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Norway and REDD+ in Indonesia: The

Art of Not Governing?
a
Desmond McNeill
a
Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University
of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Published online: 11 Feb 2015.

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Governing?, Forum for Development Studies, 42:1, 113-132, DOI: 10.1080/08039410.2014.997791

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 Forum for Development Studies, 2015
Vol. 42, No. 1, 113– 132, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2014.997791

Norway and REDD1 in Indonesia: The Art of Not Governing?

Desmond McNeill

Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

This article examines the dilemmas that Norway faces in seeking to secure good
governance while minimising its role as a political actor. REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries)
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is a global programme which seeks to create a financial value for the carbon
stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce
emissions from forested lands. The ambitions and expectations of REDD+ are
enormous, and it may be that these will never be successfully achieved. The
first phase is so-called REDD-readiness which involves preparing REDD+
countries to implement the proposed programme. It is already clear that the
governance challenges are daunting, at every level: global, national and local.
Norway is playing a major role in REDD+, having pledged 0.5 billion US
dollars per year to the programme. It has committed 1 billion US dollars to
Indonesia alone, and there can be no doubt that it is now seen as a very
important actor in the forest sector in that country. But Norway wields its
power reluctantly and has adopted what it calls a ‘light touch’. While some
commentators have questioned the efficacy of this approach, many in Indonesia
apparently regard Norway as having taken an unduly active role. This article
discusses whether REDD+ should be treated as aid, with conditions attached;
sets out the options facing Norway; analyses the content of the Letter of Intent
between the two countries and assesses Norway’s actions: Do they govern too
much or too little?
Keywords: REDD+; governance; forest; Indonesia; Norway

Introduction
The title of this article is a play on the title of the recent book by James Scott, The Art of
Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. The phenom-
enon that I am interested in is, in a sense, the obverse: the challenge for Norway in
the case of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
in developing countries)1 in Indonesia is that of ‘not governing’. How can Norway not
act as a powerful or even dominant force, when this would seem unavoidable in view of
1
REDD+ was formerly just ‘REDD’. The ‘plus’ reflects the extension of REDD to include the
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon
stocks.

# 2015 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

 114 Desmond McNeill

the massive funding they are providing – or at least promising – to Indonesia in

support of their REDD+ activities?
In his book, Scott introduces the reader to ‘Zomia’, the name he adopts for a large
mountainous area stretching over many lands in South East Asia where people live who
have resisted or simply avoided control by the state. He describes ‘the last great enclo-
sure movement in Southeast Asia’ which, seen from the state centre, ‘is, in part, an
effort to integrate and monetize the people, lands, and resources of the periphery’, an
‘attempt to fully incorporate them [peripheral peoples] (which) has been culturally
styled as “development”, economic progress, literacy and social integration. In practice,
it has meant something else’.

Everywhere they could, states have obliged mobile, swidden cultivators to settle in per-
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manent villages. They have tried to replace open common-property land tenure with
closed common-property, collective farms, or, more especially, the individual freehold
property of liberal economies. They have seized timber and mineral resources for the
national patrimony. . . . (2009, p. 5)

Although the phenomenon that Scott examines – of not being governed – is the
obverse of my concern in this article, his thesis is of relevance for our theme. The
phenomena he describes – the replacement of open common-property land tenure
with closed common-property, the seizing of timber resources for the national patri-
mony – are all too relevant for REDD+. A central concern for Scott is how ordinary
people deal with a predatory state; while that facing Norway is how to deal with the
predatory state of Indonesia. This is the subject of this article, which examines the
dilemmas that Norway faces in seeking to secure good forest governance while mini-
mising its role as a political actor.2

REDD1 and forest governance in Indonesia

REDD+ is a new and very ambitious global programme that seeks to create a financial
value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to

2
It is not my purpose in this article to evaluate whether Norway’s efforts have impacted on
deforestation in Indonesia, although this is of course an extremely important issue. Some
are doubtful (Lang, 2014), while Frances Seymour, former Director General of CIFOR
(Center for International Forestry Research) has been far more positive (see below). The
problem is that an accurate evaluation would compare today’s situation with what would
have happened in the absence of Norway’s efforts, and this is extremely difficult to assess.
A study commissioned by Norway (LTS, 2014) concluded that the bilateral agreement has
generated ‘substantial political leverage’ (p. 270) and that ‘substantial progress’ has been
made regarding readiness planning (p. 272). But it is clear that payments based on actual ver-
ified emissions reductions are still in the future.
 Forum for Development Studies 115

reduce emissions from forested lands.3 Via the Kyoto protocol, the majority of nations
of the world have committed, in principle, to reduce emissions by various means. Per-
suaded by the economic logic of the Stern Report, 2007, and other political consider-
ations, many nations have agreed to promote REDD+, following the Conference of the
Parties (COP) of UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change) in Bali in December 2007. REDD+ has been further discussed at subsequent
COPs, but progress has been very limited.4
The basic idea is that those who generate high levels of gas emissions should pay off
those who generate very low levels. The simple (even simplistic) idea is that the rich
pay the poor not to cut down trees. The purpose of REDD+ has now become three-
fold, with the aims of poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation added to that
of reducing CO2 emissions. It is already becoming apparent that reconciling the
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primary goal – reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation – with
that of poverty reduction will be difficult in practice; and that there is a danger that
measures to inhibit or prohibit access to the forest may come largely at the expense
of poor and marginalised groups, and especially indigenous communities.
The first phase of REDD+, which has started with financial support from the North,
is so-called REDD-readiness which involves preparing REDD+ countries to
implement the proposed programme. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are
here playing a significant role, not least in designing and implementing pilot projects,
with financial support from multilateral and bilateral sources.
It may be that the high ambitions of REDD+ (a ‘win –win–win’ policy) are never
successfully achieved; or that the payments are in fact made to national or local govern-
ments rather than to individuals (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012). All is at this stage very
uncertain. But the expectations are enormous. What is already apparent is that imple-
menting REDD+ will constitute a huge governance challenge – at global, national
and local levels; and research on this topic is badly needed. ‘What has been conspicu-
ously lacking both in policy discussions and in the scientific literature is critical analysis
of whether countries are actually going to be able to put into practice effective policies
and programmes that reverse deforestation and degradation’ (Skutsch and McCall,
2010, p. 396).
The countries which have most to gain include several – such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Indonesia – which do not enjoy particularly good governance.

3
The original idea of REDD+ was to create a multilevel system of payments of environmental
services, that is, the climate services provided by forests in developing countries in the form of
sequestering and storing carbon, with the primary funding from REDD+ credits sold as offsets
in a compliance carbon market (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008).
4
COP 15 in Copenhagen (2009) failed to deliver an agreement. The Durban platform agreed at
COP17 in 2011 states that an agreement should be ready by 2015 and take effect from 2020. In
parallel with the UNFCCC process, national and regional carbon markets are evolving, by far the
largest being EU’s Emission Trading System. Yet it remains highly uncertain to what extent
carbon markets ever will become a major source of funding for REDD+.
 116 Desmond McNeill

This article focuses on the latter country, which has the world’s third-largest forested
area – 120 million hectares of rainforest.5 In an insightful article, Gellert (2010) ana-
lyses how governance of the forest sector in Indonesia has changed in the last 40 years,
under the influence of what he calls ‘rival transnational networks’. Suharto’s ‘New
Order’ regime, from 1967 to 1998, ‘was, in effect, a liberal capitalist network generally
supported by Western powers’ (Gellert, 2010, p. 547). During this period the ‘govern-
ance of the forestry sector came to be controlled by an oligarchy of domestic timber
industrialists’. At the end of the century, however, the situation changed, giving
power to two other ‘rival transnational networks’: IFIs (international finance insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and NGOs. ‘The
Asian economic crisis and collapse of the Suharto regime provided a political
opening for alliances between the two rival networks that helped bring down the
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ruling oligarchy in timber’ (Gellert, 2010, p. 539). For a brief period, Gellert argues,
these two groups of actors found common cause in fighting corruption and promoting
democracy, and they became allies in putting pressure on the government to introduce
reforms.6 However, their priorities, and indeed their perspectives, were too different,
and this alliance was rather short-lived. (In brief, the IFIs promoted a post-Washington
consensus, with an emphasis on ‘good governance’, interpreted largely in management
terms, while NGOs adopted a more explicitly political approach, promoting participa-
tory democracy.) And Gellert argues that today the power of domestic ‘crony capital-
ists’ in the forest sector is not entirely dead. In fact, the rate of deforestation remained
high after the fall of Suharto – driven largely by local government.
In the last few years, a new actor has come on the scene, the Norwegian govern-
ment, thanks to their role in promoting REDD+, the new global forest and climate
initiative. It may seem extravagant to claim that Norway is an actor on a par with
the IFIs, but the sheer size of their financial commitment to REDD+ in Indonesia –
1 billion US dollars over 5 years – is impressive. From having had virtually no pres-
ence in this sector in Indonesia, Norway has suddenly become the largest funder. Other
bilateral aid agencies, such as those of Australia or Germany, appear to have mixed
feelings about having a new, and rather large, kid on the block. Among multilateral
agencies there may be similar sentiments (at the World Bank, for example, which
already has experience and expertise from its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF)). But these are probably more muted, not least since international agencies
may find that Norway decides to channel funds through them. Indeed, some UN
agencies have already benefited; Norway is funding UN-REDD+, and the UN agencies

5
The numbers are much debated. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010 gives a figure of 94,432 hectares (FAO, 2010). The
figures quoted here are from the Norwegian government’s ‘Fact Sheet Norway-Indonesia Part-
nership REDD+’ based on data from Indonesia National Council on Climate Change (Norway,
2010).
6
It deserves to be mentioned that IFIs played a major role in financing massive transmigration
programmes that promoted deforestation and lately oil palm development.
 Forum for Development Studies 117

that collaborate in this initiative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

FAO and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) – are presumably positive,
although there may be some interagency competition.7
Norway is in fact a major player not only in Indonesia but also elsewhere; respon-
sible for more than half of global REDD+ funding according to some estimates (Car-
avani et al., 2013). But on the international arena, as in Indonesia, Norway has been
reluctant to be conspicuous in its leadership.8

Norway’s role in REDD1

At the Bali COP in 2007, REDD was established as a key element in the Bali
Road Map, the action plan for negotiating a new climate regime. At this meeting,
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the Norwegian prime minister pledged massive financial support – 3 billion US

dollars – to the global initiative. In 2009, at the G20 Summit in September 2009 in
Pittsburgh, Indonesian President Yudhoyono formally announced Indonesia’s willing-
ness to make substantial cuts in emissions from a ‘business as usual’ level in 2020:
either 26 per cent, in the absence of international assistance, or 41 per cent with inter-
national funding.9 Stoltenberg subsequently committed 1 billion of Norway’s support
to Indonesia alone, formalised in a Letter of Intent (LoI) signed in May 2010. Having
been rather passive with regard to REDD+ when it was first proposed, Norway thus
7
For example, the Global Environment Fund (GEF) may not be pleased. To quote Development
Today (3 March 2011):

Barbut (Chief Executive Officer of GEF) points out that the GEF has been in the business of
protecting forests for two decades. Until 2007, the GEF provided two-thirds of all multilateral
funding for forest protection projects. However, none of the Norwegian forest climate money
has been channeled via the GEF. She admits that, at the time, she feared that the enormous Nor-
wegian pledge would trigger a rush of donor funds away from the GEF; that other donors
would follow Norway and put their money into the World Bank and the newly-created UN
REDD programme instead of GEF. ‘We worried that the Norwegian money would leverage
other funds. Happily, this did not happen,’ she said.

8
To quote the leader of the latest evaluation (LTS, 2014): ‘Norway has been made the global
leader on REDD. It didn’t want to be, but that’s just happened’ (Hardcastle, 2014). Norway
has taken initiatives to encourage dialogue, such as the Oslo REDD Exchange organised in
2011 and 2013. It was also active in trying to begin operationalising elements of the Copenhagen
Accord on REDD+, through the REDD partnership. But here it was cautious, perhaps in
response to NGO criticism. Thus, Prime Minister Stoltenberg, in his video statement, states
that ‘This partnership must supplement and inspire, not compete with, the UN negotiations’
(http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/05/06/reply-form-norwegian-government-to-ngo-statement-
on-paris-oslo-process/). Norway is probably also concerned to ensure that its very substantial
funding inspires rather than crowds out additional finance from other countries.
9
This apparently came as a surprise to many in Indonesia, who saw it as placing a considerable
burden on the country. Some ministries claimed that they did not know about the commitment
before they heard the president’s speech (Sulistiawati, 2014).
 118 Desmond McNeill

suddenly emerged as the leading actor. The reasons for this, in terms of domestic
Norwegian politics, are interesting and are well analysed in Nilsen (2010). In brief,
three different factors came into play. At one extreme is Norway’s role as major aid
donor, promoter of global peace and prosperity, a ‘moral superpower’. At the other
extreme is a desire to draw attention away from the fact that Norway is a major oil
exporting country, which in practice lags behind the European Union in terms of
meeting many environmental targets. An intermediate explanation is that for
Norway, REDD+ seems like a potentially attractive contribution towards solving a
global problem, in accordance with the ‘REDD+ as a low hanging fruit’ logic of the
Stern Report. Whatever the combination of reasons, the outcome has been strong pol-
itical support from all but one of seven parties in Norway, and a commitment to provide
a total one billion US dollars a year to REDD+ in Indonesia, Brazil, Congo, Tanzania
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and other countries.

In becoming involved in Indonesia, Norway faced a major challenge. The Ministry
of Forestry has for many years been recognised as a powerful but largely corrupt organ-
isation, exemplifying what Indonesians refer to as ‘KKN’ (Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme/
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism). How should Norway deal with this – ‘the
elephant in the room’ (Sulistiawati, 2014)?
In one of a series of studies on Norway’s foreign policy, commissioned by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Katzenstein and Carpenter argue: ‘Because of its small
size and lack of hard power, Norway should welcome and think creatively about soft
power, a subject generally not well conceptualized’ (2010, p. 1). In the particular
context of REDD+ in Indonesia, it appears, however, that Norway could exercise
hard power – based not on any formal mandate or on its expertise but on the money
it promises. But to what extent should it, and did it, do so? Much of the answer is to
be found in an analysis of the LoI.
In the rest of this article I will

. discuss whether REDD+ should be treated as aid, with conditions attached;

. set out the options facing Norway and summarise the content of the LoI;
. assess Norway’s actions: Do they govern too much or too little?

REDD1 and aid conditionality

The initial idea of REDD+ is based on the establishment of a cap-and-trade system and
carbon market.10 When (if) this is in place, REDD+ will simply be a market trans-
action, a payment for a service – that of contributing to the global public good of
combating climate change, which benefits Norway and the whole world. Thus, with
a carbon market, the ‘condition’ that would need to be satisfied would simply be that
10
The situation has changed since then; now the main idea is still some kind of result-based pay-
ments, but from aid and other sources, not from a carbon market that does not exist and will not
be created in the near future (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012).
 Forum for Development Studies 119

there are verified emissions reductions. Why should any conditions be applied to
payment for a service such as this? To argue by analogy: a rich person may pay a neigh-
bour not to cut down a tree because of the pleasant shade it provides, but it would surely
be unreasonable also to require that the neighbour spend the money on a good cause,
like children’s education. In practice, this argument has not – at least so far – prevailed,
for two reasons. One is that Norway decided to classify REDD+ funding as aid; the
second is that payments are initially for ‘REDD-readiness’. I will discuss each in turn.
In Norway, the decision to define REDD+ as aid was taken mainly because this
enabled the government to achieve the magic ‘1 per cent of GDP’ level of development
assistance. This led to some bureaucratic complications. Responsibility for REDD+ is
divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad (the Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation – a directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and
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the Ministry of Environment. Primary technical responsibility lies with NICFI (the Nor-
wegian Climate and Forest Initiative), a new unit established under the Ministry of
Environment. This rather awkward arrangement worked after a fashion as long as
Erik Solheim headed both ministries – Development and Environment – but it
became increasingly problematic, especially when in November 2012, Solheim left
in a ministerial reshuffle and the two Ministries were again split.11 Following the elec-
tion of the conservatives in 2013, the Ministry of Development Cooperation was abol-
ished, or rather subsumed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new government
did not radically change policy on REDD+, but did allocate the funds to the Ministry of
Environment budget. Apart from lack of clarity, the major issue arising out of this
complex division of responsibilities has been how much emphasis should be given
to – respectively – the ‘development’ (poverty reduction) and ‘environment’
(climate and biodiversity) aspects of REDD+. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Norad are well acquainted with, and committed to, long-established principles of devel-
opment assistance; by contrast the Ministry of Environment is more concerned with
forest conservation and biodiversity.12 Nevertheless, according to Norwegian law,
development assistance money must be spent on activities which are demonstrably pro-
moting development. The problem is therefore more than simply a matter of differing
policy emphases between the two ministries.

11
Ironically, the 1 per cent aid target was not achieved, at least initially. The OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) objected to the aid expenditure figures that
Norway reported concerning REDD+ on the grounds that only actual expenditures on
REDD can legitimately be included, not commitments. Norway had to agree, thus reducing
its aid performance to below the magic 1%. Even more ironically, this occurred when
Solheim moved from Norway to a new post as chair of OECD/DAC. In this position, he had
to insist on Norway adhering to the rule which he, as minister, had previously failed to follow.
12
In the rush to show progress and spend money, there has been strong pressure to cut corners,
and some friction between the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for
example, regarding Guyana (Bade, 2012).
 120 Desmond McNeill

Should funding for REDD+ be viewed as aid, at least in the REDD-readiness

stage? Establishing the necessary conditions for financing a global public good
should, I suggest, also be regarded as a global public good. However, payment for
the various measures that constitute REDD-readiness, such as establishing monitoring
and verification procedures, must necessarily be based on convincing evidence that
these measures have been satisfactorily put in place (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and
McNeill, 2012) – and this amounts to a sort of conditionality.

Norway’s options and the path chosen

The dilemma facing Norway was that it needed to spend a large amount of money very
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rapidly, but also wished to minimise the risk of misuse of funds. (Solheim had earlier
declared a policy of ‘zero tolerance’ for corruption in development assistance.) But cor-
ruption was endemic in Indonesian forest governance, with the Ministry of Forestry as a
major culprit.
I suggest that in this case Norway had four options (not all mutually exclusive), as
follows, ranging from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ in terms of exerting power:13

1. make payment conditional on specific actions undertaken to secure good govern-

ance, or withheld if there is evidence of bad governance;14
2. channel payments to those parts of government which Norway regards as more
reliable;
3. channel money to non-government actors that may promote popular
participation;
4. dialogue.

Norway’s agreement with Indonesia took some time to negotiate, and in the meanwhile,
LoIs were signed with three other countries, Tanzania, Brazil and Guyana. Norway, one
may assume, learnt from these experiences. According to Angelsen (2013): ‘In terms of
structure and form, this contract (the LoI with Indonesia) is the most developed and
logical, and is modelled on the phased approach.’

The agreement came almost two years after Brazil, and was delayed for several reasons.
Indonesia played the game poorly initially, showing low willingness to reform and even to

13
I have not included measures which Norway could perhaps take relating more directly to the
private sector. Companies engaged in logging, palm oil and mining account for the greater part
of deforestation in Indonesia, as in most other countries, constituting the third ‘transnational
network’ identified by Gellert: international and domestic capital.
14
The concept of ‘good governance’ is much debated; and what constitutes ‘good governance’,
either in general or more specifically with regard to forest governance, is also much debated.
(Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; Larson and Petkova, 2011) Norway was concerned both to
minimise corrupt practices and encourage popular participation (see below).
 Forum for Development Studies 121

‘talk the talk’. After an extended period of consultations , which involved contentious
issues, such as indigenous rights and safeguards, and the specifics of the moratorium
on forest conversion, the Letter of Intent (LoI) was signed. The LoI had a cap of US
dollars 1 billion for an initial period of five years (getting the same amount as Brazil
was considered important for Indonesia). (p. 17)

The LoI between Norway and Indonesia was signed in May 2010.15 This was followed
by Presidential Decrees concerning the REDD+ Task Force (President Decree No. 19/
2010 and No. 25/2011 released in May 2010 and September 2011); and concerning the
moratorium on the issuing of new logging, mining or palm oil licences in the forest
estate (President Decree No. 10/2011, May 2011). Critics maintained that these were
weaker than the LoI on several grounds, most notably regarding the rules of the mor-
atorium, indigenous rights and logging permits.16 However, according to a subsequent
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interview with Frances Seymour, Director of CIFOR: ‘the Letter of Intent prompted a
tectonic shift in the dialogue about forests, who participates in it, realignment of dom-
estic constituencies among themselves and vis-à-vis international constituencies in a
way that I haven’t seen in 25 years’ (2013).
The payment of one billion US dollars by Norway is spread over three phases. In
each phase, a number of specified actions need to be undertaken, as follows:
Phase 1.

a. Complete a national REDD+ strategy

b. Establish a REDD+ Agency
c. Develop a strategy for establishing an MRV (monitoring, reporting and verifi-
cation) agency
d. Design and establish a funding instrument
e. Select a province-wide pilot

Phase 2.

a. Funding instrument operational

b. MRV system in place
c. Establish appropriate ‘policy instruments and enforcement capabilities’: 2-year
moratorium, degraded land database, enforce existing laws against illegal
logging, address land tenure conflicts and compensation claims.
d. First province-wide pilot in place
e. Second province-wide pilot selected

15
‘Cooperation on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation’ (see http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/2010/Indonesia_avtale.pdf).
16
NGO criticisms are summarised in Rainforest Foundation Norway (2011). It should also be
noted that a delegation from Commission IV of the Indonesian House of Representatives
visited Norway from 20 to 26 March 2011 to argue against the LoI (Caldecott et al., 2011, p. 17).
 122 Desmond McNeill

Phase 3. Contributions for verified emissions

“Funding allocated in the two first phases will be provided by Norway on the basis of deli-
verables channeled through an agreed financial mechanism.”

In summary, financial contributions by Norway would initially ‘focus solely on results

in terms of enabling policies and measures’ (REDD-readiness activities). But the inten-
tion is to move as fast as possible to a situation in which payments will be based on
independently verified emissions reductions: in pilot provinces (Phase 2) and nationally
(Phase 3). An ambitious timetable is set in the LoI: to move into Phase 3 in 2014. In
practice, and not surprisingly, this deadline has not been met, and very little of the
one billion dollars has been spent – although significant progress has been made.
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Norway’s concern for good governance is apparent from the seven ‘principles’ that
follow in the LoI after the stated purpose of the partnership. Of these, items b and d are
especially relevant for this article (the others are less ‘political’).

b. Give all relevant stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, local communities and
civil society, subject to national legislation, and, where applicable, international instru-
ments, the opportunity of full and effective participation in REDD+ planning and
implementation.
d. Be fully transparent regarding financing, actions and results.

Referring back to my earlier discussion of Gellert (2010), one may note that these
two issues are of concern both to NGOs and to IFIs. But while NGOs tend to put
especial emphasis on the former, which one might call ‘participation’ for short, IFIs
place more emphasis on the latter: ‘good governance’.17 In simple terms, promoting
‘good governance’, as favoured by IFIs, is sought by putting money in trustworthy
hands, combined with sanctions for failure to conform (checking, by independent
monitoring, what actually happens to the funds). Promoting ‘participation’ which
is favoured especially by NGOs is sought mainly by involving NGOs, to try and
ensure that the people affected have the opportunity to influence the decisions
taken. (While NGOs have often been critical of conditionality, they do sometimes
in effect recommend it – to promote what they regard as valid ends.) These two
alternative strategies coincide rather closely with options 2 and 3 listed above.
I will now summarise and assess what Norway has done, with regard to each of the
four strategic options listed above.18
17
Note that the LoI qualifies ‘full and effective participation’ by adding: ‘subject to national
legislation, and, where applicable, international instruments’. NGOs have criticised the
wording as being unacceptably weak.
18
This account takes the story up until 31 August 2013 when President Yudhoyono signed Pre-
sidential Decree No 62/2013 to set up a ‘REDD+ Agency’. Before the end of the year, Heru
Prasetyo was appointed as the head, and a financial mechanism, FREDDI – Financing
REDD+ in Indonesia – was established in late 2013 to facilitate the flow of funds for
REDD+ financing.
 Forum for Development Studies 123

Conditional payments
As the summary indicates, the LoI is quite specific in its requirements, constituting, one
may say, rather clear and explicit conditionality. But these conditions relate to REDD-
readiness. What will happen as the programme moves beyond this? According to the
LoI payments are, in Phase 3 – and, as far as possible in Phase 2 also – to be made
simply on the basis of proven emissions reductions. The expectation is thus that the
bulk of the one billion dollars will be paid on this basis. Only a relatively small
share of the total can be spent on ‘readiness’, which implies only a limited opportunity
to impose conditions.
To exacerbate the situation, there is very great pressure to disburse (which is com-
plicated by REDD+ being classified as aid, as noted above). Norway, and REDD+,
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will lose credibility – and effective political influence – the more time passes with
only little actual transfer of funds. The whole point of Norway’s massive commitment
is to be a ‘game-changer’, on the international scene as well as in Indonesia – even
at the risk of encountering ‘bad governance’. Thus Solheim, then Minister of Develop-
ment and Environment, is quoted in Development Today (13 May 2011) as saying that
‘This is a first for Norway to try to change the logic of the world in a highly politicised
arena’. He acknowledges that corruption is a huge risk: ‘But we can’t wait until there
will be no corruption to save the forests. The risk of waiting is higher for humanity than
acting now. . . . The biggest risk is that the international community does not come on
board.’ While making payments conditional is very feasible in the readiness phase, it is
not in Norway’s interest to withhold money unduly long; the move to actual emissions
reductions, and payments based on them, needs to happen soon.

Use of ‘more trustworthy’ government channels

This second option for Norway may also be seen as a kind of conditionality – an
attempt to reduce the risk of misuse of funds. The one billion US dollars that
Norway has committed is small by comparison with the revenues generated by the
forest sector in Indonesia. But there is nevertheless competition between different
government agencies to be the beneficiary, not least because in the longer term
this might set the pattern for the future allocation of much larger REDD+ funds.
One may identify two types of competition between government agencies: ‘horizontal’
competition between different ministries at the national level; and ‘vertical’ competition
between levels of government.
The Task Force, later REDD+ Agency, has ‘supra-ministerial’ status. BAPPENAS
(the National Planning Ministry) and the Ministry of Forestry appear to be the major
ministries involved, although several others play a significant role: for example,
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry
of Home Affairs. The division of responsibility, and resources, between BAPPENAS
and the Ministry of Forestry has been a major issue. In broad terms, the former is
responsible for overall strategy, and the latter for implementation. Norway has
 124 Desmond McNeill

tended to favour the National Planning Ministry; unlike some other donors (such as
UN-REDD, also largely funded by Norway), they have channelled only a small
share of funds to the Ministry of Forestry. This too can be interpreted as exerting its
influence. But it will be increasingly difficult to restrict the extent to which they can
do so in future, in view of the Ministry of Forestry’s technical expertise, and their
formal mandate.
There is also ‘vertical’ competition between levels of government; and the relative
power of the districts is now greater than it was before the fall of Suharto. Amid the
political upheavals at the end of the last century, there came a sudden and rather dra-
matic shift towards decentralisation. But there is some confusion as to what this
means in practice; for example, there are disputes about who has the power to legislate
in certain matters, and even examples of conflicting legislation regarding the forest.
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What is clear, however, is that the power of the District has been significantly enhanced
at the expense of the Province and the central government. The District level
now enjoys a substantial degree of autonomy, and there are concerns that policies
from the centre, even a Presidential Decree, may not be fully followed at the local level.
It is debatable whether the local level of government is more, or less, corrupt than
central government; more, or less, participatory. In Indonesia, as in many other
countries, the evidence is that decentralisation may be less positive than was earlier
– perhaps naively – thought. Indeed, the conventional wisdom in Indonesia now
seems to be that there has simply been a ‘decentralisation of corruption’; and a draft
law is being discussed that would to some extent reverse the process, transferring
some powers from the District to the Province level.
It is unclear whether, and how, Norway should seek to allocate funds to a lower
level of government, in the interests of efficiency, equity and good management. In
the initial phases, what has in practice occurred is that one particular province has
been selected as the pilot, and thus favoured for funding. After some competition,
Central Kalimantan was chosen.

Funding other (non-government) actors

Norway, partly through its funding of UN-REDD, has been very supportive of NGOs
and will continue to provide funding – local, national and international – on a very
large scale.19 Norway has also been promoting NGOs in seeking to give them ‘a
place at the table’ in global fora, such as the REDD Partnership. This was launched
during the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference hosted by Norway in May 2010,
where heads of state and government, ministers and other representatives from 50
19
Norad, through the Civil Society Department, has allocated very substantial amounts to NGOs
such as the Rainforest Foundation Norway, foundations such as the Clinton Foundation and
foreign research organisations such as the CIFOR. By contrast, and perhaps significantly,
there has been a marked absence of funding for independent research by Norwegian researchers.
 Forum for Development Studies 125

countries agreed on a framework for the rapid implementation of measures for reducing
deforestation.
There are various roles that NGOs may take on: as implementing agencies (at least
in the pilot phase); as facilitators and trainers; as monitors of performance; and,
especially in Latin America, as critics of REDD+. This last point may be problematic
for Norway. The demands of some NGOs, summarised in the slogan ‘No rights, no
REDD+’ may be hard to satisfy in practice. Norway might thus find itself squeezed
– confronted by the contrasting imperatives pointed out at the beginning of this
article, following Gellert’s analysis. Here, the imperative of ‘getting the money
spent’ may weigh heavily. NGOs have been active in representing local communities
at the multi-stakeholder consultations that have been held all over the country to
discuss REDD+. But ‘promoting participation’ turns out to be especially difficult in
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the case of REDD+, for technical reasons. What NGOs generally demand is FPIC
– free, prior, informed consent. In the case of, say, the flooding of a settlement resulting
from a new dam the likely impact on the local people, to which they are asked to give
their consent, is fairly easy to specify: in brief, loss of home, land and livelihood in
exchange for compensation in cash or kind. In the case of REDD+ it is very
unclear. Who will be paid? Will those who are paid receive cash or will the money
go to the community for schools and clinics? Will it reach the local level at all? And
how much money will be paid? There is so much uncertainty surrounding these ques-
tions that it is effectively impossible to say that local people give their consent – unless
to a pilot project which may or may not be followed up (Howell, 2014). A further ques-
tion is the interpretation of FPIC. There is no doubt what the acronym stands for: the C
stands for consent. But others, notably the World Bank, have on occasion tried to rein-
terpret it as free, prior, informed consultation – a very different matter. (Doyle, 2008)
Even if the amounts of money involved are a relatively small percentage of the total
allocated, their effect may be substantial. To quote Katzenstein and Carpenter again:

The role of NGOs is likely to grow in a world in which soft power often offers the greatest
advantage to the weak and Norway should seek to influence and work through and with
NGOs in that part of world politics that is beginning to emerge as ‘governance beyond
government’. (2010, p. 1)

In Indonesia, Norway has provided substantial funding to NGOs, partly via UN-REDD,
including Kemitraan (‘partnership’ in Indonesian). A sort of NGO, set up following a
UNDP-funded project to promote good governance, Kemitraan facilitates contact
between NGOs and government and exerts pressure on the latter. But there are limits
to how much Norway can spend on NGOs; not only what is politically acceptable rela-
tive to funding to government, but also in terms of the absorptive capacity of NGOs.20
Such funding is also demanding to administer, in terms of time and human resources.

20
Nevertheless, total (global) grants to civil society by NICFI are more than four times the
amount allocated to Indonesia. (LTS, 2014: xix).
 126 Desmond McNeill

Dialogue
This is traditionally a favoured option for Norway, certainly when it comes to their role
in peace-making, but also in development assistance. The LoI begins with this as its
first stated purpose ‘Conducting a policy dialogue on international climate change
policy, in particular international policy on REDD+’. But what exactly does this
entail? It requires both establishing a good relationship between the parties involved,
and also a good knowledge of the situation in Indonesia and competence in forest gov-
ernance issues. In Oslo, the number of people involved in REDD+ is small. The
primary policy and implementing body, NICFI, established under the Ministry of
Environment in 2008, has few staff and relatively little development experience.
Their official website (in 2013) listed 13 staff, of whom one ‘works on Norway’s
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cooperation with Indonesia, participation in the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

(FCPF) and Forest Investment Program (FIP), and issues related to REDD+ financing
and the private sector’.21 The situation at the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta does not
alter this picture. In summary, Norway does not have (and has chosen not to establish)
the capacity to become involved in detail in the planning and implementation of
REDD+ in Indonesia. But what has been crucial is the level of trust established
between two or three key individuals in Norway and a similar number on the Indone-
sian side.
Those in Oslo would surely claim that they have a close and fairly informal contact
with Indonesia, conversing by telephone and exchanging occasional visits.22 Whether
this is regarded as ‘governing’ depends mainly on the extent to which the views of
Indonesia and Norway are aligned. Seen through Norwegian eyes, two aspects of the
Task Force (now REDD+ Agency) were especially positive. One is that it reports
directly to the President of Indonesia – which both gives it a high degree of authority.
The second is that it is chaired by Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Head of the President’s
Delivery Unit on Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4). Kuntoro previously
served as the Head of the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Aceh-Nias,
established after the tsunami disaster in late 2004.23 He was widely regarded as both
honest and efficient in carrying out this very challenging task.

Does Norway govern too much or too little?

A ‘real-time evaluation’ that was carried out in 2011 was generally positive of
Norway’s support to REDD+ in Indonesia, but it called into question the ‘light
21
http://www.regjeringen.no/templates/RedaksjonellArtikkel.aspx?id=547202&epslanguage=
EN-GB (accessed 27 November 2013). It should be added that NICFI has made considerable use
of staff of the Rainforest Foundation Norway, the NGO which played a crucial role in garnering
political support for REDD+ in Norway (Nilsen, 2010).
22
This view appears to match that of the Secretary of the REDD+ Task Force (Purnomo, 2012).
23
His Deputy there was Heru Prasetyo.
 Forum for Development Studies 127

touch’ approach that Norway has favoured (LTS International, 2011). To quote the
report:

Although NICFI considers the ‘light touch’ approach as important for promoting national
ownership of REDD+ in Indonesia, the reviewers think that, in a programme of such
importance, more of a balance needs to be struck between promoting ownership and
providing inputs and oversight. (LTS International, 2011, p. xxi)

And again: ‘More NICFI staff in Indonesia are needed to support the partnership’ (LTS
International, 2011, p. 106). The report asserts that ‘without more staff on the ground in
Indonesia, it would be hard for Norway to keep abreast of and fully understand the pol-
itical and field contexts and realities’ (LTS International, 2011, p. 102). Other donors I
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spoke to in Indonesia said they were mystified by Norway’s apparent lack of

leadership.24
This picture may seem to be inconsistent with the findings of a recent study by an
Indonesian researcher (Sulistiawati, 2014).25 Here, staff from five agencies were
interviewed: Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Environment, National Council for
Climate Change (DNPI), National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and the
REDD+ Task Force.26 They were asked to assess the extent of donor involvement
with respect to four issues: ‘Conditionality of funding’, ‘Decision-making in
project’, ‘Monitoring and evaluation activities’ and involvement in ‘preparation
of the regulatory process’. In each case, the extent of Norway’s involvement was
reported as either ‘high’ or ‘very high’. The conclusion would seem very clear,
and contrary to the ‘light touch’, as judged by outsiders. But a rather different
interpretation may be drawn from a book by Agus Purnomo, the Secretary of the
REDD+ Task Force, which deals in detail with the process of establishing the
agreement between Norway and Indonesia, in which he – along with Kuntoro Man-
gkusubroto and Heru Prasetyo – played a central role (Purnomo, 2012). In this
book,

(H)e clearly described that word for word in the LoI, especially the targets of each phase
are agreed on and, in fact, pushed by the GoI (Government of Indonesia) to be in the LoI.
(Emphasis added). The GoI in the time of LoI negotiations was sure that if everything was
written down in a clear and concise language, everyone would understand what is
expected by the LoI and the articles in the LoI can become targets of accomplishments,
more than just mere articles. (Sulistiawati, 2014, p. 152)

24
This point is also made in LTS 2014 (p. 268), based on more formal interviews.
25
The study examined two cases: UN-REDD and the Norwegian bilateral programme.
26
Of the five agencies and institutions, four have regulatory power (only DNPI is excluded); they
are all at the same ‘horizontal’ level in Indonesia’s governmental structure and compete with
each other.
 128 Desmond McNeill

To quote Sulistiawati more fully:27

This research reveals that external pressure – in the forms of donor projects – do exist in
Indonesia’s REDD+ regulatory process. This is seen clearly written in the basic agree-
ments of case studies. The terms of agreements show clearly that the donors have the
final say on the projects, including the conditionality of funding, monitoring and evalu-
ation activities as well as organizing activities for REDD+ preparations. It is, however,
interesting to see how this external pressure plays out in the case studies. . . . (Instead),
the GoI is very flexible in understanding the donor’s perspectives in the donor projects.
. . . However, the donors in the case studies do give full trust to the GoI in running the
projects. In terms of the REDD+ Task Force, the GoN (Government of Norway) empha-
sizes this many times: as long as the project goes according to the LoI and the President
agrees with the REDD+ Task Force, the GoN will always support the project. (Sulistia-
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wati, 2014, p. 154)

How can this apparent contradiction be explained? Did Norway exert pressure or a
‘light touch’? First, it is important to distinguish between the LoI and the subsequent
follow-up. One may argue that Norway applied some quite strict conditions in the
LoI (at least in the REDD-readiness phase); and it is only thereafter that Norway
displayed its somewhat criticised ‘light touch’. Second, it does appear that the
two parties to the negotiations shared a common interest in reducing the risk of cor-
ruption, associated most closely with the Ministry of Forestry. The conditions speci-
fied in the LoI are, I suggest, ones which may be unwelcome for some of the key
actors, but seen as necessary from the point of view of those in the most influential
position, seeking to fulfil the president’s stated aim and recognising the potential
threats to it.
In summary, with financial support from Norway, and through the institutional
mechanism of a Presidential Task Force, some of the problems which would arise in
seeking to implement the programme through normal channels could, at least for an
interim period, be avoided. By some, the terms specified in the LoI concerning
Norway’s REDD+ funding would be seen as welcome support, by others as unwel-
come pressure.
But it should be noted how dependent all this is on the support of the president. In
this connection, it is significant that the REDD+ Agency is established by Presidential
Decree (of 2013). This does not have the same legal standing as Undang-undang (Law/
Act). To amend the latter requires the support of the legislative and the president, but a

27
In his book, Purnomo stresses the importance of the one billion US dollars.

I reminded Hans over the phone that the agreement about including a figure for the Nor-
wegian commitment is politically important to Indonesia, and if that figure could not be
agreed upon, President SBY may change his intention to attend the Oslo Climate and
Forest Conference. (2012, p. 27)
 Forum for Development Studies 129

Presidential Decree can be replaced (by a new president), or simply allowed to lapse.28
While some have criticised Norway for their ‘light touch’, at least subsequent to the
signing of the LoI, one might argue that there was sufficient agreement between the key
actors to ensure that progress was kept roughly on track. But as the foregoing analysis
reveals, the situation is fragile. Dialogue and a light touch are effective so long as those
with the power to determine events on the Indonesian side are aligned in their intentions
with those in Norway. This situation could rapidly change when a new president is
elected in 2014. In this event, will the LoI be effective? Could Norway withstand
pressure to release funds? Would it be legitimate to resist doing so?29
REDD+ today, at least as seen from Norway, looks like a classic, indeed extreme,
example of an aid project: a great sense of haste; a degree of optimism which dis-
courages criticism; and a large amount of money which is difficult to spend. To
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quote Development Today (7 July, 2011):

By last year less than a tenth of the NOK 1.9 billion30 allocated for the three countries had
been disbursed. The rest is mainly in bank accounts in Oslo and Washington. And no dis-
bursement decisions for the three have been made so far in 2011. If the trend continues,
unspent aid funds for these three countries will likely exceed NOK 3 billion by the end of
this year.

The level of spending is especially low in Indonesia.31 This is a difficult game for
Norway to play. The pressure to spend money is considerable – and will be increas-
ingly difficult to resist.

Conclusion
Measured in terms of financial commitment, Norway is by far the most dominant actor
with regard to REDD+, both internationally and in Indonesia. Although deriving some
benefits from this on the international stage, being routinely congratulated for its efforts
and gaining ‘a place at the table’ in various fora, Norway has not sought to take too
obvious a leadership role. In Indonesia, Norway is certainly a very big player, but
does not want to be seen to exert influence. This is for two main reasons. One is that
Norway’s stated policy with regard to development assistance is that this should be
28
One of the recommendations from the 2011 evaluation is relevant here: ‘engage more actively
with the Indonesian House of Representatives, to build support through increased understanding
among parliamentarians of the strategic advantages of the LoI process for Indonesia’ (Caldecott
et al., 2011, p. 4).
29
Note: since this article was written a new president – Joko Widodo – has been elected. Of the
candidates he is generally regarded as the one most likely to be favourable to REDD+.
30
1 NOK (Norwegian crown) is about 0.15 US dollars.
31
According to LTS 2014 (p. xix), a total of NOK 10.3 billion (1.7 billion US dollar) of funding
has been disbursed by NICFI since 2008. Brazil has received 44% of the total (NOK 4.6 billion),
while Indonesia has received only 2%: less than one-quarter of the grants to civil society.
 130 Desmond McNeill

based on an equal partnership, involving ‘recipient responsibility’ and ‘ownership’. The

second is that Norway does not wish to be far out in front, compared to other development
agencies, with regard to REDD+, for fear that instead of others matching (or preferably
exceeding) their financial contribution, Norway will be left holding the baby. There may
also be pragmatic domestic reasons for its so-called light touch approach, notably
Norway’s limited capacity and experience in the field of forest governance. On the
other hand, it appears that many Indonesian bureaucrats believe that Norway has been
quite intrusive, insofar as the LoI is rather specific in its conditions. The key appears
to be that, according to the public commitments of the Indonesian president,
Norway’s intentions and those of Indonesia are congruent.
One assessment of Norway’s engagement in Indonesia would conclude that it has
been successful; that a very few key individuals on the Norwegian side have established
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close informal working relations with a very few key individuals on the Indonesian
side, which has made it possible for them to ensure that the programme is in line
with Norway’s intentions. A more critical assessment would be that Norway has in
fact exerted little or no influence over Indonesia’s policy; either by choice or necessity
it has left the key decisions up to Indonesia. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere in
between: that there has been a high level of agreement between the parties concerned
as to what is the overall objective, and – to a large extent – how this should be
achieved, so that ‘governing’ has not been necessary. If so, how long can this situation
be expected to last? Norway cannot for much longer delay payment of much larger
sums than are being spent on REDD-readiness. There is pressure to disburse both on
the Norwegian side and on the Indonesian side. It is possible that the relationship
between REDD+ Norway and Indonesia has indeed been as rosy as the more positive
assessment just described, but the situation has become more challenging now.

Acknowledgements
This article was largely written while I was an Academic Resident at the Rockefeller Foundation’s
Bellagio Center. I am also extremely grateful to Arild Angelsen, Daniel Murdiyarso, Linda Sulis-
tiawati and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own.

Notes on Contributor
Desmond McNeill (PhD, University College London) is Research Director at SUM (Centre for
Development and the Environment) at the University of Oslo. A political economist, he has
worked in many countries in the South largely in the field of governance and sustainable devel-
opment. Recent books: Development Issues in Global Governance (with Benedicte Bull), 2007;
Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights (with Asun Lera St. Clair), Routledge, 2009.

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