Farmers, Industries, and the State:

The Culture of Contract Farming in

Spain and Japan
MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI
The University of Chicago

INTRODUCTION

Farmers used to grow, process, store, and merchandise food and fiber. Such
"agriculture as an industry in and of itself or as a distinct phase of our
economy," however, has long become a legacy of the past (Davis and Gold-
berg 1957:1). Farmers today stand in relations of growing complexity with
various "others" for the purpose of agricultural production, i.e. farm sup-
pliers, banks, research centers, processors, storage operators, distributors,
and the government. In other words, farmers work in the complex web of
relationships created by all these individuals and institutions. In this context,
"contract farming," a topic of growing interest among social scientists,
seems to epitomize, perhaps most clearly, such complex production relations
maintained by many farmers today in various corners of the world.
Contract farming is a type of agricultural production based on "those
contractual arrangements between farmers and companies, whether oral or
written, specifying one or more conditions of production and/or marketing of
an agricultural product" (Ewell 1963:3). According to what conditions of
production and/or marketing it specifies, contract farming takes various dif-
ferent forms (Ewell 1963:5-6; Wilson 1986:50). It is an increasingly visible
type of agricultural production between farmers and domestic capitals in the
advanced industrialized societies and between farmers in the third world and
international capitals. As the English term contract implies, contract farming
"in and of itself has been neither good nor bad" (Ewell 1963:9). Indeed, the
Western understanding of contract is that it transforms socially unequal per-

The research in Belunya reported here was supported by the American Association of University
Women and Northwestern University. Research in Mino was supported by the United Nations
University. The support of each of these organizations is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to
thank John Cornell, Harumi Befu, David Gilmore, Richard Moore, John Wilson, and an anony-
mous reader of this journal for their valuable criticism of an earlier draft of this paper. Two
different versions of this paper were presented at the workshop of the State and Cultural Transfor-
mations of the United Nations University in Macau (December 1986) and at the annual meeting of
the Association of Asian Studies in Chicago (March 1986).

0010-4175/88/3209-0231 $5.00 © 1988 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History

432
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 433

sons and groups into "political and legal equals" (Goodell 1980:285). How-
ever, precisely because of this legal neutrality, contract farming often "con-
ceals (and yet, on analysis, reveals) the system of social relations" between
farmers and domestic and/or international capitals (Wilson 1986:47). In the
Western legal system, each party of the contract can hire a lawyer who works
for the benefit of his client; when disagreement occurs between parties of the
contract, the rights of plaintiff and defendant can be judged in the court by
substantive legal rules (Henderson 1975:2). This modern legal system, how-
ever, is rarely employed in the case of contract farming, because of the sheer
difference in the amount of capital to which each party to the contract can
resort. It is thus commendable that various scholars have made great efforts to
unravel the real nature of relationships entailed in contract farming (Heffernan
1972; Raup 1973; Althoff 1979; Burbach and Flynn 1980; Wilson 1986).
Based on their own findings, these scholars have reached several different
conclusions about the nature of contract farming. Some claim that it is a
special way for family farms to solve the problem of the economy of size.
Thus, unlike "corporate farming," under which farmers provide nothing but
wage labor, contract farming could avoid the "alienation" of farmers
(Heffernan 1972; Raup 1973). Others argue that contract farming must "di-
minish control by farmers over their operation while increasing their exposure
to risk" (Wilson 1986:47; see also Althoff 1979; Bernier 1980; Burbach and
Flynn 1980). On the other hand, most economists emphasize the positive
aspects of contract farming, arguing that it creates new nonfarm jobs and
elevates the standard of living of all economic groups (Davis and Goldberg
1957; Ewell 1963; Austin 1974).
In the present study, instead of generalizing the nature of contract farming,
I will show that the way farmers perceive contract farming, i.e. defining,
negotiating, and accepting "contract" and "contractual relationship" with
food industries, differs in each cultural context, and that such perceptions can
only be understood with reference to the economic, political, and cultural
forces to which they are inexorably linked. In other words, "the norms, skills
and rules for contractual interaction" are created and nurtured by the people
in a specific cultural and historical context (Goodell 1980:307). To demon-
strate this, I will investigate such norms, skills, and rules in two different
cultural contexts and compare them. Obviously, such norms, skills, and rules
have not been formed within the narrow context of industry-farmer rela-
tionship alone: they must have been formed in the larger context of changing
and increasingly complex relations of production of farmers. Such norms,
skills, and rules also emerged over a long period of time and were perhaps
built upon antecedent norms, skills, and rules of relationship for agricultural
production (cf. Taussig 1980). The present study is thus not only "an-
thropological," as I try to view local farmers' perceptions of their relations of
production in the context of their everyday life, but also "historical," be-
434 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

cause I will deal with such perceptions over the period of more than a century,
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. I will thus argue that contract
farming should be viewed as a cultural and historical phenomenon rather than
as an imposed legal category of universal human relationships, and that it
should be viewed from the perspective of participants, in this case, farmers.
The two villages I chose for the purpose of present study are located in the
two industrial nations of Europe and Asia, Spain and Japan. The farming
sectors of these two nations share many common characteristics, which are
largely the consequences of the similar degree of urbanization of the coun-
tryside and of penetration of agricultural industries into the farming sector.
First, the share of agriculture in each nation's employment of labor has been
decreasing since the 1950s, but agricultural households still compose about 15
percent of the total number of households. The agricultural share of each
nation's gross national product has also been decreasing, and farming house-
holds are obtaining more income from nonfarm sources. Third, the family-
farm has shown strong tenacity as the basic unit of agricultural production,
and farming by the owner is the most common type of agricultural operation
in both countries. Furthermore, while the standard of living has been rising
and the pattern of consumption has been changing among Spanish as well as
Japanese farmers, they have been suffering from the increasing cost of agri-
cultural production. Complex marketing is also evident in both nations with a
large number of middlemen, wholesalers, and retailers (Ministerio de Agri-
cultura, Pesca y Alimentation 1984; Nihon Nogyo Nenkan Kanko-kai
1986).' The two villages I chose, Belunya (pseudonym) in northern Catalonia
in Spain and Mino (pseudonym) in central Japan, should also be viewed in
light of this similar background of the larger society and economy. In both
villages, a single household has been the only viable unit of production, and
the practice of inheritance by a single heir is the norm. Contract farming has
also been an increasingly popular type of production since the 1950s in both
villages.2 My concerns here are how the relations of production of local
farmers have been transformed by the appearance of contract farming and

1
There are also certain differences between Spanish and Japanese farming sectors. While
about 70 percent of farmers work land of less than one hectare each in Japan, the scale of farming
varies from region to region in Spain. There are also differences in the composition of agricultural
land distribution and final products. While Japan depends on the import of food, Spain depends
upon its export. The local condition of Belunya thus does not represent the condition of many
other local communities in Spain, but is comparable with that of Mino in that a single household
is the sole unit of production.
2
There is a question here of the extent to which either Belunya or Mino is representative of
other rural communities in Spain or Japan. In both countries, there are certainly many varieties of
rural communities in terms of population scale, ecological condition, production pattern, or land
tenure system (see note 1 for Belunya). Belunya or Mino, then, is only one of them. However, in
terms of the degree of urbanization of the countryside and of penetration of agricultural industries
into the fanning sector, both Belunya and Mino represent the prevailing condition of many other
rural villages and towns of both countries.
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 435

how local farmers have responded to and perceived such transformations. But
first, some picture of these places is necessary.

SETTINGS

Belunya is a village located approximately two hours' driving distance from

Barcelona. Local buses connect this village to three major local towns.
Belunya consists of a town nucleus with a population of over 2,000 and its
surrounding hinterland, in which the population currently amounts to only
about 400. Farmhouses are dispersed in the hinterland, and so are the plots of
cultivated land among the meadow land and forests. At the edge of the town
nucleus, one finds numerous patches of small vegetable gardens irrigated by
the river water, which many townsmen work after they come home from wage
work or on weekends. The population of the town nucleus has been steadily
increasing since the 1940s, due to the increasing employment opportunities
provided by various small-scale industries built in and near Belunya. Since
1960, the growth of the town nucleus has also been attributed to peasant
migration from the surrounding hinterland (Asano-Tamanoi 1982, 1983; Fla-
quer 1986).
Mino is a village located approximately four hours' driving distance from
Tokyo. It is also connected to several local towns by the well-developed
highway. Mino consists of twelve hamlets located in the valley between the
river and a series of mountains. Numerous rice paddies and dry fields are also
found in the valley. The mountain land, although a part of Mino, has been
largely uninhabited. Mino's population too has been increasing since the end
of World War II, due also to the increasing employment opportunities created
by small-scale industries in and near Mino. Its current population is approx-
imately 10,000.
The agricultural production system of both villages went through major
transformations around the 1950s, which I will describe shortly. This is right
after the period when the agrarian economies of Belunya and Mino were
devastated by the Civil War and the Second World War during the 1930s and
1940s. Indeed, the 1950s is also the time when farmers in both villages began
to feel the presence of food industries and the necessity of being engaged in
contract farming. However, in order to understand such transformations, one
has to move back the starting point of the time framework for the analysis. I
will therefore begin with the mid-nineteenth century to trace the change of
local farmers' relations of production and of their perceptions of such rela-
tions in both villages.3 The selection of this time framework is based on my

3
It seems to me that the norm of farming as a family enterprise had already been established
long before the nineteenth century in both Belunya and Mino. In Belunya, those peasants who
were hereditary servants obtained their freedom in the late fifteenth century, and the long-term
contractual relationship between landowners and tenants had been established since then (Roca
1977; Vicens Vives 1978). In Mino, those large extended families with their own hereditary
436 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

own observation of the agricultural history of both villages, and the reason is
twofold. First, it is between 1808 and 1854 in Belunya and in 1868 in Mino
when feudalism came to an end and privately held marketable land increased
substantially (Malefakis 1970; Simon Segura 1973). Second, during the first
half of the nineteenth century new production techniques and fertilizer were
diffused, the development of transportation and communication further in-
creased the market scale, and rural industrial activities emerged in both the
villages of Belunya and Mino (Vicens Vives 1961:58-64; Nakamura 1966;
Grabolosa 1973; Vila Valenti 1973; Minami-minowa Sonshi Hensan Iinkai
1984).4 However, the mid-nineteenth century should not be viewed as a point
of sudden politically induced change in either village. In Belunya the sei-
gnorial domain and the land held by monasteries, convents, and parish
churches were by no means substantial; hence a series of legislations of the
so-called desamortizacion had little effect. In Mino, with the development of
market forces, private sales of land occasionally took place before the end of
feudalism. Rather, the mid-nineteenth century should be viewed as a point in
history when the influence of commercial economy on the village life became
inevitable, and from which one could most effectively foresee subsequent
changes in village life. Hence Part I of the following comparison will deal
with the period between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries,
whereas Part II examines the period after the 1950s. For Belunya, my field-
work was conducted in 1979 and 1980 before Spain's entry into the European
Community. It was too soon to assess the effects of the so-called "democra-
tization" process in post-Franco Spain on the agricultural sector in Belunya.
My research in Mino was conducted over three summers between 1984 and
1986.

THE COMPARISON: PART I

Any elderly farmer in Belunya, when asked what fanning was like before the
1950s, will say that he planted "una mica de tots [a bit of everything]"—
wheat, barley, oat, maize, olives, wine grapes, beans, potatoes, and fruits. In
fact, Censo de Declaration Ganaderia, Declaration de Trigo y Declaration
de Subsistencias of Belunya of the past century confirms his memory. Such a
multicrop pattern of production was followed on each self-sufficient farm,
called a mas. Each farm consisted of a residential house for a peasant and his

1
servants were believed to be dissolved sometime during the seventeenth century (cf. Smith 1959).
What one has to bear in mind is that farming by a single household is also an historical construct,
which emerged at a certain time in history and has been maintained to this day.
4
However, there is one notable difference between Belunya and Mino. Although the growth
of agricultural productivity and the market was a long-term, gradual process beginning sometime
after 1600 in Mino, the same process had been repeatedly interrupted by wars in Belunya.
Nevertheless, the early nineteenth century could still be seen as the culminating point of the
growth of agricultural productivity and the market in both villages.
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 437

family, auxiliary constructions such as barns, pig sties or rabbit coops, culti-
vated land for cereals, land for tree crops such as olives or wine grapes,
vegetable garden, and often meadow land and forests. Each farm was oc-
cupied by a single tenant called a masover and his family.5 Various historical
records published between 1860 and 1951 show that there had been 133 farms
occupied by 133 tenant families, which had been owned by 57 landowners,6
and that these numbers haabeen remarkably stable.7 These numbers, then,
suggest that there were some landowners who owned more than one farm.
Most of these were small-scale landowners, owning only one (twenty-eight
landowners) or two (thirteen landowners) farms. On the other hand, five
landowners owned more than seven farms each. Although this small number
of landowners owned a large area of land, the area size of each farm was more
or less the same since a single tenant household took care of it. The small
difference among farms in area size that appeared on the statistical data was
largely attributed to the area size of forests not utilized by tenants. While
forty-three of these landowners lived in the town nucleus, fourteen lived in the
hinterland on one of their own farms, usually right next to the house of one of
their tenants. However, wherever they lived, they actively participated in
their tenants' farm operations, sharing the risks of farming with them. The
agricultural production was thus pursued on each farm by a single tenant and
his family in his collaboration with his landowner. Cooperation in agricultural
work among tenants was quite rare; indeed, even tenants who served for the
same landowner or who were related as kin seldom cooperated. The produc-
tion system was based solely on the isolated vertical relationship between a
landowner and his tenant family.
This relationship represents a long-term contractual relation, often de-
scribed as "el cens de I'emfiteusi" or as "the contract of masoveria" (Vicens

5
The closest translation of masover may be a sharecropper, since he pays rent in produce.
Although there are various forms of sharecropping, the term usually implies that land is granted
as separate parcels, sharecroppers commute to the land instead of living on it, and landowners
form contracts with sharecroppers as individuals. Since none of these conditions applies in the
case of masover, I use the term tenant instead of sharecropper.
6
I mainly referred to the records of Repartimiento Individual de la Contribution Territorial of
Belunya, which are based on the survey conducted every ten years between 1860 and 1980, and
to the records of Contribution Industrial y de Comercio compiled in 1860, 1897-98, and 1930.
Although these sources clarified to a great extent the situations of landowners, they did not tell
much about the situations of their tenants. The Catastro de la Riqueza Rustica (1959-71), which
record the amount of property on each farm owned by these landowners, are useful sources in this
respect. Since the total amount of land property of each landowner had been more or less stable
between 1860 and 1959,1 referred to the data of Catastro to find out the scale of each farm in the
late nineteenth century.
7
The same document sources indicate that there were another 32 farms occupied by 32 owner-
cultivators and their families. These farms were usually small, without meadow land and forests,
and occupied only about 10 percent of the total agricultural land of Belunya. The group of
peasants who first gave up agriculture in the post-Civil War period came from these farms. Thus,
the dominant pattern of agricultural production was and has been tenant farming under leasehold.
438 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

Vives 1961; Vila Valenti 1973; Roca 1977; Flaquer 1986). However, this
relationship is by no means a completely negotiated agreement between two
individuals. In many cases, the landowner imposed certain conditions of
relationships upon his tenant according to "el costum del bon pages [the
custom of a good peasant].'' This ' 'custom'' actually constituted the common
core of every contractual agreement between a landowner and his tenant.
Some small-scale landowners often formed contracts orally; in that case, the
contract specified only traditional or customary rights and obligations of both
parties. The landowner must contribute to his tenant by maintaining the land
in perfect condition and providing barns for livestock and large agricultural
equipment. He must pay the land tax for the estate, supervise the agricultural
activities of his tenant, and decide the general directions of agricultural ex-
ploitation in agreement with his tenant. Meanwhile, the tenant must plant
crops in agreement with his landowner and pay a certain portion of the harvest
as rent. He must use all the buildings and tools with extreme care. He can
usually have products from a small vegetable garden if he does not sell them
on markets, and he can gather firewood in the forests for domestic use.
However, the condition of each farm was unique, because it was situated in
a different ecological niche, and this uniqueness added individual charac-
teristics to the common core of each contractual agreement. For example, the
proportion of partition was set separately for each different kind of crop by
each landowner, who took into account various criteria, such as the productiv-
ity of land, the degree of manual labor required for the production on the part
of his tenant, or the amount of investment each landowner had put in the land.
Some tenants could afford to own a few milk cows and pigs; the landowner
then designated the location and area size of land on which the tenant could
freely plant alfalfa for his own animals. Several landowners invested in such
small-scale industries as brick manufacturing, paper manufacturing, lumber-
ing, or limestone quarrying. During the agricultural slack season, their tenants
were often hired as wageworkers in addition to those nonpeasant workers
living in the town nucleus. In these cases, the contract also stipulated the
relationship between the landowner and his tenant in the area of industries.
Thus, in addition to the common core, each contract included those stipula-
tions which had been "negotiated" between the two individuals.
There was an obvious imbalance of power between the two, particularly
when the landowner owned a large number of farms. When small disputes
occurred, tenants might have yielded to the power of their landowners. Vari-
ous complaints about their former landowners that the people of Belunya
recounted to me seem to describe such an unbalanced power relationship:
"my landowner asked me to share even the cabbage I planted in between the
rows of maize," or "my landowner always gave me such poor land for my
alfalfa," etc. However, several cases of open disputes brought to the local
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 439

public notary attest that both parties of the contract could stand on the same
legal ground if they had to do so. 8
In short, each tenant had to maintain his relations of production only with
his landowner, understanding his rights and obligations stipulated in the con-
tract. He had been incorporated into the larger economic structure mostly
through his landowner, who marketed what he received from his tenants. The
tenant's commercial activities had been discouraged by the contractual agree-
ment itself. The condition of markets (particularly the price fluctuations of
wheat) as well as the state's intervention in agriculture largely affected the
decisions of landowners, but not of tenants. Indeed, the intervention of the
state in the rural organization before the Civil War was quite limited in its
scope, and the frequent change of the government made a large proportion of
the agrarian legislation issued between 1860 and the Civil War largely inef-
fective. Rather, it is the landowner who created a "buffer zone" between
tenants and the larger commercial economy. Each tenant could thus perceive
his production relations in terms of a specific dyad, consisting of himself and
his landowner, within the local context.
One should not ignore a kind of "horizontal" relationship that existed
among tenants in Belunya. However, such a relationship was never mobilized
for any production purpose. Indeed, numerous occasions brought these ten-
ants together in Belunya: local markets on Tuesdays when they gathered in the
town plaza; Sunday masses at the church; Sardana (the Catalan national
dance) gatherings on the town plaza; family religious rituals when relatives
gathered; or simply drinking parties at local bars and cafes. On each of these
occasions, they mutually assessed each other's contractual terms, complained
about them, exchanged accounts of how smartly they cheated their land-
owners at the time of rent payment, or gossiped about the family affairs of
their landowners. But these horizontal relationships did not motivate tenants
to cooperate in the production sphere. After all, the contract itself excluded
such a possibility for cooperation.
A peasant in Mino also planted "a bit of everything" before the mid-
twentieth century, including rice, wheat, barley, millet, soybeans, black
beans, vegetables, and several cash crops such as tobacco leaves or indigo.
However, the organization of production in which he participated presents a
different picture from the one in Belunya. The land record of 1886 shows that
there were 108 owner-cultivators, 378 part-tenants who kept their own small

8
All these cases of open disputes are found among the documents preserved at the National
Archival Office in Olot. These documents were recorded by the successive public notaries who
resided in the town nucleus of Belunya. The number of these cases brought by either a landowner
or a tenant is not clear, due to the poor condition of preservation of these documents. For the early
twentieth century, I read at least three cases of legal disputes, one of which was brought by a
tenant and two by landowners.
440 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

land but also depended on the rented land, and 54 tenants. However, unlike
Belunya, the land-tenure pattern had been very unstable between 1886 and the
mid-twentieth century. In fact, the dynamic land-tenure pattern could already
be observed in the late feudal period of the early nineteenth century (Nochi
Kaikaku-shi Henshu Iinkai 1953). Furthermore, after the price of agricultural
products declined in the early present century, about a third of owner-
cultivators became part-tenants, losing land plot by plot. On the other hand,
about a third of the part-tenants became owner-cultivators with the increasing
cash-earning opportunities provided by various subsidiary occupations, keep-
ing their own land but giving up the rented land. Some owner-cultivators and
part-tenants lost all of their land and had to become tenants. In addition, as a
large tract of forest land was reclaimed by public as well as private corpora-
tions, which then leased it out to newcoming tenants, the number of tenants
increased substantially from 54 to 200 in 1919, and further to 256 in 1943.
This dynamic pattern of land tenureship indicates several notable differences
between Belunya and Mino in terms of the organization of agricultural
production.
First, there had been no such isolated and stable landowner-tenant rela-
tionships as those we could find in Belunya. Rather, all the peasants, irrespec-
tive of their status in terms of land ownership, worked their own or rented
fields, making decisions of production and marketing by themselves. In addi-
tion, many tenants rented several pieces of land from more than one land-
owner at one time. Aside from paying a certain amount of rent, which was
usually specified orally and was fixed by landowners irrespective of weather
conditions,9 tenants were not bounded by other obligations vis-a-vis land-
owners.10 Since rent was paid exclusively in rice, tenants had freedom to
select crops as long as they produced enough rice to pay rent. They usually
possessed their own dwellings and a few draft animals and paid for the farm
equipment, fertilizer, and other necessities.
On the other hand, most of the landowners were small in scale and were
themselves owner-cultivators.11 By the beginning of the present century,

9
This type of tenancy prevailed in Mino during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. However, some landowners seem to have fixed the amount of rent in rice annually after
an estimate of the harvest was made. In addition, a small number of landowners actually asked for
money rent instead of rice. Thus, several different types of tenancies seem to have coexisted in
Mino.
10
An exception to this rule is the case of mortgage agreement. When a landholder needed the
cash, he put up a field as collateral on a loan, which was due in a set number of years. If the loan
could not be repaid when it was due, the field was forfeited to the creditor. Hence he could not
break the relationship with the creditor—usually another landholder in Mino—during that peri-
od. However, this was also a relatively short period of time, perhaps about five years or so, and
the relationship ceased to exist once the field was forfeited.
11
Since the system of land ownership was so dynamic, the amount of land owned by indi-
viduals must have varied between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. However,
landowners seem to have been largely "small scale." For example, according to the scheme of
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 441

certain conditions further curtailed the power of local landowners: increasing

agricultural productivity; declining prices for rice; increasing availability of
subsidiary occupations; increasing government intervention in the form of
government loans, credit facilities, or relief measures; and the development of
tenants' unions (cf. Dore 1959:19-22). As a consequence, some relatively
large-scale landowners in Mino began to form a joint-stock corporation by the
late 1920s, avoiding direct contact with their own tenants.
Thus, unlike Belunya, the penetration of a cash economy affected every
individual household whether or not it owned the land. Each household had to
seek cash-earning opportunities independently. In Mino, production of cash
crops and sericulture were two major sources of cash for peasants, although
small surpluses of rice, soybeans, and wheat were occasionally sold for cash.
This means that each peasant had to maintain some relations with merchants,
who sold what peasants needed—mostly fertilizer—and who purchased prod-
ucts from them. Most of these merchants were themselves landowning
cultivators living in Mino. However, even in this sphere of commercial ex-
change, a long-term isolated peasant-merchant relationship did not emerge. A
combination of counterforces prevented this. First, peasants tried to organize
themselves into groups in buying or selling certain products vis-a-vis specific
merchants; and second, the government, in order to increase the direct control
of the agricultural sector, tried to block the penetration and spread of the
power of private merchants in the local villages. The merging of these two
forces from "below" and "above," then, resulted in the establishment of an
agricultural cooperative in 1900, which could partially succeed in supplanting
merchant capital on the local scene.12
However, for peasants, organizing themselves into groups was by no
means a strategy aimed only against merchant capital. In fact, groups were
formed for a variety of other production purposes: not only for purchasing
large equipment or for marketing tobacco leaves or indigo but also for control-
ling irrigation water or for rice planting. While some of these groups were
formed on the basis of previously existing groups, such as a group of related
households, a neighborhood group, or a religious group, others were formed

land reform, each landowner could retain up to 2.3 hectares of land. However, only 22 out of 155
landowners residing in Mino in 1943 owned more than 2.3 hectares of land. Although the forest
land was outside the scheme of land reform, it was largely owned by absentee landowners.
12
One type of agricultural cooperative (No-kai) had already been established during the
1870s. This was a cooperative for relatively wealthy landowning-cultivators, who introduced new
types of technologies to local villages to increase agricultural productivity. The other cooperative
(Sangyo Kumiai) was established in 1900 with the government's initiative for middle- and small-
scale owner-cultivators, part-tenants, and tenants. Both types of cooperatives were established in
almost all villages and local towns. By the 1930s 31 percent of fertilizer had been sold to local
peasants and 28 percent of rice had been marketed through the network of Sangyo Kumiai (Ouchi
1960:239). These two types of agricultural cooperatives were later merged into one single
organization during the 1940s.
442 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

on an ad-hoc basis for specific purposes. To form a group was partly to solve
the problem stemming from their scale of fanning. (In the early 1940s, more
than 70 percent of peasants in Mino worked land shares of less than one
hectare each, which was further divided into several plots of wet and dry
land.) Thus, a single household became a member of many different groups at
one time. A single group usually consisted of households of various economic
statuses. By the 1930s, all these groups had been incorporated into the gov-
ernment-supported agricultural cooperative.
Peasants in Mino certainly perceived their relations of production in a
different way from those in Belunya. Whether they were owner-cultivators,
part-tenants, or tenants, they were "independent" peasants, each being "free
to farm as he would whatever others might do" (Smith 1959:211). They
organized themselves into groups to solve the problem of the scale of farming,
and the government further supported their group activities through the agri-
cultural cooperative. Their inclination toward forming groups, however,
should not be viewed as a reflection of "harmonious" relationships among
peasants, but rather as an economic necessity for all these "independent" and
competing peasants. Indeed, a peasant often changed his group memberships
to fulfill his own production purposes. There were obvious differences in
power among these peasants, but they were by no means "static" differences
that would have led to long-term and dyadic relationships between two specif-
ic individuals. Peasants maintained production relations with landowners and
merchants. With the development of a commercial economy, new types of
economic relationships, such as wage relationships or even mortgage agree-
ments, emerged. But all of these relationships involved relations formed
between two "independent" individuals whenever the necessity occurred. In
Mino before the mid-twentieth century, the "contract" or "contractual rela-
tionship" was thus perceived in a way quite different from that in Belunya. It
was an ad-hoc and short-term relationship; and if one was caught in that
relationship, one tried hard to get out of it to seek "independence." In
addition, the government, by introducing the agricultural cooperative, tried to
undermine such contractual relationships wherever they emerged. Each peas-
ant, then, seems to have sought his own means of survival in the midst of a
constantly changing economy.

THE COMPARISON: PART II

In Belunya as well as in Mino, the agrarian economy was devastated by wars
toward the middle of the present century. Essential foodstuffs were rationed,
and the distribution of such foodstuffs was regulated by the state. However,
black markets flourished for many agricultural goods in both villages, as the
government outlawed their private markets (Grabolosa 1973; Minami-
minowa Sonshi Hensan Iinkai 1984). In a sense, these flourishing black
markets led to the recovery and stabilization of the economy of both villages.
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 443

Furthermore, these local farmers had to increase the production of foodstuffs

for the growing urban population and for rebuilding the nation. The agri-
cultural production system of both villages began to change by the beginning
of the 1950s in order to meet these demands, and by the early 1960s it had
been radically transformed. In both villages, multicrop agriculture totally
disappeared. The production of wheat in Belunya dwindled by the late 1950s,
and farmers have been specializing in various combinations of livestock pro-
duction (dairy cattle, beef cattle, pigs, poultry, sheep, and calves) together
with the production of feed crops since the early 1960s. Farmers in Mino have
specialized in the production of a single cash crop (vegetable or fruit) or of a
single livestock animal (dairy cattle or beef cattle), while combining it with
the production of rice since the late 1950s. What brought about these
changes? In brief, the rapid growth of the national economy in the postwar
period increased the demand for food in the urban sector and the farmers'
need for cash income.
A notable phenomenon in Belunya is that the land tenure pattern hardly
changed. Those 57 landowners still owned the land as of 1980 at the time of
my field work. On the other hand, a large number of tenant farmers abandoned
agriculture in response to the increasing wagework opportunities in the town
nucleus. Until the early 1960s their number decreased gradually, and they
were engaged in the production of wheat, which the government purchased at
good prices. But it plunged to only 31 by the early 1970s. In other words, the
area of land formerly cultivated by 133 households became available for a
small number of farming households, giving them the opportunity to increase
the scale of their agricultural operations. The traditional integrity of each farm
was broken, and many tenants' houses were abandoned. Farmers, who have
migrated to the town nucleus since the 1960s, now commute to the hinterland
to work the land and tend the animals. In 1980, these 31 tenant farmers were
engaged themselves in large-scale farming (the production of livestock ani-
mals and of feed crops on a large tract of land, averaging 30 hectares). The
state's coordinated intervention into the farming sector, which finally began
in the 1950s through the reorganization of a number of offices, ministries, and
commissions, made it possible for these tenants to undertake large-scale farm-
ing operations. The state began to provide these tenants with credit facilities,
subsidies in the form of grants for purchasing machinery, tractor sales and
rental programs, free fuel for tractors, and so on.
Landowners, except for those three who began to work their land by them-
selves with the help of machinery, withdrew almost completely from par-
ticipating in their tenants' agricultural operations while keeping their own
patrimony. This is mainly because, with the increasing opportunities for
various types of wagework, it became difficult for landowners to find tenants
who were eager to work on their farms. In addition, as the majority of
landowners were small-scale, they would have had to become tenants also to
444 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

enlarge their agricultural operations. Instead, they sought their primary in-
come in nonagricultural occupations. Furthermore, their knowledge of agri-
culture was appropriate to a traditional, multicrop pattern of production on a
single farm, not a modern, large-scale agricultural operation.
However, they have continued to maintain contractual relationships, not
with their tenants whom they know well, but with a small number of large-
scale farmers whom they often do not know well. These tenant farmers, in
turn, have to form contracts with four or five landowners at one time. Under
such conditions, the type of meticulous contractual agreement between a
landowner and his tenant characteristic before the 1950s lost much of its
significance. The landowner, as long as he receives rent regularly, does not
want to be bothered with the day-to-day activity of his tenant. The tenant in
turn needs freedom of agricultural operation. The contract has thus become
greatly simplified. It now specifies only a single condition: the amount of
annual cash rent, which is usually set automatically based on the official price
of wheat (until 1967) or of feed cereals (since 1967). All the other conditions
of the traditional contract became obsolete. Indeed, with the introduction of
cash rent, tenants have obtained almost complete freedom of farm operations.
These large-scale tenant fanners began to switch from the production of
wheat to feed crops and livestock animals by the late 1950s. Of the various
factors that explain this shift in production systems, perhaps the most impor-
tant is the entry of multinational companies into the Spanish farming sector.
Indeed, the government "facilitated corporate entry and expansion," after a
brief period of economic autarky during the 1940s (Harding 1984:123). In
addition, the state shifted the focus of its agricultural policy from wheat to
feed crops in the early 1960s, due mainly to the increasing surplus of wheat.
For the tenant farmers, who had just obtained freedom of farm operation but
who had to pay the increasing cost of production, multinationals seemed to be
the one great source that could provide farmers with necessary assistance.
Indeed, they have provided farmers with at least a part of necessary factors of
production free of charge, secure cash outlays for the final products, and
necessary technical know-how.13 Furthermore, these multinationals intro-
duced several new types of livestock production of poultry, calves, and sheep,
in addition to the traditional types of milk, beef, and pork production. The
multinational has thus assumed the role played by the landowner before the
mid-twentieth century, that is, as partner in the tenant's agricultural produc-
tion.
13
Just as there are many different forms of contract farming, so the risks and costs for which
farmers are responsible also vary. In some cases, various cash needs must come out of the
farmer's pocket; in others, the fanner has to provide certain factors of production such as land or
buildings. In some other cases, the company does not protect farmers from the vagaries of
weather or epidemics among livestock. These negative sides of contract farming are often not
well considered by the farmer who contemplates entering into a contractual relationship with the
industry.
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 445

Legally speaking, the contract is formed between a farmer and a company,

but it is usually arranged between two "individuals": a farmer and a repre-
sentative of the company. A small number of such representatives own dozens
of granjas (livestock factories) franchized in this locality. They are associated
with large multinational feed companies. Another group of men who handle
milk are the representatives of dairy industries based in northern Europe.
Meat packaging and distributing industries own several slaughterhouses in
nearby towns and send their representatives to Belunya to seek farmers who
are willing to raise livestock animals. These individual representatives are
local men who were themselves farmers in the past. In addition to these
multinationals, locally based, small-scale food industries have also emerged
since the late 1960s. Contracts take various forms: while some specify only
marketing conditions, others specify both production and marketing condi-
tions (Asano-Tamanoi 1983). Thus the contract is based on a visible and
personal relationship between two specific individuals.
From the viewpoint of a tenant farmer, the difference between his rela-
tionship with the food industry and his former relationship with the landowner
is not so much in kind as in degree. Even with the change of production
systems, each local farmer did not seek cooperation for production or market-
ing with his fellow farmers; he simply enlarged his agricultural operation in
collaboration with food industries. Although there are two kinds of agri-
cultural cooperatives in Belunya, they hardly function to integrate farmers in
relation to food industries.14 Thus, each farmer's agricultural operation is
unique (in terms of the kind and combination of livestock production), and so
is the contractual relationship he creates and maintains. Hence a farmer can
still perceive his production relations in terms of an isolated and long-term
dyadic relationship with each representative of the food industries. It is only
that the contract with an industry, unlike the contract with a landowner, is
phrased in strict market terms such as "guaranteed minimum price," "feed
on credit," or "advanced payment." It is certainly more complex than the
contractual agreement with his landowner. And when these local farmers
gather on a plaza or at local bars and cafes, they still compare each other's
contractual terms with the industry, complain about them, and gossip about
the family affairs of company representatives. The horizontal relationship has
thus continued to be appreciated among tenant farmers, but not to be mobi-
lized for any production or marketing purpose.

14
These two types of cooperatives are Hermandad (Brotherhood of Agriculturalists and
Livestock Owners) and Unio de Pagesos (Pan-Catalonian Peasant League). The former was
originally established during the Franco regime for landowners and owner-cultivators, but most
tenant farmers now belong to this cooperative. It provides them with loans, credit facilities,
insurances, and pensions, but does not have any specific policy toward contract farming. The
second was established in 1974 in opposition to the centralization policy of the Franco govern-
ment, and its local office is in a nearby town. Very few farmers of Belunya belong to this
organization.
446 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

For Mino, the changes that occurred since the mid-twentieth century cannot
be discussed without referring to the land reform at the end of World War II
(1946-47). Indeed, the reform produced dramatic changes, which can be
clearly seen in the change of statistical figures. The reform increased the
number of owner-cultivators to 663 and decreased the number of tenants to
30. Although the number of part-tenants remained stable (333 in 1943 and
350 in 1952), it has constantly decreased since then as more and more people
of this group have given up the rented land in exchange for wage income.
What is also impressive is the decrease of tenanted land from 44.8 percent of
the total cultivated land in 1943 to only 6.8 percent in 1952. Thus, the reform
created a large number of owner-cultivators whose scales of farming were
homogeneous but very small. In 1960, for example, 80 percent of fanning
households worked less than 1.5 hectares each, and this has remained con-
stant since then.
However, the effect of land reform is often said to be more "psychologi-
cal" than "technical" (Kondo 1975:32). This is because the reform rein-
forced or created the strong feeling of attachment among all the farmers in
Mino to a piece of land, which became their own property. In addition, those
pieces of land were usually the same pieces of land they had worked as tenants
before the reform. This also means that many of the essential characteristics
of the organization of production of the prereform era have remained un-
changed. For example, unlike Belunya, the decrease in the number of agri-
cultural households is by no means remarkable. The increase of village popu-
lation is largely due to incoming nonagricultural households. In addition, the
relative freedom of peasants in terms of their choice of crop and technology
before the 1950s has been further reinforced by the reform, as they obtained
the central means of production, land. Group activities have also persisted for
old and new production purposes: new groups include those for cutting rice
production in accordance with the government's order or those for harvesting
rice for part-time farmers. The agricultural cooperative was reorganized in
1943, and it has been continuously supporting all these group activities among
local fanners. The entire structure of the agricultural cooperative, with the
national headquarters at the top and numerous local ones at the bottom, is a
highly centralized organization. The government can effectively intervene in
the nation's whole farming sector through the intricate networks of this
organization.
Immediately after the reform a tomato sauce and juice manufacturing in-
dustry based in the prefectural capital approached the area for possible con-
tractual arrangements with local farmers. The industry first approached a few
entrepreneurial farmers, who were then asked to find other fanners interested
in producing tomatoes for the company. Faced with a novel situation, those
who decided to have contracts with the company formed a group. This group
provided a certain protection for these farmer-members against the industry,
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 447

while providing security for the industry, which was seeking a regular supply
of raw materials. Although the industry originally sought contractual arrange-
ments with an individual farmer, it had to form such arrangements with a
group of farmers.
This pattern of forming a group has become a common response among
fanners seeking protection and security in their dealings with food industries,
including dairy industries, meat processing industries, pickle-making com-
panies, tobacco industries, and pharmaceutical companies (for so-called
"health food")- The scale of these industries varies, from large-scale Japa-
nese multinationals to medium- or small-scale locally based ones, but, unlike
in Belunya, they are domestic industries. Each group of fanners has a specific
goal to produce a single item for a specific industry or a specific set of
industries. Hence, when there is more than one industry purchasing the same
product, there is more than one group. For example, there are four groups
among milk producers, which have contracts with four different sets of com-
panies. Furthermore, all these groups have been quickly incorporated into the
organization of agricultural cooperatives as subgroups of either local, region-
al, or prefectural cooperatives. In other words, the contract, which was origi-
nally formed between a group of farmers and a private industry, has moved
from the hands of farmers to those of employees of agricultural cooperatives.
However, the entire structure of agricultural cooperatives generates a curi-
ous phenomenon: the contract itself can go up and down the ladder of various
levels of cooperatives. For example, for tomato and tochu (a tree crop for
manufacturing medicinal herb-tea) production, the contract has been formed
between an industry and a prefectural level of cooperative. For milk produc-
tion, the contract is often formed between an industry and a regional level of
cooperative. Fanners thus do not feel the presence of industries. All the
production and marketing arrangements are set in the prefectural or regional
capital in the office of the agricultural cooperative, and local farmers are
notified by the agent of the local cooperative.
Another notable phenomenon is that the national level of agricultural coop-
erative (Zen-noh) is becoming like any other food industry by increasing its
shares in the Japanese markets for compound feed, dairy products, eggs, and
so forth (Goldberg and McGinity 1979:86). It now operates various manufac-
turing plants of fertilizer and compound feed, processing and marketing
firms for several agricultural products, and retail shops. In addition, the or-
ganization of agricultural cooperatives is the sole dealer in rice; it not only
processes and stores rice but also controls the marketing of rice, which the
government purchases at a fixed price. In other words, Zen-noh has become
the other party of contract farming for local farmers, who market most of their
produce through the local cooperative.
Farmers in Mino thus continue to hold memberships in various groups,
many of which now exist in relation to food industries. All these groups have
448 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

been firmly integrated into the organization of agricultural cooperatives from

local to national levels. In addition, local fanners have continuously been
"independent" in pursuing their agricultural operations. In other words, by
organizing themselves into groups, farmers prevented the industry from enter-
ing directly into their relations of production. At the same time, the govern-
ment, through the agricultural cooperatives, has made conscious efforts so
that the industry does not deal with fanners directly. Despite this "buffer
zone" between industries and farmers created by the cooperatives, the indus-
try has been able to leave room for competition among farmers. The company
usually arranges this by setting different prices for different qualities of prod-
uct. The industry thus creates competition among member farmers, without
forming direct relations of production with them. Thus, even with the penetra-
tion of food industries and the increasing popularity of contract farming, a
long-term relationship binding two specific individuals has never emerged in
Mino.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: FARMERS, INDUSTRIES, AND THE

STATE

The preceding comparative analysis has shown that in both Belunya and Mino
the food industry has brought a new element into the existing organization of
production, but farmers in both villages have incorporated this new element
without disturbing their own perceptions of such relations. Indeed, they seem
to have been already equipped by their respective norms, skills, and rules to
adjust themselves to a new type of agricultural production. Thus, we have
seen and compared two quite different patterns of response to contract farm-
ing.
The question, then, is why they have incorporated the food industry into
their relations of production without much altering their perceptions of such
relations. Is it because of their conscious efforts to preserve their immediate
environment? Or have they been forced to do so by the strategies of profit-
making food industries? Or is it because of the state's conscious intervention
in trying to maintain the "conservativeness" of farmers? In other words, one
has to analyze here the complex relationship among farmers, industries, and
the state. And in order to do so, one could perhaps most effectively resort to
the concept of reproduction. My understanding of this concept is quite broad:
it refers to the continuous production of not merely the means of subsistence,
"but of human beings and families, social relations of cooperation, and new
needs as well" (Turner 1986:100).
Using this concept, one could argue that, despite the increasing commer-
cialization of agriculture and of the transformation of production systems,
farmers in Belunya, like those in Mino, have made efforts to reproduce their
own unit of production, the household, in generation after generation. Farm-
ing as a family enterprise has never changed in both villages. They have also
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 449

made efforts to reproduce their relations of production within and beyond

their village to assure the continuation of their households. However, the way
that the state intervenes in the farming sector seems to have gone through a
decisive change. Theoretically speaking, the state, in its normal state of
affairs, has been concerned with the reproduction of the entire society. Thus,
before the massive penetration of agricultural industries into the rural sector,
the state could deal with the farming sector as an entity by providing fanners
with transportation networks, loans and credits, technical information, and so
forth. Since the reproduction of the farming sector was usually "not achieved
automatically by the economy'' (Mann and Dickinson 1980:284), the state had
to help farmers so that they could reproduce their own units of production.
Although it is clear that the farming sector had already been intimately con-
nected to the other sectors of national economy, the state could execute
separate policies for each of these economic sectors. However, with the
penetration of agricultural industries into every local village and town, the
state has been forced to change its direction of intervention. Industries are
interested in reproducing and expanding their own business firms; their firms
are all over, not only in local towns but also in cities or foreign countries. The
state now has to reproduce the "relationship" between farmers and industries
to achieve the reproduction of an entire national and/or international econ-
omy.
In Belunya, then, a local farmer has tried to reproduce his own unit of
production, always perceiving his relations of production as a dyadic, iso-
lated, and long-term relationship with a specific "other." Although the state
began its serious and coordinated intervention in the farming sector after the
Civil War, once the confusion in the immediate postwar period was over-
come, it became increasingly dependent upon the Invisible Hands of market
forces to maintain the nation's fanning sector. The entry of multinationals
was facilitated by the government, and the state's provisions of loans and
credits were used by local farmers so that they could form contracts with food
industries. Consequently, not only the industry but also the state began to give
preference to the large-scale farming operators. Local farmers, being unable
to cooperate among themselves for any production purpose, have individually
demanded the financial and technical assistance of food industries.
In Mino, on the other hand, a local farmer has always been "indepen-
dent," making decisions about production and marketing by himself. He has
participated in various cooperative groups to fulfill his own production and
marketing goals. The state, instead of assisting either farmers or industries,
has integrated local farmers and industries through the organization of agri-
cultural cooperatives. The agricultural cooperative, by shifting its role as the
protector of farmers ("The organization of farmers, for farmers and by farm-
ers" was the original catch phrase at the time of its establishment) and the
processor and/or distributor of agricultural produce, has been playing the role
450 MARIKO ASANO-TAMANOI

of a key agent of the government. It has been acting to guard the "indepen-
dence" of a local farmer, so that he, despite the growing complexity of his
production relations, could still be an "independent" and "autonomous"
farmer. Whether this "independence" is nothing but an illusion, which has
been created by the state and in which he still wants to believe, is an intriguing
question, which would perhaps require a deeper level of analysis. All that I
can say here, however, is that a local farmer's perception of contract farming
should be seen as the result of this complex and dialectical relationship among
farmers, industries, and the state, in which each participant has been con-
cerned with reproducing oneself, one's own organization, and one's own
environment.
Contract farming is nothing but a technical term (an analytical category) for
researchers to describe a certain type of legal relationship. Local farmers in
the villages of Belunya and Mino do not have a specific term to describe their
relations of production with food industries. Contract farming does not neces-
sarily represent an imposed production relation for them. Rather, farmers
seem to have developed their own norms, skills, and rules to deal with it, and
in turn these norms, skills, and rules seem to be firmly linked to the eco-
nomic, political, and cultural forces in each unique environment. It is thus
necessary to view contract farming not as a universal legal relationship but as
a cultural and historical phenomenon that should itself be an object of
investigation.
In the third world, scholars, overcoming the overly generalized categories
of "rational" and "moral" economies (Moise 1982; Peletz 1983; Roeder
1984), have redirected their attention to "peasant ideologies, world views,
and cultures" (Kahn 1985:49). However, in the advanced industrialized econ-
omies, farmers have often been perceived as "rational" actors, knowing the
best combinations of factors of production to generate the maximum profits
(Franklin 1969; Mendras 1970). Alternatively, such a "rational" quality of
farmers has often been simply "assumed."
Several anthropologists, however, have been aware of the fact that all
farmers, whether they live in the third world or in the advanced industrialized
societies, "operate within the cultural and institutional environment in which
they are located, and all face vagaries of weather, health, and prices" (Barlett
1980:546; see also Johnson, et al. 1961; Cancian 1972). However, these
anthropologists' efforts have been directed largely to individual decision-
making processes and adaptive strategies, so that it is increasingly difficult to
understand what conceptions of their production relations are shared by farm-
ers in a given culture. Although I do not mean to understate the importance of
"variability in behavior of individuals within groups and communities" (Bar-
lett 1980:547), a certain cultural pattern of how people perceive others and
their relations with them and how such a pattern has been changing should
also be analyzed. Geertz argues that nothing, not even economic processes,
 CONTRACT FARMING IN SPAIN AND JAPAN 451

takes place "in a cultural vacuum" (1984:520). If so, contract farming cannot
be introduced in a cultural vacuum either. The concept of contract has been
reformulated and accepted by local farmers in their own cultural tradition, so
that they could continuously recreate their own households and family farms.
Although Geertz refers to the case of Indonesia, his argument should definite-
ly be appreciated in the study of economic processes of advanced indus-
trialized societies. Looking back at the history of these two villages, one
might argue that these local farmers did experience "a shift from preindustrial
to industrial capitalism" (Harding 1984:128). However, seen from the per-
spectives of local farmers, the change might not have been so radical as the
juxtaposition of these two terms connotes. After all, farmers in advanced
industrialized societies also have their own "ideologies, world views, and
cultures," which cannot be encapsulated by the universal principle of indus-
trial capitalism.

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