accept a shifting border as the river itself shifts or to agree
on a boundary which remains fixed despite changes in the course of the river. The latter is
usually the more rational choice. But such matters require friendly consultations aimed at
mutually acceptable outcomes not emotionally charged grandstanding.
Just a few days before this controversy erupted, the prime ministers of India and Nepal
inaugurated, through a video conference, the much awaited Motihari-Amlekhgang pipeline,
which will enable safe, secure and assured supply of petroleum products to Nepal. These
supplies were trucked across the border in the past with frequents incidents of pilferage and

contamination in transit and interruptions due to natural disasters or road blocks set up
during political protests. This is a demonstration of what cross-border cooperation can
achieve to benefit both countries. The ugly anti-Indian protests in Kathmandu provide the
self-defeating counterpoint.
There are six to eight million Nepali citizens living and working in India. They enjoy
immense goodwill and a congenial and friendly environment wherever they are. Political
leaders in Nepal should reflect on this extraordinary asset their country enjoys built over
centuries of benign togetherness. Its thoughtless erosion may prove to be costly for both our
countries.
Delhi needs to engage with Moscow on the unfolding Sino-Russian

naval partnership
Over the last few years, China and Russia have conducted impressive naval manoeuvres
in the Western Pacific, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. The joint exercise with
South Africa this week brings the unfolding Sino-Russian naval partnership closer home
to India.
Russia, long seen as marginal to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, is rejoining the major
power scrum in the contested littoral. Three recent events highlight Russia’s growing
strategic interest in the Indian Ocean and should compel Delhi to think of its consequences
for India’s own regional strategy.
Last week, Perekop, a training vessel of the Russian Navy, arrived at the Hambantota port
in Sri Lanka. Late last month two, Russian long-distance “Black Jack” nuclear bombers
flew to South Africa. This is the first time these aircraft have been deployed to Africa.
This week, the Russian and the Chinese are conducting a trilateral naval exercise with South
Africa in the strategic waters off the Cape of Good Hope. Called, Moris, this is the first time
that the three countries (India’s partners in the BRICS forum along with Brazil) are doing
such a joint exercise. The exercise reflects the growing weight of China and Russia in South
Africa’s security calculus and Pretoria’s growing political distance from the West.
Meanwhile, Iran has said that it plans to hold joint naval drills with Russia and China in
the turbulent waters of the Persian Gulf.

Until now, Delhi’s discourse on the Indian Ocean has been focused on the growing
competition with China, whose maritime profile has been growing in the littoral. This, in
turn, has led to the rapid expansion of India’s naval cooperation with the United States and
Japan, as well as with its regional partners like Indonesia, Singapore and other ASEAN
countries in the east, many nations in the Gulf as well as the east coast of Africa.
More recently, India has also been developing a partnership with France, a resident power
in the littoral and a traditional security provider in the Western Indian Ocean and Africa.
India would also want to develop similar intensive engagement with Britain and the
European Union.
Russia’s return to the Indian Ocean is relatively recent. It must also be seen as a part of its
new strategic activism in the Middle East and Africa. Five decades ago, as a rising Soviet
Russia sought to enter the Indian Ocean littoral amidst the British withdrawal from the east
of Suez, it set off concerns in the region about being sucked into the superpower rivalry.
The region’s calls for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean went nowhere as the US quickly
replaced Britain as the main security provider in the littoral. The Soviet Union too expanded
its strategic footprint the Indian Ocean during the 1970s and 1980s. But the collapse of the
Soviet Union disrupted Moscow’s Indian Ocean trajectory.
As it returns to the Indian Ocean, many fundamental constraints remain on Russia’s
ambitions. Russia is a vast continental state and its limited access to the sea remains
vulnerable to exploitation by its adversaries. The unfreezing Arctic will present new
opportunities for Russia, but most of them are for the long-term. Russia is also constrained
by its limited economic resources. China, Japan, Europe and the US bring far greater
economic weight to bear upon the region. The Indian Ocean is certainly not at the top of
Moscow’s maritime priorities.
Yet, Russian President Vladimir Putin, has demonstrated the political will and strategic
acumen to make the best of a weak hand. While Russian might never dominate the Indian
Ocean, it certainly has the capacity to shape the strategic outcomes in the region.
For one, Moscow is one of the world’s major arms exporters and has turned that into an
effective leverage in the Indian Ocean region. Second, the success of Russia’s military
intervention in Syria in saving the Bashar al Assad regime has got the attention of many
countries in the littoral struggling to cope with civil wars. The recent reports on Russia’s

growing security role — including the use of hybrid forces — in the Central African
Republic, Libya and Mozambique are a testimony to this.
Third, Russia is using its new security role in the region to gain privileged military access.
Although it does not have a naval base in the Indian Ocean, acquiring one is probably a
high priority. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its naval diplomacy in the region, making
regular visits to ports in the region and deepening special relationships that it already has
with countries like India.
Fourth, as a permanent member, Russia also offers diplomatic protection for many regimes
in the UNSC against Western pressures on such issues as human rights. Moscow’s strong
support to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs is of great value to many
African nations. Finally, Russian energy and mineral companies do offer important options
for resource development in many parts of the littoral.
On the face of it, Russian activism in the Indian Ocean should be a welcome addition to the
emerging multipolarity in the region. But, there are challenges that are not adequately
debated in Delhi. Moscow’s deepening tensions with the West and growing strategic
embrace of Beijing do pose problems for India’s own strategy.
The impact of Russia’s conflict with the US has come into public view in the case of Delhi’s
purchase of S-400 missiles from Moscow and the consequent threat of Washington’s
sanctions. But there is far less focus on the implications of the emerging Sino-Russian naval
and maritime partnership.
Over the last few years, China and Russia have conducted impressive naval manoeuvres in
the Western Pacific, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. The joint exercise with South
Africa this week brings the unfolding Sino-Russian naval partnership closer home to India.
Delhi needs an early and intensive dialogue with Moscow on its Indian Ocean collaboration
with China.
India in pivotal geographies: Central Asia

India has a long history of cultural and commercial relations with Central Asia (CA),
facilitated by its geographical proximity and the Silk Route. However, India–CA relations
stagnated in the 20th century, due to the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the “Great Game”[1] and
the consequent emergence of nation-states with differing ideologies. The breakup of the
Soviet Union led to the formation of the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Due to its strategic location and rich natural
reserves, CA is an important player in global politics. Consequently, the “New Great
Game,”[2] which defines modern geopolitics in CA, has seen fierce competition between
global players to increase influence, hegemony and power over the region. However, unlike
during the Great Game, CA governments are now working to use the renewed external
involvement of the New Great Game to their sovereign advantage by fending off disruptive
demands, reinforcing their political control at home and bargaining for bilateral or
regional agreements. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has adopted a
coherent strategy to upscale its relationship with CA and reinvigorate the ancient
socioeconomic and traditional ties with the region through new initiatives.
In 1991–92, all the heads of CA countries visited New Delhi. India, in turn, sent a semi-
official delegation led by former Union Minister R.N. Mridha to Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and
Almaty (Kazakhstan) to establish diplomatic relations. Then Prime Minister Narasimha
Rao visited CA in 1993 and provided a much-needed financial support of US$10–15 million
to each country in the region. Thus, during the early 1990s, the India–CA relations started
to improve. However, issues such as instability in Afghanistan and the India– Pakistan
discord prevented India from reaping the benefits of its engagement with the hydrocarbon-
rich and geostrategically important region. Political problems within the CA countries
further hindered India’s outreach, e.g. the civil war in Tajikistan; the Tulip Revolution in
Kyrgyzstan; and authoritarian regimes in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
The growing geostrategic and security concerns regarding the China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC)—China’s flagship venture with Pakistan under the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI)—forced New Delhi to fix its ineffectual strategy. Soon after assuming
office, Narendra Modi visited all the CA countries in July 2015, boosting the momentum of
the “Connect Central Asia” Policy of 2012 and setting in motion the next stage of
international cooperation. The visits also marked a major shift in India’s diplomatic
relations with CA. For the first time, New Delhi was looking at the region as a composite

geographical unit. Eventually, the CA became the link that also placed the Eurasian region
firmly in New Delhi’s zone of interest. India and CA signed several deals on a range of
issues including security, energy, trade and culture, with the prime minister reiterating [3]
the region’s importance to India’s future.
The reciprocal high-level state visits by the presidents of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan in the last four years further highlight the evolution of the India–CA dynamics
through bilateral and trilateral arrangements (See Table 5). Uzbekistan’s president
returned to India within three months of his
Table 5: India–CA High-Level Official Visits and Agreements Consequently Signed
Source: Data collected by the author

first visit as the chief guest at the Vibrant Gujarat Summit. These developments are
indicative of improved relations as well as India’s constructive engagement with the region
for energy, market and security.
India’s renewed focus on the region has coincided with CA’s efforts for internal regional
integration. A “silk visa”[4] has been proposed to allow tourists to visit all countries in the
region with a single visa. The stronger economic integration proposed by Kazakhstan

President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Ashgabat–Turkmenabat highway between
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan[5] also shows that the CA countries are keen to take advantage
of the renewed global interest in the region.[6]
The Chabahar port that was recently made partially operational gives New Delhi direct
land access to CA. India has made a capital investment of US$85.21 million and committed
to an annual revenue expenditure of US$22.95 million for the equipping and operating of
two berths in Chabahar Port Phase-I.[7]
In the last five years, India has invested in projects such as the International North–South
Transport Corridor (INSTC).[8] The INSTC made substantial progress after India joined
the Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods under cover of TIR Carnets
(TIR Convention).[9]
In 2016, some CA countries (e.g. Uzbekistan) signed trilateral transit-and- trade corridor
agreements with India, Iran and Afghanistan.[10] It was agreed that the existing Iranian
road network from Chabahar port would be linked to Zaranj in Afghanistan, which could
then connect to the 218-km Zaranj– Delaram Road—constructed by India in 2009 at a cost
of INR 680 crore—and finally to Afghanistan’s Garland Highway.
India’s Central Asia Policy received a significant boost in 2018, when New Delhi’s
diplomatic efforts paid dividends in the form of admission into the Ashgabat
Agreement,[11] signed in 2011 between Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and
Qatar, for the establishment of an international transport and transit corridor. In 2016,
Kazakhstan and Pakistan joined the group. This agreement allows India to use the existing
land connectivity networks to facilitate trade and commercial interaction with both CA and
Eurasia, by exploiting the natural resources of the region and exporting products to CA .
One of the railway lines under the Ashgabat Agreement that connects Iran Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan became operational in 2014.
Such high-level engagement in the last five years is reflected in increased trade between
India and CA countries (See Figure 19).
Figure 19: India’s Trade with Central Asian Countries by Year (Value in USD Millions)
Source: Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank, accessed 10 March 2019,
CA countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are keen to have India as a key
partner in their quest to consolidate their position in the global arena. In February 2019,
Kazakhstan’s ambassador to India, Bulat Sarsenbayev, said, “Our trade is growing but the
potential is much more. Chabahar and Bandar Abbas are part of one project in reality.
Chabahar will be completed, they (Kazakhstan) will construct a railway from Chabahar to
the Iranian railway network; it will later go to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.” [12]
A direct access to CA will help India to not only establish itself as one of the major players
in the New Great Game but also undermine China’s much-hyped BRI flagship projects.
Is India Redefining Its Role in the Politics of the Middle

East?
A closer look at India’s increasingly complex relationships with countries of the Middle
East.

On September 24, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while speaking at the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), raised the issue of Kashmir. Before his speech at the
UNGA, Erdogan had met with the Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan on the sidelines.
On August 5, India abrogated Article 370 which gave special status to the state of Jammu
and Kashmir. This action attracted criticism from Pakistan, but India received support from
a number of countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Turkey, on
the other hand, has supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue as illustrated by Erdogan’s
remarks.
The countries supporting India have endorsed India’s position that Kashmir is an internal
Indian matter. Pakistan has tried to garner support from the international community over
the issue of Kashmir. Most countries, however, have shied away from supporting Pakistan’s
position. Turkey is one of the few countries to support Pakistan. However, in doing so
Turkey drew the attention of India.
India’s Response to Turkey
Since Erdogan came out in support of Pakistan, India has taken a number of steps to counter
Turkey. One of India’s first responses was during the UNGA as well. After Erdogan raised
the Kashmir issue, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with the leaders of Cyprus,
Armenia and Greece. Cyprus and Greece have territorial disputes with Turkey, while
Armenia considers Turkey responsible for the genocide of millions of Armenians in 1915.
During these meetings India extended its supports to the respective stands of these three
countries against Turkey.
Another step from India is its criticism of Turkey’s offensive action against the Kurds in
Syria. On October 9, Turkish forces launched an attack against the Kurds in northeast
Syria, creating what it calls a “safe zone.” India condemned the attack and called upon
Turkey to exercise restraint.
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A third step taken by India is the cancellation of Modi’s scheduled visit to Turkey that was
to take place toward the end of October. The visit was to precede Modi’s visit to Saudi
Arabia from October 29 to 31.

A fourth step that India has taken is the downsizing of defense ties with Turkey. In the view
of growing defense ties between Turkey and Pakistan, India is reducing its export of arms
to Turkey.
Apart from these measures, the Indian government issued a travel advisory to its citizens to
exercise caution while travelling to Turkey.
India’s Diversifying Middle East Ties
Two factors have played an important role in India’s relations with Middle Eastern
countries: economics and India’s internal politics. The economic factor is centered on the
oil trade and remittances from the sizable Indian diaspora in the Middle East. The second
factor is India’s internal politics with regard to its own large Muslim population. Relations
with Middle Eastern countries have often been considered as levers to appease Indian
Muslims.
Over a period of time, however, India has diversified its relations beyond these factors.
Especially in the case of Saudi Arabia. India has been developing a strategic partnership
with the Saudis over the past few years. Bilateral visits between the countries have taken
place regularly. Modi visited Saudi Arabia in 2016; Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman visited India in February 2019 and as noted above, Modi will visit
the Kingdom next week. During the February visit, India and Saudi Arabia reached an
agreement to set up a Strategic Partnership Council. Recently India and Saudi Arabia
agreed to increase cooperation on counterterrorism. Overall India’s progression in
relations with Saudi Arabia highlights that the areas of cooperation between India and the
countries of the Middle East have expanded. More areas of cooperation not only strengthen
bilateral relations but they also allow India to play a greater role in that region.
Challenges for India
The politics of the Middle East are complex and multidimensional. The Saudi Arabia-Turkey
rivalry is one of the dimensions. Another dimension is the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry. India
has close relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, India is yet to work out a
way to balance its ties with Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the United States
on the other. Iran is strategically important for India, but India-Iran relations also need the
diplomatic backing and power that India has at the moment put behind growing its relations
with Saudi Arabia. In stepping up its diplomatic offensive against Turkey and by actually
giving preference to Saudi Arabia, India is signaling that it may be ready to take sides.

Although India has a long way to go, the recent steps indicate that India is looking to
redefine its role in Middle Eastern politics.
US rhetoric dogs India-Iran ties

The Trump administration’s attempts to create another West Asia crisis should worry India.
India’s ambassador to the United States, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, announced on May 23
in Washington DC that New Delhi had ended all oil imports from Iran amid pressure from
the Trump administration. “India had already sharply decreased its imports from Iran and
bought 1 million tonnes of crude in April, the last month before Washington stepped up its
pressure campaign against Tehran. That’s it; after that, we haven’t imported any (oil),” he
said.
India’s ambassador to the United States, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, announced on May
23 in Washington DC that New Delhi had ended all oil imports from Iran amid pressure
from the Trump administration.
In 2018, a team of US officials in New Delhi prepared to address India’s concerns on two
important issues—Iran sanctions and Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act regarding India’s purchase of S-400 missile defence system from Russia. The
American representatives, with shirt sleeves folded up, an aggressive posture, told Indian
analysts across the table that while some compromise could be achieved, they were looking
for New Delhi to stop all trade with Iran soon.
Fast-forward to May 2019, and India now stands at that juncture. Prime Minister Narendra
Modi has won his second term with a thumping victory, and the diplomatic dance being
played by India between Iran and the US will become one of the first major foreign policy
challenges of his new tenure. The US, an increasingly pivotal partner for India, offers a
challenge not just to Indian bilateral ties, but its idea of ‘strategic autonomy’.
The US, an increasingly pivotal partner for India, offers a challenge not just to Indian
bilateral ties, but its idea of ‘strategic autonomy’.
Foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale earlier this year said that India’s alignment today is issue-
based, not ideology-based, giving it diplomatic flexibility and decisional autonomy. This
thinking is now being tested.

India’s relations with Iran are in the Trump administration’s cross-hairs. While New Delhi
managed to save the Chabahar Port project from US ire, oil imports played the role of the
‘fall guy’ as Washington DC moves troops to West Asia amid an increasingly precarious
geopolitical situation. India, which imports nearly 70% of its annual crude requirements,
historically had Iran as one of its top three suppliers. Oil is the single-most important
commodity, political or economic, between New Delhi and Tehran. Remove oil from the
picture, and India-Iran trade ties are laid bare bone with little else to ride home about for
now.
While New Delhi managed to save the Chabahar Port project from US ire, oil imports
played the role of the ‘fall guy’ as Washington DC moves troops to West Asia amid an
increasingly precarious geopolitical situation.
Over the past few days, tensions between the US and Iran have escalated significantly. After
Gulf states accused Tehran of trying to “sabotage” their oil tankers operating in the region,
the White House announced military deployment along with supplying billions of dollars
worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan. This claim in itself is highly
contested; with other than ‘intelligence’ reports being highlighted by the US, little other
concrete evidence has been presented, raising concerns of another American misadventure
in the region.
This brewing crisis has many in New Delhi jilted, over both the supply of crude oil to India
and, in general, a significant hike in global crude prices. However, more than oil itself,
what concerns India equally, if not more, is its space in the global order and how it chooses
to position itself in an increasingly transactional world. That is, not an out-and-out ally of
the US, attempting to maintain its ‘strategic autonomy’.
More than oil itself, what concerns India equally, if not more, is its space in the global
order and how it chooses to position itself in an increasingly transactional world. That is,
not an out-and-out ally of the US, attempting to maintain its ‘strategic autonomy’.
Under Iran sanctions during the P5+1 negotiations with Tehran a few years ago, the
Islamic country dropped down to seventh position as India hedged its energy security bets.
This showcased that oil security is possible to achieve within Iran’s neighbourhood with
both Iraq and Saudi Arabia seeing increased oil imports from India back then, and others
such as Nigeria also chipping in to cover the deficits. Despite this, India went out of its way
to protect its historic and civilisational relations with the home of Shia Islam.

New Delhi holds good experience on how to manage itself amid US – Iran tensions. Tehran,
as it did last time, is pushing India to increase its investment flow into its economy with a
question mark hanging over Europe’s alternative plans to open financial highways that
would work despite American sanctions. Previously, India continued to purchase Iranian
crude, the kind around which infrastructure such as the Mangalore refinery was built (Iran
has a specific kind of crude oil known as ‘heavy crude’) specifically to cater for Iranian
supplies despite sanctions.
Tehran, as it did last time, is pushing India to increase its investment flow into its
economy with a question mark hanging over Europe’s alternative plans to open financial
highways that would work despite American sanctions.
To game the sanctions, India continued to purchase oil from Iran while depositing money
into a bank account in Kolkata. At its peak, the account at a branch of UCO Bank held more
than $6 billion in dues to the Iranians as Tehran was being pushed by Western powers (and
India) to commit to what we today know as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), committed to by Iran and UN Security Council members and Germany, and
abandoned later by the Trump administration. In essence, today Iran stands on a higher
moral pedestal than the US on this issue.
During the JCPOA negotiations and the time before that, Tehran applied similar pressure
on India, as it would now, to increase economic presence and purchase more oil on
extremely favourable terms and conditions. While India accommodated the American
whims, it also gave space to Tehran, allowing Iran’s Bank Pasargad to open a branch in
Mumbai, a move previously not entertained by India in order to pacify the US. This time,
however, the openly bullish nature of the US has pushed India to highlight the fact that its
bilateral relations with Tehran, while having some room for manoeuvre to accommodate
American concerns, are sacrosanct to its own national interests.
While India accommodated the American whims, it also gave space to Tehran, allowing
Iran’s Bank Pasargad to open a branch in Mumbai, a move previously not entertained
by India in order to pacify the US.
The looming economic concerns for India do not necessarily come from American pressure
on New Delhi to rein in oil imports, but on the Trump administration’s irresponsible
attempts to create another crisis in West Asia suggesting Iran as an imminent threat, stoking
fears of another Iraq War-like situation where US started a conflict on false pretexts. The
US withdrawal from the JCPOA has created a problematic situation in Iran, where

moderates who propagated the deal now find themselves facing the ire of conservatives and
anti-US mullahs to reverse Iran’s outreach to the West and recede back into its anti-Western
posture, which has prevailed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
For the new Modi government, which was staking its claim once again in New Delhi at the
time of writing, playing by the rules of new global diplomatic challenges, weaponisation of
international trade, threats to multilateralism and global diplomatic institutions are the
challenges that wrap around the US—Iran kerfuffle, and by association, the globalised
Indian economy as well.
Perspectives on India-Iran Relations

Iran-India relations are far-reaching and multidimensional. However, a variety of issues,
including the upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, U.S and Israeli influence over
the region, Iran-Israel belligerence, and terrorism all constrain bilateral diplomacy.
Historically, Iran and India have shared social, political, and economic ties. Until the
British colonization of India, the court language of India was Persian. During colonization,
relations between India and the rest of the world were subject to drastic changes, and
consequently contact between Iran and India decreased. Postcolonial political and cultural
ties between the Shah of Iran and India were strong.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 then restructured Iran’s relations with the rest of the world.
Iran’s seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages, the death sentence assigned to Salman
Rushdie, rhetoric toward Israel, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and the Iran-Iraq War
all isolated Iran from the global community. Indeed, most of the world sees Iran as a hostile
country that is resistant to change. Accordingly, the Iran-India relationship has been
checkered. With the wave of Western sanctions imposed on Iran, relations between the two
countries are likely to become even more complicated. However, leaders of both nations
have tried to expand ties in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, regional
stability, and energy security.[1]
India's Approach to Iran
India’s foreign policy after its independence in 1947 can be divided into three periods.

In the first period, from 1947-1990, the country’s policy was marked by “Nehruism,” or
nonalignment with the superpowers and coalition with Third World countries.
In the second period, from 1991-2001, neoliberal ideas and economic reform became a
priority. India’s fundamental objectives were to acquire advanced technology, resolve
political disputes with neighbors, and hasten globalization.
In the third period, from 2001 to the present, India’s foreign policy focus has shifted from
economics to security. Military power and defensive capabilities have taken a more
prominent role. India also seeks interaction with superpowers, greater influence in global
affairs, and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.[2]
Several key issues shape the Iran-India relationship. Iran and India have the largest and
the fourth largest Shi`i Muslim populations in the world, respectively. Therefore, they share
a mutual concern over Sunni-Shi`i conflicts, especially in Pakistan. Through emphasizing
these conflicts, New Delhi sees an opportunity to limit Pakistan's influence in international
Islamic forums. In addition, Iran’s geopolitical position is significant for India, as it can
counteract China's increasing presence throughout Asia and boost India's regional
influence. New Delhi is working with Tehran to open the Iranian port of Chabahar. The
development of this port as well as Indian investment in infrastructure along Iran's border
with Afghanistan not only helps India to counter the massive Chinese investment in
Pakistan's Gwadar port but also boosts India's influence in Afghanistan, which counters
Pakistan's influence there. Lastly, Iran is rich in oil and gas reserves and thus can help meet
India’s domestic energy needs and aid it in avoiding an over-reliance on Saudi Arabia,
which has had traditionally close ties with Pakistan.[3]
Iran’s Approach to India
Iran considers India significant for a number of reasons. First, India, like Iran, is an Asian
country, and the two share historic, cultural, and ethnic links. India's foreign policy is also
congruent with that of Iran; they are both opposed to U.S. unilateralism and a unipolar
world.[4] Following the New Delhi Declaration of 2003, Iran and India referred to each
other as “strategic partners” and embarked on joint military exercises. However, Iran
cannot expect India to favor it in global and security issues, especially in its nuclear issue.
Cooperation and Convergence
Given their affinities, there are various areas of potential cooperation for Iran and India.

International Structure
Both countries are looking to revise the global security equation and the structure of
international security. Iran objects to the world management model, especially the UN
Security Council structure. India, for its part, as a nascent great power, is seeking a
permanent seat on the Council. Because the two countries are outsiders in regard to this
structure, they are brought together.
Economics
India is under pressure from its Western allies vis-à-vis its relationship with Iran, yet India's
sustained economic growth makes Iran's economic cooperation and energy
indispensable.[5] However, international sanctions have caused a decline in Iranian oil
exports to India. In the first seven months of 2013, India's crude oil imports from Iran fell
46 percent compared with the same period last year. As payment to Iran is in rupees rather
than dollars, India could save $8.5 billion in the 2013-14 fiscal year if it was able to
continue importing Iranian oil at the same rate as before.
The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, also known as the Peace Pipeline Project, is under
construction and will deliver natural gas from Iran through Pakistan and to New Delhi. If
implemented, it could not only augment India’s influence in the Middle East and Central
Asia but also diversify its energy basket. The project could also boost and deepen Iranian
economic diplomacy and political influence in the Indian subcontinent. In this way, energy
is the main field of cooperation between the two countries.
Yet, after 2005, the American variable entered into the Iran-India relationship equation,
with India seeking closer ties with the West. In spite of Iran and India’s talks and discussions
about the pipeline, India's foreign policy drastically changed, and progress on the project
has halted.[6]
Stability and Regional Security
One of the top security issues for India is Pakistan, as the two neighbors have a long
relationship of animosity. Communal tension and violence between Hindus and Muslims
have risen in some areas of India over the past decade, and India's growing relationship
with Israel and the United States, which has brought about domestic criticism, has prompted
India to reinforce its ties with the Muslim world. Iran can be helpful to India by providing

it with a Muslim partner that acts as a counterbalance to Pakistan, and thus Iran presents
a potential strategic advantage for India.
International Terrorism
Tehran and New Delhi are both concerned about the spread of pernicious Sunni Islamist
militias in South Asia and the revival of Wahhabi power in Asia and the Middle East. This
concern led to the establishment of a joint committee in 2003 targeted at eliminating
terrorist activities, gun trafficking, and the narcotics trade. During the Taliban era, when
Iran was under a serious threat from both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it decided to expand
its cooperation with India and Russia, and even helped the United States to overthrow the
Taliban. India and Iran welcomed the Taliban's demise in October 2001 and made
Afghanistan's reconstruction and stability a common, critical goal. Thus, counterterrorism
can be a significant area for convergence and integration between the two countries.[7]
Strategic and Defense Cooperation
One of the most significant provisions of 2003’s New Delhi Declaration sought to upgrade
defense cooperation between Iran and India. The wide-ranging partnership involved all
three military services: the army, navy, and air force. After the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran
rebuilt its conventional arsenal by purchasing tanks, combat aircraft, and ships from Russia
and China. It also reportedly solicited Indian assistance in 1993 to help develop new
batteries for three Kilo-class submarines it had purchased from Russia. The submarine
batteries provided by the Russians were ill-suited to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf,
and India had substantial experience operating Kilo-class submarines in warm water. Iran
remains inclined to acquire Indian assistance for other upgrades to its Russian-supplied
military hardware, including MiG-29 fighters, warships, and tanks.[8]
However, despite these initiatives, strategic and defense cooperation between the two
countries is relatively low. The reason for this is India’s turn to the West.
Conclusion
Realistically, India should make it a priority to expand and deepen its ties with the United
States. Politically, the United States has announced its commitment to the process of making
India a global power, and militarily, the U.S army is looking to India as a military partner
to implement its short-term operations in Asia.

India has already begun to choose the United States over Iran, and will likely continue to
do so. In terms of strategic affairs, such as Iran's nuclear program, India has acted in
conformity with U.S policies. When more of such changes occur in India’s foreign policy
toward Iran, they may come as a surprise to Iranian politicians, who still view India as
neutral and non-aligned, especially in regard to Third World countries. Iran also expects
India, as a developing country, to have a revisionist or reformist outlook toward the
politico-economic structure of the international system.
Xi’s Nepal Visit Reveals a Grander Chinese Himalayan

Approach
Not long ago, Beijing’s perspective towards Nepal was limited to that of a ‘good neighbour’
only.1 Though the presence of about 20,000 Tibetans in Nepal has been an issue of major
concern to Beijing, it has carefully managed its relations with Nepal which it sees as a
strategic geographic zone in the Himalayan valley. The Chinese outlook seems to be
changing fast as evident from the outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal
on October 12-13, 2019. With growing emphasis on strengthening bilateral cooperation
especially on building sub-regional connectivity,2 Beijing seems to be orchestrating a
Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy
in making.
On the side-lines of his Nepal visit, President Xi’s article published in Nepali newspapers
sketched a bigger Chinese ambition with a view to forge “strategic and long-term”
cooperation between the two sides.3 Stressing on a ‘renewed friendship’, Xi’s article was a
curtain raiser to the joint statement which outlined resolute Chinese goals to promote
“trans-Himalayan multi-dimensional connectivity network” in the region. Such ambitions
are not unusual in Chinese strategic calculus — a similar approach could be noticed in
China’s interactions with other immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Myanmar in particular. What is striking about China’s recent outreach to Nepal is its effort
to transform the relationship into a comprehensive partnership, aiming to integrate with its
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Himalayan valley.
In other words, Xi’s recent visit to Nepal could be viewed within the spectrum of China’s
‘neighbourhood’ policy that Beijing has been reinforcing for some time through greater
strategic presence and multi-modal connectivity plans, and importantly, offering attractive
financial aids. Orchestrating a pragmatic mode of comprehensive partnership, rather than

just a simple form of engagement, is becoming the highpoint of China’s Himalayan
approach.
Bilaterally, Xi’s visit to Nepal was the first-ever by a Chinese President since 1996. With
more than 20 agreements, his visit outlined an ambitious Chinese approach not only to
promote the flagship BRI-funded projects but also to link it strategically with its various
trans-Himalayan connectivity projects that are being discussed between the two sides. For
instance, the intended cooperation on Kathmandu-Pokhara-Lumbini Railway project,
restoration of Zhangmu/Khasa port, implementation of various highway projects in the
Himalayan valley promoting transit–transport connectivity and plans to promote three
north-south corridors in Nepal (Koshi Economic Corridor, Gandaki Economic Corridor
and Karnali Economic Corridor) – all outlining China’s ambitions to deepen connectivity
with Nepal,4 both within and outside the purview of the BRI.
Nepal, a signatory to the BRI, signed the Transit Transport Agreement (TTA) with China in
September 2018, which in a way assured Nepal of access to seven transit points in China –
four seaports (Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang and Zhanjiang) and three land ports
(Lanzhou, Lhasa and Xigatse).5 Further, based on the memorandum of understanding
(MoU) signed on June 21, 2018, both countries agreed to cooperate in the field of energy,
hydropower, wind power, solar power, biomass energy and other kinds of new energy.
While the ports would be enabling Nepal to end its transit dependence on India slowly, the
same also operated as an assurance of continued economic as well as strategic relations
between China and Nepal.
Xi’s recent visit to Nepal should also be seen beyond the purview of bilateralism. An
upgrade in the China-Nepal relationship comes amidst Beijing’s effort to increase its
influence in South Asia. Such Chinese intent was aptly noted during Xi’s first visit to India
in September 2014. In his speech, he explicitly factored in all the South Asian countries
including Nepal as being central to the BRI (then referred to as ‘One Belt One Road’).6
Further, the locus of geo-politics has been increasingly shifting towards the Indo-Pacific
which is also encouraging China to accord more importance to Nepal and other immediate
neighbours in the region. With many countries viewing China’s BRI doubtfully due to
concerns over its opaque and unjust policies, creating financial debt burdens in the process,
it has increasingly become a challenge for Xi to ensure the sustenance and success of the
connectivity initiative, a focal point of China’s foreign policy. In this regard, Nepal’s
enthusiastic stance towards the BRI comes as an advancement of China’s greater
connectivity ambitions with a focus on the Himalayan region. The Chinese attempt is to

gradually change Nepal “from a landlocked to a land-linked country”.7 For Nepal,
inclusion in BRI means a much-wider strategic platform to connect with China as much as
with the entire Himalayan region.
From envisioning cooperation between the two sides in the United Nations to multilateral
trading regimes to various infrastructural development and regional connectivity projects,
the two countries are increasingly exhibiting signs of an evolving relationship. However,
the China-Nepal relations are not unidimensional. Trade and economic contacts are an
important aspect. China remains the second largest import partner to Nepal with bilateral
trade worth $1.523 billion in 2017-18, a shift from mere $445 million in 2009.8 Further,
their commitment to promote exchange and cooperation in the fields of culture, education,
tourism, traditional medicine, media, think tanks and youth at different levels re-emphasise
a comprehensive outlook to their relations. China has offered 100 Confucius Institute
scholarships to the Nepali side and initiated the ‘friendship city’ concept to strengthen the
ties between Kathmandu and Nanjing and also Butwal and Xi’an. This approach of
connecting city to city is a classic Chinese scheme, a part of its ‘development partnership’
strategy that is even evidenced in the case of India-China, China-Pakistan, China-Sri
Lanka, China-Bangladesh and China-Maldives ‘Sister City’ cooperation framework.
Importantly, any advancement in the China-Nepal relations should also be perceived from
the perspective of Beijing’s rising footprint in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, under Xi, China’s
South Asia policy has been heavily influenced by connectivity and infrastructural initiatives
such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Myanmar Economic
Corridor (CMEC), deep seaports at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka,
Gwadar in Pakistan and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh. In a way, these only validate
China’s traditional “peripheral diplomacy” that Xi revitalised through the October 2013
“Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference” by focusing on land and maritime domains.
These projects give China strategic access into the Indian Ocean and expand its presence
in the region to protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOC). In this regard, while
developing relations with Nepal might not directly provide China access to the Indo-Pacific,
a strategic dimension to the China-Nepal relations in tandem with China’s South Asia
policy would help Beijing expand its influence in the region.
Beijing also acknowledges Nepal’s fervent yet cautious approach towards China and its
connectivity initiatives, in the context of India’s staunch condemnation of the CPEC as well
as the BRI. Nepal acknowledges the need to tread carefully between India and China so as
to preserve its growth and territorial integrity.9 Aware of Nepal’s dependence and
historically close relations with India, China too would be cautious not to hurt its

developing partnership with India at the cost of its new strategic partnership with Nepal.
This was aptly reflected in Wang Yi’s recent press briefing, post Xi’s visit to Nepal, where
he stated that “no matter how the external situation unfolds, China would continue to create
opportunities for both countries”, hinting at a long-term cooperation with both Nepal and
India.10 China’s continuous pitch for a “China-India Plus” cooperation framework, as
Wang Yi’s statement indicates, refers to an open South Asia policy that is much more
engaging. Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, former prime minister of Nepal, had
espoused his vision of a trilateral cooperation between India, China and Nepal during his
visit to New Delhi in April 2013.11 Since then, Nepal and China have been pushing for such
a cooperation.
Beijing takes serious note of India’s rising profile as a power, mainly as a strategic pivot in
the Indo-Pacific construct. 12 The same is encouraging China to view its relationship with
India through a new spectrum, specifically after Xi’s visit to India for the Mamallapuram
‘informal summit’, just ahead of his trip to Nepal. Hence, China would aim to forge a
partnership with Nepal without disrupting its growing engagement with India.
In brief, Xi’s visit to Nepal signifies China’s emerging approach towards its immediate
neighbours. Solidifying relationship with Nepal strengthens China’s sub-regional outreach
in the Himalayan valley. Xi’s Kathmandu visit thus sets a new parameter for the China-
Nepal ties to imbibe a regional approach, moving away from the traditional interstate
relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement.
Throttled at the grass roots

Local governments remain hamstrung and ineffective — mere agents to do the bidding of
higher level governments.
Democratic decentralisation is barely alive in India. Over 25 years after the 73rd and 74th
constitutional amendments (they mandated the establishment of panchayats and
municipalities as elected local governments) devolved a range of powers and
responsibilities and made them accountable to the people for their implementation, very
little and actual progress has been made in this direction. Local governments remain
hamstrung and ineffective; mere agents to do the bidding of higher level governments.
Democracy has not been enhanced in spite of about 32 lakh peoples’ representatives being
elected to them every five years, with great expectation and fanfare.
The ground report
Devolution, envisioned by the Constitution, is not mere delegation. It implies that precisely
defined governance functions are formally assigned by law to local governments, backed
by adequate transfer of a basket of financial grants and tax handles, and they are given staff
so that they have the necessary wherewithal to carry out their responsibilities. Above all,
local governments are to report primarily to their voters, and not so much to higher level
departments.
Yet, none of this has happened, by a long shot. Where did we go wrong? Was the system
designed to fail?
The Constitution mandates that panchayats and municipalities shall be elected every five
years and enjoins States to devolve functions and responsibilities to them through law. This
is regarded as a design weakness, but on closer look, is not one. Given diverse habitation
patterns, political and social history, it makes sense to mandate States to assign functions
to local governments. A study for the Fourteenth Finance Commission by the Centre for
Policy Research, shows that all States have formally devolved powers with respect to five
core functions of water supply, sanitation, roads and communication, streetlight provision
and the management of community assets to the gram panchayats.
Key issues

The constraint lies in the design of funding streams that transfer money to local
governments. First, the volume of money set apart for them is inadequate to meet their basic
requirements. Second, much of the money given is inflexible; even in the case of untied
grants mandated by the Union and State Finance Commissions, their use is constrained
through the imposition of several conditions. Third, there is little investment in enabling
and strengthening local governments to raise their own taxes and user charges.
The last nail in the devolution coffin is that local governments do not have the staff to
perform even basic tasks. Furthermore, as most staff are hired by higher level departments
and placed with local governments on deputation, they do not feel responsible to the latter;
they function as part of a vertically integrated departmental system.
If these structural problems were not bad enough, in violation of the constitutional mandate
of five yearly elections to local governments, States have often postponed them. In 2005,
when the Gujarat government postponed the Ahmedabad corporation elections, a Supreme
Court constitutional bench held that under no circumstances can such postponements be
allowed. Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected other alibis for election postponement,
such as delays in determining the seat reservation matrix, or fresh delimitation of local
government boundaries. Yet, in Tamil Nadu, panchayat elections have not been held for
over two years now, resulting in the State losing finance commission grants from the Union
government.
Downside of centralisation
Successive Union governments have made a big noise about local involvement in a host of
centrally designed programmes, but this does not constitute devolution. Indeed, the current
Union government has further centralised service delivery by using technology, and
panchayats are nothing more than front offices for several Union government programmes.
The beaming of homilies over the radio to captive audiences of local government
representatives does nothing to strengthen local governments.
Union programme design for cities is inimical to decentralisation. The ‘Smart City’
programme does not devolve its funds to the municipalities; States have been forced to
constitute ‘special purpose vehicles’ to ring fence these grants lest they are tainted by
mixing them up with municipality budgets. There cannot be a greater travesty of devolution.
Sadly, except for a few champions of decentralisation in politics and civil society, people
do not distinguish the level of government that is tasked with the responsibility of delivering

local services. Therefore, there is no outrage when the local government is shortchanged;
citizens may even welcome it.
On corruption
Are local governments as corrupt as they are alleged to be? Doubtless, criminal elements
and contractors are attracted to local government elections, tempted by the large sums of
money now flowing to them. They win elections through bribing voters and striking deals
with different groups. Furthermore, higher officers posted at the behest of Members of
Legislative Assemblies, often on payment of bribes, extract bribes from local governments
for plan clearances, approving estimates and payments. Thus, a market chain of corruption
operates, involving a partnership between elected representatives and officials at all levels.
Yet, there is no evidence to show that corruption has increased due to decentralisation.
Decentralised corruption tends to get exposed faster than national or State-level corruption.
People erroneously perceive higher corruption at the local level, simply because it is more
visible.
To curb these tendencies, first, gram sabhas and wards committees in urban areas have to
be revitalised. The constitutional definition of a gram sabha is that it is an association of
voters. Because of our erroneous belief that the word ‘sabha’ means ‘meeting’, we try to
regulate how grama sabha meetings are held and pretend that we are strengthening
democracy. Cosmetic reforms of the gram sabha by videography of their meetings, does
little for democracy. Consultations with the grama sabha could be organised through
smaller discussions where everybody can really participate. Even new systems of Short
Message Services, or social media groups could be used for facilitating discussions between
members of a grama sabha.
Second, local government organisational structures have to be strengthened. Panchayats
are burdened with a huge amount of work that other departments thrust on them, without
being compensated for the extra administrative costs. Local governments must be enabled
to hold State departments accountable and to provide quality, corruption free service to
them, through service-level agreements.
Third, we cannot have accountable GPs, without local taxation. Local governments are
reluctant to collect property taxes and user charges fully. They are happy to implement top-
down programmes because they know that if they collect taxes, their voters will never
forgive them for misusing their funds. The connection between tax payment and higher
accountability is well known, but we wish to ignore these lessons.

India’s efforts in decentralisation represent one of the largest experiments in deepening
democracy. Decentralisation is always a messy form of democracy, but it is far better than
the operation of criminal politicians at the higher level who appropriate huge sums of tax-
payer money, without any of us having a clue. We can keep track of corrupt local
government representatives; at the higher level, we will never know the extent of dirty deals
that happen.
We have given ourselves a reasonably robust democratic structure for local governance
over the last two decades and more. It is for us to give life to this structure, through the
practice of a robust democratic culture. Be warned; if we do not tell our higher level
governments to get off our backs so that we can better govern ourselves, they will not. It is
as important to tell higher level governments to stay away as it is for us to hold our local
governments to account.
A fit case for municipal legislature

Shashi Tharoor’s move to raise a private member bill to amend the 74th amendment comes
as a breath of fresh air in the stalemate that is municipal governance in India. Even though
it was a significant move towards deeper federalism, the original amendment did not have
a major impact on the political dominance of mayors. To bring about a significant change,
the power structure at the state and municipal levels will have to be reimagined.
It has been 24 years since the 74th amendment to the Indian Constitution was passed. The
amendment recognises municipal corporations as independent bodies and defines the
relationship between governments at the Union, state and municipal levels. Even though
the amendment highlights the need for mayors, municipal planning bodies and municipal
corporations, it still leaves cities mostly under the supervision of state legislatures. The role
of a mayor even though highlighted in the amendment continues to remain highly titular.
The current perception of mayors dates back to the formation of municipal corporations in
India. Municipal corporations have existed in India since the pre-independence era. These
corporations were based on the administrative structure created by the Municipal
Corporation Act of 1835, a British law originally passed by the UK Parliament.
The foundations of the Municipal Corporation Act along with the diarchy system introduced
by the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms continue to
exist in independent India. Diarchy is a system of government that is overseen by two

independent heads, one administrative and the other legislative. In Indian cities, the mayor,
elected by the citizens, is supposed to be the legislative head and the municipal
commissioner, an Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officer reporting to the state
government, is the administrative head. However, among the two heads, it is the
commissioner who plays a more significant role.
According to the seventh schedule of the Constitution of India, local governments fall under
the State List. In other words, only state governments and legislatures have authority in this
area. It is, therefore, the chief minister of the state who appoints the municipal
commissioner. The mayor, on the other hand, has limited powers as the decisions of state
assemblies prevail over and above the decisions made at the municipal level. Even the 74th
amendment that tried to empower mayors continued to subscribe to this power distribution
and therefore had limited impact.
The absence of a strong mayor in cities primarily creates two problems: one, lack of
accountability and second, a short-sighted approach towards city planning. The reason for
both problems lies in the distribution of power between the state and its municipalities.
Municipal commissioners, by virtue of their appointment, are only answerable to the chief
minister of the state. On the other hand, mayors stand accountable to their citizens at each
election. It is this difference in incentives that makes mayors invested in the long-term
growth of cities. Also, a commissioner responsible for the execution of policies in a short
timeframe has limited scope and reach. Hence, in order to incentivise growth on a city, a
municipality would require an ambitious mayor looking to make an example out of his/her
work along with a strong commissioner.
A significant change in the role of the mayor can be brought only by reworking the
distribution of powers and responsibilities between state and municipal governments.
However, this herculean task can only be completed by the Union government via a
Constitutional amendment. Ideally, the amendment should introduce a fourth list for local
governments into the seventh schedule, but at the very least it should lay the foundation for
an independent and accountable city administration.
Cities need to be headed by a legislative structure where the mayor, like the chief minister
at the state level, would be the elected head of the city-level government. The legislative
structure will comprise a city council, mayor-in-council, consisting of corporators elected
from various wards. The mayor-in-council will be responsible for making policies for the
city. The municipal commissioner in this governance structure would be accountable to the

legislative body to ensure the execution of plans. To ensure checks and balances, the mayor-
in-council will be able to impeach the mayor.
The mayor-in-council will be responsible for all the functions of a municipal corporation.
Keeping in line with the structure at the Union and state level, the elected members will be
assigned specific mandates. This would include areas such as maintenance of urban
utilities, water supply and sewage, public health and land-use plans. The mayor should also
be able to raise finances at the city level and look after the rule of law. The mayor-in-council
should approve all budgets, building by-laws, city laws and zone changes.
For a city to be able to plan for the needs of its citizens and inevitable changes, it requires
a long-term plan and robust implementation capacity. To achieve this, a separate
metropolitan cadre can be created in the state administrative services for administrative
officers with experience and a strong understanding of urban issues. This cadre should be
tasked with carrying out policies decided by the mayor-in-council. The municipal
commissioner can be the highest ranking IAS officer in the metropolitan cadre.
Municipalities in India require strong leadership invested in the welfare of its citizens. To
create this leadership, it is important to have a legislative representative and a cabinet of
members elected by the citizens to oversee the needs of the city. It is in this context that the
bill raised by Tharoor plays a significant role. A Constitutional amendment that empowers
the legislative structure at city levels will help bring uniform change across the country.
That said, since municipalities are state subjects, the policies require strong support from
the state to enable an independent municipality. This change would, therefore, require a
chief minister who is ready to take the bold step and leave a legacy of a more federalised
government.
With the economic centre of gravity shifting to states, India’s growth

hinges on cooperative federalism.
India’s prospects, including our aspiration for a $5 trillion economy, depend on the Centre
and the states working together.
India’s prospects, including our aspiration for a -trillion economy, depend on the Centre
and the states working together.

In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business index released last month, India ranked 63, an
impressive jump from its lowly rank of 142 when the Narendra Modi government first came
into office in 2014. Yet, there is anecdotal evidence of investors being frustrated by venality,
indifference and corruption at the operating level.
Now consider this: When the government amended the terms of reference of the 15th
Finance Commission a few months ago asking that allocations for defence and internal
security be carved out upfront, before determining the pool of resources to be shared with
the states, the latter baulked at the highhandedness of the Centre.
Also consider this: Early in his tenure, Modi attempted to reform the land acquisition law
by tweaking the balance in favour of investors, but quickly buckled down as many states
took umbrage. This, even though land is on the concurrent list in the Constitution, and a
central law would have prevailed notwithstanding states’ opposition.
The three snippets above, seemingly disparate, tell an important story — that of the growing
importance of states in India’s economic management.
It wasn’t always like this. In the early years of our republic, the Centre dominated across
all domains — political, economic and administrative — and states, even those led by
leaders with political heft, acquiesced to this unequal arrangement. The reaction to central
dominance came in the early 1980s when strong regional leaders started agitating against
“the hegemony of the Centre”. Several of them, for instance N T Rama Rao, built their
political careers on an “anti-Centre” platform.
As a consequence, the Centre yielded to the states, but largely in the political space. Much
of the economic policy control stayed with the Centre which decided not just public
investment but even private investment through its industrial and import licensing policies,
leaving the states on the margins of economic management.
That arrangement started to change with the onset of reforms from 1991. Three trends, in
particular, have shifted the economic centre of gravity from the Centre to the states
The first is the change in the content of the reform agenda. The Centre could push through
the reforms of the 1990s without even informing, much less consulting, the states because
they all pertained to subjects such as industrial licencing, import permits, exchange rate
and the financial sector, which were entirely within its domain. In contrast, the second-
generation reforms on the agenda now shift the emphasis, to use economic jargon, from

product to factor markets like land, labour and taxation, which need, not just acquiescence,
but often the consent of states.
Nothing illustrates the increased clout of the states in driving reforms more than the GST
negotiations. There was a clash of interests not just between the Centre and states but also
between producer and consumer states, large and small states and coastal and inland states.
The grand bargain that culminated in the GST, admittedly imperfect, involved all parties
making compromises. But the deal could not be clinched until the Centre guaranteed to fill
the revenue gap, if any, of states according to an agreed formula.
The second factor driving the economic centre of gravity towards states is the changing
dynamics of our fiscal federalism. Ballpark estimates suggest that the Centre collects about
60 per cent of the combined revenue (Centre and states), but gets to spend only about 40
per cent of the combined expenditure. This asymmetry is mirrored on the states’ side.
Together, they collect 40 per cent of the combined revenue, but spend as much as 60 per
cent of the combined expenditure.
More important than the aggregates is the greater autonomy that states now enjoy in
determining their expenditure. Gone is the Planning Commission. The states now not only
get a larger quantum of central transfers but also get to decide on how to spend that larger
quantum.
And how states manage their public finances matters much more than before. The RBI in
its latest annual report on state finances, raised several red flags — states’ increasing
weakness in raising revenue, their unsustainable debt burden and their tendency to retrench
capital expenditures in order to accommodate fiscal shocks such as farm loan waivers,
power sector loans under UDAY and a host of income transfer schemes.
As the RBI pointed out, the quality of expenditure at the state level has a multiplier effect
on overall development outcomes. Conversely, fiscal irresponsibility will take a heavy toll
on our growth and welfare prospects. The market will penalise mismanagement of public
finances; it does not much care who is responsible, the Centre or the states, for an
unsustainable debt burden or for even the colour of the fiscal deficit.
That segues into the third major trend behind the states’ growing importance in economic
federalism — their critical role in creating a conducive investment climate in the country.
Much of the responsibility for improving the ease of doing business rests not with Delhi but
with the states. This highlights the need for coordinated action.

India’s prospects, including our aspiration for a $5 trillion economy, depend on the Centre
and the states working together. No one would know this better than Modi who combines
over two decades of experience as chief minister and prime minister. Arguably, he has
another unique advantage in that more than two-thirds of the states are currently governed
by the BJP.
If ever there was an opportune moment for a big push on cooperative federalism, it is now.
The paradox of India’s Green Revolution

Despite the rapid strides made in foodgrain output, malnutrition remains stubbornly high.
More than five decades after India launched the Green Revolution, its war on hunger is far
from won.
The impetus for the Green Revolution came from harvest failures and famine conditions in
the mid-1960s. But its main goal was to ensure India’s national food security, more
precisely its self-reliance in foodgrain production.
We can see now that the policies adopted then, and left largely unchanged since, have not
only failed to eliminate hunger but also made more intractable the challenge of providing
adequate and appropriate nutrition for all of India’s people.
These policies have included subsidies for fertiliser and groundwater extraction, minimum
support prices for foodgrains (especially rice and wheat), and procurement and public
distribution of grains (also mostly rice and wheat).
Today, India has achieved self-reliance in foodgrain production. It has become the world’s
second largest producer of both wheat and rice and the largest exporter of rice.
Despite the large increases in total production, per capita availability of all foodgrains has
increased only modestly as the population has more than tripled since the mid-1960s.
Per capita net availability jumped from 144 kg per year in 1951 to 171 kg in 1971 largely
due to greater availability of wheat, but over the last 50 years has fluctuated between 170
and 180 kg.

What has changed markedly is that wheat and rice have largely displaced more nutritious
pulses and other cereals such as millets in consumption.
Through the Public Distribution Scheme of 5,00,000 Fair Price Shops around the country,
wheat, rice, and sugar are supplied to the poor at highly subsidised prices. While the scheme
and its successor programmes have clearly provided a vital nutritional floor for India’s
poor, especially its urban poor, they have been widely criticised for large leakages to the
non-poor and incentives to consume calories and exclude more nutritious foods.
India’s increases in total food production have, unfortunately, not translated into
proportionate decreases in malnutrition. While over the last two or three decades, higher
rates of economic growth, declining poverty and availability of staples have led to
reductions in the number of undernourished to around 15 per cent of the population,
malnutrition remains stubbornly high.
As a result, India ranks 103rd out of 119 countries on the International Food Policy
Research Institute’s (IFPRI) 2018 Global Hunger Index (GHI) and is home to the largest
number of malnourished people in the world, about one quarter of the global total.
Malnutrition in India today is concentrated among children under five. While the rates of
child malnutrition have diminished over the last decade or two, child wasting and stunting
are still widespread. According to the 2018 Global Nutrition Report, in 2015 about 21 per
cent of all children under five were wasted and 38 per cent stunted.
Problem of over-nutrition
India is also experiencing rapid increases in over-nutrition, largely due to over-
consumption of calories.
This trend is evident in the rising incidence of overweight and obesity especially among
adolescents and adults, but also among children 5-19 years old.
It is leading to higher rates of diabetes and other non-communicable diseases. Already
today, mortality due to diet-related diseases is rising more rapidly in India than in many
other emerging economies. Clearly, one cause of persistent child malnutrition in India is
still high rural poverty — 25 per cent nationally and higher in poorer States, as compared
to 14 per cent in urban areas.

Today, agricultural households account for 50 per cent of extreme poverty in India. Major
reasons include the government’s failure to change the terms of trade between agricultural
producers and consumers and invest adequately in the agricultural sector. A recent study
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Indian
Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) found that over the
last 18 years, India has implicitly taxed agriculture at the rate of over 14 per cent, largely
by keeping food prices low for urban consumers.
From 1981-2014, the growth of public (Central and States) investment in agriculture and
irrigation averaged 4.6 per cent and 4.0 per cent respectively, well below China’s
investment rates at a comparable level of development.
Not surprisingly then, the incidence of malnutrition, especially stunting, is higher in both
rural and lower income households, primarily farm households. A second cause of
persistent child malnutrition is the inefficiencies and distortions of the Green Revolution
agriculture and food policies.
Programmes focused on child nutrition such as the Integrated Child Development Scheme,
launched in 1975, and the Mid-Day Meals Scheme, introduced in 1995, have not corrected
the Public Distribution Scheme’s bias toward calories. Subsidies continued the reliance on
rice and wheat and did not include more varied and nutritious foods.

Poor sanitation
A third cause of persistently high child malnutrition in India has been impure drinking water
and poor sanitation. India has made significant strides in improving safer drinking water
availability, but according to the 2018 Global Nutrition Report, the prevalence of open
defecation, a well-known cause of disease, especially in children, was still about 40 per cent
in 2015.
A comparison with Africa is instructive. While the poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is
nearly three times higher than in India, and the rates of undernourishment in the two regions
are nearly equal, open defecation is more prevalent in India, and so also are child wasting
and stunting rates. To Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s credit, he has launched a major
effort to improve sanitation, the Swachh Bharat initiative, that is clearly showing signs of
success. Looking ahead, poverty and malnutrition in rural India will be exacerbated by
increasingly frequent droughts, other weather extremes, and long-term climate change
impacts.
Successive droughts in 2014-15 and 2015-16 affected much of the country. The IFPRI’s
2018 Global Food Policy Report projects that 93 million Indians will be at risk of hunger
by 2030 and 45 million by 2050, if the expected effects of climate change are considered.
Today, India faces an urgent crisis of child malnutrition and a looming crisis of over-
nutrition with long-term consequences for public health. The responses required include:
(i) Reforming the Green Revolution policies of price supports, input subsidies,
procurement, and public distribution to shift their focus from wheat and rice to
more nutritious grains, pulses, vegetables, and fruits.
(ii) Moving swiftly to increase biofortification of a wider range of foods than is so
far included in India’s plans.
(iii) Improving sanitary facilities, especially in the rural areas where poverty and
child malnutrition are concentrated.
In the 1960s, India showed itself and the world it could move dramatically to relieve hunger
and feed itself.
Today it is at another critical juncture in the search for overall food security. As Prime
Minister Modi readies for a historic second term in office, he has the opportunity over the
next five years to declare India’s final victory over hunger and malnutrition.
From Hong Kong to Chile, 2019 is the year of the street protester. But why?
By last week it was undeniable: 2019 has become the year of the street protester. As
hundreds of thousands marched in Hong Kong and Santiago, Lebanon and London, what
has become a global explosion of people power was prompting panic among a host of
governments — and raising some interesting questions about how and why it was all -
happening.
Of course, the phenomenon is not new, even in modern times. Since the late 1980s, when
people took to the streets in the Philippines and South Korea, and then in the captive nations
of Eastern Europe, mass movements of people have been overthrowing governments or, at
least, creating political turmoil.
But this year is exceptional for the sheer breadth and diversity of the unrest. Hong Kong,
which has now had 20 consecutive weeks of mass protests, has had perhaps the most noted
uprising. But the Middle East has seen demonstrations in Algeria, Sudan, Egypt and Iraq
in addition to Lebanon.
In Latin America, Chile’s riots followed mass protests in Ecuador, Argentina and
Honduras. In Eastern Europe, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Serbia and Georgia
have been rocked. Vladimir Putin has had to contend with the largest street demonstrations
in Russia since 2012. And the list goes on.
Why now? After all, the global economy is still growing, as it has for the past decade. In
most of the world, poverty is declining. Governments in many countries where people are
marching are corrupt, repressive or simply dysfunctional — but arguably no more so than
they have been for decades.
Facile explanations have flourished. In Chile, where at least 18 people have died in
demonstrations, foreign correspondents who rushed to seek explanations from Santiago’s
left-leaning intelligentsia came away with a suspiciously ideological story: The “neo-
liberalism” that Chile has practiced over the past 30 years, it was said, had failed. But wait.
The poverty rate has fallen from nearly 50 percent to 6 percent during that time, living
standards have risen dramatically, and inequality is less severe than in all but two other
Latin American countries.

Some Middle East analysts jumped to the conclusion that the unrest in Iraq and Lebanon
showed that people were finally fed up with sectarianism, especially that promoted by Shiite
Iran. Maybe — but that doesn’t account for the uprisings in Sunni Algeria, Sudan or Egypt.
A New York Times survey posited “a louder-than-usual howl against elites in countries
where democracy is a source of disappointment.” But that doesn’t explain Algeria or Hong
Kong.
A simple conclusion could be that the global unrest has no shared characteristics other than
the tactic of taking to the streets. But I think there is more to it than that. Hong Kong and
Egypt, Chile and Lebanon have two things in common: pervasive social media and a rising
generation of discontented youth who are masters of it. The combination of the two has
changed the balance of power between government and society in both democratic and
authoritarian states.
Chile’s protests began not with unions or opposition parties but with middle and high school
students, who used social media to call on riders to jump subway turnstiles in protest of a
fare hike. The protest went viral; the government, caught unawares, overreacted and called
out the army. Soon the whole country was in turmoil. Similarly, Lebanon’s unrest began
with young people outraged over a tax on phone calls made on WhatsApp.
In Egypt, thousands of mostly young, male soccer fans took to the streets of Cairo in
response to a call from a previously unknown businessman who posted videos on YouTube
denouncing corruption. The panicked regime of Abdel Fatah al-Sissi responded by
arresting numerous opposition activists who had nothing to do with what was an entirely
new channel of discontent.
By far the most sophisticated use of new media is by the opposition movement in Hong
Kong, which has used it to remain leaderless. Activists coordinate over secure apps such as
Telegram; they used another app to identify and avoid police deployments before Apple
pulled the tool under pressure from Beijing. As elsewhere, the backbone of the movement is
young people, including teenagers.
This is a motivated generation, pushing for dramatic change in the political status quo. In
that sense, the youth of 2019 are a little like those of 1968. Their command of new
communications technologies makes it easy for them to attract followers, circumvent the
usual channels of public debate and blindside governments. They are able to mobilize large
numbers on small issues, such as fare increases, and tap into general discontent that
otherwise might have remained unexpressed.

The mass protests they have generated have had very different aims in very different places.
But they augur a new era of political conflict.
The proliferation of popular protests
If there is one thing that unites the world in 2019, it’s anger at governments—that should
worry both governments and the people that are raging against them
The world isn’t fair. But that’s not new; what’s new is the speed and intensity with which
popular fury at this unfairness is boiling over into sustained political protests. In the last
few months, protests have gripped rich and poor countries alike, strong democracies and
strong repressive regimes, too.
At the heart of this anger is the widespread perception that policymakers are acting in the
interests of elites rather than the people. Protests feature regularly in developing countries,
and for good reason; their populations suffer acutely when governments fail to provide
basic services, and the lack of developed political institutions means that non-traditional
actors—protestors very much among them—tend to move the political needle.
In the last few weeks, Egypt has seen its biggest protests since the Arab Spring, prompted
by allegation of corruption by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the military, and further
exacerbated by economic reforms that have resulted in lower subsidies and higher taxes for
the country’s poorest. In Lebanon, a WhatsApp tax on online communications prompted
protests that became quickly engulfed by broader economic and political concerns,
ultimately forcing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign. Iraq’s president Adel
Abdul Mahdi hasn’t fared much better than the Lebanese PM, and his country has been
gripped by protests by people exhausted by high unemployment and lacklustre public
services. In Ecuador, the decision of president Lenin Moreno to scrap long-standing fuel
subsides powered weeks-long protests on a range of social issues that ultimately led him to
reverse his decision, a victory for the country’s protestors but a loss for the country’s fiscal
discipline.
Historically, protests have tended to be less effective in wealthier countries—both because
politics are more entrenched and likely to have been already captured by special interests,
and because wealthier populations have the luxury of waiting for the next election cycle to
register their political dissatisfaction at the polls.

Increasingly though, voting booths are no longer capable of acting as political release
valves.
In Chile, Sebastian Pinera’s three percent hike in metro tickets kicked off protests in one of
Latin America’s wealthiest and most stable countries, as people came out to protest low
pension and the high costs of basic services like utilities and medicine (some even set fire
to the streets), only to be enraged further by the decision to deploy the military in a country
with a history of military dictatorship. The Gilets Jaunes movements in France brought
Paris to a near standstill almost a year ago, and while the movement has largely petered
out, upcoming pension reform and the anniversary effect risk reigniting the movement. In
Spain, the recent decision by the country’s Supreme Court to hand down long jail sentences
to Catalonia leaders who spearheaded the 2017 independence referendum and secessionist
push touched off massive protests, complicating upcoming elections this weekend which
already were looking unlikely to produce a clear winner.
Meanwhile on the other side of the world, Hong Kong protests continue, flummoxing one of
the world’s most significant economic power centres. Yet of all these protests, it’s those in
Hong Kong that seem to pose the least threat to their respective government (albeit
indirectly) in Beijing, which has the luxury of simply waiting out the protestors. Which
raises the critical question: In our day of widespread grievance and political frustration, is
democracy still the best form of government going forward? Democracy has thrived in
recent decades as more and more people began contributing to their country’s economic
productivity (one of globalisation’s most important by-products), making it easier for them
to get a larger say in politics. But now globalisation is retreating and technology has begun
displacing labour and will continue to do so for years to come.
It’s a question worth tracking, though it’s too early to say that democracy’s best days are
behind it; globalization has been far too successful to write it off completely. But when you
combine all these structural problems with a global economy that’s slowing down, it makes
it even harder for governments to address the legitimate concerns of their people going
forward. If there is one thing that unites the world in 2019, it’s anger at governments—that
should worry both governments and the people that are raging against them.
Anger on the streets, from east to west

YEAR OF PROTESTS The second half of 2019 has witnessed pro-democracy
demonstrations in various continents

Mass demonstrations, nationwide roadblocks, violent clashes with police and immense
damage to property. Throughout the second half of 2019, several protest movements have
sent shock waves across continents.
Among the most prominent hubs of ongoing activism are Hong Kong, Spain, Iraq, Lebanon,
Iran, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria and Russia haven’t been spared
either, alongside several other nations.
Most of these protests panning out simultaneously have a common thread. They have largely
been dubbed “pro-democracy movements”, with particular focus on the state’s role in
economic failure and corruption.
In West Asia, protests have added to the instability caused by the US-Iran tensions. In Iraq,
people are protesting violently against corruption and job losses. Its neighbour Iran has
been left shaken by protesters on rampage following an unpopular fuel price rise. Rattled
by the unrest, Tehran has gone on to announce that hundreds of banks, government sites
and petrol pumps have been torched by angry mobs.
In Lebanon, which is reeling under economic woes, demonstrators are taking their
government to task over the administration’s controversial move to levy a tax on WhatsApp
calls.
On the South American continent, Chile has been spiralling into chaos due to violent
protests over a hike in subway fares and escalating inequality. Bolivia, too, has descended
into chaos. Supporters of Evo Morales are at loggerheads with political opponents after
protests over alleged electoral fraud forced him to flee the country.
Moving on to Europe, in Spain, the Catalonia pro-independence movement has kept
Barcelona constantly on the boil with activists facing off with cops.
The most widely talked about movement is the one raging in Hong Kong, where
demonstrators are seeking greater political freedom from China. The crisis has kept the
spotlight away from Russia, where the government has witnessed protests over local
election results, and has carried out mass arrests.

India-China equation post-Mamallapuram
In a nutshell, the two summits acknowledge that India and China were not 'adversaries' but
two large economic powers open to a healthy competition in a multipolar world.
The most important takeaway from the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and
President Xi Jinping at Mamallapuram, formerly Mahabalipuram -- the second since
Wuhan that happened in April 2018 -- is that the two biggest nations with a deep
civilisational legacy could successfully explore the areas of detente and cooperation
independently of the third party influences. The scale of welcome accorded to the Chinese
President reflected the cultural content of Indian hospitality that would not go unnoticed in
terms of the message of willingness to work for mutually beneficial relationship that it put
out for the visiting dignitary.
What Wuhan had registered was an explicit sharing of this thought in spite of the Doklam
episode and at the end of a year since, the notable outcome for India-China relations is that,
notwithstanding the adverse impact of Sino-Pak alliance on them, the two countries can
retrieve the positives that were still out there. In a nutshell, the two summits acknowledge
that India and China were not 'adversaries' but two large economic powers open to a
healthy competition in a multipolar world. The big picture is that China could no more
afford to take India for granted, that international relations today primarily weighed in for
peace and development and that 'checks and balances' were now recognised as a legitimate
instrument for preventing 'military' conflicts in the post- Cold War era.
The demeanour of President Xi at the cultural reception organised for him suggested that
he was preoccupied with the thought of dealing with what was substantive in India-China
relationship for him, at a time when his country had challenges on multiple fronts. China
needs time to build itself as the second super power through the economic route - even as it
continues to simultaneously consolidate its military power to reach parity with the US in
that sphere.
Speed breakers that the Trump Presidency has created for the unfettered advantage
accruing to China in its trade with US in the past would lead President Xi Jinping to an
effort to retrieve whatever trade benefit it could continue getting from the Indian market. A
trade deficit of over $52 billion confronting India in relation to China should get Xi to
realise that things would not be the same again and that a pragmatic approach to India-
China trade relations alone could serve the interests of the two countries. Prime Minister

Modi is adept at showing the pathway to shared progress to President Jinping in this area
-- he now knows Xi personally enough to make this process smooth. The outcome of the
summit would be keenly awaited.
As far as the perennial issues around the LAC are concerned, Doklam tested India's
political will not to tolerate any border encroachment or alteration of the existing dividers.
China has brought in PLA to directly oversee the LAC and India has responded by pushing
the army closer to the borders with China but both sides seemed to be in favour of
maintaining peace and promoting confidence building measures there. Sino-Pak military
alliance is a regional leverage that China no doubt thinks it can invoke against India but it
is apparently more about the CPEC opening up new ways for China's economic expansion-
including an outlet into the Arabian Sea.
On the issue of terrorism China knows it cannot uphold Pakistan beyond a point -- its
response on Kashmir after the abrogation by India of Articles 370 and 35A has essentially
been to advocate bilateral talks on the issue between India and Pakistan -- this is a low cost
instrument for China to keep Pakistan humoured. China would have sensed that conversion
of Ladakh into a Union Territory gave the Centre here a more direct control on this sensitive
territory on the Chinese border. Moreover, the fear of radicalisation of its Muslim minority
has come alive for the Chinese leadership - its historical memory of how in the Cold War
era Pakistan helped the US-led West to encourage Islamic militancy in Xinjiang and
Uzbekistan bordering Afghanistan would not have been completely erased.
The possibility of a synchronised mischief by China and Pakistan on our borders has been
factored in by our Defence forces - even though such an eventuality still remains only in the
background. India has activated its participation in QUAD but the focus of this US-Japan-
India-Australia convergence is so far on maintenance of 'rules based regime' in the Indo-
Pacific maritime zone. President Xi must have got the message that India would be willing
to halt any designs of the Chinese in the Indian Ocean further up north through this steadily
developing multi lateral -- but as yet non-military -- partnership. Since Wuhan, India's Look
East policy has strengthened our friendship with many countries in the East and this also
works to India's advantage.
The statements made by the two sides at this summit would be analysed by strategic experts
but given the content and the unambiguous language of both, certain deductions can be
made upfront. Surely, China has taken cognisance of the fact that in the Modi regime India

is now a major voice in the world community on matters of global security and economic
relations and that Prime Minister Modi would not be found wanting in responding to any
positive overtures from Xi Jinping. India's willingness to work for a 'balance of power' to
ensure global peace has been in evidence in the recent period. All of this provided a
backdrop to the Mamallapuram summit that favoured the pursuit of understanding and de-
emphasised friction.
Prime Minister Modi declared that 'Chennai Connect' had opened a new chapter in India-
China cooperation and President Xi Jinping on his part disclosed that in the multiple
conversations he had had with the Indian leader, there was heart-to-heart exchange of
views - like among friends - on 'bilateral matters'. As expected trade relations were on top
of the agenda - an indication of this coming from the announcement by India that Finance
Minister Nirmala Sitharaman would, along with the Chinese Vice Premier, lead the
initiative to develop a mechanism for carrying trade, investment and services forward.
President Xi elaborated further on the tenor of discussions by saying that the two nations
now enjoyed a 'deeper strategic communication and effective practical cooperation'. It is
clear that Xi Jinping did not get involved with Kashmir - one would like to believe that the
Indian delegation, while broaching the subject of terrorism, succeeded in waking up the
Chinese to the reality that this new faith-based global terror invoking Jehad, which was
emanating from Pakistan, was dangerous for both India and China in the long run. In a
nutshell, the second informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi
Jinping is an advance over Wuhan and has established a bilateral grid that suits the security
and economic strategy of India. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister will handle it
well to India's long-term advantage.
2nd India-China Informal Summit

1. The Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi and the President of the People's
Republic of China Mr Xi Jinping held their Second Informal Summit in Chennai, India, on
11-12 October 2019.
2. The two Leaders had an in-depth exchange of views in a friendly atmosphere on

overarching, long-term and strategic issues of global and regional importance.
3. They also shared their respective approaches towards national development.

4. They evaluated the direction of bilateral relations in a positive light and discussed how
India-China bilateral interaction can be deepened to reflect the growing role of both
countries on the global stage.
5. Both Leaders shared the view that the international situation is witnessing significant
readjustment. They were of the view that India and China share the common objective of
working for a peaceful, secure and prosperous world in which all countries can pursue their
development within a rules-based international order.
6. They reiterated the consensus reached during the first Informal Summit in Wuhan, China
in April 2018, that India and China are factors for stability in the current international
landscape and that both side will prudently manage their differences and not allow
differences on any issue to become disputes.
7. The Leaders recognized that India and China have a common interest in preserving and
advancing a rules-based and inclusive international order, including through reforms that
reflect the new realities of the 21st Century. Both agreed that it is important to support and
strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system at a time when globally agreed trade
practices and norms are being selectively questioned. India and China will continue to work
together for open and inclusive trade arrangements that will benefit all countries.
8. Both Leaders also underscored the important efforts being made in their respective
countries to address global developmental challenges, including climate change and the
Sustainable Development Goals. They emphasized that their individual efforts in this regard
would help the international community achieve the targets.
9. Both Leaders are concerned that terrorism continues to pose a common threat. As
countries that are large and diverse, they recognized the importance of continuing to make
joint efforts to ensure that the international community strengthens the framework against
training, financing and supporting terrorist groups throughout the world and on a non-
discriminatory basis.
10. As important contemporary civilizations with great traditions, both Leaders deemed it
important to enhance dialogue in order to foster cultural understanding between the two
peoples. Both Leaders also agreed that, as major civilizations in history, they can work
together to enhance greater dialogue and understanding between cultures and civilizations

in other parts of the world.
11. They shared the view that an open, inclusive, prosperous and stable environment in the
region is important to ensure the prosperity and stability of the region. They also agreed on
the importance of concluding negotiations for a mutually-beneficial and balanced Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
12. The two Leaders exchanged views on the age-old commercial linkages and people-to-
people contacts between India and China in the past two millennia, including significant
maritime contacts. In this regard the two leaders agreed on establishment of sister-state
relations between Tamil Nadu and Fujian Province, exploring the possibility of establishing
an academy to study links between Mahabalipuram and Fujian province on the lines of the
experience between Ajanta and Dunhuang and conducting research on maritime links
between China and India in view of our extensive contacts over the centuries.
13. The two Leaders shared their mutual vision on goals for development of their respective
economies. They agreed that the simultaneous development of India and China presents
mutually-beneficial opportunities. The two sides will continue to adopt a positive, pragmatic
and open attitude and to enhance appreciation of each other’s policies and actions in line
with the general direction of their friendship and cooperation. In this regard, they also
agreed to continue to enhance strategic communication on all matters of mutual interest,
and to continue the momentum of high-level exchanges by making full use of dialogue
mechanisms.
14. The leaders were of the view that the positive direction of ties had opened up possibilities
for taking bilateral relations to greater heights. They agreed that this endeavor also
required strong public support in both countries. In this context the two Leaders have
decided to designate 2020 as Year of India-China Cultural and People to People Exchanges
and agreed that the 70th anniversary of the establishment of India-China relations in 2020
will be fully utilized to deepen exchanges at all levels including between their respective
legislatures, political parties, cultural and youth organizations and militaries. To celebrate
the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations the two countries will organize 70 activities
including a conference on a ship voyage that will trace the historical connect between the
two civilizations.
15. In pursuit of their efforts to further deepen economic cooperation and to enhance their
closer development partnership, the two Leaders have decided to establish a High-Level

Economic and Trade Dialogue mechanism with the objective of achieving enhanced trade
and commercial relations, as well as to better balance the trade between the two countries.
They have also agreed to encourage mutual investments in identified sectors through the
development of a Manufacturing Partnership and tasked their officials to develop this idea
at the first meeting of the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue.
16. The two Leaders have exchanged views on outstanding issues, including on the
boundary question. They have welcomed the work of the Special Representatives and urged
them to continue their efforts to arrive at a mutually-agreed framework for a fair,
reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement based on Political Parameters and Guiding
Principles that were agreed by the two sides in 2005. They reiterated their understanding
that efforts will continue to be made to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas,
and that both sides will continue to work on additional Confidence Building Measures in
pursuit of this objective.
17. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi also appraised the practice of Informal Summits
in a positive light as providing an important opportunity to deepen dialogue and to promote
mutual understanding at the Leaders’ level in line with the ‘Wuhan Spirit’ and the ‘Chennai
Connect”. They agreed to continue this practice in the future. President Xi invited Prime
Minister Modi to visit China for the 3rd Informal Summit. Prime Minister Modi has
accepted the invitation.
At Mamallapuram, Xi and Modi look to past to shape future of Sino-India ties

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi held “productive" talks
with on Friday as part of the second India-China informal summit in the southern coastal
town of Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu, with both looking to chart a new course for bilateral
ties over the next few decades despite a series of irritants that have cropped up between the
two nations.
Xi, who arrived at the Chennai airport a little after 2pm on Friday, was welcomed by Tamil
Nadu governor Banwarilal Purohit and chief minister Edappadi K. Palaniswami, among
others.
The meeting is the third between the two leaders since Modi’s re-election as Prime Minister
in May and the sixth since Modi and Xi sat down for their first informal summit in Wuhan
last April.

Modi, dressed in a traditional veshti (dhoti/sarong), a white shirt and an angavastram,
welcomed Xi, who was informally dressed in a white shirt and black trousers, when he
arrived in Mamallapuram.
Modi took Xi to three iconic monuments in the historical coastal city—Arjuna’s Penance,
Panch Rathas and the Shore Temple. The monuments date back to the Pallava era (4th-9th
century CE). One of the reasons for choosing Mamallapuram was to highlight the contacts
between the Pallava kings and China’s Fujian province where Xi served as governor once.
The two leaders witnessed a cultural programme at the temple complex before sitting down
for a round of talks in the lawns of the Shore Temple complex. Modi later hosted a private
dinner for Xi at the temple complex that rounded off the programme on Friday.
“Concluding a highly productive day with a pleasant conversation over a long dinner,"
foreign ministry spokesman Raveesh Kumar said in Twitter post. “PM @narendramodi &
Chinese President Xi continued their exchange of views on deepening of the India-China
partnership over a breathtaking Kalakshetra cultural performance followed by dinner."
Friday’s talks between Modi and Xi were aimed at building on the relationship reset that
began in Wuhan in April last year.
People familiar with the visit said the summit’s informal structure helped provide an easy
setting for the leaders to meet and discuss where they see India-China ties going over the
next several decades. No agreements are expected, giving the leaders the time they need to
discuss all the matters that they want to. The broad agenda included their unresolved border
dispute, trade and people-to-people contacts besides regional and global issues.
A person familiar with the developments said the objective of the informal summit was to
“ensure that communication between the leaders is one which is routinized, easy-going... it
indicates that President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi are getting down to
business in an informal way, not simply in a structured summit.... but in a much more
practical way of several hours of one-to-one discussion at which any subject can be
discussed".
Chinese ambassador to India Sun Weidong was quoted as saying by news reports that a
“new set of consensus" including “guiding principles" on giving a new direction to the
bilateral ties were expected after this weekend’s summit.

The countdown to the Friday-Saturday summit was clouded by a series of irritants including
a statement by Xi telling Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan that he was watching the
situation in Kashmir and would support Pakistan on issues related to its core interests. The
comment was in the context of tensions between India and Pakistan after New Delhi
scrapped a temporary provision in its constitution that gave special status to Kashmir and
integrated the region more closely with India.
India has termed it as its internal matter and issued a sharp response to Xi’s comments,
that was also notable for its timing—less than 48 hours ahead of Xi’s arrival in India.
“India’s position has been consistent and clear that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part
of India. China is well aware of our position. It is not for other countries to comment on the
internal affairs of India," foreign ministry spokesman Raveesh Kumar said.
China, on its part, has been reportedly unhappy about Indian military exercises in
Arunachal Pradesh, some 100km from the undemarcated border between the two countries.
China claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as part of its territory.
The irritants surfacing in India-China ties ahead of the Mamallapuram summit have been
in sharp contrast to the atmospherics ahead of the Wuhan meet last year. The announcement
of the Wuhan meet had signalled a thaw in bilateral ties after the 73-day India-China
military face off at Bhutan’s Doklam plateau in 2017. Modi had spent close to two days at
Wuhan with Xi. In contrast, Xi is in India for less than 24 hours. He will be stopping over
in Nepal for a visit on his way back to Beijing.
The Second ‘Informal Summit’ Is Done. Now for the Hard Part in India-China Ties
The optics of the latest “informal summit” aside, India and China remain worlds apart on
major issues.
The recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President
Xi Jinping in the southern Indian city of Mamallapuram was meant to provide a forum for
the leaders to build on the progress they had purportedly made in the central Chinese city
of Wuhan in 2018, their first “informal summit.”
In theory, an informal summit setting has value. It allows the two leaders to get to know one
another. Modi, leader of the world’s largest democracy with a political mandate unseen in
more than three decades, and Xi, effectively China’s leader for life if he chooses, stand to

be significant figures when the history of Asian geopolitics in the first half of the 21st century
is written.
Candid exchanges between the two, therefore, are meant to pave the way for progress.
However, there’s little indication that this sort of progress is really under way as part of
the Wuhan-Mamallapuram process.
Xi and Modi may have grown used to sharing the stage for photo opportunities on each
other’s soil, but the geopolitical issues that divide India and China remain
To keep the mood positive in Mamallapuram, neither pressed on raw nerves. On the Indian
side, these include the recent decision by the government to abrogate parts of article 370 of
the constitution, changing the internal administrative status of northern Jammu and
Kashmir state.
For China, complaints about “core interests” – including the protests in Hong Kong,
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and even atrocities in western Xinjiang
Uygur autonomous region – were omitted.
China claims the entirety of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet,” and
India claims China-occupied Aksai Chin as part of its territory. These issues have been part
of talks for years, but a final, comprehensive settlement remains distant, even after 2017
when the armed forces of the two countries went eyeball-to-eyeball along the border.
Beyond this, issues new and old – from India’s continued accommodation of the Dalai Lama
to China’s “all-weather” relationship with Pakistan – continue to dog their ties. But despite
these differences, India and China have largely been able to maintain a relationship that
waxes and wanes between cooperative and competitive bouts.
If appearances at Mamallapuram are to be believed, the relationship continues in its post-
Wuhan summit “reset.” However, look closer and the geopolitical unease between India
and China bubbles to the surface.
According to Xinhua’s view of the meeting, China emphasized the need for both sides to
“correctly view each other’s development and enhance strategic mutual trust.”
The message? Neither side should allow external influences to affect their relationship. This
summit, of course, came just weeks after the first foreign minister-level meeting of the
reconvened “quadrilateral” involving the United States, India, Japan and Australia on the

sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Neither China nor India
has forgotten about the broader tensions underlying their relationship.
As if to underscore these concerns, Xi followed up his trip to India with a visit to Nepal,
where he became the first Chinese leader to set foot in the country since Jiang Zemin in
1996.
In Kathmandu, Xi elevated the relationship between the two countries and was likely to have
marked what will someday be seen as a watershed moment in Nepal’s geopolitical drift out
of India’s orbit, where it had lingered for decades.
The Modi government has its foreign policy tastes and predilections, but India’s primary
grand strategic goal remains its own economic uplifting. Even as relations with China
remain difficult – and are likely to become more so in the years ahead – it will be difficult
for New Delhi to totally and decisively pivot away from its neighbour to the north.
And so, at Mamallapuram, it was economic issues that were the easiest to discuss and
announce: rebalancing trade, encouraging mutual investors, and deepening economic
cooperation. For India, in particular, slowing economic indicators make China’s salience
as a neighbour and investor all the more important.
The story of India and China in the near term will be more of the same. The competitive
dynamic will persist but its effects will be managed before they can spiral out of control.
The informal summits – an Indian idea – may have their place as long as Xi and Modi sit in
control in Beijing and Delhi but their effect will be far from transformative. Another such
meeting will take place next year in China.
For now, India and China remain as far apart as ever on the fundamentals. And given their
interests and mutual suspicions, no amount of meetings can change that.

With China, India must recognise power imbalance, liberate itself from prolonged
illusions, false hopes
Delhi’s overestimation of its leverage with Beijing in the triangular relationship with
Washington has unfortunately meant India often chose to voluntarily limit its partnership
with the US and its allies.
That India’s relationship with China is passing through a difficult moment is not hard to
see, even amidst the usual hype that surrounds meetings between leaders of the two
countries. The rhetoric about India and China changing the world has always masked the
persistent structural problems that hobbled their ties. If managing the relationship with
China has become the biggest test for Indian foreign policy, the second informal summit
between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping is a good occasion to
reflect on the trends in Delhi’s diplomacy towards Beijing.
First is the danger of putting form above substance and betting that the higher the level of
engagement, the more significant the results. The novelty of the “informal summit” that
dazzled everyone when Modi traveled to Wuhan to spend two days in a relaxed setting with
Xi last year has worn off. Like so many other mechanisms before it, the informal summit,
too, is proving to be inadequate to cope with the range of structural tensions that have
enveloped the bilateral relationship — from Kashmir to trade and multilateral challenges.
Since they sought to normalise relations more than three decades ago, when Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi traveled to Beijing, the two sides have experimented with different
mechanisms to address the basic differences. They started with a dialogue at the level of
foreign secretaries in 1988, elevated it to empowered special representatives in 2003, and
most recently, the informal summits. None of these have been able to resolve the boundary
dispute, trade deficit and China’s growing support to Pakistan in Islamabad’s contestation
with Delhi.
Second, the lack of enough contact at the highest levels is no longer a problem. In the 20th
century it was but rare when leaders of India or China traveled to the other country. In the
21st century, the Indian Prime Minister runs often into the PM or President of China and
has talks on the margins of such regional and international settings as the East Asia Summit
(EAS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Russia-India-China Forum, BRICS and

the G-20. Frequency of talks has not improved the ability to resolve the problems facing the
relationship.
Third, the current difficulties between India and China are not due to lack of mutual
understanding. The problem is the widening gap in the comprehensive national power of
the two Asian giants. China’s aggregate GDP, now at about $14 trillion, is nearly five times
larger than that of India, hovering at $2.8 trillion. China’s annual defence spending at $250
billion is four times larger than that of India. More than the size of the spending, China has
outpaced India in the much needed modernisation of its armed forces and higher defence
organisation.
This power imbalance translates into an unpleasant fact on the diplomatic front. That China
is under no pressure to please India. Or, more precisely, it can afford to displease India —
whether it is the question of blocking India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
or opposing India’s Kashmir move and taking it to the UNSC. That did not change at Wuhan
nor will it alter in a big way at Chennai.
Fourth, is the persistent belief in Delhi that current tensions in US-China relations might
encourage Beijing to make nice to India. That expectation has turned out to be wrong. The
deepening crisis in US-China relations has made little difference to Beijing’s approach to
Delhi. The movement has apparently been in the opposite direction.
For China, the foremost strategic priority today is to cut a deal with the US. If Xi Jinping
can’t fix the problem with President Donald Trump in the next year, he would hope that
Trump will be defeated in the elections at the end of 2020 and his potential Democrat
successor would be a lot easier to deal with in 2021. That the Chinese priority is the US
should not be surprising given the scale and intensity of the stakes involved in Beijing’s ties
with Washington.
Delhi’s overestimation of its leverage with Beijing in the triangular relationship with
Washington has unfortunately meant India often chose to voluntarily limit its partnership
with the US and its allies. That has not led to any strategic appreciation in Beijing of Delhi’s
restraint or the need for neutrality in the disputes between India and Pakistan. Viewed
strictly in terms of power hierarchy, China’s strategy does look logical — to keep India in
play without giving up on any of its positions of concern for India.
Fifth is the long-standing presumption in Delhi that cooperation with China on global issues
will create the conditions for ameliorating bilateral contentions. This turned out to be

wrong on three counts. India’s support to China on global issues has not led to Beijing’s
reciprocation on multilateral issues, such as Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism, of interest
to India, nor has it made it easier to resolve bilateral disputes. Worse still, grand-standing
on global issues with Beijing may have made India oblivious to China’s rapid regional
advance in the Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean.
Finally, if there is one thing that distinguishes Modi’s diplomacy from that of his
predecessors, it is the appreciation of power and its centrality in international relations.
When he took charge as PM, Modi seemed confident about his ability to arrive at some kind
of understanding with the Chinese leadership. His expansive engagement with the Chinese
during his tenure as the chief minister of Gujarat had warmed him to China.
In the last five years, much water has flowed under the bridge and has probably convinced
Modi of the difficulty of persuading Xi to demonstrate any significant flexibility towards
India. Delhi’s new realism makes it possible to approach the challenge of China without
sentimentalism or unrealistic expectations. It should also help prepare India to wrestle
intelligently with a China that is in a higher weight class.
Recognising the power imbalance with Beijing should liberate Delhi from the prolonged
illusions about strategic parity with China and false hopes about building a new global
order with it. That, in turn, should help focus India’s effort at Chennai on small and
pragmatic steps to narrow differences with China on bilateral issues — especially the
boundary dispute, trade deficit and the development of regional infrastructure. Thinking
small might offer a long overdue corrective to India’s diplomatic tradition of putting the
China relationship in a grandiose framework.
The limits of informality

There are clear limits to informal summitry, as India has found out since Wuhan. Despite
all the rhetoric and symbolism on display at Mamallapuram, the substantive outcome
remains clouded in mystery.
The setting was perfect. The spectacle was extravagant. The food was reportedly sumptuous.
There were around five-and-half hours of one-on-one talks between Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spread over two days. Modi welcomed Xi
with all the warmth at his disposal. And, yet, the outcome was along predictable lines.
Grand words, little else.

It was decided at the Mamallapuram ‘informal summit’ that a new mechanism would be set
up for issues relating to trade and investment. The two leaders underscored the need for
having a rules-based global trading system, as well as the importance of cooperating on
important regional and global issues.
Radicalisation and terrorism were also discussed, and China raised the possibility of
enhancing defence cooperation. People-to-people exchanges between the two countries got
a push, with India announcing a five-year tourist e-visa with multiple entry facility for
Chinese travellers.
One step at a time

While Modi suggested the start of a new era of cooperation between India and China on
Saturday with the ‘Chennai Connect’, Xi said their ‘candid’, ‘heart-to-heart’ discussions
on bilateral relations were ‘in-depth’ and ‘good’.
Modi is right in suggesting that the Wuhan summit in April 2018 led to increased stability
in Sino-Indian relations, as strategic communication increased between the two sides. But
at Wuhan, it was also decided that the two nations would prudently manage their
differences, and will be sensitive about each other’s concerns. China’s behaviour vis-à-vis
India since then has been hardly comforting. In fact, if anything, Beijing’s priorities have
become clearer.
It should be apparent to New Delhi that China is now willing to bear significant costs
diplomatically and politically to scuttle Indian interests. Beijing stood up for Pakistan at a
forum like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) even as it was largely isolated. This
underscores the commitment China is making to its anti-India policy options.
China’s behaviour vis-à-vis India since Wuhan has been hardly comforting. In fact, if
anything, Beijing’s priorities have become clearer.
It is important for India to engage China. And the informal summitry of the kind Modi has
engaged in with Xi allows India to stand on par with its much more powerful neighbour and
discuss issues in a setting where there is no pressure of deliverables.
The Wuhan summit last year did bring down the temperature after the high-decibel
Dokalam crisis, and managed to steer the China-India relationship from an overtly

conflictual stance. The Mamallapuram summit was also an attempt to take the Sino-Indian
conversation away from the immediate divergences on Kashmir and Pakistan.
Broadening the conversation to cooperation on global issues and cultural exchanges
manages to temporarily shield the relationship from the vagaries of structural challenges.
But there are clear limits to informal summitry, as India has found out since Wuhan. Despite
all the rhetoric and symbolism on display at Mamallapuram, the substantive outcome
remains clouded in mystery. There is no dearth of mechanisms in Sino-Indian engagement.
But the results have been quite shallow. So, this talk of a new trade mechanism should also
be taken with a pinch of salt.
The talk about cooperation on global issues is also becoming old hat. Cultural exchanges
and enhancing people-to-people dialogue will do little to change public perceptions if
Chinese policies vis-à-vis India do not alter in a positive direction. Much has been made
out in sections of the media of no mention of the Kashmir issue during Modi-Xi talks.
Cultural exchanges and enhancing people-to-people dialogue will do little to change
public perceptions if Chinese policies vis-à-vis India do not alter in a positive direction.
But Xi had made his views perfectly clear a day before reaching India, and New Delhi, too,
had responded. So what if no one belched at the table?
Cultivated connect
While Modi’s intent in proposing regular informal summit meetings with China is sound,
the pomp and pageantry of such engagements can’t hide the fact that the Sino-Indian
bilateral relationship has had not much to show for itself so far. And that’s a consequence
of underlying structural realities shaping the engagement.
China is interested in shaping an alternative global order commensurate to its growing
economic and military power. And India is a nation on China’s periphery whose rise it
seeks to scuttle to secure its interests. Indian foreign policy has to effectively respond to this
challenge.
In New Delhi, there is now a more realistic appraisal of China. Indian foreign policy has
evolved in directions that demands reciprocity from Beijing. China is both India’s most

important neighbour, and its most significant foreign policy challenge. India cannot ignore
China, and it is cognisant of the growing power differential between the two.
Indian foreign policy has evolved in directions that demands reciprocity from Beijing.
But New Delhi, too, has its options, and over the last few years it has made it clear to Beijing
that it’s not a pushover. From Dokalam to India’s opposition to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), India’s message has been clear: New Delhi will stand up for its vital
interests. There is now less diffidence in carving out strategic partnerships with other like-
minded countries.
In his departing statement, Xi suggested that “to achieve the ‘Dragon and Elephant Dance’
is the only correct choice for China and India, which is in the fundamental interests of both
countries and their peoples”. While he has proposed a 100-year plan to cement ties between
the two neighbours, he must recognise that for New Delhi, waiting for a century is not really
an option.
Unless there is some tangible movement on key issues very soon, even the limited
enthusiasm in New Delhi for the next summit in China will be very difficult to sustain.
China-India Brief
Suddenly, after a difficult 4-5 years, China-India relations seem to have moved into a more
positive phase. Differences over a number of nettlesome issues have reduced, and the
discourse between them has grown more normal. Indeed, something akin to a Sino-Indian
détente is quite visible: they are rivals but must manage the relationship better for a variety
of reasons.
China-India relations are defined by nodes of interaction at the bilateral, regional, and
global levels. At each level, a perceptible change in diplomatic tone has occurred since the
summit meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Wuhan
on 27-28 April 2019.
At the bilateral level, the defining issue is of course the border quarrel. But there are at
least two other matters that come into play: New Delhi’s stand and actions on Tibet; and
the flow of water in the Brahmaputra river. In all three areas, the two countries have
signalled a reduction in differences and tensions.

After the Doklam standoff in the summer of 2017, Beijing and New Delhi have taken steps
as in the past to improve communications between the two governments and militaries. The
hope is that there will not be a repeat of Doklam which was the most serious confrontation
between the two armies since the tensions in Sumdurong Chu in 1986-87.
With respect to Tibet, in March/April 2018 and just weeks prior to the Wuhan meeting, New
Delhi tried to reassure Beijing by ordering that no government functionary should attend
the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile. It also emphasized that
the Dalai Lama and Tibetans were not permitted to carry out any political activities on
Indian soil.
As for the Brahmaputra river flows, China stated that it will resume providing hydrological
data to India. For a year prior to this, in the wake of the Doklam crisis, despite the China-
India agreement, it had stopped giving India updates on water flows.
At the regional level, too, China and India have clearly tried to avoid stepping on each
other’s toes beyond a point. China’s relations with Pakistan are the most divisive issue here
but competition in the Indian Ocean area is also a worry as is Afghanistan.
While China and Pakistan continue to be “all-weather friends”, Beijing has tried to meet
some Indian concerns. These relate to New Delhi’s insistence that China take action on
Islamabad’s inactions on terrorism. Indian diplomats and Prime Minister Modi have
lobbied with China to take a stand against the harbouring of Hafeez Saeed and Masood
Azhar, two well-known extremist leaders in Pakistan. Beijing has long blocked the UN from
actions against both. However, China is now prepared to consider any further information
on Masood Azhar that India is willing to provide; and it stayed neutral when Pakistan was
put back on the ‘grey list’ of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which aims to curb
money laundering and terror financing.
Pakistan is still a problem between China and India. For instance, on 31 October 2018,
New Delhi lodged a strong protest with both Beijing and Islamabad over the start of the bus
route between Kashgar and Lahore, saying that the route traversed Pakistan-Occupied
Kashmir which is legally part of India. Still, since Wuhan, India has clearly reduced its
criticisms of China’s Belt and Route Initiative (BRI).
China and India are showing some sensitivity to each other’s concerns and ‘face’ in other
South Asian situations. For a moment in February 2018, it appeared the two were on
collision course in the Maldives. China warned India not to intervene in the Maldives in the

third week of February 2018, and later in that month a small flotilla of PLA Navy ships
were seen heading to the east Indian Ocean through the Lombok Strait. At the same time,
the Indian Navy was exercising in the Arabian Sea and Sunda Strait area. The Chinese navy
eventually turned back, and in the event, India did not intervene in the Maldives. Both
countries welcomed the new government that took power in the island state after the
presidential elections on 23 September 2018.
Beijing and New Delhi have also shown a degree of restraint in the emerging Sri Lankan
constitutional and political crisis which started on 26 October 2018. China has been more
fulsome about the appointment of former President Mahendra Rajapaksha as the new Prime
Minister after the shock sacking of Ranil Wickremesinghe; but India has urged democratic
norms to be respected and not much else. Before the dismissal, New Delhi had hosted both
Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksha. While New Delhi did well out of the change of
government in the Maldives in September, it is distinctly uncomfortable with developments
in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, China and India have not squared off openly.
Also in South Asia, China and India have shown that they can positively work together. Both
view the instability and extremism in Afghanistan as a threat to their security. For some
years, New Delhi has worried that China’s influence there will grow, especially in the wake
of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At Wuhan, however, the two decided to
put their heads somewhat together. The first expression of their cooperation on Afghanistan
was the agreement to jointly train Afghan diplomats. The programme began in October
2018. This is a small step, to be sure, but it is a signal that they are prepared to cooperate
rather than compete in this vital South Asian state.
Finally, China and India have come together at the global level. Beijing and Delhi have
been in agreement on quite a number of issues over the years – the global economic system,
climate change, and opposition to humanitarian intervention, among others.
More recently, being at the receiving end of US economic pressures has brought them
together. The US trade war is mostly directed at China, but India too has been the object of
raised tariffs. Both are finding themselves the target of visa restrictions. China is being
targeted as part of the US’s attempt to stop Chinese access to American high technology
and influence mongering. India is being targeted as part of the crackdown on the issuance
of H1B employment visas. In addition, Washington wants everyone to stop buying Iranian
oil and Russian weapons.

Not surprisingly, China and India, at Wuhan, argued for “the importance of building an
open, multipolar, pluralist and participatory global economic order which will enable all
countries to pursue their development and contribute to the elimination of poverty and
inequality in all regions of the world” in opposition to what they regard as the increasing
protectionism of the US.
It is too early to tell what is driving this détente between China and India. One factor is
domestic preoccupations. President Xi continues to increase his hold domestically but there
are signs of unhappiness over the extension of his tenure. There are some indications of
unhappiness also over the vast sums of money China is spending abroad in the BRI. In
India, Prime Minister Modi is in the run-up to the general elections in early 2019. It is
widely expected that his BJP will lose seats and could even lose it majority.
A second and perhaps even more important factor is US foreign policy under Trump.
Trump’s buccaneering and unpredictable external economic and security policies have
disturbed both Beijing and New Delhi. The trade war has taken a toll on China. And the
US’s insistence on India desisting from buying Iranian oil and Russian weapons has
annoyed New Delhi. In this situation, despite their mutual suspicions, China and India are
trying to reduce their differences if only to increase their bargaining room vis-à-vis the US.
How long will the Sino-Indian détente last? Clearly, another border confrontation could
upset the spirit of accommodation that has taken hold. Regionally, a terror strike on India
from Pakistan could once again lead to an explosive situation in the subcontinent. China
could be drawn into a crisis. The situation in the Maldives but even more so in Sri Lanka
could be another source of China-India tensions. If, as some are expecting, the
constitutional conflict in Sri Lanka is not resolved peacefully, New Delhi may be tempted to
take a hand. This could lead one side or other to turn to Beijing for help. Globally, there is
not much that divides the two, but Chinese support for Pakistani membership in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), hinted at during the visit of Prime Minister Imran Khan to China
in early November 2018, could inflame the Indian side which has had its application for
membership categorically rejected by China. US pressures on India to take sides in the
trade war and emerging “cold war” could also cause the Sino-Indian détente to unravel.
For now, though, the two sides seem set on reducing points of friction and increasing their
ability to manage differences.

The Chennai Connect in Sino Indian Relations: Assessing the Second India-China
informal Summit at Mamallapura
The optics of the second Sino-Indian informal summit held at the UN Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Heritage site Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu
was great. Chinese President Xi was given a warm welcome by Prime Minister Modi and
taken on a tour of the stunning rock cut 7th century shore temples of Mamallapuram,
depicting the scenes from the Mahabharat. Modi also presented President Xi a
Kanjeevaram silk cloth bearing Xi’s portrait. President Xi said that he was ‘overwhelmed’
by the warmth and hospitality of the host.
Prime Minister Modi described the second informal summit as a continuation of the Wuhan
spirit, a reference to the first informal summit that was held in Wuhan, China in April 2018.
He said that the Mamallapuram summit will take forward the momentum in Sino-Indian
relations which was built after Wuhan meeting. In his characterstic manner, Modi coined
the phrase "Chennai connect" to describe the start of a ‘new chapter’ in Sino-Indian
relation after the second informal summit.
Holding informal summits at beautiful locations is an innovation in Sino-Indian relations.
A lot of goodwill is generated when two leaders meet in informal settings two discuss
complex issues without any prior agenda. Without going into the nitty-gritty of complex
matters, the leaders are able to an overview of the relationship and provide guidance to the
officials about future directions. Such summits undoubtedly lower the temperature.
In the weeks preceding the summit, the relationship had been stressed particularly after
India abrogated Article 370 of its Constitution. The Chinese took strong exception and
described the Indian action as undermining China’s sovereignty. They helped organise an
informal closed-door meeting at the UN Security Council on Pakistan’s request to discuss
the India’s Kashmir action. They issued strongly worded statements on Kashmir echoing
the positions taken by their all-weather friend Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi in his UN
General Assembly (UNGA) address avoided any mention of Kashmir but the Indian foreign
ministry issued appropriately worded statements countering China’s positions on Kashmir.
The Indian External Affairs Minister, during his visit to Beijing in August, clarified the
Indian position and sought to reassure the Chinese side that the Indian action did not mean
any change in India’s position on the boundary question. That did not prevent the Chinese
from making references to the UN Security Council resolutions in their statements as well
as in the Sino- Pakistan joint press release issued on the conclusion of Pakistan Prime
Minister Khan’s visit to Beijing a few days before the Mamallapuram summit.

An excellent ambience was created at Mamallapuram that must have helped in calming the
situation that threatened to go out of control on account of Kashmir related statements. But,
what did the summit achieve in terms in relation to the outstanding problems?
The Indian Foreign Secretary, in his press conference, summed up the results of the summit.
He identified six main areas which the two leaders discussed: trade, people-to-people
connect, tourism, defence and security, climate change, terrorism and the threat of
radicalisation. He noted that the two sides had managed to avoid any disruptions in the
bilateral relationship and take it forward.
Trade was perhaps the most important issue discussed at the summit. The major takeaway
from the summit was that the two sides have agreed to set up yet another mechanism, this
time at the levels of the finance ministers, to look at trade and investments issues in a holistic
fashion. It will be recalled that India and China already have a strategic economic dialogue
at the level of Niti Ayog and National Development Council of China to look into these
matters. The ambit of discussions will be widened in the new mechanism that has been
announced.
Significantly, Kashmir was neither raised not discussed. This was a wise move. Discussing
Kashmir would have only accentuated the differences and derailed the summit.
On the boundary question, it was agreed that the Special Representatives will continue with
their discussions. Nothing more. Clearly this is one of those intractable issues on which the
two sides do not have a common view on its resolution.
No new confidence building measures to maintain peace and integrity of the border were
announced. It was however, decided that the Indian Defence Minister will visit China in
due course. The nitty-gritty of border management, joint military exercises et cetera will
most likely be discussed during that visit.
The Mamallapuram summit should be assessed not just for what it achieved on the hard
issues but also for highlighting the soft tissues. People may not remember the details of the
discussions at Mamallapuram but they will not forget the stunning visuals of the shore
temples of Mamallapuram.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the importance of soft power in India’s diplomacy is
growing by the day. Prime Minister Modi has been at the forefront of showing India’s
culture and civilisation to the visiting leaders. The Mamallapuram summit was all about

India showcasing its considerable soft power. Mamallapuram, a UNESCO World Heritage,
brings into relief the ancient China-India civilisational contacts dating back to several
centuries. The Pallava Kings who ruled Mamallapuram circa the seventh-eighth centuries
used to have trade connections with what is now the Fujian province of China.
Archaeological findings show that Tamil traders had possibly built a temple there. The
summit has evoked a great deal of interest in researching and documenting ancient
civilisational contacts between India’s southern states and China.
Notwithstanding the hard problems of Sino-Indian relations, people-to-people contacts are
becoming an important factor in bilateral relations. Mamallapuram summit will help the
two sides to bring the public into the Sino-Indian relations in a big way. A series of activities
leading up to the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations next year are lined up to make
Indian and Chinese public more aware of their historical relations. The two sides also seem
to have discussed how to exploit the enormous tourism potential. That will yield a lot of
economic benefit also.
Clearly, neither side came to the summit with the expectation of any major breakthroughs.
None was achieved. It was merely decided that the discussions will continue at various
levels to maintain the momentum in bilateral ties generated after the Wuhan summit.
The informal summit process which began at Wuhan to contain the fall out of the Doklam
crisis will continue in future as well. Prime Minister Modi has been invited to visit China
for the next informal summit. But there is also a risk that frequent informal summits may
undermine the formal negotiating channels which are indispensable for any bilateral
relationship to go forward.
The massive churn in the global environment impacts both countries deeply. They are
competing with each other for their place in the world. Just as India is watching China’s
moves such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and its growing influence in the
neighborhood and the Chinese inroads into the Indian Ocean, China is also observing with
some concern the growing closeness between India and the United States. India has
upgraded its participation in the quadrilateral group of countries (QUAD) which will
unnerve China. The two countries also have a separate channel of interaction on the
multilateral fora such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Russia-India-China
trilateral, BRICS and G-20. India is also negotiating with China and other countries a giant
free trade agreement Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.
If concluded, RCEP will tantamount to a free trade agreement between India and China.

The China-India relationship has become multidimensional. Although the core issues
between the two countries remain, other issues are also gaining importance. Both sides
need to approach the relationship with extreme caution and care. The two leaders, already
having met 18 times since 2014, are interested in enhancing mutual understanding of these
changes. They do not want the bilateral relationship to be derailed by the difficult issues.
As Mr Modi observed at the delegation level talks, Mamallapuram summit is a step towards
‘managing’ the relationship and building trust and not letting differences become disputes.
Neither side seems to be in a mood to take up the difficult questions at this stage to avoid
derailing the relationship. That seems to be the message coming from Mamallapuram. The
difficult issues like the boundary question can await resolution. The second informal summit
kept the focus on convergences with an eye on the future. The emphasis in Mamallapuram
seems to have been to ‘manage’ the differences ‘prudently’.
Macron’s wake-up call to EU

The French President has rightly said that the bloc needs to assert sovereignty over its
political and security decisions
In November, French President Emmanuel Macron created a political stir with a far-
reaching interview in which he declared that “Europe is on the edge of a precipice”, unable
to cope with the political challenges of the U.S. pursuing ‘America first’; a resentful Russia
on its border; and a China determined to emerge as the new global power. Coming after
the European Union (EU) meet in October and prior to the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) summit (scheduled to take place this week), Mr. Macron’s interview
gave a wake-up call to the EU and reminded it that the bloc can no longer be an economic
giant and a political dwarf.
The EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC), was established in 1957,
following the Treaty of Rome. Consisting of a homogeneous group of six countries (Belgium,
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), it quickly formed a
customs union. Five of these six nations were also founding members of NATO, which had
been set up in 1949.
Political disunity
The next stage was the Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992 to reflect the realities of a post-
Cold War Europe and a unified Germany. It helped create the Euro and, later, also pushed
the eastward expansion of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 marked another political
evolution, giving the EU a stronger legal character by introducing a permanent President
of the European Council and strengthening the position of the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
These were steps towards a nascent European sovereignty but ended up exposing
weaknesses in the project. Today, the EU’s 28 member states are a heterogeneous lot, unlike
the original six; and a key member, the U.K., is already sitting in the departure lounge. The
idea of Europe with a “variable geometry”, proposed during the hasty expansion during
the 1990s to accommodate differences is now a clear sign of political disunity.
Meanwhile, NATO has 27 European member states (plus Canada and the U.S.) and most,
but not all, are EU members. NATO’s major expansion took place post-Cold War when the
Baltic states and a number of East European countries joined. The Eurozone consists of 19
(out of the 28) EU members while the Schengen common visa area covers 26 European
countries. And then, there is the 31-member European Economic Area, composed of the
EU-28 and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The Council of Europe in Strasbourg was
set up in 1949 to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law and currently has
47 member countries, including the 28 EU nations. Rounding up, there is the 57-member
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, established originally to promote
confidence and security building measures, which now also has the mandate of free
elections, open media and human rights.
Somewhere in this multiplicity, the EU lost its political moorings. Originally, it was a
grouping of West European democracies committed to closer economic ties, with NATO as
the security provider. Liberal democracy was integral to EU membership. Greece joined
the EEC in 1961 but was suspended in 1967 after the military coup. Spain’s request in 1962,
under General Francisco Franco, for membership was rejected. Eventually, Greece applied
again in 1975 and was admitted in 1981, while Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. Today,
Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary (which joined in 2004) proudly claims to
represent an “illiberal democracy”. Right-wing populist leaders in other European
countries have also become more vocal and visible in recent years and many of them would
like to retrieve sovereignty back from Brussels.
NATO’s diminishing role

Mr. Macron’s blunt assessment was that the U.S., which guaranteed West European
security during the Cold War, can no longer be relied upon to play the same role because
its priorities are changing. He cited President Donald Trump’s recent unilateral decision
to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria as an example, since it was taken without consultation
or coordination with NATO allies. Further, it gave another NATO member, Turkey, the
licence to undertake military operations in Syria, creating tensions with NATO allies
operating in the area. In Mr. Macron’s words, Europe is seeing the “brain death” of NATO.
NATO was never a grouping of equals. The U.S. always contributed the larger share and
underwrote European security. Out of NATO’s common budget of approx. $2.5 billion, the
U.S. contributes 22%, Germany around 15% and France and the U.K. more than 10% each.
However, in terms of defence budgets, there is significant disparity, which makes NATO
completely dependent on the U.S. for airlift and space-based assets.
The U.S. spends 3.6% of its GDP on defence, amounting to a whopping $700 billion with
most major European countries spending between 1% and 2%. In 2014, after considerable
prodding by the U.S., members had agreed to bring up their budgets to 2% of GDP by 2024.
At present, among major countries, only the U.K. spends 2% of its GDP on defence. France
is at 1.8% and Germany at 1.2%.
These variations were accepted as long as the U.S. and Europe enjoyed political
convergence but now rankle Mr. Trump, who has taken a transactional approach and,
according to Mr. Macron, “does not share our idea of the European project”. In any case,
there are historical shifts under way, with the U.S. less engaged in West Asia on account of
becoming self-sufficient in hydrocarbons, and focusing more on the Indo-Pacific.
Consequently, the U.S.’s commitment to NATO is undergoing a change and the Europeans
need to recognise it.
The way ahead

Mr. Macron’s words were called “drastic” by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, though
she had echoed similar sentiments two years ago after a difficult G7 summit in Sicily when
she urged Europeans “to take our fate into our own hands” because “the era in which we
could fully rely on others is over to some extent”.
Yet, the way ahead is not clear. Mr. Macron’s suggestion for a rapprochement with Russia
to prevent it from getting closer to China makes Poland, Czech Republic and the Baltic
countries nervous.
China has already driven a wedge in the EU with 14 EU countries, including Italy, now
part of Belt & Road Initiative. In 2012, China began its dialogue with East European
countries in the 16+1 format; out of the 16, 11 are EU states and 13 are NATO members.
This has made it impossible for the EU to take a common approach on issues like 5G and
Huawei, while allowing China to selectively increase investments in critical areas in
European countries to which France and Germany are now waking up. Even after taking a
unified stand to preserve the Iran nuclear deal following the U.S.’s unilateral exit more
than 18 months ago, the EU failed to deliver on its assurances to provide concrete relief to
Tehran against U.S. sanctions.
The problem is that NATO provided security on the cheap and now, when Mr. Trump
questions the utility of NATO, it only exposes differences between Europeans who want to
develop greater military and diplomatic heft and others (the Baltic nations and East
Europeans) who fear this will loosen ties with the U.S.
In today’s uncertain times, the EU stands for a rules-based order but as Mr. Macron rightly
pointed out, the EU can only emerge as a strategic actor once it is able to assert sovereignty
over its political, diplomatic and security decisions. Perhaps, the time for it has come as the
Anglo-Saxon influence over Europe recedes with Brexit and the rise of Mr. Trump.
The End of the World

The apocalypse, when it comes, will be livestreamed. Like a Hindi film release or Chetan
Bhagat’s next book tour, it will have its own devoted publicist. Make sure to sign up for
an unlimited data plan.
Several reliable authorities have predicted the end of the world: the Bible, the Incas, the
Vikings, Nostradamus, Oswald Spengler, sci-fi literature, Hollywood, Samuel P
Huntington, more or less anybody who regularly frequents the Speaker’s Corner in
London’s Hyde Park, and many of the contributors to the op-ed pages come to mind. It has
been visualised in opera classics such as the ‘Twilight of the Gods’, which is part of the
massive 15-hour Der Ring des Nibelungen by Richard Wagner, a production so complex it
required a custom-built theatre when it was first staged in 1876. Some, like the Romans and
the Dodos, have already gone through the end and experienced its traumas, but the rest of
us have yet to deal with it. Here’s a step-by-step guide to help you make the most of it:
How to recognise the beginning of the end?
You may want to do some research on Wikipedia, which will make you appreciate that
Wikipedia itself may possibly be the harbinger of its imminent arrival: a public forum where
truth stopped being factual truth but, instead, consists of whatever random claims anybody
wants to put up online. Subsequently, Facebook and Twitter have invested heavily in the
same business idea, with many other multinational corporations following suit. Therefore,
these apocalyptic developments cannot be reversed except at a great loss to the stock
market. For those who doubt this new reality, please note that the word of the year 2016,
selected by the publishers of the Oxford Dictionary, is “post-truth”, meaning

“circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than
appeals to emotion and personal belief”.
When and how will it happen?
Due to commercial considerations, it is going to happen during American daylight hours
so that US citizens can take selfies before it, to share on WhatsApp, and it can, thus, also
be broadcast on the evening news with the maximum number of viewers, which will generate
significant advertisement revenue. This means that it will almost certainly happen before
7am Indian Standard Time, so set your alarm clocks accordingly.
Tentatively, the main event will be hosted in the “Pub City of India” to allow people to
celebrate it properly. The party will start at 6.30 the night before at the open-air theatre of
UB City down the road from Bangalore Club. There will be stalls serving cocktail nibbles
such as disco samosas, chilly chicken and churmuri sponsored by the pub owners’
association, and the bar will have a special licence to stay open until 4 am, when the pre-
dawn show will be inaugurated with fireworks, followed by sentimental readings by local
poets who lament the loss of civilisation. By the time those poets have gone on for about 30
minutes, most of us will eagerly await the end of it all. There will then be cheerleaders from
Ukraine, one of the three Khans will tap dance on stage while Bryan Adams will be roped
in to compose the special power rock score for the live-broadcast reality show version,
which will be directed by none other than Steven Spielberg himself. (For those of you who
can’t make it to Bangalore, there will be auxiliary events in Goa — an all-night rave at
Anjuna Beach — and the Maidan in Kolkata, where a hilsa-cookout-cum-Rabindrasangeet-
marathon recital will be hosted.)
Of course, there is going to be reserved front-row seating for politicians and the who’s who
because even if the rest of us stand before the end, the VIPs will be comfortably seated. So,
keep your mobile charged and just wait for that tweet or personal email invite from the
event promoters. For, trust me, the end of the world will be very much a corporate do with
its own devoted publicist, much like a Hindi film release or Chetan Bhagat’s next book tour.
But, in point of fact, the end will not be immediate — the above is merely the provisional
plan for its inauguration. Technically speaking, even the world’s largest demolition squad
will need upwards a month to destroy the world as we know it, no matter if they have the
latest American weapons of mass destruction at their disposal. This means that we will all
be given about a month to get ready to go.
What to do during the last 30 days?
For starters, all cash will probably have been demonetised once again to prevent black-
marketeers and other contractors from hoarding it, so ask your bank manager for unlimited
credit and go shopping. Get that Merc you always lusted for. In the last 30 days, vintners
will quickly bottle and sell out all their vintages in order not to take a big loss, which means
we can buy good tipple for cheap and stop guzzling Golconda port. Ramachandra Guha
will update India After Gandhi and launch a new deluxe edition of it. Books will, in fact, get
cheaper when Flipkart starts its end-of-the-world sale, but remember to tick the option for
delivery to the next world.
Beachfront hotel rates will go skywards since everybody will want to die with a seaview, as
will the rates of Indian premium coffee because nobody will want to be asleep when the end
comes knocking. YouTube.com will see a lot of new users who upload their private footage
and viewers will want to track what the end looks like in, say, Melbourne or New Jersey or
Knäckebyhult. So, to take part in the 24/7 fun and watch Greenpeace activists chain
themselves to organic tea bushes in Darjeeling, make sure to sign up for an unlimited data
plan with your internet provider.
The opposition will stage a hartal in the Lok Sabha, but the supporters of the ruling parties
will distribute sweets in their respective states — and we can all eat those sweets in
abundance, since we don’t have to worry about dental issues, calories or diabetes. In the
end, we can all look forward to having a good laugh about it, because Amul will take out
funny ads every day in order to use up the whole year’s ad budget in a month.
Will it be good or bad?
Mostly good. For example, I often worry about dying, but if the world ends during my
lifetime, it means that I’ll stop worrying now. The sooner, the better, because then I can say
bye-bye to my BP pills. But that is an egoistical take. The larger benefits that we all can
enjoy together include things like no more garbage on the streets because there’ll be nobody
to throw it there, no spam, no unsolicited marketing calls, no more antibiotic-resistant
bacteria, no computer viruses either or dandruff or deforestation or sandalwood poaching,
no traffic jams, crazy lane-driving or wrong-side overtaking, no genetically modified
vegetables, no MSG, no EMIs, no foreign hand, no corruption, no constipation, no riots, no

nothing.
The end of the world is the simplest solution to all woes. On the whole, we are looking at a
far healthier “post-end” world, somehow neater and perhaps even cleaner, in short, a
global health spa type of planet upon which we’d all love to go on living — if it wasn’t for
the one small hitch: once it’s over, it is over. But, nevertheless, we should enjoy it while it
lasts.
Unfortunately, the end will not come easy. It may involve broken ribs, dyspepsia, tinnitus,
and other ailments that no amount of Chyawanprash can set straight. One may have to sleep
on a friend’s couch or move home to one’s parents for the duration of it, as one’s own
mortgaged apartment will probably be taken back by the bank as soon as the end begins.
What can we do to make it less painful?
In the past, I sometimes worried about whether I’ll have enough money to live on until I die,
but thanks to the Indian rupee getting demonetised, I realised that such mundane worries
don’t matter very much in real life. As I was walking around with no valid cash, I found that
one survives because of the goodness of one’s fellow humans: pharmacists sold me those
pesky BP pills I must take against the defunct banknotes, restaurant owners who noticed
that I was hungry told me to eat now but pay whenever I managed to locate an ATM with
any money in it. I myself made it a point to use whatever change I received to make
purchases from pushcart vegetable vendors to ensure that they got enough business to
survive.
It turned into a very hope-inducing incident and I suspect that, in the end, we people will
help each other to make it less painful for all. By now, you have come to the obvious
conclusion that I am a visionary thinker and you may wonder what my top tip is for a worry-
free ending. Well, it is simple: chill, adjust, and take it as it comes.
The collision of these 3 geographies is creating a new world order

For the past seven decades, the world has been moulded by a strong, transatlantic
relationship with the US and EU underwriting the terms of peace, stability and economic
prosperity.
The success of this order has created its own existential challenge. Its rising beneficiaries
in Asia and elsewhere increasingly challenge the validity of these arrangements and the
efficacy of rules that have managed global affairs. While the historian John Ikenberry
described the liberal world order as a “hub and spoke” model of governance, with the West
at its centre, it is now clear that the peripheries of the system are developing wheels and
engines of their own.
Indeed, the rise of Asia as a whole is recasting the physical and mental map of the world.
Proliferating transnational relationships and new flows of finance, trade, technology,
information, energy and labour have created three new strategic geographies which are
already escaping the shadow of transatlantic arrangements. They essentially represent the
collision of erstwhile political constructs – and their management requires new ideas,
nimble institutions and fluid partnerships.
The Indo-Pacific
The first collision, which is already well underway, is the union of the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. Popularly defined as the Indo-Pacific, it is a construct encouraged by the rise of
China but defined in equal measure by regional actors responding to Beijing’s proposition.
Maritime Asia is now larger than the US, ASEAN and China – earlier organized under the
Asia-Pacific construct. Its frontier is not limited to the eastern Indian Ocean. From
Nantucket to Nairobi, conversations on security, development and trade in this region will
now include actors from three continents.
Eurasia
The second is the conflation of Europe and Asia into one coherent strategic system: Eurasia.
This is an old idea, steeped in history, but it has a new vocabulary. The interaction of
markets and communities from these once separated geographies is creating a new super-
continental-sized interdependence.
Yet this interdependence is not without friction: China’s shadow looms large over Europe
and its promise to underwrite the continent’s prosperity has proved too difficult to resist.
Moscow, meanwhile, is exhibiting a new zeal to reclaim its place as the archetypical
Eurasian player and members of NATO continue to bicker over their future role in the
region. As these geopolitical tectonic plates both clash and merge, it is clear that East and
West will set new terms of engagement.
The Arctic
And finally, we have the Arctic. Born as an unintended consequence of climate change, this
geography will, for the first time, merge the politics of the Atlantic and the Pacific, even as
it stimulates a clash between the arrangements that exist in these regions. The Northern Sea
Route has been a tantalising theory; global warming is renewing it as reality. The global
shipping giant Maersk, for example, completed its first voyage unassisted by ice-breakers
this August (even though the company expresses scepticism about the near-term viability of
the route). The emergence of this geography, however, will be far from frictionless and may
well create a new distribution of wealth and power in the region.
While most Western governments currently share Maersk’s ambivalence, Moscow and
China are investing heavily in building commercial infrastructure, naval capacity and
military capabilities. As part of its Polar Silk Road ambitions, in fact, Beijing now actively
encourages its enterprises to utilize the Northern Sea Route. Additionally, de-facto control
over shipping routes in the region currently rests with Moscow, which has arrogated the
power to grant shipping permits – a position that American officials have already warned
might contravene the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas. In 1956, Britain went to war
with Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal; without appropriate arrangements for Arctic
governance, history may well repeat itself a few latitudes north.
The collision of these three geographies will shape the 21st-century world order. Yet this
process has no historical parallels. The post-war order and its predecessors were born after
a revolutionary and catastrophic churn in global politics – and devastating, large-scale
conflicts. Today, this change is likely to be gradual, interdependent and evolutionary. There
will be no single defining moment when a new order will be born. Instead, global politics
will operate in 50 shades of grey for the foreseeable future.
As these three geographies discover themselves, then, there are five trends that deserve
attention:
1. The first is the risk of separate cold wars across geographies. Unlike the 20th century,
this tension will not be bipolar and each actor's motivations, means and goals will differ.
Whether it is the Himalayan cold war between India and China, the Arctic chill between
Moscow, Europe and Washington, or the Mediterranean melee between the EU and China,
multiple powers will exercise influence over these geographies and will compete at the
intersection of social, commercial and military domains.
2. More "coalitions of convenience” are likely to emerge across these geographies. In an

uncertain and fluid world order, issue-based partnerships may well have outsized influence
over certain conversations. Russia, for example, is entering the fray in Afghanistan after
nearly three decades with help from Iran and China, while India and France are
cooperating on maritime security and development. China is partnering with Greenland –
amid much anguish in Denmark – to cement its Arctic claims. If global institutions fail to
manage emerging geographies, such coalitions will likely multiply.
3. The third is the possibility for new institutional dialogues. Already, the EU is claiming a
stake in the Indian Ocean Rim Association and ASEAN states are making overtures to the
Arctic Council. These actors and organizations are transcending their 20th-century mental
maps in search of new commercial and strategic opportunities. It is not entirely
inconceivable that NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), for example,
might one day have a conversation on Eurasian security and connectivity.
4. The fourth trend: the opening up of the Arctic will test the ability of powers to provide
security as a public good in other parts of the world. In other words, with geostrategic
conduits like the Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits possibly approaching their expiry
dates, the imperative to secure Arctic sea lanes may well leave erstwhile routes bereft of
powers willing to protect them. Are parts of the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia, then, destined to
become ungoverned spaces – as in the Gulf of Aden – or will regional powers craft an
arrangement of their own?
5. Finally, the institutional matrix will also evolve in response to these changes. It is clear
that existing international institutions do not fully respond to the needs of developing
countries and emerging regional powers. Which institutions, then, will be critical to these
geographies? Will the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) usurp the role of the
World Bank in Asia or will new multilateral propositions emerge from countries like India,
America and Japan? Will the UN be central to conversations on peace and security, or will
regional institutions like the SCO (perhaps in a different guise) and the Arctic Council
strengthen their own norms and rules?
In the 20th century, multilateral institutions were perceived to be mitigators and managers
of conflict. That conventional wisdom may be turned on its head now, given that competing
centres of power will, for the first time since the Peace of Westphalia, create their own
institutional arrangements for exerting influence. An organization like the SCO, may,
therefore, posit itself as the guardian of Eurasian stability, in contrast to an OSCE or

NATO, that has hitherto played this role.
How nation states imagine the world is significant; their mental maps dictate diplomatic
priorities, economic partnerships and security arrangements. The collision of new
geographies is compelling states to reimagine their worldview.
In the 21st century, East and West are meaningless constructs. More important is how
actors and institutions resolve the contradictions that will inevitably arise in Indo-Pacific,
Eurasia and the Arctic. This is that strange and rare moment when global governance is
more than the sum of its parts or individual regional configurations.
India’s strategy in the China-Russia-USA triangle

Delhi wants to remain an Eurasian power, swinging between East and West according to
its priorities. Its military ties with Moscow. The economic importance of Beijing. America
as a strategic counterweight – as long as it works.
An engaging feature of the current global situation is the rise of China and the
transformation of the Sino-Russian relationship from enmity to détente and now entente. In
considerable measure the relationship has been shaped by their estrangement with the West
in general and the United States in particular.
Where Russian enmity with China had global consequences, so does their close friendship
today. Both scenarios have an impact on India, the former historically, and the latter in
prospect. Russia has been a long-time friend of India, it not only provided the Indian arms
to maintain a formidable military profile, but also provided invaluable political support to
India on a variety of regional issues. Transfer of military technology has been an important
part of both the old and the new Russian-Chinese relationship. What is different now it the
greater depth being developed between the two through their growing economic ties based
on cross border trade and Chinese investment in Russia.
India does not, and cannot, view this as a zero-sum game and has sought to engage both
China and Russia bilaterally, as well as through a raft of organisations such as the Russia-
India-China (RIC) grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Brazil,
Russia, India China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping. Not surprisingly, given the relative
imbalance of power between them, Russia often sees India as a means of balancing China.
India-Russia relations
India had a remarkably close relationship with Soviet Union. It defied the United States and
created a non-aligned bloc of nations to maintain an equidistant posture between the two
rivals in the Cold War. The USSR became a major arms supplier to India, even as it backed
New Delhi’s regional policy whole heartedly. On the other hand, despite tensions in relation
to Pakistan, the United States gave India huge amounts of foreign aid that help modernise
its education and helped launch the Green Revolution.
As tensions with China mounted on the border in the late 1950s, the Soviets readily offered
to supply India’s needs for supersonic Mig-21 jets, AN-12 transports and Mi-4 helicopters.
As the Sino-Soviet rift developed, Russia deepened its arms transfer ties to provide India
submarines, corvettes, tanks and artillery and helped India to stave off US-Chinese pressure
in the 1971 war with Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh.
Despite India’s decision to seek out western suppliers in 1980, by the time of the collapse
of the USSR, India had become almost hugely dependent on the Soviet Union to maintain
the kind of force profile it had with Russian Kashin-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines,
T-72 tanks, BMPs, 130mm field guns, MiG series fighters provided on special “friendship
prices”.
The Soviet collapse at the end of 1991 hit New Delhi particularly hard. It found it extremely
difficult to maintain its forces because of the post-Soviet chaos in its defence industry.
Further, the kind of political backing it received from the erstwhile Soviet Union melted
away in the face of new realities, which immediately meant American influence in Russian
decisions. So, the Russians not only terminated the lease of a nuclear propelled submarine
to India, but also cancelled a plan to provide India with technology to make cryogenic
engines for its GSLV heavy space launch rocket.
India had little choice to remain with Russia and it did its best to help the country’s military
industry to recover by committing itself to the Su-27 programme and continuing its
purchases of Russian military equipment. But, beyond arms transfer, the relationship
between India and Russia did not go very far. It failed to develop a significant economic
component despite many efforts. And in the 2000s, as ties between India and the US grew,
India began to look at the Americans as a potential source of weaponry. But despite
everything India continued to purchase hardware like fighters, frigates, medium lift
helicopters, and as a result even today 70 per cent of its armed forces systems are of Russian
origin.
Russia continued to assist India in areas where western countries will not. Its most
significant example is the help provided by Russia to build its nuclear propelled submarines,
two of which have been launched and provide an SSN on lease. The Russians no longer
offer “friendship prices”, the cost for the some of the systems is steep and it is charged in
US dollars.
Another significant assistance was provided in the development of the Brahmos supersonic
anti-ship and land attack missile. There has been assistance, too, in the form of consultancy
for India’s space and missile programmes. But the heft of their relationship is limited by the
fact that by 2015-16, India only constituted 1.2 per cent of total Russian trade, while Russia
was only 1 per cent of Indian trade. Interestingly, while the Russian export profile to India
remains unchanged, dominated as it is by mineral fuels and precious metals, India has been
enhancing its exports to Russia so that besides pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery, TV
components and equipment and vehicles.
Russia-China
The Russian-Chinese détente took place in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union
revolved around the settlement of their border dispute that had brought the two of them to
war, was resolved in two tranches in 1994 and 2004. China’s rapid industrial growth made
it an ideal partner for Russia which is rich in natural resources like petroleum, gas, wood,
non-ferrous metals, fish and seafood, and chemicals.
Two events, a quarter century apart, have shaped the current relationship between the two
countries, the Chinese decision to crush the protest movement in Tiananmen in 1989 and
the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014. The former led to a comprehensive arms
embargo on China by the European Union and the latter resulted in sanctions against
Russia by the EU.
The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with the Chinese efforts to transform their
economy. Imbued by the goal of catching up and surpassing the developed West, China
came up with a clutch of policies and projects. They were aware that an earlier version of
this policy had yielded substantial results when the erstwhile Soviet Union had carried out
what John Garver says was “one of the largest transfers of capital equipment in history”
in the 1950s that had led to the establishment of entire classes of Chinese industries for
machine tools, airplanes, cars, trucks tractors, precision instruments and so on. It was
equally impressive in the military field when Soviets transferred technology to make
fighters, submarines, tanks, artillery and ballistic missiles.
But the 1990s plan was different, it involved opening up the China to Four Modernisations
in agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence. But the Soviet collapse
compelled them to look to the west for the inputs into their plans. The policy focused on
acquiring, digesting and absorbing and thereafter re-innovating imported technologies and
has been so spectacularly successful that China became the world’s leading manufacturing
power. Today, it is seeking to aiming to acquire and develop new technologies by itself and
hopes to leap frog to the position of becoming a world leader in an array of emerging
technology areas and thereby avoid what is called the middle income trap.
Unlike China, Russia was already an upper middle income country in the 1990s. Market
reform in the 1990s privatised much of its industry and agriculture. After a period of
turmoil, the Russian economy bounced back in the 2000-2223 period following economic
reforms. In the subsequent period till 2008, it got a boost from the rise in commodity prices.
After a sharp but brief recession following the global financial crisis in 2008, the economy
righted itself in 2009 and joined the WTO in 2011 and was actually described as a high-
income economy by the World Bank in 2013 and set for a period of steady growth.
However, the Russian annexation of Crimea and its involvement in Ukraine led to the US,
EU and some European countries, Canada and Japan imposing sanctions on Russia’s
financial, energy and defence sectors. This and the decline in oil prices affected the Russian
economy significantly resulting in a financial crisis in the latter part of 2014. Subsequently,
finance from China also played a significant role in stabilising the Russian economy
especially after the 2008 financial crisis. Chinese exports to Russia are in the main
machinery and equipment, clothing, chemical products, fur and fur products, footwear and
furniture. Russian investments in China are about $ 1 billion, while those of China in
Russia, ten times more. In 2017 Russia’s top export destination was China ($39.1 billion)
and its top import origin was China ($43.8 billion).
Closer political ties between Russia and China were presaged by the creation of the
Shanghai Five Grouping, a direct outcome of the border agreement between China, Russia
and the Soviet successor states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikstan. This led
to agreements on military Confidence Building Measures and in 2001, with the
participation of Uzbekistan the mechanism took on the role of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation(SCO). The SCO doubled as a security as well as a developmental outfit
bringing Russia, China and the Central Asian states closer. It was aimed at reassuring the
Central Asian states facing the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
In 2007, the SCO linked up with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) that
had been set up to provide security to the Soviet Union’s successor states. An outfit with a
chequered history, the CSTO currently comprises of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and has helped various governments to maintain power in the
face of domestic protests. To a considerable degree, these measures have been a defensive
outcome of NATO expansion in the west and the presence of the United States in
Afghanistan, beginning 2001. Subsequently, the two came closer, driven by external
circumstances– the western embargo of Moscow in 2014 and the emergence of concerns in
the west over the rise of China. Since then, their relationship has progressed to the status
of what many say is a quasi alliance. Indeed, in recent times, Putin has been hailing the
relationship as an “allied relationship of strategic partnership.”
The China-Russia dynamic has played itself out across the Eurasian landmass as China has
steadily moved westwards to incorporate the Central Asian States into its economic
embrace. It has, however, been careful not to tread too heavily on Russian toes. It has gone
along with the fact that its growing rail traffic with Europe has to bear with changing
gauges through the former Soviet Union. It has also deferred to the EEU in striking FTAs
with the Central Asian states. Even so, Moscow has quietly conceded Chinese primacy given
the manner in which Beijing has succeeded in changing the facts on the ground through its
connectivity and investment policies.
Over the years China has developed significant rail links through Eurasia to Europe, and
also several pipelines linking Central Asia with China. All this happened even as Russia
sought to draw a defensive perimeter through the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union
drawing Belarus, Kazakhastan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan closer together in an integrated
single market. While the EEU was aimed at moderating the Chinese pressure on the ex-
Soviet space, the reality of China’s economic power has ensured that Beijing has the upper
hand in any relationship between the EEU and China.
China-US-India
China and the US had been close to each other since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad in
Afghanistan. Tiananmen had set back relations, but the subsequent opening up of China
had seen US companies rush into the Chinese market. Following India and Pakistan’s
nuclear tests in 1998, the two, both members of the P-5, joined hands to pass strictures
against India and Pakistan. However, much to the chagrin of the Chinese, India and the US
soon repaired their ties and began an extensive dialogue that eventually led to the Indo-US
nuclear deal in 2005.
Sino-Indian relations, too, took a positive track when, following the visit of Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Beijing in 2003, the two sides agreed to upgrade their ties and make
a special effort to resolve their border issue. By 2005 the two sides had signed a far-
reaching agreement on the Political Parameters and Agreed Guidelines for a Border
Settlement. This more-or-less spelt out that they could resolve their border on an “as
is/where is” basis.
However, the Indo-US nuclear deal took China aback since it signalled a strategic shift
towards India by the United States, something that Beijing felt was not in its interest. This
created a triangular dynamic that persists till this day. India and China have not resolved
their border dispute, at the same time, New Delhi has steadily developed important military
ties to the US, without quite becoming an American ally or endorsing Washington’s Indo-
Pacific formulations.
Russia-India-China (RIC)
Russia-India-China group emerged in the late 1990s encouraged by the then Russian Prime
Minister (1998-1999) Yevgeny Primakov aimed at promoting a multipolar grouping to
offset US power in Eurasia. A major motive was to move away from the craven pro-
American Yeltsin era towards re-establishing strong ties with New Delhi. Its global
iteration, by including Brazil and South Africa was the BRICS. Though the grouping
functioned largely as an informal coordination mechanism at the official and ministerial
level, in recent years it has also added an apex level summit where the leaders of the three
countries meet, usually at the sidelines of other multilateral gatherings such as the G-20 or
the SCO.
In December 2018 the RIC leaders met in a summit for the first time in 12 year at the G-20
summit in Buenos Aires. In June 2019, Prime Minister Modi chaired the Osaka informal
summit of the RIC and it was clear from his remarks and those of his officials, that India
sees value in collaborating with Russia and China on not just the issues relating to
promoting free trade and opposing protectionism, but also counter-terrorism and climate
change.
At first sight the RIC looks like an unlikely grouping, given the rivalry between India and
China. But what seems to be binding the grouping is the strong relationship that Russia and
China have developed on one hand, and on the other, the time-tested close ties between
India and Russia. In a sense, then, Moscow serves as a bridge of sorts between New Delhi
and Moscow, on the other hand, it also helps them to offset China’s gravitational pull.
So, the Indian commitment to the RIC has multiple layers. First, it is part of a larger
commitment to stabilising its security environment, something that cannot be done minus
these three principal powers. Second, it is a means of demonstrating a cooperative posture

towards China which has the capacity of negatively affect Indian interests. Third, by
participating in the grouping India is able to secure its valuable strategic relationship with
Russia which would, otherwise, drift towards China by default. Fourth, it enables India to
project itself as a Eurasian and an Indo-Pacific power and as such have equities in
groupings like the Quad and the SCO.
Recent trends
We know that the current ties are an outcome of the Russia-Europe and China-US
estrangement. But things can change, as they have in the past 60 years. Russia and China
have been friends at one time enemies at another, likewise, the US/Europe and Russia. India
is the only one that has remained largely with the same perspective that it had in the 1950s.
Though the US has listed Russia as being at par with China as its strategic competitor, the
reality is that only China is competing and it is in US interests to keep Russia and China
apart.
Since his election, President Volodomyr Zelenskiy has prioritized the restoration of
normalcy between Ukraine and Russia. The exchange of prisoners between Russia and
Ukraine in September 2019, and the more recent Russian decision to return 3 Ukrainian
ships they had seized, all point to a thaw in their ties. In turn, there are signs that EU’s
principal players, France and Germany, may be tiring with their conflict with Russia.
During the August 2019 G 7 Summit, President Macron announced that he would work to
rebuild ties with Russia, even as President Trump declared that he would invite Russia to
the next G7 summit that would be hosted by the US.
It is no coincidence that all this is happening at a time when the EU’s most hawkishly anti-
Russian country, UK, is leaving the grouping. In September France held 2+2 talks with
Russia in Moscow, there have been several high-level German visits to Russia, including
that of Chancellor Merkel. As a result of intense diplomacy, President Macron announced
that Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine would resume their “Normandy format”
meeting to resolve the eastern Ukraine issue. The Americans have also signaled their
interest in joining these talks.
Moscow’s economy remains oriented toward Europe to which it is a major energy supplier.
The EU is its largest trading partner and source of FDI. It is in its own interest to make up
with Europe, rather than accept a position of a junior partner to China. All sides need to
step back and take a look at their own conduct. The NATO’s eastward expansion was viewed
legitimately as threatening by Russia. Likewise, the EU was not happy with Russia’s
conduct in Ukraine and the web of links Moscow has developed with right-wing forces in
Europe.
India, too, has been trying to shore up its ties with Russia. This was manifested by the first
informal summit held between India and Russia in 2018 which signaled India’s intention to
double down on its arms purchase relationship with Russia. Subsequently, India signed up
to deals worth $ 15 billion with Russia, despite the threat of American sanctions. Among
these were the S-400 missile system. Both sides have underscored the need to focus on the
weak non-defence economic relationship. A strategic and economic dialogue was
established to identify problem areas and set them right. An important aspect of this was
Russia’s invitation to India to invest in the Russian Far East (RFE), an issue that was
followed by the decision to hold the 2019 annual bilateral summit in Vladivostok in
September 4-5 where Prime Minister Modi was chief guest at the 5th Eastern Economic
Forum (EEF).
Despite the poor experience in relation to trade historically, there has been a distinct uptick
of Indian interest in the RFE. Besides delegations of business associations, chief ministers
of four Indian states were part of a delegation led by commerce and industry minister to the
area and identified diamond cutting, petrochemicals, wood processing and tourism as
potential areas of interest. Another significant development has been discussions on
developing a maritime corridor between Chennai and Vladivostok. There is pressure for
the two sides to sign a trade agreement between the EEU and India.
Energy remains a key are of cooperation between the two countries, a sector that has seen
both investments in both upstream and downstream sectors in recent years. Russia has
become a new source of LNG for India. The one area which has shown promise is bilateral
investment with the two sides having achieved the $ 30 billion target set for 2025, well
ahead of schedule. Of course, the bulk of the investments have been in the energy sector.
India is clearly seeking to work on a longer range strategy of offsetting Chinese power in
its own backyard as it were. By itself it lacks the resources to be a significant player in
Northeast Asia. But along with Japan and Korea, it can be a player who the Russians will
welcome because it helps them to prevent putting all their eggs in the Chinese basket.
There are still basic questions that need to be answered : We all know why India needs
Russia. But just what place does India have in Russia’s global strategy ? Is it merely a
hedge against US and China or something more ?
For reasons of its own, India has felt the need to maintain its strategic autonomy and links
with Russia and China. Russia is a special case here. India’s formal trade with it is not
significant but it remains vital for India’s defence posture. Leave alone the present, in the
immediate future, India may have to seek Russian help to build nuclear attack submarines
and hypersonic vehicles since, notwithstanding its close ties with the US, Washington is
unlikely to provide them. Not having such systems will seriously imbalance its military in
relation to China. For its part, too, Russia cannot be oblivious to the fact that China is both
strategic competitor and friend. Even while deferring to Russia in the Central Asian
connection, Beijing is building connectivity linkages to Europe that bypass its current
Russian connection. Its relationship to Central Asia is undermining the Russian influence
in the region.
There is, of course, a certain logic in the Russia-China nexus, in view of the fact that both
of them have been designated by the US as revisionist powers seeking to displace it from
the Indo-Pacific. Even though India does not share the US or Japanese concepts of the Free
and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), it is a member of the Quadrilateral or Quad group
comprising of the US, Australia, Japan and India which is aimed at countering China.
An engaging feature of India participating in the RIC at the sidelines of the G-20 in Buenos
Aires in 2018 was that it also joined the leaders of Japan, US in what is now called the JAI
or Japan-America-India trilateral. This was repeated at the June 2019 G 20 summit at
Osaka where the Indian Prime Minister participated in both the RIC and the JAI summits
as well.
By participating simultaneously in the JAI, Quad, RIC, the SCO and BRICS, India is
signalling that it has its own views of these groupings and the Indo-Pacific concept. And in
essence, its policy is pursuing the idea that a multipolar world is the one that best suits its
interests.
Modi has understood the value of India being a swing power in the Asia-Pacific region.
While it needs the US to balance the rising Chinese power, it realises that joining the
American camp formally would reduce India’s value. On the other hand, by cooperating
with China on issues and maintaining its military ties with Russia, it is able to enhance its
bargaining power with the US and still maintain a semblance of being a Eurasian power as
well.
India's culture Diplomacy and Soft Power

It is with great pleasure that I accepted the invitation to visit Pondicherry and deliver this
lecture. It is my second visit. I have been a follower of Shri Aurobindo’s philosophy for
many years. It is most appropriate that the theme of today’s lecture here in Pondicherry
so close to Sri Aurobindo’s Ashram and Auroville focuses on India’s cultural diplomacy
and its soft power.
Shri Aurobindo has often been quoted in UNESCO’s debates from his seminal poem
entitled "Who”, which underlines his mysticism on one hand and the unity of our culture
on the other, thereby demonstrating the continuing relevance of his philosophy. To cite a
few lines from "Who”:
"In the blue of the sky

in the green of the forest,
who is the hand
that has painted the glow?
It is He in the Sun
who is ageless and deathless,
and into the midnight
His shadow is thrown.
When darkness was blind
and engulfed with darkness,
He was seated within it,
immense and alone.”
What is soft power? How is it linked with cultural diplomacy? My visit comes soon after
the historic 2nd Informal Summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi
Jinping at Mamallapuram (also known as Mahabalipuram). It was a spectacular
demonstration of India’s magnificent Tamil heritage and soft power. It also demonstrated
the shared cultural and civilizational connect between India and China. The magnificent
rock sculptures at Mamallapuram had been visited by Hiuen Tsang in 630 AD at the
height of the Pallava reign. Thus the ‘Chennai Connect’ is the new buzz word for India’s
soft power.
It is internationally recognised that one of India’s significant global contribution’s has

been the exercise of its soft power, drawing on its ancient cultural and civilisational roots.
‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ was among the first precursors of Global Citizenship as it is
understood today – the concept that all individuals are collectively responsible towards
each other and their shared future. It forms the basis of UNESCO’s ongoing dialogue
between cultures, religions and civilisations. Today, India’s soft power as represented
through her vibrant cultural and civilisational heritage and through her Diaspora spread
worldwide, serves as a powerful reminder that India’s values of secularism, tolerance,
inclusiveness and cross fertilisation of cultures which are an intrinsic part of our
civilisation, are more relevant than ever before in the uncertain international scenario of
today.
Cultural diplomacy is therefore an important dimension of a country’s soft power. The

international impact of India’s soft power was felt long before the term found place in
popular parlance in the 21st century. Indian arts, culture and spiritualism have attracted
people from all around the world for centuries. Our Prime Minister in Modi 1.0
reoriented Indian diplomacy by combining new elements of soft power. The five pillars of
this soft power, used in a strategic sense are Samman (dignity), Samvaad (dialouge),
Samriddhi (shared prosperity), Suruksha (regional and global security), and Sanskriti
evam Sabhayata (Cultural and civilizational links). These are interlinked with India’s
broader political and economic goals of the country.
Now in his second term, PM Modi has sought to embed India’s political values in a larger
geopolitical context and has put special emphasis on the idea that India can be the
‘viswaguru’ or world teacher. The aim is to build an Asian Century on the basis of
‘vikasvaad’ that would bring peace and stability. As the ‘Chennai Connect’ between India
and China demonstrates, Asia, the largest continent in the world, is bringing the message
of peace, brotherhood, coexistence and prosperity to the rest of the world.
Cultural bonding can be one of the ways to prevent conflict and promote peace. The
pursuit of cultural diplomacy and soft power in India is underpinned by MEA’s iconic
institutional structure, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) which was
established in 1950 with the objective of reviving and strengthening India’s cultural
relations with rest of the world. This reorientation of our foreign policy was indeed timely
and intrinsic to a successful foreign policy initiative, not just in our neighbourhood but
also with our strategic partners and new dialogue partners in Africa and Latin America.
Indian spirituality has had a global presence for centuries. One of its important
manifestations in today’s world is the large number of Yoga centres spread across the
world. At the personal initiative of PM Modi soon after his election in 2014, the UN
General Assembly recognised 21st June as International Day of Yoga. It has been
commemorated on that day across the world since 21st June 2015.
PM in a powerful presentation related to yoga on 27 September 2014 at the United

Nations General Assembly made this proposal which was approved by 193 members of
the UNGA on 11 December 2014. He said "Yoga is an invaluable gift of India’s ancient
tradition. It embodies unity of mind and body; thought and action; restraint and
fulfilment; harmony between man and nature; a holistic approach to health and well-
being. It is not about exercise but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world
and the nature. By changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help us deal
with climate change. Let us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day”.
Other elements of India’s soft power include Indian classical dance in various forms
which enjoy a high degree of world-wide acclaim and appreciation. The global popularity
of Bollywood films is another instance of the strength of India’s soft power not to mention
Indian cuisine. Today, UK defines its national food as ‘Chicken Tikka Masala’! Our
Prime Minister has also underlined that tourism is an important means to promote mutual
understanding, achieve economic growth and create jobs.
Religious tourism is another way to spread this soft power across India’s borders,
including through the ‘Buddhist Circuit’. This constitutes a journey purely for internal
peace. It is a journey through austere Stupas and ancient monasteries reverberating with
the mystical chants of sacred Buddhist mantras. Every point on the Buddhist circuit has a
history steeped in myth and meaning; every monument stands testimony to faith fused into
reality. In Sanskrit, the word "Bodh” means knowledge; Buddha would thus mean "One
who has attained all knowledge” or "one in whom there is no conflict, no suffering", in
short, one, who has mastered himself. The Chinese call him the Zen Master.
Another example is the ‘Ramayana Circuit’. In May 2018, PM Narendra Modi and his
Nepalese counterpart KP Sharma Oli jointly inaugurated direct bus service between
Janakpur (Nepal) and Ayodhya (India). 15 destinations have been identified for
development under’ Ramayana Circuit’ theme under Swadesh Darshan Scheme. They are
Ayodhya, Nandigram, Shringverpur and Chitrakoot (Uttar Pradesh), Sitamarhi, Buxar
and Darbhanga (Bihar), Chitrakoot (Madhya Pradesh), Jagdalpur (Chhattisgarh),
Mahendragiri (Odisha), Nashik and Nagpur (Maharashtra), Bhadrachalam (Telangana),
Hampi (Karnataka) and Rameswaram (Tamil Nadu).
Cultural diplomacy and soft power are important instruments in regional and
international cooperation and are of particular relevance in our region i.e. South Asia.
Culture and cultural diplomacy have emerged as the force to connect, to build bilateral
relations and to heal the raptures created by history and politics. It may take time for such
a process to mature since some of our neighbours continue to be apprehensive of cultural
connectivity across states and frontiers. The process, however, as far as India is
concerned, continues and will continue. The internet, the social networking sites, our
television channels, Indian movies, especially Bollywood, and visits by acclaimed musical
and cultural troupes and theatre groups have contributed to the cultural connectivity
across borders.
Some examples are the joint commemoration by India and Bangladesh of Gurudev
Rabindranath Tagore’s 150th birth anniversary and Nazrul’s 100th birth anniversary. It
is unique that both the Indian and Bangladeshi national anthem has been composed by
Rabindranath Tagore. India has revived the old Buddhism tourism circuit to link up with
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and other States in our wider neighbourhood which had
Buddha’s footprints. Thus, India’s culture and soft power are an example of how both
help States to overcome years of mutual mistrust and push forward the process of regional
integration.
The formation of the EU is an excellent example of the triumph of soft power to settle
centuries of dispute and conflict in Europe. Immediately after World War II, school
children from France and Germany were sent on exchange programmes to learn about
each other’s culture, language and customs. The result today is striking. Within the
European Union, the strongest partnership is the Franco-German one.
Another important element of soft power is India’s tangible and intangible cultural
heritage. Intangible heritage includes traditions or living expressions inherited from our
ancestors and passed on to our descendents, such as oral traditions, performing arts,
religious and cultural festivals and traditional crafts. This includes Vedic chanting and
the Kathakali (dance drama). Multilaterally, UNESCO through the World Heritage
Committee on one hand and the Committee for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage
on the other is India’s partner in promoting an international, inter-cultural dialogue and
promoting in the long run international peace and security.
Practitioners of Indian cultural diplomacy need to acknowledge that our culture and
civilisation is complex. Even to our younger generation here in India it is difficult to
comprehend except through careful scholarship and application. Another issue is to bring
that culture to our Diaspora as India’s soft power, since it is a living culture and can only
survive if nurtured and strengthened by successive generations including our Diaspora.
Unless we present our traditions called our ‘parampara’, and our civilisation and cultural
heritage in a manner which is both comprehensible and attractive to young India who
form 80% of our vast population, this heritage cannot be nurtured and strengthened.
Keeping that perspective in mind, an understanding of what is culture and what is

heritage should be the starting point of an understanding of India’s cultural and
civilisational heritage. At the Rukmini Devi Memorial Lecture at Kalakshetra historian
and my old professor from alma-mater, Miranda House, Delhi University, Dr. Romila
Thapar defined heritage as that which has been inherited. This is implicit in the term
‘parampara’, also called tradition, which goes into the making of our culture and
civilisation. Dr. Thapar cautioned that heritage should not be thought of as static since
each generation changes the content, sometimes substantially. This civilizational heritage
called ‘sanskriti’ or ‘shristhi’ when juxtaposed with ‘prakriti’ or natural heritage
becomes cultural heritage. Dr. Thapar noted: "We have to seek out and discuss insights
that will give meaning to construction of our heritage.”
Speaking of culture and imperialism and its impact on India, Dr. Thapar pointed out that
"dominant cultures, such as the European culture which are backed by wealth, leave the
maximum traces for posterity. They have texts, describing their ideas, which are icons in
stone and metal, and their architectural forms indicate their religious and social
preferences. The Renaissance period in European history is a splendid example.
Subordinate groups in society leave few such traces. They do not have the wealth to build
monumental temples and mosques or to house manuscripts in libraries. Those at the lower
end of the social ranking provide the wherewithal for the wealth, but are not participants
in elite culture. Their culture has been different and much of it from the past has to be
inferred from how they are viewed by the elite.”
How should we mark the territorial boundaries of Indian civilization? It has often been
defined from the perspective of the Ganges heartland, the perspective from which histories
were usually written until recently. But civilization when seen from the rim, from India’s
far flung frontiers, indicate other more distant but significant contacts. Cartographic
boundaries enclose and isolate lands. Frontier zones extend them and open them up. The
concept of civilization has become territorially open-ended. Hence, any definition of
India’s neighbourhood today includes not just her immediate territorial neighbours but
also Indonesia on one hand since the island of Bali is very close to Andaman Islands and
the Middle East with whom we have traditional historic and civilizational links. The above
directly impacts not only India’s strategic space but also underline the importance of
safeguarding India’s civilisational and cultural integrity in a globalised age of
multiculturalism, hybridism and trans- cultural norms.
The difficulty arises from the complexity of the task of interpreting this heritage
historically in an objective manner. Efforts to date our civilisation began with the
Harappan culture in 2500 BC, the migration of Aryans to India in 1500 BC, the rise of
Budhisim and Jainism around 486 and 468 BC, the invasion of Alexander the Great in
326 BC and the rise of the Great empires in North and South India thereafter, such as the
Mauryas, the Guptas, as well as the Pallavas and the Chalukyas. Of particular
significance were the visits by foreign chroniclers including Fa-Hsein in 405 AD and
Hiuen Tsang in 630 AD. Their chronicles are important inputs in calculating eras, as they
provide the means of cross evidence in dating our ancient history. They were not the only
visitors. After the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni in 997 AD, we were visited by Alberuni in
1030 AD and later the visit of Ibn Batutah around 1325 AD and others. This part of our
history is referred to commonly as the Ancient and Medieval Indian periods.
Efforts were made to belittle or downgrade our heritage in the next historical period,
referred to as Modern India after the arrival of the Dutch, Portuguese, French and British
to India, the rise of the foreign settlements, the complete domination of India under
colonial rule and the rise of our national movement. During this period too, as chronicled
by Edward W. Said in his seminal work entitled ‘Culture and Imperialism’, interpretation
of our heritage was dominated by the notion that the West needed to bring civilisation to
primitive people or to destroy it where it existed, an approach which later led to the great
movement of decolonisation in Asia, Africa and the Arab world. Said noted that the notion
of inferior races helped fuel the imperial acquisition of territory during this period. The
culture of imperialism therefore entailed venerating one’s own culture to the exclusion of
other cultures, a notion completely antithetical to the Indian approach. Mark Twain called
it the ‘white man’s burden’.
This attitude is best symbolised in Macaulay’s Minute in 1835 when he said: "We must at
present do our best to create a class, who may be interpreters between us and the millions
whom we govern, a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in
opinions, in morals and in intellect.” He continued: "I have never found one among them
who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native
literature of India and Arabia. It is I believe no exaggeration to say that all the historical
information that has been collected from all the books which have been written in the
Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgement
used at preparatory schools in England”.
One of the most authoritative works of A.L. Basham entitled ‘The Wonder that was India’,
rejects the earlier prevalent interpretation of the West that Indian civilisation is un-
political, spiritual and unchanging i.e., that Indian civilisation itself is static and non-
dynamic. Basham demonstrates that India has a dynamic civilisational and cultural
heritage and that Indian civilisation is much more than a history of its religions. India’s
oral traditions had an important contribution, and as a result, Indians through the ages
were fully conscious of the antiquity of their own culture.
Some say that mystics, exemplified by the development of the Bhakti and Sufi movements,
were the earliest practitioners of cultural diplomacy in India. The Bhakti movement did
not recognise any class or caste distinction and brought their message of universal love
across India. Both movements demonstrated the universality of India’s soft power, its
culture and civilisation.
Kabir declared:
"I am not Hindu or Muslim

Allah and Ram is the breadth of my body.”
Kabir equated Ram with Rahim and Hari with Hazrat and Krishna with Karim. After his
death, his Hindu and Muslim disciples could not even agree whether to bury or cremate
him. There are two Samadhis of Kabir at Maghar, one is venerated by Hindus and the
other by Muslims. It is important to underline that the two movements, whether Sufism or
the Bhakti movement, mirror a spiritual development, which fought against ritualism,
fanaticism and sectarianism. Thus, India’s soft power as demonstrated in its cultural and
civilisational heritage is secular and based on tolerance and cross fertilisation with other
cultures.
Let me now move to India’s soft power and its legacy to its Diaspora and to global
heritage. India’s heritage is present in distant parts of the world, taken by Indians by sea
or by land from ancient times. As a member of the UN World Heritage Committee, India is
seeking international recognition of several projects. Let me give one example.
Aapravasi Ghat in Mauritius which marks the entry point of more than two million
indentured labour from India, a point of no return, was inscribed in July, 06 on
UNESCO’s World Heritage List, only after my detailed presentation as Ambassador to
UNESCO and India’s representative on the World Heritage Committee on the similarity
between the indentured and the slaves. Even then, I had to counter the Western argument
that the indentured were similar to modern day immigrants, leaving behind the poverty,
disease and dirt of India for better horizons abroad. Aapravasi Ghat represents the most
significant surviving manifestation of the indentured labour system that existed in colonial
times in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Established after the formal abolition of slavery in 1834, Aapravasi Ghat marks the point
where the indentured labour, drawn mainly from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh Provinces but
also from Southern Provinces of colonial India, would pass through these gates either to
stay on in Mauritius to work as indentured labour in the sugar plantations or to sail on to
further destinations, such as Guyana, Suriname and Reunion Island, to name a few.
Thus, during this period from 1834 i.e. after the abolition of slavery to the early 20th
century, more than two million indentured labour travelled on this route, also known as
‘Coolie Route’, to Mauritius and other destinations. This route represents therefore not
just the development of a new system of a contractual labour but also the conservation of
the civilisational heritage, traditions and values that these people carried with them to far
off destinations, including Mauritius. This resulted, a century later, in the evolution of
multicultural societies in these new countries from where most often these indentured
labour never returned to their homeland. It reflects the spread of India’s civilisation
beyond its boundaries to far flung destinations such as Mauritius but also Suriname,
Guyana, South Africa, Fiji, to name a few.
The International Indentured Labour Route Project has been recognised by UNESCO’s
Executive Board as a significant contribution to the ‘Memory of the World Register’,
similar to the Slave Route. It also highlights India’s contribution to the cultural diversity
of its Diaspora spread worldwide, including our oral traditions, such as the Bhojpuri
language and songs which are still sung in Mauritius, Guyana and Suriname and all over
the Caribbean. They recall the memories of their great Motherland, India and keep alive
the cultural traditions brought 150 years ago to these countries.
Soft power and its dissemination are now linked to the rise of public diplomacy. In MEA
too, we have a special focus on public diplomacy through our External Publicity Division.
Cultural diplomacy, the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy
goals is now regarded in many countries as a subset of the practice of public diplomacy, a
Government’s communication with external audiences in order to positively influence
them. It underpins people to people contact and is seen as a confidence building measure
across borders.
Unfortunately cultural diplomacy is still regarded to be at a lower level in most Foreign
Offices than traditional diplomacy which is based on a country’s hard power depending
on its strategic and military options. Yet, cultural diplomacy has the potential to
contribute much more effectively to achieve objectives of foreign policy. To enable
cultural diplomacy to reach its full potential the practice needs to be understood better. In
particular, it makes a significant contribution to national image, branding and social
cohesion. In presenting a national image abroad, cultural diplomacy can positively
overcome with its message an audience suspicious of official messages and serve to
reduce tension.
Our soft power which is multidimensional and based on our cultural heritage is India’s
gift to the world. This message of love, tolerance and understanding is more relevant than
ever before in a world where the forces of fundamentalism and extremism are raising their
ugly heads. It is a composite culture spread worldwide. It reflects the evolution of our own
history, the manner in which India seamlessly absorbed other cultures but never lost its
own. William Dalrymple had pertinently noted in this context:
"India has always had a strange way with her conquerors. In defeat, she beckons them in,
then slowly seduces, assimilates and transforms them”.
Dalrymple was only echoing Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore. As part of MEA’s outreach
programme, I had visited Vishwa Bharati University, Shantiniketan and read Gurudev
Rabindranath Tagore’s inspirational message which still resonates today.
Gurudev had said:
"India represents the wealth of mind which is for all.

We acknowledge India’s obligation to offer to others the hospitality of her best culture
And India’s right to accept from others their best.”
Even at that time and age, Gurudev had understood that our soft power was our unique
strength and a global heritage. We need to disseminate this soft power through the
institutions of cultural diplomacy of our country so that we can build bridges across
borders and across continents for greater international understanding, peace and
harmony. This is our responsibility. It is what we owe to India and to our future
generations.
We also have a responsibility to understand, nurture, strengthen and conserve this

heritage for our future generations. This is the least that we owe to India and her 25
million Diaspora, the largest in the world.
India’s Soft Power Diplomacy

At the outset, I would like to thank the IIM, Tiruchirapally for giving me this privilege of
inter-acting with the students and the Faculty of this prestigious institution. I am delighted
to be here in this historic city after a long time. I must also express my sincere gratitude to
the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of
India for giving me this honor under the Distinguished Lectures Series. Let me give you an
idea about this Series. Governments keep projecting their Foreign Policy ideas in foreign
countries through formal and informal channels. One of the informal channels is Public
Diplomacy, which has become very popular in recent times. We will talk about Public
Diplomacy in a while. However, Government of India realized that apart from
communications with foreign audiences, it is vital to have them with our own people. In a
vibrant democracy like India, people not only have a right to know about the details and
the making of Foreign Policy but should also contribute to the making of it. This flows
from the principle that "Foreign Policy is too serious a matter to be left only to
Diplomats.” The Distinguished Lecture Series aims to generate conversations in
Academic Institutions with Retired Diplomats. I am keenly looking forward to a
stimulating conversation with all of you.
What is Soft Power?
Power in International Relations (IR) is defined in relational terms, as the ability of actor
A to influence the behavior of actor B to get the outcome he wants. (Nicolas Blarel 2012).
That is to say, there is no absolute power. Traditionally, military and economic powers
were considered the major factors. However, some other intangible aspects have also
been given importance by many strategic thinkers even in the past. The term Soft Power
was first used by the eminent IR scholar Joseph Nye in his book "Bound to Lead: The
Changing Nature of American Power.” In the book, he identified three dimensions of

power; coercion by military force, influence by offering economic incentives and finally
the ability to co-opt other states by the nation’s appeal based on its culture and values.
The argument is that other states modify their preferences because of their favorable
perception of you. They like your story and your narrative.
Personally, I have never been a great fan of this concept of Soft Power even though I
consider Joseph Nye as a leading IR expert. The problem lies in the definition of the
concept. It is very imprecise, to say the least. Is Soft Power a product or a process? I
would say it is more the latter than the former. Let me give an example. Normally military
power is considered hard and hence looked down upon in the context of Soft Power.
However, when it is used for Peacekeeping or disaster relief, it is a humanitarian and
welcome activity. Similarly, projection of one’s culture is considered good; however,
aggressive projection of a big and historical nation’s culture in smaller countries,
particularly in the neighborhood, can be interpreted as cultural imperialism. Hence, the
important thing is how one uses the instruments. Soft Power ultimately becomes a process
and not a product.
Three factors mainly determine the Foreign Policy of a country: its geography, history
and capabilities. (David M Malone, Perspectives). Geography is a given. As they say, a
country cannot choose its neighbors. Hence, neighborhood policy becomes vital for any
nation. Normally, engagements and conflicts are more pronounced with neighbors.
History determines the mind sets, outlooks and visions of countries. They also determine
some of the linkages with others. Capabilities are what a nation acquires over a period of
time. These could be in the military, economic or technological areas. With new
capabilities, the Foreign Policy approaches of a country evolves. New interests outside of
neighborhood develop. Terms like "extended neighborhood’ and "strategic interests” have
become common usages in International Relations.
In the context of ‘Soft Power”, capabilities become relevant. How do you protect your
interests? What are the instruments you use? Strategic thinkers over the ages have asked
these questions. Our own Kautilya in his Arthashastra, talks of the Six Stratagems or
Shadgunyas and the four Upayas or instruments to be used. These are Saam, Dhaan, Bhed
and Dhand. Of these, the first two preferences are for peaceful means and incentives.
At the most fundamental level Soft Power is about winning the hearts and minds of people.
Hence, there has to be a people centric approach. Governments cannot do beyond
facilitating the process. Let me give you two examples. In the last century, there were only
two instances of the idea of India becoming very popular among a large section of the
global population. The first was during our freedom struggle with Mahatma Gandhi’s
concept of non-violent non-cooperation. The second was during the 1960’s and the Hippie
movement when many in the West got attracted to Yoga, Meditation, Indian Classical
Music and Indian spirituality. In both these instances, the Government had very little to do
with their propagation. In fact, in the first case, the Government of the time was British
who did their best to discredit the concept. Even in the second case, the Government of
India was not particularly encouraging.
Nonetheless, governments all over are nowadays facilitating the spread of positive ideas
from their countries. This would also include arts, culture, music, philosophy, sports and
cuisine. India is no exception to this rule. In fact, Government of India realizes that it has
an abundance of these resources. So, why not use them to further our interests in a subtle
manner.
The operative term here is "subtle”. Using Soft Power to achieve specific goals is a
contradiction in terms and can be counter-productive. Ideally, Soft Power dissemination
should be neutral without any reference to our interests.
Can Soft Power by itself achieve Foreign Policy Goals?
It is obvious that Soft Power may be a necessary condition for achieving goals, but is not
a sufficient condition. This is because Foreign Policy outcomes are not unilateral
decisions. Their success depends on other nations. Their interests play a crucial role on
how successful we are. If our goals are opposed to their national interests, they would not
tow our line even if they like our culture and civilization. That is where use of some
aspects of "hard power” would come into play. That does not automatically imply use of
force. There are other instruments of persuasion. Nonetheless, the fact cannot be denied
that Soft power "lubricates” other instruments in Diplomacy. If a country is appreciative
of our values and culture, it may be pre-disposed towards avoiding an adversarial
position. Hence, during decision-making occasions, it could tend towards a favorable one
provided it is not against its national interests.
What are India’s strengths and weaknesses in Soft Power?
While making this assessment, one should not lose sight of the product and process
aspects we talked about earlier. Both are critical.
The most important element is India’s long history, culture and civilization. These have
attracted both intellectuals and common folk from across the globe to India. If they were
not attractive, so many brilliant minds would not be working as Indologists. In the 1980s,
the famous theatre personality Peter Brook produced the Mahabharata with a universal
cast. The impact was spectacular. The great Indian epic became popular in the far
corners of the world over night.
India is fortunate to have all the major religions of the world. Four are homegrown:
Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. Four came from outside: Zoroastrianism,
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This adds to the incentives for the religiously minded
foreigners to visit India. The international media coverage of the Khumbmela is testimony
to the admiration of other countries for India and how it has kept up its beliefs and
traditions over millennia.
Religious tourism into India is a major factor in our external relations. Apart from Hindu
religious sites like Varanasi, Badrinath, Kedarnath, Vaishnao Devi, Amarnath, Tirupathy,
Sabarimala, Tanjavoor, Madurai etc., a large number also come for places of interest to
other religions. India is the most favored destination for Buddhist pilgrims. This is not
surprising because most of the places associated with Lord Buddha’s life are in India.
Throughout the year, there is a steady stream of visitors from the ASEAN countries,
Japan, Sir Lanka and Myanmar to Bodh Gaya and Nalanda. Christianity and Judaism in
India are also very old and there are historic Churches and Synagogues in South India.
Speaking of Islam, the Dargas of Sufi saints like Moinuddin Chishti and NIzzamuddin
Aulia attract thousands of devotees.
Connected to religious aspects of India are Yoga and Meditation, which have become
household terms in most countries. The health aspects of these are being researched and
propagated by well know physicians and doctors. Government of India did well by making
the United Nations declare June 21 as the Global Yoga Day a few years ago.
Equally important are the music, dance, art and architecture of India. Even though the
Taj Mahal is the most famous monument of India, foreign tourists are discovering
thousands of other historical and archeological sites all over India. These visits will
certainly have a positive effect on their attitude towards our country. Propagation of our
culture is nothing new. In earlier times, we called it "Cultural Diplomacy”. The Indian
Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) under the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) does
pioneering work in not only disseminating our culture abroad but also encouraging
exposure of other cultures in India to encourage a cultural dialogue.
Bollywood has been projected as a great Soft Power tool for India. Sometimes there is
exaggeration of this aspect. It is true that Bollywood movies are popular among the
people of many countries. However, it is equally true that Bollywood does not figure high
among its peer competitors. For decades now, Indian cinema has not figured prominently
in any of the famous Film Festivals like Cannes, Berlin, Venice or Karlovy Vary. Let us
look at the size of it. Hollywood’s worldwide box office receipts and international
diffusion are far greater than those of Bollywood. The latter’s success is in a limited "echo
chamber” of Non-resident Indians (NRIs), People of Indian Origin (PIOs) and some India
lovers. One has also to mention here the adverse effects of Bollywood on the Indian
regional cinema, which tends to be marginalized. Having said all that, the attractiveness
of Bollywood, particularly its music and dance deserves a lot of credit.
Indian Cuisine is a major attraction for foreigners. There is universal appeal for its
variety and sophistication. There may not be a single big city in the world without at least
two or three Indian Restaurants. They all do great business. It is joked that the national
dish of UK today is CTM or Chicken Tikka Masala.
Indian Diaspora namely NRIs and PIOs play a vital role in projecting its Soft Power. Both
put together add up to twenty million. They are spread across all continents and have
become prosperous, famous and influential over the last two decades. They not only help
in disseminating our culture but also have, on occasions, contributed to promoting our
Foreign Policy goals. The best example of this was during the negotiations of the Indo-US
Nuclear Deal in the early years of the first decade of this century. Many influential
Indians in USA did remarkable work in lobbying Congressmen and Senators and bringing
them to our point of view. The Indian Diaspora is becoming a real asset as more and more
of them achieve success in their respective fields in different countries.
One important aspect of Soft Power that is not often discussed is the power to lead by
example. Mahatma Gandhi could do it. Others will respect and admire us only if we do
what we preach. They would judge us by our commitments to our promises. This is
particularly relevant in the case of Development Partnership Projects in Developing
Countries. In International Relations, nothing is more important than credibility of one’s
statements.
India, at present, faces the challenges of an important emerging power. Hence, it has to
play multiple roles. Our interests are both with the developing world and with major
powers. Sometimes, others could feel that we are running with the hares and hunting with
the hounds. It is a delicate balancing act that India has to perform constantly. It is easy to
convince the Foreign Governments, since they are in the same business and can
understand the compulsions of other Governments. The problem is to convince the
common citizens of those countries. That is where the articulation of our narrative
becomes important. Is our story credible? Is it interesting? Does it evoke respect?
Public Diplomacy is the new tool to deal with these issues. The idea is to communicate
directly to the citizenry in simple terms. These have to be devoid of jargons and overt
propaganda. Earlier, these used to done through the conventional media and
lectures/seminars. The advent of Social Media has changed the face of Public Diplomacy
drastically. Today, even national leaders are resorting to Tweeting to make their ideas
known. Here, PM Narendra Modi is leading by example and encouraging all officers in
the Government to leverage Social Media for communication with the public.
Soft Power is not "image polishing”. It is much more than that. Mere image polishing
without corresponding improvement in reality can be counterproductive.
Others judge us also by our ability to understand and appreciate them. Openness, humility
and empathy go a long way in Diplomacy. Let me quote the French born American
historian Jacques Barzun who said " To see ourselves as others see us is a very rare and
remarkable quality; however, in International Relations it is even rarer and more useful if
you can see others as they see themselves.” Real communication can be there only if you
see them in their perspective.
One way of winning hearts and minds is not to be obsessed with projecting our successes
and achievements all the time, but also try to celebrate those of others. Famous Film
Festivals where movies from all over the world compete on an equal footing like Cannes,
Berlin or Venice generate a great deal of goodwill for the hosts. Why do countries fight
for hosting international sporting events like Olympics? It is a way of showing
appreciation of universal talents. India has increased its activities in this respect. ICCR’s
objective is to not only promote Indian culture abroad but also make Indians aware of
other cultures. Care has to be taken that this is done without even a hint of condescension
or patronizing.
To conclude, I would say that even if the concept of Soft Power is not precise, Joseph Nye
did well to flag this important aspect in Foreign Policies of countries. There is no country
in the world today, which does not attach importance to this factor. India is in a good
position in this respect due to its enormous resources that come in handy in increasing the
country’s attractiveness to others. Academics and intellectuals can play a critical role in
this endeavor.

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