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UNDERSTANDING CHINESE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)

AGAINST INDIA IN AKSAI CHIN

Op Perspective

Indian apprehensions towards Chinese aggression in Aksai Chin are borne out of its bitter
experiences of 1962 war. India, which considers Aksai Chin a part of its held territory of
Laddakh has never come to terms with China regarding the status and alignment of Line of
Actual Control (LAC). Within Aksai Chin, the Chinese line of perception and Indian line of
perception varies, conflating the LAC mgmt mechs. Johnsons's line, the actual border b/w China
and the disputed territory of Aksai Chin is the intl recognised border of China. The area ahead of
it and upto the LAC is the disputed area of Aksai Chin. Within this area ran another line;
Mcdonald's line which was proposed to China by British Indian Govt as an intl border in 1899.
(It is also said that any grand settlement of Aksai Chin issue with India might be very close to the
alignment of this line). China never recognised this line therfore it holds no significance today.
Further ahead of it is the Indian line of perception (ILP) claimed by India as the LAC. The
chinese line of perception (CLP) runs further south of it, towards indian side. Varying
perceptions has created an avg belt of 4-6 kms b/w both lines with a status of No Man's Land
open to the ptl msns from both sides.

Aggressive Indian stance during Doklam standoff in 2018 resulting in the withdrawl of Chinese
troops on a fav note for India, reinforced Chinese perceptions regarding Indian hegemonic and
challenging designs in the region. India had vehemently opposed and challenged the constr of rd
by china in the Doklam plateau. Indian abrogation of Article 370 of its constitution and
subsequent re-org of J&K region in two union territories (J&K and Laddakh) was reveived by
China as a unilateral change of status quo. China has always been averse to any unilateral change
in the constitutional/ political status of Laddakh region whose northern part forms the Aksai
Chin. The very core tenets of their agreements reached in 1993, 1996 and 2000 were premised on
the prospects of keeping the staus quo intact.

Indian claims of annexing Gilgit Baltistan by force; a region considered by it as part of J&K has
also been conceived by China as an act of aggression in the region with threatening intentions.

Concls From Zone of Op (ZOO)

1. Aksai Chin being a protrusion b/w Tibet and Xingiang province of China provides a
strategic gateway b/w mainland China and Tibet which extends till the eastern part of its border

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of Arunachal Paradesh ; a disputed territory held by India and claimed by China. Aksai Chin also
oversees a crucial land link b/w China and Pakistan; Korakoram Pass.

2. Comparative open spaces in Aksai Chin imed behind the cbt zone along LAC  with well
dev comm infra and close proximity of Indian vulns (DBO and Rd Durbuk-Shyuk-DBO) to LAC
affords Superior Strat Orientation (SSO) to China in this area and allows rapid buildup of its tps
before the Indians can do, upsetting their time and space relationship from the outset.

3. Highway G219 originates from Tibet and traverses through Aksai Chin, Xingiang and
finally links up with the Korakoram Highway (G314) in Kashghar. The highway is the linchpin
of Chinese CPEC proj (flagship of BRI) specially for the manifestation of proj in Pakistan. F or
China it is its maj sensitivity in the op depth.

4. DBO; a small town sandwiched b/w Siachin and Aksai Chin housing a mil and an airbase
has emerged out to be an imp Base of Op (BOO) affording Indian Army consistent log and air sp
to ops in multiple dirs. (Siachin and Aksai Chin)

5. Rd Durbuk-Shyuk- DBO is a maj lateral running along LAC and the bank of River Shyuk
in Indian AOO and is the main artery through which Indian defs are maint. The L of C runs very
close to the Chinese line of perception (LAC) and is to be gd in str to forestall China's attempts at
creating division in the Ind defs.

6. River Shyok a/w its adjoining hts running almost parralel to the Chinese line of
perception is the first line of def for India based on waterline and affords it the cap of
orchestrating an exaggerated fwd def posture in maj portion of this area.

7. River Nubra in the rear of River Shyuk provides tac depth to the India defs in this region.
Area b/w River Shyuk and River Nubra is critical for the meaningful op battle of Ind fmn def the
LAC (Critical Space).

8. Galwan River; a tributary of River Indus and the valley through which it flows to join
River Shyuk runs prependicular to the LAC, and is situated at the northern shoulder of a salient
formed by the serpentine alignment of LAC. For China, the con of the valley is imp for two
reasons:

a. Domination of Rd Durbuk-Shyok-DBO as it runs closer to the valley.

b. Securing the northern flank and shoulders of the Galwan-Pangong Tso

salient for its reduction in later timeframe.

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c. Denial of newly constr br on an extn of Rd DSDBO over River Galwan thereby

disallowing India from maint/ sp its fwd defs in this area.

9. Hotsprings is an area situated near Gogra post of India. It falls within a small salient at
the head of the Galwan-Pangong Tso salient. Retention of Hotspring area by China denies India
the Jump of Pt (JOP) and dir access to KongKa Pass rt across the Chinese line of perception
(LAC). Furthermore, it also forecloses opportunity of fwd exaggerated def posture to India
thereby improving Chinese def posture at this point.

10. Cheng Chenmo River which links with River Shyok further south of Galwan, bisects the
Galwan-Pangong Salient into two halves and and provides a valley apch dir to the hotsprings
area. Across LAC, this river/ apch leads to the Lanak La Pass after passing around the Kongka
Pass.

11. Lanak La Pass provides a gateway b/w Tibet and Aksai Chin. Being situated very close to
a pt where G219 passes Tibet-Aksai Chin border, it is critical for China for fol reasons:-

a. Uninterrupted use of its vital G219 rd.

b. To sustain ops in south eastern sec of Aksai Chin.

c. Pass also draws its significance from the fact that up till 1959, Indian border ptls
had been accessing this pt without any confrontation and had been claiming this
Pass as as the rt most pt of their claimed LAC.

12. Spanggur Lake sits aside Razang La Pass. The Pass is critical for the dev of any
meaningful offn by China from Chushul apch.

13. Indian fwd posturing in DBO and Murgo Sub Sec also known as Sub Sec North (SSN),
threatens the KKH necessitating eff safegds by China and Pakistan for its uniterrupted op.

14. Shaksgam valley; an area ceded by Pakistan to china in 1963, is significant for the def of
KKH providing it flank protection by China from West and East. Area also provides depth to the
KKH and Siachin by China at op lvl in case of a Three Front War.

15. Encirclement of DBO by Siachin and Aksai Chin, and the close proximity of Korakoram
Pass creates viable conditions for China and Pakistan Army for interoperability against India in
this Sub Sec.

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16. Pangong Tso Lake befalling on the southern end of the Galwan-Pangong Tso salient in
LAC overlooks the most significant apch through which China dev its attks in 1962 war with
India. The area along this apch called, Chushul apch , is comparatively plain and facilitates dev
of low scale mech mnvrs. A portion of Rd Durbuk-Shyuk-DBO passes at the base of this lake.
Ridgline adjacent to the lake has 8 spurs (called fingers) jutting out from top of the ridge to the
base of the lake. India claims area till finger 8. China puts its claim till finger 3 along which LAC
bifurcates the lake. These spurs, named by India as fingers are critical for China for fol reasons:-

a. Physically holding Chushul apch as well as denying freedom of mnvr/ free mov to
India on Rd DBO-Shyok.

b. Securing the southern shoulder of Galwan-Pangong Tso salient thereby

dispositioning its forces for pincer attks (reducing the salient) inside Laddakh in
later timeframe.

c.  Addressing Chinese vuln in this area as Aksai Chin tapers down to a thin belt of
area here, devoid of any tac depth, laying prone to being cutoff in a single
incursion/ attk by India.

17. Area bounded by Galwan, Hotspring and Pangong Tso lake (Galwan-Pangong Tso
Salient) is the farthest from rd Durbuk-Shyuk-DBO and is vital for conduct of tac battle of fmn
def the Indian side of LAC (Vital Gr). Eff con of the same will facilitate maint of fwd def posture
by India and deny domination of rd Durbuk-Shyuk- DBO to China.

18. Duklam/ Tawang Plateu; an area of Bhutan situated at considerable height protrudes
ahead of the LAC in Eastern sec and dominates India's Chicken's Neck, which is crucial to India
for fol reasons:

a. Accessibilty to Arunachal Paradesh from mainland India; a disputed area held by

India and claimed by China situated across McMohan Line.

b. Gd against the division (eff) , likely to be created by China in the defs of fmn def
LAC in Eastern sec, by dominating Doklam/ Tawang area and reducing the
Chicken's Neck. (It is in this area that India objected to the constr of Chinese rd in
Bhutan's territory of Doklam at the behest of Bhutan. Chinese Army halted the
constr of the rd and pulled out of the transgressed area).

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Indian Design (Op Design with linkage to the Design at Strategic Lvl)

Denying SSO to China by dev comm infrastructure req for the sustenace of def ops along and
across LAC. Consolidating the fwd defs to retain launch pads for incursions/ attks in future
thereby improving def posture for maint of exaggerated fwd defs and curtailing the chances of
being surprised by China. By eff utilising well dev comm infra and retaining the leverage of
superior time, space and relative str, launch small scale attks across LAC from suitable launch
pads (LPs) to extract political concessions from China for formally accepting the change in status
quo of the region.

H-1 (Hypothetical – Hs have been formulated just to represent concept of force

dispositioning of India China. Size and composition of forces may vary as the conflict
progresses)

1.  Main Def Effort - A Bde  along Gulwan valley to deny domination of this valley to
China and hold northern shoulder of Galwan-Pangong Tso salient to gd aginst its reduction to
maint the sanctity and func of Rd Durbuk-Shyuk-DBO.

2. Sdry Def Effort - Bde (-) in Pangson Tso to hold southern shoulder and gd own vuln of
close L of C and denying Chushul apch to China, accentuating its vuln (lack of tac depth in a thin
strip of aksai Chin).

3. Aux Def Effort - Bn along DBO Sub Sec on offn fixation.

4. A bde in Res ahead of River Shyuk.

Other Hs - Combinations with corresponding Designs.

Chinese Scheme of Op

1. Design

Deny freedom of of mnvr to Indian forces and curtailing their offn options by carrying out
preemptive redispositioning of forces thereby accentuating their vulns in the area. Orchestrating
a caliberated standoff, preconceived for a gradual deinduction after negotiating from a posn of str
and terminating it on a favourable note. Retain residual presence in the transgressed areas for
estb new normal and permanently halting the dev of Indian comm infra.

2. Conduct (Hypothetical)

Main - Division (-) Along Galwan Valley.

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Sdry -  Bde (-) On Chushul Apch across Pangong Tso.

Aux 1 - Bn (-) on Hotsprings.

Aux-2 - Coy on fixation along DBO.

Variants - As per the materialsiation of other Hs ; (Unfolding of Indian Def Battle).

Lets hope, now we understand fol:-

1. Why do Armies do what they do?

2. How do they fight battles in Mountains? 

3. How do they relate to the design of higher fmns?

4. And that there is still a space for op strategy in Mountain/ High Altitude Warfare.

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