Book 2 Short Emb 190

190
ATA 53 Fuselage
190
Table of Content
53-00 The fuselage

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Floor panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Wing to fuselage fairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Forward fuselage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Center fuselage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Rear fuselage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The fuselage main sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
53-10 Forward Fuselage

Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Skin panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Stringers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
53-20 Center Fuselage

Center Fuselage I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Center Fuselage II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Center Fuselage III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
53-30 Rear Fuselage

The tailcone system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The wing to fuselage fairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

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53-00 The fuselage

General Floor panels
The fuselage structure or "shell" provides accommodation for the crew, pas- The floor panels support the crew and passenger foot traffic, the service
sengers, and cargo, as well as structure for component installation. The fu- carts stowed beneath the galley units, and the weight of the loaded baggage
selage structure of the aircraft is a semi-monocoque type and is made of compartment.
aluminium alloys. It has typical double bubble sections and is reinforced to
carry the pressurization loads. The basic structural elements include: string-
ers, frames, and skins. The structure has an expected integrity of 80,000 Wing to fuselage fairing
flight hours or 60,000 flights. The wing-to-fuselage fairing consists of panels which give a better aerody-
namic shape to the wing-to-fuselage junction, by radiusing its corners and
The fuselage is the main portion of the aircraft where systems like wing, hor- closing its gaps.It also protect the systems and components attached to the
izontal and vertical stabilizers, APU (Auxiliary Power Unit), and several other wing stub/fuselage lower region.
systems and components are attached to.
The main function of the fuselage is to provide accommodation for the pas- Forward fuselage
sengers and crew, as well as room for baggage in the overhead bins and in
the forward and aft cargo compartments. The forward fuselage has provisions for the flight-crew stations (pilot and at-
tendant seats), contains supporting structures for the forward avionic com-
ponents, and houses the NLG (Nose Landing Gear).
Center fuselage
The center fuselage is composed of three segments, and it is where the wing
joins the fuselage.
Rear fuselage
The rear fuselage provides continuity for the fuselage and connects the
center fuselage III to the tail cone.It closes the pressurized vessel at the aft
section of the passenger cabin by means of the rear pressure bulkhead.
Figure 1: Fuselage introduction

190
The fuselage main sections
The fuselage has the following main sections:

• The forward fuselage,
• The center fuselage,
• The rear fuselage.
The fuselage structure is further divided into the following six sections:
• The forward fuselage,
• The Center fuselage I,
• The Center fuselage II,
• The Center fuselage III,
• The Rear fuselage,
• The tail cone.
Figure 2: Fuselage sections

190
53-10 Forward Fuselage

The forward fuselage section extends from frame 01 to frame 20.It is a semi
The forward fuselage has four types of frame splice joints:
monocoque structure with a conical and a double bubble cross-section.The
fuselage is provided with skins, frames and stringers, as well as longitudinal
and transverse floor beams.It also has brackets and supporting structures • Joint 1 - The splice is attached to both flanges and to the web.
for systems and equipment.In addition, the fuselage has cutouts for the pas-
senger and service doors, and passenger windows. • Joint 2 - The splice is attached to the web of the frames and to the inner
flange.Joint 2 has one more fastener close to the outer flange, on each
The forward fuselage is divided into two parts, namely the upper forward fu- side.
selage and the lower forward fuselage.
• Joint 3 - This type of splice is a variation of joint 2 with a joggle on its web
The floor structure consists of crossbeams and longitudinal beams that to avoid the use of shims.It is used when there is a joint between frame
transmit the loads to the primary structure.The crossbeams help to with- channels with different thicknesses.
stand pressure loads and to keep the cross-sectional shape of the fuselage.
Joint 4 - This type of splice is a variation of joint 1 with two angles to facilitate
the assembly and avoid the use of shims on the flange.
Frames
The forward fuselage structure comprises 20 aluminium frames divided into
two groups, as follows:
• Formed C-shaped frames, which are directly attached to the skin or at-
tached by means of shear clips.The attachment by means of shear clips
allows the stringers to run the full length of the fuselage.This type of frame
constitutes the majority in a typical fuselage section where there are no
special features.On occurrence of special features, such as door cutouts,
the stringers are interrupted and the frame outboard flange is attached di-
rectly to the skin.
• Machined C-shaped frames, which are directly attached to the skin or at-
tached by means of shear clips.The attachment by means of shear clips
are found at the passenger cabin floor level.The direct attachment is used
near areas of high stress, such as windshield, access door, door cutouts
and NLG wheelwell cutout.
Figure 1: Forward fuselage, FR 1 to FR 20

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Skin panel
The forward fuselage comprises twenty skin panel assemblies with stringers
and shear clips.The skin panels are made of aluminium sheet with chemical
milling at pockets between stringers and frames.
The skin panels are padded up around the cutouts and reinforced locally by
doublers which gradually redistributes the stresses of corners to the skin and
to the surrounding structure.The doublers are made of aluminium and at-
tached to the skin by rivets.They are continuous across the width of the door
to serve as a skin splice.
The skin panels are joined with skin splices of the butt joint type.
Stringers
The forward fuselage structure contains 28 stringers on each side of its sec-
tion at frame 20, 17 stringers on each side of its section at frame 05, and 13
stringers on each side of its section at frame 02.
The stringers are manufactured with aluminium extruded Z-shaped sections

and are attached to the skin by rivets.
Figure 2: Forward fuselage
A
ZONES
120
220
STGR STGR
STGR 01L
STRINGER
02R
03L STGR STGR
STGR
STGR 01R STGR 04R
02L
STGR 03R
05L
04L STGR STGR
05R 06R
STGR STGR
07L 06L
STGR
07R STGR
STGR 08R
A
C
STGR 08L
09L STGR
09R STGR
STGR
STGR
10L
10R
STGR B
11L 11R
STGR STGR
STRINGER
12L 12R
STGR STGR
13L STGR STGR 13R
14L PASSENGER CABIN FLOOR 14R
STGR STGR STGR STGR

15L 16L 16R 15R
STGR STGR STGR STGR STGR STGR

17L 18L 19L 19R 18R 17R
STGR STGR STGR

20L 21L 20R
STGR
STGR 21R
22R
STGR STGR
22L 23L STGR
STGR
STGR 25L STGR
24R STGR
23R B
STGR STGR
24L 26R
27L STGR
C
28R TYPICAL STRINGER CROSS SECTION
STGR 25R
STGR STGR
26L
28L 27R
SKIN

190
53-20 Center Fuselage

The center fuselage is composed of three segments, and it is where the wing
joins the fuselage.
The main function of the center fuselage is to provide accommodation for the
passengers and crew, as well as room for baggage in the overhead bins and
in the forward and aft cargo compartments.
Center Fuselage I
The CF (Center Fuselage)I provides room for the forward cargo compart-
ment and accommodation for the passengers and luggage by means of pas-
senger seats and overhead bins.
Center Fuselage II
The CF (Center Fuselage) II provides accommodation for the passengers
and luggage by means of passenger seats and overhead bins.
In addition to the supporting structures for the overhead bins and floor, this
fuselage section also accommodates the wing stub and the middle avionics
compartment.
Center Fuselage III

The CF (Center Fuselage) III provides room for the aft cargo compartment
and accommodation for the passengers and luggage by means of passen-
ger seats and overhead bins.
Figure 1: Center Fuselage

190
53-30 Rear Fuselage
There are three minor cutouts provided with reinforcing frames, each for the
The rear fuselage extends from frame 90A to frame 100, whereas its pres- hydraulic ground servicing port, the electrical ground servicing port, and the
surized section extends from the middle point between frames 90 and 90A aft jacking point of the aircraft.
to the rear pressure bulkhead (frame 91), and the non pressurized section
extends from the rear pressure bulkhead (frame 91), to frame 100.
The non-pressurized section houses the No.3 hydraulic system, APU fire ex-
tinguishing system, aft section of the APU bleed line, aft section of the APU
The rear fuselage is a semimonocoque structure that consists of skins, fuel line and the HSA (Horizontal-Stabilizer Actuator).The pressurized sec-
transverse frames, stringers, two cutouts for the horizontal stabilizer, one tion houses the waste tank, vacuum pump, HF)High Frequency) coupler,
cutout for the rear fuselage access door and other brackets and supporting NAV (Navigation) unit, ELT (Emergency Locator Transmitter), impact
structures for systems and equipment. switch, and supports for the aft electronic rack.
The rear fuselage floor structure has two dedicated configurations: The negative and positive relief valves of the cabin pressurization system
• One in the pressurized section with transverse and longitudinal beams are installed on the rear pressure bulkhead.
that transmit the cabin loads to the primary structure.This structure finish-
es the cabin floor structure at the rear section of the passenger cabin.
• One in the non-pressurized fuselage section, for maintenance purposes,
with transverse and longitudinal beams that transmits the loads to the pri-
mary structure.
The rear fuselage contains 1 semiframe in the pressurized section, 9 frames

in the non-pressurized section, 23 stringers on each side of the forward sec-
tion and 15 stringers on each side of the aft section.
The rear pressure bulkhead (frame 91) closes the pressurized passenger
cabin at the aft section of the aircraft and consists of a dome composed of
11 segments and one ring divided into 2 sections.
The rear fuselage has three major cutouts, one for the access door and two
for the horizontal stabilizer.The access door cutout is on the RH (Right-
Hand) side of the fuselage and extends from frame 94 to frame 96 and from
stringer 14AR to stringer 25R.The two horizontal stabilizer cutouts, one on
each side of the fuselage, extend from frame 97 to frame 100 and from
stringer 7L/7R to stringer 14AR/14AL.
Figure 1: Rear Fuselage
Access door Pressure bulkhead
FWD Fuselage Center Fuselage 1 Center Fuselage 2 Center Fuselage 3 Rear Fuselage Tail Cone
x 29837
X=29632 X=33427
x 31837 x 31095

190
The tailcone system
The tailcone system provides a fully integrated fireproof tailcone.It is created

from machined panels and stringers, fabricated from aluminum and steel.
The tailcone is attached to the aircraft rear fuselage using 4 bolts, and is a
designated fire zone.
A titanium firewall separates the forward end of the tailcone from the adja-
cent aircraft aft fuselage bay.The tailcone incorporates provisions for over-
board drains, acoustic silencing of the APU inlet and exhaust, and two
access panels for inspection, servicing and maintenance of the APU system.
Figure 2: Tailcone system
Panels
Stringers
Acoustic silencing
Titanium firewall
Overboard drain

190
The wing to fuselage fairing
To reduce aircraft drag, the fuselage contains a wing-to-fuselage fairing.The

wing-to-fuselage fairing extends from frame 27 to frame 77.It is a composite
structure made of carbon fiber sandwich panels, and contains the following
main segments: the forward panel, the center panel, and the aft panel.
The forward panel contains panels that give access to the environmental
control system components, the slat power drive unit, the air pressure
ground connection and two NACA air inlets.
The center panel contains the environmental control unit outlet louver, ac-
cess panels for the aileron control mechanism, the hydraulic system compo-
nents and the wing stub region.The center panel includes the lower red
beacon, the brush assemblies for the main landing gear and as an aircraft
option, the vertical speed brake.
The aft panel contains access panels and access doors for the hydraulic
compartment, ecology bottles, flap power drive-unit and the middle avionic
compartment.
Figure 3: The wing to fuselage fairing
The aft panel contains:

The forward panel contains: - hydraulic compartment
- environmental control - ecology bottles
The center panel contains:
system components - flap power drive-unit
- environmental control
- slat power drive unit - middle avionic compartment
outlet louver
- air pressure
- access panels for the
ground connection
aileron control mechanism
- two NACA air inlets
- hydraulic system
components
- wing stub region
Frame 27 - The center panel includes:

- lower red beacon
- brush assemblies
- vertical speed brake
Frame 77

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190
ATA 54 PYLONS
190
Table of Content
54-00 Pylons
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pylon Box Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pylon fairings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

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54-00 Pylons
Introduction
The pylon main box is an all-metallic structure attached to the structure of

the wing main box.The pylon main box attaches to the wing through five fit-
tings:
• two upper link fittings on the wing front spar, at wing ribs 8 and 9;
• two lower link fittings on the wing lower skin (below the front spar), at wing
ribs 8 and 9; and
• a single fitting on the aft lower skin, at wing rib 8A.
Two upper links attach the pylon to the wing upper link fittings.The pylon
structure attaches directly to the wing lower link fittings.A drag link attaches
the pylon to the drag link wing fitting.
The engine, nacelle and thrust reverser are mounted off the pylon main box,
at the engine mounts and nacelle/thrust reverser hinges.
Pylon Box Structure
The pylon box structure holds the loads and moments transmitted by the en-
gine, nacelle and thrust reverser in all three axes.Thus, the design of the py-
lon box structure lets it hold vertical lateral shearloads, axial (thrust) loads
and torque, together with vertical bending caused by the offset of the engine
C.G..
Figure 1: Pylons
Pylon
Upper links
connecting to the wing spar 1
Lower links
connecting to the wing lower skin
Aft link
which functions as a drag strut.
Removable panels

190
Pylon fairings
The forward lateral fairing is attached to the top inboard and outboard sides
of the main structure.The forward lateral fairing is made of aluminium sheet
and composite material.
The movable aft fairing is attached to the wing main box structure.
The movable aft fairing is made of aluminium sheet and composite material.
Figure 2: Pylon fairings

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190
ATA 55 STABILIZERS
190
Table of Content
55-00 Stabilizer
Stabilizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

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55-00 Stabilizer
The horizontal stabilizer is an all-metal, three spar construction hinged to the
rear fuselage, designed as a movable control surface for longitudinal
trim.The stabilizer consists of two sections attached to each other at the air-
craft center line, and can be removed as a single unit.Each section has a
one-section leading edge and a tip fairing.
To cover the gap between the horizontal stabilizer and the rear fuselage cut-
out, there are two removable sliding plates each on the upper and lower sur-
faces, and one removable sliding fairing attached to the horizontal stabilizer,
on each side of the rear fuselage.Elevators are hinged to the trailing edge of
each section of the horizontal stabilizer.Aerodynamic seals on the interface
between the elevators and the horizontal stabilizer guarantee the NACA
(National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) aerodynamic profile.
The horizontal stabilizer is an all moving surface attached to the fuselage

with a pair of hinges and a trim actuator attachment.It is an all-metal surface
composed of skins, spars and ribs, with fairings made of composite material.
For each side of the horizontal stabilizer the structural box comprises three
spars, seventeen ribs and upper and lower skin panels reinforced with at-
tached stringers.
The spars are named the front spar, middle spar and rear spar.The upper
and lower skin panels are made of clad sheet material.
The spar machining includes rib posts and intermediate stiffeners.The mid-
dle and rear spars have additional titanium third caps for damage tolerance
purposes.These additional third caps are on the rear spar from ribs 1 to 10
and on the middle spar from ribs 1 to 8.
The right and left sections of the horizontal stabilizer are joined at the aircraft
centerline by means of splices.
Figure 1: Stabilizer
EMPENNAGE
YAW
Vertical stabilizer is stationary
PITCH
Horizontal stabilizer is movable,

operates as a pitch trim device
Horizontal Tail Structure Vertical Tail Structure
Vertical Stabilizer Trailing Edge
Rudder
Horizontal Stabilizer Trailing Edge
Elevator

190
Stabilizer Each elevator hinges to the horizontal stabilizer trailing edge by means of
five elevator hinge fittings along the rear spar and two actuator fittings.
Rib 1 is an integral part of the joint.It gives the connection between many of
the separate items, redistributes the shear around the torquebox as well as The trailing edge, between ribs 1 and 14 has:
reacting the kink loads in the stringers due to the dihedral.
• upper and lower skins;
The materials of the centerline joint at the middle spar are: • a set of ribs attached to the rear spar;
• forward upper and lower splices - aluminum alloy hand forging; • stringers at the trailing edge and middle chord; and
• center upper and lower splices - aluminum alloy hand forging; • access panels in the lower skin.
• middle spar vertical splice - aluminum alloy forging; and
The trailing edge between ribs 15 and 17 has an auxiliary spar from rib 15
• all connections are made with titanium protruding head Hi-Lite fasteners. to rib 17 (closing root and tip trailing edge ribs) and the closing trailing edge.
At this location, the trailing edge upper and lower skins are attached to the
The materials of the centerline joint at the rear spar are: main box skin of the horizontal stabilizer with a butt joint splice.
• rear upper and lower splices - aluminum alloy hand forging;
• upper and rear spar vertical splices - aluminum alloy forging; and
• lower rear spar vertical splice - aluminum alloy forging.
The main spar box (middle spar to rear spar) ribs are numbered from the
centerline (rib 1) to the tip (rib 17).
The secondary spar boxes (front spar to middle spar) ribs have the same
number but with the suffix A.The secondary spar boxes start with rib 3A.The
secondary spar boxes start with rib 3A.The inboard nine ribs are aluminum
alloy machined.
The others are made of clad aluminum sheet, reinforced with machined fit-
tings locally to major load inputs (e.g. the major hinge points and the elevator
actuator).
The inboard nine ribs give support for the trim actuator and horizontal stabi-
lizer hinge fittings (ribs 2 and 3 respectively) and the inboard elevator hinge
(rib 4).Rib 3 consists of two components for damage tolerance require-
ments.The outer item is continuous from the rear spar to the middle
spar.The inner item, attached to the outer, runs only from the rear spar for-
ward two and half stringer pitches.
Figure 2: Stabilizer structure
UPPER SPLICE
PLATE
UPPER SKIN
UPPER VERTICAL
SPLICE
A
RIB 3 TRIM ACTUATOR
ZONES FITTING
334
TRAILING EDGE UPPER SKIN
344 RIB 1
( RIB 15 TO RIB 17) MIDDLE SPAR
RIB 3
REAR SPAR
FRONT SPAR LOWER VERTICAL

SPLICE
TIP RIB
(RIB 17)
TRAILING EDGE
(RIB 15 TO RIB 17)
A
LOWER SPLICE
PLATE
LOWER SKIN

190

190
ATA 56 WINDOWS
190
Table of Content
56-00 Windows
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
56-10 Cockpit windows

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The windshields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Direct- vision windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
56-20 Cabin windows

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cabin windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

190

190
56-00 Windows
General
Various windows are installed in the aircraft flight compartment and in the
passenger cabin. There are four windows in the flight compartment: pilot's
and copilot's windshields, and pilot's and copilot’s direct-vision windows.
There are 27 window assemblies installed on the right side of the passenger
compartment, and 26 on the left side, and one window in each of the two
service doors.

Figure 1: Windows
Direct vision window
Windshield
One window in each of the two service doors
27 window assemblies on the right side of the passenger compartment 26 window assemblies on the left side of the passenger compartment

190
56-10 Cockpit windows

General
Cockpit window system components include: The pilot's and copilot's wind-
shields, which have anti-ice and anti-fog protection, and the pilot's and copi-
lot's direct-vision windows.
During cockpit evacuation, the direct-vision windows may be used as emer-

gency exits.

Figure 1: Cockpit windows
Windshield
Anti-ice and anti-fog protection
Direct vision window
During cockpit evacuation, the direct vision windows may be used as emergency exits.

190
The windshields
The windshields have two panels, each with a laminated transparency. The
transparency contour has a continuous metal frame on the outside and a
segmented retainer ring on the inside.
Standard attachment holes on the frame edge match the holes in the air-
plane structure. A heating system with electrically-conductive elements, built
into the windshield panel, is integrated between the glass and the adjacent
ply.
Electrical power is supplied by bus bars located near the heated area
through flat braided wire conductors routed through the bus bar to an input
terminal block.
Three identical, independent temperature sensors are built into the laminat-
ed transparency. These sensors are used to prevent overheating.

Figure 2: The windshield
Attachment holes
Continuous metal frame
Segmented retainer ring
Temperature Bus bars

sensors Heating system
Input terminal block

190
Direct- vision windows
The pilot's and copilot's direct-vision windows include a transparency and a

carbon fiber frame, and are attached to a mechanism that supports, opens
and locks the windows. The windows are installed on four tracks - two fixed
to the upper part of the plane structure and two fixed to the lower part of the
plane structure. The windows slide in the tracks on seven rollers attached to
the opening mechanism of the windows.
In the closed position, the windows are pressed against the fuselage struc-
ture. To open the windows, press the unlock button and pull the handle
backwards.

Figure 3: Direct- vision windows
4 Tracks
Unlock button
7 Rollers
Direct-vision windows

190
56-20 Cabin windows

General
The passenger cabin windows are installed in aluminium alloy forged struc-
tures. The panes of the cabin windows are acrylic panels. The passenger
cabin has passenger cabin windows and two service door windows.
Cabin windows
The passenger cabin has 53 windows - 26 windows on the left side and 27
windows on the right side of the fuselage.The 53 windows include the two
overwing emergency exits windows.Each window has two transparencies
and a frame which is an integral part of the air frame. The transparencies are
attached to the frame by 8 clamps. The windows are sealed by silicone
shaped seals attached to the transparency edges.

Figure 1: Cabin windows
Passenger cabin
window
Passenger cabin 53 windows:
Aluminum alloy forged structures
26 windows on the left side
27 windows on the right side
8 Clamps
Acrylic panels
Passenger cabin windows Frame
Silicone
shaped
Transparencies

190

190
ATA 57 WINGS
190
Table of Content
57-00 Wings
Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Wing stub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Wing leading edge, Slats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Wing trailing edge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Spar II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Flaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Spoiler hinge fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Aileron hinge fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Aileron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Spoilers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

190

190
57-00 Wings
The wing surfaces cause aerodynamic forces which support the airplane in
flight.The aircraft has a low-wing design.The wing stores fuel and fuel sys-
tem components.The wing structure supports the main landing gears, flaps,
spoilers, slats, winglets and the ailerons.
The wing is attached to the wing stub which is located in the center fuselage
II.
The wing is divided into four main parts:
• wing main box;

• leading edge;
• trailing edge;
• outer wing.
Figure 1: The wings
fuel and fuel system component
DRY BAY
SLAT 1 WING STU
ENGINE
W
SLAT 2 P
YA =
YA
SLAT 3
WING SPAR 1 Landing Gear

SLAT 4
SPOILERS WING SPAR 3

INBOARD FLAP Y = 00.00
OUTBOARD FLAP
WING SPAR 2 YA = 00.0
AILERON
WING TRAILING
EDGE

190
Wing
The wing is attached to the wing stub structure, which consists of two main
compartments: the main box, for the wing installation, and the rear box,
which forms the main landing gear wheelwell.The wing main box structure
has the function of a fuel tank.The L/E (Leading Edge) region consists of the
Fixed Leading Edge (FLE) and the movable L/E (slats).There are three
spars in the wing: spar 1 (front spar), spar 2 (rear spar) and spar 3 (rear
spar).The leading edge is a single torque-box structure delimited by spar 1
(front spar).
Attached to the spar 1, there is a fixed leading edge, comprising skin and
ribs,some of which support the slat tracks.
In the rear portion spar 2, there is a box for the main landing gear and a se-
ries of movable control surfaces such as flaps, spoilers and ailerons.
The wing trailing edge is a fixed metallic structure that supports the ailerons,
flaps, spoilers amd main landing gear.Its primary purpose is to carry the
loads of the control surfaces to the wing main box and spar 2.
There are five spoilers and one aileron on each side of the wing, installed aft
of the rear spar.
The outer wing is composed of the wing structure that extends from spar 2
to spar 3, from rib 1a to rib 10 and the wing main box structure that extends
from spar 1 to spar 2, from rib 23 to rib 29.
Figure 2: Wing main structure
The wing main structure is made from aluminum alloy

3 main parts separated by spars:
Fixed leading edge DRY BAY

SLAT 1
ENGINE
Main box WING REF.
SLAT 2 POINT
YA = 00.00
Fixed trailing edge
SLAT 3
WING SPAR 1
SLAT 4
WING SPAR 3
INBOARD FLAP Y = 00.00
OUTBOARD FLAP
WING SPAR 2 YA = 00.00
AILERON
WING TRAILING
EDGE

190
Wing stub
– rib 2 LH and
The wing stub main box is located between spar 1 and spar 2.This compart- – rib 2 RH.
ment has a metallic semimonocoque structure and a torque box structure
and a torque box structure whose main components are as follows:
The landing gear wheelwell is located between rib 1 and rib 2 of the rear box.
• two integral milled skin panels:
– upper skin and lower skin There is a machined removable rib between the wing main box and the wing
• two machined spars: stub structure.
– spar 1 and spar 2
• five machined ribs:
– rib 1, rib 2 LH, rib 2 RH, rib 3 LH, rib 3 RH.
The wing stub main box connects the LH and RH of the wing.This main box
structure houses the space for fuel tank and also contains all the wing-to-
fuselage interface components and overwing floor support brackets.
The wing stub main box can withstand the lift load, bending and torsion mo-
ments from the wings.
The upper skin of the wing stub main box and rear box are part of the cabin
pressurization boundary.
The wing stub main box will extend to external side of the fuselage to help
the final assembly of the inboard wing to the fuselage.
The wing stub rear box is located between spar 2 and spar 3.This compart-
ment has a metallic semimonocoque structure whose main components are
as follows:
• one upper skin panel machined from aluminium alloy plate;

• one spar machined from aluminium alloy plate, namely spar 3 , and;
• three ribs machined from aluminium alloy plate:
– rib 1
Figure 3: Wing stub
The wing stub is a semimonocoque construction

Main box
5 ribs
Rear box
Front spar 1
Span-wise stiffened upper skin panels
4 ribs
Lower skin panel
The main box extends outside the fuselage Rear spar 2

to allow attachment of the two half-wing Spar 3
bolted flanges
The rear box includes the space for the main

landing gear tires when the gear is retracted.

190
Wing leading edge, Slats
The slats consist of four RH and four LH slat surfaces, identified sequentially
from inboard to outboard as slat 1 thru slat 4.
The slats are on the L/E of the wing.
Slat 1 is inboard of the engine, and slat 2, slat 3, and slat 4 are outboard.
The four slat surfaces are manufactured from aluminium alloy sheet.
Slat 2, slat 3, and slat 4 have an anti-icing system and these three slats (slat
2, slat 3, and slat 4) are similar in design and construction.
These slats house the piccolo tube used to provide hot air for de-icing.
The piccolo tube is manufactured from titanium alloy.
The slats are assembled in a total of nine support tracks.Slat 1 is supported

by three tracks and slat 2, slat 3, and slat 4 are supported by two tracks
each.
The slat surface is attached to tracks by means of bolts, bearings, links, and
side plates.
The slat surfaces contact the wing Fixed Leading Edge along the slat Trail-
ing Edge.
Figure 4: Wing leading edge, Slat
A
ZONES
611
612 C
C
613 C
614
A
ZONES
511
512
513
514
F
B E
D
A
SLAT 1
TRACK
C
TRACK 2
B
TRACK 3
TRACK 1

190
Wing trailing edge Spar II
The fixed trailing edge (TE) include fixed shrouds and main landing gear Spar II is divided into two parts, namely outboard spar II and inboard spar II,
doors and supports the aileron, flaps, spoilers and main landing gear which are spliced together.
units.The fixed TE also contains operating mechanisms, tubing, and cables.
The outboard portion of the wing aft of spar II (rear spar) and main landing Outboard spar II is machined from aluminium alloy plate.
gear bay are the overall TE structure.
Inboard spar II is machined from aluminium alloy forging.
The outboard part of the structure of the fixed TE consists of:

Spar II is integrally machined with vertical stiffeners in the web (which acts
as panel breakers and attachments for the rib webs).
• spar II;
At its lower portion, Spar II has a third cap that provides failsafe capability
• third caps; for the lower spar cap.The lower spar cap has a rectangular cross-section
and is made of sheet titanium.The spar cap attaches to the spar web by
• aileron hinges; means of titanium Hi-Lite fasteners.
• spoiler hinges;
• spoiler actuator support;
• shroud supports; and
• attachment brackets.
The fixed TEs have seals for aerodynamic sealing of the spoilers and
flaps.All doors and panels are protected against lightning strike and are elec-
trically bonded.
Figure 5: Wing trailing edge
FITTINGS
SPAR 3
SPAR2
OUTBOARD
FLAP
A
INBOARD
FLAP
TRAILING EDGE - DESCRIPTION
OUTBOARD
INBOARD
A SPAR 2

190
Flaps Spoiler hinge fittings
There are four flap panels on each side of the wing: Each spoiler panel has two hinge fittings and one actuator/center hinge fit-
ting.
• two inboard flaps; and
• two outboard flaps. The hinge fittings are located at both ends of the spoiler panel.
The inboard flap is of the double-slotted type and the outboard flap is of the The actuator/center hinge fitting is located at the center of the spoiler panel.
single type. All fittings are machined from aluminium aloy plate.
The two panels of the inboard flap are:
• the main panel; and
• the aft panel Aileron hinge fittings
The flap panels have a multi-rib structure made of carbon/epoxy composite The aileron hinge fittings are located on the backside of spar II web from rib
material. 24 to rib 29.There are four hinge fittings machined from aluminium alloy
plate.Each fitting has a lug with a bearing that takes axial and radial loads
The inboard flap extends from wing rib 1a to wing rib 10. from the aileron.The hinge fittings are attached to spar II web by means of
The outboard flap extends from wing rib 10 to wing rib 23. fasteners.
The flap mechanism is of the track type.There are two linear actuators for
each flap.They are installed at the holding position.The inboard mechanism
of the inboard flap is located in the wing-to-fuselage fairing.Two torque tubes
connect the mechanism to the inboard flap panels.
There is an additional support, installed between the main flap panel and the
aft flap panel, which prevents separation of the aft panel in the event of a
bird strike.
Aerodynamic seals are installed to both sides of each flap.The outer tip of
the inboard flap, and the inner tip of the outboard flap, are in lightning strike
zone 2B.Copper mesh is bonded on the skins for lightning protection and
electrical bonding.
Figure 6: Flap, Spoiler, Aileron
SPAR 2
FLAP SRHOUD SUPPORT FITTING
FLAP SRHOUD SUPPORT FITTING
OUTBOARD
FLAP TRAILING EDGE - FLAP SHROUD SUPPORT FITTINGS
B
A B MAIN
PANEL
B AFT
PANEL
INBOARD
FLAP SPAR 2
AILERON HINGE FITTING

190
Aileron Spoilers
There is one aileron for each side of the wing. There are five spoilers for each side of the wing, located aft of the rear spar.
The two inner spoilers are only ground spoilers.The three outer spoilers are
The aileron control surface consists of a composite shell structure with four used as both flight spoiler and ground spoiler.
aluminium hinges and two aluminium actuator fittings.
Spoiler 1 and spoiler 2 (inboard spoilers) are located above the inboard flap.
The Aileron is actuated by two actuators, which are located side-by-side be- Spoilers, 3, 4 and 5 (outboard spoilers) are located above the outboard flap.
tween hinge 1 and hinge 2, these actuators are energized simultaneously. They are also called multi-function spoilers.
The aileron panel is a multi-rib box with the main spar, upper/lower skins and
ribs, which are made of solid composite material.The lower skin, ribs and
spar are bonded to each other at curing process.The upper skin and fittings The spoilers contain protection for lightning strike, electrical bonding and
are attached to the lower skin assembly using titanium fasteners. aerodynamic seals at each end.
The aileron does not have tab or balance weight. The spoiler has these parts:
• spoiler panel;
• spoiler hinge fittings; and
• spoiler actuator fittings.
Figure 7: Spoilers
A B
ZONE
691 B
692 B
A 693
694
ZONE 695
B
591
592 B
593
594
595
SPOILER HINGE
FITTING
A
SPOILER
SPOILER ACTUATOR
FITTING
SPOILER HINGE
FITTING
SPOILER PANEL
AILERON PANEL
B
TYPICAL AILERON ACTUATOR FITTING
A

190

190
ATA 52 / Doors
190
Table of Content Main Door Skin-Allowable Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Main Door Repair Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
52-00 Doors general
52-20 Emergency Exit
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Emergency exit components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Passenger doors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Emergency exits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Main handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Cargo doors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
External handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Service doors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Escape hatch actuating mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Fixed interior doors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Microswitches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Door indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Visual indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
52-10 Main Doors Emergency exit opening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Escape hatch closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Fwd Passenger door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
52-30 Cargo Doors
The Fwd passenger door (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The door support arm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Cargo Door construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Fwd passenger door operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Cargo door installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The emergency evacuation slide assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Latching and locking mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Opening the door from outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Opening the cargo door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Closing the door from outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Closing the cargo door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Opening the door from inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Baggage Door Skin-Allowable Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Closing the door from inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Opening the door in the emergency mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Emergency Opening System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 52-TOC Page I
190
52-40 Service Doors Cockpit Door Control Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The fwd avionics compartment hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Cockpit Access Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Opening and closing the hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cockpit Door Electromechanical Latch - Manual Operation . . . . . .9
The fuelling compartment access door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
52-60 Air Stair System
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The middle avionics compartment access door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The rat door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Stair Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
52-41 Fwd and Aft Service doors Stair Actuation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The forward Service door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stair Control Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
The support- arm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Main Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
The Service door locking mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Back up subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
The emergency evacuation assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Balancing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Fwd Service door Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Movable Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Opening the door from inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Closing the door from inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Abnormal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Unlocking the Service door in an emergency situation . . . . . . . . . 17 Main Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Service Door Skin-Allowable Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Back up subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Main Landing Gear Door Allowable Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Relay Control Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
52-50 Fixed Doors 52-70 Doors warnings

Reinforced Cockpit Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Reinforced Cockpit Door - Emergency Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 52-TOC Page II
Passenger Doors Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Service Doors Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cargo Doors Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Compartment Doors Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Forward Avionics Compartment Access Hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Fueling Compartment Access Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Rear Fuselage Door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Forward Avionics Compartment Access Hatch Microswitch . . . . . 23
Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door Microswitch . . . . . . . 23
Fueling Compartment Access Door Microswitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Rear Fuselage Door Microswitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
52-MEL (Example)
190
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190
52-00 Doors general

Introduction Passenger doors
The aircraft has two passenger doors, which provide the passengers with
The doors provide easy access for the passengers/crew to go in and leave easy access to the aircraft.
the cabin, as well as galley servicing, cabin cleaning, and cargo compart-
ment loading and unloading in the pressurized compartment.
Emergency exits
Some doors can also be used as emergency exits for the passengers/crew.
There are two identical overwing emergency escape hatches on the aircraft.
There are eight doors in the airplane that give easy access for:
• Passenger and crew entrance/exit in/from the aircraft,

Cargo doors
• Cleaning and servicing of the galley and the aircraft, The aircraft is provided with two cargo doors which give easy access to the
• Loading and unloading of the cargo compartment, cargo compartment.
• Emergency exit.
The passenger and service doors can also be used as emergency exits for
Service doors
evacuation of the aircraft.The pilot and copilot windows are the cockpit The aircraft has seven service doors, which provide access to many different
emergency exits. compartments of the aircraft.
There are other service doors that give access for servicing the various air-
craft systems. Fixed interior doors
The reinforced cockpit door is a physical lockable separation between the
cockpit and the passenger cabin that isolates the two areas and guarantees
the integrity of the flight crew members so that they can have full control over
the aircraft, even in case of an attack.The reinforced cockpit door ensures
that the flight and landing will not be disrupted by intrusion or discharges of
a firearm.The door has an electronic control system that makes it easy to be
locked and unlocked by one of the flight crew members.

Figure 1: Types of doors
FORWARD AVIONICS
FORWARD
COMPARTMENT AFT SERVICE
PASSENGER
ACCESS HATCH DOOR
DOOR
AFT CARGO
DOOR
AFT PASSENGER FORWARD

DOOR CARGO
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR
DOOR
FORWARD
FUELING SERVICE
COMPARTMENT DOOR
ACCESS DOOR
RAT
DOOR
MIDDLE AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT
ACCESS DOOR FOWARD AVIONICS
COMPARTIMENT
ACCESS HATCH

190
Door indications
A door indication and warning system informs the cockpit crew about the
status of the doors on the EICAS and MFD.
The following doors are monitored by Proximity Sensor Switches:
• The two Passenger Doors,

• the two Service Doors and,
• the two Cargo Doors.
The following doors are monitored by Switches: the Forward Avionics Com-
partment Access Hatch, the Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door, the
Rear Fuselage Door and the Fueling Compartment Access Door.

Figure 2: MFD, EICAS page
FORWARD AVIONICS
FORWARD
COMPARTMENT AFT SERVICE
PASSENGER
ACCESS HATCH DOOR
DOOR
AFT CARGO
DOOR
AFT PASSENGER FORWARD

DOOR CARGO
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR
DOOR
FORWARD
FUELING SERVICE
COMPARTMENT DOOR
ACCESS DOOR
RAT
DOOR
MIDDLE AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT
COMPARTIMENT
ACCESS HATCH

190
52-10 Main Doors

General
Two passenger doors installed on the EMB190 provide access for the crew
and passengers. The forward passenger door is installed on the left side of
the aircraft in zone 811. The aft passenger door is also installed on the left
side of the aircraft, in zone 812. Both doors can be used as emergency exits.
As both doors are similar in construction and function, only the forward pas-
senger door will be described here.

Figure 1: Passenger doors
Zone 812
Zone 811

190
Fwd Passenger door
The forward passenger door is a fail-safe plug type, metallic door. Its main
structural components are six horizontal stringers, four vertical frames, skin
and edge members that are riveted together. A deflector is fitted at the top
of the door to give aerodynamic smoothness when the door is closed. The
passenger door has an actuating and locking mechanism that permits lock-
ing and unlocking the door manually using either the internal or the external
handle.
During the unlocking and opening operations, the door moves inward, up-
ward, outward and forward, parallel to the fuselage. The passenger door is
provided with an emergency-evacuation slide mechanism. The emergency-
evacuation slide is stowed in a hard container at the lower part of the door,
and is controlled by a handle on the inner side of the door. When the door is
opened from the outside, the emergency-evacuation slide release mecha-
nism is disabled automatically.
The passenger door has water drain holes in its bottom to prevent water en-
trapment. It is also provided with a non-pressurized rubber seal that is at-
tached to the door contour.
There are twelve stops on the door contour, which rest against twelve stops
on the fuselage door frame. There are sixteen fittings on the forward passen-
ger door periphery. Twelve of these fittings support the door stops and the
other four fittings support four rollers that go into guide ramps on the fuse-
lage door frame. The stops are adjustable. The door stops and their coun-
terparts on the fuselage door frame transfer the cabin pressure loads to the
aircraft structure.
The forward passenger door has a sight window installed above the door
handle assembly. There are two proximity sensors installed in the forward
passenger door. Each sensor sends a signal to the EICAS which provides
indication of door open or closed status. A micro switch installed on the sup-
port arm operates a courtesy light if the door is open.

Figure 2: Fwd passenger door
Skin and edge members

93 8 T/ 0- 1 94 0 DO OR PAX FWD OPEN
OFF OFF
0 0 N1 0 0
Deflector
26°° T
TT 28°°
0 0 N2 0 0
11 12 1
Four vertical frames

0 0 FF PPH 0 0
LAND NG GEAR
LA
FU
UEL QTY
5510
FQ LB
L
5520 DN
11030
DN DN
OI L V P APU
OFF
CAB N
CA
ALT 19000 FT
RATE
RA 0 FPM
1 45° 48° P 0 0 PS
PRE
RESS TEMP
TE L
LP HP L E
LF 2915 FT
SLA
LAT/ FLA
LAP/ SPD
DBRK T MS
TR
SPD
DBRK P TC
TCH
S F ROLL
RO
FU
ULL
0
S/ F
Six horizontal stringers

Water drain holes
Rubber seal
Emergency evacuation slide
Door stops Rollers

190
The Fwd passenger door (continued)

The door seal consists of a rubber extrusion, which is installed on the inner
side of the outer skin, around the periphery of the door. When the door is
closed, the seal is pressed against the fuselage door frame to form a pres-
sure-tight seal.
A vent flap in the forward passenger door balances the pressure differential
between the outside air and the passenger cabin interior. When operated,
the vent flap releases pressure in the passenger compartment.
The door support arm

The forward passenger door support arm holds the weight of the door from
the moment it moves upward, during the operation. The support arm allows
the door to move outwards and forward, parallel to the fuselage.
The door is attached to the support arm by means of the upper and lower
arm fittings. A hook located on the arm structure holds the door in the fully
open position. A handle on the support arm releases the hook.

Figure 3: Fwd passenger door (continued)
Seal striker
Seal
Vent flap
Hook Handle
FWD passenger door support arm

190
Fwd passenger door operation

The forward passenger door internal and external handles operate the door
locking mechanism. The internal handle is connected to the main shaft. The
external handle connects to the main shaft via gear hubs. Thus, when the
door is operated with the internal handle, the external handle moves at the
same time. The external handle also connects to the vent flap shaft though
the connecting rod and bell cranks.
The vent flap shaft has a separate control handle on the internal side of the
door. Both the main shaft and the vent flap shaft are provided with stabiliza-
tion devices to hold them in the open and closed positions.

Figure 4: Fwd passenger door operation
External and internal door handle
Vent flap control handle
Main shaft
Vent flap shaft
Stabilization devices

190
The emergency evacuation slide assembly
The emergency evacuation slide assembly is installed at the bottom of the

door. The slide is attached to a girt bar. This girt bar can be locked, either to
the fuselage in the emergency (armed) mode or to the door in the normal
(disarmed) mode. The emergency-evacuation slide handle is connected to
the girt-bar actuating mechanism by control rods and levers. When the
emergency-evacuation slide handle is operated, the release mechanism of
the emergency-evacuation slide moves to the disarmed position.
A visual indicator, located at one end of the girt bar, shows if the emergency
evacuation slide mechanism is armed or disarmed. If the release mecha-
nism of the emergency-evacuation slide is armed, the slide will be actuated
when the door is opened.

Figure 5: The emergency evacuation slide assembly
ARMED
SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17
DISARMED
SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17
Emergency-evacuation slide handle
Girt bar can be locked either to the fuselage emergency (armed) mode,
or to the door normal (disarmed) mode

190
Opening the door from outside
To open the door from outside, pull up the access panel and pull up the lower
half of the external handle. Continue pulling the external handle upwards,
unlatches the door. Now pull the door out parallel to the fuselage.
Closing the door from outside
To close the door from outside, use the door stabilization handle to disen-
gage the door stabilization hook from the fuselage.When the door reaches
its latching position, pull down the external handle to latch and lock the door.

Figure 6: Opening /Closing the door from outside
OPENING
CLOSING

190
Opening the door from inside
To open the door from inside, pull the vent-flap internal handle and the emer-
gency-evacuation slide handle upward. This disarms the evacuation slides
and opens the vent flap. To unlatch the door pull the internal handle upward.
Visual indicators show that the emergency-evacuation slide is disarmed and
that the door is unlocked. Now push the door outward and forward, parallel
to the fuselage.

Figure 7: Opening the door from inside
Door is unlocked
Emergency evacuation slide handle
DISARMED
Vent flap internal handle

SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17

190
Closing the door from inside
To close the door from inside, pull the door stabilization handle to disengage
the door stabilization hook from the fuselage. When the door reaches its
latching position, push down the internal handle. Visual indicators show
whether or not the door is locked.Visual indicators show if the door is locked
and the emergency-evacuation slide is armed.

Figure 8: Closing the door from inside
Stabilization handle
Indicating that door is latched/ unlatched


190
Opening the door in the emergency mode

To open the door in the emergency mode pull the internal handle upward
which opens the vent flap and unlocks the door. Visual indicators show that
the emergency-evacuation slide is armed and that the door is unlocked. Now
push the door outwards and it will open with pneumatic force. As the door
opens, it actuates the emergency-evacuation slide.
Emergency Opening System
The emergency opening system is installed on the support arm.The operat-

ing mechanism is installed on the door and it is connected to the emergency-
evacuation slide handle.When the emergency-evacuation slide handle is
moved to the safe position, the operating mechanism moves to the disarmed
position.When the evacuation slide handle is in the armed position, the
emergency opening system operates by the time that the main internal han-
dle is moved to the fully up position.The door will open automatically.
The following components complete the emergency opening system:
• Pneumatic assembly with pressure gage and charging valve mounted on

the support arm.
• Actuator mounted inside the support arm.
• Crossbow on the support arm drive chains.
• Control mechanism mounted on the door.

Figure 9: Opening the door in the emergency mode
ARMED
SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17
Indicating door is unlocked
Control
Actuator System
Crossbow Pneumatic
Assembly

190
Main Door Skin-Allowable Damage

This section gives comprehensive detailed information on allowable dam-
age and clearly defines critical areas of skin & structure.
As well as specific guidelines, general notes and warnings are to be found

here concerning main door structural considerations.
Structural integrity of all pressurised doors is of the highest priority to certi-

fying staff. Decisions regarding allowable damage i.e. continued service with
damage remaining can only be taken IAW this chapter.
For damage or concerns outside of the scope of this chapter Embraer must
be contacted.

Figure 10: Passenger Door Skin Thickness

190
Main Door Repair Examples

The examples below are only a small selection of available repairs.
When Assessing damage on main doors SRM chapter 51 must be used in

conjunction with relevant repair.
Applicable repair scheme will depend on many criteria, as you will see on
the diagrams below.
Notes at bottom of diagram and in triangles will guide you to allowance or

non applicabilaty for differing damange areas and depths.

Figure 11: Passenger Door Repair Examples

190
52-20 Emergency Exit

• closing only from inside the aircraft; and
There are two identical overwing emergency escape hatches on the aircraft. • latching.
The overwing emergency escape hatches provide an extra exit for passen-
gers to leave the cabin in an emergency situation. The hatch can be used only in emergency situations.
The overwing emergency escape hatches are of the” plug- in” type. The aircraft pressurization pushes the hatch on its seal (the door is larger
than its opening) and keeps the door latched.
The main components of the overwing emergency escape hatches are:

During the flight. it is not possible to unlatch the escape hatch.
• structure
The microswitches and visual indicators give position information to the
• window frame crew.
• main handle
• external handle
• latch
• lock
• handle lock
• handle seal
• handle spring
• support handle
• icebreaker
• bellcrank
• rod
• X stop
• Z stop
• door seal
• floor fitting
• microswitch
• visual indicators
• air tightness
• opening from inside or from outside the aircraft;

Figure 1: Emergency Exit
ZONE
825
A ZONE
813
LATCH
A Z STOP
EXTERNAL
DOOR
LATCH HANDLE
LOCK
WINDOW
FRAME DOOR
STRUCTURE
MAIN
HANDLE HANDLE DOOR
SPRING SEAL
WINDOW
FRAME
DOOR
STRUCTURE
X STOP X STOP
HANDLE FLOOR
FLOOR
SUPPORT FITTING
FITTING
A
A

190
Emergency exit components
Structure Visual indicators

The escape hatch structure is composed of the skin, frames and beams, The crew makes sure that the overwing emergency escape hatch is latched
window frame, inner skins and hatch seal around the skin. and locked through two visual indicators.They are painted in red on the
latches.
The seal, engaged all around the escape hatch, gives the tightness of the
hatch.This seal is pushed against the aircraft fuselage. The visual indicators are examined to ensure that the hatch is in the correct
ON and OFF positions.
Main handle
The main handle has two stable positions:
• overwing emergency escape hatch open: the main handle is held in fully
open position by the handle spring effect and by the handle lock;
• door closed: the main handle spring keeps the main handle in closed po-
sition.
External handle
The external handle when locked is held flush with the fuselage by the hatch
actuating mechanism.
Escape hatch actuating mechanism

The main handle is attached to the external handle.They move the two latch-
es through the rods.The main handle is locked in open position.The handle
spring and lock keep the handle in latched position.The handle spring and
handle lock keep the main handle open when the hatch is open.
The latch axis moves the bellcrank and the icebreaker in order to disconnect
the hatch from the fuselage skin even if there is ice on the door seal.
Microswitches
The microswitches show the position of the overwing emergency escape
hatch to the crew for them to check the correct latched and locked position.

Figure 2: Emergency exit components
ZONE
825 LATCH
A ZONE
813
A
ICEBREAKER
EXTERNAL
HANDLE
DOOR LOCK
BELLCRANK
MICROSWITCH
ROD
MAIN HANDLE
HANDLE LOCK HANDLE SEAL
HANDLE SPRING
VISUAL
INDICATOR

190
Emergency exit opening Escape hatch closing

The hatch can be opened from inside or from outside the aircraft, from the It is only possible to close the overwing emergency escape hatch from inside
latched or locked positions. the aircraft.
The handle must be actuated on its full course:
• when the handle is at 0 degree (fully closed), in flight position, the latch is To close the hatch, it must be placed on its lower fittings on the floor and then
installed, the lock is installed and the microswitch is ON; closed until the seal touches the aircraft frame.After that, the handle lock
• when the handle is at 16.3 degrees, the lock is installed; must be pulled to unlock the main handle.When the main handle is moved
from the bottom to the top on its complete course, several actions happen,
• when the handle is at 28.1 degrees, the latch axis is in contact with the depending on the handle degree:
icebreaker;
• when the handle is at 53 degrees, the hatch opens;
• when the handle is at 37 degrees, the rod axis moves down;
• when the handle is at 47.1 degrees, the rod axis moves up;
• when the handle is at 40.7 degrees, the icebreaker is in contact with the
• when the handle is at 33 degrees, the latch moves;
fuselage;
• when the handle is at 28.1 degrees, the icebreaker locks;
• when the handle is ta 53 degrees (open), the mechanism is opened and
the hatch moves 3 millimeters. • when the handle is at 16.3 degrees, the latch is installed;
• when the handle is at 0 degree (fully closed), in flight position, the
latch is installed, the lock is installed and the microswitch is ON.
When the handle is at 53 degrees, the hatch must be removed from its lower
fittings.To do that the hatch must be turned 24.5 degrees.
After the hatch is locked, the flight attendants use visual indicators to check
the correct position of the hatch.
To open the hatch from outside the aircraft, the external handle must be ac-
tuated on its full course.This makes the mechanism move and opens the
hatch.

Figure 3: Opening/Closing
ZONE
825
A ZONE ROD AXIS

813
HANDLE POSITION 53° (OPENED) HANDLE POSITION 47.1°
CONTACT
CONTACT
LATCH
MOVEMENT
HANDLE POSITION 33° HANDLE POSITION 16.3° HANDLE POSITION 0° (CLOSED)

HANDLE POSITION 28.1°
(FLIGTH POSITION)

190
52-30 Cargo Doors

General
Two baggage bay doors are installed on the fuselage lower right side to per-
mit access to a baggage bay for baggage loading and unloading. The for-
ward and aft baggage doors are opened and closed manually from the
outside of the aircraft, and are mechanically held in the open position.
The opening and closing movements are facilitated by compensation devic-

es. The two doors have differing geometry but perform the same functions;
therefore, only one door is described in detail.

Figure 1: Cargo Doors
2 baggage bay doors

190
The Cargo Door construction

The cargo door is a metallic construction, fail-safe plug type door. Its main
structural components are:
• six horizontal machined beams and

• eleven formed beams,
• seven vertical frames,
• the skin and edge members which are riveted together.
• A piano hinge is installed at the top of the door.
The cargo door has an actuating and locking mechanism that permits lock-
ing and unlocking the door manually through the external handle. During the
unlocking and opening operations, the door moves outward and upward.
The cargo door has a stabilization mechanism to hold the door in the fully
open position, and has water drain holes in its bottom to prevent water en-
trapment. A non-pressurized rubber seal is attached to the door contour.
Four sensors send signals to the EICAS to inform the crew when the door is
open or closed.

Figure 2: Cargo Door construction
Stabilization mechanism
Piano hinge
Main structural components:

Skin and edge members
11 formed beams
7 vertical frames
6 horizontal machined beams
Locking mechanism
4 sensors
Non-pressurized rubber seal

190
The Cargo door installation
The cargo door is attached to the aircraft fuselage by a 5-piece hinge as-
sembly. The hinge assembly transmits the load to the fuselage when pres-
surized. A maintenance panel on the door gives access to the latching and
locking mechanism and sensors. Four inspection windows are installed at
the bottom of the door to allow the so called "C" latches to be checked.
The Vent Flap has to be opened and closed through door operation, to as-
sure cargo compartment pressure equalization and to lock or unlock the
door locking mechanism. When it is closed, the main handle is flush with the
skin. It is used to latch or unlatch the door locking mechanism.
Note: Vent Flap closing is impossible if the door is not latched. The A/C can`t
be pressurized with an incorrectly latched and locked door.
Four proximity sensors are installed in the cargo door, including a CLOSED
sensor, a LOCKED sensor and two LATCH sensors. Each sensor sends a
signal to the EICAS for indication of door open/closed or latched/locked sta-
tus.
The inner side of the cargo door is covered by the upper, lower and bottom
lining covers. The Internal manoeuvring handle is located in the door lining.
As the cargo doors recess into the pressurized zone, a seal engages. The
seal is installed around the door and is crushed by a seal striker on the air-
craft frame.
The cargo door has two support arm assemblies that connect the cargo door
to the door frame. Each support arm assembly has a drive rod and gas-
spring actuator. The forward support arm also has a stabilization device that
holds the door in the fully open position.

Figure 3: Cargo door installation
5-piece hinge assembly
Note:
Vent Flap closing is impossible
Vent Flap if the door is not latched.

The A/C can't be pressurized
with an incorrectly
latched and locked door.
Maintenance panel
4 inspection windows
2 support arm assemblies

Gas-spring actuator
Internal maneuvering handle
Seal striker Seal
1 closed sensor
Drive rod
1 locked sensor
Stabilization device
2 latch sensors

190
Latching and locking mechanism

After the three lining covers are removed, there is free access to the latching
and locking mechanism.
This mechanism has the following main components:
• Main handle and support shaft;

• Lock shafts; Latch drive rod;
• Latch pinions (1 and 2, 3 and 4);
• Latches 1 and 2, 3 and 4;
• Latch connecting shaft;
• Lock connecting shaft;
• Lock drive rod; lock spring rods;
• Ditching stop assembly;
• Vent Flap assembly and Flexball.
The latch function has a fail safe design. In normal condition, only two latch-
es are loaded and two latches are in fail safe condition. The door structure
has 2 terminal shafts, supported by 2 terminal fittings (forward and aft) at the
bottom of the door. Each terminal shaft has an operational “C” latch and a
fail safe “C” latch. By moving the main handle, it rotates, through its associ-
ated mechanism, the “C” latches around the fuselage latch axis, to latch the
door.

Figure 4: Latching and locking mechanism
Flexball
Lock shafts
Main handle and support shaft
Vent flap assembly
Ditching stop assembly
Latch drive rod
Lock drive rod
Latch pinions (1 and 2, 3 and 4)
Lockspring rods
Latches 1 and 2, 3 and 4
Lock connecting shaft
Latch connecting shaft
Normal condition
2 latches are loaded
2 latches are in fail safe condition

190
Opening the cargo door

To open the cargo door, push in the ditching push button and open the Vent
Flap. Now push in the main handle access flap and pull the main handle up
to turn the main handle shaft. Then lift the cargo door with the main handle:
The cargo door is assisted by the two gas spring actuators that push on the
cargo-door support arms. When the door reaches the fully open position,
two stabilization cams engage with full open stops on the fuselage to hold
the door open.

Figure 5: Opening the cargo door
Ditching pushbutton
Main handle access flap Vent Flap 1 2
Gas spring actuators
3 4

190
Closing the cargo door

To close the cargo door push the stabilization handle. Assisted by the gas
spring actuators, the cargo door moves down. When the door reaches its
closed position, it is necessary to push down the main handle until the cargo
door touches the door frame. Push down the main handle which engages
the latches, and pull out the vent flap to lock the door.

Figure 6: Closing the cargo door
1 2
3 4

190
Baggage Door Skin-Allowable Damage


here concerning baggage door structural considerations.

be contacted.

Figure 7: Forward Cargo Door Skin Thickness & Dent Allowance

190

Figure 8: Cargo Door Dent Allowance

190
52-40 Service Doors

The following components form the hatch actuating and locking mechanism:
The fwd avionics compartment hatch • The handle,

The forward avionics compartment access hatch is on the bottom of the for- • the vent flap,
ward fuselage at its centerline, in zones 123 and 124. The access hatch pro- • the vent flap shaft,
vides access to the forward avionics compartment. • the vent flap shaft cam,
• the two vent flap shaft bell cranks,
• The plug-in type hatch has the following main structural compo- • and the two lock pins and six stops.
nents:
• the skin,
One micro switch installed in the fuselage is in contact with the hatch by the
• the surround frame, hatch lock pin. The micro switch sends signals to the EICAS to provide indi-
• one lateral beam cation of hatch locked or unlocked status.
• and two longitudinal beams which are riveted together.
The forward avionics compartment access hatch has a locking mechanism

that permits locking and unlocking the hatch manually through its handle.
The hatch is driven during opening and closing by combined movements on
its handle and vent flap. To lock the hatch in the closed position when the
aircraft is not pressurized, there is a mechanism with a shaft and two lock
pins that lean against the fuselage.
When the aircraft is pressurized, there are also six stops which rest against
the fuselage to help to lock the hatch. The forward avionics compartment ac-
cess hatch has a rubber seal that is attached to the hatch contour. One mi-
cro switch provides indication.
The forward avionics compartment access hatch seal is a rubber extrusion.

It is installed on the inner side of the hatch contour. When the hatch is
closed, the seal is pressed against the fuselage hatch frame, forming a pres-
sure tight seal.
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 52-40 Page 1
Figure 1: The fwd avionics compartment hatch
Zone 123
Vent flap cam
Forward avionics compartment
Zone 124 Vent flap shaft bellcranks
access hatch
Lock pins
Handle Vent flap
Vent flap shaft

Plug-in type hatch
The skin
Locking mechanism
The surround frame
Two lock pins
Microswitch
Two longitudinal beams
One lateral beam
Six stops
Shaft
Rubber seal
190
Opening and closing the hatch
The forward avionics compartment access hatch is opened by pulling the
hatch handle. The motion of the handle releases the vent flap shaft cam. To
continue the hatch opening operation, it is necessary to push the vent flap:
The vent flap causes a rotation of the shaft which rotates the bell cranks at-
tached to it. As the bell crank rotates, it actuates the lock pins that move out
of the fuselage. Pulling the hatch inward and back causes the hatch to move
back following the fuselage tracks.
To close the forward avionics compartment access hatch, you have to pull
the hatch forward to the fuselage cutout on its position. After the door gets
to its position, it is necessary to pull the vent flap: The motion of the vent flap
rotates the vent flap shaft and its bell cranks. As the bell crank rotates, it ac-
tuates the lock pins that move in the fuselage to lock the hatch. Then the
handle and the vent flap must be pulled simultaneously to completely close
the hatch. The motion of the handle will release the vent flap shaft cam so
that the vent flap can be closed.
Figure 2: Opening and closing the hatch
1
2
190
The fuelling compartment access door
The fuelling compartment access door is installed on the right wing in zone
616, and provides access to the fuelling compartment.
The main components of the door are:

the skin,
which is made of composite material,
the two bell cranks, which are metallic,
the rod
and four locks.
The fuelling compartment access door is actuated manually. To open the
fuelling compartment access door, press the four latches to release the
door, and pull it down until the end of the rod's course.
NOTE: The rod has a lock that keeps the door open. To close the fuelling
compartment access door, release the rod lock, close the door and latch the
four latches.
Figure 3: The fuelling compartment access door
REFUEL SELECTION POWER SELECTION

MANUAL AUTO NORMAL BATTERY
DO NOT INITIATE THE
REFUELING BEFORE
CONFIRMING THAT THE
REFUELING VALVE LIGHTS
ARE INITIALLY ON
CLOSED CLOSED FUEL QTY REMAINING

OPEN
Fueling compartment access door LH TANK RH TANK
Zone 616
OPEN OPEN
SELECTED
INCR TKSEL
CLOSED CLOSED
DECRT TEST
REFUELING DEFUELING
2 Bellcranks
4 Locks
REFUEL SELECTION POWER SELECTION
MANUAL AUTO NORMAL BATTERY
DO NOT INITIATE THE
REFUELING BEFORE
CONFIRMING THAT THE
REFUELING VALVE LIGHTS
ARE INITIALLY ON
CLOSED CLOSED FUEL QTY REMAINING

OPEN
LH TANK RH TANK
OPEN OPEN
SELECTED
INCR TKSEL
CLOSED CLOSED
DECRT TEST
REFUELING DEFUELING
Skin
Rod
190
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR NOTE:
Introduction • Before closing the rear fuselage door, make sure, that the adjusta-
The rear fuselage door provides access to the non-pressurized area of the ble rod is attached to the clamp on the door.
rear fuselage. It gives access to the horizontal stabilizer actuator, electrical
harnesses, hydraulic lines, fire-extinguisher tubing, bleed valve, and service • Make sure that all the latches are engaged properly.
light. It is located on the right side of the rear fuselage, in zones 314 and • When the door is closed, make sure that it is flush with the rear fu-
316. selage skin.
General Description
The rear fuselage door skin is made of composite material, whereas its other
components are metallic in construction. It has a center louver that allows
airflow into the non-pressurized area of the rear fuselage. Airflow enters to
the non-pressurized area of the rear fuselage through a NACA (National Ad-
visory Committee for Aeronautics) air intake installed in the vertical stabilizer
leading edge and exits through the door louver.
It hinges on its upper side on a piano hinge that is divided into two sections.
The section in contact with the rear fuselage door is riveted to it, whereas
the other section is installed in the rear fuselage by means of screws.
To guarantee electrical conductivity, the door has a copper mesh ply in the
composite structure and two bonding jumpers that connect the door to the
metallic structure of the rear fuselage. There is a microswitch to provide an
electrical signal in the cockpit to confirm that the door is closed.
The rear fuselage door has six latches of the pressure-relief type. These
latches allow the rear fuselage door to open if a depressurization occurs.
The door has an adjustable rod that holds it in the open position.
Components
The main components of the door are the composite material skin, the latch-
es, the adjustable rod, and the hinge. These items are made of metal.
Operation
To open the rear fuselage door, it is necessary to release the six latches. Pull
the door up and attach the adjustable rod on the terminal pin installed on the
fuselage. To close the door, release the adjustable rod from the fuselage
and attach it to door clamp. Position the door on its rear fuselage frameand
latch it.
Figure 4: Rear fuselage door - Location
ADJ US TABLE R OD B
DOOR HINGE
DOOR
A
ZONES
314 LAT CH
316 (6 P OS IT IONS )
B ONDING J UMPE R
T ER MINAL P IN
F WD
A
F WD
190
The middle avionics compartment access door
NOTE: The door will be attached to the fuselage by the fuselage lock pin.
The middle avionics compartment access door provides access to the mid-
dle avionics compartment. It is installed on the left side of Centre Fuselage
II in zone 147. The middle avionics compartment access door is a plug-in
type, constructed of metal.
Its' main structural components are:
• the skin,
• the surround frame,
• and the ribs, which are riveted together.
The middle avionics compartment access door has a locking mechanism

that permits the door to be locked and unlocked manually using the mecha-
nism handle. The door is driven during opening and closing by two combined
movements on its mechanism handle. The hatch is locked closed by a
mechanism with a lever and four stop pins that lean against the fuselage.
The middle avionics compartment access door has a rubber seal. The seal
is installed on the inner side of the door contour. When the door is closed,
the seal is pressed against the fuselage doorframe to form a pressure tight
seal. One micro switch, attached to the fuselage frame, sends signals to the
crew when the door is unlocked.
The following components make up the door actuating and locking mecha-
nism: Mechanism handle; Mechanism handle shaft; Four lock rods; Four
lock pins; the Bell crank and the vent-flap shaft, which has a separate control
handle on the internal side of the door.
To open the middle avionics compartment access door, press the mecha-
nism handle latch and pull the mechanism handle. Then rotate the mecha-
nism handle: The motion of the mechanism handle causes the rotation of the
handle shaft which rotates the bell crank attached to it. As the bell crank ro-
tates, it actuates the lock rods and the lock pins that move out of the fuse-
lage; the handle can now be grasped and the door pushed inward.
Figure 5: The middle avionics compartment access door
Main structural components are:

the skin,
Zone 147 the surround frame,
and the ribs, which are riveted together.
Locking mechanism:
Mechanism handle
Lever and 4 stop pins
Rubber seal
Middle avionics compartment access door
Press the mechanism handle latch Pull the mechanism handle Rotate the mechanism handle
190
The rat door
The rat door is installed on the right side of the forward fuselage in zone 124.
The main components of the door are its skin, which is made of composite
material, and the forward and aft bell cranks, which are metallic. The rat door
is actuated by a rod that permits the door to open and close when stowed..
The rat door operation is described in chapter 24.
Figure 6: The rat door
Rat door
Zone 124
Skin
Fwd and aft bellcranks

Rod
190
52-41 Fwd and Aft Service doors

General
The forward and aft service doors are installed on the right side of the fuse-
lage in zone 821 and 824. In an emergency, they can be used as emergency
exits. As both doors are similar and have the same functions, only the for-
ward door will be shown in detail.
Issue: june06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

Figure 1: Service doors
Zone 824 Zone 821

190
The forward Service door
The forward service door is of the fail-safe plug type, of metallic construction.
Its main structural components are six horizontal stringers, four vertical
frames, skin and edge members which are riveted together. A deflector is
fitted at the top of the door to give aerodynamic smoothness when the door
is closed. The forward service door has an actuating and locking mechanism
that permits locking and unlocking the door manually by using either the in-
ternal or the external handle.
The forward service door has an emergency-evacuation slide mechanism.

The emergency-evacuation slide is stowed in a hard container at the lower
part of the door. The emergency evacuation slide is controlled by a handle
on the inner side of the door. When the door is opened from the outside, the
emergency evacuation slide release mechanism is disabled automatically.
The forward service door has water drain holes in its structure to prevent wa-
ter entrapment. It is also provided with a non-pressurized rubber seal that is
attached to the door contour. There are stops on the door contour and the
fuselage door frame to carry the pressure load when the door is closed.
Two sensors send signals to the EICAS to indicate to the crew when the
door is open.
There are twelve fittings on the forward service door periphery. Eight of
these fittings support the door stops, and the other four fittings support four
rollers that go into guide ramps on the fuselage door frame. The stops are
adjustable. The door stops and their counterparts on the fuselage door
frame transfer the cabin pressure loads to the aircraft structure. The forward
service door has a sight window above the door vent flap assembly.
The forward service door seal consists of a rubber extrusion. It is installed

on the inner side of the outer skin, around the periphery of the door. A vent
flap in the forward service door balances the pressure differential between
the outside air and the cabin interior. When operated, the vent flap releases
any pressure in the passenger compartment.

Figure 2: The forward Service door
Deflector 4 vertical frames
Actuating and locking mechanism
Skin and edge members 6 horizontal stringers
Side window
Vent flap Non pressurized rubber seal
FWD service door

Stops on the door contour
and the fuselage door frame
Water drain holes
Seal
Stops Rollers

190
The support- arm

The forward service door support-arm holds the weight of the door from the
moment it moves upward during the opening operation. The support arm al-
lows the door to move outward and forward, parallel to the fuselage. The
door is attached to the support arm by means of the upper and lower arm
fittings.
A hook located on the arm structure holds the door in the fully open position.
A handle on the support arm releases the hook.
The Service door locking mechanism

The forward service door internal and external handles operate the door
locking mechanism. The internal handle is connected to the main shaft. The
external handle connects to the main shaft via gear hubs. Thus, when the
door is operated with the internal handle, the external handle moves at the
same time. The external handle also connects to the vent flap shaft through
the connecting rod and bell cranks.
The vent flap shaft has a separate control handle on the internal side of the
door. Both the main shaft and the vent flap shaft are provided with stabiliza-
tion devices to hold them in the open and closed positions.

Figure 3: The support- arm and the locking mechanism
FWD service door support arm
Handle
Hook
The upper and lower arm fittings.

Vent flap control handle
Handles
Main shaft
Connecting rod
Bellcranks
Vent flap
Stabilization device

190
The emergency evacuation assembly
The emergency evacuation slide assembly is installed at the bottom of the

door. The slide is attached to a girt bar. This girt bar can be locked, by means
of levers and fittings, either to the fuselage in the emergency (armed) mode
or to the door in the normal (disarmed) mode.
A visual indicator, located at one end of the girt bar, shows if the emergency-
evacuation slide mechanism is armed or disarmed. The emergency-evacu-
ation slide handle is connected to the girt-bar actuating mechanism by
means of control rods and levers. When the emergency-evacuation slide
handle is operated, the release mechanism of the emergency-evacuation
slide moves to the disarmed position.

Figure 4: The emergency evacuation assembly
Girt bar:
can be locked to the fuselage in the emergency (armed mode) Disarmed
or to the door (disarmed mode)
Visual indicator

190
Fwd Service door Operation

To open the door from outside, push in the access panel and pull up the low-
er half of the external handle. This movement actuates the vent-flap internal
handle and the emergency-evacuation slide handle. The emergency-evac-
uation slide handle rotates the girt bar, which disengages from the emergen-
cy-evacuation slide fittings on the cabin floor.
A visual indicator, located on the bottom of the door inside the cabin, shows
if the emergency-evacuation slide is disarmed or armed. The vent-flap inter-
nal handle actuates and unlocks the two locks. Two visual indicators, locat-
ed on each side of the internal handle base, indicate if the door is unlocked.
To continue unlocking, pull the external handle upwards. The external han-
dle rotates the two latches and unlatches the door.
Two visual indicators located on either side of the door inside the cabin, in-
dicate whether or not the door is unlatched. The rollers slide inside the relat-
ed control ramps, located on the fuselage door frame. The door moves
inward and upward, following the rollers' movement in the guide ramps. To
continue door opening, pull the door outward and then move it forward, par-
allel to the fuselage: The support arm allows movement of the door forward.
This forward movement of the door is stopped by a damper to prevent con-
tact between the arm structure and the fuselage. The door stabilization hook
engages in the door stabilization pin.

Figure 5: Fwd Service door Operation
1 2 3
LIFT LOWER HALF OF EXTERNAL LIFT EXTERNAL HANDLE AND PULL PULL THE DOOR FORWARD AND
HANDLE TO UNLOCK THE DOOR THE DOOR OUTWARD LOCK IT OPEN
1 2 3
PULL STABILIZATION HANDLE PUSH THE DOOR TO CLOSURE LOWER THE EXTERNAL HANDLE
AND BRING THE DOOR TO POSITION TO LOCK THE DOOR AND CLOSE
CLOSURE POSITION THE VENT FLAP
FORWARD SERVICE DOOR - EXTERNAL OPENING AND CLOSING

190
To close the door from outside, pull the door stabilization handle and then
the door aft and inward. The door stabilization handle disengages the door
stabilization hook. The door moves over the support arm and at the same
time as the door moves inward, the rollers go into their related guide ramps.
When the door reaches its latching position, pull down the external handle
to lock the door. The door starts moving downward and then outward, follow-
ing the rollers' movement inside the guide ramps. The external handle ro-
tates the two latches and latches the door. Two visual indicators, located on
the sides of the door inside the cabin, show whether or not the door is
latched. To complete the door locking, move the external handle down. As
the external handle moves down, it moves the vent-flap internal handle and
the emergency-evacuation slide handle in the same direction. The vent-flap
internal handle locks the door and closes the vent flap. Two visual indicators,
located on each side of the internal handle base, show whether or not the
door is locked.

Figure 6: Closing the door from outside
1 2 3
LIFT LOWER HALF OF EXTERNAL LIFT EXTERNAL HANDLE AND PULL PULL THE DOOR FORWARD AND
HANDLE TO UNLOCK THE DOOR THE DOOR OUTWARD LOCK IT OPEN
1 2 3
PULL STABILIZATION HANDLE PUSH THE DOOR TO CLOSURE LOWER THE EXTERNAL HANDLE
AND BRING THE DOOR TO POSITION TO LOCK THE DOOR AND CLOSE
CLOSURE POSITION THE VENT FLAP
FORWARD SERVICE DOOR - EXTERNAL OPENING AND CLOSING

190
Opening the door from inside
To open the door from inside, open the handle cover. Then push the vent-
flap internal handle and the emergency evacuation slide handle upward.
The vent-flap internal handle opens the vent flap. The emergency-evacua-
tion slide handle rotates the girt bar which disengages it from the emergen-
cy-evacuation slide fittings on the cabin floor.
The visual indicator shows whether or not the emergency-evacuation slide

is disarmed. The vent-flap internal handle actuates and unlocks the two
locks. Two visual indicators, located on each side of the internal handle
base, show if the door is unlocked. To unlatch the door, it is necessary to pull
the internal handle upward. The internal handle rotates the two latches and
unlatches the door.
Two visual indicators, located on the sides of the door, show if the door is
unlatched. The rollers slide inside the related control ramps, located on the
fuselage door frame. The door moves inward and upward following the roll-
ers movement inside the guide ramps. To start opening the door, push the
door outward and then move it forward, parallel to the fuselage, until the
movement is stopped by the damper and the door stabilization hook engag-
es.

Figure 7: Opening the door from inside
Indication of Door locked/unlocked
DISARMED
SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17

190
Closing the door from inside

To close the door from inside, pull the door stabilization handle to disengage
the stabilization hook, and the door aft and then inward. At the same time as
the door starts moving inward, the rollers go into their related guide ramps.
When the door reaches its latching position, push down the internal handle.
The door starts moving downward and outward, following the rollers move-
ment inside the guide ramps. The internal handle rotates the two latches and
latches the door.
The two visual indicators show if the door is latched or not. Next, the vent-
flap internal handle and the emergency-evacuation slide handle must be
pulled down. The vent-flap internal handle locks the door and closes the vent
flap. The two visual indicators on the side of the internal handle base show
whether or not the door is locked.
The emergency-evacuation slide handle rotates the girt bar which engages
on the emergency-evacuation slide fittings on the cabin floor. The visual in-
dicator shows if the emergency-evacuation slide is armed. The handle cover
must be closed after the vent-flap internal handle and the emergency-evac-
uation slide handle reach the end of their movement.

Figure 8: Closing the door from inside
Indication of Door locked/unlocked
Indication of door latched/ unlatched
ARMED
SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17
Stabilization hook

190
Unlocking the Service door in an emergency situation

To unlock the forward service door in an emergency situation, it is necessary
to pull the internal handle up. The internal handle rotates the two emergency
unlock bell cranks which rotate the two locks around the lock shaft. The
locks pull the two link rods in order to rotate the vent flap shaft and open the
vent flap. As the internal handle rotates, it comes into contact with the two
gear hubs. The internal handle and the two gear hubs rotate the main shaft,
which rotates the two latches in order to unlatch the door. The rollers slide
inside the related control ramps located on the fuselage door frame. The
door starts moving inward and upward, following the rollers movement in-
side the guide ramps. To continue opening the door, it is necessary to push
the door outward and it will open by pneumatic force, until the stabilization
hook engages in the door stabilization pin. As the forward service door
opens, it actuates the emergency evacuation slide.

Figure 9: Unlocking the door in an emergency situation
ARMED
Indication of door locked/ unlocked

SLIDE
INDICATION
CDPL56-17

190
Service Door Skin-Allowable Damage

This Section gives comprehensive detailed information on allowable dam-

here concerning service door structural considerations.

be contacted.

Figure 10: Service Door Skin Thickness and Repair Example

190

Figure 11: Service Door Skin Thickness and Repair Example

190
Main Landing Gear Door Allowable Damage


here concerning structural considerations.
Structural integrity of all doors is of the highest priority to certifying staff. De-
cisions regarding allowable damage i.e. continued service with damage re-
maining can onlybe taken IAW this chapter.
be contacted.

Figure 12: Main Landing Gear Door Allowable Damage
EICAS DISPLAY MFD'S
AP B VAPP FLARE
236 247 OO 8O.O MTO 8O.O CABIN DOOR OPEN
AT B VOR ASEL 4OOO
ATTCS Map Plan Systems Fuel
26O 1 255OO
4 FMS1 OOO Ê
15 SAT C
R 7 25 TATÊ C
1O 1O 2 3OO TAS KTS
24O 2 O.O NM
1 O MIN N DME1
5.O OM 2O.7 N1 2O.7 3 65.3 NM
33
LAX
22 O E 25O OO 1OOO REV
RF
3O
6
1
2OO AP
CAUTION
1O 1O 2
IGN Ê Ê IGN
19O 463 ITT 463
4 A A
18O 9O.O N2 9O.O
MESSAGE
E
555 M 29.92 IN [ 1OO ] [ 1OO ]
1OOO FF PPH 1OOO WEATHER
LANDING GEAR
[ -9.9 ] A O.O5 L
PROGRESS TCAS
CHR HDG GSPO FUEL QTY
UP
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO WX/R/T S WPT DIST ETE FUEL TA ONLY
O7:12 33O O79
3OO KT STAB/TGT NEXT ZUN 55.6 O1+32 11.4 FLT LVL
1O DTK 1 LX/OFF DEST GUP 95 O2+52 1O.4 EXPANDED
FMS1
E OO5
6 12
VIB APU
1OO % Ê
1O2O C
5O 1OO
PUM
CABIN
3
ZUN
ALT -5 FT GUP
15
KPHX FL13O
RATE -5 FPM
N
H 5OO NM FL118
23 MIN
12 81 11
Ê Ê
1O6 P -64.6 PSI FL11O GUP44
S
VOR1 PRESS TEMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT

33
VOR2 FLO9O
21
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
3O 24 S F
VHF1 W APP WPT NAV1 UP
118 O25 VPTH MSG 118 O3
119 O25 HDGINT 119 O3
22
2 YAW
TCAS Weather Checklist
S/F
5J0862
P0862
S0132
FORWARD AVIONICS
ACCESS HATCH SWITCH
B GS0371 SN
2 C
1
3 F TP2-12
FORWARD
5 G AVIONICS
4 COMPARTMENT
6 J 33-32 ACCESS HATCH
(31-41) - 124 MAU 2

L
MASTER
CAUTION
PUSHBUTTONS

190
52-50 Fixed Doors

Reinforced Cockpit Door
Components
The reinforced cockpit door is located between the passenger cabin and the
cockpit. It is ballistic- and intrusion-resistant, and is equipped with an elec-
tronic control system, that makes the door easy to be locked or unlocked by
either of the flight crew members.
The reinforced cockpit door has an electromechanical door latch controlled
through a control panel located on the cockpit control pedestal or through a
cabin crew emergency access request panel positioned on the right side of
the aisle that gives access to the cockpit. It also has a handle for manual op-
eration.
For manual operation, there is a manual override button, that can be actuat-
ed only downwards. The manual override button also allows a visual indica-
tion of the door status: a red bar indicates that the electrical cockpit door
latch is unlocked and a green bar indicates that the electrical cockpit door
latch is locked. The lock button is under the manual override button. The lock
button prevents the flight crew from manually opening the door if an emer-
gency entry cycle is started by the flight attendant when the inhibit button,
located on the cockpit control panel, is not working properly.
The reinforced cockpit door is equipped with ballistic-resistant peephole,
passive lock, doorknobs, strap handles, and maintenance lock.The passive
lock, located on the cockpit side, provides positive locking of the door when
in the closed position. There are two strap handles installed on the cockpit
side of the ballistic panel, to help remove the door if the flight crewmembers
need to evacuate the cockpit in an emergency situation.
For pressure equalization in the event of a sudden decompression, the rein-
forced cockpit door is provided with two fully flexible, foldable blowout devic-
es, known as blowout bags. One is located in the upper portion of the door
and the other in the lower portion of the door. Upon sudden decompression,
the blowout panel bags automatically unfold and deploy forward (towards
the cockpit).
Figure 1: Reinforced Cockpit Door /Components
MONUMENT
(RE F.)
A
ZONES
123/124
221/222
223/224
226
G RE E NLED R EINF OR CE D
C OC KP IT DOOR
(RE F.)
R ED LED
W HITE LED
C
C OC KP IT AC C ES S P ANEL
D B
C OC KP IT DOOR C ONTR OL
LOC K INHIB UNLOCK ED A

T ES T
ON
C OC KP IT DOOR C ONTR OL P ANEL C OC KP IT DOOR E LE CT ROME CHANIC AL LAT CH
C B
F IXED INTE RIOR DOORS - C OMPONE NT S
190
Reinforced Cockpit Door - Emergency Operation
To exit the cockpit in an emergency, do the procedures below:
• Rotate the door lock handle downwards to unlock the cockpit door;
• Remove the quick-release pin from the housing;
• Push the cockpit door outward.
To open the door when the door is locked by the cabin passenger side, do
the procedures below:
• Keep the pushbutton of the cockpit access panel on the FWD (Forward)
RH (Right-Hand) G1 Galley pressed for 3 seconds to start the
emergency access request;
• After 3 seconds the white LED is activated;
• If pilot or co-pilot does not inhibit the emergency access, after 30 seconds
the door opens and the green LED is activated
• If pilot or co-pilot inhibits the emergency access, the red LED remains ac-
tivated for 500 seconds and after this time a new emergency ac-
cess can be performed.
Figure 2: Reinforced Cockpit Door - Emergency Operation
1 2 3 4
A
R OT AT E T HE DOOR B
LOC K HANDLE
DOW NW AR DS P US H DOOR OUT WARDS
(THE B OLT R ET RACT S). R EMOV E QUICK R ELEASE P IN. W HILE HOLDING HANDLE. R EMOV E DOOR A S IDE.
190
Cockpit Door Control Panel
Fixed interior doors - Cockpit door control panel features
The cockpit door control panel has the function of controlling the door latch
and is installed on the control pedestal so that both flight crew members can PUSHBUTTONS INDICATION FUNCTION
have comfortable and easy access to it.This panel has three pushbuttons LIGHTS
and an indicator light.
Stops the function of
When actuated, its the emergency entry
Table 1: Fixed interior doors - Cockpit door control panel features amber hatched rec- time and aural warn-
INHIB tangle and the red ing activated through
PUSHBUTTONS INDICATION FUNCTION LED on the cockpit the cockpit access
LIGHTS access panel come panel and denies the
A white illuminated on. emergency cockpit
striped bar indicates access request for
the position of the 500 seconds or 8
button (locked or minutes and 20 sec-
unlocked).When onds.
deactivated, the ON Tests the aural warn-
indication of the ing generator.When
UNLOCKED annun- - actuated, feeds a
ciator comes on as a buzzing sound to the
LOCK function of the latch Locks and unlocks TEST cockpit loudspeak-
microswitch posi- the door. ers and flight crew
tion.The LOCK push- member’s phones,
button acts as a regardless of audio
master switch for the selection.
control sys-
tem.When activated,
its white hatched rec-
tangle and the ON
indication of the
UNLOCKED annun-
ciator go off.
Figure 3: Cockpit Door Control Panel
COCKPIT DOOR CONTROL
LOCK INHIB UNLOCKED

TEST TEST
PUSHBUTTON
ON
LOCK INHIB UNLOCKED

PUSHBUTTON PUSHBUTTON INDICATOR LIGHT
COCKPIT DOOR CONTROL PANEL
190
Cockpit Access Panel
The cockpit access panel is installed on the passenger cabin side on the
FWD (Forward) RH (Right-Hand) G1 galley facing the aisle that gives ac-
cess to the cockpit.It has the following features:
Table 2: Fixed interior doors - Cockpit access panel function
PUSHBUTTON INDICATOR LIGHT FUNCTION
A green indicator light Makes it possible to

becomes steady on if unlock the door from
the door is unlocked. outside the cockpit
REF The red LED comes during an emergency.
on if the INHIB push- If the access request
button is actuated on command (timed
the cockpit door con- buzzer) is not denied,
trol panel. the door unlocks.
Figure 4: Cockpit Access Panel Function
ZONE
226
B B
MONUMENT
(RE F.)
G RE E NLED
A
R ED LED
W HITE LED
C OC KP IT AC C ES S P ANEL
190
Cockpit Door Electromechanical Latch - Manual
Operation
To open the cockpit electromechanical door latch manually, do the

procedure below:
• Move the manual override button downwards. This action will un-
lock the electrical cockpit door latch.
To close the cockpit electromechanical door latch manually, do the

procedure below:
• Move the manual override button downwards. This action will lock
the electrical cockpit door latch.
To keep the cockpit electromechanical door latch closed manually, do

the procedures below:
• Assure the cockpit door is locked;

• Move the lock button upwards, so as to prevent the manual over-
ride button from moving down.
Figure 5: Cockpit Door Electromechanical Latch - Manual operation
ZONES
221/222
223/224 1 2
A
MANUAL MANUAL
OVER R D I E OVER R D I E
B UT T ON B UT T ON
T O OPE N T HE C OC KP IT T O C LOSE T HE C OC KP IT
E LE CT ROME CHANIC AL E LE CT ROME CHANIC AL
DOOR LAT CH MANUALLY: DOOR LAT CH MANUALLY:
MOV E T HE MANUAL MOV E T HE MANUAL

OVER R DI E B UT T ON OVER R DI E B UT T ON
DOW NW AR DS . DOW NW AR DS .
3
C OC KP IT DOOR
E LE CT ROME CHANIC AL
LAT CH
MANUAL
OVER R D I E
B UT T ON
T O KE E PT HE C OC KP IT
E LE CT ROME CHANIC AL DOOR LOC K
LAT CH C LOSE D MANUALLY: B UT T ON
AS S UR E T HE C OC KP IT IS LOC KE D;
MOV E T HE LOC K B UT T ON UPW AR DS .
A
190
Figure 6: Cockpit Door Assembly - Schematic Diagram
A
FWD RH G1 GALLEY
(REF.)
COCKPIT ACCESS PANEL

COCKPIT DOOR
REINFORCED
COCKPIT DOOR
A ELECTROMECHANICAL
LATCH
(REF.)
B
FWD FUSELAGE
CABIN CREW PANEL
(SDS 52-51)
(MPP 52-51-02)
28VDC TO TIME DELAY

B
INHIB CONTROL SW
GND TO ELECTRICAL
5VDC INPUT DIMMER
28VDC INPUT PWR
UNLOCKED INPUT
RETURN DC PWR
EMER CALL LT
FWD FUSELAGE
FWD AVIONICS COMPT MID AVIONICS COMPT
BLINKER
COCKPIT DOOR
ELECTROMECHANICAL LATCH MRC 1 MRC 2
(SDS 52-51) (SSM 34-02-80) (SSM 34-02-80)
C (MPP 52-51-03)
FWD RH G1 GALLEY
WARNING
WARNING
RETURN DC PWR
AURAL
AURAL
SOLENOID
UNLOCKED NC
COCKPIT
(MPP 25-31-01)
PWR INP
(MOD-A6)
(MOD-A6)
LOCKED NO
(SDS 25-31)
DC BUS 2
CONTACT
CONTACT
A
LO
LO
HI
HI
COCKPIT DOOR
5A
CTRL SYS
COCKPIT REINF DOOR
(MPP 52-51-03)
B
(SDS 52-51)
RH CBP
DIMMER
(SSM 33-12-80)
COCKPIT DOOR CONTROL
LOCK INHIB UNLOCKED
OUTPUT
OUTPUT
TEST
PWM
PWM
CH 4
CH 2
LO
HI
+ -
28VDC PWR
PNL
IND
SHIELD
LIGHTED
BLINKER
RETURN DC PWR
CHASSIS GND
TIME DELAY
GND TO GREEN LED

INP 28VDC FOR
GND FOR ELECTRICAL

OUT EMER CALL LT
PWR OUT
SOLENOID
TO INHIB CONTROL
AURAL WARNING
5V PWM INPUT DIM

(SDS 52-51)
(MPP 52-51-02)
CONTROL PEDESTAL
190
52-60 Air Stair System

Description
The Air Stair Actuation System purpose is to provide means of passenger

boarding and deployment in airports where no ground support for this func-
tion is available.The air stair system is composed of the stair mechanism,
control panel and actuation system.The stair is an optional item and is not
integral to the forward passenger main door.The stair control panel is in-
stalled on the left top corner of the wardrobe or lavatory, once again, it will
depend on the interior configuration of the stair, but it can be defined that the
panel shall always be at the right side of the operator when this one is inside
the aircraft facing the door frame. Stair panel is defined to provide means for
control of stair deployment and retraction through normal and back up
modes besides indicating to operator stair status.

Figure 1: Air Stair System- General Description

190
Composition
The stair is mechanically composed of a movable last stair step, two hinged
beams and a base plate to which the stair is attached.There is only one stair
per aircraft and it can be configured to be stowed to the forward or to the rear
in relation to the forward door, depending on the interior configuration of the
aircraft.
Stair Mechanism
The stair mechanism is composed of the base plate, to which the actuation
system is attached as well as the stair itself, and it rolls over tracks on the
cabin floor to stow the stair or to put it in front of the door to start its move-
ment.It is also composed of three links, two major beams and one little last
structure (last step) and finally by the baluster.
Stair Actuation System
The actuation system is composed of the main actuator, back up actuator

and its batteries and recharger and, finally, the control panel.

Figure 2: Stair Mechanism and Stair actuation system
Relay
Panel
Battery plus
recharger case
Back up
actuator
Main
actuator

190
Operation
Before its operation the stair shall be removed from its stowed position to the
lock position in front of the main forward passenger door.That is achieved
manually by the flight attendant.After being pulled out from its stowed posi-
tion and locked in front of the door it can be extended down by a control pan-
el that provides interface to commanding the stair in normal mode and back
up mode.Both modes are commanded from the control panel, however in
the former the performance of the stair is faster, 30 second maximum to de-
ploy or retract against 2.5 minutes performed in the back up mode.

Figure 3: Operation of airstair

190
Stair Control Panel
The Stair Control Panel will provide means of commanding the actuator to
deploy or retract the stairs and will also provide means to switch the actuator
to back up mode and also command the back up actuator.It will also indicate
the status of the stair.Indication will be Ready, Unlocked and Manual.
In order to provide command of the actuator the control panel, which is a

membrane switch type, has two membrane switches and one alternate:
1) Up switch: once it is continuously pressed it will command the

actuator to move the stair to the up position.
2) Down switch: once it is continuously pressed it will command
the actuator to move the stair to the down position.
3) Back up Mode Switch: once pressed switches the mode of ac-
tuation from normal to back up and from back up to normal.
In order to provide indication of the status of the stair to the operator, the
control panel has four indication leds:
1) Back up Indication - embedded with switch : stair system is

failed if flashing or stair in back up mode if lit ;
2) Unlocked Indication : stair unlocked ;
3) Ready : lit if stair is either deployed or retracted and flashing if
stair is moving.

Figure 4: Stair Control Panel

190
Main Actuator
The main actuator is composed of a DC brushless motor, which electrically

drives the stair mechanism.The Actuator is also composed of an electronic
control card that interfaces with the control panel and receives commands
to actuate the motor and sends status indication of the stair to the control
panel.The electronic control card provides intelligence to the actuator in or-
der to perform.It is responsible for speed for profiling, monitoring and indica-
tion.As specified it deploys and retracts the stair in less than 30 seconds,
monitors the micro-switches for stair status and sends information to control
panel of status and to CMC of errors.
Back up subsystem
The back up subsystem is composed of a DC actuator, a battery pack and

a recharging device.The back up actuator is attached to the main actuator
back up input, so the former will use part of the gearing of the latter.However
power is supplied through the battery pack to the motor and batteries that in
their turn are recharged by the recharging device which is connected to the
aircraft DC bus.Back up subsystem is used in case of any failure, excluding
stair jam, which prevents the main actuator from operating.Deployment or
retraction of the stair is expected to happen in 2.5 minutes.Indications will be
similar to the ones in normal mode of operation.

Figure 5: Actuation System - Full installation
Relay
Panel
Battery plus
recharger case
Back up
actuator
Main
actuator

190
Balancing System
The balancing system is composed of a cable connected to the base plate,

as the stair is deployed or retracted the cable pulls a quadrant with variable
diameter, which in its turn is meshed to a main gear.
This main gear transmit movement to one middle gear, installed at one of
the ends of the middle torsion bar, and this middle gear is also meshed to
two more gears each one attached to a torsion bar.
Therefore as the stair turns all three torsion bars are used and great part of
the load due to the weight of the stair is balanced.The other ends of the tor-
sion bars are attached to the beam.Ultimately the torsion bars absorb the
load due to weight.
Also in the upper beam there is the commanding strut that with the help of
the baluster commands the movement of the lower beam.

Figure 6: Balancing System
Quadrant
Bar
Quadrant
Gear
Middle Gear
Pulling
Main Gear Cable
Commanding strut
Stair hinge
Cable
Quadrant
Torsion bars

190
Movable Step
The movable step has two microswitches at its feet to indicate stair down
and to enable the stair lights.

Figure 7: Movable Step

190
Normal Operation
Normal operation of the stair is achieved through the use of control panel
and main actuator.As operator manually removes the stair from stowed po-
sition and locks it in front of the door operation is performed through control
panel.Down command at this moment will cause the stair to be deployed
within less than 30 seconds.As it reaches the ground, the down micro switch
will indicate it to the electronic control card causing the actuator to automat-
ically stop.A second down command will be disregarded in that case.A fol-
lowing up command will cause the stair to be retracted and automatically
stopped as it reaches the restrainer.The restrainer has up micro switches.
A second up command in that case will be also disregarded.Retraction is
also achieved within less than 30 seconds.
Abnormal Operation
In case of any failure occurs, as mechanical jam, actuator fail or monitoring

system fail, the system shall be operated in back up mode.First if any of
those occur, the back up indication in the control panel will flash to bring at-
tention of the operator, once the operator is acquainted he should press the
back up switch in control panel to put the system in back up mode and op-
erate the stair through the back up commands also on the control panel.
Performance of the back up mode is slower as it needs 2.5 minutes to deploy
or retract the stair.Indication philosophy is the same, however in back up
mode it is impossible to indicate stair movement.Back up system is also
used for the case of aircraft accessibility without powering on the air-
craft.This serves for maintenance on the aircraft.

Figure 8: Electric and Mechanical Architecture
Electric Architecture
DC BUS2
Stair Control Panel
RECHARGER
DC BUS 1
Main RELAY
BATTERY
Actuator LOGIC
BACK UP ACTUATOR
CMC micro switches

Back Up
Actuator
Input
Output
Actuator Shaft
Motor
Clutch Gears
Stair
Brake
Mechanical Architecture

190
Main Actuator
The main actuator is composed by a 28 Volts DC brushless motor, a clutch,

a brake and a differential gear train that has an input for the back up actuator
so the latter will use the same gear train to actuate the stairs.
Clutch is responsible for disconnecting the mechanical path to the motor in
case a mechanical jam occurs in any point of the system, with the same
function there is an electronic protection to avoid motor windings heat to
build up.
Brake is to hold the system and provided irreversibility of the system.The
planetary gear serves for torque and speed adjustment as well as it provides
back up input.ECC is the electronic control card that provides intelligence to
the actuator to perform.
Back up subsystem
The back up subsystem is composed of back up actuator, and a casing with

batteries and a recharging device.

Figure 9: Main Actuator
Electrical
Connector ECC
Attaching screws Output to main
Motor actuator
Brake
Recharging device
Clutch
Planetary
Gear
Back up
Input
Battery pack

190
Relay Control Board
The relay control board is composed of four relays, as depicted below.This

control is intended to operate when system is in back up mode of operation.
To put the system in back up mode, back up switch shall be pressed in con-
trol panel, therefore the commands are transferred to back up command
switches.Pressing back up command switch in control panel enables back
up enable relay.Consequently the indication relay switches from main actu-
ator indicating to control panel to indications from relays to control panel.
Up and Down command relays are in charge of the H-Bridge control over the
brush DC motor.

Figure 10: Relay Architecture
Control
Panel
Command
Relay - UP
BackUp
DC Enable
Relay
Command
Relay - DN Indication
Enable
Relay

190
52-70 Doors warnings

Introduction
The doors warning subsystems provide the flight crew with indication of the
status of the aircraft doors.
General Description
The DOOR WARNING includes these subsystems:

• COMPARTMENT DOORS WARNING
• PASSENGER DOORS WARNING
• CARGO DOORS WARNING
• SERVICE DOORS WARNING
Sensors and/or microswitches send signals to the MAU (Modular Avionics

Unit).The MAU converts these signals and send them to the MFD (Multi-
Function Display) and to the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting
System) display.
The EICAS display shows the warning/caution messages.
The MFD shows the graphical representation of an aircraft and its doors rep-
resented by squares.The squares change their color from green (closed
door status) to red (open door status), and also shows a “DOOR OPEN”
message in a red box on the takeoff system page.
The AWU (Aural Warning Unit) receives signal from the MAU to generate
three chimes for the warning message and one chime for the caution mes-
sage, and sends them to the digital audio system.
The master warning/caution pushbutton sends ground signals to the AWU
to set the system again.
The master warning/ caution lights come on and go off when any warning/
caution message comes into view.

Figure 1: Doors Warning - General Description
GLARESHIELD MASTER WARNING GLARESHIELD

PANEL LIGHTS (PUSHBUTTONS) PANEL
C MASTER CAUTION
LIGHTS (PUSHBUTTONS)
AFT SERVICE
FORWARD CARGO DOOR MESSAGE
DOOR MESSAGE "DOOR SERV AFT OPEN"
"DOOR CRG FWD OPEN" (WARNING)
(WARNING) 2 SENSORS
FORWARD SERVICE 4 SENSORS
AFT CARGO
B A B DOOR MESSAGE
"DOOR SERV FWD OPEN" DOOR MESSAGE
(WARNING) "DOOR CRG AFT OPEN"
2 SENSORS (WARNING)
4 SENSORS
EICAS DISPLAY MFD'S
WARNING AND
CAUTION
MESSAGES
FORWARD PASSENGER
DOOR MESSAGE AFT PASSENGER
"DOOR PAX FWD OPEN" DOOR MESSAGE
(WARNING) "DOOR PAX AFT OPEN"
2 SENSORS (WARNING)
2 SENSORS
FORWARD AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT ACCESS HATCH
MESSAGE MIDDLE AVIONICS
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR
"DOOR FWD EBAY OPEN" COMPARTMENT DOOR MESSAGE
MESSAGE "DOOR HYD OPEN"
A B (CAUTION)
1 MICROSWITCH
"DOOR CENTER EBAY OPEN"
(CAUTION)
(CAUTION)
1 MICROSWITCH
1 MICROSWITCH

190
Notes:

Figure 2: CMC door indication diagnostic
CMC door indication diagnostic (found under ATA 32 in diagnostic due to PSEMs relationship with undercarriage)
this diagnostic area of CMC only covers Pax, service and Cargo doors (proximity sensors only)

190
Passenger Doors Warning
Operation
Introduction
Moving the door to the closed position causes:
The passenger door warning systems give a visual and an aural indication • The latches to fully engage with the guide ramps.
to the flight crew about the passenger door status:
• Closed/open (latched/unlatched) • The latch proximity sensor to detect the proximity of the latch.
• Locked/unlocked • The latch proximity sensor to send a signal to the EICAS which gives the
indication of door closed (latched) position.
The passenger door warning systems are installed on each passenger door,
in zones 811 and 812. • The internal handle to move fully down and the lock stop bellcrank to shift
to a position near the lock stop proximity sensor, which detects its prox-
imity.
General Description • The lock stop proximity sensor sends a signal to the EICAS which gives
the indication of door locked position.
Each passenger door has a warning system with two proximity sensors as
follows:
Moving the door to the open position causes:
• A latch proximity sensor, installed on the frame guide of the passenger
door. • The lock stop bellcrank to move away from a position near the lock stop
proximity sensor, thus preventing the sensor from detecting the proximity
• A lock stop proximity sensor, installed internally in the passenger door of the lock stop bellcrank.
and connected to an electrical harness.
• The lock stop proximity sensor to send back a signal to the EICAS which
The sensors send a signal to the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alert- provides the indication of door unlocked position.
ing System) which provides an indication of the door status.
• The latches to fully disengage from the guide ramps.
• The latch proximity sensor not to detect the proximity of the latch.
Components
• The latch proximity sensor to send a signal to the EICAS which provides
the indication of door opened (unlatched ) position.
The latch proximity sensor is installed on the guide ramp of the frame guide.
The lock stop proximity sensor is installed on a mounted bracket of the door
frame.The mounting bracket is located near the lock stop bellcrank of the
box mechanism.
The sensors detect the proximity of the lock stop bellcrank and/or the latch
in the guide ramp.

Figure 3: Passenger Doors Warning Location
C
C
B D D
ZONE
812
A
ZONE AFT
811 PASSENGER
FORWARD DOOR
DOOR
PASSENGER
FRAME
DOOR
E LOCK STOP
A B
PROXIMITY BELLCRANK
SENSOR BOX (REF.)
LATCH ELECTRICAL
PROXIMITY MECHANISM
CONNECTOR
SENSOR
LATCH LOCK STOP

BELLCRANK
E
ELECTRICAL
HARNESS
COMMAND FRAME SENSOR

RAMP INTERNAL
GUIDE
HANDLE
MOUNTING
BRACKET
C D E
TYPICAL TYPICAL TYPICAL

190
Service Doors Warning
Operation
Introduction
Moving the door to the closed position causes:
The service doors warning systems give a visual and an aural indication to • The latches to fully engage with the guide ramps.
the flight crew about the service door status:
• Closed/opened (latched/unlatched) • The latch proximity sensor to detect the proximity of the latch.
• Locked/unlocked • The latch proximity sensor to send a signal to the EICAS which gives the
indication of door closed (latched) position.
The service doors warning systems are installed on each service door, in
zones 821 and 824. • The internal handle to move fully down and the lock stop bellcrank to shift
to a position near the lock stop proximity sensor, which detects its prox-
imity.
General Description • The lock stop proximity sensor sends a signal to the EICAS which gives
the indication of door locked position.
Each service door has a warning system with two proximity sensors as fol-
lows:
Moving the door to the opened position causes:
• A latch proximity sensor, installed on the frame guide of the service door.
• The lock stop bellcrank to move away from a position near the lock stop
• A lock stop proximity sensor, installed internally in the service door and proximity sensor, thus preventing the sensor from detecting the proximity
connected to an electrical harness. of the lock stop bellcrank.
The sensors send a signal to the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alert- • The lock stop proximity sensor to send back a signal to the EICAS which
ing System) which provides an indication of the door status. provides the indication of door unlocked position.
• The latches to fully disengage from the guide ramps.
Components • The latch proximity sensor not to detect the proximity of the latch.
• The latch proximity sensor sends a signal to the EICAS which provides
The latch proximity sensor is installed on the guide ramp of the frame guide. the indication of door opened (unlatched) position.
The lock stop proximity is installed on a mounting bracket of the door
frame.the mounting bracket is located near the lock stop bellcrank of the box
mechanism.
The sensors detect the proximity of the lock stop bellcrank and/or the latch
in the guide ramp.

Figure 4: Service Doors Warning -Location
ZONE FORWARD SERVICE DOOR AFT SERVICE DOOR

824
B ZONE
821 C
D
A
D
C
DOOR
FRAME
A B
NUT
E LOCK BELLCRANK
LATCH PROXIMITY (REF.) ELECTRICAL
SENSOR BOX
PROXIMITY MECHANISM CONNECTOR
SENSOR
ELECTRICAL LOCK STOP
LATCH HARNESS BELLCRANK
E
COMMAND INTERNAL SENSOR

FRAME HANDLE
RAMP GUIDE MOUNTING
BRACKET
C D E
TYPICAL TYPICAL TYPICAL

190
Cargo Doors Warning
Operation
Introduction
Moving the door in closed position causes:
The cargo doors warning systems give a visual and an aural indication to the • The terminal shats to rotate and then latch the cargo door.The latch prox-
flight crew about the cargo doors status:
imity sensors to detect the proximity of the terminal shafts and send back
• Latched/unlatched a signal to the EICAS which provides the indication of door latched posi-
• Closed/opened tion.
• Locked/unlocked • The lock handle shaft to move the lock handle fitting near the closed prox-
The cargo doors warning systems are installed on the cargo doors, in zones imity sensor, which detects its proximity and send back a signal to the EI-
822 and 823. CAS which provides the indication of door closed position.
• The lock shaft to move the lock bellcrank, so that the lock proximity sen-
General Description sor detects the proximity of the lock bellcrank target and send back a sig-
nal to the EICAS which provides the indication of door locked position.
Each cargo door has a warning system with four proximity sensors as fol-
lows: Moving the door in opened position causes:
• Two latched proximity sensors. • The lock shaft to move the lock bellcrank.The lock bellcrank target is not
• A closed proximity sensor. near the locked proximity sensor, which can not detect its proximity, then
• A locked proximity sensor. the sensor sends back a signal to the EICAS which provides the indica-
tion of door unlocked position.
The sensors send a signal to the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alert-
ing system) which provides an indication of the door status. • The lock handle shaft to move the lock handle fitting.The lock handle fit-
ting is not near the closed proximity sensor, which can not detect its prox-
imity, then the sensor sends back a signal to the EICAS which provides
Components the indication of door opened position.
• The terminal shafts to rotate and then unlatch the cargo door.The latch
The sensors are installed on the mounting bracket of the cargo door frame, proximity sensors can not detect the proximity of the terminal shafts, then
in order to detect the proximity of the following parts: send back a signal to the EICAS which provides the indication of door un-
• Terminal shafts, for the latched proximity sensors. latched position
• Lock handle fitting, for the closed proximity sensor.
• Lock bellcrank target, for the locked proximity sensor.

Figure 5: Cargo Doors Warning-Location
CARGO DOORS
ZONE
ELECTRICAL
823 HARNESS
ZONE
A 822
A
B
LOCK
BELLCRANK D
LOCK TARGET A BELLCRANK
HANDLE LATCHED
FITTING E E LOCKED PROXIMITY
(REF.) NUT
PROXIMITY SENSOR ELECTRICAL
LOCK
HANDLE
SENSOR E CONNECTOR
SHAFT LATCHED
PROXIMITY
SENSOR
E
LOCK
CLOSED SHAFT
PROXIMITY TERMINAL
SHAFT LOCK SENSOR
SENSOR
BELLCRANK MOUNTING
TERMINAL BRACKET
SHAFT
B C D E
TYPICAL TYPICAL TYPICAL TYPICAL

190
Notes:

Figure 6: Cargo Doors Warning-Location
Cargo Door Closed Sensor Cargo Door Latched Sensor
Cargo Door Locked Sensor

190
Compartment Doors Warning
Introduction
The compartment doors are:

• Forward avionics compartment access hatch
• Fueling compartment access door
• Rear fuselage door
• Middle avionics compartment access door.
Visual and aural indications are given to the flight crew if these doors are
open.

Figure 7: Compartment Doors Warning-Doors Location
FORWARD AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT
ACCESS HATCH
REAR FUSELAGE
DOOR
MIDDLE AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT
COMPARTIMENT
ACCESS HATCH

190
Forward Avionics Compartment Access Hatch
The forward avionics compartment access hatch incorporates a microswitch

that sends a signal to the MAU (Modular Avionics Unit) 2 when this hatch is
closed.
If the hatch is open, the DOOR FWD EBAY OPEN caution message comes
into view on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) dis-
play.The takeoff system page, on the MFD (Multi-Function Display), shows
a graphical representation of the aircraft.This graphical representation has a
square that represents the forward avionics compartment access
hatch.When the hatch is open, the color of the square changes from green
to red and a DOOR FWD EBAY OPEN indication comes into view in a red
box below the aircraft graphical representation.

Figure 8: FWD Avionics compartment access hatch
A
ZONE
123
B
MICROSWITCH

190
Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door
The middle avionics compartment access door incorporates a microswitch

that sends a signal to the MAU 3 when the door is closed.
If the door is open, the DOOR CENTER EBAY OPEN caution message
comes into view on the EICAS display.The takeoff system page, on the
MFD, shows a graphical representation of the aircraft.
This graphical representation has a square that represents the middle avi-
onics compartment access door.When the door is open, the color of the
square changes from green to red and a DOOR CENTER EBAY OPEN in-
dication comes into view in a red box below the aircraft graphical represen-
tation.

Figure 9: Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door
B
A
ZONE
147
C A
MICROSWITCH
B C

190
Fueling Compartment Access Door
The fueling compartment access door incorporates a microswitch that sends

a signal to the MAU 3 when the door is closed.
If the door is open, the DOOR FUELING OPEN caution message comes into
view on the EICAS display.The takeoff system page, on the MFD, shows a
graphical representation of the aircraft.This graphical representation has a
square that represents the fueling compartment access door.When the door
is open, the color of the square changes from green to red and a DOOR
FUELING OPEN indication comes into view in a red box below the aircraft
graphical representation.

Figure 10: Fueling Compartment Access Door
ZONE
616
616 HB
MICROSWITCH

190
Rear Fuselage Door
The rear fuselage door incorporates a microswitch that sends a signal to the
MAU 3 when the door is closed.
If the door is open, the DOOR HYD OPEN caution message comes into
view on the EICAS display.The takeoff system page, on the MFD, shows a
graphical representation of the aircraft.This graphical representation has a
square that represents the rear fuselage door.
When the door is open, the color of the square changes from green to red
and a DOOR HYD OPEN red indication comes into view in a red box below
the aircraft graphical representation.

Figure 11: Rear Fuselage Door
LOCKWIRE
WASHER
A NUT
A
WASHER
ZONE
316
NUT
B
MICROSWITCH

190
Forward Avionics Compartment Access Hatch Operation
Microswitch FORWARD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT ACCESS HATCH
If the forward avionics compartment access hatch opens:
There is one microswitch installed inside the forward fuselage bottom that is • The microswitch is released.
in contact with the forward avionics compartment access hatch.This micro- • The signal is sent to the MAU 2.
switch changes a mechanical signal into an electrical signal.This electrical • The EICAS display shows the DOOR OPEN caution message.
signal is sent to the MAU 2 in the forward avionics compartment.
• The MFD shows, on the takeoff system page, the red square that repre-
sents the forward avionics compartment access hatch and the message
Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door DOOR OPEN in a red box.
Microswitch • The AWU (Aural Warning Unit) generates one chime to the digital audio
system, and the caution message will flash.
There is one microswitch installed inside the CF (Center Fuselage) II that is • When you push the master caution pushbutton, a ground signal is sent to
in contact with the middle avionics compartment access door.This micros- the AWU to set the system again.Thus, the CAS (Crew Alerting System)
witch changes a mechanical signal into an electrical signal.This electrical message stays ON and the audio signal goes OFF.
signal is sent to the MAU 3 in the middle avionics compartment. • The square and the message DOOR OPEN, on the MFD, stay ON.
Fueling Compartment Access Door Microswitch
There is one microswitch installed inside the fueling compartment that is in

contact with its door.This microswitch changes a mechanical signal into an
electrical signal.This electrical signal is sent to the MAU 3 in the middle avi-
onics compartment.
Rear Fuselage Door Microswitch
There is one microswitch installed inside the rear fuselage that is in contact
with the rear fuselage door.This microswitch changes a mechanical signal
into an electrical signal that is sent to the MAU 3 in the middle avionics com-
partment.

Figure 12: Compartment Doors Warning / FWD Avionics Compartment Access Hatch
EICAS DISPLAY MFD'S
AP B VAPP FLARE
AT B VOR ASEL 4OOO
26O 1 255OO
4 FMS1 OOO Ê C
15 SAT
R 7 25 TATÊ C
1O 1O 2 3OO TAS KTS
24O 2 O.O NM
1 O MIN N DME1
5.O OM 2O.7 N1 2O.7 3 65.3 NM
33
LAX
RF
3O
6
1
2OO AP
CAUTION
1O 1O 2
IGN IGN
19O
A
463Ê ITT 463Ê A
4
18O 9O.O N2 9O.O
MESSAGE
E
555 M 29.92 IN [ 1OO ] [ 1OO ]
LANDING GEAR
[ -9.9 ] A O.O5 L
PROGRESS TCAS
UP
O7:12 33O O79
FMS1
E OO5
6 12
VIB APU
1OO % Ê
1O2O C
5O 1OO
PUM
CABIN
3
ZUN
ALT -5 FT GUP
15
KPHX FL13O
RATE -5 FPM
N
H 5OO NM FL118
23 MIN
12 81 11
Ê Ê
S

33
VOR2 FLO9O
21
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
3O 24 S F
118 O25 VPTH MSG 118 O3
119 O25 HDGINT 119 O3
22
2 YAW
S/F
5J0862
P0862
S0132
FORWARD AVIONICS
ACCESS HATCH SWITCH
B GS0371 SN
2 C
1
3 F TP2-12
FORWARD
5 G AVIONICS
4 COMPARTMENT
6 J 33-32 ACCESS HATCH
(31-41) - 124 MAU 2

L
MASTER
CAUTION
PUSHBUTTONS

190
Operation
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT ACCESS DOOR
If the middle avionics compartment access door opens:
• The microswitch is released.
• The signal is sent to the MAU 3.
• The EICAS display shows the DOOR OPEN caution message.
• The MFD shows, on the takeoff system page, the red square that repre-
sents the middle avionics compartment access door and the message
DOOR OPEN in a red box.
• The AWU generates one chime to the digital audio system, and the cau-
tion message will flash.
• When you push the master caution pushbutton, a ground signal is sent to
the AWU to set the system again.Thus, the CAS message stays ON and
the audio signal goes OFF.
• The square and the message DOOR OPEN, on the MFD, stay ON.

Figure 13: Compartment Doors Warning / Middle Avionics Compartment Access Door
EICAS DISPLAY MFD'S
AP B VAPP FLARE
AT B VOR ASEL 4OOO
26O 1 255OO
4 FMS1 OOO Ê C
15 SAT
R 7 25 TATÊ C
1O 1O 2 3OO TAS KTS
24O 2 O.O NM
1 O MIN N DME1
5.O OM 2O.7 N1 2O.7 3 65.3 NM
33
LAX
RF
3O
6
1
2OO AP
CAUTION
1O 1O 2
IGN IGN
19O
A
463Ê ITT 463Ê A
4
18O 9O.O N2 9O.O
MESSAGE
E
555 M 29.92 IN [ 1OO ] [ 1OO ]
LANDING GEAR
[ -9.9 ] A O.O5 L
PROGRESS TCAS
UP
O7:12 33O O79
FMS1
E OO5
6 12
VIB APU
1OO % Ê
1O2O C
5O 1OO
PUM
CABIN
3
ZUN
ALT -5 FT GUP
15
KPHX FL13O
RATE -5 FPM
N
H 5OO NM FL118
23 MIN
12 81 11
Ê Ê
S

33
VOR2 FLO9O
21
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
3O 24 S F
118 O25 VPTH MSG 118 O3
119 O25 HDGINT 119 O3
22
2 YAW
S/F
5J0862
P0862
S0132
REAR FUSELAGE
DOOR SW
B GS0525 SN
2 C
1
3 F BP1-59
5 G MUDDLE
4 AVIONICS
6 J 33-32 COMPARTMENT
(31-41) - 146 MAU 3

L
MASTER
CAUTION
PUSHBUTTONS

190
Operation
REAR FUSELAGE DOOR
If the rear fuselage door opens:
• The microswitch is released.
• The signal is sent to the MAU 3.
• The EICAS display shows, on the takeoff system page, the red square
that represents the rear fuselage and the message DOOR OPEN in a red
box.
• The AWU generates one chime to the digital audio system, and the cau-
tion message flashes.
• When you push the master caution button, a ground signal is sent to the
AWU to set the system again.Thus, the CAS message stays ON and the
audio signal goes OFF.
• The square that represents the rear fuselage door and the message
DOOR OPEN, on the MFD, stay ON.

Figure 14: Compartment Doors Warning / Rear Fuselage Door
EICAS DISPLAY MFD'S
AP B VAPP FLARE
AT B VOR ASEL 4OOO
26O 1 255OO
4 FMS1 OOO Ê C
15 SAT
R 7 25 TATÊ C
1O 1O 2 3OO TAS KTS
24O 2 O.O NM
1 O MIN N DME1
5.O OM 2O.7 N1 2O.7 3 65.3 NM
33
LAX
RF
3O
6
1
2OO AP
CAUTION
1O 1O 2
IGN IGN
19O
A
463Ê ITT 463Ê A
4
18O 9O.O N2 9O.O
MESSAGE
E
555 M 29.92 IN [ 1OO ] [ 1OO ]
LANDING GEAR
[ -9.9 ] A O.O5 L
PROGRESS TCAS
UP
O7:12 33O O79
FMS1
E OO5
6 12
VIB APU
1OO % Ê
1O2O C
5O 1OO
PUM
CABIN
3
ZUN
ALT -5 FT GUP
15
KPHX FL13O
RATE -5 FPM
N
H 5OO NM FL118
23 MIN
12 81 11
Ê Ê
S

33
VOR2 FLO9O
21
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
3O 24 S F
118 O25 VPTH MSG 118 O3
119 O25 HDGINT 119 O3
22
2 YAW
S/F
5J0862
P0862
S0132
REAR FUSELAGE
DOOR SW
B GS0402 SN
2 C
1
3 F BP1-60
5 G MUDDLE
4 AVIONICS
6 J 33-32 COMPARTMENT
(31-41) - 146 MAU 3

L
MASTER
CAUTION
PUSHBUTTONS

190
52-MEL (Example)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¦ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ¦
¦ MASTER MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST ¦
¦ FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: ORIGINAL ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 52-2 ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 52-1 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 1. ¦ 2. NUMBER INSTALLED ¦ ¦ 1. ¦ 2. NUMBER INSTALLED ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SEQUENCE ITEM ¦ ¦ 3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH ¦ ¦ SEQUENCE ITEM ¦ ¦ 3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ------------------------- ¦ ¦ ¦ 4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS ¦ ¦ ------------------------- ¦ ¦ ¦ 4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS ¦
¦ 52 DOORS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 52 DOORS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 30-20 Forward and Aft C ¦ 4 ¦ 2 ¦ One Gas Spring Actuator per door ¦ ¦ 51-00 Cockpit Security ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Cargo Compartment ¦ ¦ ¦ may be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ Door Automatic ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Door Gas Spring ¦ ¦ ¦ opposite Actuator Bellcrank and ¦ ¦ Locking System ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Actuators ¦ ¦ ¦ Actuator Rod operate normally. ¦ ¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 30-22 Forward and Aft C ¦ 4 ¦ 2 ¦ One Actuator Bellcrank per door may ¦ ¦ 1) Cockpit Door ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Cargo Compartment ¦ ¦ ¦ be damaged or missing provided ¦ ¦ Control System ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Door Actuator ¦ ¦ ¦ opposite Gas Spring Actuator and ¦
¦ Bellcranks ¦ ¦ ¦ Actuator Rod operate normally. ¦ ¦ a) LOCK A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Cockpit Security Door ¦
¦ 30-24 Forward and Aft C ¦ 4 ¦ 2 ¦ One Actuator Rod per door may be ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Automatic Locking System is ¦
¦ Cargo Compartment ¦ ¦ ¦ damaged or missing. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative, and ¦
¦ Door Actuator ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Repairs are made within two ¦
¦ Rods ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦
¦ 31-28 Forward and Aft C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative or missing | ¦ ¦ b) LOCK B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦

¦ Cargo Door ¦ ¦ ¦ provided alternate procedures are | ¦ ¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Closing Rods ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used. | ¦ ¦ Light ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 51-00 Cockpit Security A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ c) INHIB A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ Door Automatic ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Automatic locking system is ¦ ¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Cockpit Security Door ¦
¦ Locking System ¦ ¦ ¦ deactivated, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Automatic Locking System is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Mechanical Latch operates ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ normally and is used to lock ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Repairs are made within two ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the door, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Alternate procedures are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used for ¦ ¦ d) INHIB B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ locking and unlocking the ¦ ¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight deck door using the ¦ ¦ Light ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Mechanical Latch, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ d) Repairs are made within two ¦ ¦ e) UNLOCKED B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦ ¦ Annunciator ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Door Chime operates ¦
¦ ON Light ¦ ¦ ¦ normally, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (Continued) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Alternate procedures are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (Continued) ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Revision: 00 Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 52-MEL Page 1
MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¦ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ¦ ¦ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ¦
¦ MASTER MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST ¦ ¦ MASTER MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST ¦

¦ FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ¦ ¦ FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: ORIGINAL ¦ PAGE: ¦ ¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 52-3 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 52-4 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 52 DOORS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 52 DOORS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 51-00 Cockpit Security ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 60-00 Airstair D ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided it is ¦

¦ Door Automatic ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ *** ¦ ¦ ¦ correctly stowed and locked for ¦
¦ Locking System ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight. ¦
¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 70-00 Door Position C ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided | ¦
¦ 2) Flight ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Indications on ¦ ¦ ¦ affected door is verified closed, ¦
¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ MFD and ¦ ¦ ¦ latched and locked before each ¦
¦ Cockpit Door ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Associated EICAS ¦ ¦ ¦ flight. ¦
¦ Control Panel ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Messages ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ a) Emergency B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Call ¦ ¦ ¦ alternate procedures are ¦
¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used ¦
¦ b) Emergency B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Call ¦ ¦ ¦ alternate procedures are ¦
¦ Pushbutton ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used ¦
¦ Light ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ c) Door B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Opening ¦ ¦ ¦ alternate procedures are ¦
¦ Sequence ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used ¦
¦ Inhibited ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Red Light ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ d) Door B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Unlocked ¦ ¦ ¦ alternate procedures are ¦
¦ Green Light ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used ¦
¦ 3) Maintenance D ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦
¦ Lock ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190

190
ATA 25 Equipment & Furnishing

190
Table of Content The Lavatory Smoke Detection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
25-10 Equipment & Furnishing Flight deck Activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 System Operation Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Pilot Seat Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Lavatory auto discharge fire extinguisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
PILOT SEATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
25-20 Equipment & Furnishing Cabin 25-60 Equipment Furnishing Emergency equipment
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Passenger Seats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The flight deck safety items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Forward Cabin Crew Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Items in the fwd cabin crew area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Aft Cabin Crew Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Items in the LH cabin crew seat area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Items at the LH and RH bulkhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
25-61 Emergency Locator Transmitter System
Windscreen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
This window has to be latched during take off and landing. . . . . . 11
General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
25-30 Equipment & Furnishing Galley Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Circuit breakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
25-MEL (Example)
Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
25-40 Equipment & Furnishing Lavatory
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
190
190
25-10 Equipment & Furnishing Flight deck
Introduction
The Embraer 190 flight deck is configured as follows:
There are two pilots seats. The one on the left hand side is the commander
seat. The one on the right hand side is the first officer seat. A foldable seat
positioned just in front of the flight deck door is intended for an optional ob-
server. When it is not used, it is stowed behind the commander seat against
the flight deck partition.
A flight deck bulkhead and the flight deck door separate the main passenger
cabin from the flight deck. The door is located just aft the observer seat.
There is a keyhole located in the flight deck door from the cabin side, but en-
try is possible only if the secondary locking mechanism of the door latch has
been disengaged from the flight deck side. This door also incorporates a
“spy” hole for the flight crew to see who is trying to gain entry.
The flight deck interior contains the:

• control columns and rudder pedals,
• the commander and first officer lateral consoles located beside
each pilot seat,
• the aft right hand side console and circuit breaker panel located be-
hind first officer seat,
• the control pedestal and overhead panel.
Figure 1: Flight deck
Observer seat
(unfolded)
Spy hole
Key hole
190
Pilot Seat Operation
An override manual control allows the seat to be adjusted in case of electri-
cal motor failure or in case of electrical supply failure.
Most of the pilot seat adjustment controls are located on the RH and LH trim
panels of the seats for best ergonomics.
THIGHREST ANGLE ADJUSTMENT
SEAT FORE, AFT AND LATERAL ADJUSTMENT

The thighrest system is located in front of the seat pan.An angle setting sys-
tem provides support as required.
The longitudinal (fore and aft) and lateral locking pins are linked to the same
command handle, which has 3 positions:
While turning the knob, the two thighrest structures rotate together from -27
• The neutral position locks the seat. degrees up to 27 degrees, taking 8-degrees seat pan tilt as a reference.
• The up position unlocks the longitudinal locking pins and allows seat ad-
justment fore and aft along the seat tracks between the stops.
A break-over system allows pilot thigh support without discomfort while
• The down position unlocks the lateral locking pins and allows seat out- pushing the rudder pedal.
board stowage when the seat is at the rear stop level.
LUMBAR ADJUSTMENT
BACKREST INCLINATION ADJUSTMENT The lumbar support valve pushbutton is pressed to open the valve and re-
lease the air contained in the pouch while the pilot is pushes with his back
The backrest recline lever has three positions: to obtain to required seating.Then the push button is released to lock the set-
• The neutral position locks the backrest recline. ting.
• The up position allows the backrest recline setting from 5 degrees to 25
degrees (20 degrees range). INERTIAL REEL LOCKING
• The down position locks the backrest in the upright position 5 degrees (in
case of recline actuator or control cable failure). The inertial reel locking lever has two positions:
• Locked when pushed forward
SEAT HEIGHT ADJUSTMENT • Released when pushed backward
The electrical actuator control switch has three position: ARMREST ADJUSTMENT
• The neutral position locks the height adjustment (provided by electrical
actuator irreversibility). The armrest adjustment control is located under the forward end of the arm-
• The up position lifts up the seat. rest, and includes a roller that controls the height of the armrest.
• The down position lowers the seat.
Figure 2: Pilot Seat Operation
RH CIRCUIT BREAKERS PANEL RH COCKPIT CONSOLE
DC ESS BUS 3
SEAT SEAT
ADJUST 7.5 ADJUST 7.5
PILOT COPILOT
DC FEED
DC FEED
A A
A (SDS 25-11)
(MPP 25-11-01)
PILOT
SEAT COCKPIT
(SDS 25-11)
(MPP 25-11-01)
COPILOT
SEAT COCKPIT
190
PILOT SEATS
The pilot and copilot seats are identical in their design and operation, differ-
ing only in the symmetrical arrangement of the controls.
The pilot seats have mechanical, electrical and hydromechanical com-
mands. These are some of the commands:
• Handle for the thighrest support adjustment, with mechanical oper-

ation;
• Adjustable armrests and headrest, with mechanical operation;
• Longitudinal/lateral adjustment lever, with mechanical operation;
• Control switch for electrical actuation of the seat height adjustment;
• Control for backrest reclining, with hydromechanical operation;
• Handle for harness inertial device manual locking;
• Push button actuator for lumbar support, which actuates a foam
bag with air in it, allowing different adjustments.
The pilot seats can be operated with or without electrical power.

Some commands have backups, such as:
• Lateral adjustment, through a spare lateral handle located at the aft

part of the lower structure.
• Longitudinal adjustment, through a spare longitudinal handle locat-
ed at the middle of the rear crosspiece of the lower structure.
• Backrest adjustment, through an override system that allows man-
ual tilting of the backrest to the upright position in case of failure of
the controls or recline actuator.
• Height adjustment, through a crank handle attached below the seat
pan and used in the electrical actuator override manual control.
Figure 3: Cockpit seats - pilot seat components
A
ZONES ARMRE ST
F OLDE D
221
222
ARMRE ST
HEADR E S T DEP LOYE D
LIF E V ES T
S TOWAGE
B AC KR E S T
LUMBAR S UP P OR T
REST R AINT
S YS TE M
S EAT P AN
S EAT P AN
LAT ER AL
T IG HT RE ST B
T RIM P ANEL
LOWER S TR UC TURE
190
Notes:
Figure 4: Cocpit seats - pilot seats operation
A
ZONES INE RT IAL RE E LLOC KE D
221
222 B INE RT IAL RE E LUNLOC KE D
S EAT LONGITUDINAL UNLOC KING
ARMRE ST ADJ US TMENT S EAT LOC KING (NE UT RAL P OS IT ION)

R OLLER (BE LOW) S EAT LAT ER AL UNLOC KING
LUMBAR S UP P OR T
P US H B UT T ON
C
T HIGHRE ST UPWAR D
S ET T IN G
B
T HIGHRE ST DOWNWAR D
C
S ET T IN G
S EAT UPWAR D S ET T IN G
S PARE B AC KR E S TLOC KING
A S EAT HEIGHT LOC KING
S EAT DOWNWAR D S ET T IN G B AC KR E S TLOC KING
B AC KR E S TR EC LINING
190
25-20 Equipment & Furnishing Cabin
Introduction
The passenger cabin is 274cm (9ft.) wide at shoulder level and 200cm
(6ft.7in.) high. The aisle is 48.9cm (19.25in.) wide. The overhead storage
compartments are large enough for roll-on bags (61x40x25cm).
The passenger seats are left hand and right hand double configuration, and
are 46.3cm (18.25in.) wide. Each seat has a baggage restraint device capa-
ble of restraining items 3x12x17cm and weighting 10kg, a life jacket stowage
area under the seat and a seat belt.
Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 25-20 Page 1
Figure 1: Passenger Cabin
Aisle
200 cm/6ft. 7in.

274 cm/9 ft
Baggage restrain
PULL PULL PULL PULL
device
190
Passenger Seats
The aisle side armrests can be folded up to permit access to the seat by
handicapped persons.
The seats in the first row are equipped with armrest-mounted food tables. All
other passenger seats are provided with seat back mounted sliding food ta-
bles. A back-mounted literature pocket is mounted under the table.
The seats are capable of quick release to enable a carry-on stretcher to be

brought on board the airplane.
Figure 2: Passenger Seats
Arm rest
Food table
Food table
Literature Pocket
190
Forward Cabin Crew Station
The forward cabin crew station is furnished with an aft-facing, self-stowing

seat, mounted on the aft surface of the forward wardrobe. It is provided with
life jacket stowage underneath, a body belt and shoulder harness. Next to
the jumpseat a cabin crew handset, a cabin crew panel and an emergency
flashlight are mounted on the wall.
Figure 3: Forward Cabin Crew Station
Forward Cabin Crew Station
TEMPERATURE SETTING
LOW
OFF HIGH C H ENABLED

D O O R Z O N E T E M P E R AT U R E C AB I N T E M PER AT U RE
CABIN LIGHTING GALLEY MASTER
ON ON ON ON OFF
FWD FW D GAL LEY

CE I LI NG S I DE WAL L E NT RAN CE ARE A PANEL LIGHTS
BRIGHT BRIGHT BRIGHT BRIGHT

TEST
DIM DIM DIM DIM
EMERGENCY LIGHT COURTESY LIG HT E VAC HO RN
ON / RESET OFF
TEST ON
ARMED
AUTO
LAVATORY SMOKE TEST PSU
FWD AFT TEST RESET
Shoulder harness
ATTND CALL
RESET
Body belt
190
Aft Cabin Crew Station
The aft cabin crew station is similar to the forward cabin crew station. The
jumpseat faces forward and is attached to the forward surface of the aft lav-
atory. It is also equipped with life jacket stowage underneath, a body belt
and a shoulder harness.
The station is also provided with a cabin crew handset, a cabin crew panel
and an emergency flashlight. The optional third jumpseat is an aft-facing
seat mounted on the surface of a windscreen.
Figure 4: Aft Cabin Crew Station
TEMPERATURE SETTING
LOW

D O O R Z O N E T E M P E R AT U R E C A B I N T E M P E R ATU R E
C AB IN LIG HTIN G GALLEY MASTER
ON ON ON OFF
AFT
CEILIN G SID EWALL
ENTRANC E PAN EL LIGHTS
BRIGHT BRIGHT BRIGHT

TEST
DIM DIM DIM
EM ERGE NCY LIGHT C O U RT E S Y L IG H T E VA C H O R N
ON / RESET OFF
TEST ON
ARMED
AUTO
WA S TE S Y S TE M
TANK SERVICE
FWD AFT FAULT
FULL TANK
L AVATO RY FA U LT
ATT ND C ALL WAT E R S Y S TE M

WAT E R Q U A N T I T Y
RESET FAULT 1/4 1/2 3/4
Shoulder harness
Body belt
190
General Description
• Galley Master: The button OFF turns the galley master off.To prevent un-
intentional operation, the button is protected with a switch guard.The LED
The following systems are related to the flight attendant panels: next to the button is on if the galley master is off.
• TEMPERATURE CONTROL • Panel Lights: The button TEST tests the panel lights.
• PSU (Passenger System Unit)
• LAVATORY SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM • Attendant Call: The button RESET resets the attendant call.
• CABIN LIGHTS
• ATTENDANT CALL INDICATORS Some functions can only be controlled through the FWD flight attendant pan-
• COURTESY LIGHTS el.These are:
• EMERGENCY LIGHTING
• POTABLE WATER SYSTEM • cabin Lighting: The buttons ON and BRIGHT/DIM turn on/off and regulate
• VACCUM WASTE SYSTEM the intensity of the ceiling lights, sidewall lights, FWD entrance light and
FWD galley area light.LEDs next to the buttons show the present status
(ON, BRIGHT and DIM) of each group of lights.
Operation
• Lavatory Smoke Test: This button tests the smoke detector installed in
the lavatory.
Some functions can be controlled either through the FWD flight attendant
panel or the aft flight attendant panel.These are: • PSU: The buttons TEST and RESET test and reset the passenger read-
ing lights, attendant call indicators, zonal attendant-call lights, lavatory
• Temperature Setting: An analog potentiometer adjusts continuously the dome lights and lavatory occupied signs.
temperature of different areas of the passenger cabin.The LED (Light-
Emitting Diode) ENABLED next to the cabin temperature button shows
the status of the cabin temperature control.
• Emergency Light: The button ON/ARMED turns on the emergency

lights.To prevent unintentional operation, the button is protected with a
switch guard.The button TEST tests the emergency lights.The LED on
the top left of the button ON/ARMED is on if the emergency lights are on.
• Courtesy Light: A switch toggles the operating mode of the courtesy lights
between AUTO and OFF.The RESET button resets the operating mode.
Figure 5: Flight attendant panel
FWD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT LH CBP COCKPIT
(SWPM 20-32-01)
ATTD CONTROL
PNL TEST RLY
FLASH FWD
DC BUS 1
CHARGER
5A
B
SSM 21-60-80
SSM 33-50-80
SSM 33-29-80
SSM 33-29-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 33-21-80
SSM 25-31-81
25-31-82
25-34-81
FWD FUSELAGE
FWD LH LAVATORY
TEMPERATURE SETTING
C H
ENABLED
CABIN TEMPERATURE
ON ON ON ON
OFF
FWD FWD GALLEY

CEILING SIDEWALL
ENTRANCE AREA
PANEL LIGHTS
TEMP CONTROL ENABLED

TEST
FWD GALELEY LTS ON
DIM DIM DIM DIM

FWD GALLEY LTS BRT
FWD GALLEY LTS DIM
FWD ENT LTS BRT
EMERGENCY LIGHT COURTESY LIGHT

FWD ENT LTS DIM
FWD ENT LTS ON

EMER LTS ON
SIDE LTS BRT
ON/ OFF
CEIL LTS BRT
RESET
SIDE LTS DIM
CEIL LTS DIM
GALLEY OFF
SIDE LTS ON
PNL LTS TEST
TEST
CEIL LTS ON
ARMED AUTO
FWD AFT TEST RESET
ATTND CALL
RESET
B
FWD ATTENDANT CONTROL PANEL
FWD ATTENDANT CONTROL PANEL
A B
FWD LH LAVATORY
190
Windscreen
A left hand and right hand windscreen separate the aft galley area from the
cabin. The left hand windscreen has a large cutout with a drop down win-
dow, so that the cabin crew member seated in the forward facing cabin crew
seat is able to see more than 50% of the seated passengers.
This window has to be latched during take off and landing.
Figure 6: Windscreen
Left-hand windscreen
190
25-30 Equipment & Furnishing Galley

Introduction
The airplane has provisions for three galleys. G1 and G2 are located in the
forward fuselage by the forward service door. G3 is located in the aft fuse-
lage adjacent to the aft service door. The galleys provide an area for food
stowage and preparation, and stowage of other miscellaneous items.
The basic design of G1 provides storage areas for two trolleys and one
standard unit. It also has a Hot Liquid Container (HLC), a coffee maker, sink
and a waste disposal unit.
In addition to storage areas, the G3 provides two ovens, a HLC, a coffee

maker and a waste disposal unit. The G2 is equipped with one oven.
In addition to storage areas, G3 has two ovens, a HLC, a coffee maker and
a waste disposal unit.
Circuit breakers
To turn off electrical power in abnormal situations, all three galleys are pro-
vides with circuit breakers.
Figure 1: Galleys
HLC Two ovens

Coffee maker
Waste disposal unit
WASTE
Galley G1
NO CIGARETTE
DISPOSAL
COFFEE
MAKER
10
OUTLET OVEN 1
HOT JUG
15 15
ON 2
HOT JUG OVEN 2
Galley G3 ON 2 15
WORK LIGHT
COFFEE
BRIGHT MAKER WORK LIGHT
ON 2
DIM
10 BRIGHT 2
ON
DIM
One oven
PRA/CD
OVEN
PLAYER
2 15
WORK LIGHT OUTLET
BRIGHT
ON 2 15
DIM
Galley G2
Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY Chapter 25-30 Page 2

Reproduction Prohibited
190
Components
The FWD galley(s) is(are) equipped with a set of facilities that minimize the
flight attendant’s workload.
Each one of the galley inserts is controlled by one circuit breaker installed
on the galley control module.Each circuit breaker is rated in accordance with
the galley insert’s current, thus preventing the possibility of an overload con-
dition in the aircraft power system due to an insert failure.
The galley lower portion provides sufficient room for the accomodation of the
trolley(s) used to serve the meals and beverages to the passengers.
The galley)s) also (has)have some compartments used for storing miscella-
neous items.
FWD RH G1 GALLEY
These pieces of equipment includes electrical inserts.
The galley water system is protected by a manual shutoff valve that can be
closed when desired, as in a maintenance situation or in a failure condition.
There is a pull-out table to increase the flight attendant work area when de-
sired or needed.
Figure 2: Fwd galley schematic
CENTER FUSELAGE III MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
AFT LH LAVATORY LICC

(SSM 24-51-80) CD
OVEN
PLAYER
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
AFT FLIGHT GALLEY
2 15
SPDA 2 FEED 4 RELAY 4
ATTENDANT PANEL
(SSM-24-61-80)
DC POWER (SLOT 7)
(SDS 25-25)
WORKLIGHT OUTLET
A
AC BUS 1
GALLEY MASTER SWITCH BRT
GALLEY MASTER ON 2 15
DIM GALLEY CONTROL
SWITCH
DISCRETE I/O (SLOT 11) MODULE
25A
GALLEY AND HORN
FORWARD FUSELAGE
DISCRETE I/O (SLOT 9)
GALLEY ON IND OUT FWD RH G2 GALLEY
STAT BIT
PWR 1
GALLEY CONTROL
(SDS 25-31)
5A
GALLEY OFF MODULE
(MPP 25-31-02)
DC POWER (SLOT 7) (SDS 25-36)
(MPP 25-36-01)
GALLEY FEED4 RLY STAT
OVEN OVEN
DISCRETE I/O (SLOT 9) 115VAC

DC BUS 1
GALLEY FEED 4 RLY CMD 115VAC
115VAC
15A
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT AC RETURN
LICC A CHASSIS
(SSM 24-51-80)
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT CHASSIS
AC OUTLET PWR GALLEY CONTROL MODULE
(SWPM 20-32-01) (SDS 25-36)
AC OUTLET
(MPP 25-36-01)
(SDS 24-54)
SERVICE BUS
AC GROUND
GALLEY 1/3 RLY AC OUTLET (MPP 24-54-02
BLACK
20A 15A
SILVER
A GREEN
LAVATORY OCCUPIED
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT SIGN
(SSM 33-28-50)
SPDA 2
(SSM 24-61-80) 28VDC (DIM)
FWD FUSELAGE
DC POWER (SLOT 7)
(SSM 33-28-50) 28VDC (BRT)
AC OUTLET RLY PWR STAT FWD LH LAVATORY
DC RETURN
(SSM 25-34-82)
AC OUTLET RLY PWR CMD
FWD FLIGHT
ATTENDANT PANEL GALLEY CONTROL MODULE
(SDS 25-25) (SDS 25-36)
FWD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
(MPP 25-36-01)
SPDA 1 PRA/CD PLAYER CD PLAYER
(SSM 24-61-80) GALLEY MASTER (SSM 44-21-80)
DC POWER (SLOT 7) SWITCH
2A
GALLEY MASTER SWITCH PBS 400
RH CBP COCKPIT A (SSM 46-41-80)
GALLEY AND HORN
GALLEY OFF
PRA/MUSIC GALLEY CONTROL MODULE
GALLEY ON IND OUT
DC BUS 2
(SDS 25-36)
GALLEY CONTROL MODULE
(MPP 25-36-01)
5A (SDS 25-36)
ON/OFF SWITCH (MPP 25-36-01)
BRT/DIM SWITCH
W W
BRT
ON W W
W W
RH CBP COCKPIT GALLEY CONTROL DIM
MODULE W W
(SDS 25-36) NC
(MPP 25-36-01) NC
GALLEY 2 WORK COUNTER NO
CONTROL LIGHT NO
A NC
A
DC BUS 2
A
2A NC
7.5A WORK COUNTER
NO
EM170SSM250020.DGN
LIGHT
A NO (SDS 33-29)
(MPP 33-29-01)
28VDC (DIM)
FWD RH G2 28VDC (BRT)

GALLEY
DC RETURN
Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY Chapter 25-30 Page 4

190
25-40 Equipment & Furnishing Lavatory

Introduction
The EMBRAER 190 standard configuration has two lavatories - one in the
forward area and another in the aft area. The forward left hand lavatory is
located just aft of the left hand flight deck bulkhead. The aft lavatory is locat-
ed just aft of the aft passenger door.
Both lavatories are equipped with:
• a toilet and sink,

• assist handles,
• NO SMOKING and RETURN TO SEAT signs,
• a cabin crew button,
• oxygen dispensing units with two masks,
• a waste compartment with an integrated fire extinguisher and
• a smoke detector.
A baby changing table can be found in the rear lavatory. The lavatory doors
are designed to prevent anyone from becoming trapped inside the lavatory.
The door can be unlocked from either side.
Figure 1: Introduction Lavatory
No smoking
Return to seat
Cabin crew button
Assist handles
190
The Lavatory Smoke Detection System The forward Attendant Light Indicator Panel indicates forward lavatory
smoke and the Aft Attendant Light Indicator Panel indicates aft lavatory
The lavatory smoke detection system identifies smoke in the lavatories and smoke.
warns the crew.
On the forward FLT Cabin Crew Panel there are two Lavatory Smoke De-
The system consists of: tection System test switches, one for the forward and one for the aft lavatory.
Smoke detectors mounted on the forward and aft lavatory ceiling panel, lav-
atory smoke test switches on the forward cabin crew panel, and circuit Activation
breakers installed in the flight deck for the forward lavatory smoke detection
system and in the Centre-E-Bay for the aft lavatory smoke detection system. When smoke is detected in any lavatory, the following sequence is initiated:
The lavatory smoke detection system has the following indications: An alarm will sound inside the lavatory where smoke has been detected.
The chime is mounted into the lavatory smoke detector assembly and is au-
dible from anywhere in the cabin.
• CAS messages,
• aural indication through a smoke detector built-in chime,
The flashing amber light on the Attendant Light Indicator Panel will be acti-
• visual indication through the smoke detector and the FWD and AFT vated, giving the cabin crew visual indication of the detection of smoke from
attendant light indicator panels installed on the FWD LH entrance anywhere in the passenger compartment. The forward Attendant Light Indi-
ceiling panel and AFT main ceiling panel, and cator Panel indicates forward Lavatory smoke and the Aft Attendant Light In-
• CMC fault reporting. dicator Panel indicates Aft Lavatory smoke.
Via MAU 1 from the forward or via MAU3 from the aft lavatory, a CAS warn-
Indications ing message “LAV SMOKE,” in conjunction with the Master Warning indica-
tion, will illuminate in the Flight Deck.
Sampling the air for presence of smoke begins immediately after power is
applied from the Essential DC BUS 1 or 2, and is indicated by a green power
indicator.
System Operation Test
When the smoke ion density reaches the threshold, the outputs, alarm horn System operation can be confirmed electrically by a self-test circuit, by push-
and red indicator turn on. There is also an interrupt switch to reset the horn ing the built-in self-test switches on the Forward Cabin Crew Panel. When
and outputs, and return to normal sampling when the smoke has cleared. BIT is initiated from the Forward Cabin Crew Panel by pressing and holding
the test switch for a particular lavatory, the smoke detectors, cabin crew and
flight crew indications are tested. After the test switch is released, the CAS
The Attendant Light Indicator Panels indicate smoke in the lavatory by a message and the Master Warning indication are held for seven seconds.
flashing amber light, the same one used to indicate a lavatory to cabin crew
call.
Figure 2: Introduction Smoke Detection System
TEMPERATURE SETTING
LOW

D O O R Z O N E T E M P E R AT U R E CABIN TEMPERATURE
ON ON ON ON OFF
Lavatory Smoke Detectors
CEILING SIDEWAL L
FWD
ENTRANCE
FWD GALLEY
AREA PANEL LIGHTS Power Interrupt
Indicator Panel Indicator Switch
TEST
DIM DIM DIM DIM
EMERGENCY LIGHT COURTESY LIGHT EVAC HORN
ON / RESET OFF
TEST ON
ARMED
AUTO
FWD AFT TEST RESET
Alarm Indicator Alarm horn

ATTND CALL
RESET
The lavatory auto discharge fire extinguishing system
Lavatory Smoke test switch
Circuit
FWD LAV AFT LAV
SMOKE DET SMOKE DET breakers
5 5
visible pressure gauge Halon discharging tubes
190
The Lavatory auto discharge fire extinguisher
The lavatory auto discharge fire extinguishing system consists of one fire ex-
tinguishing bottle in the waste disposal receptacle of each lavatory. The bot-
tle is mounted with the discharging tubes extended into the lavatory waste
compartment, above the waste container. The fire extinguisher bottle, a
heat-actuated device, is charged with 120 grams halon 1301 agent. The fire
extinguisher bottle pressure gauge is visible when the waste compartment
door is opened.
Operation
If fire occurs inside the waste disposal, the auto discharge fire extinguishing
bottle will automatically discharge. The tip at the end of each discharge tube
melts at 78º C (172º F), causing the bottle to fully discharge into the waste
compartment and knock down the fire. Discharge indication can be seen on
this pressure gauge.
Figure 3: The lavatory auto discharge fire extinguisher
78°C 172°F
Discharge
indication
Discharge flow
190
25-60 Equipment Furnishing Emergency

equipment
Introduction
The Embraer 190 is equipped with standard safety items, readily available
for use in an emergency situation. The location of the equipment must be
known by each cabin crew member. The basic version of the Embraer 190
has the following safety equipment stations:
• the flight deck,

• the forward cabin crew seat area,
• the air stair stowage,
• the aft left hand cabin crew seat area
• and the left hand and right hand bulkheads.
Figure 1: Location of Standard safety items
LH and RH Bulkheads
Flight Deck
Airstairs stowage
FWD cabin crew Aft LH cabin crew

seat area seat area
190
The flight deck safety items
The flight deck is provided with the following standard safety items:
• three crew life jackets located at the back rest of the pilot seats.
• Two portable flashlights, fixed to the side consoles of each pilot
seat.
• A crash axe, fixed on the LH side console, next to the commander
seat.
• A fire extinguisher and a PBE (Personal Breathing Equipment)
mounted on the LH bulkhead behind the commander seat.
• On the LH and RH ceiling an escape rope is stored. This can be
used to exit the airplane through the flight deck windows in an
emergency.
Figure 2: Standard safety items (Basic version )
Flight deck
2 x escape rope
FIRE
EXTINGUISCHER
1. Sicherung
ziehen
2. Schlauch
fassen
3. Hebel
3x
2x
nieder-
drücken
Vorsicht bei elektr.

Anlagen, nur bis
1000 V Mindestab.
ÖNORM EN 3
1 Pull 3 4 7
out
sharply
5
6
2
190
Items in the fwd cabin crew area
The fwd cabin crew area has a crew life jacket underneath the seat, and an
emergency flashlight mounted on the wall. The air stair stowage contains
two fire extinguishers, a PBE, a portable oxygen bottle, an oxygen key, a
medical and first aid kit.
Figure 3: Items in the fwd cabin crew area
FWD cabin crew Airstairs

seat area stowage
TEMPERATURE SETTING
LOW

D O O R Z O N E T E M P E R AT U R E C AB I N T E M P E R AT U R E
ON ON ON ON OFF
FWD FW D GA LLEY
C E I LIN G S I D E WA L L ENTRAN CE AR E A PANEL LIGHTS

TEST
DIM DIM DIM DIM
EMERGENCY LIGHT COUR TESY LIGHT EVAC HO R N
ON / RESET OFF
TEST ON
ARMED
AUTO
LAVATO RY SMOKE TEST PSU
FWD AFT TEST RESET
ATTND CALL
RESET
Oxygen
key
ON OFF ON
2x
NO SMOKING WHILE IN USE
190
Items in the LH cabin crew seat area
The aft LH cabin crew seat area is equipped with a life jacket and an oxygen
key underneath the seat, and an emergency flashlight fixed to the wall.
Items at the LH and RH bulkhead

The LH bulkhead is provided with two fire extinguishers, a PBE and one
portable oxygen bottle. The RH bulkhead contains a first aid kit and a meg-
aphone.
Figure 4: Items in the LH cabin crew area
RH Bulkhead LH Bulkhead Aft LH cabin crew seat area
2 x Fire extinguiser
First aid kit PBE
Megaphone
Oxygen bottle
Oxygen key
190
25-61 Emergency Locator Transmitter

System • ELT Antenna
Introduction • ELT Battery
• ELT Buzzer
The function of the ELT (Emergency locator Transmitter) is to make the air-
craft search and rescue operations easier, facilitating aircraft location.The
ELT provides automatic transmission of the standard swept tone and encod-
ed digital message sent to a satellite (COSPAS (Cosmicheskaya Sistyema
Poiska Avariynich Sudov) - SARSAT (Search and Rescue satellite-Aided
Tracking) in the event of a crash.The emergency locator transmitter sub-
subsystem transmits signals through emergency frequencies of 121.5 MHz,
243.0 MHz and 406.025 MHz.
General description
The ELT transmits the standard emergency swept tone on 121.5 and 243.0
MHz and the aircraft identification code or serial number of the transmitter,
country code and the ID code on the 406.025 MHz.The 406.025 MHz trans-
mitter transmits for 24 hours every 50 seconds for 520 ms and then is auto-
maticall shut down.The 121.5/243.0 MHz transmitter transmits continuously
until the battery is drained which takes approximately 72 hours.The 406.025
MHz transmitter has an average error of 1 to 2 km, and the 121.5/243.0 MHz
transmitter has an error of 15 to 20 km.
The information sent to the satellite is programmed at the factory and con-
tains a unique number that can be used to identify the beacon.
The system includes the components that follow:
• ELT
• ELT Remote Switch Panel
Figure 1: Emergency Locater Transmitter System Schematic
ELT REMOTE SWITCH PANEL

(SDS 25-61) ELT ANTENNA
COCKPIT (MPP 25-61-02) MAIN INST PNL (SDS 25-61) CENTER
(MPP 25-61-03) FUS III UPPER
RH CBP
DC ESS BUS 2
D E
A
EXTERNAL ON
GROUND
RESET 1
RESET 2
28 VDC
LIGHT
ELT
B TX
5
ELT REMOTE
D SWITCH PANEL
BNC
TNC
C
ELT BUZZER
BULKHEAD
121.5/243 MHz
(REF.)
406 MHz
E
A
B
ELT ANTENNA
EMERGENCY LOCATOR
PWR
GND
BNC
TPS
LIGHT
CHASSIS
RESET 1
TRANSMITTER
RESET 2
EXTERNAL ON
LOOP
G-SWITCH
RF
HORN
TRANSMITTER
B C
ELT BUZZER AFT AVIONICS ELT - (EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER) AFT
(SDS 25-61) COMPT (SDS 25-61) AVIONICS COMPT
(MPP 25-61-01)
C
(MPP 25-61-05)
190
Components
• A minimum velocity change (V min) before the G-Switch sensor will acti-
vate.
ELT The specific criteria are:
The transmitter unit is housed in a high impact fire resistant polycarbonate • G th = 2.3 +/- 0.3 G’s.
plastic case, which is installed in the aft avionics compartment and it has the
internal components that follow: • V = 4.5 +/- 0.5 ft/s.
• G-Switch The ELT unit has an ON/OFF switch which has the functions that follow:
• Transmitter
• Microprocessor
Table 1: Emergency Locator Transmitter System-ELT-ON/OFF Switch
• Miscellaneous components
• “ON” light POSITION DESCRIPTION
• Battery
ON The transmitter starts its operation
manually.
The transmitter is an electronic circuit which transmits RF (Radio Frequen-
cy) signals on the frequencies of 121.5 MHz, 243.0 MHz and 406.025 MHz. OFF The units is OFF but it can start oper-
ation automatically through the G-
The signals transmitted on 121.5 and 243.0 MHz are modulated in AM.They Switch operation.
are designated with the carrier amplitude modulated with an audio frequency
sweeping downward over a range of not less than 700 Hz, within the range ELT REMOTE SWITCH PANEL
of 1600 to 300 Hz.The sweep repetition rate is between 2 and 4 Hz with a The ELT remote switch panel is located on the main instrument panel, in the
modulation factor of at least 0.85. cockpit.It has an ON/ARM switch and a red LED (Light-Emitting Diode)
which indicates if the ELT is activated or not activated.The ON/ARM switch
The signal transmitted in 406.025 MHz is a digital information message.The has the following functions:
modulation is phase modulated and classified as 16K0G1D.Every 47.5 to
52.5 seconds the 5 W transmitter is turned on for 440 ms (short message)
or 520 ms (short message). Table 2: ELT Remote Switch Panel
The transmitter has a G-Switch that senses the aircraft longitudinal deceler- POSITION DESCRIPTION
ation.The G-Switch shall activate the ELT in accordance with the require-
ments as depicted in the response curve of the G-Switch. ON The transmitter starts its operation
Two criteria govern the performance of the G-Switch sensor: manually.
• A threshold force level (G th) below which the G-Switch sensor will not ARM It is the normal position for an auto-
respond. matic operation
Figure 2: Emergency Locator Transmitter System Schematic
ELT REMOTE SWITCH PANEL

(SDS 25-61) ELT ANTENNA
COCKPIT (MPP 25-61-02) MAIN INST PNL (SDS 25-61) CENTER
(MPP 25-61-03) FUS III UPPER
RH CBP
DC ESS BUS 2
D E
A
EXTERNAL ON
GROUND
RESET 1
RESET 2
28 VDC
LIGHT
ELT
B TX
5
ELT REMOTE
D SWITCH PANEL
BNC
TNC
C
ELT BUZZER
BULKHEAD
121.5/243 MHz
(REF.)
406 MHz
E
A
B
ELT ANTENNA
EMERGENCY LOCATOR
PWR
GND
BNC
TPS
LIGHT
CHASSIS
RESET 1
TRANSMITTER
RESET 2
EXTERNAL ON
LOOP
G-SWITCH
RF
HORN
TRANSMITTER
B C
ELT BUZZER AFT AVIONICS ELT - (EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER) AFT
(SDS 25-61) COMPT (SDS 25-61) AVIONICS COMPT
(MPP 25-61-01)
C
(MPP 25-61-05)
190
Operation
• 3 flashes indicates a 406.025 MHz transmitter problem.
The ELT can be operated either manually or automatically. • 5 flashes indicates there is no navigation data present.
Under normal conditions, the ON/ARM switch of the ELT remote switch pan- • 7 flashes indicates a battery problem.
el is in the ARM position and the ON/OFF switch of the ELT unit is in the OFF
position.Upon impact (a change velocity of 4.5 +/- 0.5 ft/s or if subjected to
30 G’s of cross axis forces) the G-Switch will automatically activate, activat-
ing the ELT.The LED, in the ELT remote switch panel, will continuously flash
and the swept tone will be audible.
For manual operation, the ON/OFF switch of the ELT unit or the ON/ARM
switch of the ELT remote switch panel must be at the ON position.These
switches can also be used to do the test of the ELT, which must be per-
formed within the first five minutes after the hour UTC (Universal Time Co-
ordinated) and cannot exceed 30 seconds.After approximately 47 seconds
the satellite system will consider the transmission as a valid distress signal.
If the ELT is activated accidentally, it can be reset through the ON/ARM

switch.The resetting is done when the switch is set to the ON position and
then immediately set again to the ARM position.It is also possible to reset
the ELT at the unit itself by positioning the ON/OFF switch on the ELT unit
to ON position, then immediately back down to the OFF position.The ELT
cannot be reset if either the ON/ARM switch of the ELT remote switch panel
or the ON/OFF switch of the ELT unit is in the ON position.
The DC ESS BUS 2 supplies power for the LED of the ELT remote switch
panel.
The status of the ELT, active or not active, is indicated on the ELT remote
switch panel.When the ELT is active, a continuous flashing light will be
present on the ELT remote switch panel.If a problem is detected, the light
provides a coded signal following the initial 1-second pulse.The coded signal
and related problems are as follows:
• 1 flash indicates a G-Switch loop open failure.
Figure 3: ELT Remote Switch Panel
ELT REMOTE
SWITCH PANEL
190
25-MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: ORIGINAL ¦ PAGE: ¦ ¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: ORIGINAL ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-1 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-2 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 25 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 25 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 10-05 Eye Locator C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦ ¦ 11-01 Pilot Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 10-07 Cockpit C ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ Cockpit convenience items, as ¦
¦ Convenience ¦ ¦ ¦ expressed in this MMEL are those ¦ ¦ 3) Longitudinal C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided backup ¦
¦ Item(s) ¦ ¦ ¦ items related to crewmember ¦ ¦ Seat ¦ ¦ ¦ system operates normally. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ convenience or comfort such as, but ¦ ¦ Adjustment ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ not limited to: cap holders, ash ¦ ¦ Systems ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ trays, footrests, etc. Items ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ addressed elsewhere in this ¦ ¦ 4) Lateral Seat C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided backup ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ document shall not be included. ¦ ¦ Adjustment ¦ ¦ ¦ system operates normally. ¦
¦ Systems ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 10-09 Chart Holders C ¦ 4 ¦ 2 ¦ May be inoperative or missing ¦ ¦ C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ provided one is available at each ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) It has failed with the ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ pilot station. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ affected seat at inboard ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ position, and ¦
¦ 11-01 Pilot Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Seat is acceptable to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ affected crewmember. ¦
¦ 1) Vertical Power C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ Seat ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected system is ¦ ¦ 5) Lumbar C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided seat is ¦
¦ Adjustment ¦ ¦ ¦ deactivated, and ¦ ¦ Supports ¦ ¦ ¦ acceptable to affected crewmember. ¦
¦ Systems ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Vertical Manual Seat ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Adjustment System operates ¦ ¦ 6) Armrests C ¦ 4 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ normally. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected armrest is stowed ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ in the retracted position, ¦
¦ 2) Vertical C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and ¦
¦ Manual Seat ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected seat has failed in ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Seat is acceptable to ¦
¦ Adjustment ¦ ¦ ¦ a position that permits ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ affected crewmember. ¦
¦ Systems ¦ ¦ ¦ normal pilots visibility, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Full flight control movement ¦ ¦ 7) Recline C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided seat is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ is available, and ¦ ¦ Functions ¦ ¦ ¦ acceptable to affected crewmember. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Position of seat is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ acceptable to flight crew. ¦ ¦ 8) Headrests C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided seat is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ acceptable to affected crewmember. ¦
¦ C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Vertical Power Seat Adjustment ¦ ¦ 9) Thigh Supports C ¦ 4 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided seat is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ System operates normally. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ acceptable to affected crewmember. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 25-MEL Page 1
MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-3 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-4 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 11-02 Primary A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ 12-15 Sunvisors C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ Observer Seat ¦ ¦ ¦ a) A passenger seat in the ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ provided there are no visual ¦
¦ (Including ¦ ¦ ¦ passenger cabin is made ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ restrictions to affected ¦
¦ associated ¦ ¦ ¦ available to an FAA ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ crewmember. ¦
¦ equipment) ¦ ¦ ¦ inspector for the ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ performance of official ¦ ¦ 12-17 Direct Vision C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ duties, and ¦ ¦ Window Sunshades ¦ ¦ ¦ provided there are no visual ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Repairs are made within two ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ restrictions to affected ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ crewmember. ¦
¦ A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ 13-03 Crew Baggage D ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative or missing | ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Required minimum safety ¦ ¦ *** Stowage Straps in ¦ ¦ ¦ provided crew baggage is properly | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ equipment (safety belt and ¦ ¦ the Cockpit ¦ ¦ ¦ stowed. | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ oxygen) is available, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Seat is acceptable to an FAA ¦ ¦ 20-02 Overhead Storage C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inspector for the ¦ ¦ Bin(s)/Cabin and ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Procedures are established ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ performance of official ¦ ¦ Galley Storage ¦ ¦ ¦ to secure compartment ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ duties, and ¦ ¦ Compartment/ ¦ ¦ ¦ CLOSED, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Repairs are made within two ¦ ¦ Closets ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Any emergency equipment ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ located in affected ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ compartment is considered ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 1: These provisos are ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ intended to provide for ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Affected compartment is not ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ occupancy of the above ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ used for storage of any ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat by an FAA inspector ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ item(s) except for those ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ when the minimum safety ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ permanently affixed. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ equipment (oxygen and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ safety belt) is functional ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Note: If no partitions are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and the inspector ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ installed, the entire ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ determines the conditions ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ overhead storage compartment ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to be acceptable. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ is considered one bin. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 2: The pilot-in-command will ¦ ¦ 20-03 Cabin/Galley C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ One latch per compartment may be | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ determine if the minimum ¦ ¦ Storage Latches ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative. | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ safety equipment is ¦ ¦ (Dual Latch ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ functional for other ¦ ¦ Installations) ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ persons authorized to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ occupy observer seat. ¦
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Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited

Chapter 25-MEL Page 2
190
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¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦ ¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: ORIGINAL ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-5 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-6 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 20-05 "Fasten Seat Belt C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ One or more signs or placards may ¦ ¦ 21-05 Passenger Seat(s) C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ While Seated" ¦ ¦ ¦ be illegible or missing provided a ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Seat does not block an ¦
¦ Signs or Placards ¦ ¦ ¦ legible sign or placard is readable ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Emergency Exit, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ from each occupied passenger seat. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Seat does not restrict any ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ passenger from access to the ¦
¦ 20-07 Passenger ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ Passenger convenience items, as ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ main aircraft aisle, and ¦
¦ Convenience ¦ ¦ ¦ expressed in this MMEL, are those ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) The affected seat(s) are ¦
¦ Item(s) ¦ ¦ ¦ related to passenger convenience, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ blocked and placarded "DO ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ comfort, or entertainment such as, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOT OCCUPY". ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ but not limited to, galley ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ equipment, movie equipment, ash ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 1: A seat with an inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ trays, stereo equipment, overhead ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat belt is considered ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ reading lamps. Items addressed ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ elsewhere in this document shall ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ not be included. (M) and (O) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 2: Inoperative seats do not ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ procedures may be required and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ affect the required number ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ included in the air carrier's ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ of Flight Attendants. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ appropriate document. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 3: Affected seat(s) may ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE: EXTERIOR LAVATORY DOOR ASH ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ include the seat(s) behind ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ TRAYS ARE NOT CONSIDERED ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and/or adjacent outboard ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ CONVENIENCE ITEMS. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seats. ¦
¦ 1) Recline C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative and seat ¦

¦ Mechanism ¦ ¦ ¦ occupied provided seat is secured ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ in the up-right position. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-7 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-8 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 21-05 Passenger Seat(s) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 21-20 Flight Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Seat Assembly ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (Single or Dual ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 2) Underseat C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ Position) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Baggage ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Baggage is not stowed under ¦
¦ Restraining ¦ ¦ ¦ seat with inoperative ¦ ¦ 1) Required B ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (M)(O)One seat position or assembly ¦
¦ Bars ¦ ¦ ¦ restraining bar, ¦ ¦ Flight ¦ ¦ ¦ (dual position) may be inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Associated seat is placarded ¦ ¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ "DO NOT STOW BAGGAGE UNDER ¦ ¦ Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected seat position or ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ THIS SEAT", and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat assembly is not ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Procedures are established ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ occupied, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to alert Cabin Crew of ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Flight attendant(s) ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative restraining bar. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ displaced by inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat(s) occupies either an ¦
¦ 3) Armrests C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative or missing and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ adjacent flight attendant ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat occupied provided: | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat or the passenger seat ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Armrest does not block an | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ which is most accessible to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Emergency Exit, | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the inoperative seat(s), so ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Armrest does not restrict | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ as to most effectively ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ any passenger from access to | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ perform assigned duties, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the main aircraft aisle, and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Alternate procedures are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) For an armrest with a | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used as ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ recline mechanism, seat is | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ published in crewmember ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ secured in an upright | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ manuals, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ position. | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ d) Folding type seat stows ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ automatically or is secured ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ e) Passenger seat assigned to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight attendant is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ placarded "FOR FLIGHT ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ATTENDANT USE ONLY". ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 1: An automatic folding seat ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ that will not stow ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ automatically is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. ¦
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190
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-7 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-8 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 21-05 Passenger Seat(s) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 21-20 Flight Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Seat Assembly ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (Single or Dual ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 2) Underseat C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ Position) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Baggage ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Baggage is not stowed under ¦
¦ Restraining ¦ ¦ ¦ seat with inoperative ¦ ¦ 1) Required B ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (M)(O)One seat position or assembly ¦
¦ Bars ¦ ¦ ¦ restraining bar, ¦ ¦ Flight ¦ ¦ ¦ (dual position) may be inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Associated seat is placarded ¦ ¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ "DO NOT STOW BAGGAGE UNDER ¦ ¦ Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected seat position or ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ THIS SEAT", and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat assembly is not ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Procedures are established ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ occupied, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to alert Cabin Crew of ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Flight attendant(s) ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative restraining bar. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ displaced by inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat(s) occupies either an ¦
¦ 3) Armrests C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative or missing and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ adjacent flight attendant ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat occupied provided: | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat or the passenger seat ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Armrest does not block an | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ which is most accessible to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Emergency Exit, | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the inoperative seat(s), so ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Armrest does not restrict | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ as to most effectively ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ any passenger from access to | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ perform assigned duties, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the main aircraft aisle, and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Alternate procedures are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) For an armrest with a | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used as ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ recline mechanism, seat is | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ published in crewmember ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ secured in an upright | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ manuals, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ position. | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ d) Folding type seat stows ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ e) Passenger seat assigned to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight attendant is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ placarded "FOR FLIGHT ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ATTENDANT USE ONLY". ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 1: An automatic folding seat ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ that will not stow ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ automatically is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 25-9 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-10 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 21-20 Flight Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 21-20 Flight Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ Seat Assembly ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Seat Assembly ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (Single or Dual ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (Single or Dual ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Position) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Position) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 1) Required ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 2: A seat position with an ¦ ¦ 2) Excess Flight ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 1: An automatic folding seat ¦
¦ Flight ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative or missing ¦ ¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ that will not stow ¦
¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ restraint system is ¦ ¦ Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ automatically is ¦
¦ Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. ¦ ¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. ¦
¦ (Cont'd) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 3: Individual operators, when ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 2: A seat position with an ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ operating with inoperative ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative or missing ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seats, will consider the ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ restraint system is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ locations and combinations ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ of seats to ensure that ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the proximity to exits and ¦ ¦ 22-04 Passenger Service C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ distribution requirements ¦ ¦ Unit (PSU) ¦ ¦ ¦ alternate procedures are | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ of the applicable FAR are ¦ ¦ Test/Reset ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used. | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ met. ¦ ¦ Switches ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE 4: If one side of a dual seat ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ assembly is inoperative ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and a flight attendant is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ displaced to the adjacent ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ seat, the adjacent seat ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ must operate normally. ¦
¦ 2) Excess Flight C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided: ¦

¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected seat position or ¦
¦ Seats ¦ ¦ ¦ seat assembly is not ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ occupied, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Folding type seat stows ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ in the retracted position. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦ ¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-11 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-12 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 25-00 Flight Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ 30-03 Galley Waste C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided: ¦

¦ Panels (FAP) ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ Receptacles ¦ ¦ ¦ a) The container is empty and ¦
¦ Access ¦ ¦ ¦ the access is secured to ¦
¦ 1) Forward FAP B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ Doors/Covers ¦ ¦ ¦ prevent waste introduction ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Aft FAP is operative, | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ into the compartment, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Passenger Service Unit (PSU) | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Procedures are established ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Test/Reset Switches are | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to ensure that sufficient ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative, and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ galley waste receptacles are ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Lavatory Smoke Test Switches | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ available to accommodate all ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are considered inoperative. | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ waste that may be generated ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ on a flight. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE: Any function on the FAP | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ which operates normally may | ¦ ¦ 34-03 Wheelchair D ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ As required by regulations. | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ be used. | ¦ ¦ *** Restraint System ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ 2) Aft FAP B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ 40-03 Exterior Lavatory ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Forward FAP is operative, | ¦ ¦ Door Ashtrays ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Water/Waste System | ¦ ¦ 1) Airplanes with A ¦ - ¦ - ¦ One may be missing provided it is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ indications are considered | ¦ ¦ more than one ¦ ¦ ¦ replaced within 10 calendar days. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative. | ¦ ¦ exterior ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ lavatory door ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE: Any function on the FAP | ¦ ¦ ashtrays ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ which operates normally may | ¦ ¦ installed ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ be used. | ¦
¦ 2) Airplanes with A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May be missing provided it is ¦
¦ 27-01 Drop-Down Window D ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided it | ¦ ¦ only one ¦ ¦ ¦ replaced within 3 calendar days. ¦
¦ on Aft Cabin ¦ ¦ ¦ is removed or secured in the down | ¦ ¦ exterior ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Divider ¦ ¦ ¦ position. | ¦ ¦ lavatory door ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ashtray ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ installed ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 61-00 Emergency D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦

¦ *** Locator ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be inoperative. ¦
¦ Transmitter (ELT) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-13 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 25-14 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 62-01 Emergency Medical ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 62-05 Pyrotechnic D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦

¦ Equipment ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Signal Devices ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be inoperative or missing. ¦
¦ 1) First Aid Kits D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦ ¦ 62-07 Flight Deck/ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ and/or ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be incomplete, missing or ¦ ¦ Attendant ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Associated ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative. The number of kits ¦ ¦ Flashlight and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Equipment ¦ ¦ ¦ required by the FARs must contain ¦ ¦ Holder Assemblies ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the minimum content as required by ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the FARs. ¦ ¦ 1) Flashlight C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ provided crewmember assigned to ¦
¦ 2) Emergency D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ associated seat has a flashlight of ¦
¦ Medical Kit ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be incomplete, missing or ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ equivalent characteristics readily ¦
¦ and/or ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative provided that at least ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ available. ¦
¦ Associated ¦ ¦ ¦ one kit contains the minimum ¦
¦ Equipment ¦ ¦ ¦ content required by the FARs. ¦ ¦ 2) Holder C ¦ - ¦ - ¦ May be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ Assembly ¦ ¦ ¦ provided alternate stowage means ¦
¦ 3) Automated D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are provided. ¦
¦ External ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be incomplete, missing or ¦
¦ Defibrillator ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative provided that at least ¦ ¦ 62-09 Overwing Escape D ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative or missing | ¦
¦ (AED) and/or ¦ ¦ ¦ one kit contains the minimum ¦ ¦ *** Hatch Lifeline ¦ ¦ ¦ provided airplane is not operated | ¦
¦ Associated ¦ ¦ ¦ content required by the FARs. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ on extended overwater flights. | ¦
¦ Equipment ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 62-02 Flotation D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦

¦ Equipment (Crew ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ and Passenger) ¦ ¦ ¦ provided required distribution is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ maintained. ¦
¦ 62-03 Megaphones D ¦ - ¦ - ¦ Any in excess of those required by ¦

¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ FAR may be inoperative or missing ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Inoperative megaphone is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ removed from the passenger ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ cabin, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Required distribution is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ maintained. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190
190
ATA 29 Hydraulic power

190
Table of Content The flow limiter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Pump Un-Loader Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
29-00 Hydraulic power general System 1, 2 and 3 filter manifold assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Filter Element and Bowl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Hydraulic system 1, 2 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Pressure transducers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
The Hydraulic control panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Heat exchanger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Switching logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Hydraulic systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Firewall shut-off valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Electrical power generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The accumulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Accumulator Pressure Gauge/ Fill Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
29-10 Main Hydraulic System general
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 29-30 Hydraulic System Indication
Normal operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Hydraulic synoptic page and EICAS indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 EICAS Message - HYD 1 or HYD 2 LO PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Bootstrap reservoir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 EICAS Message - HYD 3 LO PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
A temperature transducer monitors hydraulic fluid temperature in the EICAS Message - HYD PTU FAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
reservoir, and displays the information on the EICAS. . . . . . . . . . 11 EICAS Message - HYD 1 or 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
EDP and ACMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 EDP - De-pressurization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
EDP installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Solenoid Valve and Depressurization Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 29-MEL (Example)
AC Motor driven pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Manual Mode Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Automatic Mode Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
190
190
29-00 Hydraulic power general

Introduction
The EMBRAER 190 uses three independent hydraulic systems to power:
• the primary and secondary flight controls,

• the landing gear,
• the brakes,
• the nose wheel steering and
• the thrust reversers.
All three hydraulic systems use phosphate-ester hydraulic fluid type IV or V,

and operate at a nominal supply pressure of 3,000psig.
Figure 1: Hydraulic systems
The EMBRAER uses three independent hydraulic systems to power:
The primary and secondary flight controls
The landing gear
The brakes
The nosewheel steering
The thrust reversers
190
Hydraulic system 1, 2 and 3
System 1 and 2 are powered by an engine driven pump, EDP, and backed
up by an AC motor-driven pump, ACMP.
The ACMP is used during take-off and landing, and powers the system in
the event of an engine or EDP failure.
A power transfer unit is installed between the two systems to transfer hy-
draulic power from system 1 to system 2 without mixing fluid between the
systems. This is used for landing gear retraction and extension in the event
of an engine- or EDP failure.
System 3 is powered by an AC motor-driven pump, and uses an additional

ACMP as a backup.
L/H Outboard Elevator Elevator inboard

Upper Rudder
Aileron inboard
GS2 GS1
MFS 3-4 MFS 5
L/H thrust rev R/H thrust rev
Outboard brakes Inboard brakes
Emerg/park brakes
Landing gear
Nose wheel steering
R/H Elevator
Lower Rudder
Aileron Outboard
190
The Hydraulic control panel When in AUTO mode, the ACMP will automatically start when the following
conditions are true:
The hydraulic control panel, located in the cockpit overhead panel, allows • ACMP 1B and 2B will start when the flaps are selected to any posi-
the crew to manually control the engine-driven pumps, the AC motor-driven tion unequal to flaps 0, providing back-up power during take-off and
pumps and the power transfer unit for all three hydraulic systems. landing.
• ACMP 1B and 2B will also turn on automatically in case the EDP of
During normal operation, the ACMPs and the PTU are controlled automati- the respective side fails.
cally when the respective rotary switch is selected to AUTO. An exception is • ACMP 3B will be turned on if ACMP 3A is not operational.
the ACMP 3A, which can only be manually controlled to either ON or OFF
• The PTU will start to operate if EDP 2A fails during take-off or land-
ing.
TAB LE - MAIN HYDRAULIC POWE R - GE NE RAL DES CR IP TION

R EF CONT ROL/INDICATOR P OS IT ION/INDICATION F UNC TION
1 SY S 1 ENG P UMP S HUTOFF switch O FF C loses the No. 1 hydraulic s ys tem firewall s hutoff valve.
2 SY S 2 ENG P UMP S HUTOFF switch O FF C loses the No. 2 hydraulic s ys tem firewall s hutoff valve.
OFF D e-energizes AC MP 1B .
Automatically energizes AC MP 1B if EDP pres s ure decreas es dur-
3 SY S 1 ELEC PUMP switch AUTO
ing takeoff or landing.
ON E nergizes AC MP 1B .
Automatically energizes AC MP 2B if EDP pres s ure decreas es dur-
4 SY S 2 ELEC PUMP switch AUTO
ing takeoff or landing.
OFF D e-energizes AC MP 3A.
5 SY S 3 ELEC PUMP A s witch
ON E nergizes AC MP 3A.
Automatically energizes AC MP 3B if AC MP 3A pres s ure de-
6 SY S 3 ELEC PUMP B s witch AUTO
creas es .
OFF D e-energizes the P TU select valve.
Automatically energizes the P TU select valve, which causes the
7 PT U s witch AUTO P TU to operate, if the right engine or EDP s tops during takeoff or
landing.
ON E nergizes the P TU select valve, which causes the PT U to operate.
Figure 3: Control panel
HYDRAULIC
ENG PUMP PTU ENG PU
SHUTOFF SHUTO
AUTO
OFF ON
S S
Y ELEC PUMP ELEC PUMP Y
S S
AUTO AUTO
1 OFF ON OFF ON 2 OC
CL K
ET
ST A R
ES
T-
S T OP - R
TC CS
SYS 3
ELEC PUMP A ELEC PUMP B
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
When in AUTO mode, the ACMP for system 1 and 2 will automatically
start when the following conditions are true:
The flaps are selected to any position unequal to flaps 0
During take-off and landing
n case the EDP of the respective side fails
190
Switching logic
ACMPs 1B, 2B, 3B, and the PTU use a three position double pole switch
while ACMP 3A uses a DPDT switch. Each back up ACMP has its own rotary
switch that can put the ACMP or PTU into AUTO control, OFF, or ON.
In AUTO mode, ACMPs 1B and 2B turn ON automatically when the flaps are
extended for take-off and landing and turn OFF when the flaps are stowed,
or when primary pump pressure is lost.
ACMP 3B in AUTO mode only activates when ACMP 3A is lost and does not
activate during take-off and landing.
Similarly, the PTU in AUTO mode turns ON when EDP 2A fails during take-
off and landing.
Since ACMP 3A is the primary power source on System 3 and is always ON
during normal flight operations, its rotary switch has only two positions, ON
or OFF.
The automatic control logic for ACMPs 1B, 2B, and 3B and the PTU is im-
plemented in the SPDAs. There is no automatic logic associated with ACMP
3A, it is either ON or OFF.
A direct hard wire connection is provided from the cockpit switches to the
ICCs for each hydraulic pump. This will allow these pumps to be manually
selected ON if its respective SPDA goes off-line.
Figure 4: Switching logic
OFF OFF
AUTO AUTO
MAU 1 MAU 2
ON ON
OFF OFF
AUTO
AUTO
SPDA 2 SPDA 2
ON ON
+28 +28
OFF ACMP OFF ACMP
AUTO 1B AUTO 3B
ON ON
RIGHT RIGHT
ICC ICC
ACMP 1B Cockpit Sw. ACMP 3B Cockpit Sw. OFF
MAU 2
AC BUS 2 AC BUS 2 ON
ACMP
3A
OFF
EMER
ON AC ESS BUS
ICC
OFF OFF
+28
AUTO AUTO
ACMP 3A Cockpit Sw. RAT
MAU 2 MAU 1
ON
ON
GCU
OFF
OFF
AUTO
SPDA 1 AUTO
ON SPDA 1
ON
+28
OFF ACMP +28
AUTO 2B OFF
ON AUTO
LEFT ON
ICC PTU
Select
ACMP 2B Cockpit Sw.
Valve
AC BUS 1 PTU Cockpit Sw.
190
PTU
AUTO
OFF ON
ENG PUMP ENG PUMP
SHUTOFF SHUTOFF
S S
Y Y
S ELEC PUMP ELEC PUMP S
1 AUTO AUTO 2
OFF ON OFF ON
SYS 3
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
(SDS 24-64) (SDS 29-10) (SDS 24-61)

(MPP 24-64-00) (MPP 29-10-01) (MPP 24-51-03)
RH CBP COCKPIT HYDRAULIC OVERHEAD PANEL RICC MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT
DC BUS 2 AC BUS 2
ELEC
35 35 35
AUTO
PUMP
OFF
5 AUTO
ON
SYS 1 OFF ON
ACMP 1B
C
A
B
ACMP 1B ON
ACMP 1B COMMAND
ACMP 1B AUTO
ACMP 1B AUTO
ACMP 1B RLY STATUS

(GENERIC I/O MOD 11)
PHASE
B
(MPP 29-11-02)
ACMP 1B
LEFT WING FAIIRING
(SSM 31-41-80) MAU 1 (SSM 24-61-80) SPDA 2
Figure 5:
HYDRAULIC
PTU
AUTO
OFF ON
ENG PUMP ENG PUMP
SHUTOFF SHUTOFF
S S
Y Y
1 AUTO AUTO 2
OFF ON OFF ON
SYS 3
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
(SDS 29-11)
(SDS 24-64) (SDS 29-10) (MPP 29-31-02)
(MPP 24-64-00) (MPP 29-10-01) PTU PRESS SW
LH CBP COCKPIT HYDRAULIC OVERHEAD PANEL FUSELAGE CENTER SECTION
DC BUS 1
PTU 5 AUTO
OFF ON
ON
AUTO
OFF
PTU
SELECTOR PTU
VALVE PRESSURE
SWITCH
(SSM 29-11-82)
PTU ON
PTU AUTO
PTU AUTO
PTU VALVE COMMAND

PTU PRESS SW
PTU PRESS SW
(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
(GENERIC I/O-MOD 11)

C
(SDS 29-11)
(MPP 29-11-17)
(SSM 31-41-80) (SSM 24-61-80) SPDA 1 (SSM 31-41-80)
PTU SELECTOR VALVE
MAU 2 FORWARD FORWARD AVIONICS COMPT MAU 1 FORWARD
FUS CENTER SECTION
AVIONICS COMPT AVIONICS COMPT
190
HYDRAULIC
PTU
AUTO
OFF ON
ENG PUMP ENG PUMP
SHUTOFF SHUTOFF
S S
Y Y
1 AUTO AUTO 2
OFF ON OFF ON
SYS 3
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
(SDS 24-64) (SDS 24-64) (SDS 29-10) (SDS 24-61) (SDS 24-61)
(MPP 24-64-00) (MPP 24-64-00) (MPP 29-10-01) (MPP 24-61-00) (MPP 24-61-00)
LH CBP COCKPIT RH CBP COCKPIT HYDRAULIC OVERHEAD PANEL RICC MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT EICC FORWARD AVIONICS COMPT
DC ESS BUS 1 DC BUS 2 AC BUS 2 AC ESS BUS
HYD 3 HYD 3
ELEC ELEC PUMP B PUMP A
PUMP 5 PUMP 5 PWR 35 PWR 35
SYS 3A SYS 3B
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
ON
ON
AUTO
OFF
OFF
A
ACMP 3A ACMP 3B
J19
J3
ACMP 3B COMMAND
C
A
B
ACMP 3B AUTO
ACMP 3A OFF
ACMP 3B AUTO
ACMP 3A ON
ACMP 3B ON
ACMP 3B RLY STATUS
ACMP 3A RLY STATUS

(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
PHASE
PHASE
B A
(MPP 29-11-02) (MPP 29-11-02)
ACMP 3B ACMP 3A
REAR FUSELAGE REAR FUSELAGE
(SSM 31-41-80) (SSM 31-41-80) (SSM 24-61-80) SPDA 2 (SSM 31-41-80)

MAU 2 FORWARD MAU 1 FORWARD MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT SPDA 1 FWD
AVIONICS COMPT AVIONICS COMPT AVIONICS COMPT
A B
HYDRAULIC
PTU
AUTO
OFF ON
ENG PUMP ENG PUMP
SHUTOFF SHUTOFF
S S
Y Y
1 AUTO AUTO 2
OFF ON OFF ON
SYS 3
ON AUTO
OFF OFF ON
(MPP 29-10-01) (SDS 31-15) (SSM 31-41-80) MAU 2 (SSM 26-21-82) (SDS 26-21) ENG 2 SHUTOFF/ (SSM 24-61-80)
HYDRAULIC OVERHEAD PANEL FORWARD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT EXTINGUISHING SW OVERHEAD PANEL IH CBP COCKPIT
HOT BATT BUS 2

28VDC
(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
HYDR SOV 2 CLOSED

SHUTOFF COMMAND
NOT SHUTOFF
HYDR SOV 2 OPEN
SHUTOFF
DC SN DC
CLOSED
DC
COMMAND
OPEN
CLOSED
INSTRUMENT
AND PANEL
LIGHTS
(SSM 33-12-80)
(SDS 33-12)
J4
J3
A
OPEN
CLOSED
HYDR FIREWALL
SHUTOFF VALVE 2
A
(MPP 29-11-11) (SDS 29-11) SYS 2 (SSM 24-61-80) RICC MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
HYD FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE RIGHT PYLON
190
Hydraulic systems
The hydraulic system is designed in such a way that even a failure of two
hydraulic systems will not result in a complete loss of flight-critical functions. Hydraulic system 3, installed in the aft fuselage, supplies:
• the left and right outboard aileron PCU’s

The following hydraulic users are powered by hydraulic system 1, installed
in the left centre fuselage bay: • right outboard elevator PCU and
• the lower rudder PCU
• left outboard elevator PCU
• ground spoiler pair 2
• multi function spoiler pairs 3 and 4
• left thrust reverser
• outboard brakes
• emergency/parking brake and
• the upper rudder PCU
System 2, located in the right centre fuselage bay, powers:
• the left and right inboard aileron PCU’s

• left and right inboard elevator PCU’s
• multi function spoiler pair 5
• ground spoiler pair 1
• landing gear
• nose wheel steering
• inboard brakes
• emergency/parking brake
• right thrust reverser and
• the ventral air brake
Hydraulic system 3, installed in the aft fuselage, supplies:
• the left and right outboard aileron PCU’s
Aileron R udder
Hydraulic S ys tem C omponents:
Filter Manifold
R es ervoir
P res s /T emp S ensing MFS
R elief V alves #5
Accumulator
MFS
P riority V alves T hrus t #4
T hermal B ypas s V alves R everser
C as e-Drain Filter Manifold MFS
#3
P ump Un-Loader V alve Multi-F unction S poilers
F low Limiter V alve
Quick Dis connects Landing G ear
GS
#2 G round S poilers
S teering
GS
#1
E le vator
GS
#1 Heat
B rakes E xchangers
Legend
GS
#2
S ys tem 1 C omponent
S ys tem 2 C omponent MFS

#3
MFS
#4
MFS
E ngine-Driven P ump #5
AC Motor-Driven P ump
P TU
190
Electrical power generators
The Emb 190 aircraft has four electrical power generators: an Integrated
Drive Generator (IDG) on each engine, an IDG on the Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) and an AIr Driven Generator (ADG) on the Ram Air Turbine (RAT).
During normal flight operations the two engine IDGs supply the electrical
power with the left engine supplying AC bus 1 and DC bus 1, and the right
engine supplying AC bus 2 and DC bus 2. The IDG on the APU is available
for ground operation of the Hydraulic System and can be used in flight if nec-
essary. The ADG on the RAT is only used in the event of a dual engine fail-
ure and supplies the AC essentials bus and the DC essential bus.
The ACMPs on Systems 1 and 2 are each powered by the AC bus supplied
by the generator on the opposite engine, so that system availability is main-
tained in the event of a single engine or generator failure, although at a re-
duced flow capacity. In the event of the loss of a single engine or generator
some Hydraulic System monitoring and display functions will be lost and the
operation of some of the backup pumps will be lost.
Appropriate attention has been paid to the layout of both the hydraulic sys-
tem and the electrical system to ensure that a common failure cannot cause
the loss of more than two hydraulic systems, either directly or indirectly due
to loss of electrical power. The maximum segregation of tubing and wiring
has been applied in order to maximize the remaining system functions in the
event of an external fault.
Figure 7: Electrical power generators
Hydraulic System Electrical Installation Schematic
ENG ENG
#1 IDG IDG #2
#1 APU #2
EDP EDP
1A 2A
AC BUS 1 AC BUS 2
ACMP ACMP ACMP

2B TRU TRU 1B 3B
ADG
ACMP 2B Sys #2 RLC ACMP 1B
Contactor DC BUS 1 Press Xdcr DC BUS 2 Contactor
PTU AC ESS Sys #1 ACMP 3B
ACMP 3
Select Valve Press Xdcr Contactor
Temp Sw ACMP
TRU 3A
EDP 2 EDP 1
De-Press DC ESS 1 DC ESS 3 DC ESS 2 De-Press
ACMP 3A PUV FLV
Contactor Sys #3
Press Xdcr
EDP 1A EDP 2A
FWSOV HOT BATT 1 HOT BATT 2 FWSOV
EDP 1A EDP 2A
Temp Sw Temp Sw
190
29-10 Main Hydraulic System general

Introduction
Each of the three independent hydraulic systems include the necessary

components for supplying clean, pressure-regulated oil to the hydraulic us-
ers.
A bootstrap reservoir in each system provides pump inlet pressure and ac-
commodates the oil volume change in the system. Contaminants are re-
moved from the oil through filters in the pump discharge and case drain lines
and in the main system return line.
The flow of pump case drain oil through a hydraulic fluid-to-fuel heat ex-
changer for systems 1 and 2 is designed to prevent temperature extremes.
System 3 relies only on radiation and convection for dissipating heat. An

electrically-commanded shutoff valve in the engine-driven pump suction line
isolates the flow of fluid in the EDP in the event of fire.
System #1 System #2 System #3

BOOTSTRAP BOOTSTRAP BOOTSTRAP
RESERVOIR RESERVOIR RESERVOIR

AC AC
ENGINE M MOTOR ENGINE M MOTOR AC M M
DRIVEN PUMP DRIVEN PUMP MOTOR
PUMP PUMP PUMP
1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B
AP6VSC -124 PMP05V-- 34
PMP05V AP6VSC -124 PMP05V-- 34
PMP05V
PMP05V-- 34
PMP05V PMP05V--34
PMP05V
FILTER MANIFOLD FILTER MANIFOLD

FILTER MANIFOLD
L.H. Thrust R.H. Thrust

PV PV
Reverser Reverser PV
System System
ACCUMULATOR System Priority
ACCUMULATOR L.H.+R.H. G.S. #2 L.H.+R.H. G.S. #1 Valve
ACCUMULATOR
L.H.+R.H. M.F.S. #3 L.H.+R.H. M.F.S. #4 L.H.+R.H. M.F.S. #5
L.H. Inboard R.H. Inboard L.H. Outboard R.H. Outboard

AILERON AILERON AILERON AILERON
L.H. Outboard Upper L.H. Inboard R.H. Inboard Lower R.H. Outboard
ELEVATOR (A/S) RUDDER (A/S) ELEVATOR (A/S) ELEVATOR (A/S) RUDDER (A/S) ELEVATOR (A/S)
Outboard BRAKE Inboard BRAKE

System System
Emergency/Park PV
Brake BRAKE
Brake Airbrake
ACCUMULATOR ACCUMULATOR (ERJ--170 only)
(ERJ
PTU Selector
Valve
PV
Nose Wheel
LANDING GEAR
Steering
MPP1C--12
MPP1C Retraction Extension
Nose Main
190
Normal operation
The normal operation of the Emb 190 Hydraulic System is largely automatic
with very little pilot input required. The System 3 backup pump, ACMP 3B, is not switched on during this phase
as there are no high flow demands on System 3 and, because ACMP 3A is
The system architecture and control philosophy is such that it can cope with on the AC essentials bus, System 3 would not be affected by the loss of an
most abnormal aircraft operating conditions or Hydraulic System failures engine. This also simplifies the control logic, which would otherwise require
with requiring pilot action. that ACMP 1B and ACMP 3B have staggered starts because they are both
on AC bus 2 and would overload the circuit breaker if both pumps attempted
Start-up procedures for the Hydraulic System are contained in the Aircraft to start simultaneously.
Flight Manual (AFM) and very simple.
During the climb, cruise and descent flight phases the Hydraulic System
As Systems 1 and 2 have EDPs as the primary pumps the systems will pres- uses just the primary pumps to provide the power required by the flight con-
surize with engine start. Operating the switch for SYS 3 ELEC PUMP A on trols. The system accumulators are also available to provide supplementary
the cockpit control panel starts the System 3 primary pump. The remaining power to make-up momentary shortfalls in flow due to transient events such
ACMP switches and the PTU switch must all be set to AUTO before flight. as collision avoidance, etc., in any flight phase.
Should a switch not be in the right position for flight then an EICAS message
will be displayed to alert the flight crew that a switch is not correctly set.
Under extreme low temperature operating conditions the AFM details a spe-
cific Hydraulic System start procedure that will raise the hydraulic fluid tem-
perature to its minimum operating temperature before the aircraft is ready for
flight.
This procedure involves running the ACMPs for fifteen minutes before en-
gine start and then running the ACMPs and the EDPs for a further ten min-
utes after engine start while the engines are warming up. During this period
the PTU will also be run to ensure that all of the cold fluid is displaced from
its circuits. Some cycling of the Hydraulic System users is also required to
ensure that cold hydraulic fluid has been displaced from their circuits.
When the aircraft is ready for takeoff ACMPs 1B and 2B will come on auto-
matically when the flaps are extended, under control of the SPDAs. This will
result in the pumps being warm and already running should an EDP or en-
gine failure occur during takeoff and thus minimize the effect of switching to
the backup pump.
Once takeoff is complete and the aircraft has commenced to climb the back-
up pumps will switch off when the flaps are stowed.
Figure 2: System 1
L. H. THRUST To
REVERSER System 2 R
34
C
1 37
20
PTU
EDP 33
P
C
1A
Thermal Fuel/Oil
S P Heat
Bypass
3 Valve Exchanger Upper
2 10 Filter Manifold 26 23 22 8
RUDDER
Pylon 15m
15mm PTU
Firewall Case drain filter Selector
24 L. H. Outboard
Valve
35
32
31
Pressure Switch Pressure filter ELEVATOR
5mm
Firewall Priority Valve L & R G..S. #2

16 20
Shutoff Pressure
Valve 5 RV Return Transducer 19
Filter 21 17
L & R M.F.S. #3
4 6 5mm
P
System
ACMP Accumulator
1B Dump L & R M.F.S. #4
C S Valve
36
Ground Fill Temperature
28
Transducer
30
Emergency/Park
Ground Quantity
Pressure R BRAKE
Gauge
15m
15 mm Bootstrap
12 Reservoir Outboard BRAKE
System
SSV
Relief / Bleed Valve 13

Brake Accumulator
29
Ground 36
27
Return Ecology Bottle
190
Normal Operation
When the aircraft is ready for takeoff ACMPS 1B and 2B will come on auto-
matically when the flaps are extended, under control of the SPDAs. This will
result in the pumps being warm and already running should an EDP or en-
gine failure occur during takeoff and thus minimize the effect of switching to
the backup pump.
Once takeoff is complete and the aircraft has commenced to climb the back-
up pumps will switch off when the flaps are stowed. The System 3 backup
pump, ACMP 3B, is not switched on during this phase as there are no high
flow demands on System 3 and, because ACMP 3A is on the AC essential
bus, System 3 would not be affected by the loss of an engine. This also sim-
plifies the control logic, which would otherwise require that ACMP 1B and
ACMP 3B have staggered starts because they are both on AC bus 2 and
would overload the circuit breaker if both pumps attempted to start simulta-
neously.
During the climb, cruise and descent flight phases the Hydraulic System
uses just the primary pumps to provide the power required by the flight con-
trols. The system accumulators are also available to provide supplementary
power to make-up any momentary shortfalls in flow due to transient events
such as collision avoidance, etc., in any flight phase.
Figure 3: System 2
15µm
C AS E-DR AIN
F ILTE R
G ROUND
P RES S .
B ALL P RES S UR E P RES S UR E
AT T ENUATOR S WITC H T RANS DUCE R
F LOW
5µm LIMIT ER LOWER R UDDER
C P V ALVE
ACMP P RIOR IT Y
P RES S UR E
3A V ALVE
S WITC H F ILTE R
S P UMP R . H. OUT BOAR D
MANIF OLD S YS TE M
AC C UMULAT OR E LE VATOR
V ALVE
5µm
C R . H. OUT BOAR D
P
ACMP Dump T EMPE RATURE AILER ON
3B V alve T RANS DUCE R
S
R L. H. OUT BOAR D
T EMPE RATURE QUANT IT Y BOOTS TR AP
S WITC H AILER ON
G AUGE R E S E ROIR
V
SSV
E COLOGY R ELIE F/BLE E D/
B OT T LE S AMPLE V ALVE
G ROUND E COLOGY
R ET UR N B OT T LE
L EG END :
P RES S UR E
No. 3 HYDRA UL IC S YS TE M
S UC TION
R ET UR N
C AS E-DR AIN
NIT ROGE N G AS
190
Operation
Operation of the hydraulic systems is mostly automatic with very little pilot
input required. The system architecture and control philosophy is such that manifold. The filter manifold filters the fluid before it is distributed to the user
it can cope with most abnormal aircraft operating conditions of Hydraulic systems. This pressurized flow also creates a pressure within the reservoirs.
System failures without requiring pilot action. The flight crew is notified of ab- This allows the reservoirs to maintain a positive fluid-supply pressure at
normal conditions by the MFD hydraulic synoptic page (if being observed) each of the system pump inlets. The No.3 hydraulic system does not have a
and by CAS messages, aural tones, and flashing indicators. heat exchanger, instead it relies on convection and radiation alone for dissi-
pating heat.
ACMP 3A is the primary source of hydraulic fluid pressure for the No. 3 hy-
draulic system. ACMP 3B will automatically supplement 3A if additional fluid
flow is required. The No.3 hydraulic system ACMPs are controlled by switch-
es on the Hydraulic System control panel, on the overhead panel in the
cockpit.
ACMP 3A OFF/ON switch must be set to ON before flight.
ACMP 3B OFF/ON/AUTO switch must be set to AUTO before flight. Should
either switch not be in the correct position for flight, then an EICAS message
will be displayed to alert the flight crew that a switch is not correctly set.
In the event of the loss of both engines, the No.3 hydraulic system becomes
the primary hydraulic system for the aircraft. There are sufficient flight con-
trols on the No.3 hydraulic system to maintain control over the aircraft in all
three axis and enable a controlled landing to be performed.
With the loss of both engines ACMP 3A will initially go off-line due to the loss
of the electrical power when the IDG (Integrated Drive Generator)s go of-
fline. The accumulator will provide power to the lower rudder, right outboard
elevator and both outboard ailerons until the RAT is deployed and operating,
which will provide power to the AC ESS BUS that ACMP 3A is connected to.
At RAT deployment SPDA (Secondary Power Distribution Assembly) 2 com-
mands the pump unloader to open, which reduces the fluid flow through
ACMP 3A and the flow limiter valve to open, which reduces the fluid flow to
the users to 1.75 to 2 gal/min., this allows the RAT to spin up to speed faster.
When the RAT has spooled up and is producing power to the AC ESS BUS,
ACMP will start and the pump unloader valve will be commanded to close
and system pressure will increase to normal pressure. The flow limiter valve
will remain on as long as the RAT is deployed or the RAT GEN is producing
power.
The hydraulic fluid delivered to the pumps is stored in the system fluid res-
ervoir. The pressurized fluid output from the pumps passes first into a filter
Figure 4: System 3
15µm
CASE-DRAIN
FILTERS
15µm
GROUND
PRESS.
BALL PRESSURE PRESSURE
ATTENUATOR SWITCH TRANSDUCER
FLOW
5µm LIMITER LOWER RUDDER
C P VALVE
ACMP PRIORITY
PRESSURE
3A VALVE
SWITCH FILTER
S PUMP R. H. OUTBOARD
MANIFOLD SYSTEM
ACCUMULATOR ELEVATOR
VALVE
5µm
C R. H. OUTBOARD
P
ACMP Dump TEMPERATURE AILERON
3B Valve TRANSDUCER
S
R L. H. OUTBOARD
QUANTITY BOOTSTRAP
AILERON
GAUGE RESERVOIR
SSV
ECOLOGY RELIEF/BLEED/
BOTTLE SAMPLE VALVE
GROUND ECOLOGY
RETURN BOTTLE
PRESSURE
SUCTION
RETURN
CASE-DRAIN
NITROGEN GAS
190
Figure 5: System 2 and 3
Figure 6: system 1
190
Bootstrap reservoir
Each of the three hydraulic system reservoirs are of the bootstrap type, us-
ing system high-pressure fluid acting on a piston to supply pressurized fluid
to the pumps.
The reservoirs for system 1 have a minimum fluid storage capacity of 12.3
litres and for system 2 14.7 litres, while the reservoir for system 3 has a min-
imum capacity of 6.15 litres. The reservoirs contain a quantity indicator,
measuring the remaining fluid volume in the reservoir.
A dial gauge,visible to ground personnel, indicates fluid quantity left in the

reservoir. This information is also displayed in the cockpit on the EICAS syn-
optic display. In the event of low fluid quantity a message will be displayed
on the EICAS for the respective system.
A temperature transducer monitors hydraulic fluid temperature in the

reservoir, and displays the information on the EICAS.
Figure 7: Reservoir
190
EDP and ACMP
The two Engine Driven Pumps (EDP) are variable-delivery hydraulic engine-
driven pumps, mounted to the engine gearbox.
Pressurized hydraulic fluid is supplied to the EDP via the suction line. The
pump provides hydraulic pressure to hydraulic systems 1 and 2 whenever
the respective engine is running. It supplies the desired system pressure by
varying the volume of fluid output to the system, depending on system flow
demand.
The pump produces a rated discharge pressure of 3000 psig, and has a rat-
ted output flow of 22.4 gallons per minute.
The ACMP is also a pressure-compensated type, similar to the EDP, but is

driven by an electric AC motor.
Pump operation can be automatic or manual, using the respective rotary

switch in the cockpit.
The ACMPs on system 1 and 2 are powered by the electrical AC bus nor-
mally supplied by the generator installed on the opposite side, ensuring the
function of each system in case of engine failure.
On hydraulic system 3 the ACMP 3B is powered by the AC bus 2, and the

ACMP 3A is powered by the AC essential bus, which can also be powered
by the Ram Air Turbine (RAT).
Figure 8: EDP
20
40
30
10
B
190
EDP installation
The EDP is attached to the engine’s accessories gearbox by means of a V-

band clamp in order to provide a simple installation that facilitates the quick
removal and replacement of an EDP. An anti-rotation spigot is used to react
the torque loads back into the gearbox and to provide a positive means of
alignment for the pump.
The pump is installed with the case drain port uppermost to ensure efficient
bleeding of air from the pump’s lubrification circuit. The EDP drive shaft seal
drains into a dry cavity on the gearbox that is in turn drained overboard. The
suction, discharge and case drain fluid connections to the EDP are by hose
and tube arrangements that run from the pump, around the left side of the
engine to the firewall.
There are two sets of quick disconnects in each line to facilitate both the re-
moval and replacement of an EDP and the removal and replacement of an
engine without having to remove the tube assemblies. EDP replacement can
be accomplished using the quick disconnects closest to the pump, whereas
engine replacement can be accomplished using the quick disconnects at the
firewall.
Figure 9: EDP installation
20
40
30
10
B
190
Solenoid Valve and Depressurization Circuit
The EDP incorporates a 2-position, 3-way solenoid valve to reduce the dis-
charge pressure and input torque required during engine windmill relights.
Valve activation is controlled by the FADEC to reduce discharge pressure to

approximately 1000 psig (68.9 bar) whenever the aircraft engine N2 is below
15% and not weight-on-wheels (WOW). Note, at higher N2 speeds the dis-
charge pressure will increase above 1000 psig (68.9 bar).
When the solenoid valve is in the “de-energized” condition, discharge pres-

sure at the valve (P) is blocked, and the control port (C) is connected to the
case (R). In the “energized” position, discharge pressure is routed to the
control port with the return to case port blocked at the valve.
With the depressurization valve “de-energized”, the engine driven pump op-
erates as a normal pressure compensated variable displacement piston
pump. When the depressurization valve is “energized” the solenoid valve
position shifts resulting in pump discharge pressure being ported directly be-
hind the auxiliary stroking piston, bypassing the compensator. With suffi-
cient pressure applied across the auxiliary stroking piston area, the auxiliary
piston pushes on the primary stroking piston, decreasing the hanger angle,
and reducing the pump outlet flow.
Since the compensator is bypassed, the pump discharge pressure is re-

duced to the minimum pressure required to destroke the unit.
When the applied voltage to the solenoid is removed, the de-energized so-
lenoid valve returns to the normally closed position, venting the pressure ap-
plied behind the stroking piston back to the case.
Discharge pressure is blocked at the solenoid valve and normal pump oper-
ation via the compensator resumes.
Figure 10: Solenoid valve
WOWA = AIR WOWA = AIR

Energize EDP 1A Energize EDP 2A
GND/OPEN
WOWB = AIR GND/OPEN WOWB = AIR Depressurization
DRIVER Depressurization DRIVER
Solenoid Solenoid
15% 15%
Left ENGINE N2 Right ENGINE N2
40% (active channel) 40%
(active channel)
L FADEC R FADEC
MAU 1 MAU 3
DEPRESSURIZATION SOLENOID
(Shown de-energised)
OUTLET
COMPENSATOR
2
7 ROTATING GROUP
2
INLET 7
CASE
1 4
3
1 4
STROKING PISTON
HANGER
(Shown at full stroke)
5
Discharge Case 5
Pressure
Discharge
ZERO FLOW POSITION

FULL FLOW POSITION
HANGER
AUXILIARY STROKING PISTON
190
AC Motor driven pump

The rated output of the pump is 3.0 gpm (11.3 l/min) at 2850 psig (197 bar)
The AC motor driven pump (ACMP) is a pressure-compensated type that minimum.
varies the volume of fluid delivered to maintain the desired system pressure
and has a fully sealed motor with external air cooling. This rating applies with an inlet pressure of 50 psig (3.4 bar), when the motor
is supplied with three-phase 115/220 VAC, 400 Hz electrical power.
Each ACMP is installed to the aircraft structure with four shock mounts to de-
crease the vibration and noise transmitted to the cabin. In addition, the pump will function normally and will meet all performance re-
quirements at the following extreme conditions:
The ACMPs installed in the Systems 1 and 2 bays are suspended from the • Discharge pressures up to 3050 psig (208 bar)
shock mounts, whereas the ACMPs installed in the System 3 bay are invert-
ed in relation and are standing on the shock mounts.
A dedicated bonding strap is installed under one of the 1/4 inch (6.35 mm) • Case drain pressures up to 90 psig (6.2 bar)
bolts to a dedicated bonding point adjacent to each pump in order to provide
for both electrical bonding and safety. • Inlet fluid temperatures between 20°F and 200°F (-7°C to 93°C)
The discharge, suction, and case drain ports of the pump include hydraulic • Ambient air temperatures between -65°F and 165°F (-54°C to
fitting ends and are connected directly to the aircraft hydraulic system 74°C)
through hoses. A seal drain port is connected to an ecology bottle through
plastic tubing.
The nominal displacement is 0.097 cubic inches per revolution (1.59 cc/rev).
The case-drain and seal-drain ports are swapped around between the two Proof pressure capability is 4500 psig (310 bar) at the discharge port, 150
installation attitudes to ensure that the case drains is at the top and the seal psig (10.3 bar) at the inlet port and 500 psig (34.5 bar) at the case drain port.
drain at the bottom.
The case drain port is installed uppermost to avoid air entrapment in the
pump’s cooling and lubricating circuit.
Electrical power for the motor is transmitted through a single electrical con-
nector, which mates with the aircraft wiring harness.
The AC motor driven hydraulic pump is an axial piston type unit wherein a
cylinder barrel containing nine pistons is driven by an electric motor.
The principal operating design of the rotating group for the AC motor driven
pump is identical to that of the EDP. The pump has a compensator valve
similar to that in the EDP.
Figure 11: EDP cross-cut
190
Manual Mode Control

ACMP ENABLE signals for ACMPs 1B, 2B and 3B (ENABLE signal is set to
Manual mode control is accomplished by the flight crew placing the respec- FALSE when no aircraft generators are operational) are used to minimize
tive ACMP cockpit control switch into either the “ON” or “OFF” position. the hazards presented to ground crew during normal aircraft maintenance
Note that the ACMP 3A can only be controlled manually (no auto mode ex- activities.
ists). The ACMPs will be turned off when the ACMP cockpit switch is in nei-
ther the “ON” or “AUTO” position.
Whenever the ACMP cockpit switch is placed into the “ON” position, that
ACMP will be commanded on regardless of the state of the auto mode con-
trol logic (i.e ACMP commanded on or off).
Automatic Mode Control
The ACMP 1A, 2A and 3B will be in automatic mode control when their re-
spective cockpit switch is placed in the “AUTO” position.
When in “AUTO” mode the ACMPs will be automatically started when the
following conditions are true:
• ACMPs 1B and 2B will be turned on when Flaps not 0, ACMP is en-

abled, and the aircraft is in the air or take-off thrust has been ap-
plied
• ACMP 1B will be turned on when EDP 1A or the left engine is not

operational, aircraft is in the air or take-off thrust has been applied,
and ACMP 1B is enabled.
• ACMP 2B will be turned on when EDP 2A or the right engine is not

operational, at least one aircraft generator is operational, and
ACMP 2B is enabled.
• ACMP 3B will be turned on when ACMP 3A is not operational, air-

craft is in the air, and ACMP 3B is enabled.
Figure 12: ACMP Logic
Common Pump Control Logic
Left TLA Ch A @ Take Off Thrust hold HI for 60 sec

before
Left TLA Ch B @Take OffThrust going low
ENG
TRUE
Right TLA Ch A @ Take Off Thrust hold HI for 60 sec
before The engine running signals are held
Right TLA Ch B @ Take Off Thrust going low high for 60 seconds to allow for the
pumps to continue to run during a
RTO when throttles are pulled backto
ground idle to engage thrust reversers
WOWA=AIR WOW is held in air mode for for 60 seconds

hold HI for 60 sec
before
AIR after touchdown to keep the backup pumps
WOWB=AIR going low TRUE running during the landing roll
AIR This signal is only used for the PTU logic
Flap Handle Ch A valid & Detent A

At least one of the four Flap Lever
Flap Handle Ch B valid & Detent A FLAP position signals is not in detent
Slat Handle Ch A valid & Detent A 0º position A (Flaps are not at 0 degrees)
Slat Handle Ch B valid & Detent A
190
Figure 13: ACMP 1B Logic
ACMP 1B Pre-Command SPDA ELEC PMP 1

COMMAND
FLAP
hold Low for 1.4
¹ 0º sec before
going high
Energize
ENG ACMP 1B
TRUE Contactor
AIR
TRUE
1B
hangar ACMP 1B
Test
1B
ENABLE
Timer limits level of RMS motor current when
pressure hovers about pressure switch trip point
AC BUS 2
HYD ENG PMP 1 PRESS
hold HI for 120 sec
SWB LOW valid & set before
going low
NOT(Left Engine N2valid & >40%)
(active channel)
Reset if AUTO
mode de-selected
HYD ELEC PMP 1 SWB AUTO valid & set
HYD ELEC PMP 1 SWB ON set
(this signal is a direct connection from cockpit switch to ACMP contactor)
FLAP
¹ 0º
ACMP 2B Pre-Command
HYD ELEC PMP 1 SWB AUTO SPDA ELEC PMP 2
valid & set COMMAND
1 Aircraft Generator is Operational
HYD ENG PMP 1 PRESS
SWB LOW valid & set
Left Engine N2 40% (active channel) Energize
ACMP 2B
ENG Contactor
TRUE
AIR
TRUE
2B ACMP 2B
Reset EMER Park
Brake Timer when hangar
Signal transitions from Test
ON set to ON not set
hold HI for 360 sec AC BUS 1
EMER Park Brake ON valid & not set before 2B
going low
Possible ENABLE
Left Engine N2> 40% (active ch.) Ground
Taxi
Right Engine N2> 40% (active ch.)
HYD ENG PMP 2 PRESS
hold HI for 120 sec
SWB LOW valid & set before
NOT(Right Engine N2 valid & 4>0%) going low
(active channel) Reset if AUTO

mode de-selected
HYD ELEC PMP 2 SWB AUTO valid & set
HYD ELEC PMP 2 SWB ON set
190
.
3B
hangar
Test
3B SPDA ELEC PMP 3B

ENABLE ACMP 3B COMMAND
Pre-Command
AIR
TRUE Energize
ACMP 3B ACMP 3B
Contactor
Timer limits level of RMS motor current when
pressure hovers about pressure switch trip point
AC BUS 2
hold HI for 120 sec
HYD ELEC PMP 3A PRESS before
going low
SWB LOW valid & set
Reset if AUTO
HYD ELEC PMP 3B mode de-selected
SWB AUTO valid & set
HYD ELEC PMP 3B SWB ON set
Figure 16: Depressurization Logic
ACMP Load Shedding Truth Table
Input Variables Output Variables

# of aircraft ACMP 3A ACMP Pre-
Pre-Command (0 ENABLE Command (0
generators Contactor = OFF, 1 = ON, x = don’t = disabled, 1 = enabled, x =
operational Status care) don’t care)
(1=closed) 1B 2B 3B 1B 2B 3B
0 x x x x 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
³ 2 x x x x 1 1 1
ACMP Priority: ACMP 3A ® ACMP 2B ® ACMP 1B ® ACMP 3B
190
The flow limiter
The flow-limiter valve is located in the rear fuselage, right side, aft of the
pressure bulkhead. The flow-limiter valve limits the flow of hydraulic fluid to
6.62 to 7.75 litres per minute (1.75 to 2.0 gal/min), to the accumulator, res-
ervoir, and the system 3 users during the deployment of the RAT. The valve
operates on 28 VDC (Volt Direct Current).
Pump Un-Loader Valve
The pump un-loader valve is located in the rear fuselage, right side, aft of
the pressure bulkhead. The pump un-loader valve relieves the hydraulic
pressure on the ACMP 3A during the deployment of the RAT thereby de-
creasing the demand on electrical power while the RAT spins up. The valve
operates on 28 VDC.
Figure 17: Pump un-loader valve
D
C
E
F
B
B
A PUMP
UNLOADER
ZONE VALVE
310 A
PRESSURE BLEED/RELIEF/SAMPLE
TRANSDUCER VALVE
ACMP 3A
PRESSURE
SWITCH C
DPS
ACMP 3B E
PRESSURE
SWITCH ATTENUATOR
F QUANTITY
GAUGE TEMPERATURE
TRANSDUCER D
190
System 1, 2 and 3 filter manifold assembly
Systems 1 and 2 contain a filter manifold assembly, filtering:
• the supply fluid coming from the aircraft pumps,
• the case drain fluid from the EDP,
• the return fluid from the users reservoir fill, and
• incoming supply pressure fluid from the ground service panel.
The assembly incorporates:
• two filter elements for pressure and return lines, and
• one for EDP case drain flow
System 3 contains a filter manifold assembly similar to the ones for systems
1 and 2. However, it only contains two filter elements for the supply fluid
coming from the two AC motor pumps, return fluid from the users reservoir
fill, and incoming supply pressure from the ground service panel.
Additionally, the hydraulic system incorporates four case drain filters, one
each on systems 1 and 2, and two located on system 3 to provide filtration
of case drain fluid from all ACMPs.
Figure 18: Manifold
190
Filter Element and Bowl
The filter manifold assembly contain two sizes of filter element for pressure
and return, and for case drain, they are compatible with phosphate ester
type hydraulic fluids.
Pressure and return flows are routed through identical, separate 5-micron fil-
ters and the EDP case drain flow is routed through a 15-micron filter.
Identical pressure and return filters elements were used to reduce the
number of sizes of filter elements required to maintain the aircraft.
The filter element in each case is a non-cleanable type and provides depth-
type filtration, with flow from the outside to the inside. Each element is de-
signed to withstand 4500 psid (310 bar) minimum differential pressure with-
out collapsing.
Although the pressure and return filter elements are interchangeable the fil-
ter bowls are not and are designed for their specific operating pressures in
order to minimize the weight of the filter manifold. Using different thread siz-
es for the two bowls prevents the possibility of installing the return filter bowl
in the pressure filter location.
The pressure and return element minimum dirt-holding capacity is 6.0 grams
at 30.0 gpm (114l/min) flow at a differential pressure of 70 psid (4.8 bar) at
a 100°F (38°C) fluid temperature.
The case drain filter element minimum dirt-holding capacity is 2.0 grams at
2.0 gpm (7.6l/min) flow at a differential pressure of 70 psid (4.8 bar) at a
100°F (38°C) fluid temperature.
Both elements will withstand cold start and operation at -40°F +/- 5° (-37°C
to -43°C) at 3000 psid (207 bar) without evidence of filter media damage or
increase in pressure drop.
Figure 19: No. 1 and No.2 hydraulic systems - components
D F
B
G
E
D
A
A T YP IC AL
ZONE
190
H
ACMP
F ILTE R
P RES S UR E
MANIF OLED S WITC H
DPI
B
P RES S UR E
T RANS DUCE R
E DP
P RES S UR E
H S WITC H
F ILTE R
B OWLS
190
Pressure transducers
All three filter manifold assemblies incorporate a bypass valve in the return
circuit to permit bypassing of hydraulic fluid in the event of excessive restric-
tion of flow through the filter element.
A variety of pressure transducers and pressure switches installed on the fil-

ter manifold are used for system monitoring and control.
The pressure transducers, one for each system, are connected to the MAU
and provide hydraulic system pressure indication to the cockpit crew via the
EICAS synoptic page.
Pressure values are displayed in:
• amber for values below 1800 psi.
• green for values between 1800 and 3300 psi. and
• white for values above 3300 psi.
Two pressure switches located on the filter manifold assembly monitor pres-
sure output from the two pumps, and are used to annunciate hydraulic pump
and hydraulic system failures.
Figure 20: Pressure transducers
190
Heat exchanger
Systems 1 and 2 each have a fluid-to-fuel type heat exchanger to provide

cooling of the hydraulic fluid. The source of the fluid is the combined case
drain flow for both the EDP and the ACMP, which passes through the heat
exchanger and returns to the system reservoir. The cooling medium is the
aircraft fuel in the collector tanks.
A bypass valve is installed to improve the hydraulic system warm-up re-

sponse time after a clod soak, by diverting the flow of the fluid around the
heat-exchanger.
Figure 21: Heat exchanger
Heat exchangers
R/H Collector tank L/H Collector tank
From HEAT To HEAT

EXCHANGER EXCHANGER
Pressure
Relief Valve
OUTLET INLET
190
PTU
occurred, so the unit will spend most of its life at system return pressure with
The power transfer unit (PTU) is a fixed displacement, uni-directional device the drive shaft stationary, and therefore the seal drain leakage will be insig-
used to transfer fluid power from System 1 to System 2. nificant. Even when the unit is operating at full pressure it will do so for only
a few minutes during the takeoff and landing phases and again the seal leak-
A hydraulic motor installed in system 1 drives a pump in System 2 through age will be insignificant.
a driveshaft to transfer hydraulic power without sharing fluid between sys-
tems. Unless manually selected ON, the PTU will only operate in the event
of a loss of the right-hand engine or right-hand EDP to provide hydraulic
power during landing gear retraction and also during descent and landing.
The PTU for the Emb 190 is a modification of an existing unit used in other
aircraft applications.
Usage of the PTU will primarily be due to warm-up in extreme cold weather
conditions and routine testing of the PTU circuit during maintenance inspec-
tions.
Emergency operation after a right engine failure or an EDP 2A failure can be

expected to be a very rare occurrence. Therefore, in order to minimise the
size and weight of the PTU a unit has been selected that has been de-rated
to a considerably shorter life than the rest of the Hydraulic System.
The PTU is not intended to operate continuously or be pressurised every

time the Hydraulic system is energised. It is isolated from the high-pressure
circuits by the PTU select valve on the motor side and the check valve on
the pump side and will spend most of its service life pressurised to the sys-
tem return pressure.
Unlike other Hydraulic system pumps on the Emb 190 the PTU does not
have an associated ecology bottle and will vent any drive shaft seal leakage
directly overboard through a dedicated vent.
In order to make the best use of the available space the PTU is located low
down within the System 2 Hydraulic Bay and does not have sufficient space
below it to install an ecology bottle. This was possible because the PTU will
operate for only a short duration after a right engine or EDP 2A failure has
Figure 22: PTU
3500 14.000
3000 12.000
2500 10.000
Pump Discharge Pressure (PSI)

Motor Inlet Pressure (PSI) &
PTU Shaft Speed (KRPM)

Motor Inlet Flow (GPM) &
2000 8.000
1500 6.000
1000 4.000
500 2.000
0 0.000
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0
PTU Pump Discharge Flow (GPM)
Discharge Pressure Motor Inlet Diff. Pressure Shaft Speed Motor Inlet Flow
190
SPDA PTU COMMAND

AIR
(this signal is a direct connection from
the cockpit switch to the solenoid)
HYD PTU SWB ON set
PTU
HYD PTU SWB AUTO valid & set Command
Right Engine N2£ 50%
(active channel)
Energize
HYD ENG PMP 2 PRESS
PTU Isolation
SWB LOW valid & set
Solenoid
FLAP
¹ 0º DC BUS 1
NOT(allGearUplock1)
NOT(allGearUplock2) Reset latch if AUTO
mode de-selected
HYD ENG PMP 1 PRESS
SWB LOW (<1800 psig) valid & not set On rising edge, hold
HYD SYS QUAN 2 valid &³ 12 % low for 12 sec. If
or invalid high for ³ 12 sec,
latch to a high state
HYD PTU PRESS SWB LOW (<1800
Timer disables PTU if it fails to produce
psig) valid & set pressure within 12 seconds after being
selected ON
Figure 23: PTU selector valve
190
Firewall shut-off valve
Systems 1 and 2 each contain a firewall shutoff valve located in the EDP
suction line outside the engine pylon area. In the event of an engine fire, this
valve can be closed to stop hydraulic fluid from reaching the engine. Each
assembly consists of a DC motor-operated ball-type shutoff valve with a vis-
ual position indicator, a thermal relief valve, a relay, and four switches.
When fully open the valve will flow 18.0 gpm (68.1 l/min).
The valve includes a visual position indicator arm that moves with the ball
through a 90° arc to align with OPEN and CLOSED markings on the hous-
ing.
A thermal relief valve is built into the assembly to provide protection from
downstream over pressurization, due to thermal expansion, when the shut-
off valve is in the closed position. The relief valve allows a small amount of
flow from the outlet to the inlet, bypassing the valve ball. The cracking pres-
sure is 100 psid (6.89 bar) maximum; reset is 60 psid (4.14 bar) minimum.
There are two position indicator microswitches that are actuated by cams as
the valve ball rotates through its 90° arc of motion and are used to indicate
valve position (open or closed) to the data acquisition unit. Both switches are
open (to ground) unless the valve ball is within 4° of its full open or full
closed position.
During the valve opening cycle, the contacts of the open-position-indication

switch close (to ground) when the valve ball reaches 86° open.
Figure 24: Firewall shutt-off valve
HYD Ovr
heat > 125
˚C
ENG PUMP SHUTOFF SYS 1 set Energize

L FWSOV L FWSOV
L Engine Fire Handle = ‘FIRE’ Relay
Hot Batt Bus 2
ENG PUMP SHUTOFF SYS 2 set Energize

R FWSOV R FWSOV
R Engine Fire Handle = ‘FIRE’ Relay
HYD Ovr
heat > 125
˚C
190
The accumulators
Nitrogen gas pre-charged accumulators, installed in all three systems, pro-

vide bootstrap pressure to keep reservoir pressure at a sufficient level for:
• pump start-up, and
• prevent pump cavitation.
In conjunction with the priority valves, the accumulators are designed to

maintain bootstrap pressure for:
• overnight parking of the aircraft, or
• for pump start at high altitudes following a failure.
The system 3 accumulator also has the important function of providing flow
to the flight-critical hydraulic users during dual engine failure until the Ram
Air Turbine (RAT) generator becomes operational, which then powers the
ACMP 3A via the AC ESS bus.
The accumulators also function as pressure dampers during rapid move-

ments of hydraulic users.
Figure 25: Accumulators
190
Accumulator Pressure Gauge/ Fill Point
Each system accumulator includes a port to accept a charging valve and gas
pressure gauge.
The accumulator gauge is designed to operate with pressures up to 4000

psig (276 bar) and the burst pressure is 10000 psig (686 bar).
The gauge accuracy is +/- 75 psig (5.17 bar) at 70°F (21.1 °C).
The gauge is attached to the aircraft’s Ground Service Panel by four screws
and is electrically bonded by the tubing connection.
Figure 26: Accumulator Pressure Gauge/ Fill Point
190
29-30 Hydraulic System Indication

Introduction
Crew alerting and Hydraulic System condition indicating is achieved via the
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). Various sensors are
installed in the Hydraulic System, which provide information to the MAUs in
order to display the Hydraulic System performance parameters on the Hy-
draulic Synoptic Page (HSP) of the Multi-Function Displays (MFD) in the
cockpit. The MAUs also use these parameters, along with other signals from
other aircraft systems, to annunciate any hydraulic system problems on the
EICAS display.
Figure 1: MAU, HSp and EICAS
HYDR. SYSTEM#1 HYDR. SYSTEM#3 HYDR. SYSTEM#2
ACMP EDP Firewall SOV ACMP ACMP EDP Firewall SOV

ACMP
1B 1A & Pos.Switch 3B 3A 2A & Pos.Switch
2B
ACMP1 EDP1 ACMP 3B ACMP 3A ACMP2 EDP2

Press. Switch Press. Switch Press. Switch Press. Switch Press. Switch Press. Switch
Hyd. System 1 Hyd. System 3 Hyd. System 2

Press. X-Ducer Press. X-Ducer Press. X-Ducer
Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap

RESERVOIR RESERVOIR RESERVOIR
PTU
Selector MAU
VALVE
Temp. X-Ducer Temp. X-Ducer Temp. X-Ducer

Res.Quantity Indicator Res.Quantity Indicator Res.Quantity Indicator
PTU
Press. Switch
PTU
HSP Map Plan Systems Hyd EICAS

PRESS QTY PRESS QTY PRESS QTY
SYS 1 SYS 3 SYS 2
90°C 90°C 90°C
3000PSI 42% 3000PSI 85% 3000PSI 57%
PTU
A B
LANDING GEAR
ELEV OUTBD LH ELEV OUTBD RH ELEV INBD
RUD UPPER RUD LOWER AIL INBD
ENG2REVERSER
ENG1 REVERSER AIL OUTBD MF SPOILER5
MF SPOILER 3/4 GND SPOILER1
GND SPOILER 2 BRAKE INBD
BRAKE OUTBD NOSE WHEEL STR
SPEEDBRAKE
EMER/PARK BRAKE
TCAS WX Checklist
190
Hydraulic synoptic page and EICAS indications
The Hydraulic Synoptic Page presents the following information to the cock-
pit crew on a display page dedicated to the Hydraulic System:
• Reservoir Quantity for all three systems

• Fluid Temperature for all three systems
• System pressure for all three systems
• Fire Wall Cutoff Valve (FWSOV) position
• Hydraulic pump status for both EDPs and ACMPs
• PTU status
Both analog and discrete data are used for the hydraulic system synoptic
page:
• Analog data is used to display actual values (reservoir fluid temper-

ature, quantity and hydraulic system pressure) and pictorial gauges
(reservoir quantity and system pressure).
• Discrete data is used to indicate hydraulic flow paths, failed pumps,
PTU availability,and fire wall shut off valve position and availability.
The Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) is used to draw
the attention of the flight crew to the existence of any aircraft system abnor-
mality that requires their attention.
Figure 2: MFD Hydraulic, Status
190
C
E
H
A
C D
B K L
C F G G
(SSM 24-61-50) (SSM 24-61-50) (SSM 24-61-50)

SPDA 1 FWD SPDA 2 MIDDLE SPDA 2 MIDDLE
BP COCKPIT AVIONICS COMPT AVIONICS COMPT LH CBP COCKPIT AVIONICS COMPT RH CBP COCKPIT
DC BUS 2 DC BUS 1 DC ESS BUS 3 J
ACMP 3A PRESS SW
EDP 2A PRESS SW
EDP 1A PRESS SW
A
ESS
ND
PRESS
IND
HYDR
EDP
H
S1 SYS 2 SYS 3
J4
J3
J3
HYDR SYS 1 HYDR SYS 2 HYDR SYS 2 HYDR SYS 3 HYDR SYS 3 HYDR SYS 2 HYDR SYS 1 HYDR SYS 1 HYDR SYS 3
PRESS XDCR ACMP 2B PRESS SW EDP 2A PRESS SW ACMP 3A PRESS SW ACMP 3B PRESS SW PRESS XDCR ACMP 1B PRESS SW EDP 1A PRESS SW PRESS XDCR
WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING REAR FUSELAGE REAR FUSELAGE WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING REAR FUSELAGE
(MPP 29-31-01) (SDS29-31) (MPP 29-31-04) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-03) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-05) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-06) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-01) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-04) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-03) (SDS 29-31) (MPP 29-31-01) (SDS 29-31)
D E F L J D E F K
PRESS XDCR +
PRESS XDCR +
PRESS XDCR +
PRESS XDCR -
PRESS XDCR -
PRESS XDCR -
+28VDC
+28VDC
+28VDC
GND
GND
GND
-
+
-
+
-
+
ACMP 3A PRESS SW
EDP 1A PRESS SW
ACMP 2B PRESS SW
EDP 2A PRESS SW
ACMP 3B PRESS SW
ACMP 1B PRESS SW
(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
HYDR SYS 1
PRESS XDCR
HYDR SYS 2
PRESS XDCR
HYDR SYS 3
PRESS XDCR
(SSM 31-41-80) MAU 1 FORWARD AVIONICS COMPT (SSM 31-41-80) MAU 2 FORWARD AVIONICS COMPT (SSM 31-41-80) MAU 3 MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT
Figure 3: Indication schematic
A D
B
C
F
C
E
HYDR SYS 1 HYDR SYS 2 HYDR SYS 3

QTY XDCR QTY XDCR QTY XDCR
WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING WING / FUSELAGE FAIRING REAR FUSELAGE
(MPP 29-32-01) (SDS 29-32) (MPP 29-32-01) (SDS 29-32) (MPP 29-32-01) (SDS 29-32)
A E
D G G
C
EMPTY
EMPTY
EMPTY
FULL
FULL
FULL
F
G
B
L
H
HYDR SYS 1 QTY
HYDR SYS 2 QTY
HYDR SYS 3 QTY

(GENERIC I/O-MOD 9)
(SSM 31-41-80) MAU 1 FORWARD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT (SSM 31-41-80) MAU 2 FORWARD AVIONICS COMPARTMENT
190
CAS MESSAGE TYPE DESCRIPTION FAULT CODE

HYD 1 EDP FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that EDP 1A is not operat- 29100601
ing properly and therefore not supplying hydraulic
power to the system.
HYD 1 EDP NOT D-PRESS CAUTION The message indicates that the EDP did not de- 29100501
pressurize when commanded.
HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the ACMP 1B is not 29100701
producing hydraulic power when it should be.
HYD 1 HI TEMP CAUTION The message indicates that hydraulic system #1 oil 29300201
temperature is hot and requires crew awareness CAS MESSAGE TYPE DESCRIPTION FAULT CODE
and subsequent action HYD 3 LO PRESS CAUTION the message indicates that hydraulic system # 3 oil 29300303
HYD 1 LO PRESS CAUTION The message indicates that hydraulic system #1 oil 29300301 pressure is low (less than approximately 1800 PSI).
pressure is low (less than approximately 1800 PSI). HYD 3 LO QTY ADVISORY The message indicates the fluid level in hydraulic 29100803
HYD 1 LO QTY ADVISORY The message indicates the fluid level in hydraulic 29100801 system #3 reservoir is low and requires servicing.
system #1 reservoir is low and requires servicing. HYD 3 OVERHEAT WARNING The message indicates that hydraulic system #3 oil 29300103
HYD 1 OVERHEAT WARNING Indicates that hydraulic system #1 oil temperature 29300101 temperature is very hot and requires immediate pi-
is very hot and requires immediate pilot action lot action.
HYD 1 SOV CLOSED STATUS The message indicates that the left engine hydrau- 29101301 HYD 3 PUMP A NOT ON ADVISORY The message indicates that a non-flight standard 29101000
lic firewall SOV is closed when commanded to be switch selection exists for the hydraulic AC Motor
closed. Pump.
HYD 1 SOV FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the left engine hydrau- 29101201 HYD 3 VLV FAIL CAUTION The message indicates that the PUV control circuity 29101400
lic firewall SOV did not go to its commanded posi- or the FLV control circuity presents problems that
tion. that not allow the PUV or the FLV to go to its com-
HYD 2 EDP FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that EDP 2A is not operat- 29100602 manded position.
ing properly and therefore not supplying hydraulic HYD PTU FAIL CAUTION The message indicates that the PTU is not operat- 29100400
power to the system. ing properly and therefore not supplying hydraulic
HYD 2 EDP NOT D-PRESS CAUTION The message indicates that the EDP did not de- 29100502 power to hydraulic system #2.
pressurize when commanded. HYD PTU NOT AUTO ADVISORY The message indicates that a non-flight standard 29101100
HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the ACMP 2B is not 29100702 switch selection exists for the PTU.
producing hydraulic power when it should be. HYD PUMP NOT AUTO ADVISORY The message indicates that a non-flight standard 29100900
HYD 2 HI TEMP CAUTION The message indicates that hydraulic system #2 oil 29300202 switch selection exists for the hydraulic ACMP's 1,
temperature is hot and requires crew awareness 2, or 3B.
and subsequent action (selecting ACMP 2 OFF if HYD TEMP SENS FAIL ADVISORY Failure of the temperature sensor. 29300200
presently running). HYD3 ELEC PUMP A FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the ACMP 3A is not 29100703
HYD 2 LO PRESS CAUTION The message indicates that hydraulic system #2 oil 29300302 producing hydraulic power when it should be.
pressure is low (less than approximately 1800 PSI) HYD3 ELEC PUMP B FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the ACMP 3B is not 29100704
HYD 2 LO QTY ADVISORY The message indicates the fluid level in hydraulic 29100802 producing hydraulic power when it should be.
system #2 reservoir is low and requires servicing.
HYD 2 OVERHEAT WARNING The HYD 2 OVERHEAT CAS message indicates 29300102
that hydraulic system #2 oil temperature is very hot
and requires immediate pilot action (selecting the
left engine firewall SOV closed).
HYD 2 SOV CLOSED STATUS The message indicates that the right engine hy- 29101302
draulic firewall SOV is closed when commanded.
HYD 2 SOV FAIL ADVISORY The message indicates that the right engine hy- 29101202
draulic firewall SOV did not go to its commanded
position.
HYD 3 HI TEMP CAUTION The message indicates that hydraulic system #3 oil 29300203
temperature is hot and requires crew awareness
and subsequent action.
Figure 4: HYD overheat, Hi temp Logic
X = 1, 2, or 3
HYD SYS X TEMP valid & > 131°C
HYD SYS X TEMP valid & > 131°C 1.0 sec “HYD X OVERHEAT”
set delay Warning Message
X = 1, 2, or 3
“ HYD X OVERHEAT ” CAS Message valid & not set
HYD SYS X TEMP valid & > 100°C
“HYD X HI TEMP”
HYD SYS X TEMP valid & > 96°C 1.0 sec Caution Message
set delay
190
EICAS Message - HYD 1 or HYD 2 LO PRESS
This message indicates that the System 1 or System 2 hydraulic fluid pres-
sure is low (less than 1800 psig) and the hydraulic components connected
to this system may be non- operational.
The 8-second set delay from ACMP manual switch on is to allow time for the
both the Hydraulic System and Brae System accumulators to recharge and
eliminate false LO PRESS messages appearing during accumulator charg-
ing.
The 3-second set delay is to allow the backup ACMP to come on and re-es-
tablish system pressure without a transient LO PRESS message being dis-
played should a primary pump failure occur.
The “HYD 1 LO PRESS” message is shown below, the “HYD 2 LO PRESS”

message uses the same logic arrangement but with inputs from the right en-
gine, ACMP 2B and System 2.
EICAS Message - HYD 3 LO PRESS
This message indicates that the System 3 hydraulic fluid pressure is low
(less than 1800 psig) and the hydraulic components connected to this sys-
tem may be non-operational.
A 6-second set delay after the manual switch on of ACMP 3A or 3B is incor-

porated to allow time for the system accumulator to recharge and avoid a
nuisance message appearing while it recharges.
The 3-second delay is to allow the backup pump to come on and re-establish
system pressure in order to eliminate a transient LO PRESS message ap-
pearing should a primary pump failure occur.
Figure 5: HYD 1 LO PRESS, HYD 3 LO PRESS Logic
LEFT ENGINE RUNNING valid & set

SPDA ELEC PMP 1 COMMAND valid & ON
HYD ELEC PMP 1 SWA valid & ON 8.0 sec

WOWA = AIR set delay
WOWB = AIR
AIRSPEED valid & >40 knots
(The active AIRSPEED signal shall be used)
HYD ENG PMP 1 PRESS SWA LOW valid & set
3.0 sec “HYD 1 LO PRESS”
HYD ELEC PMP 1 PRESS SWA LOW valid & set set delay Caution Message
HYD SYS 1 PRESS valid &£ 1800 PSI
HYD ELEC PMP 3A SWA valid & ON

6.0 sec
HYD ELEC PMP 3B SWA valid & ON set delay
LEFT ENGINE RUNNING valid & set

RIGHT ENGINE RUNNING valid & set
AIRSPEED valid & >40 knots
(The active AIRSPEED signal shall be used) 3.0 sec “HYD 3 LO PRESS”
WOWA = AIR set delay Caution Message
WOWB = AIR
HYD ELEC PMP 3A PRESS SWA LOW valid & set
HYD ELEC PMP 3B PRESS SWA LOW valid & set

HYD SYS 3 PRESS valid &£ 1800 PSI
190
EICAS Message - HYD PTU FAIL
The “HYD PTU FAIL” message indicates that the PTU is not operating prop-
erly and therefore not supplying hydraulic power to hydraulic system #2.
The PTU should be producing hydraulic power when the right engine or EDP
2A are failed, EDP 1A is producing pressure, Flaps>0 degrees, reservoir #2
has sufficient hydraulic fluid to raise/lower the landing gear, and the cockpit
switch is in the AUTO position.
The 3-second set delay is to allow the PTU to start and build-up pressure
before the EICAS message is displayed and thus avoid nuisance messages
appearing.
Figure 6: HYD PTU FAIL Logic
HYD PTU PRESS SWA LOW valid & set

HYD PTU SWA ON valid & set
3.0 sec “HYD PTU FAIL”
SPDA PTU COMMAND valid & ON set delay Caution Message
HYD ENG PMP 2 PRESS SWA
LOW valid & set
Right Engine N2£ 50%
(active channel) & valid
HYD PTU SWA AUTO valid & set
HYD SYS 2 QUAN valid &³ 12% or invalid
HYD ENG PMP 1 PRESS SWA LOW valid & not set
FLAP HANDLE CHA valid & ¹ DetentA
FLAP HANDLE CHB valid & ¹ DetentA

FLAP HANDLE CHC valid & ¹ DetentA
FLAP HANDLE CHD valid & ¹ DetentA

NOT(allGearUplock1)
NOT(allGearUplock2)
WOWA = AIR
WOWB = AIR
190
EICAS Message - HYD 1 or 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL
The “HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL” or “HYD 2 ELEC PUMP FAIL” messages
indicate that ACMP 1B or ACMP 2B is not producing pressure when it
should be.
When the pump is in AUTO mode, then it should start automatically if the pri-
mary pump fails.If the backup pump should also fail or cannot produce pres-
sure due to low fluid level, then a “HYD 1 LO PRESS” or “HYD 2 LO PRESS”
message will be displayed, as appropriate.
In order to avoid having multiple EICAS messages being displayed that all
indicate that the same system is unavailable a lockout is included in the logic
that will prevent the “HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL” or “HYD 2 ELEC PUMP
FAIL” message being displayed if the appropriate LO PRESS message is al-
ready present.
The 5-second set delay is included to allow time for the LO PRESS message
to appear and trigger the lockout should the appropriate conditions exist.
An 8-second set delay is included after the manual switch on of the ACMP
to allow time for the system accumulators to recharge and avoid nuisance
messages while they are doing so.
The “HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL” message is shown below, the “HYD 2 ELEC
PUMP FAIL” message uses the same logic arrangement but with inputs
from System 2.
Figure 7: HYD 1 ELEC PUMP FAIL, HYD 3 ELEC PUMP B FAIL Logic
LEFT ENGINE RUNNING valid & set 5.0 sec “HYD 1 EDP FAIL”
set delay Advisory Message
HYD SOV 1 POSCLOSED valid & not set
HYD ENG PMP 1 DEPRESSURIZED valid & not set
“ HYD 1 LO PRESS” CAS Message not set
HYD SOV 1 POSOPEN valid & not set
L ENG FIRE HANDLE ARMED

valid & set
ENG PMP SHUTOFF SYS 1

valid & set 5.0 sec “HYD 1 SOV FAIL”
190
EDP - De-pressurization
The “HYD 1 EDP FAIL” or “HYD 2 EDP FAIL” messages indicate that EDP
1A or EDP 2A is not operating properly and therefore not supplying hydraulic
power to the relevant system.
The pump should be producing hydraulic power whenever the relevant en-
gine is running and the relevant FWSOV is in the open position.
As the EDPs are the primary pumps for Systems 1and 2 then the backup
ACMP will start automatically if an EDP failure occurs. If the backup pump
should fail to start or does not produce pressure due to a low fluid level, then
a “HYD 1 LO PRESS” or a “HYD 2 LO PRESS” message will be displayed,
as appropriate.
In order to avoid having multiple EICAS messages that all indicate that a
system is unavailable there is a lockout included in the logic for these mes-
sages such that if the system LO PRESS message is already displayed the
EDP FAIL message is locked out and will not be displayed.
The 5-second set delay is included to allow time for the LO PRESS message
to appear and trigger the lock out should the appropriate conditions exist.
The “HYD 1 EDP FAIL” message is shown below, the “HYD 2 EDP FAIL”
message uses the same logic arrangement but with inputs from the right en-
gine and System 2.
Figure 8: EDP - De-pressurization
LEFT ENGINE RUNNING valid & set 5.0 sec “HYD 1 EDP FAIL”
HYD ENG PMP 1 DEPRESSURIZED valid & not set
“ HYD 1 LO PRESS” CAS Message not set
HYD SOV 1 POSOPEN valid & not set
L ENG FIRE HANDLE ARMED

valid & set
ENG PMP SHUTOFF SYS 1

valid & set 5.0 sec “HYD 1 SOV FAIL”
HYD ELEC PMP 1 SWA valid & ON

190
29-MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 11/16/2004 ¦ 29-1 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 29-2 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 29 HYDRAULIC POWER ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 29 HYDRAULIC POWER ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 11-01 Engine Driven ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 11-04 Systems 1 and 2 A ¦ 6 ¦ 4 ¦ One per system may be inoperative ¦
¦ Pumps (EDP) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Filter Manifold ¦ ¦ ¦ provided repairs are made within 3 ¦
¦ Differential ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦
¦ 1) Depressuriza- C ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ May be inoperative on one pump ¦ ¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ tion Function ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦ ¦ Indicators ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Both Starter Control Valves ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (SCV) operate normally, ¦ ¦ 11-06 Systems 1 and 2 A ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided repairs ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Both Engine Bleed Valves ¦ ¦ Case Drain ¦ ¦ ¦ are made within 3 flight days. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ operate normally, and ¦ ¦ Differential ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Crossbleed valve operates ¦ ¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ normally. ¦ ¦ Indicators ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ C ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ May be inoperative on one pump ¦ ¦ 11-10 Systems 1 and 2 B ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)Bleed function may be ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦ ¦ Reservoirs Relief ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Both Starter Control Valves ¦ ¦ Bleed Valves ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected valve is verified ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ (SCV) operate normally, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ for no evidence of leakage, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) APU Pneumatic Bleed System ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ operates normally, and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Associated reservoir ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Crossbleed valve operates ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ quantity is verified ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ normally. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ adequate once each flight ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ day. ¦
¦ 11-02 Systems 1 and 2 ¦ ¦ ¦ Deleted, Rev. 2. ¦
¦ Electrical Pumps ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 11-27 Engine Driven C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be missing provided affected ¦
¦ Pump Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ attenuator connection remains ¦
¦ Attenuators ¦ ¦ ¦ capped. ¦
¦ 11-28 Engine Driven C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be missing provided affected ¦

¦ Pump Suction ¦ ¦ ¦ attenuator connection remains ¦
¦ 11-03 Power Transfer ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Attenuators ¦ ¦ ¦ capped. ¦
¦ Unit (PTU) ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 11-29 Systems 1 and 2 C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be missing provided affected ¦
¦ 1) Automatic A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ Electrical Pumps ¦ ¦ ¦ attenuator connection remains ¦
¦ Activation ¦ ¦ ¦ a) PTU is selected on before ¦ ¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ capped. ¦
¦ Function ¦ ¦ ¦ takeoff and landing, and ¦ ¦ Attenuators ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Repairs are made within 3 ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ flight days. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 11/16/2004 ¦ 29-3 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 12/16/2003 ¦ 29-4 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 29 HYDRAULIC POWER ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 29 HYDRAULIC POWER ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 11-30 Systems 1 and 2 C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ 12-17 System 3 C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be missing provided affected ¦
¦ Accumulators ¦ ¦ ¦ affected accumulator pre-charge ¦ ¦ Electrical Pumps ¦ ¦ ¦ attenuator connection remains ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ pressure is verified adequate once ¦ ¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ capped. ¦
¦ Indicators ¦ ¦ ¦ each flight day. ¦ ¦ Attenuator ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 12-01 System 3 C ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ Pump 3B may be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ 12-18 System 3 C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦
¦ Electrical Pumps ¦ ¦ ¦ it remains selected OFF. ¦ ¦ Accumulator ¦ ¦ ¦ affected accumulator pre-charge ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ pressure is verified adequate once ¦
¦ Indicator ¦ ¦ ¦ each flight day. ¦
¦ 13-00 Systems 1, 2 and C ¦ 9 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative closed ¦

¦ 3 Ground Service ¦ ¦ ¦ provided: ¦
¦ Connections ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected connection is ¦
¦ 12-02 System 3 Filter A ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ One may inoperative provided ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ verified for no evidence of ¦
¦ Manifold ¦ ¦ ¦ repairs are made within 3 flight ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ leakage, and ¦
¦ Differential ¦ ¦ ¦ days. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Associated Reservoir ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ quantity is verified ¦
¦ Indicators ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ adequate. ¦
¦ 12-04 System 3 Case A ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ May inoperative provided repairs ¦ ¦ 31-01 Systems 1, 2 and C ¦ 6 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦
¦ Drain ¦ ¦ ¦ are made within 3 flight days. ¦ ¦ 3 Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Differential ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Indication on MFD ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Indicator ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 32-00 Systems 1, 2 and C ¦ 6 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦
¦ 3 Quantity ¦ ¦ ¦ quantity is verified adequate on ¦
¦ 12-07 System 3 B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)Bleed Function may be ¦ ¦ Indication on MFD ¦ ¦ ¦ associated Reservoir Quantity ¦
¦ Reservoir Relief ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative provided: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Indicator before each flight. ¦
¦ Bleed Valve ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Affected valve is verified ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ for no evidence of leakage, ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE: Associated HYD 1(2)(3) LO ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ QTY Advisory EICAS Message ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Associated reservoir ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ will be inhibited. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ quantity is verified ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ adequate once each flight ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ day. ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190

190
ATA 27 Flight controls

190
Table of Contents Flight Control Modules (FCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Spoiler-ACE (S-ACE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
27-00 Flight Controls General Augmentation Electronic Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 FCM features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Roll control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Avionic Standard Communication Bus (ASCB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
The yaw control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
27-10 Flight Controls Ailerons
The pitch control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The pitch trim control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Aileron control assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The high lift systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pilot- Copilot control wheels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The spoiler control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Flight Deck Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Cockpit Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Cable System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The flight control panel (FCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Interconnect, disconnect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
EICAS indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Artificial feel and centering unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
The Multi function Display (MFD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Aileron power control units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
27-03 Flight Controls Electronic Architecture Cross- port relief valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aileron Electrical System Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
ACE Command lane / Monitoring lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Aileron Trim System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
The flight control panel (FCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Aileron Trim Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Operation of the P-ACE unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Autopilot input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Primary Actuator Control Electronic Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Aileron components failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Command lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
27-20 Flight Controls Rudder
Monitoring lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
FBW back-up battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
190
Flight deck rudder controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Elevator Thrust compensation (ETC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Artificial Feel Unit (AFU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stall warning and AOA limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Linear Variable Differential Transformers (LVDT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Rudder PCU’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 EICAS indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The rudder electro-hydraulic actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Elevator PCU Maintainability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
LVDT feedback signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Maintenance features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
The rudder trim system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Elevator Actuator PCU rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
The rudder system modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Rudder, CAT 2 and CAT 3 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 27-40 Horizontal Stabilizer
Rudder Control System Functionalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Rudder Flight Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Horizontal Stabilizer Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Thrust Asymmetry Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Horizontal Stabilizer - Actuator Control Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Horizontal Stabilizer High Level Functions Description . . . . . . . . . .7
Direct Mode - Hinge Moment Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Horizontal Stabilizer High Level Functions Description . . . . . . . . . .9
Engine Thrust Compensation Off-load Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
27-30 Flight Control Elevator Elevator changes off-load function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Control Column Gain Shaper Off-load Trim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The flight deck controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Auto Flight control System (AFCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Disconnect mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Secondary Nut Jamming Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Auto Flight control System (AFCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Tie Rod Lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Operation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Elevator System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Normal/Direct mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
190
Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 27-60 Flight Control Spoilers
Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Normal / Direct mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
27-50 Flight Control Flaps
Roll control function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Composite command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The slat/flap control lever (SFCL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ground Spoilers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
The Flap Power Drive Unit (PDU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Ground spoiler electrical system operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Torque tubes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Spoiler handle assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Angle Gearboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Control-yoke position sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Bearing Supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FCM, Spoiler ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The flap actuators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
FCM, Spoiler ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
FLAP ACTUATOR TRIP INDICATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Electro-Hydraulic multi function spoiler actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Position sensing unit (PSU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The ground spoiler control module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The ground spoiler actuators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Flap Skew Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Ground spoiler proximity sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
The flap panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Ventral air brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
EICAS Position Indications and Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Ventral air brake hydraulic actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Flap System Mechanical Rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ventral air brake control module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
System Electrical Rigging and Autoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Operation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
SF-ACE Rigging Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Ventral air brake position sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Electrical operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Re-lubrification Frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
EICAS indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Other Maintenance Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Electrical operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 27-TOC Page III
190
27-80 Flight Control Slats
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The slat/flap control lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SF-ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The slat/flap system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Power Drive Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Torque tubes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Bearing supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Angle gearboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Slat actuators general description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Slat Actuators Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Slat Actuator Torque Limiter Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Position Sensor Unit (PSU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The slat tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Electronic skew sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
EICAS Position Indications and Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Slat System Mechanical Rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
System Electrical Rigging and Auto rig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
27-MEL (Example)
190
27-00 Flight Controls General

Introduction
The flight control system (FCS) is comprised of the primary and the second-
ary flight control systems and their associated system components. The pri-
mary flight control system consists of:
• the ailerons and the multi function roll spoilers for roll axis control
• the elevators for pitch axis control
• the rudder for yaw axis control.
The secondary flight control system includes:
• the horizontal stabilizer

• flaps and slats
• the multi-function spoiler (when used as speed brakes or ground
spoilers), dedicated ground spoilers and the ventral air brake.
The flight control system employs hydraulic actuators to control the respec-
tive flight control surfaces. These are generally referred to as Power Control
Units (PCUs).
The ailerons are driven by conventional control cables that run from each
control wheel back to a pair of hydro-mechanical actuators, moving the con-
trol surfaces.
The rudder, elevators and roll spoilers as well as all secondary flight control
systems, including the horizontal stabilizer, flaps and slats, ground spoilers
and speed brakes, are controlled electronically using 'Fly-By-Wire' (FBW)
technology.
Primary Actuator Control Electronics (P-ACE) and/ or Flight Control Mod-

ules (FCM) are employed to operate the respective electro-hydraulic or elec-
tro-mechanical actuators.

Figure 1: Primary and secondary flight control systems
Primary flight control system

ELECTRIC
POWER
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
Aileron
PrimusEpic®
Speedbrake MAU
Handle 5 PAIR
Elevators PrimusEpic®
MAU SPOILERS
Rudder
2 FCMS/MAU
RUDDER
Multi funktion
roll spoilers
XDCR P-ACE ELEVATORS
COCKPIT
Aileron
CONTROLS
AILERONS
HYDRAULIC
Secondary flight control system POWER
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
Horizontal stabilizer HS HORIZ

ACE STAB
Slats Flaps FLAP / SLAT

PDU FLAPS
POSITION FS ACE
SELECTOR PDU SLATS
Ventral air brake
Mechanical Electrical Hydraulic

190
Roll control
The roll control system installation includes both the conventional hydro-me-
chanical aileron control system and the fly-by-wire electro-hydraulic multi
function spoiler control system, providing roll axis control.
The system is controlled either by the pilots, rotating the control wheel left or
right, or by the autopilot.
The aileron control system controls two aileron surfaces attached to the rear
spar of the wings, while the multi function spoiler control system drives three
outboard pairs of spoiler surfaces to assist roll control.
A feel- and- centering unit provides artificial feel (force feedback) to the
cockpit control wheels. The aileron control system is performed manually by
using the roll trim switch on the Trim Control Panel, located in the cockpit on
the centre pedestal, or automatically when the autopilot is engaged.

Figure 2: Roll control
The roll control system installation includes:

Aileron
A pair of ailerons
3 pairs of
3 pairs of "fly by wire" roll spoilers roll spoilers
The system is controlled either by the pilots

control wheel or by the autopilot.
PITCH TRIM
ROLL PITCH
BACKUP
A feel- and- centering unit provides artificial feel

(force feedback) to the cockpit control wheels.
YAW
LEFT RIGHT
Feel and centering unit The aileron control system is trimmed

manually by using the roll trim switch
on the Trim Control Panel, located on
the Cockpit center pedestal, or automatically when the autopilot is engaged.

190
The yaw control system
The yaw control system is a fly-by-wire, electro hydraulic control system,

providing control around the aircraft yaw axis. The system is controlled ei-
ther by the pilot, moving the rudder pedals forward or backward, or by the
autopilot, taking the place of the pilot input commands.
The rudder control system moves a single rudder surface attached to the
vertical stabilizer. Primary -ACE and FCM control logic is used to control two
rudder actuators, or PCUs, operating in Active/Stand-by mode. With no me-
chanical connection between the rudder pedals and the rudder surface, a
feel unit provides artificial feel and centering to the rudder pedals.
The rudder control system is trimmed manually by using the yaw trim switch
on the trim control panel, or automatically when the autopilot is engaged.

Figure 3: The rudder control system

190
The pitch control system
The pitch control system installation is a fly-by-wire, electro hydraulic control

system, providing control around the aircraft pitch-axis. The system is con-
trolled either by the pilots, moving the control column forward or backward,
or by the autopilot, taking the place of the pilot input commands. The eleva-
tor control system moves the left and right elevator surfaces, which are at-
tached to the horizontal stabilizer.
P-ACE and FCM control logic is used to control two hydraulic elevator actu-
ators for each surface, operating in an Active/Stand-by mode. With no me-
chanical connection between the control column and the elevator surfaces,
two independent feel units provide artificial feel and centering to the control
columns.
The aircraft is trimmed around the pitch axis by repositioning the Horizontal
Stabilizer, using the Pitch trim switch on the control yoke or the backup Pitch
trim switch on the Trim Control Panel in the cockpit.

Figure 4: The pitch control system

190
The pitch trim control system
The horizontal stabilizer trim control system, as a part of the pitch axis con-
trol system, provides the installation for trimming the aircraft around the air-
craft longitudinal axis.
The system controls the moveable horizontal stabilizer using the pilot, copi-
lot and back-up trim switches for manual pitch trim, and a combination of in-
puts from the Automatic Flight Control System and the FCM units for:
• autopilot trim,
• configuration trim and
• mach trim.
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Control Electronics (HS-ACE) and one Hori-

zontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator (HSTA) are used to move the control surface
from +4 degrees to -11 degrees.
In order to avoid a possible pitch trim runaway condition, manual pilot trim
commands are limited to three seconds. Airspeed augmentation is per-
formed within the HS-ACE to modify trim speed of the horizontal stabilizer.

Figure 5: The pitch trim control system
HS-ACE
HSTA
AFCS and FCM units provides:

utopilot trim
onfiguration trim
ach trim

190
The high lift systems
The EMBRAER high lift system consists of two actuation systems, one con-
trolling eight slat surfaces on the leading edge of the wing (four per wing) and
the other one controlling four double slotted flap surfaces on the trailing edge
(two per wing).
A single control lever, located on the centre pedestal in the cockpit, is used
to control the movement of slats and flaps. There are seven slat/ flap control
lever positions, defining the combined positions of the slat and flap surfaces.
Slat and flap motion is sequenced such that slats extend first, and flaps re-
tract first, when the motion command requires both surfaces to move.
Deployment of both slat and flap surfaces is commanded by two Slat/ Flap
Actuator Control Electronics (SF-ACE), and electrically operated using Pow-
er Drive Units (PDUs).

Figure 6: The high lift systems
Slat Double slotted flap

(four per wing) (two per wing)
Slat/Flap contol lever PDUs
TR
I DN
M
M
DN
IC O MI
I
TR
M PTT F
C
OC OC F
CL K CL K
O P
UP
TR
M FF T
OT
H
T T
ET
ET
ST A R
ST A R
I
UP HO
M
I
TR
ES
ES
/PUSH T- T- R
P T IM/
IM S T OP - R ST OP -
R A
A P TR
PU
ER
SHER
FD AP/ F
C P/ IS
D
D IS A C
D
T
T CS CS
SF-ACE

190
The spoiler control system
The spoiler control system commands five symmetrical pairs of spoiler pan-
els, three pairs of multi function spoilers located on the outboard wing sec-
tion and two pairs of dedicated ground spoilers located on the inboard wing
section.
The system provides roll control to augment roll inputs from the ailerons, in-
flight speed brake control to increase the aircraft descent rate. The system
also provides automatic ground spoiler deployment to increase wheel brak-
ing efficiency, and aerodynamic drag to reduce the stopping distance after
touchdown.
A speed brake handle assembly located on the centre pedestal in the cock-
pit is used to command the speed brakes, and a steep approach switch al-
lows the crew to enable the ventral air brake system.

Figure 7: The spoiler control system
STEEP
Multi function spoilers APPROACH
CLOSE
W TOW
D D
E E
P P
L L
O O
Ground Spoilers Y Y
FULL FULL

190
The Flight Control System (FCS)
The Flight Control System interfaces with the following aircraft systems:
• The Electrical System, to provide a power source for control com-

ponents and electrical actuators;
• the Hydraulic System, to provide the power source for PCUs and
actuators;
• the Air Data System, which provides speed signals;
• the Automatic Flight Control System for autopilot inputs;
• the Landing Gear System, providing inputs from the Proximity Sen-
sor Evaluation Module and Brake Control module;
• the FADEC, for engine parameters and power settings; and
• the Aircraft Diagnostic and Maintenance System, which displays
system maintenance messages.

Figure 8: Hydraulic System Interface

190
Figure 9: Electrical System Interface
RAT GEN ON LINE

IDG 1 APU IDG 2
AC GEN
40 kVA 40 kVA
EXT PWR 40kVA
LICC RICC
GLC1 EPAC ALC GLC2
BTC1 BTC 2
EICC
AC BUS 1 AC BUS 2
ETC RAT
15
kVA
RLC
GSTC AC ESS BUS
AC GROUND
SERVICE
TRU 2
200A
TRU 1 AC STANDBY BUS STBYC
200 A
DC GROUND
SERVICE TRU ESS
STATIC 200 A DCTC
TRU1C INVERTER TRU2C
1 kVA
DC BUS 1
DC BUS 2
EC1
EC 2
TRUEC
ETC 1 ETC 2
DC ESS BUS 1 DC ESS BUS 3 DC ESS BUS 2
DC EXT
PWR EPDC BC 2
(APU START) APU START
BC 1 BUS
ABC
APU
HOT BATTERY BUS 1 START
BATTERY 1 ASC HOT BATTERY BUS 2
BATTERY 2
AICC

Figure 10: Air Data System Interface
Air Data Interface
MAU 3 ADA 3
TAT 1
4A
3A
4B
ADSP 4 ADSP 3 3B
TAT 2 TAT 1
ADSP 2 ADSP 1
1A STBY
2A
2B 1B
AIR DATA SYSTEM FC

190
Figure 11: FADEC Interface

Figure 12: AFCS Interface
AIOP
CAN Bus-A
Module - A1 Elevator Servo
(MAU1)
Servo Lane A
AFCS A
Servo Lane B
AIOP
CAN Bus-B
Module – A2
(MAU1)
Rudder Servo
Servo Lane A
Servo Lane B
AIOP (Provision for CAT III)

Module – B1
(MAU2)
Aileron Servo
AFCS B
Servo Lane A
AIOP
Module – B2 Servo Lane B
(MAU3)

190
Figure 13: PSEM Interface
PSEM #1
FCM #1
1R
R 2R
WOW
3R
4R
H/W
S/W
1L ACE #1
L 2L
WOW
3L
4L
FCM #2
PSEM #2
1L
L 2L
ACE #2
WOW
3L
4L
H/W
S/W 1R
R 2R
WOW
3R FCM #3
4R
ACE #3
FCM #4

Figure 14: ADMS Interface
A429 Display Remote

Cursor
Maintenace Page Terminal
Video Ethernet
FBW Member ASCB CMC ASCB Generic I/O

System Module in a MAU
Module in a MAU
in AIOP Module
ASCB ASCB A429 A429

8 8 2 2
FCM F/S ACE

Member System
6 2
ANALOG CAN BUS CAN BUS
Analog ACES
HS ACE
Actuators
Member System
Position LVDTs

190
Cockpit Controls
The Cockpit Flight Control System includes an indication system and a con-
trol system. The FCP also provides indications of normal/direct mode status via lamps
driven by the associated ACE channels. The lamps are split between com-
mand and monitor lanes to drive the indications. Only the active ACE will
The control system includes the Control Column and the control wheel, drive the indicators.
which contains a Pitch Trim switch that allows trimming the aircraft when the
autopilot is not engaged, and a quick disconnect button, which when
pressed, disconnects all trim systems. The centre pedestal contains the
Flight Control Mode Selection Panel, the Flap/slat lever, the Speed brake le-
ver and a Trim panel.
The flight control panel (FCP)
The flight control panel (FCP) Mode Selector switches allow the pilot to force
the flight control system into DIRECT mode in order to minimize system fail-
ures that affect the pilot workload.
The switches interface directly with the associated ACE channel, which can
force the ACE into direct mode.
The elevator Direct mode switch forces all the elevator ACE channels into
direct mode. It also forces a switch between the active and stand-by chan-
nels on each elevator surface.
The rudder direct mode switch operates much like the elevator switch by
forcing the rudder ACE channels into direct mode and forcing a switch be-
tween active and stand-by channels.
The spoiler direct mode switch interfaces with the analog section of the FCM
and forces the multi function spoilers into direct mode. The roll spoilers will
default to a fixed gain, and the speed brake/ground spoiler functions will be
disabled.

Figure 15: Cockpit controls and FCP
Trim control panel (TCP)

Flight Control Mode Selection Panel ROLL
PITCH TRIM
PITCH
BACKUP
FLIGHT CONTROLS
MODE SELECTION
ELEVATORS RUDDER SPOILERS
YAW
LEFT RIGHT
Pilot control wheels

Cockpit center pedestal
Speed brake lever Flap/slat lever
CLOSE
UP
0 SLAT/ 0 W TOW
FLAP
1 1
D D
E E
TR
I DN
M
M
DN
IC O MI
I
TR
M PT F
C
OC OC F
T CL K CL K
OF P
UP
TR
M
T
O
H
F T T
T
ST A R
ST A R
T
I
UP HO
M
I
TR
E SE
E SE
/PUSH T- T- R
P T IM/
IM S T OP - R S T OP - R A
A P TR
PUS R
ER
HE
FD AP / F
C P/ IS
D
D IS
2
A C
D
P P
T
T CS CS
3 3
L L
O O
4 4 Y Y
5 5 FULL FULL
FULL FULL
DOWN

190
EICAS indications
Flight control system indication has three distinct groups on the EICAS dis-
play.
The top right section of the screen displays status, advisory, caution and
warning messages. The bottom left section of the screen displays the roll,
yaw and pitch trim positions on a white scale with green bugs. Numerical
pitch trim position is displayed on the screen and a green band is provided
for pitch trim takeoff configuration. The bottom right hand section of the
screen displays Slat/Flat Speed brake positions and Slat/Flap lever posi-
tions. Indication in green displays real surface position or lever position. In-
dication will change to amber when surfaces are in transit. If the arrows or
the Flap/Slat indication become invalid or unavailable, the associated indi-
cation will be removed from the display.
The Multi function Display (MFD)
The multi function display Flight Control synoptic page shows the flight con-
trol surface deflections on an aircraft symbol.
This page also contains a STATUS section, which provides indication of the
operating hydraulic system, mode and actuator in control of the rudder, LH
and RH elevator systems.
The active hydraulic system will be displayed in numbers. The actual mode
of the system will be indicated as NORMAL or DIRECT. The actual actuator
in control will also be indicated with numbers.

Figure 16: EICAS indications

190
27-03 Flight Controls Electronic

Architecture
Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) uncommanded or incorrect motion, power supply for out of tolerance voltag-
es, and provides fault isolation data to the LRU level.
The Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) module is the primary component in
the flight control system. A total of six ACE units are installed:
The two lanes within each channel are not interchangeable, and are physi-
cally and electrically isolated from each other and from the other channel
• two Primary-ACE's in the Forward Electronics Bay, within the Primary -ACE.
• two Slat/Flap ACE's (SF-ACE) in the Middle Electronics Bay,
• one Primary -ACE
• one Horizontal Stabilizer ACE (HS-ACE) in the Aft Electronics Bay.
The three Primary -ACE units control the rudder and elevator surfaces, the
two SF-ACE units control the slats and flaps, and the HS-ACE unit controls
the horizontal stabilizer.
Each ACE unit contains two independent channels, providing the direct con-
nection of the cockpit controls to the respective actuators, effectively replac-
ing the cable mechanism of a conventional aircraft. For example, Primary -
ACE 1 controls the left outboard elevator actuator through channel one, and
the lower rudder actuator through channel two.
ACE Command lane / Monitoring lane
Each ACE channel provides closed loop control and monitoring of a single
electro-hydraulic actuator. The channel itself is comprised of two independ-
ent processing lanes, implemented on separate circuit cards, called Com-
mand Lane and Monitoring Lane.
The Command Lane provides Direct Mode operation to the actuator, while
the Monitor Lane monitors surface and actuator feedback signals for

Figure 1: ACE’s location

190
The flight control panel (FCP)
The flight control panel (FCP) Mode Selector switches allow the pilot to force
the flight control system into DIRECT mode in order to minimize system fail-
ures that affect the pilot workload.
The switches interface directly with the associated ACE channel, which can
force the ACE into direct mode.
The elevator Direct mode switch forces all the elevator ACE channels into
direct mode. It also forces a switch between the active and stand-by chan-
nels on each elevator surface.
The rudder direct mode switch operates much like the elevator switch by
forcing the rudder ACE channels into direct mode and forcing a switch be-
tween active and stand-by channels.
The spoiler direct mode switch interfaces with the analog section of the FCM
and forces the multi function spoilers into direct mode. The roll spoilers will
default to a fixed gain, and the speed brake/ground spoiler functions will be
disabled.
The FCP also provides indications of normal/direct mode status via lamps
driven by the associated ACE channels.

Figure 2: Flight control panel
Manual Automatic
ACTIVE
ACTIVE P-ACE
P-ACE ACTIVE
ACTIVE P-ACE
P-ACE
NORMAL
NORMAL DIRECT
DIRECT NORMAL
NORMAL DIRECT
DIRECT
MODE
MODE MODE
MODE MODE
MODE MODE
MODE
1 4 1 4
3 2 2 3
STANDBY
STANDBY P-ACE
P-ACE STANDBY
STANDBY P-ACE
P-ACE
NORMAL
NORMAL DIRECT
DIRECT NORMAL
NORMAL DIRECT
DIRECT
MODE
MODE MODE
MODE MODE
MODE MODE
MODE

190
Operation of the P-ACE unit
The P-ACE unit operates in four modes:
• ACTIVE- Channel & associated actuator in control. All Monitoring

functions active. Active/ Stand-by status controlled by FCM.
• STANDBY- Associated actuator pressurized & monitored but not in

active control.
• FAILED- P-ACE or associated actuator failed and channel shut-

down.
• MAINTENANCE- P-ACE available to run IBIT & Electronic Rigging.
- There are Three layers of BITE (Built-In-Test-Equipment) in each ACE:
- Power-up, On-Ground Initiated Maintenance, Continuous.

Figure 3: Operation of the P-ACE unit
CHANNEL 1 CHANNEL 2
(ELEVATOR CTL) (RUDDER CTL)
COMMAND
COMMAND
MONITOR
MONITOR
LANE 1
LANE 2
LANE 1
LANE 2

190
Primary Actuator Control Electronic Architecture
The Actuator Control Electronics (ACE) unit is the primary component in the
flight control system. The primary flight control system incorporates three
primary ACE units, each containing two identical ACE channels for a total of
six P-ACE channels.
The P-ACE is primarily an analog-processing unit that provides a direct elec-

tronic path between the cockpit control transducer (CTT) position sensors
and the Electro-hydraulic actuators that power the primary flight control sur-
faces. In addition to the straight through analog path from the cockpit con-
trols to the actuators, each P-ACE channel accepts digital control inputs
from the FCM modules.
The digital inputs are used to augment the cockpit control inputs to linearize
the pilot commands over the entire flight envelope, over the full range of air-
craft configurations and flight conditions (e.g., airspeed, altitude, thrust and
flaps and gear extended/retracted positions).
Each P-ACE channel is comprised of two independent processing lanes

(Command and Monitor) implemented on separate circuit cards. The circuit
cards plug into a single mother board but the electrical traces within the
mother board associated with the COM / MON lanes are physically isolated
from one another by location of the external connections and by the multi-
layered circuit card.
The external electrical interfaces for each lane are provided by means of in-
dependent electrical connectors.
The flight control system design use of independence between control chan-
nels is manifested in the P-ACE design.
With its dual lane architecture and independent sensor, electrical power
sources, and actuator interfaces, each P-ACE incorporates internal hard-
ware monitoring that allows the unit to perform its critical control and moni-
toring functions independent of external influences. The control and
monitoring functions are distributed between the Command and Monitor
lanes. The Command lane provides the control function, while both lanes
provide the monitoring required by the P-ACE architecture to provide critical
control integrity.

Figure 4: Primary Actuator Control Electronics Architecture
Cross-Lane Command
COMMAND LANE Cmd Comp
Monitor RIG Actuator
0.5 BIAS
+
Pilot Input
Position DEMOD + GAIN 0.5 + LIMIT ++ SA
Sensor + -
EHSV LVDT
Surface LVDT
RAM LVDT
Hardover
Aug Cmd
Monitor
Airspeed DEMOD
Monitor
Default Default
CAN Bus Interface DEMOD
Pressure
(Primary) Digital
XDCR
Monitor
XCVR Parameter Status
Airspeed
Dispenser Sched 28 VDC
Airspeed
Sched (Qc) (CAS)
X-Channel Engage
Status Logic
Solenoid Drive Wrap
Cross-Lane Command RAM Feedback Position

Cmd Comp
MONITOR LANE Monitor
0.5
Command/
Position + -
Sensor
DEMOD + GAIN 0.5 + LIMIT ++ Response
+ Monitor
Aug Cmd RIG

Aug Cmd BIAS
Airspeed DEMOD
Monitor
Default Default
DEMOD
CAN Bus Interface Digital

XCVR Parameter Monitor
(Secondary) Airspeed Status
Dispenser Airspeed Sched
Sched (Qc) (CAS)
X-Channel Engage
Status Logic
Solenoid Drive Wrap

190
Command lane
– Provides BITE and Fault Isolation data to the LRU level.
– Commands the actuator Electro Hydraulic Servo Valve (EHSV) to con-

trol the actuator RAM movement.
– Monitors the actuator EHSV LVDT to detect a hard over or jammed

condition.
– Limits control surface movement based on airspeed data from FCM.
– Defaults surface control to a safe set of analog gain schedules when

the FCM is off-line (i.e. Direct Mode of control).
– Provides the high side voltage (28vdc) for operation of the Active/
Stand-by Solenoid Operated Valve on the actuator.
Monitoring lane
– Simulates the control path of the Command channel for fault monitor-
ing.
– Monitors surface position & actuator pressure sensor signals for un-
commanded or incorrect motion.
– Provides the low side ground for operation of the Active/Stand-by So-
lenoid Operated Valve on the actuator.
– Monitors power supply for out of tolerance voltages.

Figure 5: Command lane and monitoring lane
MAU 1 MAU 3
ESS-1 ESS-1 DC-2 DC-2
FCM 1 FCM 2 FCM 3 FCM 4
DC-1 DC-1 ESS-2 ESS-2
L ELEV
FCM 1
FCM 2
FCM 3 (BU)
FCM 4 (BU)
R ELEV
FCM 3
FCM 4
CAN BUS 1-2
FCM 1 (BU)
FCM 2 (BU)
CAN BUS 2-2
RUDDER
FCM 1 CAN BUS 3-2
FCM 2 (BU)
FCM 3 (BU) CAN BUS 4-2
FCM 4
CAN BUS 1-1
H STAB
FCM 1 (BU) CAN BUS 2-1 CAN BUS 3-1
FCM 2
FCM 3
CAN BUS 4-1
FCM 4 (BU)
P-ACE 1 P-ACE 2 HS-ACE P-ACE 3

ESS-1 DC-2 ESS-2 CH 1 ESS-1 ESS-2
ELEV RUD ELEV ELEV CH 2 ELEV RUD
DC-2 ESS-1 DC-1 ESS-3 ESS-3
MON
COM
COM
COM
MON
COM
MON
MON
COM
MON
COM
MON
DC-1 DC-1 ESS-2
ESS-2
Primary Bus Input/Output

Secondary Bus Input/Output

190
FBW back-up battery
The flight control system receives power from the two Normal DC busses
and all three Essential DC busses.
The power is distributed such that single power source or electrical bus fail-
ures will have a minimal effect on the aircraft handling qualities.
In addition to the above mentioned power sources, a dedicated and inde-

pendent FWB Hot Bus powered by a dedicated battery is provided for the
elevator and rudder ACEs that are considered essential for aircraft control-
lability. The independent power source will guarantee aircraft controllability
even in an upmost case of total loss of the existent electrical power sources.
The additional power source increases the level of redundancy and provides
robust segregation of the ACE’s powered by the independent power supply.
Thus, power for these ACE’s is independent of electrical bus integration, au-
tomatic load shedding or the interface with other systems through the elec-
trical buses.
The DC Essential Bus 3 during normal operating condition charges the bat-
tery. The battery is a lead acid battery type, similar to the ones used for
Stand-by Instruments after loss of Normal Electrical Power.
Although the battery is connected to the aircraft buses, the use of an internal
rectifier keeps the battery from powering back through the buses. This as-
sures isolation for cases of failure in the main Electrical Power System.
A dedicated circuit will be responsible for switching the power from the ex-
isting Electrical Power System buses to the FBW Hot Bus in case of failure
of the existing Electrical Power System buses.
In this failure case, the ACEs input power configuration will switch to the
FBW Hot Bus.

Figure 6: FWB back-up battery

190
Flight Control Modules (FCM)
There are four identical Flight Control Modules (FCM) installed: FCM 1 & 2
are located in the Modular Avionics Unit #1 (MAU 1) in the forward electron-
ics bay, while FCM 3 & 4 are located in the Modular Avionics Unit # 3 (MAU
3) in the centre electronics bay.
The FCM provides the digital interface between the flight control system and
the rest of the aircraft avionics systems, and is required for normal-mode op-
eration of the flight control system.
The FCM units are connected to the primary ACEs via the Controller Area
Network Bus (CAN bus), providing digital inputs to the Primary ACE, which
are combined with pilot inputs. This is used to augment pilot inputs for differ-
ent airspeeds, and provides other high level functions such as:
• thrust asymmetry compensation or
• Angle-Off-Attack (AOA) limiting to the primary ACE units.
Spoiler-ACE (S-ACE)
In addition to the digital lanes, the Flight Control Module (FCM) include an
independent analog section, also referred to as Spoiler-ACE (S-ACE), that
is used for control and monitoring of the multi function spoilers, the ground
spoilers and the ventral air brake.
The FCM interfaces the Primary-ACE with the Avionics Standard Communi-
cation Bus (ASCB), allowing full access to other aircraft systems. In case of
failure, the FCM provides failure information and fault isolation data to sys-
tems like EICAS or the Central Maintenance Computer (CMC) via the ASCB
bus.

Figure 7: FCM and Spoiler-ACE
CHANNEL A CONNECTION
PROCESSOR A CCA
SPOILER CCA
SPOILER/MEZZANINE
CONNECTION
SPOILER/PROCESSOR
INTERCONNECTION
MEZZANINE CCA
BRACKET
CHANNEL B
CONNECTION
PROCESSOR B CCA
EXTERNAL CONNECTION

190
Augmentation Electronic Control System
In addition to the P-ACE and S-ACE direct analog path from the cockpit con-
trols to the actuators, each P-ACE and S-ACE channel has the capability to The MAU modules comprise the functionality within the Avionics system,
accept augmentation inputs from the FCM modules. The augmentation from some of which are used specifically by the flight control system.
the FCM is provided by digital electronics that perform computations by The Avionics system is a highly integrated system that allows independent
means of software. applications to operate without being directly influenced or affected by each
For the S-ACEs channels, the augmentation is provided by means of analog other, yet segregated in a manner to provide availability of functions after
to digital (A / D) converters that reside within the FCM module. failures where redundancy is required.
For the P-ACEs, the augmentation is provided by means of a high integrity There are however common components within the Avionics system archi-
bidirectional data bus called the Control Area Network (CAN) bus. The CAN tecture that is used by the flight control system and all other sub-systems
bus used to transmit augmentation commands to the P-ACE channels is that use modules that reside in the integrated MAU architecture.
also used to interface the FCM to the Horizontal Stabilizer ACE, which is
known as the HS-ACE. These common components consist of both hardware and software compo-
The Avionics system is used by the flight control system to host the digital nents, primarily related Input / Output (I/ O) and data routing gateways that
portion of the system that provides the non-”Full-Time-Critical” functions. are an integral part of the Avionics system architecture and the power supply
The Avionics system is comprised of three MAUs, MAU1, MAU2 and MAU3. that sources electrical power to each MAU channel.
Each MAU is populated with multiple modules in a single chassis assembly.
Four of the MAU modules called Flight Controls Modules (FCMs) are appli-
cation specific and dedicated to the flight control system. The FCMs host the
flight controls digital electronics that use software to provide augmentation
to cockpit controls commands to the ACes, added higher level control and
monitoring functions to the flight control system.
The FCMs are comprised of the digital electronics that perform the software
computation aspects in the flight control system, in addition to the S-ACE an-
alog electronics for direct “wheel-to surface” for controlling the multi function
spoilers.
MAU 1 is a 20-module slot wide unit, while MAU 2 and MAU 3 are 16-module
slot wide units.
Each MAU is comprised of two channels that are designated as Channel-A

and Channel-B.

Figure 8: Augmentation Electronic Control system
MAU 1 MAU 3
ESS-1 ESS-1 DC-2 DC-2
DC-1 FCM 1 FCM 2 DC-1 ESS-2 FCM 3 FCM 4 ESS-2
L ELEV
FCM 1
FCM 2
FCM 3 (BU)
FCM 4 (BU)
R ELEV
FCM 3
FCM 4
CAN BUS 1-2
FCM 1 (BU)
FCM 2 (BU)
CAN BUS 2-2
RUDDER
FCM 1 CAN BUS 3-2
FCM 2 (BU)
FCM 3 (BU) CAN BUS 4-2
FCM 4
CAN BUS 1-1
H STAB
FCM 1 (BU) CAN BUS 2-1 CAN BUS 3-1
FCM 2
FCM 3
CAN BUS 4-1
FCM 4 (BU)
P-ACE 1 P-ACE 2 HS-ACE P-ACE 3

ESS-1 DC-2 ESS-2 CH 1 ESS-1
ELEV RUD ELEV ELEV CH 2 ELEV RUD ESS-3
DC-2 ESS-1 DC-1 ESS-3
MON
COM
COM
COM
MON
COM
MON
MON
COM
MON
COM
MON
DC-1 DC-1 ESS-2
ESS-2
Primary Bus Input/Output

Secondary Bus Input/Output

190
FCM features
– Provides the primary means of interfacing the aircraft avionics sys-

tems and sensors with the Flight Control System (FCS).
– Each FCM consists of two identical lanes which serve as command

and monitoring lanes providing:
• Airspeed programming to P-ACE units for actuator control.
• Digital data routing for system control, communication, and mainte-

nance diagnostics.
• Monitoring of alternate lanes for fault detection.
– Each FCM interfaces with two P-ACE units through the primary Con-
troller Area Network (CAN) data bus to provide enhanced functionality
(Normal Mode).
• Provides failure information to the EICAS and fault isolation data to

the CMC.
• The FCM is the only unit of the FCS where software algorithms re-
side.
• There are three levels of internal BIT (Built-In-Test) tests per-

formed in each FCM:
Power-up (PBIT), On-Ground Initiated Maintenance (IBIT),
Continuous (CBIT).

Figure 9: FCM features
Offside Surface
LANE A Position
BIAS
Spoiler Actuator
WHEEL /
Control Wheel RVDT DEMOD GAIN SPEEDBRAKE + LIMIT ++
MIXER + - SA
RAM LVDT
Airspeed Spdbrake Roll
Speedbrake Lever RVDT DEMOD Air/Gnd
Cmd Augment
LVDT
A/D D/A Converter Monitor
DEMOD
To Virtual Backplane 486
BIC
Processor
XCVR
Discrete I/O
Ground Spoiler Command Wrap CAN Bus Interface
28 VDC
Ground Spoiler
Logic Ground Spoiler Command
Weight On Wheels
Ground Spoiler
Solenoid Drive
LANE B Offside Surface Position
WHEEL / Command/
Control Wheel RVDT DEMOD GAIN SPEEDBRAKE + LIMIT + Response
MIXER + + Monitor
Airspeed Spdbrake Roll BIAS

Air/Gnd
Cmd Augment
A/D D/A Converter

BIC
Processor
XCVR
Discrete I/O CAN Bus Interface
Ground Spoiler Command Wrap
28 VDC
Ground Spoiler
Weight On Wheels Logic Ground Spoiler Command
Ground Spoiler
Solenoid Drive

190

Figure 10: AFCS
Failure Effect on AFCS AFCS Effects on FBW FCS

Condition Response
Loss of 1 FCM No effect Normal operation Normal Mode
Loss of 2 FCMs No effect Normal operation Normal Mode
Loss of 3 FCMs No effect Normal operation Normal Mode
Loss of 4 FCMs FBW in Direct Mode Disconnect AP/YD Direct Mode
Loss of 1 Elevator No affect Normal operation Normal Mode
ACE channel
Loss of 2 Elevator FBW in Direct Mode Disconnect AP Direct Mode on Elevator
ACE channels
(same Elevator)
Loss of 2 Elevator No affect Normal Operation Normal Mode
ACE channels
(different Elevators)
Loss of 1 Rudder No affect Normal operation Normal Mode
ACE channel
Loss of 2 Rudder Rudder streamlined Disconnect YD Loss of Rudder Control
ACE channels
Loss of 1 Aileron No affect Normal operation Degraded roll control
Actuator
Loss of 2 Aileron Aileron effectiveness Disconnect AP Degraded roll control
Actuators (same reduced by 2
Aileron surface)
Loss of 2 Aileron No affect Normal Operation Degraded roll control
Actuators (different
Aileron surface)
Loss of 1 spoiler Reduced roll Stay engaged, Degraded roll control
pair effectiveness performance may
degrade
Loss of 2 spoiler Reduced roll Disconnect AP Degraded roll control
pairs effectiveness
Loss of 3 spoiler Reduced roll Disconnect AP Degraded roll control
pairs effectiveness
1 Spoiler Pair in Default Spoiler Stay Engaged Degraded roll control
Direct Mode Scheduling
Control Wheel Jam Pilot forces control Disconnect AP/YD Loss of 1 or 2 MFS pairs
wheel disconnect - Degraded roll control
Column Jam Pilot forces control Disconnect AP/YD Loss of 1 elevator - 2nd
wheel disconnect elevator Direct
Pedal Jam Loss of rudder control Disconnect AP/YD Loss of Rudder Control

190
Avionic Standard Communication Bus (ASCB)
The flight control system communicates with other aircraft systems via the
Avionic Standard Communication Bus (ASCB).
The ASCB provides data exchange between all FCM’s, and with other com-
ponents of the avionic system. The following systems provide data to the
flight control system:
• Smart probes and the Air Data Application (ADA) modules provide
air data for various airspeed augmentation commands;
• The Proximity Sensor Evaluation Module (PSEM) provides Weight-

On-Wheel (WOW) and ground spoiler position data to the FCM’s;
• Brake Control Modules (BCM) provide wheel speed signals used

for ground spoiler deployment;
• The FADECs provide Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) to the FCM’s used
for thrust asymmetry and elevator thrust compensation, and the Au-
tomatic Flight Control System (AFCS) provides autopilot com-
mands.
Data is also shared on the ASCB for the EICAS to display warnings, cau-
tions, advisory messages and system status, and provided to the central
maintenance computer for system diagnostics.

Figure 11: Avionic Standard Communication Bus (ASCB)
FCM
ADA BCM PSEM FADEC AFCS EICAS CMC

190
27-10 Flight Controls Ailerons

Introduction
The lateral control system installation includes both the conventional hydro-
mechanical aileron control system and the fly-by-wire electro-hydraulic multi
function spoiler control system, providing roll axis control. The system is
controlled either by the pilots, rotating the control wheel left or right, or by the
autopilot.
The aileron control system controls two aileron surfaces attached to the rear
spar of the wings, while the multi function spoiler control system drives three
outboard pairs of spoiler surfaces to assist roll control.
A feel- and-centering unit provides artificial feel (force feedback) to the cock-
pit control wheels.
The aileron control system is trimmed manually by using the roll trim switch
on the Trim Control Panel, located in the cockpit on the centre pedestal, or
automatically when the autopilot is engaged.
Figure 1: Flight Controls Ailerons
DISCONNECT
UNIT
MAU 3
MAU 1
DC-2 FCM 1 FCM 1 FCM 3 FCM 3 FCM 4 FCM 4

DC-1 ESS-1
S-ACE S-ACE S-ACE S-ACE S-ACE S-ACE
(Analog SP) (Analog SP) (Analog SP)
ESS-2 DC-2
Lane Lane Lane Lane Lane Lane
ESS-1 (Analog SP) (Analog SP)
(Analog SP)
A B A B A B
Feel Unit Trim Servo
AP
Servo
RAM LVDT
RAM LVDT
RAM LVDT
RAM LVDT
EHSV Return
EHSV Return
EHSV Command
EHSV Return
EHSV Return
EHSV Return
EHSV Return
RAM LVDT
EHSV Command
EHSV Command
EHSV Command
EHSV Command
EHSV Command
RAM LVDT
Hyd #3 Hyd #2 Hyd #2 Hyd #3
Actuator
Actuator
Actuator
Actuator
Hyd Hyd Hyd Hyd Hyd Hyd
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
Act
#2 #1 #1 #1 #1 #2
Spoiler Spoiler Spoiler Spoiler Spoiler Spoiler

L5 L4 L3 R3 R4 R5
Left Aileron Right Aileron
Multi-Function Spoilers Multi-Function Spoilers
Filename: Lateral Control System Direct Mode.vsd
2/24/2003
Rev -
190
Aileron control assembly
The system consists of two conventional control wheel assemblies for pilot
and copilot, used to drive both the fly-by-wire roll-spoilers and the aileron and convert the inputs into electrical signals that are processed by the ACE/
control system. FCM units for roll spoiler deployment.
Two forward torque tubes are installed underneath the flight deck - one for
each control wheel. Two independent aft torque tubes are located on each
side of the centre fuselage. Two sets of cables, connected to the forward Flight Deck Controls
torque tubes, provide the aileron commands to the aft torque tubes.
The installation includes two conventional control wheel assemblies (Pilot‘s
and Co - pilot‘s), which drive two forward torque tubes located beneath the
The right set of cables runs under the cabin floor, terminating at the right aft flight deck. The rotation of the forward torque tubes drives cable commands
torque tube, while the left set of cables runs along the bottom of the fuselage to the rest of the hydro - mechanical aileron control system.
to provide separation through the rotor burst zone, and terminates at the left The control wheel travel is limited by two system stops. The primary stops
aft torque tube. A second set of cables is attached to the aft torque tubes, are located at the end of the cable system in the wing quadrant. These stops
terminating at the wing quadrants, which drives the input levers to the hydro- are set + /- 40 degrees no load travel of the control wheel. The secondary
mechanical aileron actuators, or PCUs. stops are located on the control wheel and limit the travel to + /- 44.5 de-
grees. With cable stretch due to cable friction and feel forces, the primary
Cockpit Control Transducers (CCTs), connected to the forward torque stop should be contacted when the control wheel reaches + /- 43.5 degrees
tubes, provide control wheel inputs to the multi function spoiler control sys- and further cable stretch will then be necessary for the secondary stop to be
tem. contacted + /- 44.5 degrees.
The cable and chain system between each control wheel and forward torque
Pilot- Copilot control wheels tube incorporates a sprocket attached to the control wheel at its center of ro-
tation. The sprocket drives a chain that runs down each side of the pitch con-
trol column. The ends of the chain are connected to cables routed over
Each of the pilot control wheels has a sprocket attached to its centre of ro- pulleys located on each side of the control column on the column‘s center of
tation, which drives a chain that runs down each side of the pitch control col- rotation. These cables are attached to quadrants on the forward torque tube,
umn, rotating the forward torque tube. The rotation of the torque tubes drives through which they control rotary motion of the torque tube.
cable commands to the rest of the aileron control system.
The gearing is such that 40 degrees of control wheel produces 30.4 degrees
Control wheel travel is limited to 40 degrees to either side, producing 25 de- of quadrant / torque tube travel. This control wheel to torque tube motion is
grees aileron up travel and 15 degrees aileron down travel. identical for the ERJ 170 and EMB 190.
Three cockpit command transducers (CCT), mounted on each of the two
torque tubes, sense the pilot control wheel inputs as a function of position,
Figure 2: Aileron control Assembly
B
A
ZONES
123
124
221
222
A A
ZONES
123
124
C ONTR OL Y OK E
S TICK S HAKE R
C ONNEC TOR
B
S TICK S HAKE R R IG HT T OR QUE
T UB E
A
LVDT
LEF T T OR QUE
T UB E
A
DIS CONNEC T UNIT
LEF T C ONTR OL R IG HT C ONTR OL

Y OK E Y OK E
C AB LE
MAIN C ONNEC TOR QUADR ANT

A
P ULLEY
B
B
190
There are two independent torque tubes under the flight deck, one for each F (21 degrees C) for ERJ 170 and 90 pounds at 70 degrees F (21 degrees
control wheel. A pilot / copilot activated disconnect device provides a hard C) for the EMB 190. The quadrants are sized such that + /- 40 degrees of
connection between the left and right torque tubes until the disconnect han- control wheel travel produces + = 2.42” (61.4 mm) of no load cable travel and
dle is pulled. + /-28 degrees of aileron input quadrant travel. With this arrangement the pi-
lot control wheel controls the left wing and the co - pilot control wheel con-
trols the right wing.
Three Linear Variable Differential Transducers (LVDTs) are connected to
each torque tube. The LVDTs provide control wheel inputs for spoiler con-
trol. The two halves of the aileron control system are connected via a cable inter-
connect circuit located in the center fuselage and via the disconnect unit be-
tween the two front torque tubes located under the cockpit floor.
Cable System The interconnect circuit cable is also 1/8” diameter and is tensioned to 80
pounds (36.3 kg) at 70 degrees F (21 degrees C) for the ERJ 170 and 90
The cable system consists of five seperste cable circuits. Two cable circuits pounds at 70 degrees F (21 degrees C) for the EMB 190. Control wheel in-
go from the flight deck area to the central fuselage. One cable circuit goes puts of + /- 40 degrees produce + /- 2.45 inches (62.2 mm) of no load cable
along the rear spar of each wing and one cable circuit interconnects the two travel for both airplanes.
halves of the system in the central fuselage. Two torque tube assemblies lo-
cated in the central fuselage connect all of the cable circuits together. The The aft interconnect cable circuit provides:
fuselage cable circuits for the ERJ 170 and EMB 190 are identical except for
cable length. The wing cable circuit for EMB 190 is similar to the ERJ 170, • Protection against excessive commands to the PCU due to cable
the difference is in cable length and some pulleys, grommets and fairlead- rupture.
sarrangement to accommodate the cable circuit in the wing. • A command path between the two sides of the system in case of a
cable rupture forward of the rear torque tubes.
Each fuselage cable circuit is connected to a quadrant attached to one of the • Jam override in case one side of the aileron cable system is immov-
forward torque tubes. The pilot‘s cable circuit runs beneath the cabin floor able.
and the co - pilot‘s circuit runs along the bottom of the fuselage to provide • Improved side - to - side command synchronization for high fre-
separation through the rotor burst zone. Both circuits terminate at the torque quency Auto Pilot inputs.
tubes in the center fuselage, the pilot‘s circuit terminating at the left torque
tube assembly and the Copilot‘s circuit terminating at the right torque tube
assembly. The cable 1/8 “ diameter and is tensioned to 80 pounds (36.3 kg) The disconnect unit provides synchronization between the system halves at
at 70 degrees F (21 degrees C) for the ERJ 170 and 90 pounds at 70 de- the front torque tubes and allow for a system disconnect after a jam upon
grees F (21 degrees C) for the EMB190. The quadrants are sized such that pilot / copilot activation.
a + /- 40 degree of control wheel travel produces +/- 3” (76.36 mm) of no load
cable travel and + /- 40 degrees of aft torque tube travel.
The left wing cable circuit connects to a quadrant on the left aft torque tube
and the right wing cable circuit connects to a quadrant on the right aft torque
tube. Each wing cable circuit runs along the rear spar to a wing quadrant that
provides an input to the aileron PCU via an adjustable push. The wing ca-
bles 1/8” diameter and are tensioned to 80 pounds (36.3 kg) at 70 degrees
Figure 3: Aileron control Assembly
DISCONNECT
IMPUT ROD UNIT
PCU
QUADRANT
LVDT
CABLES
TURNBUCKLE
TRIM
QUADRANT
PULLEY ACTUATOR
AILERON CABLES
SURFACE PULLEYS PULLEYS
FEEL UNIT PULLEYS
AUTOPILOT
SERVICE
PULLEY
CABLES
PULLEYS
FUSELAGE
SECTOR
PULLEY
CABLES PULLEY
TURNBUCKLE
TURNBUCKLE
FUSELAGE PULLEY PULLEYS

SECTOR
QUADRANT
IMPUT ROD
CABLES
PCU
AILERON
SURFACE
190
Interconnect, disconnect
The two halves of the aileron control system are connected via a cable inter-
connect circuit located in the centre fuselage. The forward interconnect op-
erates through a control wheel disconnect assembly which allows continued
operation following a jam in either side of the aileron system.
The aft disconnect unit is a force-operated device that will separate the two
halves of the system if at least 100 pounds of force is applied to the un-
jammed control wheel. Following a disconnect, half of the system remains
operational. If the jam occurs on the copilot’s half of the system, the pilot re-
tains control of the left aileron with normal artificial feel. If the jam occurs on
the pilot’s side, the copilot remains in command of the right aileron without
artificial feel, since the feel mechanism is attached to the pilot’s half of the
system.
Following a disconnect, the system remains separated for the remainder of

the flight, and ground maintenance is required to reset the disconnect unit.
The left aft torque tubes include attachment for the input cranks of the artifi-
cial feel unit and autopilot servo.
Figure 4: Interconnect,disconnect
190
Artificial feel and centering unit
The aileron control system employs an artificial feel-and-centering unit,

since the actual aerodynamic load on the aileron surface is fully sustained
by the aileron PCUs.
The artificial feel-and-centering unit, a preloaded spring device, is attached

to the left aft torque tube. The other end of the feel unit is attached to the roll
trim actuator, which is grounded to the aircraft structure.
As the control wheel is rotated clockwise or counter-clockwise, the feel unit

is extended and retracted, providing a feel force to the pilot moving the con-
trol wheel. The feel force increases in linear fashion as a function of control
wheel angle. No force is felt at neutral wheel position, and maximum force
is felt at 40 degrees control wheel deflection.
In the absence of pilot input, the control wheel is returned to the neutral po-
sition by the feel unit.
In the event of a left and right system disconnect, the copilot loses artificial
feel on the right side control wheel, leaving only the friction force of the cable
circuit.
Figure 5: Artificial feel and centering unit
Aileron Artificial Feel Unit
Left Torque Tube Assy
Aileron Trim Unit
190
Aileron power control units
There are four aileron PCUs in the aileron hydraulic sub subsystem. Two
PCUs are attached to each aileron control surface. enough hydraulic fluid to provide flutter damping, in the event of a loss of hy-
draulic system pressure.
The PCUs are located on the aft side of spar II. Movement of the PCUs move
the aileron control surfaces to give control and stability to the aircraft about
the lateral axis. The PCUs are mechanically controlled and hydraulically ac-
tuated. The aileron PCU has the following components:
• Aileron PCU manifold
• Anti-cavitation check valve
• Inlet check valve
• Compensator
The aileron PCU manifold houses all hydraulic and electrical components of
the PCU. The servo-valve input crank is mounted in the manifold and pro-
vides the attachment point for the input linkage. The manifold is rigidly at-
tached to the spar II of the wing with four bolts.
The anti-cavitation check valves have a flat lapped poppet and a sharp edge
on the seat. The sharp edge allows the valve to shear through contamina-
tion.
The inlet check valves have a flat lapped poppet and a sharp edge on the
seat. The sharp edge allows the valve to shear through contamination. Con-
tamination of the inlet check valve will cause an increase in pressure. The
increase in pressure will cause the inlet check valve to crack. The inlet check
valve is held in place by a cap.
The compensator provides fluid volume to compensate for PCU leakage and
fluid thermal contraction, in order to ensure the actuator damping circuit has
Figure 6: Aileron PCU
Anti-jam mechanism
Pilot input
Manual relief valve
190
Cross- port relief valves Piston

The cross-port relief valves are installed between the extend and retract The actuator piston is made from a material which provides wear resistance
chambers of the actuators. If the differential pressure exceeds a predeter- on the rods and prolongs the life of the seals.
mined value between the actuators chambers, the cross-port relief valve The piston has two seals to ensure that the PCU can provide flutter damping
opens. Fluid is then vented from the high pressure chamber to the low pres- in the event of a failure of the primary seal.
sure chamber. This action will continue until the differential pressure drops
below the predetermined value. The cross-port relief valves use a slide and
sleeve type of construction for maximum stability and to minimize friction. Pressure Transducer
The PCU also has a pressure transducer for monitoring system pressure
and for BIT testing the damping circuit. The pressure sensor is LVDT based.
Electrical connector
A single electrical connector is mounted on the manifold as the electrical in-
terface to the MAU (Modular Avionics Unit) for operation of the Delta Pres- Return Relief Valve
sure Sensor and Compensator LVDT (Linear Variable Differential- The return relief valve retains fluid in the PCU for damping after the loss of
Transducer). a hydraulic system. The return relief valve contains a flat lapped poppet and
a sharp edge on the seat. The sharp edge allows the valve to shear through
the contamination. Contamination of the return relief valve will cause an in-
Hydraulic Ports and Filters crease in pressure. The increase in pressure will cause the return relief
There are two hydraulic fittings on each PCU, one for system pressure and valve to crack. The return-relief valve includes a manual override feature
one for system return. A filter is installed downstream of the system pressure that is used to dump the compensator circuit during maintenance activities.
fitting to prevent contamination of the PCU.
Servo control valve
PCU External Linkage The servo control valve is a spool valve type, lapped slide/sleeve assembly,
The PCU external linkage consists of an input lever, a summing link, a de- which controls the flow to the retract and extend cavities of the actuators cyl-
tent link and two springs. inder. The rate of flow is dependent upon pilot input and piston position.
The purpose of the linkage is to move the servo control valve in response to
pilot commands.
A summing link provides mechanical positional feedback, so that the control

valve is moved to a neutral position when the surface reaches the com-
manded position.
The springs also provide neutral recovery in case of input linkage disconnec-
tion. The centering springs also provide protection in the event of a wing ca-
ble rupture.
Figure 7: PCU
190
Aileron Electrical System Operation
Two left aileron actuators send hydraulic delta-pressure sensor data and
compensator position data to the AFCS AIOP in MAU 1. The two right ailer-
on actuators send hydraulic delta-pressure sensor data and compensator
position data to the AFCS AIOP in MAU 3. The AIOPs send this data to the
FCMs over the ASCB-D. The FCMs processes the hydraulic delta-pressure
LVDT voltage and outputs the result on ASCB-D. The actuator compensator
position data is sent to the FCMs over the ASCB-D for maintenance moni-
toring of the aileron actuators.
There is one surface position sensor for each aileron surface. Each sensor
interfaces and supplies input data to the AIOP in MAU 1. This data is sent to
the FCM over the ASCB-D. The FCMs change the aileron surface position
transducer voltage readings to aileron surface position and output the result
on ASCB-D.
The FCMs use the delta-pressure inputs and surface position inputs to per-
form flutter suppression (damping) and leakage maintenance tests. It is also
used to make sure the aileron hydro mechanical system is operating prop-
erly. Aileron surface position also supplies information to the flight controls
synoptic display page and the FDR.
Figure 8: Aileron electrical system operation
(SSM 31-41-80)
MAU 1
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
AIOP 1A
HYD DP SENSOR (SSM 27-12-80)
LH O/B AILERON PCU
COMPENSATOR
POSITION SENSOR
HYD DP SENSOR
(SSM 27-12-80)
COMPENSATOR LH I/B AILERON PCU A
POSITION SENSOR
SURFACE
POSITION SENSOR (SDS 27-13)
(MPP 27-13-02)
LH AILERON
POSITION SENSOR EXC
B
SURFACE POSITION
SENSOR LVDT
A
(SSM 31-41-80)
MAU 2
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
AIOP 2A

RH O/B AILERON PCU
COMPENSATOR
POSITION SENSOR

RH I/B AILERON PCU
COMPENSATOR
POSITION SENSOR
B
(SSM 31-41-80)
MAU 3
A
CTR AVIONICS COMPT LH SHOWN;
AIOP 2B RIGHT HAND OPPOSITE
SURFACE
POSITION SENSOR (SDS 27-13)
(MPP 27-13-02)
RH AILERON
POSITION SENSOR EXC SURFACE POSITION
B SENSOR LVDT
190
Aileron Trim System

Aileron Trim Actuator
The aileron trim system allows the pilot to off load any unwanted force from
the control wheel by adjusting the neutral feel position of the aileron system.
The aileron trim actuator is a mechanical jackscrew driven through a reduc-
The aileron trim system consists of two parts: tion gear train by a DC motor. The aileron trim actuator is controlled by the
roll trim switch, located on the centre console. The aileron trim actuator is
connected to the aileron feel unit.
• an electro-mechanical linear actuator, which is attached to the arti-
ficial feel and centering unit and grounded to the aircraft structure,
and, The aileron trim actuator has an integral potentiometer to provide position in-
dication for display on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting Sys-
tem). The aileron trim actuator also has an integral timer that limits roll trim
• the Trim Control Panel, located on the centre pedestal in the cock adjustments to 3-second intervals.
pit.
The system is operated via the Rocker type dual control switch on the TCP,
commanding the actuator to move, and repositioning the ground point of the
feel unit, which in turn repositions the neutral feel position of the aileron sys-
tem. The actuator is equipped with a timer, limiting a single trim command
to three seconds,
A quick disconnect switch, located on the pilot and copilot control wheels,
disables the roll trim actuator by interrupting DC power to the trim motor.
The aileron trim sub-subsystem permits direct operation of the aileron con-
trol surface when the sub-system is hydraulically supplied. When the crew
operates the roll trim switch, it energizes the aileron trim actuator.
The aileron trim actuator displaces the ground point of the artificial feel unit
and changes the artificial feel neutral position. When the artificial feel neutral
position is changed, the aileron PCU, through a system of cables and quad-
rants, deflects the aileron control surface.
The aileron trim actuator is capable of providing maximum trim input equiv-
alent to 50% of the full aileron surface movement.
Figure 9: Aileron trim system and actuator
190
Autopilot input
Engaging the autopilot on the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS)

Guidance Panel located in the cockpit causes the autopilot to take the place
of pilot input commands to the system.
The One autopilot servo, connected to the left aft torque tube via cables re-
ceives AFCS commands via the CAN bus interface and provides inputs to
the aileron system.
During auto flight, the autopilot servo responds to commands from the
AFCS, moving the entire aileron control system including control wheels, ca-
bles, torque tubes, PCUs and aileron surfaces, to the desired position. In re-
sponse to the resulting movement of the forward torque tube assembly,
incorporating the LVDT position sensors, the multi function spoiler control
system is activated accordingly.
Figure 10: Autopilot input
DN
SPEED
HDG AUTO MAN
ALT SEL FPA SEL
UP
SYNC FT/M
PUSH CHG
CAN BUS
Servo motor
LVDTs, forward torque tube
190
Aileron components failure
Any single jam of the mechanical components of the system will leave half
of the system operational. In case of a jam in either pilot’s control wheel or In the event of a loss of both hydraulic systems, both actuators will be in
the associated cable assembly, the pilot is able to control the aircraft using damping mode, and the aileron surface will remain in the aerodynamic trail
the non-jammed control wheel, by operating the wheel disconnect unit to position.
separate the two halves of the system.
In the event of a jam of a PCU servo valve, a pilot force of about 1.5 pounds
will operate the jam override device integral to each actuator. The failed ac-
tuator will be neutralized by the other actuator, effectively locking the surface
hydraulically at the current position. The pilot will retain lateral control using
the remaining aileron and all the roll spoilers.
An aileron trim servo runaway will result in a shift of the control wheel neutral
point. The pilot is then required to hold a constant force to maintain neutral
position of the ailerons. Full roll control authority is maintained; however,
asymmetrical control forces will be required.
In the event of a wing cable rupture, control of the affected aileron will be lim-
ited to one direction, since only one cable remains, while control of the op-
posite aileron will be normal.
In the event of a disconnect of one aileron PCU from the surface or wing
structure, the other PCU attached to the surface will operate normally. The
aileron surface will operate normally, but the force authority of the aileron
surface will be halved.
The aileron PCUs normally share air loads during flight, and if the FCM de-
tects a difference in load-sharing from the two actuators per aileron surface,
and the message FLIGHT CONTROLS (TBD) will be displayed on the upper
right portion of the EICAS display in the cockpit.
When the hydraulic supply to one actuator is lost, the unit operates as a
damper, and the system continues to operate normally, with the remaining
actuator driving the control surface.
Figure 11: Aileron components failure
190
CAS MESSAGE TYPE DESCRIPTION FAULT CODE

AILERON LH FAIL ADVISORY Indicates that the left aileron surface has failed to 27100141
respond to control wheel commands due to a jam
in the control surface or actuator
AILERON RH FAIL ADVISORY Indicates that the right aileron surface has failed to 27100142
respond to control wheel commands due to a jam
in the control surface or actuator.
ROLL CONTROL DISC ADVISORY Indicates that the control-yoke disconnect device 27100200
disconnected.
FLT CTRL BIT EXPIRED CAUTION Indicates that the flight controls power up built-in 27000600
test time expired.
FLT CTRL FAULT ADVISORY Indicates that one of the components associated 27000200
with the flight control system has failed.This
annunciation is a global message that is associated
with monitoring throughout the flight control system.
FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH CAUTION Indicates that one or more flight control system 27000100
components or units has indicated a failure and
requires maintenance.This annunciation is a global
message that is associated with monitoring
throughout the flight control system.
FLT CTRL TEST FAILED CAUTION The flight controls test failed. 27000700
FLT CTRL TEST IN PROG STATUS Indicates that the flight controls test is in progress. 27000900
FLT CTRL TEST PASSED STATUS Indicates that the flight controls test passed. 27000800
Figure 12: Inhibit
CODE AFTER BEFORE DESCRIPTION

st
K1 Electrical Power On 1 Engine Started Parked or Taxiing
st
K2 1 Engine Started V1-15 knots Take Off Roll
K3 V1-15 knots 400 ft (Take Off) Take Off
K4 400 ft (Take Off) 200 ft (Landing) Climb, Cruise, Approach
K5 200 ft (Landing) Rollout, Braking, Thrust Reverse Landing
K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K1
Parked to Taxi Takeoff Roll Takeoff V1-15 to 400ft Climb, Cruise, Descent to Landing 200ft to Braking Taxi to Parked
200ft
190
27-20 Flight Controls Rudder

Introduction
The system uses conventional pedal assemblies to drive the fly-by-wire rud-
der control system. A pair of Cockpit Control Transducers (CCTs) are con-
nected to each rudder pedal assembly, providing the electrical signals to the
P-ACE modules, effectively replacing the control cables of a conventional
aircraft.
Two independent P-ACE modules drive the upper and lower PCU, providing
the analog rudder control functions implemented in the P-ACE hardware,
such as gain-shaping to vary the pedal-to-surface gearing as a function of
the magnitude of the pilot input.
Four independent FCM units, located in MAU 1 and 3, provide high level
system augmentation to the P-ACE units, such as:
• yaw damping
• turn coordination
• Thrust Asymmetry Compensation
• gain scheduling as a function of airspeed
• Rudder Flight Authority (RFA)

Figure 1: Rudder control schematic

190
Flight deck rudder controls
The flight deck controls include two pedal assemblies, which rotate a pair of
forward torque tubes located under the flight deck. Each pedal assembly in- blies, thus returning the pedals to the neutral position with no pilot control in-
corporates two rudder pedals mounted on arms, rotating forward and back- put.
ward. Rudder pedal travel is limited by system stops located on each
forward torque tube. With one cartridge disconnected, the feel loads on both pedals are reduced
to one half of the total force. An additional actuator trim disconnect cartridge
A push rod, attached to each pedal, provides the input force to a ‘Y’-arm, provides backup feel force in case the AFU grounding through the trim actu-
which in turn drives the interconnect linkage connecting the two pedal as- ator is disconnected.
semblies. Push rods are also attached to the pedal adjuster motors, pedal
position controlled by the pedal adjuster switches located in the cockpit left
and right consoles. The ‘Y’-arm also provides input to the two Cockpit Con-
trol Transducers per side. Linear Variable Differential Transformers (LVDT)
A feel unit, located between the two torque tubes, provides the feel and
centering force to both rudder pedal assemblies. It is grounded to the aircraft The cockpit command transducers sense the pilot rudder pedal inputs by
structure by the trim actuator. converting the mechanical deflection of the rudder pedal assembly into elec-
trical signals that are transmitted to the P-ACE units.
Autopilot servo or servoes are attached to each torque tube assembly, re-
placing the pilot input commands when the autopilot is engaged. There are four single Linear Variable Differential Transformers, or LVDTs,
installed:
Artificial Feel Unit (AFU) • two attached to the pilot's torque tube, and
• two attached to the copilot's torque tube.
The dual artificial feel unit (AFU) provides an artificial force to the rudder
pedals, which increases in linear fashion as a function of control pedal dis- A shear-out mechanism protects the rudder pedals from jamming in the un-
placement. likely event of a jammed LVDT.
The AFU consists of two cartridges with preloaded springs, extending and Each LVDT interfaces directly with the P-ACE unit controlling the actuator of
retracting according to the pedal commands, providing an independent force the same side, resulting in the pilot controlling the upper PCU, and the copi-
feedback to the left and right pedal assemblies. lot controlling the lower PCU. This distribution ensures additional redundan-
cy between the left and right side rudder systems.
The AFU is grounded to the aircraft structure through the trim actuator. The
preload in the unit is sufficient to overcome friction within the pedal assem

Figure 2: Flight deck rudder controls
PILOT INP UT
ACTUA TOR
CP INP UT

190
Rudder PCU’s
Two electro-hydraulic actuators, or PCUs, drive the rudder control surface.

The PCUs are attached directly to the rear spar of the vertical stabilizer. The PCU includes a solenoid-activated pressure reducer, which is normally
They are controlled by the associated P-ACE, commanding the PCU to drive in the deenergized deactivated state, and supply pressure of 3000psi is sup-
the rudder surface via the toggle links. plied directly to the EHSV and mode selector valve and solenoid. In the ac-
tivated state the reducer limits the pressure to 1400psi in order to limit the
maximum hinge movement of the actuator when the system reverts to direct
The two PCUs connected to the rudder surface operate in an active/stand- mode.
by mode, resulting in one actuator being energized and actively controlling
the surface, while the stand-by PCU acts as a hydraulic damper, providing
flutter protection. The solenoid valve is an electromagnetic valve that ports fluid to the mode
select valve when energized. A spring acts against hydraulic pressure to
close the inlet port when the solenoid is de-energized. The mode select
The active/stand-by status of the PCUs is alternated by the P-ACE units at valve is a four way valve, which is active when pressurized and in bypass/
the first power up on ground each day, or automatically switched when a fail- damping mode when de-pressurized.
ure is detected.
The EHSV is a deflector jet valve. The servo valve operates on a DC control
The upper PCU is powered by hydraulic system 1, while the lower PCU is voltage, and is fully open in the extend or retract position. The EHSV re-
powered by hydraulic system 3. ceives inputs from the P-ACE to select retraction or extension of the actua-
tor.
The toggle valve ensures that retract or extend pressure is supplied to the
The rudder electro-hydraulic actuator pressure transducer.
A return relief valve is provided to ensure that a quantity of fluid is retained

The rudder control system uses electro-hydraulic actuators to drive the rud- in the PCU for damping after the loss of a hydraulic system.
der control surface, controlled by the associated ACE channel via an electro-
hydraulic servo valve.
One electrical connector receives inputs from the pressure transducer and
from the compensator piston, and a second one receives EHSV and piston
Each actuator consists of a stainless steel piston jack and an aluminium LVDT signals, and forwards these values to the P-ACE.
manifold.
An inlet check valve is located in-line with the pressure port, downstream of
the supply filter.

Figure 3: Rudder PCU’s

190
LVDT feedback signals
The P-ACE receives several electrical feedback signals from the LVDTs
housed in the PCU and the LVDTs mounted to the rudder surface, ensuring
a closed loop control, as well as permanent monitoring of the PCU for failure
detection.
An LVDT on the main ram transmits actuator piston position information to

the P-ACE, used in conjunction with the inputs from the surface position
transducer to determine actual rudder position.
Another LVDT mounted to the electro hydraulic servo valve returns actual
position of the valve, and a pressure LVDT detects hydraulic pressure loss
within the actuator.
The two surface position transducers also provide data to other aircraft sys-
tems, such as the EICAS and the flight data recorder.

Figure 4: LVDT feedback signals

190
The rudder trim system
The trim system allows the pilot to off load any unwanted force from the rud-
der pedals. This is accomplished by adjusting the neutral feel position of the
pedal assembly.
The rudder trim system consists of:
• an electromechanical linear actuator attached to the Artificial Feel

Unit (AFU) and grounded to the aircraft structure, and the
• Trim Control Panel (TCP), located on the centre pedestal in the
cockpit.
The system is operated by a rotary yaw trim control switch on the TCP, com-
manding the actuator to move, repositioning the ground point of the AFU,
which in turn repositions the neutral position of the rudder feel system. The
actuator is equipped with a timer, limiting a single trim command to three
seconds.
A quick disconnect switch, located on the pilot and copilot control yoke, dis-
ables the trim actuator by removing DC power to the trim motor. A potenti-
ometer within the actuator provides position indication to the EICAS

Figure 5: Rudder trim system

190
The rudder system modes
With rotation of both torque tubes, all four command LVDTs provide equiv-
alent pedal position to the P-ACEs.
The active P-ACE then compares the position of the LVDT in the main ram
of the corresponding PCU to the commanded position from the LVDTs. The
error between command and surface position is converted to an electrical
signal to the EHSV, which commands the PCU to eliminate the error.
The other PCU that is in stand-by mode remains in bypass through the
damping orifice that allows the PCU to be back driven by the active PCU,
and provides flutter protection.
Rudder, CAT 2 and CAT 3 operations
For CAT 2 operations there are no mechanical rudder inputs from the auto-
pilot. The AFCS provides yaw damper and turn coordination signals directly
to the FCM over the ASCB. The FCM modules then transmit the commands
to the rudder P-ACE modules via CAN bus interface. The commands are
summed in series with the normal pilot commands before being modified by
the rudder gain schedule. The autopilot authority is limited electronically -
the limits are provided by the torque limits in the AFCS.
For CAT 3 operations, a single autopilot servo is installed at the forward

torque tube.

Figure 6: Rudder system modes

190
Rudder Control System Functionalities
Rudder Electronic Stroke Limiting
The Rudder Control System provides an electronic rudder limiter function in

the ACE hardware immediately upstream of the servo amplifier output to the
actuator, in order to provide structural protection for the vertical fin and em-
pennage as a function of airspeed.For the EMB 190 only, there is an extra
limiter (nominal of 31.5 degrees) located immediately after pedal shaping, in
order to diminish the cumulative effects of the mechanical errors of the rud-
der components in the cockpit to the P-ACE deflections.
The rudder limiter works in conjunction with the rudder airspeed gain sched-
ule such that the pilot’s rudder pedal authority (pilot inputs plus augmenta-
tion commands) is determined by the rudder limiter.

Figure 7: Rudder Electronic Stroke Limiting
Probe from ASCB Data
QDYN
N2
AFCS
N1
FCM Scheduled Rudder
Gain and Limit
Yaw Damper
Selection Turn Coordination
Process
+
Rudder Flight Thrust Assymetry
Authority + + Compensation
Augmentation
Command
Airspeed
Rudder
Rudder
Gain
Pt
Ps
Limit
CAN BUS
3.03 1.33 SOV

P-ACE
Limiter f laps = 0
Geared
Command
Pedal Input Pedal + Rudder

Gearing + Cmd PCU
Command
Limiter
Gain +
_
Scheduled Command
Position
Rudder Feedback
QC Lookup Airspeed Gain
Computation Airspeed
Table
Threshold Monitor
ACE

190
Rudder Flight Authority
The Rudder Flight Authority function is used to reduce the rudder maximum
authority when the airplane is in flight and both engines are operating nor-
mally.
The function is available after lift-off only when thrust asymmetry is less than
1800 lbs.The function is disabled 2 seconds after touchdown or when re-
verse thrust is applied.If the aircraft lifts off with more than +/- 5.5° of pedal
commanded, the Rudder Flight Authority is not applied until the command is
reduced to less than +/- 5.5° of pedal.The function is activated when the
FCM sends a command to reduce the maximum rudder deflection to the P-
ACE via the CAN bus.The nominal maximum rudder deflection values are
shown in table.This function reduces the loads that the pilot can impart to the
vertical fin and empennage with full rudder pedal inputs.

Figure 8: Rudder Flight Authority
Rudder Flight Authority EMB190

Speed (knots) On Ground (degrees) In-Air (degrees)
0 30,7 22,7
60 30,7 22,7
60 31,6 22,7
90 31,6 22,7
123 31,6 22,7
140 31,6 22,7
160 23,9 17,2
180 18,4 13,4
200 14,6 10,6
240 9,4 6,8
280 5,8 4,3
320 4,5 2,9
360 3,5 2,3
400 2,4 1,6

190
Thrust Asymmetry Compensation
In the event of loss of TAC due to a sensor failure, full ruder authority will be
This function will be implemented for follow-on certification. provided to the pilot.On transition from Normal mode to Direct mode, the P-
The Thrust Asymmetry Compensation (TAC) function helps to reduce the pi- ACEs shall fade the last transmitted TAC signal value to 0 with a time con-
lot workload by applying a rudder bias to reduce the yawing moment pro- stant of 1.0-+/ 0.1 seconds.
duced by asymmetric engine thrust.The TAC function also allows a
reduction in the pilot’s rudder pedal authority (in-flight), in order to provide
more balanced lateral/directional control. The FCM shall compute Engine thrust and the associated valid signal based
on signals consumed from the FADEC Air Data system by means of ASCB.
Thrust computation shall be derived from the following selected and voted
The TAC function is computed in the FCM as a function of N1, mach and valid parameters signals:
pressure altitude and applies a rudder bias proportional to the amount of
thrust asymmetry between the left and right engines.The authority of the Engine Fan Speed N1, Engine Core Speed N2, Engine Pressure Ps3,
TAC function is limited to approximately half the authority required to com- Engine Inlet Temperature, Mach Number, Static Pressure Ps.
pensate for an engine failure.By means of rudder pedal inputs, the pilot pro-
vides the remainder of the rudder command required to compensate for the
engine failure.This ensures that the effects of the engine failure are not
masked by the TAC function, while reducing the pilot workload.
The Thrust Asymmetry Compensation function becomes active 8 seconds

after liftoff, at which point the maximum pedal authority is reduced from 30
degrees to 22 degrees via an augmentation command from the FCM.In the
event of an engine failure after TAC becomes active, the TAC function is ca-
pable of providing up to 12 degrees of rudder bias (at low airspeed) to help
compensate for the resulting yawing moment.
The P-ACE shall apply a limit of +/- 12 degrees +/- 5% on the Thrust Asym-
metry Compensation command received from the FCM over the CAN
bus.On power-up, the FCM shall fade its TAC signal to the P-ACE from 0 to
its calculated values through a lag with a time constant of 1.0+/- 0.1 sec-
onds.
During the takeoff roll, prior to TAC becoming active, the pilot retains +/- 30
degrees of rudder authority through the rudder pedals, in order to ensure
that the pilot can control the yawing moment produced by an engine failure
on the ground.In the event of an engine failure after V1 but prior to TAC be-
coming active, TAC will be inhibited and the pilot will retain +/- 30 degrees
of rudder authority through the pedals.

Figure 9: Thrust Asymmetry Compensation
Corrected N1
Mach
Thrust Computation + ∆ Thrust ETC
PAmb and Thrust Validation ∆Thrust × Le Command
PS3/Corr N2 -
Cm × Qc × Sw × mac
CAS Le = thrust moment arm
FlapPosition Sw = wing area
Reference Thrust
mac = mean aerodynamic chord
Mach Computation
PAmb
Qc
AOA
Cm Computation
Mach
Cm = Thrust pitching moment

compensation factor

190
Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination
The FCMs interface with the AFCS dual autopilot system with the MAU by
means of the ASCB.
AFCS yaw axis commands originate from the autopilot processor modules.
The two-autopilot modules operate in an active-standby configuration where
the active autopilot provides auxiliary commands to the FCM, while the
standby operates as a hot spare.
The Yaw Damper and commands help to reduce the pilot workload by in-
creasing the natural dutch roll damping of the aircraft.The Turn Coordination
rudder commands to prevent sideslips in turns.These AFCS computes a
combined Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination commands based on roll attitude,
yaw rate, lateral acceleration, and airspeed.The function is sent to the FCM
by means of ASCB bus as a combined command.The FCM transmits the
command to the P-ACE modules via the CAN bus interface.The P-ACE shall
apply an independent hardware limit of +/- 6 degrees +/- 5% on the compos-
ite AFCS Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination command received from the FCM
over the CAN bus.Limits on each FCM parameter input to the P-ACE analog
circuitry are implemented to allow maximum independence of the individual
functions, such that automatic control functions are constrained to their in-
dependent limits in hardware.On transition from Normal mode to Direct
mode, the P-ACEs shall fade the last transmitted YD/TC signal to 0 with a
time constant of 12.5+/- 0.125 milliseconds.
The Yaw Damper function may be enabled or disabled via the AutoPilot
Control Panel.

Figure 10: Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination

190
Direct Mode - Hinge Moment Limiting
In the EMB 190, the logic is implemented inside the P-ACE, and uses WOW
When the P-ACE is operating in Normal mode, the P-ACE varies the rudder signal to switch the PCU pressure.
surface deflection as a function of airspeed gain schedule from the FCM. In
Direct mode, the P-ACE defaults to either one of two default gain values that
emulates a constant airspeed, and activates the pressure reducer function The pressure reducer is turned activated when the P-ACE reverts to Direct
in the rudder actuator. mode and aircraft is in air and the pressure reducer is de-activated when the
aircraft is on ground and plus 10 seconds after liftoff.
Activating the pressure reducer essentially applies the Hinge-Moment limiter
function, which limits the hydraulic pressure available to command the PCU
Ram.The actuator pressure reducer is disabled (high pressure 3000 psi)
when the ontrol channel is operating in Normal mode.In Direct mode, the
pressure reducer command is automatically set to enable if the airspeed is
above 160 knots.The pressure reducer within the actuator restricts the hy-
draulic pressure (low pressure 930 psi) and allows the actuator to operate at
reduced pressure.
Limiting the actuator hinge-moment authority prevents the rudder control

system from commanding the rudder to a position that exceeds the limit load
of the vertical fin structure.The Hinge-Moment Limiter limits the Rudder
hinge-moment to a value between 180 kgm and 230 kgm.The low-speed de-
fault gain for the rudder is set at the maximum rudder authority (30° of sur-
face) to ensure that the pilot has sufficient authority to control the aircraft
during the approach and landing.
The high-speed default gain selected for flaps up is set to provide 15° of sur-
face deflection to ensure that the rudder stroke is limited at high speeds.Fol-
lowing reversion to Direct mode, structural protection is provided by means
of the hinge moment limiting of the rudder surface by enabling a pressure
reducer integral to each rudder actuator.
The rudder hinge moment limiter is controlled by the associated P-ACE

channel, which turns the pressure reducer activated (low pressure) and de-
activated (high pressure) by means of a hydraulically operated solenoid
valve in the actuator.

Figure 11: Hinge Moment Limiting
Rudder Hinge Moment Limiter

"High Pressure in Direct Mode @ A/C Low Speed"
NO 28 VDC POW ER SOURCE

C
FROM P - ACE's
(LOW ER/UPPER RUDDER)
NC
NORMAL mode: +28VDC (3000 psi)
J2-7 DIRECT mode: OPN (1000 psi) J2-70
H NO H ( Hyd. Press. Regulation )
ACT C
J1-17
L J4-70
L ( Hyd. Press. Regulation )
NC NORMAL mode: GND) (3000 psi)
DIRECT mode: OPN (1000 psi)
P - ACE
(LOW ER/UPPER RUDDER)
NORMAL mode: OPEN
DIRECT mode: GROUND

R1 GND
J2-26 DIRECT MODE Signal
NO - normally open (FCP LAMP)
C NO NO C NC - normally closed
C - central
NC NC
C NO NO C
NC NC
R3 R4
To another actuator / P-ACE
J1-6: OPEN
J1-6 J1-6
Ps3a
Discrete Out Discrete Out
ADSP3A J1-6: GND ADSP4A

J1-51 (ESS 2) 155 Kts 165 Kts (DC 2) J1-51
OPEN (LOW SPEED, FAILURE, POW ER OFF) -> HIGH PRESSURE, SOV ON (CURRENT ON)
FROM ADSP
(J1-6)
GND (HIGH SPEED) -> LOW PRESSURE, SOV OFF (CURRENT OFF)

190
27-30 Flight Control Elevator

Introduction
The elevator control system uses conventional control column assemblies

to drive the fly-by-wire elevator control system. A pair of cockpit command
transducers, connected to each of the two independent torque tube assem-
blies, provide the electrical signals to the P-ACE modules, effectively replac-
ing the control cables of a conventional aircraft.
A total of four P-ACE units are used to independently control each of the four
PCUs, providing the analog elevator control functions implemented in the P-
ACE units, such as gain-shaping, to vary the control column-to-surface gear-
ing as a function of the pilot's input command.
Four independent FCM units, located in MAU 1 and 3, provide high level
system augmentation to the P-ACE units, such as:
• gain scheduling as a function of airspeed,

• elevator thrust compensation,
• AOA (Angle-Off-Attack) limiting,
• mach trim and
• configuration trim.
Figure 1: Elevator control system schematic
190
The flight deck controls
When the control columns are pushed or pulled, they move the rods that are
attached to the columns. The rods then transfer the force applied to the col-
umns to turn the torque tubes.
The first 2 lb is necessary to break out the feel mechanism and the feel force Disconnect mechanism
is supplied back to the pilot.
Because the control columns are connected by rods, the two torque tubes A disconnect mechanism installed between the front torque tubes allows a
move the other pilot’s column. With the movement of the torque tubes, all 4 separation of the pilot and copilot control columns, providing continued op-
LVDTs supply equivalent column position to the P-ACE (Primary Actuator eration of the system in the event of column jam.
Control Electronics)s. The active P-ACE unit then compares the position of
the LVDT of the related PCU (Power Control Unit) with the commanded po-
sition from the LVDTs. In normal operation the disconnect unit held together by balls preventing the
When the control columns move through an angle of 10 degrees in the aft plate springs to be active. By pulling the disconnect handle, the balls will re-
direction or through an angle of 7 degrees in the forward direction from the lease the springs and the unit will disconnect. The system will remain sepa-
column centered point, they move the elevator 25 degrees upwards or 18 rated for the rest of the flight, and ground maintenance is required to reset
degrees downward, respectively. the disconnect unit.
Auto Flight control System (AFCS)
Two LVDTs are attached to each torque tube, converting its motion into
electrical signals.
Two independent feel units, located at the outer edge of each torque tube,
provide feel and centering force to both control columns.
Autopilot input to the elevator system is carried out by two autopilot servos
attached to each torque tube assembly, replacing manual control column in-
puts by the pilots.
A 28 VDC stick shaker motor is attached to each control column, creating a

vibration that warns the pilot when approaching stall conditions. The motor
is activated through the stall warning system, provided by the Auto-flight
Control System (AFCS).
Figure 2: The flight deck controls
V ER TICAL
NEU TR AL P OS IT IO N
P OS IT IO N
L H T OR QU E
7° T UB E
P UL L C ONTR OL
P US H AFT C OL UMN DIS CONNEC T
F WD DEV IC E
10°
7° Q UADR ANT
C ONTR OL
C OL UMN R H T OR QU E
T UB E
C ONTR OL C OL UMN
E LE VATO R MEC HANICAL DAMPE R
C OMPO NE NT S
A
B EL L CR ANK
FE E LU NIT
C OC KP IT
F LO O R NDLE
Handle
LLED
Pul
led
A
AFU
Disconnect unit
190
Auto Flight control System (AFCS)
Engaging the autopilot on the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) guid-
ance panel, which is located in the cockpit, causes the autopilot to take over
the pilot input commands to the elevator control system.
Two autopilot servos, connected to the pilot torque tube via cables, provide
AFCS inputs to the elevator control system.
During auto flight, the autopilot servos respond to commands from the AFCS
and move the pilots torque tube, the copilot LVDT’s, P-ACE and FCM units
and the elevator PCU’s remains the same.
Two LVDT’s are attached to each torque tube, converting its motion into
electrical signals.
Two independent feel units, located at the outer edge of each torque tube,
provide feel and centering force to both control columns.
A 28 VDC stick shaker motor is attached to each control column, creating a

vibration that warns the pilot when approaching stall conditions. The motor
is activated through the stall warning system, provided by the Auto-Flight
Control System.
Figure 3: Auto Flight control System (AFCS)
190
Operation:
When the control columns are pushed or pulled, they move the rods that are
attached to the columns. The rods then transfer the force applied to the col-
umns to turn the torque tubes.
When the control columns move through an angle of 10 degrees in the aft
direction or through an angle of 6 degrees in the forward direction from the
column centered point, they move the elevator 25 degrees upwards or 18
degrees downwards, respectively.
The first 2 lb (Pound) is necessary to break out the feel mechanism and the
feel force is supplied back to the pilot.
Because the control columns are connected by rods, the two torque tubes
move the other pilot’s column. With the movement of the torque tubes, all 4
LVDTs supply equivalent column position to the P-ACE (Primary Actuator
Control Electronics). The active P-ACE unit then compares the position of
the LVDT of the related PCU (Power Control Unit) with the commanded po-
sition from the LVDTs.
The PCU pairs connected to each elevator surface operate in an active/

stand-by mode, resulting in one actuator being energized and actively con-
trolling the surface, while the stand-by PCU acts as a hydraulic damper, also
providing flutter protection.
The active/stand-by status of the PCUs is alternated by the P-ACE units fol-
lowing a power up on ground each day, or switched automatically when a
failure is detected.
The inboard PCUs on each elevator surface are powered by hydraulic sys-
tem 2. The left outboard elevator PCU is powered by hydraulic system 1,
and the right outboard elevator PCU is powered by hydraulic system 3.
Figure 4: Operation
190
Elevator System
In the event of loss of airspeed information to the flight control system, the
The elevator control function is implemented in P-ACE hardware, using an- P-ACEs will revert to Direct mode using a fixed gain.There are two Direct
alog circuitry.The four control column LVDT sensors are used as inputs by mode default gains that are selected as a function of flaps/slats up and de-
the Command and Monitor lanes of the four P-ACE channels that control the ployed positions.The low-speed default gain for the elevator is set at the
electro-hydraulic actuators. maximum authority (+18°/-25° for the EMB 190) to ensure that the pilot has
The LVDT inputs are segregated such that a single sensor failure will not re- sufficient authority to control the aircraft during the approach and landing
sult in a control surface hardover.The sensor distribution also ensures that flare.The high-speed default gain that is selected for flaps/slats up is set to
a split between the pilots and copilots control columns (due to a control sys- provide half of the maximum authority (-9°/-12.5° for the EMB 190) to reduce
tem jam and subsequent force override) will allow continued operation of the column gearing at high speeds.
one of the elevator surfaces.
The pilot inputs into the P-ACE are scheduled in the P-ACE, using gain-
shaping curves to vary the pilot to surface gearing as a function of the mag-
nitude of the pilot input.Gain shaping provides the pilot with the proper feel
characteristics for normal maneuvers while allowing full authority for avoid-
ance maneuvers or to counteract failures (e.g., elevator surface jam).
The control column gain-shaping curve, in combination with the elevator air-
speed gain schedule provides the correct ‘force-per-g’ characteristics for
longitudinal control throughout the flight envelope.This allows the traditional
Q-Feel mechanism to be replaced by a fixed feel spring at the control col-
umn for feel and centering.
The pitch axis augmentation commands, computed in the FCM, are
summed in with the control column inputs in order to reduce the pilot work-
load.The FCM augmentation inputs to the elevator through the P-ACE are
control column gain shaper, elevator thrust compensation., AOA limiting and
configuration changes (Configuration Changes function is available in the
EMB 190 only).The total augmentation command from the FCM to the P-
ACE is the sum of all these functions, and it is limited in authority to +/- 5%
in the EMB 170 and to +/- 8% in the EMB 190, except when the Stick Shaker
is active, in this case the AOA Limiting function has its authority increased,
as described in section 0.The elevator is also gain scheduled as a function
of airspeed to linearize the control column force-per-g characteristics over
the entire flight regime.
Figure 5: Elevator System
190
Normal/Direct mode
With the elevator control system operating in normal mode, the elevator is
gain secheduled as a function of airspeed, reducing elevator movement with
increasing airspeeds.
The FCM adds additional high level functions to the pilot inputs, such as:
• Elevator Thrust Compensation,

• AOA limiting, and,
• Configuration compensation.
In the event of loss of airspeed information, the FCM is reduced from the
control loop, and the associated P-ACE reverts into Direct Mode, using a
maximum low-speed gain for the elevator to ensure aircraft controllability
during approach and landing flare.FCM functions like Elevator Thrust Com-
pensation and AOA limiting are then no longer available.
The elevator control system can be forced into direct mode by using the
mode select switch on the FCP, located on the centre pedestal in the cock-
pit.
Figure 6: Hydraulic actuator
18
190
The Elevator Thrust compensation (ETC)
The Elevator Thrust Compensation function (ETC) helps to reduce the pilot
workload by applying elevator inputs to reduce the pitching moment pro-
duced by increasing or decreasing engine thrust.
The ETC function is computed in the FCM as a function of:
• N1,
• mach and
• pressure altitude.
Elevator input is limited to plus or minus 5 degrees, and is applied propor-

tional to the amount of engine thrust above or below the reference thrust set-
ting.
The command is sent to the P-ACE units via the CAN bus interface and is
then summed with the normal pilot input. If one or more sensors required to
perform the ETC function fail, the function is no longer available, and the re-
spective message will be displayed on the EICAS.
Figure 7: Elevator Thrust Compensation
P-ACE Elevator PCU pair
ETC function is computed in the FCM as a function of:
N1
FCM
Mach
Pressure altitude
190
Stall warning and AOA limiting
Stall warning is provided by the Auto-Flight Control System (AFCS) by acti-

vating the stick shaker motor on the control column.
Stall identification is provided by the FCM by means of the angle of attack

(AOA) limiting function. AOA limiting replaces the need for a stick pusher.
Once the stick shaker is activated by the AFCS, the AOA limiting function
reduces control column authority in the nose up direction gradually until the
control column reaches the aft stop, thereby limiting the angle of attack.
The FCM computes an AOA limiting command using angle of attack data,
control column position and inertial feedback. The command is sent to the
P-ACE units, where it is added to the normal pilot input. If one or more sen-
sors required to perform the AOA limiting function fails, the function is no
longer available, and the respective message will be displayed on the EI-
CAS.
The automatic flight control system channels 1 and 2 each hosts a separate
stall warning and protection system function. In case of single SWPS chan-
nel being inoperative, the pilot can select the other SWPS channel to provide
stall protection by using the callout buttons on the SPS panel.
If both channels are inoperative or the SWPS in general has failed, the pilot
will be notified via EICAS messages. The pilot must then manually operate
the airplane to avoid stall using other means of stall detection.
Figure 8: Stall warning and AOA limiting
SPS PANEL
Left Right
Cutout Cutout
Left SHAKER Motor Right SHAKER Motor
Pilot's Control Column Copilot's Control Column
Pilot's Copilot's
Rudder Pedals Rudder Pedals
Pilot's Load Copilot's Load

Feel Feel
P-ACE 1 P-ACE 2 P-ACE 3

ELEV RUD ELEV ELEV ELEV RUD
COM
COM
MON
MON
MON
COM
COM
COM
MON
MON
MON
COM
MAU 1A/B CAN 1-1 MAU 3A/B
FCM 1 CAN 3-1
FCM 3
Lane A Lane A
Lane B CAN 1-2
CAN 3-2 Lane B
MAU 1A/B CAN 2-1 MAU 3A/B

CAN 4-1
FCM 2 FCM 4
Lane A CAN 2-2 Lane A
Lane B CAN 4-2 Lane B
HS-ACE 1 HS-ACE 2
Lane 1 Lane 2 Lane 1 Lane 2
Trim up Inhibit
Trim up Inhibit
Note: Additional interfaces via ASCB not depicted on the Diagram include:
Flaps/Slats, Landing Gear, Weight on Wheels, Aircraft Personality Module, Air Data, Surface Positions, etc…
190
Operation
The first stage of the SWPS provides a warning to the pilot of the impending
stall by activating the stick shaker of each control column, which causes
each control column to shake, simulating the aircraft buffeting. In addition,
the SWPS provides other warning indications.
If the failure is known to the SWPS, the system automatically disengages all
operations and annunciates SWPS failure in the display system. However,
if the malfunction is not detected by the SWPS, the system may activate the
stall warning and protection measures in non stall conditions. In such abnor-
mal operations, the pilot may attempt to switch the SWPS channel using the
SPS panel.
If both SWPS exhibit same abnormal conditions the pilot must ignore stall
warning (shaker) measures and detect stall charasteristics using other
means: Displaying Low Speed Awareness (LSA) indication on the airspeed
tape. Displaying pitch limit indication on the Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI)
of the Primary Flight Display (PFD).
Providing stall warning annunciations (CAS message on EICAS). Second

stage of the SWPS prohibits stall on the aircraft by activating the AOA Lim-
iting function.
Figure 9: Operation
AIR DATA
AIR DATA SMART
APPLICATIONS PROBES
(ADA) (ASP)
SPS PANEL
INERTIAL
REFERENCE
SYSTEM
(IRS)
SECONDARY
POWER MCDU
DISTRIBUTION
ASSEMBLY
STALL
PROTECTION
SYSTEM AUTOPILOT
FLAP/START
(SPS) (AFGS)
ACEs
PROXIMITY
SENSOR DISPLAY
EVALUATION UNIT
MODULES (EICAS)
(PSEM)
AIR
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
EGPWS
(AMS) FLIGHT
CONTROL
MODULES COCKPIT
(FCM)
190
EICAS indications
ELEV NML MODE FAIL WARNING Indicates that the normal mode of the elevator control system 27300600
failed.
Indicates that one or more of the sensors required to perform the

ELEV THR COMP FAIL CAUTION 27000500
Elevator Thrust Compensation
ELEVATOR FAULT CAUTION Indicates that there is a fault in the elevator control system. 27300200
Indicates that the active and standby elevator control systems

ELEVATOR LH FAIL CAUTION have failed, or the surface has jammed and the left elevator surface 27300141
is no longer available.
Indicates that the active and standby elevator control systems have
ELEVATOR RH FAIL CAUTION failed, or the surface has jammed and the right elevator surface is 27300142
no longer available
PITCH CONTROL DISC ADVISORY Indicates that the control-column disconnect device disconnected. 27300500
Indicates that one or more of the sensors required to perform the

AOA LIMIT FAIL CAUTION AOA Limiting function have failed and the function is no longer 27000300
available.
Indicates that the Stall Warning function has failed and Stall
STALL PROT FAIL CAUTION Protection functions (AOA Limit) are failed. 27300300
STALL PROT ICE SPEED ADVISORY Indication that Stall Warning and Shall Protection system activation 27300700
thresholds are anticipated due to icing conditions.
SHAKER 1 FAIL ADVISORY Indicates that the Stall Warning function has failed. 27300431
SHAKER 2 FAIL ADVISORY Indicates that the Stall Warning function has failed. 27300432
Indication that Shaker activation angles have been advanced to
SHAKER ANTICIPATED CAUTION 27300800
conservative settings.
Indicates that both Slats electronic control channels are inoperative
SLAT FAIL CAUTION 27800100
and the slat system is no more available.
190
Elevator PCU Maintainability:
• The P-ACE will identify the position offset as the zero surface posi-
• Internal leakage test - CMC test tion for the LVDTs.
• Damping test - CMC test • The FCM will store the offset required for the zero position in MAU
personality module memory.
• Manual Compensator depletion check - CMC test
• Subsequent “Quick” rigging will be electronic
• Lubrification of toggle ling
• Surface is positioned using the sensors previously rigged.
• General Visual Inspection
• FCM will store new zero value of the unit replace.
Maintenance features
• Compensator manual hydraulic relief valve

used to check the PCU Compensator during
the depletion check
Elevator Actuator PCU rigging
• The actuator and toggle linkage will be factory pre-set.
• For “Surface” rigging,the Elevator surface must be placed in the

rig position using a rig board, Rig pins installed in the appropriate
cockpit controls, all hydraulics are off.
• Initiate rigging via the CMC
Figure 11: Maintainability
LEFT ELEVATOR RIGGING: (1/3)
CMC SWITCH
GENERAL GUIDELINES:
LOW PRESSURE VALID PRESSURE
6. STATUS P-ACE'S ON GROUND
1. PUSH THE "LEFT ELEVATOR RIGGING" LIGHTS P-ACE'S NORMAL MODE
BUTTON TO START THE TEST.
FCM'S ON GROUND
2. MAKE SURE THAT THE CONDITIONS FCM'S VALID DATA
ARE GO (GREEN) ON THE NEXT PAGE.
7. FBW FBW MAINTENANCE FUNCTION OPERATIONAL
3. A RED INHIBIT CONDITION ON THE MAINTENANCE
NEXT PAGE WILL NOT LET THE TEST FCM RIGGING STATUS
START. FUNCTION
FCM1A: TEST NOT STARTED
4. CORRECT THE PROBLEM AS NECESSARY FCM2A: TEST NOT STARTED
AND START THE TEST AGAIN. 8. FCM RIGGING TEST NOT STARTED
STATUS
5. PUSH THE "FWD" BUTTON.
P-ACE'S USED IN THE TEST
9. TEST STATUS
FCM1A-PACE1-1 FCM2A-PACE2-1
1. LEFT ELEVATOR
LEFT RIGGING BUTTON
ELEVATOR
RIGGING IF ALL CONDITIONS ARE GO (GREEN),
AND THE RIGGING STATUS MESSAGE
SHOWS "READY TO RIG", PUSH THE
"FWD" BUTTON TO GO TO RESULTS PAGE.
IF THERE IS A NO-GO CONDITION (RED),

TEST STATUS CORRECT THE PROBLEM AND START THE
Test Not Started TEST.
2. FWD BUTTON 11. FWD BUTTON
MAIN MAIN TEST
5. TEST STATUS MENU
TEST
MENU
FWD
MENU MENU PREV FWD
4. MAIN MENU 3. TEST MENU 10. TEST MENU

BUTTON BUTTON BUTTON
LEFT ELEVATOR RIGGING: (3/3)
1. MAKE SURE THAT THE HYDRAULIC
PUMPS ARE TURNED OFF (AMM).
2. MAKE SURE THAT THE VALUES ARE
WITHIN THE RIGGING RANGE (AMM).
3. PUSH "ACCEPT RIGGING" TO ACCEPT.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM PRESSURE

SYSTEM #1 0.00 (PSI)
COLUMN SENSOR VALUES
CCPS COM (DEG) MON (DEG)
FCM1A PACE11 LOB 0.00 0.00
FCM2A PACE21 LIB 0.00 0.00
SURFACE SENSOR VALUES

LVDT (DEG) RAM (DEG)
12. SURFACE SENSOR
FCM1A PACE11 LOWER 0.00 0.00
VALUES 0.00 0.00
FCM2A PACE21 UPPER
FCM1A TEST NOT STARTED

FCM4A TEST NOT STARTED
19. ACCEPT RIGGING
13. FCM RIGGING
TEST NOT STARTED BUTTON
STATUS
DISPLAY ACCEPT
14. TEST STATUS TOTAL ERROR RIGGING
15. DISPLAY TOTAL PUSH "MAIN/TEST MENU" TO ABORT

ERROR BUTTON PUSH "TEST COMPLT" TO FINISH 18. TEST COMPLETE
BUTTON
MAIN TEST TEST
MENU MENU PREV
COMPLETE
16. TEST MENU 17. PREV BUTTON

BUTTON
190
27-40 Horizontal Stabilizer
Introduction
The Horizontal Stabilizer Control System is comprised of the following com-

ponents:
• Column mounted ‘Pitch Trim’ and ‘Quick Disconnect’ switches

• Pedestal mounted Backup trim switch
• Pedestal mounted Cutout switches
• HS-ACE (2 channels)
• Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator with dual input (1 per HS-ACE channel)
The trim position and the Takeoff green band are provided by the EICAS.
The HS-ACE receives inputs from the pilot, copilot, and backup trim switch-
es for manual trim and from the Flight Control Modules (FCMs) for Autocon-
figuration Trim, Autopilot Trim and Mach Trim.Trim speed is modified as a
function of airspeed for inputs received via the switches.
Calibrated Air Speed (CAS) is obtained from the FCM.
For inputs received from FCM, the trim speed is not modified, however the
maximum commanded trim speed is limited.
The HS-ACE unit provides control to the electro-mechanical actuator, re-
ferred to as Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator (HSTA), attached on the up-
per end to the empennage, and on the lower end to the horizontal stabilizer
structure.
The FCM units provide additional trim commands to the HS-ACE via the
CAN bus interface.
The HS-ACE provides a closed loop velocity control of the brushless motor
in the HSA.The commanded motor speed is a function of airspeed for switch
inputs.The default rate of 0.15 deg/s is valid during emergency power oper-
ation, manual trim during loss of airspeed data, and FCM trim during loss of
FCM trim communications.The threshold for the under speed monitor is 60%
of nominal command trim rate.

Figure 1: The horizontal stabilizer control system

190
Horizontal Stabilizer Control System
The HS-ACE channels will transition to standby mode without transitioning
All trim switch inputs and discrete signals are dual pole (two inputs, A and B to the other channel when the Pilot or Copilot Quick Disconnect Switches
per function) configuration.Each input is debounced for 10 ms, if the two in- are engaged.The Pilot and Copilot Quick Disconnect are momentary switch-
puts (A and B) disagree for over 7 seconds, the input will be failed and es that disable all trim commands when depressed.Both HS-ACE channels
locked out until power is recycled. interface with the switches.
The HS-ACE will set a bit in the CAN Bus that will cause an aural warning Cutout switches 1 and 2 are used to disable a channel.When a channel cut-
tone to be generated 1 second after a trim switch disagreement has been out switch is actuated that channel will have no power anymore and the
detected and will continue setting this bit until the disagreement is corrected standby channel will go into the active mode under normal operation.The
or until the switch is set as failed (7 seconds later).The HS-ACE will also set cutout switches are in series with the 28VDC logic supply voltage.
aural warning bit when a trim switch is held too long.The HS-ACE will set this
bit 1 second after a trim command has timed out (i.e.after 4 seconds from
the beginning of the command) and will continue to set this bit for as long as Direction Inhibit discretes are used to prevent the HS-ACE from responding
the trim switch is depressed. to Pitch up trim commands during stall condition.The Direction Inhibit dis-
cretes are enabled when the Aircraft stick shaker is actuating.
The FCM provides a trim command over the Flight Control CAN Bus.The
FCM trim command is a composite of autopilot trim and autoconfiguration
trim.A trim command is limited to 3 seconds within the FCM as well as the
3-second timer within the HS-ACE.The FCM Trim Command through the
CAN Bus is updated at 20 Hertz.
In conjunction with a valid FCM trim command is the assertion of a FCM Val-
id Trim Discrete.The FCM provides a discrete signal to the HS-ACE that is
active only when a valid velocity command is present on the CAN Bus inter-
face.The discrete is used by the HS-ACE to enable the motor driver.
Command priority of the HS-ACE inputs are as follows:
BUTS Command: Priority 1

PTS Command: Priority 2
CPTS Command: Priority 3
FCM Trim Command: Priority 4

Figure 2: Horizontal Stabilizer Control System

190
Horizontal Stabilizer - Actuator Control Electronics
The Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Control Electronics (HS-ACE) is a dual

channel device working in active-standby configuration.Each HS-ACE chan-
nel consists of a control-monitor dual-lane structure controlling one electrical
motor.The control lane drives the system appropriately based on the inputs.
The control lane closes the velocity loop around the motor, thus regulating
the trim speed of the system.The monitor lane looks at the same inputs and
redundant feedback signals as the control lane and verifies that the control
lane is operating correctly.If not, the monitor lane will shut off the electro-me-
chanical relay located between the motor electrical driver (the HS-ACE) and
the motor itself.
The items that the monitor verifies are:
• Input validation (trim switches and CAN Bus inputs)
• 3-second timer
• Motor velocity and performance
• HS-ACE to FCM CAN Bus message
Integrity of the system

Figure 3: Horizontal Stabilizer - Actuator Control Electronics
J2 J4 J8
J6
J3 J1 J5
J7

190
Horizontal Stabilizer High Level Functions Description
The AUTO CONFIG TRIM FAIL message does not depend on Elevator
The Configuration Trim Function reduces pilot workload necessary to trim Thrust Compensation and Column Gain Shaper validity parameters.
out aircraft pitch changes.
The Configuration Trim Function provides automatic trim commands to com-
pensate for the effects the commands calculated by the Elevator Longitudi-
nal Control Function:
• elevator configuration changes,
• engine thrust compensation and,
• column gain shaper compensation.
The Horizontal Stabilizer Function reduces elevator deflection by off-loading

the elevator through stabilizer trim.
The Configuration Trim command is summed with the automatic trim com-
mands from the AFCS automatic trim function (Autopilot).The maximum du-
ration of a continuous automatic trim command and AFCS trim command
does not exceed 3 seconds.
The FCM implements a trim limit monitor discrete so as to prevent com-
mands of the horizontal stabilizer beyond the limits of +3.85 deg to -10.85
deg.
The Horizontal Stabilizer automatic trim function is disabled while the man-
ual trim is active.Additionally, the automatic trim function is disabled while on
the ground, until 8 seconds after transition from on-ground to in-air and im-
mediately when the airplane transitions from in-air to on-ground.
The Horizontal Stabilizer Configuration Trim Function is computed in each
FCM channel and transmitted to the HS-ACE as a command of rate (in deg/
s).The FCM calculates the elevator compensation for stabilizer off-load
commands in degrees.An ‘Autoconfiguration trim’ active signal is transmit-
ted by means of ASCB to the Autopilot when the Autoconfiguration trim is
active.
Autoconfiguration trim rate command is computed and output from the FCM
on CAN is updated at a rate of 20 Hz.
The AUTO CONFIG TRIM FAIL (Advisory) message is annunciated if any of
the following data is invalid:
Speedbrake, All Gear Down Lock, All Gear Up Lock, Qc, Flap/Slat and Hor-
izontal Stab Position.

Figure 4: Horizontal Stabilizer High Level Functions Description
HS-ACE
AFT AVIONICS RACK
LICC - MIDDLE AVIONICS
(SDS 27-43)
COMPARTMENT
D (MPP 27-43-03)
HS-ACE 1 MAU 1
MOTOR 1 FWD AVIONICS COMPT
(SSM 31-41-80)
MTR 1 PWR CHNL 1
AC BUS 1 50
TRIM ENABLE 1A FCM 1
TRIM CONTROL PANEL
A PEDESTAL TRIM ENABLE 1B
(SDS 27-43)
(MPP 27-03-04) CH 1 CAN BUS 1 HI
LH CB PANEL COCKPIT SYS1 CUTOUT SW CH 1 CAN BUS 1 LO

(SDS 27-43)
PITCH
TRIM 1 TRIM ENABLE 2A FCM 2
28-VDC CH1 PWR
DC BUS 1 5 TRIM ENABLE 2B
PITCH-BACKUP SW CH 1 CAN BUS 2 HI

(SDS 27-43)
CH 1 CAN BUS 2 LO
DN UP
BACKUP TRIM UP A
BACKUP TRIM DN A
MAU 3
MID AVIONICS COMPT
(SSM 31-41-80)
DN UP
FCM 3
BACKUP TRIM UP B CHNL 2 TRIM ENABLE 3A
BACKUP TRIM DN B
TRIM ENABLE 3B
RH CB PANEL COCKPIT CH 2 CAN BUS 3 HI

SYS2 CUTOUT SW
(SDS 27-43)
PITCH CH 2 CAN BUS 3 LO
TRIM 2
DC ESS 28-VDC CH2 PWR
TRIM ENABLE 4A FCM 4
BUS 2 5
TRIM ENABLE 4B
RICC - MIDDLE AVIONICS
COMPARTMENT
CH 2 CAN BUS 4 HI
HS-ACE 2 EMERG PWR 1
MOTOR 2 CH 2 CAN BUS 4 LO
MTR 2 PWR
AC ESS
BUS 50
TRIM EICAS DISPLAY

ROLL PITCH
BACKUP SW B (SSM 31-61-80)
DN
A
LWD RWD
UP
D
YAW SYS1 SYS2
CUTOUT CUTOUT
LEFT RIGHT
C
B
TRIM CONTROL PANEL

190
Horizontal Stabilizer High Level Functions Description
The ETC, Configuration Changes and Column Gain Shaper Elevator Off-
load Function calculates a trim offset command to off-load the elevator and
an incremental elevator deflection to compensate the equivalent horizontal
stabilizer off-load command based on the following Elevator Function com-
mands:
• engine thrust compensation,
• elevator configuration changes and,
• column gain shaper.
The FCM implements a constant conversion factor of 1/2 between the sta-
bilizer off-load trim command and the elevator deflection.
Engine Thrust Compensation Off-load Function
The Engine Thrust Compensation (ETC) function helps to reduce the pilot
workload by applying elevator inputs to reduce the pitching moment pro-
duced by increasing or decreasing the engine thrust.
ETC augmentation commands to the elevator are inserted to provide a high-
er bandwidth command to the elevator immediately providing an aircraft re-
sponse to counteract the pitching moment due to thrust changes.
For long term control of the aircraft Pitch Trim, ETC commands are off-load-
ed in order to transfer the elevator offset to the horizontal stabilizer.This
function termed ‘ETC Off-load’ allows the elevator to retain full authority,
while providing elevator control to maintain flight path condition in the pres-
ence of thrust changes.
The FCM disables and zeroes the ETC when the Elevator being controlled
by the FCM is operating in Direct mode.
The ETC off-load command is a delta trim position command (degrees) cal-
culated as a function of the ETC command.The FCM integrates the off-load
stabilizer trim rate to produce an incremental stabilizer trim command.

P-ACE Elevator PCU pair
ETC function is computed in the FCM as a function of:
N1
FCM
Mach
Pressure altitude

190
Elevator changes off-load function
The Elevator Configuration Changes Command is calculated based on

Speedbrake command, Flap Angle position, Slat Angle position, Landing
Gear configuration and Landing Gear validities, Flap Continuous angle and
Flap/Slat position validity, Impact Pressure (Qc) and Impact Pressure valid-
ity.
The Elevator Configuration Changes command is limited to +/- 8 degrees of

Elevator deflection.
The Elevator Configuration Changes Off-load Function is a trim rate com-

mand that generates a HSS delta position designed to reduce elevator de-
flection by off-loading the elevator through stabilizer trim.
The FCM integrates the off-load stabilizer trim rate to produce a stabilizer
trim command.
Control Column Gain Shaper Off-load Trim
The Control Column Gain Shaper function is computed in the FCM and is
used to modify the P-ACE control column gearing as a function of flap posi-
tion.
The Column Gain Shaper has +/- 5% of elevator authority.
The elevator command is off-loaded into the horizontal stabilizer in order to
maintain the 5° authority throughout the flap deployment airspeed envelope.
The gearing gain change is required in order to maintain the similar flight
handling characteristics throughout the envelope for varying aircraft config-
urations.
The Column Gain Shaper Off-load command consists of a delta trim position
command (degrees) calculated as a function of the column gain shaper
command.The FCM integrates the off-load stabilizer trim rate to produce an
incremental stabilizer trim command.

ASCB
Generic I/O #1 PROC MODULE CAS Maximum FCM
ARINC 429
[knots] Trim Rate [deg/s]
PROBE 1 CH A Probe 1/2 Data
PS , PT
ADA 1
PS, PT
CH B CAS 1
Custom I/O #1
0 0.7
ARINC 429
FCM
CH A
PROBE 2 CAS (3) Selection
Voting &
High
Level
160 0.7
PS , PT Monitoring
Function
PS, PT
CH B
PS , PT (4) Selection
Voting &
250 0.138
K(Qc)
Monitoring
Generic I/O #3
PS , PT (4)
Probe AoA Limit
Function
CAN Bus
HS-ACE
500 0.138
Selection
PROBE 3 CH A CAS(Qc)
PS, PT
CH B
Generic I/O #2 ADA 2

Probe 3/4 Data
CH A
PS, PT
CAS 2
PROBE 4 CH B
PS, PT Probe 3/4 Data

ADA 3
ARINC 429
ASCB CAS 3

190
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
The Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator (HSA) is an irreversible, single ballscrew

electro-mechanical actuator with dual structural load path.Two brushless
DC motors drive the actuator in an active-standby configuration.
The actuator implements a torque-summed, single load path gearbox with a
Torque-limiting clutch.Irreversibility is provided by a redundant, bi-direction-
al skewed roller no-back (self-energizing brake with load) implemented at
the ballscrew thrust flange.The no-back holds the horizontal stabilizer
against bi-directional loads.
The primary ballnut features external transfer tubes for ball circulation.In-
verted threads provide redundancy in case of a loss of balls.
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator position is provided by two independent re-
solvers.One is geared directly to the ballscrew and the other is geared to the
internal tie rod.
The torque-limiting clutch provides internal jam protection and limits the HSA
output force during a surface jam.Non-jamming mechanical stops at either
end of the ballscrew provide an over travel protection.
The secondary structural load path includes a tie rod running through the
center of the ballscrew, a bayonet lock device and a second nut connecting
the ballscrew to the horizontal stabilizer.Upper and lower gimbals connect
the actuator primary load path to the horizontal stabilizer and the rear fuse-
lage structure.
Only after a primary load path failure does the secondary load path carry the
load.

Figure 7: Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
HS-ACE
J2 J4 J8
J6
PRIMARY SECONDARY
J3 J1 J5 A/C A/C
MOTOR MOTOR J7
STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
RESOLVER RESOLVER
270 VDC 270 VDC UPPER TIE ROD

MOTOR MOTOR PRIMARY RETAINER
GIMBAL
DUAL SKEWED TAILSTOCK

TORQUE ROLLER HOUSING
NO-BACK
SUMMING
GEAR
PRIMARY SECONDARY
POSITION BALLSCREW SAFETY ROD POSITION
SKEWED RESOLVER RESOLVER
ROLLER
CLUTCH
PRIMARY INVERTED
SINGLE SECONDARY
NUT THREAD
GEAR TRAIN NUT
NUT
LOWER LOWER
PRIMARY SECONDARY
Ballscrew
Secondary Load
GIMBAL GIMBAL
Path
AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE Bolt / Washer
PRIMARY SECONDARY
MECHANICAL CONNECTION SURFACE SURFACE
ELECTRICAL CONNECTION STRUCTURE STRUCTURE
Primary Load
Path
Bolt (2)
Primary Load
Path
Sleeve Secondary
Nut

190
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator Installation Tie Rod Lock
The HSA primary load path structural attachment to the rear fuselage struc- The tie rod is designed to jam the HSA in the event of a structural failure
ture is provided by the Upper Gimbal Assembly.The secondary load path (ballscrew thread, no-back flange, upper gimbal, actuator housing lugs or
structural attachment is provided by a splined fitting.In addition to the free- aircraft structural lugs), thus preventing such a failure from being dormant.In
dom of motion that is required for the HSA to move the HSS through its full any of the above described events, a tension load on the HSA will cause the
range of travel,the Upper Gimbal Assembly is also designed to provide suf- tie rod axial movement until the rotating splines teeth of the tie rod engage
ficient motion after a primary load path failure to allow the secondary load the stationary spline teeth of the attachment fitting preventing the tie rod
path tie rod splined end to engage into the stationary splines in the attach- from rotating.
ment fitting and jam the HSA.
Structural attachment of the HSA to the HSS is provided by the Primary and
Secondary Load Path Lower Gimbal Assemblies.
Secondary Nut Jamming Mechanism
The HSA attachment failure detection mechanism consists of a split second-

ary nut (two half-shells) and a spring cartridge.The two half shells are nor-
mally loose but still engaged in the ballscrew thread.Under normal
conditions, the split nut carries no load and it floats along making light con-
tact with the ballscrew and the key in the split nut carrier.When the split nut
becomes loaded it is free to move relative to its housing.
This motion (in compression direction only) releases the spring cartridge and
wedges the two halves of the nut down upon the ballscrew thread.This caus-
es a jam by excessive friction.The failure is not instantaneously detected if
the load happens to be in tension at the time.However, it will be detected
within a single flight as the load becomes predominantly in compression.

Figure 8: HSA Installation
Embraer 190
HSA Installation

190
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator drive
Either electrical motor drives a common speed-reducing spur gear train.This

means that, at each stage of gearing, the larger spur gear is turning at a pro-
portionally lower speed than the smaller spur pinion that is driving it.The con-
stant of proportionality is the ratio of the number of teeth in
mesh.Conversely, as the speed decreases with each stage, the torque in-
creases in inverse proportion to the speed except for losses due to friction.
The Clutch Disks transfer the torque to the Clutch Pinion through a spline
connection at their I.D.The maximum torque that can be transmitted through
the clutch is determined by the friction developed between the Skewed Roll-
er Assemblies and the flange of the Clutch Gear, which is proportional to the
preload of the Belleville Springs.
The rotating torque of the ballscrew creates a linear output force at the trans-
lating ballnut.When the aerodynamic load on the Horizontal Stabilizer Sur-
face (HSS) opposes the motion of the ballnut, the ballscrew torque must be
sufficient to overcome the aerodynamic load plus the no-back anti-creep fric-
tion, the thrust bearing friction, and the frictional drag of the seals (i.e., ball-
nut and secondary nut seals, no-back oil seals, and gearbox grease seals).
When the aerodynamic load on the HSS aids the motion of the ballnut, the
ballscrew torque must be sufficient to overcome the difference between the
no-back brake friction and the aerodynamic load plus the no-back anti-creep
friction, the thrust bearing friction, and the frictional drag of the seals.
The ballnut is connected to the horizontal stabilizer by the lower primary gim-
bal mechanism.As the ballnut translates up and down the ballscrew, the
leading edge of the HSS is raised and lowered.
HSS position feedback is provided by the two independent Horizontal Stabi-
lizer Position Resolvers (HSPRs).The HSPRs transmit a signal to the HS-
ACE that is directly proportional to the distance that the ballnut moves along
the ballscrew.The proportional relationship between the HSPR shaft rotation
and the ballnut translation is achieved by single stage worm and helical gear
drive.The two independent HSPRs are isolated so that no single failure can
disconnect both HSPRs.This isolation is provided by gearing one HSPR to
the ballscrew and the other HSPR to the tie rod.

Figure 9: The Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator (HSTA)

190
Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications
Each HS-ACE Channel provides HSA position to the FCM over the CAN
Bus.The HSA position information is validated in the FCM by comparing the
output of the two HS-ACE channels and is validated by the HS-ACE based
on the Resolver Correlation Monitor.Both HSA position indications are within
+/- 2 percent of each other.
The HSA position is used for the following functions:
• Takeoff Trim Warning: The FCM provides an output to the Aural Warning
System if the validated position indication is outside the Takeoff Green-
band.
• HSS Position Display: The EICAS provides cockpit display of the Hori-
zontal Stabilizer Position using the HSA position provided by the active
channel.
The vertical scale is divided into four equal segments, with long dashes on
the ends and in the middle, and short dashes in the intermediate scale po-
sitions.The scale is divided linearly with the bottom representing full Pitch
Trim Down (+4.0 degrees of Horizontal Stabilizer position) and the top edge
representing full Pitch Trim Up (-11.0 degrees of Horizontal Stabilizer posi-
tion).
The pointer is a green outlined triangle pointing to the left.If Pitch Trim Posi-
tion Data Status is invalid, the pointer is removed.
For takeoff configuration or Takeoff Config Switch pressed, Pitch Trim out-
side of the green band, the pointer is presented in red.

Figure 10: Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications
Stroke Limits Fail
Take off Configuration

190
Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications • Monitor Lane CMDL Fault Monitor
• Pitch Trim Low Rate
• Monitor CCDL Fault Monitor
NO TAKEOFF CONFIG annunciation indicates if any of the following condi-
tions is satisfied when the throttles are advanced to the Takeoff setting or • Emergency Power Input Fault Monitor
when the Takeoff Configuration Test button is pressed: Flaps and Slats out • “1-sec Time Delay Relay” Fault Monitor
of Takeoff position, Pitch Trim out of green band, Ground Spoiler fail or • Invalid Velocity Wrong Direction Monitor
Speedbrake fault.Simultaneously the No Takeoff Aural warning is set with • Emergency Power Discrete
the message “No Takeoff Trim” in case of having the pitch trim position out-
side green band and the pitch trim indication in the EICAS changes its • CAN A Discrete¨
colors. • CAN B Discrete
FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH annunciation indicates that one or more Flight • Uncommanded Motion Fault Monitor
Control System components or units has indicated a failure requires main- • Zero Velocity Hold Disagree Monitor
tenance action prior to dispatching the aircraft.This annunciation is a global • Invalid Velocity Under Speed Monitor
message that is associated with monitoring throughout the Flight Control
System.The monitors associated with this message set a non-volatile mem- • Jam Monitor Fail
ory latch that drives the message display.The latch remains set even after • Pitch Trim Direction Disable Fail
power is cycled off, and is reset only by maintenance action.The aircraft is
not allowed to dispatch with his Caution message.Considering the HSCS,
this message is flagged according to the following monitors:
• Pitch Trim Switch Fault Monitors
• Pilot Quick Disconnect Switch Fault Monitor
• Copilot Quick Disconnect Switch Fault Monitor
• Controller Position Correlation Fault Monitor
• Monitor Position Correlation Fault Monitor
• Motor Resolver Open/Short Fault Monitor
• Actuator Resolver Open/Short Fault Monitor
• Motor Voltage Fail
• Invalid Actuator Velocity Overspeed Monitor
• Invalid Velocity Underspeed Monitor
• Discrete Input Fault
• Motor Drive Short Circuit Fault Monitor
• Motor Drive Enable Fault Monitor
• Relay High Side Enable Fault Monitor
• Relay Low Side Enable Fault Monitor
• Controller Lane CMDL Fault Monitor

CAS Message Inhibited Flight Alert Type

Phase
NO TAKEOFF CONFIG K3, K4, K5 Warning
FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH K3, K4, K5 Caution
ELEV THR COMP FAIL K3, K5 Caution
AUTO CONFIG TRIM FAIL K3, K5 Advisory
PITCH TRIM FAIL K3, K5 Caution
PITCH TRIM LO RATE K3, K5 Advisory
PITCH TRIM SW 1 FAIL K3, K5 Advisory
PITCH TRIM SW 2 FAIL K3, K5 Advisory
PITCH TRIM BKUP FAIL K3, K5 Advisory
STAB LOCK FAULT K3, K5 Caution

190
Horizontal Stabilizer System Indications
PITCH TRIM LO RATE annunciation indicates that the pitch trim system can
operate only at low rate as a result of invalid airspeed or 60% degraded rate
presented by the actuator under the nominal command.
STAB LOCK FAULT annunciation indicates that the ZVH is operative.Un-

commanded motion has occured that may indicate a failure in the no-back
device.This caution message has the function to avoid cutout switch com-
manding by the crew.
PITCH TRIM FAIL annunciation indicates that both HS-ACE channels are
inoperative and the Pitch trim function is inoperative (jamming).During this
failure condition, manual or auto-trim functions are not available and autopi-
lot engagement is inhibited.
PITCH TRIM SW 1 FAIL

A CAN Bus bit is provided to the Aural Warning System from HS-ACE to pro-
vide a seven-second maximum aural indication to the Flight Crew that the
Pilot Trim Switch or the Copilot Trim Switch or Backup Trim Switch has failed
(or when only half of switch is pressed).The aural annunciation begins one
second after the failure is detected and is repeated during 6 seconds.If the
failure persists for more than 7 seconds since switch depression or fault the
aural message is deactivated and the pitch trim switch fail Advisory CAS
message is activated (“Pitch Trim SW 1 Fail”, “Pitch Trim SW 2 Fail” or “Pitch
Trim Bkup Fail”).Refer to the timing diagram.
Therefore HS-ACE provides a CAN Bus bit for pitch trim switch fail indica-
tion.FCM makes this message available via ASCB for Aural Warning and EI-
CAS systems.
The pitch trim switch is declared failed after 7 seconds since switch depres-
sion or fault.
The aural message is “Trim” and the EICAS Message is cyan, i.e., an advi-
sory (“Pitch Trim SW 1 Fail” or “Pitch Trim SW 2 Fail” or “Pitch Trim Bkup
Fail”).
After resetting the HS-ACE (via Cutout Switch or Circuit Breaker), the mes-
sage on EICAS and the switch fault will be cleared but the message remains
on the CMC.

If the failure persists for more than

7 seconds since switch depression
or fault the aural message is
deactivated and the pitch trim
switch fail Advisory CAS message
is activated (“Pitch Trim SW 1
Fail”, “Pitch Trim SW 2 Fail” or
“Pitch Trim Bkup Fail”). Refer to
the timing diagram.
After pressed for 3 seconds, the

timer stops trim movement and if
the switch remains pressed, after
1 second an aural warning starts
with the following message:
“Trim”. When the switch is
released the Aural warning stops.

190
No-back Oil Change and Oil Ballscrew and Secondary

level Checks nut Lubrication.
Secondary Load path Jamming Detailed Visual

Mechanism & Clutch Test Inspection

Figure 13: HSA
Motor Resolver electrical

Upper Gimbal
Manual lock connector
Lubrication points (Aircraft attachment point )
Surface Position Resolver

Lower Gimbal Ball Screw electrical connector
Primary & Sec Nut
1 of 2
(Surface attachment point)

190
27-50 Flight Control Flaps

Introduction
The flap system consists of four flap panels, inboard and outboard on each
wing. Each panel is supported by two tracks with one ballscrew actuator per
track providing the actuation force. All eight actuators are connected to the
flap Power Drive Unit (PDU) using torque tubes routed along the trailing
edge of the wing.
The flap PDU is located in the pressurized centre electronic bay. Sealed
bearing supports are used to interconnect the torque tubes at the exit from
the pressurized area. The PDU consists of a speed summed differential,
driven by two DC motors operating in an active/active mode.
Position Sensors Units (PSU) are attached to the outboard flap actuators to
provide position information used for flap angle control and indication func-
tions.
System control is performed by two flap channels in the Slat/Flap Actuator

control Electronic(SF-ACE) units. The flap channels receive surface position
commands from the Slat/Flap Control Lever (SFCL) installed in the cockpit.
Besides the control and protection functions for the flap system, the control
channels also provide system performance feedback to the cockpit.
Figure 1: Flap system architecture
Installation zones
Flap Handle Flap handle - FWD Fuse
Inboard Slat Alternate Flap Switch (190 only ) - FWD Fuse
Alternate Flap
4X Skew 4 X Slat Angle Slat PDU - Wing Fairing
16X Irreversible Slat Switch Flap PDU & SF-ACE - Center Fuse II
Sensor Gearboxes (ERJ 190/195Only )
Actuators Flap driv eline/actuators - Wing Trailing edge
PDU Slat driv eline/actuators - Wing Leading edge
Position sensor units - Wingtip
Outboard Slat OB Flap Skew sensors - OB Flap tracks
4X Skew 4 X PDU
IB Slat Skew sensors - IB Slat main track ribs
Sensor MOT OR OB Slat Skew sensors-Wing Leading edge
+28 VDC +28 VDC

115 VAC 115 VAC
Slat Slat Slat Slat

Control/ Mot. Mot. Control/
Monitor Drive Drive Monitor
SF ACE#1 SF ACE #2
Flap Flap Flap Flap
4X Position Sensor Monitor Drive Drive Monitor
+28 VDC +28 VDC

115 VAC 115 VAC
Flap
4X Skew
Sensor
PDU
6 X Flap Angle
Gearboxes (170/175)
8X Irreversible Flap
4 X Flap Angle
Actuators
Gearboxes (190/195)
Flap Angle
0 to 10 >10
Slat <15 Acceptable Prohibited configuration
Angle 15 to 25 Acceptable Acceptable
190
The slat/flap control lever (SFCL)
The slat/flap control lever (SFCL) in the cockpit allows pilot input to the slat/
flap control system by converting angular displacement of the lever to elec-
trical signals to the SF-ACE units. A light plate provides reference position
markings for surface position selection.
The SFCL has seven positions, each having a detented arrangement as

shown, resulting in the respective slat/flap surface positions and placarded
speeds.
Position three is gated in either direction for the go-around gate. Moving the
lever from one detent to another causes the rotation of four RVDTs mounted
to the handle, providing independent handle position information to the four
SF-ACE control channels via two electrical connectors.
A valid motion command exists if a channel determines its RVDT to be in a

valid detent and any of the other three channels in agreement
The slat and flap motion is sequenced. When both the slat and flap surfaces
are commanded to extend, the slats extend first to 15 degrees followed by
flap extension to any commanded position up to 20 degrees.
When the command is to extend beyond position 3, the surfaces first extend
to position 3 and stop. After validating the surfaces are in position 3, the slats
first extend to 25 degrees followed by the flaps extending to the commanded
position.
When the command is to retract to less than position 3, the flaps retract first
back to 20 degrees and the slats retract to 15 degrees and stop. After vali-
dating the surfaces are in position 3, the surfaces retract to the commanded
position, following the sequence flaps retract first followed by the slats.
Figure 2: The slat/flap control lever (SFCL)
Lever RVDT
Position Position
+60 -30
+70 -20
+80 -10
+90 0
+100 +10
+110 +20
+120 +30
SFCL Slat Flap Placard

Detent Position Position Speed
(degree (degrees) (knots CAS)
s)
Flap 0 0 0 None
Flap 1 15 7 230
Flap 2 15 10 215
Flap 3 15 20 200
Flap 4 25 20 180
Flap 5 25 20 180
Full Flap 25 37 165
190
The Flap Power Drive Unit (PDU)
The flap Power Drive Unit (PDU) is located in the pressurized area of the
centre fuselage E-bay. The PDU output shaft transmits drive line torque to the actuators on both the
left and right wing to maintain synchronization within the actuator system.
Torque limiting slip clutch is utilized on the PDU output centerline to protect
The electronically controlled Power Drive Unit (PDU) provides the driving the PDU internal components and the system drive line from over torque re-
and braking torque required to position and stop the flap surfaces. lated damage. The torque limiting clutch is a friction device actuated by pre-
loaded ball ramp. There is no reset action required in case of a torque limit-
ing event. The PDU gearbox is grease lubricated and the output shaft is
Each PDU consists of: sealed using lip seals.
• two DC motor / brake assemblies,

• a speed summing differential,
• a gearbox with two outputs and
• an output torque limiting device.
The electrical signals received from the SF-ACE are converted into rotary
motion within the DC drive motor. The output of both DC drive motors is
combined within the differential, resulting in a rotary output motion to the
transmission drive lines. During single motor operation, full torque perform-
ance is provided but at one half the normal output rate.
Each brushless motor assembly is a line replaceable unit. It has three func-
tions:
• Rotor position transducer,

• DC motor and
• brake.
Under normal operation the motor torque is summed and the motor speed
is averaged at the differential and transmitted through the gear train to the
PDU output shaft.
In the event of a single channel electrical failure, the differential allows the
PDU to output full system torque at half speed.
Figure 3: Flap Power Drive Unit (PDU)
190
Torque tubes
there are three models of torque tubes: female/female, female/male, male/

male.They are cylinders of different lengths, installed in the trailing edge of
the INBD (Inboard), mid, and OUTBD (Outboard) wing sections and in the
middle avionics compartment.
The basic torque tube configuration consists of rigid aluminium tubing with
universal joints riveted on each end. The universal joints on one end of the
torque tubes are cross-drilled to allow the installation of a bolt for axial reten-
tion of the torque tubes. The universal joint at the opposite end is free to
“float” to allow axial movement between components mounted to the struc-
tures.
The universal joints are grease-packed and permanently sealed with elas-
tomer boots. The splined ends of the torque tubes are fitted with grease fit-
tings to allow periodic lubrification of the drive splines.
The torque tubes are designed to avoid incorrect installation by the length of
the torque tubes. Containment rings near the end of each torque tube pre-
vent damage to the adjacent equipment that might be caused by the spin-
ning of the tube during a torque tube disengagement. Failure of any torque
tube is detected by the SF-ACE, which shuts down the flap system. The
torque tubes in the middle avionics compartment are covered with a shroud
to protect ground maintenance personnel. The flap mechanical drive line
has 22 torque tubes in seven different configurations to meet installation re-
quirements.
Figure 4: Torque Tubes
A
ZONES
147/148
560/660
570/670
TORQUE TUBE
B
TYPICAL
190
Angle Gearboxes
The flap mechanical drive line uses angle gearboxes to change drive line di-
rection when the change in angle is greater than the 10 degrees maximum
that the torque tube universal joint allows. Each angle gearbox has two bevel
gear shafts mounted in ball bearings to provide the required change in an-
gle. The bevel gear shafts have male splined ends that allow the shafts to
mate with the torque tubes.
Two different angle gearbox configurations are used on the flap mechanical
drive line. The angle gearboxes are angled at 144 degrees and 161 degrees.
Bearing Supports
The flap mechanical drive line uses two types of bearing supports to connect
the adjacent torque tubes.
One type is an unsealed bearing support common to both the flap and slat
systems.
The other type is a sealed bearing support used to route the drive line
through the pressurized bulkhead in the middle avionics compartment.
These bearing supports are used to connect adjacent torque tubes along the
trailing edge of each wing. Each bearing support has a splined shaft with fe-
male splined ends, supported by two radial ball bearings housed in a bearing
flange.Each bearing support has a splined shaft with female splined ends.
The splined ends of each bearing support shaft engage the mating splines
on the torque tube shafts.
The flap mechanical drive line has four bearing supports to meet installation
requirements.
Figure 5: Angle gearboxes and bearing supports
190
The flap actuators

Output torque from the ballscrew and worm gear set expand the tape brake
A total of four flap actuators per side provide the actuation force to extend to prevent rotation of the actuator input shaft.
and retract the two double slotted flap panels mounted on the trailing edge
of each wing.
The flap actuators convert the rotary motion of the flap PDU through the flap Rotation of the input shaft in response to PDU and drive line commanded
transmission drive line into linear motion, using a gearbox and ballscrew as- movement unlocks the no-back by means of the backlash between the slid-
sembly to move the flap panel. Overtravel stops are provided on all flap ac- ing collar and input bevel gear allowing actuator movement in the command-
tuators at both end of the ballscrew, that ensures the system is protected ed direction.
against full impact torques due to overtravel even under a shaft disconnect
failure condition. In the event of a drive line disconnect the no-backs in the flap actuators out-
board of the failure will prevent aerodynamic loads on the panel from back
Each flap actuator contains a torque limiter/no-back mechanism to protect driving the flaps into an unacceptable asymmetric condition. The SF-ACE
the aircraft structure in the event of a jam, and prevent back driving of the will detect asymmetry of the wing tip position sensors and shut down the flap
actuator and flap panels in the event of a drive line disconnect. system within the maximum allowable asymmetry limits.
The torque limiter/no-back consists of two logarithmic tape brakes (torsional

wrap springs) installed on either side of the input bevel gear.When expand-
ed the tape brakes engage the inside diameter of the housing sleeve caus- FLAP ACTUATOR TRIP INDICATOR
ing torque to be reacted into the actuator housing and aircraft rear spar.
When a jam condition occurs at the flap actuator, the actuator input torque
One brake acts as a torque limiter in the clockwise direction and a no-back will increase above a set point.
in the counter clockwise direction. The other brake acts as a torque limiter in
the clockwise direction and a no-back in the clockwise direction.
This increase in torque will cause a spring-loaded trip indicator located on
the actuator to move to the “trip position”, giving the mechanic a visible indi-
Torque is transmitted from the actuator through shaft to the input bevel gear cation that a torque limiting event has occurred, shutting down the system.
through a sliding collar which has helical (ramped) surfaces engaging the
bevel gear.
The sliding collar and bevel gear helical surfaces incorporate torsional back- The spring-loaded indicator must be manually reset by moving the trip indi-
lash and are preloaded together axially using a helical spring. cator back to the “set position”.
The angles of the helical surfaces are different for clockwise and counter
clockwise rotation to provide different torque limiter settings for extend and
retract directions.
Under static load conditions the no-back mechanism is engaged to prevent

aerodynamic panel loads from back driving the actuator.
Figure 6: Flap actuators
T OR QUE LIMIT ER
T OR QUE LIMIT ER T RIP INDIC AT OR
T RIP INDIC AT OR
T RIP P IN
T RIP P IN
C C
Ballscrew
Drive Gear Torque
Input Limiter Trip
Shaft Indicator
Torque
Bevel Limiter/ No-
Gearset/ Back
Dropbox
Worm Ballscrew
Gear
Drive
Gear
190
Position sensing unit (PSU)
Transmission drive lines are installed on the trailing edge of each wing,
transmitting torque from the PDU output shaft to the actuators stationed
along the wing, using torque shafts and angle gearboxes.
The input shaft of each actuator is also a through shaft, transmitting the
torque from actuator to actuator, maintaining synchronization within the sys-
tem.
A position sensing unit (PSU) is located at each outboard end of the flap
drive lines, providing position feedback to the SF-ACE channels. The SF-
ACE uses the information for closed loop computing of the surface position
indication on the EICAS.
Figure 7: Position sensing unit (PSU)
190
Operation
FLAP MECHANICAL DRIVE LINE OPERATION
The flap mechanical drive line transmits the rotary output power of the FPDU
to the flap actuators. The FPDU contains two motor/brake modules that are
driven by the motor drive section of the applicable SF-ACE channel.
One motor is connected to the RH (Right-Hand) SF-ACE, and the other mo-
tor is connected to the LH (Left-Hand) SF-ACE.
When the SFCL (Slat/Flap Control Lever) is moved to extend or retract the
flaps, the respective SF-ACE channel interfaces with the FPDU and the flap
position sensor units.
The FPDU incorporates two brushless DC motor LRU (Line Replaceable
Unit) that are speed summed through the FPDU gearbox.
Torque tubes transmit the operating torque from the FPDU gearbox to the
actuators, which are connected directly to the structure through the angle
gearboxes and bearing supports.
Each flap actuator contains a gearbox and a ballscrew assembly.

The gearbox is mounted to the rear wing spar. A through shaft passes
through the gearbox and is connected to the flap mechanical drive line.
This configuration allows the actuator to transfer the torque and rotation to
the next actuator or to the flap position sensor unit at the most OUTBD ac-
tuator.
The rotary motion of the flap mechanical drive line is converted through the
ballscrew assembly into linear motion to move the flap panels.
Figure 8: Flap mechanical drive
Installation zones
Flap Handle Flap handle - FWD Fuse
Inboard Slat Alternate Flap Switch (190 only ) - FWD Fuse
Alternate Flap
4X Skew 4 X Slat Angle Slat PDU - Wing Fairing
16X Irreversible Slat Switch Flap PDU & SF-ACE - Center Fuse II
Sensor Gearboxes (ERJ 190/195Only )
Actuators Flap driv eline/actuators - Wing Trailing edge
PDU Slat driv eline/actuators - Wing Leading edge
Position sensor units - Wingtip
Outboard Slat OB Flap Skew sensors - OB Flap tracks
4X Skew 4 X PDU
IB Slat Skew sensors - IB Slat main track ribs
Sensor MOT OR OB Slat Skew sensors-Wing Leading edge
+28 VDC +28 VDC

115 VAC 115 VAC
Slat Slat Slat Slat

Monitor Drive Drive Monitor
SF ACE#1 SF ACE #2
Flap Flap Flap Flap
4X Position Sensor Monitor Drive Drive Monitor
+28 VDC +28 VDC

115 VAC 115 VAC
Flap
4X Skew
Sensor
PDU
6 X Flap Angle
Gearboxes (170/175)
8X Irreversible Flap
4 X Flap Angle
Actuators
Gearboxes (190/195)
Flap Angle
0 to 10 >10
Slat <15 Acceptable Prohibited configuration
Angle 15 to 25 Acceptable Acceptable
190
Flap Skew Sensor
The flap skew sensors prevent excessive flap panel skew and detect/annun-
ciate disconnect failures. The OUTBD flap skew sensors consist of two dual-
channel resolver units connected to the flap track carriages at flap tracks #3
and #4.
There are no flap skew sensors mounted to the INBD (Inboard) flap panels.
The primary coil of the resolver units on track #3 is excited by SF-ACE chan-
nel 1.
The secondary coils of this resolver unit are electrically connected to the
secondary coils of the resolver unit on track #4. This interconnection forms
one channel of skew sensing by providing an electrical signal to SF-ACE
channel 1.
The electrical signal is proportional to the differential motion between the two
flap skew sensors of the OUTBD flap panel.
The remaining resolvers in both OUTBD flap skew sensors are also electri-
cally connected in the same manner and interface with SF-ACE channel 2.
This dual- channel approach to skew sensing allows the system to operate
with a single flap channel active or in case of a single skew sensor channel
failure.
As a result, each SF-ACE unit independently implements skew sensing for

each of the OUTBD flap panels on both the left and right wings. If a fault oc-
curs, the SF-ACE units report the fault through the EICAS.
Figure 9: Flap skew sensor
DC ESS 1 FLAPS FLAPS DC ESS 3

X-CHAN B
AC ESS AC BUS2
OB IB IB OB
ACTUATOR ACTUATOR ACTUATOR ACTUATOR
1 2 2 1
RESOLVER RESOLVER
LEFT WING OB FLAP RIGHT WING OB F LAP

LEFT FLAP RIGHT FLAP
PANEL SKEW
SENSORS SENSORS
S KE W S ENSOR
P OS IT ION
S ENSOR UNIT
B
C
190
The flap panels
The outboard flap is a single panel.
The main flap panel is linked to two main carriages, which roll through tracks
fixed to the wing. The aft flap panel, mounted on the aft carriage, rolls on
tracks mounted to the main flap panel. Movement of the main flap panel
causes the aft flap panel to deploy relative to the main flap, through a system
of bell cranks and tie-rods.
The flap system components and control system needs rigging to assure
proper positioning of the flaps.
Flap rigging is established by using rigging pins. During assembly flaps and
actuators will be installed first this will be followed by the drive line installa-
tion.
When both wings are mechanically rigged and interconnected the PSUs will
be installed, and rough electrical alignment is performed.
Finally the SF-ACE provides the accurate flap position control, where the ac-
tual PSU offset voltages are stored. Electrical rigging data is shared be-
tween the two SF-ACE to avoid re-rigging of the system when one SF-ACE
is replaced.
Figure 10: Flap panels
190
EICAS Position Indications and Messages
Flap/Slat position and status information is provided via the MAUs to the EI-
CAS cockpit display for flight crew information and dispatch assessment.
Each ACE channel transmits three address labels which contain the position
and status information for that channel.
The slat channel transmits slat angle and the flap channel transmits flap an-
gle. This information is used for EICAS position and synoptic display.
The flap and slat position data is an average of the surface position deter-
mined by the left and right wing position sensor units (PSUs). The SFCS po-
sition data used by the EICAS and other safety critical aircraft functions is
independently verified by the monitor channel.
EICAS utilizes this data for the primary CAS page and the flight controls syn-
optic page displays.
Five different messages are used by EICAS to identify flap and slat system
fault status. It should be noted that many different fault conditions may cause
any one of the basic fault messages to be displayed.
Cause of the EICAS fault message may only be determined by the CMC.
Figure 11: EICAS Position Indications and Messages
LOGIC EQUATION
# TYPE MESSAGE (cause description) INHIBI
T
1 Caution SLATS FAIL SF-ACE1 slat channel and T.O

SF-ACE2 slat channel
disabled.
2 Caution FLAPS FA IL SF-ACE1 flap channel and T.O

SF-ACE2 flap channel
disabled.
3 Status SLAT/FLAP Surface position is not equal N/A

LEVER to a valid handle position.
DISAGREE
4 Advisor SLATS Either SF-ACE1 slat channel N/A

y HALF SPEED OR SF-ACE2 slat channel
disabled OR system is
operating in ADG Mode.
5 Advisor FLAPS Either SF-ACE 1 flap channel N/A

y HALF SPEED or SF-ACE 2 flap channel
disabled OR system is
operating in RAT Mode.
190
Flap System Mechanical Rigging

6. With both wings properly rigged in the retract position install the drive-
line torque shafts, angle gearboxes and bearing supports between the
Mechanical rigging of the flap system is performed during installation of the
system components. Mechanical rigging is performed to synchronize the PDU and inboard flap actuator on both wings.
flap actuators on each panel in the nominal retracted (0 deg.) position to as-
sure proper panel location for the aircraft cruise condition and provide timing
of the actuator overtravel stops.
Mechanical Rigging:
1. After installation of the flap track and carriage assemblies position each
flap carriage in the nominal retract (O deg) position as determined by a
rigging pin or clamp and maintain in this position throughout the rigging
process.
2. Attach the forward mounting lud of each flap actuator to the mounting
bracket on the fixed trailing edge spar using the specific fasteners.
3. With the flap carriage assembly fixed in the nominal retract position
adjust the actuator ball nut 3.5+/- 0.3 mm away from the retract overtravel
stop and connect the ball nut to the flap carriage using the serrated pillow
blocks and specific fasteners.
4. Install the drive line torque shafts between each actuator input shaft to
maintain proper rigging of the flap panels on each wing.
5. With all the flap actuators at the nominal retract (O deg) position adjust
and install the wing tip Position Sensor Unit (PSU) to the outboard flap
actuator with the timing mark on the outboard end of the sensor aligned
for the proper wing (i.e LH or RH wing).
Figure 12: Flap System Mechanical Rigging
190
System Electrical Rigging and Autoring
After the flap and slat systems are mechanically rigged, an electrical rigging
procedure is performed by command from the CMC (after system start-up is
complete).
The electrical rigging process is manually initiated via the CMC and estab-
lishes the electrical offsets for the position feedback resolvers in the wing tie
mounted SF-PSUs, inboard slat skew sensors, and outboard flat skew sen-
sors and stores them, along with aircraft tail number, in the SF-ACE non-vol-
atile memory. The SF-ACes share all electrical rig information and stores the
values for both SF-ACEs.
Electrical rigging will have to be performed any time a PSU or a skew sensor
is removed or any time the drive line is disconnected between the PDU and
either PSU, either for maintenance or after a failure event. Mechanical rig-
ging after a drive line disconnect may or may not be necessary, depending
on whether or not the system is held by rig features somehow when the drive
line is disconnected in maintenance.
There is also an auto rig process in event of an SF-ACE replacement. When

a SF-ACE is removed and another SF-ACE is installed in place of the re-
moved unit, the SF-ACE will auto rig at start-up when it recognizes that the
aircraft tail number is different. Auto rig simply transfers to the stored electri-
cal offset information from the existing SF-ACE to the replacement SF-ACE.
Figure 13: System Electrical Rigging and Autoring
190
SF-ACE Rigging Functions
The SF-ACE design and software functions include system rigging which is
broken down into three specific functions areas: Initial Aircraft Rigging, Au- Rig Mode Initialization Conditions
tomatic Rigging, and Rig Verification.
Rigging, in the sense that it is discussed here refers only to the electrical rig- Rigging is performed sequentially on like system channels when SF-ACE 1
ging of the system subsequent to the initial actuation system mechanical in- receives the rig enable command from the CMC. The system is not consid-
stallation and adjustment to the stowed position, prior to any system motion ered in the rig mode unless the following conditions are met:
being commanded.
- The two like system channels are communicating over the cross
channel CAN bus, and
Rigging Function and CMC Interface
- WOW indicates On Ground, and
The CMC is utilized by the installation or maintenance crews to transmit rig
enable and rig commands to the SF-ACE. Rigging commands are only sent - Computed Airspeed is less than 50 knots, and
to slat and flap channels in SF-ACE 1. The CMC does not provide any data
or signal conditioning functions for the rigging function.
Even if the CMC could experience some fault that generates a rig enable or - Valid Aircraft Number Code is received over ARINC 429, and
a rig command, the SF-ACE rigging conditions must be met in order for the
rig to proceed. - Surface is not in motion.
Initial Rigging Given these conditions to be satisfied, multiple failures of either the inputs of
the SF-ACE or of the CAS and WOW are required in order for the rigging to
Initial rigging must be accomplished when the SFCS is first installed on an be initiated in the air. Additionally, the rig initialization and rig commands are
aircraft, any time the flap or slat drive lines are disturbed and require me- not originated in the CMC, but by the maintenance crew. The CMC merely
chanical adjustment, and any time both SF-ACEs are replaced simultane- provides a means to transmit the rig enable and rig commands to the SF-
ously. Initial rigging is performed to store SFCS PSU resolver rig information ACE.
and offsets in the like channels (slat for slat and flap for flap) of the SF-ACEs.
Once valid resolver rig information has been stored and the flap skew sensor
rig information is stored in both SF-ACE flap channels.
Figure 14: SF-ACE Rigging Functions
190
Automatic Rigging (Auto Rig)
Auto Rig function is designed to allow the replacement of a single SF-ACE

and automatically rig it to the aircraft. When a replacement SF-ACE is pow-
ered up, the rig verification will determine that it is not rigged to the current
aircraft. In this case, the SF-ACE will obtain and store on side and offside
SF-ACE rig data, aircraft number code, and date stored in the offside SF-
ACE rig data. Thus, the replacement SF-ACE is “rigged” to the aircraft with-
out having to perform initial rigging.
The process is completely automatic and transparent to the maintenance
crew.
Rig Verification
Rig Verification is a software function executed by the SF-ACE on every

software cycle.
The SF-ACE performs rig verification as follows:
- Verify the aircraft number code (ANC) stored in the NVM matches the
valid aircraft serial number code transmitted over the DCU ARINC 429
data bus.
- Verify that the ANC and date received from the offside channel resolver
rig data matches the stored resolver rig ANC and date.
- Verify that the ANC and date received from the offside channel’s skew
rig data matches the stored skew rig ANC and date.
- Stored resolver offsets are 20+/- 12 degrees.
- Slat skew sensor rig values exist in the range of TBD1 Vrms- TBD2
Vrms for the inboard transducer.
-The rig offsets stored in on side and offside channels match.
If any of the above fail, the SF-ACE shall communicate its unrigged status
over ARINC 429 communications.
Figure 15: Auto Rig and Rig Verification
190
PSU Rigging
Figure 16:
190
Maintenance
Re-lubrification Frequencies
• Slat rotary actuator: 25,000 flight hours per MSG-3 sampling Plan
• Flap ballscrew nut: every 1200 flight hrs (2 A-Checks) or 1 year
• Flap actuator gear head: 25,000 flight hours per MSG-3 sampling
Plan
• PDU gearbox: 25,000 flight hours per MSG-3 sampling Plan
• Torque tube splines: every 6000 flight hours (C-Check)
• Angle Gearbox: 25,000 flight hours per MSG-3 sampling Plan
Other Maintenance Features
• Visual inspection of torque limiter trip indicators

- On a as needed basis for flap and start actuators
• Check for Inboard Flap Actuator disconnect
- at C check
- Visual inspection of Actuator/Carriage attachment
• Verify Flap Outboard skew sensor operation
- at C check
- Disconnect linkage and rotate resolver to trip skew sensor circuit
• Verify Slat skew sensor operation
- at C check
- Inboard Slat skew sensor- Disconnect and rotate resolver to trip
skew sensor circuit
- Outboard reed switch- Insert Alum plate in sensor gap to trip skew
sensor circuit
190
27-60 Flight Control Spoilers

Introduction
The embraer 190 spoiler system includes five spoilers panels per wing, and
an optional ventral air brake panel under the fuselage for the steep approach
function.
The panels are numbered from inboard to outboard from 1 to 5 on each

wing, as L1 to L5 on the left hand side and R1 to R5 on the right hand side.
The two inboard panels are ground spoilers and they deploy only in
GROUND MODE, to 60°, symmetrically on each wing.
Panels L3 to L5 and R3 to R5 are the multi function spoilers. These spoilers

have three mode of operation:
• Roll augmentation mode
• Speed brake mode
• Ground mode
• Mach buffet
Figure 1: Spoilers
190
In the roll augmentation mode the spoilers are deployed asymmetrically as

commanded by the pilot’s and co-pilot’s control wheel.
The control wheel inputs of less than 5.5 degrees the spoilers remain
stowed, control wheel movement in excess of 5.5 degrees in either direction
results in -
asymmetric deployment of the multi function spoilers.
Deployment range from 0° to 30° proportional to control wheel position. For

right turns the right spoiler will deploy and the left spoiler will stay in the
stowed position.
In the speed brake mode the spoilers are deployed symmetrically as a func-
tion of speed brake handle position to increase the aircraft descent rate.
Range of deployment from 0° to 30° proportional to speed brake handle po-
sition.
The multi function spoilers are automatically and symmetrically deployed as

ground spoilers to reduce the roll out distance following landing. In this mode
the multi function spoilers will be deployed to 40°.
The ventral air brake is used to increase the drag on the aircraft without loss
of lift.
The ventral air brake panel is a single panel located on the underside of the
aircraft, immediately forward of the main landing gear.
Control of the ventral air brake can be proportional of the speed brake han-
dle lever up to 60°, or automatic deployment to 60° by engaging the steep
approach button on the central pedestal.
In both case the ventral air brake will retract automatically at touchdown.
Figure 2: Spoilers
PILOT COPILOT SPEEDBRAKE HANDLE

MAU 3
CONTROL-YOKE CONTROL-YOKE (SSM 27-66-80)
(SSM 31-41-80)
(SSM 27-66-80) (SSM 27-66-80)
SPDBRK HANDLE
RH MFS3 WHEEL POS SENSOR FCM 3 FCM 3 POS SENSOR #2
LH MFS3 WHEEL
POS SENSOR
D
SPDBRK HANDLE
RH MFS4 WHEEL
POS SENSOR
FCM 4 FCM 4 POS SENSOR #3 C
LH MFS4 WHEEL
POS SENSOR
A
MAU 1
(SSM 31-41-80)
SPDBRK HANDLE
B RH MFS5 WHEEL
POS SENSOR
FCM 1 FCM 1 POS SENSOR #!
LH MFS5 WHEEL
POS SENSOR
A
B
RAM POS SENSOR

EHSV COMMAND
RAM POS SENSOR
EHSV COMMAND
C LH INBD PCU RH INBD PCU C
(SDS 27-60) NO. 1 HYD SYS (SDS 27-60)
LOCK (SSM 29-11-81)
D (MPP 27-65-01)
VALVE
LOCK (MPP 27-65-01)
VALVE
D
PRESSURE
LH INBD INLET INLET RH INBD

MULTI-FUNCTION FILTER FILTER RELIEF MULTI-FUNCTION
E.H.S.V. E.H.S.V.
SPOILER PANEL RELIEF RETURN VALVE SPOILER PANEL
(SDS 27-60) VALVE (SDS 27-60)
(MPP 27-64-01) (MPP 27-64-01)
ACTUATOR ACTUATOR
RAM POS SENSOR

EHSV COMMAND
RH MID PCU
C LH MID PCU (SDS 27-60)
C
(SDS 27-60) LOCK
D (MPP 27-65-01) VALVE
LOCK (MPP 27-65-01)
VALVE
D
PRESSURE
LH MID INLET INLET RH MID

MULTI-FUNCTION FILTER FILTER RELIEF MULTI-FUNCTION
E.H.S.V. E.H.S.V.
SPOILER PANEL RELIEF RETURN VALVE SPOILER PANEL
(SDS 27-60) VALVE EHSV COMMAND (SDS 27-60)
(MPP 27-64-02) (MPP 27-64-02)
ACTUATOR RAM POS SENSOR ACTUATOR
NO. 2 HYD SYS
(SSM 29-11-82)
C LH OUTBD PCU RH OUTBD PCU C
(SDS 27-60) LOCK PRESSURE (SDS 27-60)
D (MPP 27-65-01) VALVE
LOCK (MPP 27-65-01) D
VALVE
RETURN
LH OUTBD INLET INLET RH OUTBD
MULTI-FUNCTION FILTER FILTER
E.H.S.V. E.H.S.V. MULTI-FUNCTION
SPOILER PANEL RELIEF RELIEF SPOILER PANEL
(SDS 27-60) VALVE EHSV COMMAND EHSV COMMAND VALVE (SDS 27-60)
LEGEND:
(MPP 27-64-03) (MPP 27-64-03)
ACTUATOR RAM POS SENSOR MECHANICAL RAM POS SENSOR ACTUATOR
ELECTRICAL
HYDRAULIC
190
Normal / Direct mode
Operating in normal mode, the roll spoilers are also gain scheduled as a
function of airspeed. A roll spoiler augmentation command, computed in the
FCM, is added to the normal pilot input in order to modify the roll inputs for
changes in airspeed or different flaps settings.
Generally, an increase in airspeed results in smaller panel deflections, while

increasing the flap setting also reduces roll-spoiler authority.
In case of loss of airspeed data the digital part of the FCM is removed from
the control loop, and the system reverts to direct mode. A fixed gain is then
applied to the roll-spoiler system over the entire flight regime, independent
of airspeed or flaps setting, and the advisory message SPOILER FAULT will
be displayed on the EICAS.
The pilots can force the spoiler system into direct mode by means of pushing
the respective switch on the FCP, located on the centre pedestal in the cock-
pit.
Figure 3: Normal / Direct mode
190
Roll control function
During flight, the pilot or copilot rotates the hand wheel left or right to achieve
the desired roll rate. The sprocket and chain transfer this hand wheel dis-
placement to rotation of the FWD (Forward) torque tube.
This rotation is transferred to linear movement of the spoiler command

LVDTs, which send electrical signals to the FCM, indicating hand wheel po-
sition.
If the hand wheel deflection is sufficient to overcome the dead band, the mul-
ti-function spoiler control panels are deployed asymmetrically, proportionally
to the hand wheel deflection.
A command is sent from the FCM to the EHSV to port hydraulic fluid to the
extend chamber of the PCU.
This command is removed when the LVDT indicates that the desired posi-
tion has been reached.
When the hand wheel deflection is reduced below the threshold for deploy-
ment, the multi-function spoiler control panels are retracted in a similar man-
ner.
Figure 4: Roll control function
190
Speed brake function
The spoiler control system deploys the multi-function spoiler panels sym- The handle position is variable throughout its range of travel and will position
metrically as in-flight speed brakes. to multi-function spoiler panels from 0 to 30 degrees.
The speed brake function is manually controlled by the pilots using the Movement of the handle drives three rotary variable differential transformers
speed brake handle in the cockpit. Moving the handle commands the system (RVDTs), which electronically transmit the handle position to the associated
to deploy the multi-function spoiler panels proportionally as a function of three FCM units. Each RVDT is connected to a different FCM unit, therefore
handle position, up to the in-flight limit of 30 degrees. controlling a different spoiler panel pair.
During descent, the pilot moves the speed brake handle from the stowed po-
sition to a position proportional to the desired drag rate.
The multi-function spoiler panels will move to a position respective of that of
the speed brake handle and remain in that position until the speed brake
handle is moved to a different position or in the stowed position. Certain in-
terlocks will retract the surfaces automatically based on flap position and
TLA (Thrust Lever Angle). If the flap setting is increased to 20 degrees or
more when the multi-function spoiler panels are already deployed, they will
be retracted.
The speed brakes will retract automatically again upon selection of flaps 3.
Advancing the throttles beyond Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) 60 degrees inhib-
its speed brake deployment in order to prevent inadvertent operation during
a go-around manoeuvre.
In the event of a disagreement of handle position with actual surface position

after automatic retraction, the advisory message SPDBRK LEVER DISAG
will be displayed on the EICAS.
The speed brake handle is mounted in the cockpit on the centre pedestal,
and is operated manually by either pilot. When the handle is in the fully for-
ward position, the spoilers are in the stowed position. The handle latches
into the stowed position when it is pushed to the forward stop, and must be
lifted by the pilot to move it to the desired position.
Figure 5: Speed brake function
190
Composite command
The flight control module (FCM) incorporates software to combine the roll
spoiler commands and the speed brake commands into a composite com-
mand, when turns are flown with speed brakes deployed.
During right turn with speed brakes deployed, the left wing spoilers will re-
tract partially as the left wing spoilers extend.
The spoiler match buffet control function deploys the multi-function spoilers
symmetrically up to a maximum of 8 degrees for airspeeds above the max-
imum operating mach number (Mmo), in order to reduce the effects of buf-
feting.
The amount of spoiler deployment will vary linearly as a function of Mach

number.
Figure 6: Composite command
190
Ground Spoilers less than 24 degrees for EMB 170 and 26 degrees for EMB 190.In this situ-
ation, the ground spoilers will shut down when TLA is greater than 24 de-
grees for EMB 170 and 35 degrees for EMB 190.If the ground spoilers
The ground spoilers are automatically deployed following touchdown to in- deploy during a touch-and-go maneuver, they will retract automatically upon
crease the wheel breaking efficiency and produce aerodynamic drag, in or- application of go-around thrust (any TLA greater than 24 degrees for EMB
der to reduce the required stopping distance of the aircraft.The ground 170 and 35 degrees for EMB 190).After touchdown the bounced function
spoiler command logic, is implemented in FCM software and in S-ACE ana- with 5 seconds delay prevent ground spoilers retraction in case of bounce.
log circuitry.The ground spoiler function drives the 2 pairs inboard at 60 de-
grees and the 3 pairs outboard at 40 degrees.
The ground spoiler command is summed downstream of the spoiler/speed-

brake mixer and produces a command equivalent to the maximum stroke of
the spoiler pair.The inboard panels, which are used as ground spoilers only,
have a stroke limit of 60 degrees.The multifunction spoilers have a stroke
limit of 40 degrees.
The primary interlocks for the ground spoiler logic are the hardware driven
(no software) weight-on-wheels discrete outputs from the Proximity Sensor
Evaluation Modules (PSEMs).The ground/open discretes are direct inputs
into the portion of the ground spoiler logic implemented in analog circuitry.
The FCM ground spoiler command algorithm produces the remainder of the
interlocks, which is software driven.The inputs to the algorithm are read from
the ASCB bus and processed by FCM software.
The weight-on-wheels discretes are combined in hardware such that three

out of four weight-on-wheels signals must be in the on-ground state in order
to deploy the ground spoilers.
To allow ground spoiler deployment during high crosswind landings, the
ground spoiler discretes inputs are combined with wheel-speed discretes in
S-ACE hardware.The wheel-speed signals read in software by the FCMs
from the MAU Brake Control modules of ASCB.The signals are combined
such that if both weight-on-wheels discretes on one strut are in the on-
ground state and at least one of the associated wheels is sensed at a greater
than 45 knots (equivalent ground speed), the ground spoilers will deploy.
The ground spoiler logic also includes inputs from the thrust levers.During
landing, the ground spoiler will deploy when the Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) is
Figure 7: Ground Spoiler logic
WO W Interlock
LeftW eighton W heels #1
(HW – PSEM 2)
LeftW eighton W heels #2 O n G round

(SW – PSEM 1) (3of4 Logic)
RightWe ighton Wh eels #1

(HW – PSEM 1)
RightWe ighton Wh eels #2

(SW – PSEM 2)
G round Spoiler
LeftTLA < 24 degrees Com m and
LeftTLA Valid
FlightIdle
RightTLA Valid G round SpoilerDem and
RightTLA < 24 degrees
DE LAY
W O W (2of4) 10 sec
Airspeed Valid
Airspeed > 60 kts
G round Spoilers Arm ed
BCM 2 VALID R H 1 & LH 1

LH W heelSpeed #1 > 45 kts
LH W heelSpeed #2 > 45 kts LH Wheel Speed
BCM 1 VALID
R H 2 & LH 2
RH W heelSpeed #1 > 45 kts
R H Wheel Speed
RH W heelSpeed #2 > 45 kts
S oftw are H ardw are
190
Ground spoiler electrical system operation
For the ground spoiler system to operate, both lanes of an FCM must agree
with the input deployment logic. The inboard ground spoiler panels need
agreement between lanes A and B of FCM 1, or lanes A and B of the FCM 3.
The outboard ground spoiler panels need agreement between lanes A and
B of FCM 2, or lanes A and B of the FCM 4. This arrangement lets the
ground spoilers deploy or retract even if one FCM is inoperative.
The primary input for the ground spoiler logic is the weight-on-wheels dis-
crete outputs from the PSEMs. To carry out ground spoiler deployment, the
weight-on-wheels hardware discretes and software generated wheel-speed
discretes are combined in FCM hardware.
The wheel speed discretes from the brake control modules are combined
with airspeed. This data is used as a ground spoiler arming signal for the au-
tomatic deployment of the ground spoilers.
Wheel speed and airspeed data is provided to the FCM over the ASCB-D
(Avionics Standard Communication Bus (Version D)).
The ground spoiler logic also includes TLA inputs as an arming function. The
TLA inputs are also used to inhibit ground spoiler deployment during take-
off or go-around.
If the ground spoilers deploy during a touch-and-go manoeuvre, they will re-
tract automatically upon application of thrust. The TLA data is provided to
the FCM from the FADEC (Full-Authority Digital Engine-Control) by means
of ASCB-D.
If the conditions for deployment are met, the FCMs send 28 VDC and elec-
trical ground commands to the ground spoiler control modules, which caus-
es the ground spoiler panels to fully deploy.
If the conditions for deployment cease, the FCMs will restow the panels. The
FCMs switch both the high and the low electrical inputs through separates
lanes within the FCms. This prevents the inadvertent deployment from a sin-
gle electrical short.
Figure 8: Ground spoiler electrical system operation
190
Spoiler handle assembly
The speed brake handle is mounted in the cockpit console between the pilot
and copilot seats. The pilot or copilot operates the handle manually.
When it is in the fully forward position, the spoiler panels are in the stowed
position. In the fully forward position, the handle is in a detent that must be
defeated by lifting prior to pulling the handle aft.
The handle position is infinitely variable throughout its range of travel and
will position the multi-function spoiler panels from 0-30 degrees up, relative
to the position of the handle.
The handle contains a RVDT (Rotary Variable Differential-Transducer) that
transmits signals to the FCM through the aircraft wiring harness. Each RVDT
is wired to a different FCM, which controls a pair of spoiler panels. The FCM
mixes commands from the speed brake handle and the control yoke inputs.
Control-yoke position sensor
The control-yoke position sensors are LVDT (Linear Variable Differential-

Transducer) type transducers that receive electrical excitation from the as-
sociated S-ACE.
There are three individual LVDT position sensors on each control yoke that
generate the roll commands to the S-ACE.
Each sensor is excited with 2 kHz (Kilohertz), 7 VAC (Volt Alternating Cur-
rent) voltage generated by the FCMs that demodulate the LVDT outputs.
Figure 9: Spoiler handle assembly and control-yoke position sensor
190
FCM, Spoiler ACE
The FCM is a dual slot module comprised of two processing lanes with a
mezzanine board sandwiched in between that contains the analog circuitry
for the multi-function spoilers.
The mezzanine board is a single card that is segregated into an A and B lane
with separate connectors and separate interfaces to the associated FCM
digital processing lane.
Each lane also contains a Back plane Interface Controller (BIC) and a pair
of CAN bus transceivers.
The BIC allows the associated FCM lane to communicate with the rest of the
avionics equipment resident in the MAU.
The BIC communicates with a Network Interface Controller (NIC), which re-
sides in the MAU.
The NIC is responsible for transferring data from the client modules onto the
Avionics Standard Communications Bus (ASCB) and from the ASCB bus to
the client modules that reside in the MAU.
Each lane of the FCM communicates to the rest of the avionics equipment
via a separate BIC and a separate NIC.
The control and monitor functions are split between the two lanes (A and B)
such that one lane controls the left spoiler surface and monitor the right sur-
face, while the opposite lane controls the right surface and monitors the left
surface.
The analog portion of the FCM is also used to control and monitor the ventral
air brake. The FCM has an independent power supply to power the analog
circuitry using the aircraft 28 VDC supplies. The two digital processing lanes
are powered off of the associated MAU power supplies.
Figure 10: FCM and spoiler ACE
190
FCM, Spoiler ACE
The FCM modules include demodulators to process the LVDT/RVDT sig-

nals that are used to sense pilot commands and actuator position. The resultant ground spoiler command is summed in downstream of the
spoiler/speed brake mixer to deploy the multi-function spoilers.
The FCM also includes the oscillators that provide the excitation voltages for
the sensors and the reference voltages for the demodulators. The signal is also used to drive a discrete output (28 VDC/Open or
The control wheel LVDT inputs are demodulated and fed directly into the roll Gnd/Open for lanes A and B respectively), which is used to deploy one of
spoiler gain programmer in the associated lane. The speed brake handle po- the inboard pairs of ground spoilers.
sition signals are only processed in one lane of the FCM.
The speed brake handle position signal is demodulated and sent to the dig-
ital portion of the FCM, via the A/D converter.
The signal is then placed on the ASCB bus where it can be read back into
both lanes of the FCM along with the corresponding signals from two other
FCM modules.
The FCM modules then use the mean value of the three signals by applying
a mid-value select algorithm to the inputs. The signal is then gain pro-
grammed for use as a speed brake or ventral air brake command before be-
ing output to the analog portion of the FCM via the D/A converter.
The roll spoiler commands and speed brake commands are combined in the
spoiler/speed brake mixer, which resides in the analog portion of the FCM.
The roll spoiler inputs are gain programmed as a function of airspeed up-
stream of the spoiler/speed brake mixer to help linearize the rolling moment
of the aircraft as a function of airspeed.
The airspeed gain programmer is controlled by the digital portion of the FCM
via a signal from the D/A converter.
In the event of a failure, the airspeed gain programmer defaults to the low
speed (high authority) roll spoiler gain.
The FCM controls ground spoiler deployment using logic that is computed in
the digital portion of the FCM.
The outputs from the ground spoiler logic are sent to the analog section
where they are interlocked with air/ground logic before being used to deploy
the ground spoilers.
Figure 11: FCM, spoiler ACE
190
Electro-Hydraulic multi function spoiler actuator
One electro-hydraulic multi-function spoiler actuator per panel is attached to

spar II of the wing.
The actuator includes an electro hydraulic servo valve (EHSV),which is com-

manded electically by the analog S-ACE within the FCM. The valve meters
hydraulic fluid, causing the actuator to move the control surface.
An LVDT is installed on the main ram of the actuator to provide position feed-
back to the S-ACE. When the LVDT indicates that the desired surface posi-
tion has been reached, the S-ACE commands the EHSV to stop moving the
actuator.
A hold-down lock valve within the actuator prevents the control surface from
floating upward when hydraulic pressure is lost.
The inboard panel pair is supplied by hydraulic system 2, while the two out-
board pairs are supplied by hydraulic system 1.
A maintenance valve is located on top of each multi-function spoiler PCU.

Two people are necessary to lift the multi-function spoiler panels.
One person must turn the maintenance valve clockwise to the open position
while a different person lifts each multi-function spoiler panel.
A spoiler lock collar must then be installed on the multi-function spoiler PCU
to hold the multi-function spoiler panel open. The maintenance valve can
then be released.
To close the multi-function spoiler panels, the spoiler lock collar must be re-
moved and the multi-function spoiler panel pushed down to the retracted po-
sition.
Hydraulic systems No.1 and No.2 must then be pressurized to fully close the
multi-function spoiler panels.
Figure 12: Electro-hydraulic multi function spoiler actuator
LANE A Offside Surface

Position
BIAS
Spoiler Actuator
WHEEL /
Control Wheel RVDT DEMOD GAIN SPEEDBRAKE + LIMIT ++
MIXER + - SA
RAM LVDT
Airspeed Spdbrake Roll
Speedbrake Lever RVDT DEMOD Air/Gnd
Cmd Augment
LVDT
A/D D/A Converter Monitor
DEMOD
BIC
Processor
XCVR
Discrete I/O
Ground Spoiler Command Wrap CAN Bus Interface
28 VDC
Ground Spoiler
Logic Ground Spoiler Command
Weight On Wheels
Ground Spoiler
Solenoid Drive
LANE B Offside Surface Position
WHEEL / Command/
Control Wheel RVDT DEMOD GAIN SPEEDBRAKE + LIMIT + Response
MIXER + + Monitor
Airspeed Spdbrake Roll BIAS

Air/Gnd
Cmd Augment
A/D D/A Converter

BIC
Processor
XCVR
Discrete I/O CAN Bus Interface
Ground Spoiler Command Wrap
28 VDC
Ground Spoiler
Weight On Wheels Logic Ground Spoiler Command
Ground Spoiler
Solenoid Drive
190
The ground spoiler control module
The ground spoiler control module connects to the remote ground spoiler ac-
tuators by hydraulic piping.
The module consists of an electrically operated hydraulic solenoid valve,

used to command a control valve to the open position when energized. The
surface is then hydraulically moved to the deployed position.
A hold-down lock valve prevents the spoiler panels from floating upward fol-
lowing loss of hydraulic pressure.
The outboard spoiler pair is supplied by hydraulic system 1, and the inboard
pair by hydraulic system 2.
Figure 13: Ground spoiler control module
190
The ground spoiler actuators
The ground spoiler actuators are mounted to the aircraft wing structure and
connected to the spoiler panel via a piston rod.
The panels are held either in the fully stowed position or fully deployed po-
sition (60 degrees).
Proximity sensors are installed near the actuator, and when the panel is
opened 6 degrees or more it will indicate a not-stowed condition. The signal
is used for take-off configuration warning and failure indication on the EI-
CAS.
Figure 14: Ground spoiler actuators
190
Ground spoiler proximity sensor
The ground spoiler proximity sensor monitors the position of the ground
spoiler control surface.
It gives a stowed/not stowed indication as a configuration warning for take-

off.
EICAS messages indicate a problem during flight, and fault indication if the
panel does not deploy when commanded.
The sensor is installed near the actuator and mounted to spar III.
A target is mounted on the spoiler panel hinge bracket and when the panel
opens to 6 degrees or more, a not-stowed condition is shown. The electronic
sensor signal is processed in the proximity sensors PSEM 2 (Proximity Sen-
sor Electronic Module) in MAU 3 (Modular Avionics Unit) .
Figure 15: Ground spoiler proximity sensor
190
Ventral air brake
The ventral air brake surface is a single panel located on the underside of
the aircraft immediately forward of the main landing gear.
The panel is made of composite material. The lower surface of the panel is
flat. This ensure that the panel stay flush with the wing-to-fuselage fairing to
prevent parasite drag.
The panel is attached to the structure of the aircraft with four hinges and a
single ventral air brake actuator is attached to the panel and to the keel
beam.
The actuator is used to hold the panel in the stowed position (o degree) and
to position the surface at 62 degrees down in response to the position of full
flaps with the STEEP APPROACH switch activated. The actuator provides
the mechanical stop when the panel is either stowed or fully extended.
The ventral air brake hydraulic actuation sub-subsystem has one control
module and one hydraulic actuator that deploy the ventral air brake surface
panel to the in -flight limit of 62 degrees. The ventral air brake control module
is electronically controlled and uses hydraulic pressure from the No. 2 hy-
draulic system.
The ventral air brake actuator is hydraulically actuated by the ventral air con-
trol module.
The command for the ventral air brake control module is implemented in the
FCM (Flight Control Module)s using gnd/open discrete outputs, which drive
the two single pole relays. The relays provide the 28 VDC (Volt Direct Cur-
rent) and gnd to operate the solenoid valve that commands the ventral air
brake surface panel to extend.
Figure 16: Ventral air brake
190
Ventral air brake hydraulic actuator
The ventral air brake hydraulic actuator is a double-acting unit of convention-

al design with a restrictor to control the operating speed.
Snubbing devices in both sides reduce the actuator piston velocity in extend-
ed and retracted position.
The ventral air brake hydraulic actuator is used to hold the ventral air brake
surface panel at 0 degrees (actuator in extended position), or to deploy the
ventral air brake surface panel to the fully extended 62 degrees (actuator in
retracted position) after touchdown.
The ventral air brake hydraulic actuator is hydraulically actuated by the ven-
tral air brake control module. The actuator is biased to retract automatically
when it is hydraulically powered if the solenoid valve is not engaged.
Ventral air brake control module
The ventral air brake control module is a single body hydraulic manifold with
a normally closed dual-coil solenoid valve.
The ventral air brake control module is electronically controlled by FCMs
1,2,3 and 4.
The control module contains four separated valves used for controlling the
hydraulic fluid flow to the ventral air brake hydraulic actuator by converting
electrical signals received by the solenoid operated valve (from the FCMs)
to switch hydraulic pressure on and off in the pilot chamber of the main con-
trol valve. The main control valve has two positions one for retracting the ac-
tuator and one for extending the actuator.
A command for a single FCM is sufficient to command the ventral air brake
control module.
The ventral air brake control module has a hydraulic hold-down lock valve
that will hold the ventral air brake surface panel in a closed position if hydrau-
lic pressure is lost. The hold-down valve has manual release for mainte-
nance activity.
Figure 17: Ventral air brake hydraulic actuator and control module
190
Operation:
The ventral air brake control module receives hydraulic pressure from the
No.2 hydraulic system. The main control valve of the ventral air brake control
module supplies the hydraulic pressure to retract and to extend the ventral
air brake hydraulic actuator.
The command for the ventral air brake control module is implemented in the
FCMs using gnd/open discrete outputs, which drive the two single pole re-
lays.
The relays provide the 28 VDC and gnd to operate the solenoid valve that
commands the ventral air brake surface panel to extend. The deployment of
the ventral air brake surface panel is enabled when the flaps reach the flap
full position for landing.
The ventral air brake surface panel deployment is inhibited for flap settings
less than flaps 6.
Figure 18: Operation
190
Ventral air brake position sensor
The ventral air brake position sensor is a five-wire, brushless, LVDT type
transducer.
It receives excitation from the S-ACE (Spoiler Actuator-Control Electronics)
in the form of a 2 kHz (Kilohertz), 7 VAC voltage and outputs an amplitude-
modulated, phase-sensitive voltage that is proportional to the sensed posi-
tion.
The position sensor is mounted to the air brake and is used to monitor the
spoiler surface. It senses if the spoiler surface responds incorrectly to com-
mands or the surface deploys inadvertently.
The output voltages vary linearly as a function of input rod position up to a

maximum of 4 VAC differential (in phase or out of phase), over the working
stroke of +/- 1.25 inches.
An electrical connector is mounted on the end of each sensor to interface
with the S-ACE.
Figure 19: Ventral air brake position sensor
SOLENOID VALVE
(NORMALLY CLOSED)
ELECTRICAL
CONNECTOR
EXTEND
PORT
ACTUATOR
MAIN CONTROL
VALVE
RETURN
THERMAL RELIEF
VALVE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM #2
RESTRICTOR
SUPPLY
PRESSURE
RETRACT
PORT
SERVICE VALVE
THERMAL RELIEF (MANUAL RELIEF VALVE)
VALVE
190
Electrical operation
The surface position sensor and the command wrap around discrete signal
All four FCMs are used in the ventral air brake system. monitor the ventral air brake control system.
FCMs 2 and 4 send 28 VDC (Volt Direct Current) through a relay to the air The surface position LVDT senses if the spoiler surface responds incorrectly
brake solenoid module. to commands or the surface deploys inadvertently.
FCMs 1 and 3 supply a GND through another relay to the solenoid. This al-
lows the brake surface to be deployed if the proper conditions are met.
The command wrap around discretes are used to detect failure in the com-
The solenoid wiring is wrapped back to the generic IOM (Input/Output Mod- mand path interconnects. The wrap around discretes come from down-
ule) in the MAU (Modular Avionics Unit) to detect the improper high or low stream of the relay outputs to the solenoid. The command wraps interface
electrical input to the solenoids. to the FCS (Flight Control System) through the generic IOM 3.
The module sends the command wrap signals to the FCMs over the ASCB
The solenoid coils electrically operate the control valve that activates de- for use by the ventral air brake command wrap monitor.
ployment of the air brake. Either coil can operate the control valve.
The dicrete outputs to the relays that dive the coils come from Lane B of the The FCS annunciates the “VENTRAL AIR BRAKE FAIL”CAS (Crew Alerting
FCMs. A surface position LVDT on the air brake supplies information to lane System) message when the ventral air brake command and the surface po-
A of FCM 2 for monitoring purposes. sition disagree. The FCM monitors the status of the air brake drive relay con-
tacts to limit the exposure to latent failures.
The FCM takes steep approach mode indication information from the ASCB
(Avionics Standard-Communication Bus) data supplied by the AFCS (Auto-
matic -Flight Control System).
The FCM commands the actuator to deploy the air brake when the condi-
tions that follow are met:
• The ventral air brake available condition is satisfied

• The steep approach button is selected
• The APM (Aircraft Personality Module) indicates that the aircraft
has a ventral air brake.
• The flap handle is in position FULL
• Both TLAs are less than 70 degrees.
• The in-air condition is satisfied.
Figure 20: Electrical operation
Report No: 170-FCD-001
VENTRAL
AIR BRAKE
A
ZONE
146
A
VENTRAL AIR BRAKE
POSITION SENSOR
190
EICAS indications
In case of system failure or failed BIT the following messages will be dis-
played on the EICAS:
• Advisory message FLT CTRK FAULT if one of the flight control sys-
tem component has failed but the aircraft is dispatchable.
• Caution message FLT CTRL NO DISPATCH indicate that one of

the components has failed and system requires maintenance ac-
tion before dispatch.
• Advisory message SPDBRK LEVER DISAG displayed when mis-

match exists between handle position and surface position.
• Caution message SPOILER FAULT presented if one or more pairs

of multi function spoilers failed to respond to command or spoiler
panel extended inadvertently in flight.
• Warning message GROUND SPOILER FAIL displayed when one

or more ground spoiler surfaces has extended inadvertently or has
failed to extend when commanded.
AFCS, EICAS,
ASCB-D
FADEC, TLA,
W.O.W.
MAU 1 NIC/BIC MAU 3 NIC/BIC
BP BP
FCM 2 DC 1 GEN I/O

3
A B ESS 2
WRAP WRAP
A2
A1 A2
A1
DC BUS 2 X1 X2
X1 X2
CONTROL
HYD NO. 2 SOLENOID
LEGEND:
ELECTRICAL
LVDT PCU
HYDRAULIC
VENTRAL AIRBRAKE MECHANICAL
190
Electrical operation
The surface position sensor and the command wrap around discrete signal
All four FCMs are used in the ventral air brake system. monitor the ventral air brake control system.
FCMs 2 and 4 send 28 VDC (Volt Direct Current) through a relay to the air The surface position LVDT senses if the spoiler surface responds incorrectly
brake solenoid module. to commands or the surface deploys inadvertently.
FCMs 1 and 3 supply a GND through another relay to the solenoid. This al-
lows the brake surface to be deployed if the proper conditions are met.
The command wrap around discretes are used to detect failure in the com-
The solenoid wiring is wrapped back to the generic IOM (Input/Output Mod- mand path interconnects. The wrap around discretes come from down-
ule) in the MAU (Modular Avionics Unit) to detect the improper high or low stream of the relay outputs to the solenoid. The command wraps interface
electrical input to the solenoids. to the FCS (Flight Control System) through the generic IOM 3.
The module sends the command wrap signals to the FCMs over the ASCB
The solenoid coils electrically operate the control valve that activates de- for use by the ventral air brake command wrap monitor.
ployment of the air brake. Either coil can operate the control valve.
The dicrete outputs to the relays that dive the coils come from Lane B of the The FCS annunciates the “VENTRAL AIR BRAKE FAIL”CAS (Crew Alerting
FCMs. A surface position LVDT on the air brake supplies information to lane System) message when the ventral air brake command and the surface po-
A of FCM 2 for monitoring purposes. sition disagree. The FCM monitors the status of the air brake drive relay con-
tacts to limit the exposure to latent failures.
The FCM takes steep approach mode indication information from the ASCB
(Avionics Standard-Communication Bus) data supplied by the AFCS (Auto-
matic -Flight Control System).
The FCM commands the actuator to deploy the air brake when the condi-
tions that follow are met:
• The ventral air brake available condition is satisfied

• The steep approach button is selected
• The APM (Aircraft Personality Module) indicates that the aircraft
has a ventral air brake.
• The flap handle is in position FULL
• Both TLAs are less than 70 degrees.
• The in-air condition is satisfied.
Figure 22: Electrical operation
AFCS, EICAS,
ASCB-D
FADEC, TLA,
W.O.W.
MAU 1 NIC/BIC MAU 3 NIC/BIC
BP BP
FCM 2 DC 1 GEN I/O

3
A B ESS 2
WRAP WRAP
A2
A1 A2
A1
DC BUS 2 X1 X2
X1 X2
CONTROL
HYD NO. 2 SOLENOID
LEGEND:
ELECTRICAL
LVDT PCU
HYDRAULIC
VENTRAL AIRBRAKE MECHANICAL
190
27-80 Flight Control Slats

Introduction
The slat system consists of eight slat panels, four per wing, each actuated
by two track with two rotary actuators. The rotary actuators are interconnect-
ed with the slat drive line in the fixed leading edge of the wings.
A slat PDU provides power to the rotary actuators, PSUs mounted on the
outboard slat actuators provide the slat control channels with the slat system
position information.
Two slat disconnect detection sensors are mounted between the three out-
board panels on each wing to detect and limit panel skew. While inboard slat
panel uses resolver based skew detectors to detect and limit the inboard
panel skew.
System control provided by two SF-ACE, which receive the command from
the Slat/Flap Control Lever. Besides providing control and protection for the
slat system, the control channels also provide system performance feed-
back to the cockpit.
The slat and flap motion is sequenced such that slat extends first and flap
retracts first when the motion command requires both surface to move. The
system uses electrical power to move the surfaces.
The aircraft AC power drives the DC motors and 28vDC is used for control
purposes
Figure 1: The slat system
190
The slat/flap control lever
The slat/flap control lever (SFCL) in the cockpit allows pilot input to the slat/
flap control system by converting angular displacement of the lever into elec-
trical signals to the SF-ACE units.
A light plate provides reference position markings for surface position selec-
tion. The SFCL has seven positions, each having a detented arrangement
as shown, resulting in the respective slat/flap surface positions and placard-
ed speeds.
Position three is gated in either direction for the go-around gate. Moving the
lever from one detent to another causes the four RVDTs mounted to the
handle to rotate, providing independent handle position information to the
four SF-ACE control channels via two electrical connectors. A valid motion
command exists if a channel determines its RVDT to be in a valid detent and
any of the other three channels are in agreement.
The slat and flap motion is sequenced. When both the slat and flap surfaces
are commanded to extend, the slats extend first to 15 degrees followed by
flap extension to any commanded position up to 20 degrees.
When the command is to extend beyond position 3, the surfaces first extend
to position 3 and stop. After validating the surfaces are in position 3, the slats
first extend to 25 degrees followed by the flaps extending to the commanded
position.
When the command is to retract to less than position 3, the flaps retract first
back to 20 degrees and the slats retract to 15 degrees and stop. After vali-
dating the surfaces are in position 3, the surfaces retract to the commanded
position, following the sequence flaps retract first followed by the slats.
Figure 2: Slat/flap control lever connections
Lever RVDT
Position Position
+60 -30
+70 -20
+80 -10
+90 0
+100 +10
+110 +20
+120 +30
SFCL Slat Flap Placard

Detent Position Position Speed
(degree (degrees) (knots CAS)
s)
Flap 0 0 0 None
Flap 1 15 7 230
Flap 2 15 10 215
Flap 3 15 20 200
Flap 4 25 20 180
Flap 5 25 20 180
Full Flap 25 37 165
190
SF-ACE
Each of the two SF-ACE is a dual channel line replaceable unit with one
channel for flap control and one channel for slat control. The two flap and
slat channels operate in the active/active mode. Each channel provides the
control, protection and Built-In-Test logic for operation of the slats and flaps
actuation systems. Input commands are received from the Flap Control Le-
ver. Surface coordination and control signals are communicated between
the adjacent SF-ACE channels and between the opposite SF-ACE chan-
nels. The SF-ACEs receive position data from it`s dedicated PSU resolver,
which are mounted at each actuation system`s outboard actuator. Each SF-
ACE channel also control an electromechanical motor brake at the interfac-
ing PDU motor.The entire system is designed such that no single failure re-
sults loss of both slat and flap control.
The loss of one SF-ACE has the effect of reducing both slat and flap system
to operate at half speed. Communication to and from the SF-ACE is over
ARINC 429 data bus towards and from the MAU1 and MAU2.
Figure 3: SF-ACE
190
The slat/flap system
After power up on Built-In-Test, each SF-ACE will report its valid status to
the aircraft over the ARINC 429 interface. The SF-ACE will operate in stand-
by mode while waiting for flap or slat commands. In this stand-by mode the
SF-ACE channel monitors for uncommanded movements and asymmetric
conditions, while performing periodic internal BIT and interface checks to en-
sure integrity.
When the SF-ACE channel receives a valid surface movement command

and Slat/Flap sequencing commands between SF-ACE channels indicate
acceptability of surface movement, the SF-ACE will release the motor brake
and command the motor to move at a preset speed to the commanded po-
sition.
When a command involves slat and flap surface movement the slats will
move first on extend and flap will move first on retract. The SF-ACE monitors
this motion for validity of speed, surface symmetry, valid direction and valid
BIT checks.
In case of failure, the SF-ACE channel will disable the motor drive output,
setting the respective motor brake and record the failure condition in the
Non-Volatile-Memory.
A flap system failure will not disable the slat system and vice versa. When
there are no failures, each SF-ACE channel will drive the appropriate sur-
face to the commanded position, set the brake, turn of the drive and return
to stand-by mode.
Figure 4: Slat/Flap Control System
SLAT/FLAP
HANDLE RESOLVERS (4x) (REF.)
UNIT (REF.)
ANGLE GEARBOX (4x)
SLAT PDU
(REF.) SLAT 1
RIGHT INBD
SLAT
ACTUATOR (16x) INBD SLAT SKEW
SENSOR (4x)
SLAT 1
LEFT INBD SLAT 2
RIGHT OUTBD
SLAT 2 SLAT 3
LEFT OUTBD RIGHT OUTBD
OUTBD
SLAT 3 SLAT SKEW
LEFT OUTBD SENSOR (4x)
SLAT 4
SLAT 4 RIGHT OUTBD
LEFT OUTBD
SLAT PANEL
TRACK (18x)
RIGHT
POSITION
SENSOR
UNIT
Slat Slat Slat Slat (REF.)
Control Motor Motor Control
LEFT Monitor Drive Drive Monitor SF-ACE 2
SF-ACE1
POSITION (REF.) (REF.)
SENSOR UNIT
28 VDC 28 VDC
(REF.)
115 VDC 115 VDC
ELECTRICAL INTERFACE
MECHANICAL LINKAGE
190
Power Drive Unit
The slat PDU is an air frame-mounted gearbox with two motor/brake assem-
blies, gearbox, differential, and torque limiter/slip clutch.
Each motor/brake assembly contains a 3-phase, 270 VDC (Volt Direct Cur-
rent) brushless motor, motor shaft position resolver, and electric coil re-
leased brake.
The motor is speed-controlled by its respective SF-ACE (Slat/Flap Actuator

Control Electronics) channel.
The SF-ACE provides excitation for the motor resolver and uses the motor
shaft position resolver output to control commutation of the motor drive sec-
tion of the SF-ACE.
The brake is a spring-engaged, electrically released friction brake. Each mo-

tor/brake assembly provides system torque through the output shaft.
The male ends of the output shaft are splined and mate with the female
splined element of the torque tubes. This allows the PDU to transfer torque
through the slat mechanical drive line system.
Figure 5: Power Drive Unit (PDU)
190
Torque tubes
Torque tubes are used to transmit the rotary output power of the PDU along Angle gearboxes
the mechanical drive line to the slat actuators.
Each torque tube is a rigid aluminium shaft with universal joints riveted on The four 137 degrees angle gearboxes are used to change the path of the
each end. slat mechanical drive line system.
The universal joints have splined ends which engage the mating splines on Each angle gearbox has two bevel gear shafts mounted in ball bearings to
the rotary actuators, PDU, bearing supports, and angle gearboxes. provide the required change in angle.
The universal joint on one end of each torque shaft is cross drilled to allow The bevel gear shafts have male splined ends that allow the shafts to mate
a bolt to be installed for axial retention of the torque shaft. The universal joint with the torque tubes. The slat mechanical drive line has four angle gearbox-
on the opposite end is free to “float” and can accommodate any relative axial es to meet installation requirements.
movement between components mounted to the structure.
The torque tubes use either boot-protected, grease-filled universal joints or

swivelling bearing flange mounts to accommodate minor angle changed and
wing flex. The female spline element at each joint (except those on the bear-
ing supports) incorporates grease fittings for lubrication. The slat mechani-
cal drive line has 26 torque tubes in seven different configurations to meet
installation requirements.
Bearing supports
Bearing supports are used to connect adjacent torque tubes along the lead-
ing edge of each wing.
Each bearing support has a splined shaft with female splined ends, support-
ed by two radial ball bearings housed in a bearing flange.
Each bearing support has a splined shaft with female splined ends. The
splined ends of each bearing support shaft engage the mating splines on the
torque tube shafts.
The slat mechanical drive line has six bearing supports to meet installation
requirements.
Figure 6: slat functions
Slat 137 Degree

(PN 1700599)
190
Slat actuators general description Slat Actuator Torque Limiter Description
The slat panels are positioned by slat actuators, also referred to as Geared Each slat actuator contains a torque limiter to protect the rack and pinion and
Rotary Actuators (GRAs). The GRAs are essentially a power gear reduction slat structure from excessive loads in the event of a jam condition. The
accomplished through a planetary gear set. A ball ramp actuated torque lim- torque limiter is located between the actuator input shaft and the planetary
iting device is built into the GRAs. gearbox. One side (plate) of the ball ramp actuator for the torque limiter is
The slat actuators provide the actuation force to extend and retract the slat splined to the through shaft, while the other ball ramp side (plate) engages
panels on the leading edge of the wing. There are four slat panels on each the torque limiter brake shaft/sun gear through a multiple slot and tang inter-
wing with two slat actuators for each panel to position the panel and carry face. The rotating brake plates are splined to the torque limiter brake shaft/
the actuation loads. sun gear while the stationary plates are grounded to the housing with a pin
and slot arrangement. A helical spring and sleeve provide the predetermined
The slat actuators convert the rotary output motion of the slat PDU through axial force to the torque limiter ball ramp, which establishes the torque limit-
the slat system drive line to rotary motion through a planetary gear arrange- ing set point.
ment to move the slat panels along the panel tracks. The actuator output
shaft drives a pinion gear which in turn drives a rack that is attached to a Each plate of the ball ramp actuator has three inclined, oval shaped grooves
track on the slat panel. on their faces. The pre-load tension from the helical compression spring
holds the balls in these grooves. As torque is applied to the splined input
The slat actuators are of a sealed, non-vented design and a fixed amount of plate, the balls move to the beginning of the ramp in the grooves. In this po-
grease is used internally to reduce tare losses at extreme cold temperatures. sition, the balls transfer torque to the output plate. When torque is reversed,
the balls move to the opposite ramp. In the event of a jam failure case at the
actuator station, the force reacts against the spring force and allows the balls
Slat Actuators Configurations to move up the inclined ramp farther than they normally would. This forces
the output plate away from the input plate and reduces the clearance be-
tween the friction plates and reaction plates of the brake assembly. As the
There are a total of 16 slat actuators per ship set with three different slat ac- brake plates make contact, the operating torque is grounded to the housing
tuator part numbers/configurations. There are three Type A Actuators on and air frame and the actuator torque limiter trip indicator is tripped.
each wing located at positions #1, #3, and #5 and three Type B actuators on Once the torque limiter is engaged the total drive torque from the Slat PDU
each wing at positions #2, #4, and #6. is reacted into the mounting lugs of the jammed actuator causing the PDU
There are two Outboard Type C actuators on each wing at positions #7 and to stall and the SF-ACE to shut down both slat channels and indicate “Slats
#8. Failed” message to the EICAS display.
Each actuator has a different aircraft mounting interface to prevent installa- The actuator torque limiter will automatically disengage and reset when the
tion in the wrong location. The Type A and B actuators have the same SFCL is commanded in the opposite direction (away from the jam). The
mounting bolt pattern but have different slot locations to interface with a torque limiter can be reset up to three times per power up cycle before the
mounting pin located on the aircraft structure. The Outboard Type C actua- SF-ACE latches out the fault and prevents further operation of the slat sys-
tors have a different mounting bolt pattern than the A and B actuators. tem.
Care should be taken when installing the slat actuators to make sure they
are mounted properly in the correct location.
Figure 7: Slat actuator
190
Position Sensor Unit (PSU)
Transmission drive lines are installed on the leading of each wing, transmit-
ting torque from the PDU output shaft to the actuators stationed along the
wing, using torque shafts and angle gearboxes.
The input shaft of each actuator is also a though shaft transmitting the torque
from actuator to actuator, maintaining synchronization within the system.
A position sensor unit (PSU) is located at each outboard end of the slat and
flap drive lines, providing position feedback to the SF-ACE channels.
The SF-ACE uses the information for closed loop computing of the surface
position, for detection of asymmetric slat or flap deployment, and for surface
position indication on the EICAS.
Figure 8: Position Sensor Unit (PSU)
190
The slat tracks
The slat panels react loads to the aircraft structure through tracks supported
by needle rollers and are driven by a rack and pinion gear. There are two
tracks per panel, with one additional non-driving support track for the in-
board panel to assure function of panel in case of damage to one the driving
tracks in the event of a rotor burst failure.
Each track is driven by a Geared Rotary Actuator via a pinion splined to the
actuator and a sector gear inside the track. The track rollers provide the
main vertical load bearing and rolling support for all slat tracks.
Figure 9: The slat tracks
190
Electronic skew sensors
Electronic skew sensors are installed to prevent excessive panel skew in the
event of a disconnect in one actuator while the other actuator on the same
panel continues to operate.
The inboard skew sensors are provided with spur gear that meshes with and
are driven by the slat pinion gear mounted on the actuator output shaft. The
skew sensors have an integral electrical connector that mates with the air-
craft wiring to interconnect the two sensors to the corresponding SF-ACE
channels. If differential movement of a panel exceeds acceptable limits, the
SF-ACEs will shut down the slat system, and the respective message will be
displayed on the EICAS.
The three outboard slat panels utilize a reed switch located between panels
2-3 and 3-4 to provide skew detection and annunciation. The reed switch is
mounted on one panel while the other panel contains a striker pin which pro-
vides adequate clearance to the switch under normal differential panel de-
flections. If the relative movement between panels exceeds the
predetermined level, the striker pin will contact the reed switch and break a
mechanical fuse which trips the spring loaded switch.
Figure 10: Electronic skew sensors
L LH Inboard Slat
S
S
190
Operation
The SFCL, located on the centre pedestal, has seven detent/gated posi-
tions. A finger lift located on the lower portion of the SFCL allows movement
of the SFCL. Once the finger lift is raised, the SFCL may be moved past ad-
jacent detents without releasing the finger lift.
Each detent position has a secondary detent that allows the operator to feel
the detent without the need to look at the markings on the SFCL.
Slat position 3 contains a stop mechanism in either direction which requires
the finger lift to be released and lifted again to pass through the gated posi-
tion. This stop mechanism allows the operator to easily find and select slat
position 3 for normal takeoff and approach conditions without having to look
at the SFCL or rely on detent feel. Movement of the SFCL from one detent
position to another rotates the internal drive shaft gear. Movement of the
drive shaft gear causes the synchronous rotation of the four RVDTs mount-
ed in the handle housing. The four RVDTs convert the rotation to a voltage
signal. The voltage signals are passed to the two SF-ACE units.
Each SF-ACE unit drives one slat PDU electric motor and controls one chan-
nel of slat brakes. The slat PDU generates a rotary output motion which is
transmitted by the slat mechanical drive line to the slat actuators.
When slat panel movement commands are received, slat/flap panel se-
quencing is determined between the SF-ACE channel over the CAN bus.
When the SF-ACE channel determines it will move the slat panel, that chan-
nel releases the brakes and commands the motor to move at a present
speed to the commanded position.
Each SF-ACE channel receives position feedback signals from the two slat
position sensor units and discrete inputs from both the INBD and the OUT-
BD slat skew sensors.
The position sensor units report the actual position of the slat panels. The
INBD and the OUTBD skew sensors report fault indications to the SF-ACE
units. If a fault occurs, the SF-ACE units report the fault through the EICAS
(Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System).
Figure 11: Operation
190
EICAS Position Indications and Messages
Slat position and status information is provided via the MAUs to the EICAS
cockpit display for flight crew information and dispatch assessment. Each
ACE channel transmits three address labels which contain the position and
status information for that channel.
This information is used for EICAS position and synoptic display. The slat
position data is an average of the surface position determined by the left and
right wing position sensor units (PSUs). The SFCS position data used by the
EICAS and other safety critical aircraft functions is independently verified by
the monitor channel. ARINC 429 data with a SSM setting of “normal opera-
tion” should be used by the safety critical users of this critical labels.
EICAS utilizes this data for the primary CAS page and the flight controls syn-
optic page displays. Three different messages are used by EICAS to identify
slat system fault status. It should be noted that many different fault condi-
tions may cause any one of the basic fault messages to be displayed.
Cause of the EICAS fault message may only be determined by the CMC.
Figure 12: EICAS position indications and messages
LOGIC EQUATION
MESSAGE TYPE Inhibit (cause description)
SLATS FAIL Caution SF-ACE1 slat channel and SF-

TO
ACE2 slat channel disabled.
SLATS Either SF- ACE1 slat channel
Advisory N/A OR SF- ACE2 slat channel
HALFSPEED disabled, system is operating in
ADG Mode.
SLAT/FLAP Status Surface position is not equal to

LEVER N/A a valid handle position.
DISAGREE
190
Figure 13: EICAS position indications
and messages
Figure 14: EICAS
190
Slat System Mechanical Rigging System Electrical Rigging and Auto rig
Mechanical rigging of the slat system is performed during installation of the After the flap and slat systems are mechanically rigged, an electrical rigging
system components. Mechanical rigging is performed to synchronize the procedure is performed by command from the CMC (after system start-up is
slat actuators on each panel in the nominal retracted (0 deg.) position to as- complete).
sure proper panel location for the aircraft cruise condition and provide timing
of the rack mechanism overtravel stops.
The electrical rigging process is manually initiated via the CMC and estab-
lishes the electrical offsets for the position feedback resolvers in the wing tip
Mechanical Rigging: mounted SF-PSUs, inboard slat skew sensors, and outboard flap skew sen-
sors and stores them, along with aircraft tail number, in the SF-ACE non-vol-
atile memory. The SF-ACEs share all electrical rig information and stores
the values for both SF-ACEs.
1) After installation of the slat rack and pinion assemblies position
each track to the nominal retract position (0 deg) as determined
by a rigging block placed between the lower front roller and slat Electrical rigging will have to be performed any time a PSU or a skew sensor
track retract stop. is removed or any time the drive line is disconnected between the PDU and
either PSU, either for maintenance or after a failure event. Mechanical rig-
2) With the slat track held in the nominal retract position install ging after a drive line disconnect may or may not be necessary, depending
each slat actuator to engage the pinion gear spline using the on whether or not the system is held by rig features somehow when the drive
specified fastners. line is disconnected in maintenance.
3) Install the interconnecting drive line torque shafts and bearing
supports between each actuator input shaft to maintain proper There is also an auto rig process in event of an SF-ACE replacement. When
rigging of the slat panels on each wing. a SF-ACE is removed and another SF-ACE is installed in place of the re-
4) With all the slat actuators at the nominal retract (0 deg) position moved unit, the SF-ACE will auto rig at start-up when it recognizes that the
adjust and install the wing tip Position Sensor Unit (PSU) to the aircraft tail number is different. Auto rig simply transfers the stored electrical
outboard mounting bracket with the timing mark on the outboard offset information from the existing SF-ACE to the replacement SF-ACE.
end of the sensor aligned for the proper wing (i.e LH or RH wing)
5) With both wings properly rigged in the retract position install the
drive line torque shafts and angle gearboxes between the PDU
and inboard slat actuator on both wings.
Figure 15: Slat system mechanical rigging
190
190
27-MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 27-1 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 27-2 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 11-12 ROLL CONTROL DISC B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ 36-01 Stick Shakers B ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ (O)One may be inoperative provided ¦
¦ Advisory EICAS ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Both control wheels are | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Stall Warning System is verified to ¦
¦ Message ¦ ¦ ¦ verified to be connected | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ operate normally before each ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ before each flight, and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ departure. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Autopilot Channels are | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. | ¦ ¦ 41-01 Pitch Trim B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided ¦
¦ Position ¦ ¦ ¦ horizontal stabilizer position is ¦
¦ 14-01 Roll Trim C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ Indication on ¦ ¦ ¦ set by means of markings on tail ¦
¦ Position ¦ ¦ ¦ Ailerons are verified centered ¦ ¦ EICAS ¦ ¦ ¦ cone before each flight. ¦
¦ Indication on ¦ ¦ ¦ before each flight. ¦
¦ EICAS ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 41-09 AUTO CONFIG TRIM B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦
¦ Function ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 23-03 Rudder Pedal C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided Rudder ¦ ¦ (ERJ-170) ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ Adjustment System ¦ ¦ ¦ Pedals position is acceptable to ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ the affected flight crewmember. ¦ ¦ 43-02 Dual Pitch Trim C ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ ¦
¦ Switches on Yoke ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Rudder Pedals may be adjusted to ¦ ¦ 53-02 Slat/Flap B ¦ 4 ¦ 3 ¦ (M)Slat Channel 01 or Flap Channel ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ suit individual pilot requirements. ¦ ¦ Actuator Control ¦ ¦ ¦ 02 may be inoperative provided ¦
¦ Electronic (SF- ¦ ¦ ¦ there are no obstacles in the ¦
¦ 24-01 Yaw Trim Position B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ ACE) Channels ¦ ¦ ¦ Takeoff Flight Path above Level Off ¦
¦ Indication on ¦ ¦ ¦ Rudder is verified centered before ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Height. ¦
¦ EICAS ¦ ¦ ¦ each flight. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ NOTE: Flaps or Slats will operate ¦
¦ 31-06 PITCH CONTROL B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ at half extension and ¦
¦ DISC Advisory ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Both control columns are | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ retraction rates. ¦
¦ EICAS Message ¦ ¦ ¦ verified to be connected | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ before each flight, and | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Autopilot Channels are | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ considered inoperative. | ¦
¦ 33-05 Elevator Thrust B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ ¦

¦ Compensation ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (ETC) Function ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ (ERJ-170) ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190
ATA 32 Landing gear

190
Table of Content Downlock Springs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Shimmy Damper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
32-00 Landing Gear General Main Landing Gear Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 MLG Doors and opening/closing mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Electronic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Main Landing Gear Door/Door Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Cockpit Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Shock Absorbers Filling and Charging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The main landing gear (MLG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Jacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
The nose landing gear (NLG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Safety Pins On The Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Extension/retraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
32-20 Nose landing gear and doors
The brake control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
NLG steering modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The NLG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Position indication system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The NLG components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Landing gear indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Spare Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
32-10 Main Landing Gear The steering motor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Main Landing Gear Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Towing light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Shock Strut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The NLG doors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Sliding Tube and Axle Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Gear down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Slave Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Gear in transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Shock Absorber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Gear up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Change Over Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
32-30 Landing gear extension retraction
Side Stay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Break-away feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Retraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Locking Stay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
190
Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 32-41 Auto brake System
Emergency-Extension (Electrical Override) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Emergency-Extension (Mechanical Free-Fall) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 The auto-brake control switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The landing gear control lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Auto-brake application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Landing Gear Selector Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 either throttle lever is advanced beyond idle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
MLG Retraction Actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The rejected take off auto-brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
The up lock box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 EICAS indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
MLG and NLG down lock release actuator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The manual release lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 32-47 Brake Temperature
Emergency-Extension Override Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
The free fall selector valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 The synoptic page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
System Inputs and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
32-40 Brake control system The main brake activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Shut-off valve (SOV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
The emergency and parking brake system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Shut Off Valve (SOV) on ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The Brake temperature monitoring system (BTMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Shut Off Valve (SOV) in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The brake control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The brake control valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Brake Control Modules (BCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Pressure transducer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
BCM Inputs and Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Main brake wheel speed transducer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
The anti skid system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Main brake wheel-Hubcap drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
The locked wheel crossover protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The volume hydraulic fuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
In-flight braking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Check valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
The touchdown protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
190
32-44 Emergency Parking System The steering manifold components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The manifold operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The emergency park brake valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The steering motor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Emergency/parking brake handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Feedback Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Pressure switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Steering system disengagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
The two accumulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The NLG towing light box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Built in tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 NLG overtravel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
CAS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Nose wheel steering Control module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
The main wheel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Nose wheel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Align the nose wheel before retraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
System electronic rigging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
32-49 Wheels, brakes and tires Continuous Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Brake assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The pedal steering mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Brake temperature sensor and Shuttle valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The hand wheel steering mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Self-retracting and self-adjusting pistons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The free castor mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Steering failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
32-50 Steering System
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 32-60 Position Indicating and warning
Subsystems/Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
General Description: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Normal steering mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Steering hand wheel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Steering pedal input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The landing gear position indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Pedal RVDTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 PSEM 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY - Reproduction Prohibited Chapter 32-TOC Page III
190
Proximity sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
NLG proximity sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
MLG proximity sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Landing Gear Position indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Air/Ground (WOW) system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
NLG Weight-On-Wheels Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
MLG Weight-On-Wheels Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
WOW status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Landing Gear Warning system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Landing Gear Aural Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Landing Gear Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
For Dual Engine Landing Configuration: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
For Single Engine Landing Configuration: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
FLAP SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
RADIO ALTIMETER INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
32-MEL (Example)
190
32-00 Landing Gear General

Introduction
The Embraer 190 has a retractable tricycle landing gear system, with two
main landing gear (MLG) assemblies and one nose landing gear (NLG) as-
sembly. The MLG assemblies are telescopic and retract sideways into the
wing and fuselage. Each MLG assembly incorporates two wheels with multi-
disk carbon brake assemblies.
The NLG assembly is telescopic and retracts forward into the fuselage. The
NLG assembly incorporates two wheels with a hydraulic nose wheel steer-
ing mechanism, allowing the aircraft to turn on a taxiway as narrow as 20
meters. During normal operation, the landing gear system is electronically
controlled and hydraulically operated.
Several proximity sensors are installed to provide position and status signals
to different electronic modules, located in the modular avionics units, or
MAU, for control and monitoring purposes. The sensors also display system
status to the pilots via the EICAS display in the cockpit.
• Absorbs shocks to the aircraft structure during take-off, landing,

and during movement on the ground
• Gives retraction and extension, or emergency extension of the
landing gear units and their doors
• Controls the direction of the aircraft when it is on the ground,
through the nose wheel steering system (and also with differential
braking)
• Gives structural support to the aircraft when it is on the ground
• Supplies data about the position of the landing gear and doors and
air/ground data
• Controls the speed of the aircraft on the ground with the brakes
• Gives an interface to attach a towbar (or towbarless tractor) to the
NLG (Nose Landing Gear)
• Lets the aircraft be lifted with jacks, or moored.
Figure 1: Landing gear overview
Cockpit
Control Le ve r
Fre e Fa ll Ha ndle
Ove rrride S witch
Wing S tub
La nding Ge a r S e le ctor
Va lve
Nos e La nding Ge a r
Ba y Fre e fa ll S e le ctor Va lve
Uplock Box Che ck Va lve , LG
Re tra ctio n Actua to r

Doors S e ns ors Ma in La nding Ge a r
Ba y
Doors Linka ge
Uplock Box
Re tra ctio n Actua to r
190
Electronic Control
The Secondary Power Distribution Assemblies (SPDA) give 28 volts to all
The landing gear system uses several modules which are integrated in the control solenoids, such as the shut-off valve solenoids for the brake control
MAU. There are separate modules for landing gear actuation/proximity sen- system. The MAU and the SPDA are connected by the Avionics Standard
sor evaluation: Communication Bus (ASCB). The ASCB bus gives highspeed communica-
tion between most of the major electronic modules.
- Proximity Sensor Evaluation Module (PSEM 1-2)
Brake controls: MODULE LOCATION
- Brake Control Module (BCM 1-2) Outboard BCM 1 MAU 1

- Auto-brake Control Module (ABM) PSEM1 MAU 1
Steering control: ABM (Auto Brake Module) (optional) MAU 2

Inboard BCM2 MAU 2
- Nose Wheel Steering Control Module (NWSCM) NWSCM MAU 2
Custom I/O module for BTMS MAU 3
Each module gives the required control function and built-in-test (BIT) func- Custom I/O module for Pressure MAU 3
tions, the modules also give: Switches
PSEM 2 MAU 3
- cockpit indication on the EICAS
- CMC communication for fault messages
- communication with other aircraft systems through the MAU
Figure 2: Electronic Control
28V DC 28V DC 28V DC 28V DC

HOT B US B US 2 B US 2 ES S B US 1
(AMM S DS 24-40-00) (AMM S DS 24-40-00) (AMM S DS 24-40-00) (AMM S DS 24-40-00)
HONEY WELL P RIMUS E PIC MAU 1, 2 AND 3

E IC AS
MAU MAU MAU MAU MAU MAU
S UP P LY S UP P LY S UP P LY S UP P LY S UP P LY S UP P LY
E IC AS
P ROXIMITY P ROXIMITY NOS E WHE E L B RAKE AUT O B RAKE B RAKE

LANDING G EAR G ENER IC I/O C US TOM I/O
C ONTR OL LEV ER S ENSOR S ENSOR S TE E RING C ONTR OL C ONTR OL C ONTR OL
MODULE MODULE B TMS
E LE CT RONIC E LE CT RONIC C ONTR OL MODULE MODULE MODULE
(AMM S DS 32-30-00) P RES S UR E P RES S UR E (MAU2)
MODULE 2 MODULE 1 MODULE 2 - I/B 1- O/B
S WITC HE S T RANS DUCE RS (AMM S DS 32-40-00)
(MAU3) (MAU1) (MAU2) (MAU2) (MAU1)
(MAU3) (MAU3)
(AMM S DS 32-60-00) (AMM S DS 32-60-00) (AMM S DS 32-50-00) (AMM S DS 32-40-00) (OP TIONAL) (AMM S DS 32-40-00)
HANDWHE E LAND
P EDAL S ENSORS
(AMM S DS 32-40-00)
(AMM S DS 32-50-00)
INB OARD OUT BOAR D

P ROXIMITY P OS IT ION B RAKE C ONTR OL B RAKE C ONTR OL
E ME RG ENCY V ALVE V ALVE
S ENSORS S ENSOR 28V DC
(AMM S DS 32-60-00) (AMM S DS ES S B US 3 E XT ENSION (AMM S DS 32-40-00) (AMM S DS 32-40-00)
32-60-00) (AMM S DS OVER R DI E S WITC H
T OWING S TE E RING 24-40-00) (AMM S DS 32-30-00)
LIG HT S MOT OR
(AMM S DS (AMM S DS
32-50-00) 32-50-00)
N/W S TE E RING
OVE RT RAVE L
(AMM S DS 32-50-00) F RE E F ALL R ET R./E XT . S TE E RING INB OARD B RAKE E ME RG ENCY / B RAKE OUT BOAR D
S ELEC TOR S ELEC TOR MANIF OLD
NOS E LANDING V ALVE
B RAKE S ACT UATION P AR K B RAKE ACT UATION B RAKE S
V ALVE (AMM S DS
(AMM S DS (AMM S DS (AMM S DS (AMM S DS (AMM S DS
G EAR DOORS (AMM S DS (AMM S DS
32-50-00)
(AMM S DS 32-20-00) 32-40-00) 32-40-00) 32-40-00) 32-40-00) 32-40-00)
32-30-00) 32-30-00)
LANDING G EAR
WT ON WHE E LS
(AMM S DS 32-60-00)
LANDING G EAR
ACT UATORS
(AMM S DS 32-30-00)
LANDING G EAR MEC HANICAL

E ME RG ENCY HYDRAULIC E ME RG ENCY /
UPLOC KS HYDRAULIC
(AMM S DS 32-30-00) R ELEASE S YS TE M 2 P AR K B RAKE
S YS TE M S YS TE M 1
HANDLE
NOS E LANDING (AMM S DS 32-30-00)
(AMM S DS
29-10-00) (AMM S DS 32-40-00)
(AMM S DS 29-10-00) L EG END:
G EAR DOWNLOC KS
(AMM S DS 32-30-00)
E LE CT RICAL
F US ELAG E
E LE CT RICAL P OWER
DOORS HYDRAULIC
(AMM S DS 52-10-00)
MEC HANICAL
G ROUND ASC B B US
S POILER S
(AMM S DS 27-62-00)
190
REAR AVIONICS COMPARTMENT

RADOME
COCKPIT
FORWARD BAGGAGE
REAR BAGGAGE
COMPARTMENT
COMPARTMENT
NLG BAY REAR FUSELA GE TA ILCONE

COMPARTMENT
RA T COMPA RTME NT
FWD ELECTRONI CCOMPARTMENT

- MAU 1 MAU 2 CENTER ELECTRONIC COMPARTMENT
- MAU 3
Bra ke s (Outbd) Bra ke s (Inbd)
P S EM 1 Nos e whe e l S te e ring P S EM 2
Autobra ke
Figure 3: Modules location
190
Cockpit Controls
The following equipment is installed in the cockpit for landing gear extension
and retraction:
• The landing gear control lever for extension and retraction of the
landing gear during normal operation;
• an extension override switch is used to extend the landing gear in
case of a failure in the landing gear electronics; and
• a manual release lever used for free-fall extension of the landing
gear in case both the electronic- and electrical systems fail.
The cockpit equipment for steering the aircraft includes:
• a steering hand wheel,

• steering pedal sensors and
• disarming switches on the control yokes.
Two brake pedals for the left and right MLG brakes are installed for both pi-
lots.
An emergency/ parking brake handle mounted on the centre pedestal allows

for braking even in case of a total hydraulic system loss.
An optional automatic braking system can be engaged by the crew by se-

lecting the respective auto-brake switch in the cockpit.
Figure 4: Cockpit Controls
Automatic braking switch Landing gear control lever
AUTOBRAKE
UP
OFF
LOW
RTO MED
HI
DN
LOCK
REL
Steering handwheel DN
UP
AUTOBRAKE
AUTOBRAKE
OFF
OFF
LOW
LOW
RTO
RTO MED
MED DN
LOCK
HI
HI
REL
DN
B
R
A
K
E
Emergency parking brake handle Manual release lever
B
R
A
K Extension override switch
E
190
TAB LE - LANDING GE AR - C ONTR OLS AND INDICATIONS IN T HE COCK PIT

C ONTR OL / P OS IT ION/
R EF. F UNCT ION
INDIC ATOR INDIC AT ION
UP C auses the landing gear to retract.
1 Landing-Gear Control Lever
DOWN C auses the landing gear to extend.
C auses the landing gear to extend, if the primary landing gear control is un-
2 Extens ion Override S witch DOWN
s erviceable.
Mechanically releases the uplock on each landing gear if the electrical control
3 Emergency R elease Lever Lever up s ys tem is uns erviceable. G ravity and aerodynamic forces then caus e the land-
ing gear to extend.
Applies the brakes, on the main wheels at that side. T hus, the left pedals put
P edal Transducer (On rudder ped- the brakes on (on the left MLG wheels ), or the right pedals put the brakes on
4 P us hed
als ) (on the right MLG wheels ).This differential braking is als o used to help the
NLG steering.
5 Emergency/ Parking B rake Handle ON Gives mechanical operation of the Dual E mergency/P arking Brake-Valve.
G ives steering input s ignals to the nos e-wheel s teering subs ys tem (during
6 RV DT (On each rudder bar) P ushed
take-off, landing, or high-s peed taxi).
G ives steering input s ignals to the nos e-wheel s teering subs ys tem (during
7 Nose-wheel S teering Handwheel Turned
low-s peed taxi).
Lets the nose-wheel s teering handwheel give inputs to the nose-wheel s teer-
P us hed (Enable)
E nable/ disable S witch (Nose- ing subs ys tem.
8
wheel S teering Handwheel) P revents inputs from the nose-wheel s teering handwheel to the nose-wheel
P us hed (Disable)
s teering subs ys tem.
Arm/dis arm S witch (One on each P us h Nos e wheel s teering is in the s et mode.
9
yoke) P us h Nos e wheel s teering is in the free-cas tor mode.
S TE E RING Switch (R amp panel P us hed Nos e wheel s teering is in the s et mode.
10
125AL) P us hed Nos e wheel s teering is in the free-cas tor mode.
G reen Nos e wheel s teering is in the free-cas tor mode and the aircraft can be towed.
11 Towing Indication Lights
R ed Nose wheel s teering is in the s et mode and the aircraft cannot be towed.
P ower- S witch for Towing Indica- Makes a s election of an alternate s ource of electrical power for the towing in-
12 Up
tion Lights dication lights .
E IC AS display - crew alerting mes-
13 R efer to AMM SDS 32-60-00/1 for thes e mes s ages .
s ages
TAB LE - LANDING GE AR - C ONTR OLS AND INDICATIONS IN T HE COCK PIT (Continued)
C ONTR OL / P OS IT ION/
R EF. F UNCT ION
INDIC ATOR INDIC AT ION
UP
T he related landing gear unit is correctly locked in the up position.
(white - status )
T he position of that landing gear unit does not agree with the position of the
UP
landing gear control lever after 20 s econds .
(red - warning)
E IC AS Synoptic Display (one for T he CAS (Crew Alerting System) warning LG LE VE R DIS AG RE E als o s hows .
14
each landing gear unit) B ox with cros s hatched display
T he related landing gear unit is in transit (less than 20 seconds).
(amber - status )
T he position of the related landing gear unit does not agree with the position
B ox with cros s hatched display
of the landing gear control lever after 20 seconds.
(red - warning)
T he CAS warning LG LE VE R DIS AG RE E als o s hows .
DN
T he related landing gear unit is correctly locked in the down position.
(green - status )
T he position of the related landing gear unit does not agree with the position
14 E IC AS Synoptic Display (one for DN
of the landing gear control lever after 20 seconds.
(cont.) each landing gear unit) (continued) (red - warning)
T he CAS warning LG LE VE R DIS AG RE E als o s hows .
-- T here is no correct data (there is an error, or no data from the PS S (Proximity
(red - warning) S ensing System).
190
The main landing gear (MLG)
The main landing gear assemblies are attached to the left and right wings.
The assemblies include:
• two wheels with brakes attached to a telescopic shock strut.

• A folding side stay holds the MLG in the fully extended position.
• A locking stay holds the side stay in the fully extended position.
• A pair of down-lock springs hold the locking stay in the extended
and locked position.
• Proximity sensors
The proximity transmit the following signals to the Proximity Sensor Evalua-
tion Module, PSEM:
• MLG down and locked,

• MLG up and locked, and
• aircraft on ground, also referred to as WOW (Weight-On-Wheels).
During retraction, a hydraulic release actuator unlocks the locking stay. A

hydraulic retraction actuator retracts the MLG. The up lock holds the MLG in
the retracted position.
There are two doors attached to the outboard side of each MLG. A third door
is attached to the wing. The doors are mechanically opened during exten-
sion and closed during retraction.
Figure 5: Main Landing Gear (MLG)
# FF0000
# FFCC00
# 66CCFF
# FFFFFF
lock springs
Proximity sensors
PSEM
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shock strut
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Figure 6: Nose Landing Gear (NLG)
190
Extension/retraction
There are three modes of landing gear operation available to the crew:
• normal extension and retraction

• electrical override and
• mechanical free-fall
In the normal extension and retraction mode, the landing gear actuation is
electronically controlled and hydraulically operated. The landing gear selec-
tor valve is controlled by the Proximity Sensor Evaluation Module (PSEM).
The landing gear selector valve provides hydraulic pressure to the actuation
cylinders.
In the electrical override mode the landing gear extension is electrically con-
trolled and hydraulically operated. The extension override switch takes di-
rect control of the selector valve. the Proximity Sensor Evaluation Module
(PSEM) is removed from the control loop.
In the mechanical free-fall, or emergency extension mode, the landing gear

extension is mechanically controlled and gravity powered. Pulling the cock-
pit manual release lever mechanically releases all landing gear up locks,
and activates the free-fall selector valve. Gravity and aerodynamic forces
will then extend the landing gear.
Figure 7: Extension/retraction
UP
DN
LOCK
REL Normal extension and retraction mode
DN
Electrical override extension and retraction mode

(PSEM is removed from the control loop)
Mechanical free-fall extension mode

(extension is mechanically controlled and gravity powered)
190
The brake control system
A total of six wheels and six tires are installed on the aircraft. The four MLG
wheels are equipped with electronically controlled and hydraulically pow-
ered carbon-composite brakes.
The brake control system uses electronic modules, sensors and hydraulic
valves to control the aircraft brakes for normal braking mode, and it has an
optional auto-brake mode.
Two Brake Control Modules, or BCM, and one optional Auto-Brake control
Module (ABM) control the hydraulic pressure to the inboard and outboard
brakes. With the auto-brake switch in the cockpit selected on, the ABM will
apply the brakes automatically after landing and following a rejected take-
off.
The anti-skid control system prevents wheel skid when the brakes are ap-
plied.
The emergency/ parking brake system allows brake operation even with a
loss of hydraulic pressure.
A brake temperature monitoring system monitors actual brake temperature

and provides temperature status and brake overheat warnings to the crew
via the EICAS.
Figure 8: Brake control system
Pilot's Auto Brake EICAS/ Co-Pilot's

BRAKE PEDALS SWITCH CMC BRAKE PEDALS
Pedal Pedal
TRANSD. TRANSD.
BCM 1-Outboard Brakes (1,4)

ABM- Autobrake
BCM 2-Inboard Brake (2,3)
Supply Supply
Hydraulic
Hyd. System#1 Fuse Hyd. System#2
Return Return
Check
Fill VALVE VALVE Fill VALVE
Pressure Pressure
TRANSD. Brake TRANSD.
Pressure
Press.
Accumulator SWITCH Accumulator
Wheel
Speed
Handle
Cable
Emerg./ Parking
BRAKE VALVE
190
NLG steering modes
The NLG of the aircraft can be steered by the crew to allow for directional
control of the aircraft on ground. The crew commands the steering system
by using either the steering hand wheel for low speed steering control, allow-
ing for a steering angle of up to 76 degrees, or the rudder pedals for high
speed steering control, limiting the maximum steering angle to 7 degrees.
The system is electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated.
The nose wheel steering control module (NWSCM) controls the steering hy-
draulic system and provides input to the hydraulic steering motor installed
on the NLG.
There are two modes of operation:
• normal mode, or active steering- and

• free-castor mode, or passive steering.
The normal mode allows the crew to actively steer the aircraft using either
the steering hand wheel or the rudder pedals.
In the free-castor mode, the NLG steers in response to external forces ap-
plied, such as rudder movement, differential braking or towing.
Figure 9: NLG steering modes
TOWING
190
Position indication system
The position and warning system incorporates two identical proximity sensor
electronics modules, or PSEM. Various system proximity sensors, such as
Weight-On-Wheel (WOW) or landing gear up- and down lock sensors, are
connected to the PSEM. The PSEM controls the extension and retraction of
the landing gear, and indicates position of the landing gear system, the
ground spoiler system and the aircraft doors.
The Nose Wheel Steering Control Module (NWSCM) controls the towing
lights. The towing lights provide a visual indication of whether towing is al-
lowed.
The PSEM also controls the air/ ground system. Proximity sensors on the
Nose and MLG, referred to as WOW sensors, sense whether the aircraft is
on ground or in flight. WOW sensor status is distributed to various aircraft
systems via the ASCB.
Figure 10: Position indication system
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190
Landing gear indications
Landing gear system coloured status messages are displayed on the right
hand upper corner of the EICAS display, coloured messages can be warn-
ings, caution, advisory or status messages.
The ADMS will provide further messages on the MFD display for trouble-
shooting which are only readable on ground.
The landing gear indication system provides landing gear position indication
on the right hand side of the EICAS display. The PSEM module and logic will
decide on the final indication which will be displayed for the flight crew. Also
in the same field on the EICAS display the auto brake status is displayed.
Brake temperature displayed on the MFD status page together with the
emergency brake accumulator pressure which is only readable on this dis-
play, there are no analog indicators installed on the accumulators.
Figure 11: Landing gear indications
MFD status page
190
32-10 Main Landing Gear

They consist of the following elements:
The landing gear system provides ground-rolling capability to the aircraft,
thus enabling take-off, landing and taxi operations.
• the shock strut, which includes the main fitting, a sliding tube and double-
chamber oleo-pneumatic shock absorber with constant orifice area and
The landing gear system comprises the following subsystems: separated oil and nitrogen volumes; there is an expansion chamber in-
cluded to compensate temperature effects, which results in constant
• Main Landing Gear Subsystem shock absorber characteristics from low to high temperatures,
• Nose Landing Gear Subsystem • Side stay to resist to side loads,
• Extension and Retraction Subsystem • Locking stay to lock the side stay in down position,
• Position and Warning Subsystem • One retraction actuator to retract and extend each main landing gear,
• Downlock release actuator,
The landing gear, which is a retractable tricycle type hydraulically operated, • Downlock springs,
provides the structural support and shock absorber functions for safe trans- • Up-lock box,
mittal of landing, taxing and ground handling loads from the wheel axles to
the aircraft structure. • Wheel axles,
• Torque link damper,
The main landing gear retracts sideward and inboard into the wing and fu- • Torque Links,
selage. • Slave Links,
• Position indication sensor,
It is hinged on the wing structure and has three laterally opening gear doors • Hydraulic pipes,
attached to it. • Electrical harness.
Each gear is equipped with two wheels and tires, 2 brake assemblies and 2
wheel speed transducers.
The main landing gear wheels are braked by a “brake-by-wire” control sys-
tem in normal braking operations and by a hydraulic mechanical system for
emergency/parking brakes purposes.
The aircraft has the auto-braking feature as an option.
The main landing gears are attached to the left and right wings.

Figure 1: Main Landing Gear and Doors
MLG Harness
Retraction Actuator
Downlock Release
Actuator
Locking Stay
Uplock Box
Main Fitting
Downlock Spring
Torque Links
Side Stay
Torque Link
Damper
Sliding Tube
Slave Links

190
Main Landing Gear Components Sliding Tube and Axle Assembly
The sliding tube and axle assembly is made from ultra high tensile-strength
Shock Strut steel.The sliding tube has a wheel axle and attachment lugs for the lower
torque link as well as the jacking dome.The jacking dome is located below
the brake torque pin.
The primary components of each shock strut are the main fitting, a fixed pis-
ton, sliding tube with a damping valve, gland nut, axle, torque links, walking
links and a shimmy damper. Slave Links
The main fitting is the primary structural component of the MLG.A pintle at
each side goes through a socket in the top of the main fitting, to a bearing in The slave links mount on the rear facing side of the sliding tube.
the aircraft structure.A nut and bolt go through the walls of each socket and These links support:
through the pintle, to hold it in position.Inside the main fitting there is a fixed – electrical cables
piston and inside the fixed piston there is a floating piston.
– hydraulic hoses
– WOW targets
The sliding tube assembly then moves in the bore of the main fitting,and the
gland nut holds it in the main fitting.A jacking dome is on the lower surface
of the foot of the sliding tube.The main fitting and the top half of the sliding The lower slave link has a sperical bearing attachment to the sliding tube.
tube is pressurized with nitrogen (the fixed piston is between the oil and the
nitrogen).The floating piston is between low pressure nitrogen to the top and
oil below.Seals on the piston and the gland nut prevent oil leakage.A spare-
seal activating valve is located at the sliding tube/main fitting interface.If
there is an oil leak the spare-seal valve can be operated to prevent the leak
until the defective seal is replaced.
The torque link attaches to the bottom of the sliding tube and to the main fit-
ting.Thus, the sliding tube cannot turn in the main fitting.
A shimmy damper is installed at the pivot point between the upper torque
link and lower torque link on the front of the shock strut.The brake-torque
take-out pin and axle are attached across the bottom of the sliding tube.Nuts
and washers keep the bearings of the main wheels in position on the axle.
Each of the two WOW (Weight-on-Wheels) sensors (which is a sensor, its

target and a mounting bracket) is installed above the torque link.An electrical
harness and hydraulic tubes are also installed on the shock strut.

190
Shock Absorber
The shock absorber function is to absorb the kinetic energy during landing
and taxing in a such way that accelerations imposed upon the airframe are
reduced to a tolerable level.The MLG shock absorber is a double acting ac-
tuator type.
It has a lower chamber filled with nitrogen which is completely isolated from
the oil chamber by a separator piston, see Figure.The upper and middle
chambers are filled with oil and have communication holes between them.
These holes are calibrated to give the adequate damping effect to the shock
absorber.
At the beginning of the compression only the nitrogen is compressed.After a

certain stroke is reached the hydraulic fluid starts to be compressed.
When the shock absorber is compressed there are more hydraulic lines
available allowing a higher flow from the Upper Oil Chamber to the Middle
Oil Chamber, see Figure.It happens because the hydraulic fluid compresses
the damping valve moving it down and liberating alternative hydraulic paths
to communicate the oil between the two chambers.

Figure 3: Shock Absorber

190
Change Over Valve
For maintenance purpose, the shock absorber has a change over valve, see
Figure.
In case of a leakage of the dynamic or static seal, the change over valve
close the oil flow to the lower static and dynamic seal and activate the spare
seals.The change over valve must be operated manually to close.

Figure 4: Change over valve
Change over Valve
Secondary Seals
Primary Seals

190
Side Stay Whose function is to assure that the locking stay goes to the over-centered
(down and locked) position, keeping it in that position when the MLG is fully
extended.
The side stay is a two piece hinged strut which holds each MLG in the fully The locking stay unlocking from down position is performed hydraulical-
extended position.Its upper part is attached to the wing structure by hinge ly.The locking action is performed mechanically through two downlock
pins, while the lower part is attached to the shock-strut by another hinge springs.The down locking function is guaranteed by at least one spring, ei-
pin.The upper and lower Side Stay piece are made of forged aluminium.Both ther in normal or freefall operation mode.
parts have a hinge pin connection in the middle, where the locking stay is
attached.
Downlock Springs
Break-away feature
The downlock springs are made of steel.They are connected to the locking
stay and the side stay.
The side stay is designed to break-away from the main fitting under condi- As the MLG extends, the downlock springs pull the locking stay into the
tions of excessive load.This is to prevent excessive aircraft structural dam- over-center and locked position.
age and loss of fuel.
Locking Stay
The locking stay is a two hinged piece strut made of forged aluminium.It
locks the side stay in the extended position, and folds it during retraction,
see Figure.
The upper and lower locking stay parts are designed to have a limited rela-
tive rotation having an over-center stop position.
The upper part attaches to a mounting lug on the shock-strut, and the lower
part attaches to the hinge connection of the side stay.
The locking stay has two proximity sensors, which provide the down and
locked signal to the proximity sensor electronic module.There is a pair of
downlock springs which connects the locking stay to the side stay.

Figure 5: Side stay, Locking Stay, Downlock Springs
Attachment to Shock
Strut
Proximity Sensors
Attachment to Side
Stay
Upper Locking Stay
Upper Side Stay

Lower Locking Stay
Downlock Spring
Attachment
Wing Attachment
Lower Side Stay
Locking Stay
Attachment

190
Shimmy Damper
The shimmy damper unit is installed at the pivot point between the upper
and lower torque links.The shaft of the shimmy damper goes through each
torque link (to make a hinge) and through the support assembly (for the har-
nesses).Six bolts attach the shimmy damper to the upper torque link.
A flange bearing, a flange nut (with bolt holes) and a nut attach the damper
shaft to the lower torque link.There is a sight glass on the side of the shimmy
damper body to check the oil level in the reservoir.

Figure 6: Shimmy Damper

190
Main Landing Gear Operation
When the aircraft is on the ground, the three landing gear units (NLG (Nose
Landing Gear) and two MLG) give it structural support.Because each land-
ing gear unit is also a shock absorber, they also absorb shocks to the struc-
ture when the aircraft moves on the ground.
When a shock absorber absorbs a shock, the nitrogen is compressed, and

the sliding tube moves over the fixed piston.Oil then flows through metered
holes at the top of the sliding tube and in the fixed piston into the oil chamber
inside the ram of the fixed piston to absorb the energy of the shock and to
give a controlled reaction to that shock.After this, the compressed nitrogen
expands and thus causes the shock absorber to expand again.There is also
a low pressure nitrogen chamber incorporated in the middle of the ram of the
fixed piston.This is to compensate the effects of temperature and external oil
leakage.
There is a spare-seal activating valve installed on the main fitting.This valve

is operated when a leak of oil is found at the main fitting/sliding tube inter-
face.The valve is on the lower part of the main fitting.When the valve is
turned clockwise, the hydraulic pressure is moved from the main seals to the
spare seals, which will stop the leak until a repair can be done.
A shimmy effect is transmitted to the torque links of the MLG shock strut
through movement of the sliding tube.This causes the damper shaft to
move.Oil in the damper reservoir is forced through holes in restrictors in-
stalled in the shaft.This restricts the shaft movement and thus reduces the
torque link shimmy.
When the landing gear unit is down and locked, the two proximity sensors
on each landing gear unit send signals to the PSS, which then sends a sig-
nal to give a down and locked indication on the landing gear cockpit display.

Figure 7: Main Landing Gear Operation

190
MLG Doors and opening/closing mechanism
Each main landing gears has three doors.
The upper door is hinged to a rib of the MLG bay in the wing.Rods attach the
upper door to the MLG main fitting.When the MLG extends, the rods push
the upper door to open.When the MLG retracts, the rods pull the upper door
to close.
The middle door is not hinged; it is attached by bolts directly to the MLG main
fitting.
The lower door is hinged to the middle door.Rods from a rib of the MLG box
in the wing attach to the lower door.When the MLG extends, the rods push
the lower door to open to provide clearance for the full stroke of the MLG
shock absorber.
When the MLG retracts, the rods pull the lower door to close.
The MLG doors do not cover the wheel and tie assemblies when the MLG is
fully retracted, see Figure.

Figure 8: MLG Doors
Wing Structure
Attachment Points
Upper Door
Door Rods
MLG Attachment
Points
Brush
Middle Door
Hinges
Lower Door

190
Main Landing Gear Door/Door Mechanism
Gear Down Gear in transit Gear up

UPPER DOOR UPPER DOOR UPPER DOOR
1 - PIVOT OF HINGE FOR UPPER 1 - PIVOT OF HINGE FOR UPPER 1 - PIVOT OF HINGE FOR UPPER
DOOR IS ON THE WING DOOR IS ON THE WING DOOR IS ON THE WING
STRUCTURE. STRUCTURE. STRUCTURE.
2 - ROD 1 CONNECTS UPPER 2 - ROD 1 CONNECTS UPPER 2 - ROD 1 CONNECTS UPPER
DOOR TO MLG, AND HOLDS THIS DOOR TO MLG, AND MOVES THIS DOOR TO MLG, AND HOLDS THIS
DOOR OPEN WHEN MLG IS DOOR WHEN MLG EXTENDS OR DOOR CLOSED WHEN MLG IS
EXTENDED RETRACTS RETRACTED
MIDDLE DOOR MIDDLE DOOR MIDDLE DOOR
3 - MIDDLE DOOR IS ATTACHED 3 - MIDDLE DOOR IS ATTACHED TO 3 - MIDDLE DOOR IS ATTACHED TO
TO MLG, AND IS OPEN WHEN MLG, AND MOVES WITH THE MLG MLG, AND IS CLOSED WHEN MLG
MLG IS EXTENDED IS RETRACTED LINKAGE –
SCHEMATIC
LOWER DOOR
LOWER DOOR
LOWER DOOR
4 -PIVOT OF HINGE FOR LOWER
DOOR IS ON LOWER EDGE OF 4 -PIVOT OF HINGE FOR LOWER
4 -PIVOT OF HINGE FOR LOWER
DOOR IS ON LOWER EDGE OF
DOOR IS ON LOWER EDGE OF MIDDLE DOOR.
MIDDLE DOOR.
MIDDLE DOOR.
5 - ROD 2 CONNECTS LOWER
5 - ROD 2 CONNECTS LOWER
5 - ROD 2 CONNECTS LOWER DOOR TO WING STRUCTURE, AND
DOOR TO WING STRUCTURE, AND
DOOR TO WING STRUCTURE, MOVES THIS DOOR WHEN THE
PULLS THIS DOOR INTO THE
AND PUSHES THIS DOOR INTO MLG EXTENDS OR RETRACTS
CLOSED POSITION WHEN MLG IS
THE OPEN POSITION WHEN MLG
IS EXTENDED RETRACTED

Figure 9: Door Mechanism

190
Shock Absorbers Filling and Charging Jacking
The hydraulic fluid used in the shock absorbers is per MIL-H-5606.The gas Both mains and nose landing gears have provisions for single point jacking
used in the shock absorber is Nitrogen, by federal specification BB-N-411, to permit wheels, tires and brakes replacement.It is possible to replace a
type I, class I, and grade B. wheel or tire when brakes are still hot with no harm for maintenance people.
The aircraft jacking is possible at any gear leg with one tire flat, without any
The filling and charging valves are easily accessible for proper servicing additional support or interface tool.The jacking point contains a pad accord-
without taking the shock absorber out of the aircraft.Valves MS 28889-2 are ing to SAE-AS 33559E and placed in order to allow the utilization of standard
used. jack models.
The methods for proper servicing are easy, logical, and accessible for aver-
age skilled personnel. Safety Pins On The Ground
The filling and charging actions for the NLG shock absorber do not require Both main and nose landing gear have safety locks to prevent inadvertent
special tools and can be accomplished in the airport box, without jackig the landing gear retraction while the aircraft is parked and, due to maintenance
aircraft. or other reasons, the electrical interlock system is off or deactivated.
For the NLG shock absorber there are means of knowing if the fluid quantity The safety pins have “press to release” buttons and a visible and perma-
inside the absorber is correct without requiring its total drainage. nently attached red strip stating “remove before flight”.The safety pins are
easily installed and removed.The landing gear and the safety locks will not
MLG shock absorber filling can be performed with the aircraft either on jacks be damaged if hydraulic pressure is applied to retract the gear, with the air-
or on ground.Verification of oil quantity inside the shock absorber requires craft on jacks and safety pins installed.
full oil drainage.

Figure 10: Landing Gear Servicing

190
32-20 Nose landing gear and doors

Introduction
The NLG shock strut supports the forward fuselage while the aircraft is on
ground.
The NLG shock strut assembly includes:
• the main fitting,

• a sliding tube and axle assembly,
• a steering motor and
• the torque links.
The main fitting and the sliding tube together act as a spring and damper,
and react to loads and aircraft movement during taxiing, take-off and land-
ing.
The steering motor turns the sliding tube and axle assembly for NLG steer-
ing on ground. Centering cams on the sliding tube and main fitting hold the
steering in the zero degree position whenever the aircraft is not on ground.
The drag brace consists of an upper part attached to the fuselage, and a
lower part attached to the shock strut. A two-piece locking stay locks the
drag brace in the fully extended position. A down lock safety-pin can be in-
stalled when the aircraft is on ground.
Figure 1: NLG shock strut and Drag brace
NLG shock strut Drag brace

Two-piece
The upper part locking stay
(attaches to the fuselage)
Main fitting Steering motor
The lower part

(attaches to the shock strut)
Sliding tube Torque links

and
axel assembly
190
The NLG
The NLG shock strut includes the following main components:
• main fitting,
• the sliding tube and axle,
• the steering motor and
• the torque links.
The main fitting is the primary structural element and includes an up lock roll-
er and attachment lugs for the drag brace, the locking stay, the retraction ac-
tuator, upper torque link and NLG doors. It is attached to the aircraft
structure by pintle pins. The sliding tube fits into the main fitting. The sliding
tube includes the wheel axle, a towing adapter and attachment lugs for the
lower torque link. A jacking dome is installed for nose gear jacking. The
steering motor and a towing light indicator are bolted to the main fitting.
Figure 2: The NLG
Retraction actuator
Locking stay
Pintle pins
NLG doors
Main fitting
Uplock roller
Steering motor
Torque links
Sliding tube and
axle assembly
190
Shock strut
The primary components of the shock strut are the main fitting, a piston, a
sliding tube, gland nut, steering motor and axle.
The main fitting is the primary structural component of the NLG. It is ma-
chined from an aluminium die-forging.
The sliding tube is made from a very high-tensile steel. The piston is at-
tached to the top of the sliding tube. This assembly then moves in the bore
of the main fitting, and the gland nut holds it in the main fitting.
The shock strut is filled with oil and pressurized with nitrogen. Seals on the
piston and the gland nut prevent leakage. The torque link is attached to the
bottom of the sliding tube and to the output drive from the steering motor.
The steering motor is installed at the bottom of the main fitting. It has two hy-
draulic jacks, which are connected to the rack of a rack and pinion mecha-
nism. This gives the output drive to the torque link. The two steering
feedback sensors are installed in the steering motor, and the nose-wheel
overtravel sensor is installed adjacent to the steering motor.
At the bottom of the sliding tube is the attachment (which is a machined steel
die-forcing) for the axle and lower torque link. This attachment has a jacking
dome on its lower surface (which is on the vertical centerline of the axle,
when it is installed). Nuts and washers keep the bearings of each nose
wheel in position on the axle.
Each of the two WOW (Weight-On-Wheels) sensors are installed adjacent

to the torque link. An electrical harness and hydraulic tubes are also installed
on the main fitting of the shock strut.The primary components of the shock
strut are the main fitting, a piston, a sliding tube, gland nut, steering motor
and axle.
The main fitting is the primary structural component of the NLG. It is ma-
chined from an aluminium die-forging.
Figure 3: Shock strut
190
The NLG components
The drag brace is a two-piece hinged strut which keeps the NLG in its fully
extended position. It is attached to the aircraft structure and to the shock
strut by hinge pins, and has an attachment lug for the down lock release ac-
tuator.
The locking stay is attached at the hinge point between the two parts of the
drag brace. The other end of the locking stay is attached to the main fitting
of the shock strut. The two-piece locking stay locks the drag brace in the ex-
tended position, and folds it during retraction. The locking stay locks me-
chanically in an overcentered position and can be secured in this position by
a ground service pin. Two down lock springs force the locking stay into the
overcentered position, which guarantees safe locking in case of spring fail-
ure.
Two proximity sensors are installed on the locking stay to transmit a signal
to the PSEM when the NLG is down and locked. Unlocking the locking stay
from its down position is accomplished hydraulically using the down lock re-
lease actuator.
Figure 4: The NLG components
190
Spare Seals
The main fitting has a spare-seal activating valve. This valve can isolate the
main seals in the case of a leak through the lower cam.
The activating valve is in the lower portion of the main fitting, adjacent to the
lubrication fitting. When the activating valve closes, it switches the hydraulic
pressure from the main seals to the spare seals.
Figure 5: Nose landing gear and doors - shock strut schematic
B MAIN
LEF T R IG HT F IT T IN G
P INTLE P IN P INTLE P IN
MAIN F IT T IN G
A HYDRAULIC
F LUID
ZONE S TE E RING
711 S LIDING
MOT OR
T UB E DAMPING
V ALVE
S PARE
S EALS
F LOAT ING
S PARE -S EAL LOWER C AM P IS TON LOWER C AM
ACT IV AT ING-VALV E
(NORMALLY OPE NE D) S LIDING T UB E
MAIN S LIDING
AS S EMBLY
S EALS NIT ROGE N T UB E
T OR QUE
WHE E LAXLE LINKS
MAIN AXLE
F IT T IN G
LOWER
C AM
B -B A
C B
190
The steering motor
The steering motor is used to rotate the nose gear for manoeuvring the air-
craft on ground. The steering motor has 2 hydraulic cylinders attached to a
geared rack. The geared rack meshes with a circular gear on the main fitting.
Hydraulic power from the steering manifold can move the rack, which will
then rotate the circular gear. This rotation is transferred via the torque links
to the sliding tube and axle assembly.
A towing light box is also installed on the main fitting with two lights. If the
green light is on, towing is permitted; if the red light is on towing is not per-
mitted because either the steering motor, the brakes or parking brakes are
pressurized. Further details will be described in the steering section.
Figure 6: The steering motor
Steering manifold
lar gear Hydraulic cylinders
Nose landing gear Steering motor assembly
190
Towing light
To help towing operation towing lights are available on the nose landing
gear. The towing lights will monitor if the brakes are applied by the pedals or
by parking brake and the steering is enabled. These conditions are indicated
by red light.
If none of the above conditions are present then towing is allowed, and the
green light will be turned on the towing box.
An external switch on the back side of the box allows hot bus power selec-
tion to the towing box if external power is not available on the aircraft.
Figure 7: Towing lights
190
The NLG doors
Four doors that are attached to the forward fuselage are mechanically
opened and closed as the NLG extends or retracts.
The rear doors are connected to the main fitting by means of a rod, pushing
the door open during extension and pulling it closed during retraction.
The forward door mechanism incorporates a series of rods and cranks,

causing the doors to open during NLG extension, and then to close again as
the NLG reaches the fully extended position.
During retraction, the forward doors are opened until the NLG reaches the
fully retracted position, and then close again.
Figure 8: NLG doors
190
Gear down Gear up
1- Rod 5 connects NLG to lever 4 1- Rod 5 connects NLG to lever 4

2- Telescopic rod 3 connects lever 4 to bell crank 2 2- Telescopic rod 3 connects lever 4 to bell crank 2
3- Rod 1 connects bell crank 2 to forward door 3- Rod 1 connects bell crank 2 to forward door
4- When the landing gear is extended, the linkage is adjusted to hold the 4- When the landing gear is retracted, the linkage is adjusted to hold
door closed (with the door seal compressed). This prevents vibration the door closed (with the door seal compressed). This prevents
of the door. vibration of the door
AFT DOOR: AFT DOOR:

5- Rod 6 connects the aft door to the NLG 5- Rod 6 connects the aft door to the NLG
6- When the landing gear is extended, the rod holds the door in the open 6- When the landing gear is retracted, the rod holds the door closed
position (with the door seal compressed). This prevents vibration of the door
Gear in transit
1- When the NLG starts to retract (or extend), the rod 5 pushes the
lever 4 forward
2- The lever then pushes the telescopic C rod 3 forward, which turns the
bell crank 2
3- As the bell crank 2 turns, the rod 1 opens the forward door
4- The forward door is fully open when the bell crank 2 is at its maximum
counter clockwise travel
5- As the NLG continues to retract (or extend), all the components of the
then move in the opposite direction. This then pulls the forward
door closed
6- When the NLG retracts, the rod pushes the aft door closed. When the
NLG extends the rod 6 pushes the aft door open.
Figure 9: Gear down gear in transit and gear up
3
4 DOOR CLOSES 3
1 5
2 3 5
2 4 4
DOOR 5
6
OPENS 1
2
1
FORWARD DOOR
AFT DOOR AFT DOOR

6
AFT DOOR
FORWARD DOOR
190
D
A
ZONE
711
C
B
ZONES
731
741
NOS E LANDING G EAR

LOC KING S TAY
B
A
LANDING -G EAR
DOWNLOC K
S AF ET Y-PIN
MAIN LANDING G EAR LANDING -G EAR

LOC KING S TAY DOWNLOC K
S AF ET Y-PIN
D
C
Figure 10: safety pin location
LANDING -G EAR
DOWNLOC K
S AF ET Y-PIN
R IG HT AFT C ONSOLE
B
A
190
32-30 Landing gear extension retraction

Introduction
The LDG hydraulic system receives power from the hydraulic system
number two. It contains the necessary valves and actuators to perform the
operations required from the electrical control circuit.
The main components are:
• the LDG selector valve

• the up lock boxes
• the down lock release actuators
• the LDG actuators
• the free fall selector valve
If the normal extension fails, the landing gear can still be extended by using
an electrical override switch. The PSS control system is then bypassed and
the LDG extension solenoid is directly controlled. If the electrical system is
not available, a pure mechanical system -the free fall system, can be used
to extend the landing gear. In this situation, the free-fall selector valve and
the up lock actuators will be moved mechanically. All hydraulic lines will be
connected to return and the landing gears will extend by free fall.
Figure 1: Landing gear systems
ZONES E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION

100 C OC KP IT QUADR ANT/LE VE R
500
600
ZONE
144
E
E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION
C LOSE D LOOP C AB LE
A B
MAIN G EAR C AB LE
F
D E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION
NOS E G EAR C AB LE
ZONE
711
MAIN G EAR C AB LE
C E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION
R ET RACT ION C ENTE R QUADR ANT
DOWNLOC K ACT UATOR
ZONES ACT UATOR
R ET RACT ION UPLOC K
731
741
ACT UATOR AS S EMBLY A
DOWNLOC K
LANDING -G EAR ACT UATOR
S ELEC TOR V ALVE
H
C HE CK F
UPLOC K
V ALVE AS S EMBLY E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION
OVER R DI E S WITC H
S ELEC TOR V ALVE LANDING G EAR
C ONTR OL LEV ER
B E H
C D
190
Retraction
In the usual operation of the system, when the aircraft is in flight, and the
landing gear is to be retracted:
If the landing gear is not up and locked in 20 seconds, the PSEMs send an-
other signal to the Landing-Gear Position and Warning subsystem, which
• The landing-gear control lever is set to UP gives an error message to the crew.
• The PSEMs 1 and 2 (of the PSS) sense the position of the lever and - Removes the power from the landing-gear selector valve. When
compare it with the input from the Air/Ground (Weight-On-Wheels)
this power is removed:
system
-The retraction solenoid is deenergized
• If the results are correct, (the landing-gear control lever is set to UP
and there is no Weight-On-Wheels), PSEMs 1 and 2 supply power - The spring moves the retraction pilot valve to the neutral
to the landing-gear selector valve, where: position
- The retraction solenoid is energized and moves the retraction pilot - The pilot hydraulic pressure is removed from the retraction side
valve of the directional valve
- The retraction pilot valve supplies hydraulic power, which moves - The spring moves the directional valve to the neutral position
the directional valve to the retract position - The directional valve then connects the retraction actuators,
- The directional valve then supplies hydraulic power to all three down lock-release actuators and down lock release actuators to
down lock - release actuators and the three retraction actuators the hydraulic return line (and thus no hydraulic pressure is
• The three down lock-release actuators move the locking stays from applied to these components)
the over-centre position (against the force from the down lock
springs), to break the geometric lock at each locking stay
• The drag strut of the NLG and the side stay of each MLG are able
to fold
• The three retraction actuators retract the landing-gear units
• When each landing-gear unit is retracted, it engages with its up
lock, and the proximity sensors on that up lock send signals to the
PSEMs 1 and 2
• The PSEMS 1 and 2 (of the PSS) sense the position of the lever
and compare it with the input from the up locks
• If the results are correct, (the landing-gear control lever is set to UP
and the landing gear is up and locked in 20 seconds or less),
PSEMs 1 and 2:
- Sends a signal to the Landing-Gear Position and Warning sub-
system
Figure 2: Retraction
B LEGEND:
A
C D
K E
M F
L A
E
M
D
L K
C
J
G
J F
H H
L
K
G
190
Extension
In the usual operation of the system, when the aircraft is in flight, and the
landing gear is to be extended: If the landing gear is not down and locked in 20 seconds, the PSEMs send
another signal to the Landing-Gear Position and Warning Subsystem, which
gives an error message to the crew.
• The landing-gear control lever is set to DOWN
• The PSEMs 1 and 2 of the PSS (Proximity Sensing System) sense - Removes the power from the landing-gear selector valve.
the position of the lever and each compare it with the input from the
When this power is removed:
three up lock proximity sensors.
- The extension solenoid is deenergized
• If the results are correct, (the landing-gear control lever is set to
DOWN and the landing gear is up and locked), PSEMs 1 and 2 sup- - The spring moves the extension pilot valve to the neutral
ply power to the landing-gear selector valve, where. position
• In the landing-gear selector valve: the retraction solenoid moves - The pilot hydraulic pressure is removed from the extension
the extension pilot valve, which supplies hydraulic power to move side of the directional valve
the directional valve to the extend position: - The spring moves the directional valve to the neutral
- The extension solenoid is energized, and moves the retraction position
pilot valve - The directional valve then connects the retraction actuators
- The extension pilot valve supplies hydraulic power, which moves down lock-release actuators and plucks to the hydraulic
the directional valve to the extend position return line (and thus no hydraulic pressure is applied to
- The directional valve then supplies hydraulic power to the three these components)
up lock and the three retraction actuators
• The three retraction actuators extend the landing-gear units
• When each landing-gear unit is extended, the down lock springs
pull the locking stay over centre (to give a geometric lock), and the
proximity sensors on that locking stay send signals to PSEMs 1 and
2.
• The PSEMs 1 and 2 (of the PSS) sense the position of the lever and
compare it with the input from the locking stay
• If the results are correct, (the landing-gear control lever is set to
DOWN and the landing gear is down and locked in 20 seconds or
less), PSEMs 1 and 2:
- Sends a signal to the Landing-Gear Position and Warning sub-
system
Figure 3: Extension
B LEGEND:
A
C D
K E
M F
L A
E
M
D
L K
C
J
G
J F
H H
L
K
G
190
RETRACT COMMAND 1 EXTEND COMMAND 1
NOT (EXTEND COMMAND NOT (RETRACT COMMAND

1) 1)
EXTEND COMMAND 1_ RETRACT COMMAND 1_

OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL

2) COMMAND_RETRACT x 2) COMMAND_EXTEND x
NOT (RETRACT COMMAND NOT (EXTEND COMMAND

2_ OPERATIONAL) 2_ OPERATIONAL)

2) 2)
EXTEND COMMAND 2_ RETRACT COMMAND 2_

OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL

1) 1)
NOT (RETRACT COMMAND NOT (EXTEND COMMAND

1_ OPERATIONAL 1_ OPERATIONAL
Figure 4: Retraction/Extension
Retraction: Extension:
up up
control control
lever down lever down
time time
weight off weight off
wheel wheel
WOW WOW
indication indication
weight on weight on
wheel wheel
time time
energized energized
ctrl. lever locking ctrl. lever locking

solenoid deenergized solenoid deenergized
time time
energized energized
selector valve selector valve
extension coil extension coil
deenergized deenergized
time time
energized energized
selector valve selector valve
retraction coil retraction coil
deenergized deenergized
2 sec time time
delay
LG uplock LG uplock
no indication no indication
time 2 sec time
delay
LG downlock LG downlock
no indication no indication
time time
..
190
Emergency-Extension (Electrical Override)
When the aircraft is in flight, the PSEMs 1 and 2 (of the PSS) are unservice-
able, and the landing gear is to be extended:
• The extension override switch is set to DOWN, and:
- The PSEMs 1 and 2 (of the PSS) are bypassed
- The extension override switch disconnects the retraction solenoid
(in the landing-gear selector valve) from the PSEMs 1 and 2 (of the PSS)
- The extension override switch supplies power to energizes the ex-
tension solenoid (in the landing-gear selector valve) directly
This solenoid then moves the extension pilot valve, and thus supplies hy-
draulic power to move the directional valve to the extend position:
- The extension solenoid is energized, and moves the retraction pilot valve
- The extension pilot valve supplies hydraulic power, which moves the direc-
tional valve to the extend position
- The directional valve then supplies hydraulic power to the three up locks
and the three retraction actuators
- The three retraction actuators extend the landing-gear units
- When each landing-gear units is extended, the down lock springs pull the
locking stay over centre (to give a geometric lock).
Figure 5: Emergency-Extension (electrical override)
28V_Ess_BUS_3
retraction output
PSEM 1
controlled by
PSEM
extension output
controlled by
PSEM override
switch
override
lever command signal
preparation normal
28V_ESS_BUS 1
override
control
extension coil
supply monitor
lever normal
connector selector valve

down
override
normal
up
override
down
normal
retraction coil
up override
down normal
PSEM 2
up
28V_ESS_BUS 2
down
supply monitor
up
lever command
signal
preparation
UP
controlled by
PSEM
DN
extension output LOCK
REL
controlled by
PSEM
retraction output
DN
..
190
Emergency-Extension (Mechanical Free-Fall)
When the aircraft is in flight, there is no electrical and/or hydraulic power,

and the landing gear is to be extended:
• The lever of the emergency-extension system (free-fall) is pulled
(through an angle of 62 degrees)
• The cockpit quadrant changes the angular movement of the lever
to a linear movement in the closed-loop cables and the nose gear
cable
• The closed loop cable transmits the movement of the cockpit quad-
rant to the centre-fuselage quadrant
• As the centre-fuselage quadrant turns, it causes linear movement
in:
- The two main-gear cables
- The rod to the emergency-extension selector valve (free-fall valve)
• This linear movement causes the emergency-extension selector
valve (free-fall valve) to connect the hydraulic ports of the retraction
actuators to the return line of the hydraulic system
• When the three up locks are released, gravity and aerodynamic
forces cause the three landing gear units to extend
• When the three landing gear units are fully extended, the down lock
springs pull each locking stay into an over-centre position. This
gives a down lock at each landing gear unit.
Figure 6: Emergency-Extension (Mechanical Free-Fall)
K
C N
B
E L
E C
M
J K
F
G
N L
H
A
F
J G
H
J
LEGEND:
190
The landing gear control lever
The landing gear control lever has a lever for commanding the extension/re-
traction of the landing gear, a manual release button, and an illumination
panel. The lever has two valid positions:
- Retract (control lever up)
- Extend (control lever down)
A locking-solenoid keeps the lever in the down (gear extended) position

whenever the aircraft is on ground:
- locking-solenoid energized: lever not locked down

- locking-solenoid de-energized: lever locked down
The locking- solenoid prevents selection of landing gear retraction while the
aircraft is on ground.
The lever can be mechanically released using the manual release button.
Figure 7: The landing gear control lever
UP
DN
LOCK
REL
down up DN
locking device solenoid

red push button control lever
to mech.
unlock locking
solenoid
connector control lever
to central
gnd bus bar
down
up
control
lever
connector
controlled by
SPDA 1
SPDA
28V_ESS_BUS_3
illumination
ASCB
panel
PSEM 1 PSEM 2
190
Landing Gear Selector Valve
The landing gear selector valve is a 4-port, 3 position hydraulic valve with
two solenoid valves:
- extension solenoid valve
- retraction solenoid valve
If no solenoid valve is energized, springs hold the selector valve is the cen-
tered (neutral) position: the hydraulic supply pressure is blocked, and the ex-
tend and retract chambers of all landing gear and unlocking actuators are
depressurized.
If the extension solenoid is energized, the selector valve moves to the ex-
tend position: the landing gear up locks and the actuators are pressurized
for extension.
If the retraction solenoid is energized, the selector valve moves to the retract
position: the landing gear and the unlocking actuators are pressurized for re-
traction.
Figure 8: Landing gear selector valve
A B
ZONES
144
extention retraction
LANDING G EAR S ELEC TOR V ALVE
190
MLG Retraction Actuator
The retraction actuator is a double acting hydraulic cylinder. The cylinder

housing is attached to the wing structure. The piston rod is attached to the
main fitting.
Restrictors in the cylinder control the flow of oil into and out of the retraction
actuator. The restricted flow of oil limits the speed of MLG extension and re-
traction. End-of-stroke damping is provided for both travel directions. A float-
ing piston inside the cylinder damps the movement of the piston rod as it
nears full extension and reduces the load into the structure at the extended
end position.
Figure 9: MLG Retraction Actuator
190
The up lock box

MLG and NLG down lock release actuator
The three up locks (two for the MLG and one for the NLG) are all the same.
Each up lock is attached to the aircraft structure in the applicable wheel well.
Each up lock has a body, which contains oil ways, the hydraulically operated The Main Landing Gear (MLG) down lock release actuator is a double action
release mechanism, and two electrical connectors. A hook with a spring, and cylinder with an adjustable piston rod. The cylinder housing is attached to
a quadrant for the mechanical release mechanism are installed in the body. the main fitting of the landing gear, and the piston rod is attached to the lock-
The hook engages with a lug on the landing gear main fitting, when the landing stay. During extension, the actuator is forced to extend by the movement
ing gear is retracted. This holds the landing gear in the retracted position, of the landing gear, since both lines of the down lock release actuator are
without hydraulic pressure to the retraction actuator. connected to drain. To retract the landing gear, the down lock release actu-
There are two modes of operation for the release of the up lock. In the usual ator has to overcome the spring force of the down locking springs and re-
operation, hydraulic pressure moves the hook to release the up lock (when move the locking stay from its over centered position. Therefore hydraulic
the landing-gear control lever is set to DOWN). If the mechanical free-fall pressure is directed from the LDG selector valve through the retraction line
mechanism is used to extend the landing gear, a cable turns the quadrant, to the piston. The cylinder will retract and unlock the landing gear.
which moves the hook to release the up lock (and thus the landing-gear
unit). The Nose Landing Gear (NLG) down lock release actuator is installed be-
Two proximity sensors are installed on each up lock, to detect the condition tween the locking stay and the drag brace. The function is the same as the
of that landing gear unit (locked or unlocked). MLG down lock release actuator.
Figure 10: MLG and NLG down lock release actuator
190
The manual release lever The free fall selector valve
The manual release lever is located in a recess in the cockpit floor on the The free fall selector valve is installed in the lower-stub main box. It is a five-
right hand side of the centre pedestal. A door is opened to obtain access to way, 2 position hydraulic selector valve that can be manually actuated via
the lever. the control lever.
To pull the lever up, a safety button has to be pressed to prevent inadvertent In the normal, or non-actuated position, pressure can pass through the free
movement of the lever. fall selector valve and all other lines are blocked off.
The lever is connected via a rod to the forward quadrant, which is then con- When actuated, the valve connects all LDG hydraulic lines to return and
nected via a closed loop cable to the MLG quadrant. Another cable is direct- closes off the pressure line, allowing unrestricted extension of the landing
ed from the forward quadrant to the NLG up lock box. From the MLG gear.
quadrant a cable is directed to each MLG up lock box and a rod to the free
fall selector valve.
Emergency-Extension Override Switch
This is a six pole toggle switch, which is installed adjacent to the emergency-
extension (free-fall) cockpit quadrant/lever. It is connected directly to the ex-
tension solenoid of the landing-gear selector valve.
Figure 11: Selector valve
Normal position (non actuaded)
C
C LOSE D LOOP
C AB LE
A
NOS E G EAR
ZONES C AB LE MAIN G EAR
100 C AB LE
A 500
600
LANDING G EAR 711
C ONTR OL LEV ER 731 MAIN G EAR
A B 741 C AB LE
B
C LOSE D LOOP
C AB LE
UP D
A
DNK E ME RG ENCY E XT ENSION
C
L O EL
When actuated D
R
MAIN G EAR
C AB LE C
S YS TE M
E
DN
B E ME RG ENCY -E XT ENSION
S ELEC TOR-VALV E R OD
C
S ELEC TOR V ALVE
E ME RG ENCY E XT ENSION
OVER R DI E S WITC H
MAIN G EAR
E ME RG ENCY E XT ENSION C OC KP IT
QUADR ANT/LE VE R
C AB LE
B C D
D E C ENTE R F US ELAG E-QUADRANT
190
32-40 Brake control system

Introduction
The Brake System installed in the Embraer 190 incorporates a main brake
system and an Emergency and Parking brake system.
Two brake assemblies are installed on each Main Landing Gear. The main
brake system is a brake-by-wire system, controlled by two Brake Control
Modules, called BCMs. The outboard brakes are hydraulically powered by
hydraulic circuit number 1, the inner brakes by hydraulic circuit number 2.
The system provides differential braking capability to steer the aircraft in

case of steering system failure. Therefore the left brake pedals activate the
left MLG brakes and the right brake pedals activate the right MLG brakes.
The brake control system has the following functions:
• pedal command breaking;

• anti skid protection;
• pressure control;
• touchdown protection;
• locked wheel crossover protection;
• gear retract braking;
• Built-in Test and communication with the MAU.
An optional auto brake system can be installed.
Figure 1: Brake control system
PILOT COPILOT
MAIN-BRAKE
AUTO-BRAKE SWITCH WIR IN G DI A GR AMS
32 - 41 - 50
(OPTIONAL)
(SDS 32-40) ]
MAIN-BRAKE PEDAL
(MPP 32-41-04)
RTO OFF LO
32 - 41 - 51
TRANSDUCER (4x)
MED
B C
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-41-01 ) HI
G
A D ASC B
C
C A
A LH CBP COCK
PI
DC ESSBUS
T
1
LH FWD AVION
ICS COMPT RH FWD AVIO
NICS OMPT
C LH CBP COCKPI T
DC ESSBUS 2
C OC KP IT
E IC AS
M
MAU 1 (SSM
31-41-80) MAU 2 (SSM
31-41-80)
M L J H BACKPLANE BUS
8O.O MTO
ATTCS
8O.O
K
BACKPLANE BUS
BRK +5 +5 +5
BRK
J J
AUTO 2O.7 N1 2O.7
LEF T P EDAL OUTBD
INBD BRK REV
T RANS DUCE R
IGN 3 /64 3 /64 IGN
463 ITT 463
H
A A
BRAKE CONTRO
L CM C AUTO BRAKE BRAKE CONTRO
L
9O.O N2 9O.O
MODULE 1 (O
B) CONTROL MODULE MODULE 2 (IB)
1OOO FF PPH 1OOO
(OPTIONAL) LANDING GEAR
FUEL QTY
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO UP
L
(SDS 32-40 ) (SDS 32-40) (SDS 32-40) 1
(MPP 32-41-
07) (SSM 45-45
-80) (MPP 32-41-
02) (MPP 32-41-
07)
VIB APU
1OO % 1O2O 3 /64 C
H G
CABIN
ALT -5 FT
RATE -5 FPM
12 81 11
3 /64 1O6 3 /64 P -64.6 PSI
PRESS TEMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PIT CH
S F
M
UP
G
22
H
2 YAW
S/F
J L M
(S S M31-53-80)
L R IG HT P EDAL
SPDA 1 SPDA 2
K B T RANS DUCE R PRESSURE L PRESSURE

HYDRAULI C HYDRAULI C
C
MAIN-BRAKE
K K
SYS 1 CONTROL SYS 2
VALVE (4x)
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-41-09) MAIN-BRAKE
T IR E (RE F.) MAIN-BRAKE
SHUTOFF
SHUTOFF
VALVE (IB)
VALVE (OB)
(SDS 32-40)
(SDS 32-40) 1 4 2 3
(MPP 32-41-03)
WHE E L(RE F.) MAIN-BR AK E (MPP 32-41-03)
EMERGENCY/ EMERGENCY/
P RES S UR E
PARKING BRAKE PARKING BRAKE
MAIN-BR AK E T RANS DUCE R MAIN-BRAKE
F
SYSTEM SYSTEM
WHE E L-HUBC AP MAIN-BRAKE HYDRAULI C
CHECK FUSE (4x)
DRIVE VALVE (4x) (SDS 32-40)
(SDS 32-40) (MPP 32-41-15) MAIN-BR AK E
(MPP 32-41-17)
RETURN C ONTR OL
MAIN-BR AK E
HYDRAULI C J RETURN
L V ALVE
E
HYDRAULI C
SYS 1
WHE E L-SPE E D
M
SYS 2
T RANS DUCE R
D EMERGENCY/
MAIN-BRAKE
EMERGENCY/
PARKING BRAKE
H
PARKING BRAKE PRESSURE
SYSTEM SYSTEM
TRANSDUCER (4x)
B RACK ET (SDS 32-40)
(RE F.) (MPP 32-41-05) MAIN-BRAKE
WHEEL-SPEED
HYDRAULIC H TRANSDUCER (4x)
(SDS 32-40)
MAIN-BR AK E
C HE CK V ALVE
F US E (MPP 32-41-11)
1 2 3 4
E
L EG END:
HYDRAULIC S YS TE M AND S HUTOFF MAIN-BRAKE
B RAKE P RES S UR E V ALVE WHEEL-HUBCAP
DRIVE (4x)
(SDS 32-40)
HYDRAULIC R ET UR N
E LE CT RICAL K J
(MPP 32-41-13)
EMERGENCY/ EMERGENCY/ M
F PARKING BRAKE
SYSTEM
PARKING BRAKE
SYSTEM
EF F EC TIVITY: ALL
190
The emergency and parking brake system
As backup for the main brake system and to safely park the aircraft, a full
mechanical brake system is installed: the emergency and parking brake sys-
tem.
It is activated and controlled mechanically with the emergency park brake

handle on the centre pedestal. It is powered by both hydraulic systems and
has two dedicated hydraulic accumulators. Pressure to the brakes is regu-
lated through the emergency parking brake valve.
The emergency and parking brake system does not make use of the Brake
Control Modules or any other control valve or hydraulic line of the main
brake system.
Figure 2: The emergency and parking brake system
WIR IN G DIA GR AM
ASC B
32 - 44 - 50
LH FWD AVIONI
CS COMPT RH FWD AVIONIC
S COMPT MIDDLE AVIONIC
S COMPT
MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80

) MAU 2 (SSM
31-41-80) MAU 3 (SSM
31-41-80) C OC KP IT
BACKPLANE BUS BACKPLANE BUS BACKPLANE BUS E IC AS

8O.O MTO 8O.O
ATTCS
B 2O.7 N1 2O.7
REV
A K
CUSTOM I/ O
MODULE 13
GENERIC I/ O
MODULE 10
NWSCM GENERIC I/ O
MODULE 10
CUSTOM I/ O
MODULE 8
IGN 3 /64 3 /64 IGN

463 463
B F
ITT
(SSM 31-41-80) (SSM 32-50-80) (SSM 31-41-80) (SSM 31-41-80) A A
N M
(SSM 31-41-80)
E ME RG ENCY /P AR KING 9O.O
1OOO
N2
FF PPH
9O.O
1OOO
LANDING GEAR
B RAKE C ONTR OL P ANEL FUEL QTY

UP
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO
C ONTR OL
G 1
VIB APU
1OO % 1O2O 3 /64 C
P EDES TAL (RE F.)
CABIN
E P
ALT -5 FT
E E
RATE -5 FPM
12 81 11
3 /64 1O6 3 /64 P -64.6 PSI
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PIT CH
S F
UP
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE 22

2 YAW
PRESSURE-SWITCH 1 PRESSURE-SWITCH 2 S/F
C E ME RG / P RK G L
(OUTBD) (INBD)
(S S M31-53-80)
(SDS 32-40)
B RAKE LAMP (MPP 32-44-09)
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-09)
EMERG/PRK BRAKE
D
M
SHUTTLE-VAL
VE (4x)
(SDS 32-40)
H (MPP 32-44-05)
J MAIN BRAKE MAIN BRAKE

N
E
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE
ACCUMULATOR SYSTEM SYSTEM ACCUMULATOR
D D PRESSURE-TRANSDU
CER 1 PRESSURE-TRANS
DUCER 2
D
G (OUTBD) (INBD)
C (SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-17 )
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-17 )
E ME RG /P RK B RAKE
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE AC C UMULAT OR
ACCUMULATOR
A
P RES S UR E-TR ANSDUC ER
C
1 2 3 4 ACCUMULATOR
CHARGING-VALVE CHARGING-VALVE
C
P RES S UR E-SWIT CH
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-15 )
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-15 ) D
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAK E
J J
ACCUMULATOR ACCUMULATOR
AC C UMULAT OR
EMERG/PRK BR
AKE
(SDS 32-40) (SDS 32-40) C HARG ING-VALV E
G
(MPP 32-44-13 ) (MPP 32-44-13 ) EMERG/PRK BRAKE
EMERG/PRK BR
AKE
G
CHECK-VALV E CHECK-VALVE
(SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-11)
HYDRAULIC-FUSE (2x)
(SDS 32-40)
H H (SDS 32-40)
(MPP 32-44-11) C
(MPP 32-44-07)
E ME RG /P RK
E B RAKE V ALVE
F RETURN HYDRAULI
SYS 1
C
R B B R
RETURN HYDRAU
LI
SYS 2
C
EMERG/PRK
THERMAL
E ME RG /P RK B RAKE RELIEF BRAKE VALVE
(SDS 32-40)
C HE CK -V ALVE VALVE
(MPP 32-44-01 ) E ME RG /P RK B RAKE
PRESSURE HYDRAULIC
P P
PRESSURE HYDRAULIC AC C UMULAT OR
SYS 1 (OUTBD) SYS 2 (INBD)
F J
E ME RG /P RK B RAKE E ME RG /P RK B RAKE
C AB LE -AND-HANDLE
HYDRAULIC -F US E
G (SDS 32-40)
(MP P 32-44-03)
L EG END:
E LE CT RICAL
G AS
P R ET UR N HYDRAULIC
L
H P RES S UR E HYDRAULIC
MEC HANICAL
S HUT T LE -V ALVE
EF F EC TIVITY: ALL
190
The Brake temperature monitoring system (BTMS)
The brake temperature is monitored by the Brake temperature monitoring

system, called BTMS. Brake Temperature and system status and failures
are indicated on the MFDs and EICAS. In addition, the BCMs supply failure
information to the CMC that can be also be used for brake system tests.
Figure 3: The Brake temperature monitoring system (BTMS)
A
ZONES
731
741
A
BRAKE TEMPERATURE
SENSOR
C
TYPICAL
B
190
The brake control system
The brake control system has the following main components:
• Two cockpit brake pedal assemblies, which include one brake ped-
al transducer, (LVDT) for each pedal.
• Two identical brake control modules: BCM 1 controlling the out-
board brakes and BCM 2 controlling the inboard brakes, and
• one optional auto-brake module, all located in the MAUs.
• There are two brake shut-off valves, supplying or isolating hydraulic
pressure to the brakes depending on the operational situation, and
• two brake control valves, one for the inboard and one for the out-
board brakes, to regulate the hydraulic pressure.
• Four pressure transducers provide hydraulic pressure signals to
the BCM.
• One hubcap driven, axle-mounted wheel speed transducer per
wheel, transmits wheel speed signals to the BCM.
• One optional auto-brake switch located in the cockpit selects the
various auto-brake modes.
Figure 4: The brake control system components
Auto brake EICAS/

Pilot's switch CMC Co-pilot's
brake pedals brake pedals
AUTOBRAKE
OFF
LOW
RTO MED
HI
Pedal transducer Pedal transducer

ABM- Autobrake
SOV BCV1 SOV

Supply Supply
CYL CYL
Hyd. System#1 Hyd. System#2

Return Return
BCV2 Check
Ptransducer
Pressure Pressure
TRANSD. TRANSD.
Press.
Wheel
Speed
Handle
Cable
Emerg./ Parking
BRAKE VALVE
190
Brake Control Modules (BCM)
Two identical and interchangeable, but independent Brake Control Modules,

BCMs are installed in the MAUs, BCM 1 controls the outboard brakes and is
located in MAU1, BCM2 controls the inboard brakes and is installed in MAU
2. The two BCMs do not communicate to each other.
Each BCM contains all the circuits necessary to perform:
• the control
• monitoring
• Built in Test
• component interface
• fault isolation, and
• indication for two wheels.
It also incorporates the circuits required for communication with the aircraft
indication system, and for maintenance and troubleshooting purposes.
The BIT will check the internal circuits of the BCM and almost all associated
components in the brake system which receive or send signals to the BCM.
For system redundancy BCM1 is powered by DC ESS CBUS 1 and BCM2

by DC ESS BUS 2.
Figure 5: Brake Control Modules (BCM)
190
BCM Inputs and Outputs
Inputs of the following components and sensors are processed in the BCM:
• The cockpit pedal sensors

• the pressure transducers,
• the wheel speed sensors,
• hydraulic systems pressure status,
• thrust lever input,
• LDG lever position,
• air ground status,
• main gears down locked status,
• initiated test request from the CMC.
In tum, the BCM generates signals to: the shutt off valve, the brake control
valve, the ground spoiler system, the thrust reverse system, the nose wheel
steering and the CMC and EICAS.
Figure 6: BCM Inputs and Outputs
Pilot's Auto Brake EICAS/ Pedal Co-Pilot's

BRAKE PEDALS SWITCH CMC TRANSD. BRAKE PEDALS
Pedal
TRANSD.
BCM Inputs from: BCM 1 - Outboard Brakes (1,4)

ABM - Autobrake
BCM 2 -I nboard Brake (2,3)
- The cockpit pedal sensors
BCM generates signals to:
- Pressure Transducer Supply
Supply Hydraulic - the shutoff Valve
- Wheel Speed Sensor Hyd. System#1 Fuse Hyd. System#2
Return - the brake Control Valve
- hydraulic system pressure status Return
Check
Fill VALVE Fill VALVE - the ground spoiler system
- thrust lever input VALVE
Pressure Pressure
TRANSD. Brake TRANSD. - the thrust reverse system
- LDG lever position Pressure
- the nose wheel steering
- air/ground status Press.
- main gears down locked status Wheel - CMC and EICAS
Speed
- initiated test request from the
Handle
- CMC
Cable
Emerg. / Parking
BRAKE VALVE
190
The anti skid system
An anti skid system provides maximum brake efficiency with minimized tire
wear and optimized braking distance.
The BCM provides anti skid protection when the wheel speed is above 10
knots. The wheel speed for the anti skid system of all four wheels is meas-
ured by the axle mounted wheel speed transducer and processed by the
BCMs. This wheel speed information is used to determine incipient wheel
skid conditions.
A correction signal, the anti skid command, is generated by the BCM accord-
ing to the wheel skid condition to release brake pressure on the individual
wheel through the brake control valve.
Figure 7: Anti skid system
190
The locked wheel crossover protection
Whenever the wheel speed is above 30 knots, the locked wheel crossover
protection will be armed.
For this protection the inboard wheels are paired together. Locked wheel
crossover compares the wheel speed of a wheel with its paired wheel. If the
wheel speed of the wheels is 33% or less of its partner wheel, then a locked
wheel condition is declared by the BCM and brake pressure to the locked
wheel is fully removed by selecting return.
Locked wheel crossover protection will be disabled when the faster wheel
speed is less than 30 knots.
Figure 8: Locked wheel crossover protection
190
In-flight braking
When the gear retracts, the main wheels have to be stopped by the main
brake system. The brake control system supplies 300 psi through the brake
control valve for 4 sec to all four brakes whenever the WOW inputs indicate
air, the gear handle input transitions to up position and the gear down and
locked input is not active.
The nose wheels are stopped when they hit a stop inside the nose landing
gear bay.
Figure 9: In-flight braking
190
The touchdown protection
To prevent brake actuation during landing with the aircraft still airborne, the
touchdown protection is available. To assure that the touchdown is not per-
formed with locked wheels, this protection permits pressure only three sec-
onds after ground mode has been established by the signals of the weight-
on-wheels switches or if spin-up override will allow braking.
Spin-up override allows braking when wheel speed of above 50 knots is de-
tected. Spin-up override will also establish ground mode and will reset auto-
matically. At 10 knots the spin-up override will reset automatically. Both
touchdown protection and spin-up override work on an individual wheel ba-
sis.
Figure 10: Touchdown protection
190
32-41 Auto brake System The auto-brake control switch
Introduction The five position selector switch on the main instrument panel in the cockpit
is used to select the auto-brake modes.
The auto-brake system installed on the EMB 190 allows automatic brake ap- The following switch positions are available:
plication after landing or rejected take-off.
• Rejected take-off for maximum brake pressure application;
An auto-brake switch in the cockpit is used to select the different modes for • OFF;
automatic braking.
• LOW for low brake pressure;
• MEDIUM, and
Control of the system is performed by the auto brake module (ABM) installed
in MAU 2. The ABM is powered from DC BUS 2, and commands both Brake • HIGH for high brake pressure application during auto-brake.
Control Modules to apply sufficient brake pressure to achieve the rate of de-
celeration required by the selected mode. If the brake control system detects a brake fault, the auto brake selector
switch springs back to the OFF position.
To prevent unwanted auto brake activation the ABM considers the following
signals: According to the switch position, the ABM, which is an additional card in
MAU 2, gives pressure commands to both BCMs to control the inboard and
• Throttle lever position, outboard brakes as during normal brake application.
• WOW,
• landing gear down and locked, and During auto-brake control, the following protections are still available:
• brake pedal position.
• anti-skid control,
• touchdown protection and
• locked wheel protection.
Figure 1: The auto-brake system
AUTOBRAKE
OFF
LOW
RTO MED
HI
DC BUS 2
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MAU 2 ABM
190
Auto-brake application
To prevent inadvertent auto-brake application, several requirements have to

be fulfilled to arm and activate the auto-brake system.
Landing auto-brake can only be armed if the selector switch is set to:
• LO, MED or HI,

• the left and right WOW indicate that the aircraft is in flight,
• the average wheel speed is below 60 knots,
• pedal positions are all below 10% and
• there are no brake control system faults.
The landing auto-brake will be applied if:
• the landing auto-brake is armed,

• the average wheel speed is above 60 knots,
• the WOW indicates aircraft on ground for more than 2 seconds, and
• both throttle levers are in the idle position.
The ABM calculates the landing auto-brake application in relation to chang-

es in ground speed. The crew can reselect any of the three levels without
disarming the auto-brake.
Landing auto-brake will be disarmed if:
• the selector switch is set to OFF or RTO, or

• any pedal position is above 10%, or
• any brake control system failure is detected or
either throttle lever is advanced beyond idle.
Figure 2: The auto-brake control switch
>
190
The rejected take off auto-brake
The rejected take off auto-brake will help the crew to stop the aircraft if it has
been armed and the take off is rejected.
The RTO auto-brake can only be armed if all of the following requirements
are fulfilled:
• the selector is set to RTO,

• left and right WOW indicate that the aircraft is on ground,
• the average wheel speed is below 60 knots and
• no brake control system failures are detected.
The RTO auto-brake will be applied if:
• RTO auto-brake is armed,

• the average wheel speed is above 60 knots, and
• both throttle levers are in the idle position.
The RTO auto-brake will be disarmed if:
• the selector switch is set to OFF, LO, MED or HI, or

• any pedal position is above 10% while wheel speed is above 60
knots, or
• any brake control system failure is detected while wheel speed is
below 60 knots, or
either throttle lever is advanced beyond idle during RTO auto-brake applica-
tion.
Figure 3: Auto-brake application
190
EICAS indications
If a failure in the auto-brake system is detected, the AUTOBRAKE FAIL cau-

tion will illuminate on the EICAS, to indicate that normal braking has to be
applied.
Whenever one of the auto-brake modes is armed it will also be indicated on

the EICAS by the following status messages:
• AUTBRAKE LO ARMED;
• AUTOBRAKE MED ARMED;
• AUTOBRAKE HI ARMED;
• AUTOBRAKE RTO ARMED.
If auto brake data is invalid or unavailable, three amber dashes will replace
the indication.
LG/AUTOBRAKE LG/AUTOBRAKE
DN DN
DN DN DN DN
A-BRK RTO
AUTOBRAKE LOW ARMED
AUTOBRAKE
AUTOBRAKE MED ARMED
AUTOBRAKE RTO AUTOBRAKE OFF
AUTOBRAKE HI ARMED OFF

LOW LG/AUTOBRAKE LG/AUTOBRAKE
AUTOBRAKE RTO ARMED
RTO MED DN DN
DN DN DN DN
HI
A-BRK LO A-BRK MED
AUTOBRAKE LO AUTOBRAKE MED
LG/AUTOBRAKE LG/AUTOBRAKE
DN DN
DN DN DN DN
A-BRK HI A-BRK
If autobrake data is invalid or unavailable, AUTOBRAKE HI AUTOBRAKE DATA INVALID

OR UNAVAILABLE
three amber dashes will replace the indication.

AUTOBRAKE EICAS INDICATIONS
190
32-47 Brake Temperature

Introduction
The Brake Temperature Monitoring System, called BTMS, is installed to

measure the actual brake temperature. This information is then provided as
status information to the MFDs and for overheat cautions to the EICAS.
Each brake assembly is equipped with one brake temperature sensor. The
BTMS sensor is a chromel alumel thermocouple that can be installed in one
of two locations. One location is used to mount the sensor for the left hand
brake and the second location is used to mount the sensor for the right hand
brake. The sensors are always in the upper position, allowing sensor re-
placement with the brake installed.
The electrical signals from the four sensors are processed through the I/O-
module 2 in MAU 3, which converts the BTMS voltage to a signal for display
in the cockpit.
Issue: Sept06 FOR TRAINING ONLY Chapter 32-47 Page 1

Figure 1: The Brake Temperature Monitoring System
COCKPIT
WIR IN G DIA GR AMS

32-41-50
32-47-50
ASCB
(SSM 31-61-80)
MIDDLE AVIONICS MPT

CO
MAU 3 (SSM 31-41-80)
BACKPLANE BUS
NIC/PROC CUSTOM I/O

MOD 2
ASCB
(SSM 31-41-80 ) (SSM 31-41-80)
C
B
INBD BRAKE ASSY
INBD BTMSENSO R
RH CBP COCKPIT RH CBP COCKPIT (SDS 32-40-00)
(MPP 32-47-01)
B DC BUS 2 DC ESSBUS 2
A OUTBD BRAKE ASSY

CUST 5 CUST 5
I/O 2B I/O 2A
OUS
T
B
D
O
N
E
M
(SDS 32-40-00)
(MPP 32-47-01)

190
The synoptic page
The BTMS output that is processed in the I/O module 2 of MAU 3 is indicated
on the system status synoptic page of the MFD.
The MFD synoptic page has two ways of providing temperature indication:
Numerical and Pictorial.
There are two brake temperature categories on the MFD: Status and Advi-
sory.
Temperature indication is green up to 251°C/433°F, which means that the

brakes are able to absorb maximum kinetic energy.
Advisory indication is shown in amber between 252°C/486°F and 840°C/

1544°F, which indicates that cooling is required.
If the temperature information has failed or is out of range the arrow will dis-
appear and the read-out will be replaced by amber dashes. On the EICAS
the BRAKE OVERHEAT caution will show up for brake temperatures above
690°C, and will disappear again if temperatures drop below this value.
If the brake temperature rises above 749°C/1380°F, the caution will latch
and can only be unlatched by electrically powering down the aircraft. Note
that the fuse plugs will melt in the main wheel, and inspections, according to
the Maintenance Manual have to be performed.

Figure 2: The synoptic page
0°C - 251°C
TEMP 252°C - 840°C

°C
Above 670°C indication is replaced by amber dashes

700 200 210 650
OB IB IB OB Map Pl an Sys t ems Fuel
Temperatures > 690°C
BRAKE OVERHEAT
END
TCAS WX Checkl i s t

190
System Inputs and Outputs
• Inputs - Hydraulic pressure
The aircraft has three hydraulic systems. No.1 and No.2 hydraulic systems
supply hydraulic pressure to the main brake sub-subsystem. No.1 hydraulic
system supplies the outboard brakes, and No.2 hydraulic system supplies
the inboard brakes.
• Inputs - Electrical Power

The DC (Direct Current) power distribution system supplies electrical power
to the landing gear system from the:
– 28 VDC Bus 2
– 28 V Essential Bus 1
– 28 V Essential Bus 2
• Ouputs from the system are:
– From the BCMs to the position and warning subsystem

– Cockpit indication on the EICAS
– Fault messages, which are sent to the CMC
– Data to other aircraft systems through the MAUs

Figure 3: System inputs and outputs
ASCB ASCB ASCB
LH FWD AVIONICS COMPT RH FWD AVIONICS COMPT MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT
MAU 1 COCKPIT
MAU 2 MAU 3
BACKPLANE BUS BACKPLANE BUS BACKPLANE BUS

EICAS
8O.O MTO 8O.O
ATTCS
2O.7 N1 2O.7
REV
CUSTOM I/O GENERIC I/O NWSCM GENERIC I/O CUSTOM I/O

MODULE 13 MODULE 10 MODULE 10 MODULE 8
IGN 3 /64 3 /64 IGN
A 463 ITT 463 A
EMERGENCY/PARKING 9O.O
1OOO
N2
FF PPH
9O.O
1OOO
BRAKE CONTROL PANEL

LANDING GEAR
FUEL QTY
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO UP
1
VIB APU
1OO % 1O2O 3 /64 C
CABIN
ALT -5 FT
RATE -5 FPM
12 81 11
3 /64 1O6 3 /64 P -64.6 PSI
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
S F
UP
22
2 YAW
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE S/F
PRESSURE-SWITCH 1 PRESSURE-SWITCH 2
EMERG / PRKG (OUTBD) (INBD)
BRAKE LAMP
EMERG/PRK BRAKE
SHUTTLE-VALVE (4X)
MAIN BRAKE MAIN BRAKE

EMERG/PRK BRAKE SYSTEM SYSTEM EMERG/PRK BRAKE
PRESSURE-TRANSDUCER 1 PRESSURE-TRANSDUCER 2
(OUTBD) (INBD)
EMERG/PRK BRAKE 2 3 4 EMERG/PRK BRAKE

CHARGING-VALVE CHARGING-VALVE
EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE

EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE EMERG/PRK BRAKE

CHECK-VALVE CHECK-VALVE
HYDRAULIC-FUSE (2X)
RETURN HYDRAULIC RETURN HYDRAULIC

R B B R
SYS 1 SYS 2
EMERG/PRK
THERMAL
BRAKE VALVE
RELIEF
VALVE
PRESSURE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE HYDRAULIC
P P
SYS 1 (OUTBD) SYS 2 (INBD)
EMERG/PRK BRAKE
CABLE-AND-HANDLE

190
The main brake activation
The main brake activation is proportional to the displacement of the pilot’s or

copilots brake pedals in the cockpit. The position of the pedals is sensed by
four linear variable displacement transducers, LVDTs, one dedicated to
each pedal.
For redundancy, each LVDT is a dual sensor with a primary and secondary
winding to sense the position of the movable core. The windings are excited
by the BCMs, which can calculate pedal position via the feedback signal.
To prevent inadvertent brake application, an internal spring is installed in the

LVDT, forcing its core to the neutral position.

Figure 4: Main brake activation

190
Shut-off valve (SOV)
Two BCM controlled main brake shut-off valves are installed at the forward
wing stub. Each BCM will control its on side three-way, two position solenoid
operated brake shut-off valve. When de-energized, the pressure port is
closed. The main purpose is to isolate faulty hydraulic components. The sec-
ondary purpose is to select shutdown air mode. The shut off valve will be
deenergized closed by the BCM when air mode is established or energized
open when ground mode is established.
The shut off valve status depends upon the following inputs:
• Weight on wheels status

• landing gear selector lever position
• wheel speed and velocity reference¨
• throttle lever position and
• brake pedal position

Figure 5: Shut-off valve

190
The Shut Off Valve (SOV) on ground
The two shut-off valves (SOV) are used to isolate the brakes.
On ground when weight on wheels and thrust lever (TL) below 80% the
SOVs are energized open by the BCMs to allow brake control over the full
travel of the pedals.
With TL above 80% and pedal position above 10% the SOVs open, while if
the brake pedal position is below 10% the SOVs will be de-energized to
close.
The Shut Off Valve (SOV) in flight
After liftoff the SOVs will be energized open for gear retract braking and will
be closed after a ten second time delay when the wheel speed and refer-
ence speed are zero, the gear handle is not down, and weight off wheel is
detected. As long as the aircraft is in flight, the brakes remain isolated by the
de-energized shut off valve.
Prior to landing, when the landing gear selector is set to down, the two SOVs
are tested automatically by a pressure pulse test. The BCMs energize the
SOVs and apply a pressure of 600 psi. This change must be verified by the
transducers. Then, the BCMs shut off the pressure command and again de-
energize the SOVs. The shut-off valve will be energized to on when weight
on wheel is detected and the TL is below 80%. The touchdown protection
(WOW & 5 sec) or wheel spin-up.

Figure 6: Shut Off Valve
on ground
MAX
THRUST
SET B
CLB
SOV energized open
IIDLE
DLE
WOW
MAX REV B
TLA below 80%

P RES S UR E A
MAX
R ET UR N
THRUST
SET
CLB
SOV energized open

IDLE
C YLINDE R
MAX REV
Note: If pedal position is below 10%
the SOV will be deenergized to close
Pedal position above 10% C

TLA above 80% S HUTOF F V ALVE
after liftoff B
P RES S UR E R ET UR N P RES S UR E R ET UR N
C YLINDE R C YLINDE R
UP
SOV will be de- DE-ENER GIZE D E NE RG IZED

N
OCK
EL
energized to close
HYDRAULIC S CHEMAT IC
Wheelspeed = 0 DN weight of wheel C

190
The brake control valves
Two brake control valves are installed at the wing stub. One valve controls
and modulates pressure to the inboard brake system and the other to the
outboard brake system. The brake control valve is a dual, two-stage pres-
sure control servo-valve. The first stage develops hydraulic control pressure
proportional to input current from the BCM, and the second stage then sup-
plies the related first stage controlled pressure to the brakes.
If the brake pedals are fully depressed, the armature in the first stage will
close off the return port and system pressure can move the second stage
spool valve to deliver full system pressure to the brakes.
With no input current to the armature, the armature will close off the pressure
port and the spring in the spool valve will move the spool valve to cut off any
pressure to the brakes. Brake pressure can be modulated at any intermedi-
ate position of the servo valve and in relation to the spool valve to allow dif-
ferent brake forces.

Figure 7: Brake control valves
S PAR 2 (RE F.)

R IB 6A (RE F.)
C
B RAKE C ONTR OL V ALVE
B RAKE
P RES S UR E
R ET UR N
C -C

190
Pressure transducer
A pressure transducer is installed in each of the four hydraulic pressure lines

downstream of the hydraulic fuses.
The transducer is a hermetically sealed silicon pressure capsule-mounted

type transducer. The silicon capsule converts the pressure in an electrical
signal that is transmitted to the respective Brake Control Module.
The transducers are positioned in the rear wing-to-fuselage fairing, close to

the wheel well.
The BCMs use the signals for the closed loop pressure control to control the
brake control valve in relation to actual delivered pressure sensed by the
transducers.

Figure 8: Pressure transducer

190
Main brake wheel speed transducer
Each wheel-speed transducer is installed in the axle of the applicable wheel.

The wheel-speed transducer is installed in the transducer adapter, which is
then held in the axle adapter. This transducer is a variable reluctance alter-
nator, with 90 teeth on the rotor, and 90 equivalent poles on the stator, which
are installed in a metal case.
There is an excitation coil on the rotor which gives the magnetic field for the
alternator. The alternator turns on sealed bearings, and the rotor engages
with a drive fitting in the hubcap.
Main brake wheel-Hubcap drive
The hubcap is installed on the hub of the applicable main wheel. It is a ma-
chined aluminium casting, with the drive fitting riveted inside it.
There are three lugs on the edge of the hubcap. Each one has a hole for one
of the bolts which attach the hubcap to the main wheel. A flange is machined
on the mating face with the main wheel. This flange goes into the bore of the
main wheel.
The drive fitting is a steel machined part with three slots, which lets the hub-
cap engage with the drive of the wheel-speed transducer in three positions,
which are at 120 degrees intervals.

Figure 9: Wheel-speed transducer
Wheel speed transducer
Stator
Self-contained bearings
Rotor
made in Zirl
made in Zirl
in Zirl
in Zirl
BCM

190
The volume hydraulic fuses
The volumetric hydraulic fuses are installed at the wing stub area. One is in-
stalled in each brake line downstream of the brake control valve. They pre-
vent the loss of the hydraulic fluid in case of a leakage in the hydraulic brake
lines or at the brakes and limit the quantity of hydraulic fluid that could hit the
hot brakes.
The fuses measure the flow and velocity passing through them.
In case of a hydraulic leak behind the fuse, the pressure drop will cause the
flow and velocity to increase. This will cause the fuse to close. The manual
bypass lever on the fuse can be used to reset the fuse after it has activated,
and to bypass the fuse to allow brake system bleeding without inadvertent
fuse activation.

Figure 10: Volumetric hydraulic fuses
ZONES
521
621
A
P LUNG ER
P OP P ET AND S PR IN G
AND S PR IN G B Y P AS S A
LEV ER
R IB 5 (RE F.) C
R IB 6 (RE F.)
HYDRAULIC
F US E
F US E B ODY
S PR IN G
C
B
S LIDE
MET ER IN G MET ER IN G C HE CK P IS TON
P IS TON C HAMB ER V ALVE
C -C

190
Check valves
Four check valves are installed in the hydraulic return lines. Two are in-
stalled in the return line of the main brake system and two in the return line
of the emergency parking brake system. All of them should prevent any back
pressure to the brakes by allowing flow only in the direction of return.
Also, two check valves are installed in the supply lines to the emergency
park brake accumulators to prevent discharging of the accumulators when
no supply pressure is available, assuring sufficient pressure for emergency/
parking brake activation.

Figure 11: Check valves
B
C
C B
B
MAIN-BR AK E
BODY POPPET SPRING RETAINER C HE CK V ALVE
B
T YP IC AL
A
Pilot's Auto Brake EICAS/ Co-Pilot's
BRAKE PEDALS SWITCH CMC BRAKE PEDALS
Pedal Pedal
TRANSD. TRANSD.

ABM- Autobrake
Supply Supply
Hydraulic
Return Return
Check
Pressure Pressure
Pressure
Press.
Wheel
Speed
Handle
Cable
Emerg./ Parking
BRAKE VALVE

190
32-44 Emergency Parking System

Introduction
The fully-independent emergency and parking brake system stops the air-
craft in case of main brake system failure, and applies the parking brake.
The system is controlled from the actuating handle in the cockpit, which is
mechanically connected by a push-pull cable to the emergency/parking
brake valve.
The system is powered via two accumulators which are fed by hydraulic sys-
tems 1 and 2. Pressure switches are installed in the system to give an indi-
cation in the cockpit if the emergency/park brake is activated.
With fully charged accumulators, the emergency/parking brake system pro-

vides 6 full stroke handle actuations or remains effective in keeping the air-
craft parked for 12 hours.
Figure 1: Emergency and parking brake system
Emergency parkbrake handle
Two accumulators
B
R Six full stroke handle actuations, or
A
Aircraft parked for 12 hours

K
E
B RAKE -AC C UMULAT OR
S HOULDE R R IN G
C
(STE E L)
S CR EW C AP S EP AR AT OR
E ND C AP (ALUMINUM) C YLINDE R (ALUMINUM)
(ALUMINUM) (ALUMINUM)
G AS F LUID
C -C
190
The emergency park brake valve
The emergency park brake valve is located in the forward wing-to-fuselage

fairing, close to the wheel well.
It is a manually operated, dual body spool valve with return spring. When the
lever is not actuated, the brake port of the valve is open to return. When the
lever is manually moved, the return port is blocked and pressure is supplied
to the brakes in relation to lever movement. When the valve is in the fully ac-
tuated or parking brake position, the pressure at the brake port is at pressure
supply level. In this mode, the valve will maintain brake system pressure de-
spite changes due to small leakage, temperature change, etc., through its
internal regulating operation.
A thermal relief valve in each side of the valve precludes over pressure in
the system lines due to ambient temperature changes.
Figure 2: The emergency park brake valve
A
ZONE
195
LEVER A
RETURN
BRAKE PRESSURE
C
EMERGENCY/PARKING
BRAKE VALVE
B
TYPICAL
PLUNGER SPRINGS SLIDE & SLEEVE ASSY
C-C
190
Emergency/parking brake handle
The centre pedestal mounted emergency/parking brake handle controls the

actuation of the emergency/parking brake valve mechanically via a push pull
cable.
The handle can be moved for 60 degrees between the stowed and brake full
on position to regulate the emergency brake. The handle locks at 60 de-
grees to set the park brake. The handle is released to allow travel back to
the stowed position using a thumb-actuated button at the front of the handle.
The control cable has two outer ball-races, with a core which is held between
and moves on the two ball-races. These parts are all held in a flexible outer
case. The outer case has polyolefin outer sheath to give environmental pro-
tection to the control-case assembly. One end of the outer case is attached
to the housing, and that end of the core is attached to the handle. The other
end of the control-cable is attached to the brake valve.
Figure 3: Emergency/parking brake handle
EMERGENCY/PARKING
BRAKE LEVER
190
Pressure switch
A pressure switch is installed downstream of each hydraulic fuse. The com-

ponents of a pressure switch are:
• The switch body
• An end-plug with a hydraulic connection
• A spring-loaded snubber assembly
• A piston
• A disk spring
• A switch actuator
• An electrical assembly (single-pole double throw switch)
• A switch housing with an electrical connector
The snubber assembly and the piston are held between the end-plug and
the switch body. The snubber assembly goes into the end-plug, and the
spring of the snubber assembly pushes against the piston. An O-ring seals
the piston to prevent leakage of hydraulic fluid.
The disc spring and switch actuator and held in place between the switch
housing and the valve body. Thus the spring of the snubber assembly push-
es against the piston. A pin on the piston then pushes against the disk spring
and the switch actuator to operate the switch of the electrical assembly.
Figure 4: Pressure switch
B
ZONE
195
A
B
EMERGENCY/PARKING
BRAKE PRESSURE-SWITCH A
DISC SPRING SWITCH ACTUATOR
C
B SNUBBER ASSEMBLY PISTON SEAL PISTON ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLY
TYPICAL C-C
190
The two accumulators
One 100 cu.in. accumulator is installed in each pressure supply line of the
emergency/parking brake system. The accumulators are installed together
with a charging valve and a pressure transducer in the system related hy-
draulic compartments in the left and right wing-to-fuselage fairings behind
the wing. The accumulator is a cylindrical piston type with separated oil and
nitrogen chambers. The pressure transducer will monitor the nitrogen side
of the accumulator, and will provide a low pressure signal if the pressure
drops below 1200 psi. On the EICAS an "EMERGENCY/PARKING BRAKE
FAULT" advisory will be illuminated if this situation is sensed on one accu-
mulator.
If both accumulators have low pressure, an EMERGENCY BRAKE FAIL

caution will be illuminated. The actual accumulator pressure can be moni-
tored on the MFD system status synoptic page.
Figure 5: The two accumulators
SYSTEM 1
Pressure transducer
B
Charging valve
Accumulator
B
A
SYSTEM 2
Accumulators Signal when pressure
Seperator
EMERGENCY/PARKIN LT
190
Built in tests
The Brake Control System includes three different types of built in tests:
• Power-up or event initiated tests, which are performed every time

power is supplied to the system as part of the system initialization,
or when the power has been interrupted for more than 50ms or after
a predetermined event, for example energization of the shut off
valve after a gear down cycle
• Period tests, which are performed repeatedy, concurrently with nor-
mal brake control functions
• Operator initiated tests, which are performed in response to specific
requests
All initiated tests are executed only if all wheel speeds and velocity referenc-
es are zero and weight on wheel is indicated. The tests are performed by the
CMC.
Figure 6: Built in tests
er-up or event initiated tests

Pilot's Auto Brake EICAS/ Pedal Co-Pilot's
iodic tests BRAKE PEDALS SWITCH CMC TRANSD. BRAKE PEDALS
Pedal
rator initiated tests TRANSD.
BCM 1- Outboard Brakes (1,4)

ABM - Autobrake
BCM 2 - Inboard Brake (2,3)
CMC Supply
Supply Hydraulic
made in Zirl
andi mamnni geri
andi mamnni geri
andi mamnni geri
made in Zirl
andi mamnni geri
andi mamnni geri
made in Zirl made in Zirl made in Zirl made in Zirl Return Return
andi mamnni geri
Check
made in Zirl
andi mamnni geri
andi mamnni geri
Pressure Pressure
andi mamnni geri

Pressure
Press.
Wheel
Speed
MAU
Handle
Cable
Emerg. / Parking
BRAKE VALVE
190
CAS Messages
Figure 7: EICAS and CMC indications
Map Plan Systems Maint 93. 8 T 0- 1

T/ 94. 0 BRK
LAV SMLH
OKFAIL
E
GROUNCOMTROL
BRK D SPOI LERSFAULT
FAI L
Status LG NOPEDL
BRK DI SPATCH
LH SEAT FAIL
LG NOLH
BRK SE FAULT
DOOR OPEN
Flight Ctrl OFF OFF DME 2 FAI L
ENG 1- 2REV TLA FAI L
Hydraulics ADF 1 FAI L
0. 0 N1 0. 0
Fuel BLEED 1FAI L
AMS CTRL FAI L
Electrical OXY CREW LO PRESS
CRG AFT FI RE SYS FAI L
ECS CRG FWD FI RE SYS FAI L
anti- Ice E1- 2 NO DI SPATCH
26° I TT
T 28° YD OFF
Maintenance STALL PROT FAI L
0. 0 N2 0. 0
0. 0 FF PPH0. 0 11 12 1
LANDI NG GEAR
LA
FU
UEL QTY
5510
FQ LB
L
5520 DN
11030
DN DN
OI L VP APU
OFF
CABI N
CA
ALT 19000 FT
RATE
RA 0 FPM
1 45° 48° P 0. 0 PSI
PRE
RESS T MP
TE L
LP HP L E
LF 2915 FT
SLA
LAT/ FLA
LAP/ SPD
DBRK TRI MS
TR
SPD
DBRK PI TC
TCH
S F ROLL
RO
FU
ULL
0
TCAS Weather Checklist S F
S/
190
The main wheel
• Apply the brakes when the landing gear retracts (normal brake sub-
The main wheel is a split-web assembly made of two wheel halves ma- subsystems)
chined from forged aluminium.
The wheels lets the aircraft move on the ground, and the main brake sub-
subsystem usually controls the brake assemblies (and thus the speed of the
The two wheel halves are connected by sixteen bolts with self-locking nuts aircraft on the ground).
and washers. Two tapered roller bearings are installed in the centre of the If this sub-subsystem is unserviceable, the emergency/parking brake sub-
wheel, fully enclosed by bearing seals. subsystem then controls the brake assemblies.
A filling valve or optionally a filling valve with an incorporated pressure

gauge is installed in the outer wheel-half. A pressure relief plug, also located
on the outboard wheel-half prevents over inflation of the tire. If the pressure
rises to 365 to 435 psi, a metal diaphragm will break and release tire pres-
sure. After activation, the plug has to be replaced.
Eight quadruple layer stainless steel heat shield segments are fitted to the
inboard wheel-half to protect the wheel and tire from excessive heat gener-
ated by the brake. In case of brake overheat, four fuse plugs in the inboard
wheel-half will melt at 193 to 204°C (380-400°F) and safely reduce tire pres-
sure.
Eight replaceable drive-keys are bolted to the inboard wheel-half to transfer

the loads between the brakes and the wheels.
A hubcap installed on the outboard wheel-half allows drive clip engagement

of the wheel speed transducer for the anti-skid system.
The functions of the wheels and brakes subsystem are to:
• Let the aircraft move on the ground (wheels sub-subsystem)

• Control the speed of the aircraft when it is on the ground (with the
normal and emergency brake sub-subsystems)
• Apply, and hold the brakes on, when the aircraft is parked (parking
brake)
Figure 8: Main wheel
A
ZONES OUT BOAR D WHE E L
731 S UB AS S EMBLY
741
INB OARD WHE LL

S UB AS S EMBLY S EF -LOC KING
HEAT S HIELD
NUT
A
S UB AS S EMBLY F LAT
B
WAS HE R
WHE E LHUB
R ET AINING S PACE R
R IN G S ELF-LOCK ING C WHE E L(RE F.)
INS E R T T IR E (RE F.)
G RE AS E
R ET AINE R B AF F LE B EARING
S EAL
INB OARD B EARING C ONE
B EARING S EAL & R OLLER S
INB OARD
WIR E B EARING C UP R ET AINING
R ET AINING R IN G R IN G
DIS K DRIVE OUT BOAR D
C HANNEL K EY B EARING C UP
MAC HINE
S CR EW
WAS HE R
P RE FORMED
P RE FORMED P AC KING
S ELF-LOCK ING P AC KING
NUT F US IB LE
P LUG B
C -C C
190
Nose wheel
The primary components of each nose wheel are:

• An inboard wheel-half
• An outboard wheel-half
• A tire
• Eight tie bolts with nuts and washers
• Two roller bearings
• An inflation valve and an optional pressure gauge
• A pressure-release plug
Each wheel-half is an aluminium-allow forging, with outriggers on its rim, to
attach weights for wheel balancing. The tire is trapped, when the two wheel-
halves are assembled, and a preformed packing seals the mating faces of
the two wheel-halves. The eight tie bolts with their nuts and washers connect
the two wheel-halves, and when the wheel is assembled it is an A-frame
structure. The pressure release plus and charging valve are installed in the
outboard wheel-half, and a roller bearing is installed in each wheel-half.
Figure 9: Nose wheel
B
P RE FORMED
P AC KING
T IR E B EAD
A C S EAT (RE F.)
ZONE OUT RIG G ER

711 (RE F.)
TIR E (RE F.)

S ELF-LOCK ING
T IE B OLT NUT
A WAS HE R
B EARING C UP
B
B EARING C ONE
WHE E L(RE F.) G RE AS E R ET AINING
AND R OLLER S
B AF F LE
B EARING S EAL B EARING S EAL
WIR E R ET AINING
R IN G
P RE FORMED P ROTE CT IV E
P AC KING C OV ER
P RES S UR E
R ELEASE P LUG
INB OARD WHE E L OUT BOAR D WHE E L

B C S UB AS S EMBLY S UB AS S EMBLY
C -C
190
32-49 Wheels, brakes and tires

The brake housing is an aluminium alloy forging, with spaces for seven cyl-
Brake assembly inder sleeves. Threads hold each cylinder sleeves in the brake housing, and
there is a piston and return mechanism in each cylinder sleeve.
Oil ways or ports connect all the cylinder sleeves to give one hydraulic sys-
The primary components of each brake assembly are: tem, and there is an insulator on the end of each piston (to decrease brake
• A brake housing sub assembly heat transfer to the housing).
• A torque tube and back plate sub assembly
• A pressure plate The return mechanism in each piston gives brake release and also automat-
• Three rotating brake disks (rotors) ic adjustment of the brake to adjust for wear of the heat stack.
• Two stationary brake disks (stators) The components of a return mechanism are:
• An end plate assembly • A brake return pin
• Six cylinder sleeve sub assemblies (each with a piston and return • The brake return pin retainer (which attaches the brake return pin
mechanism) to the cylinder)
• A swage tube sub assembly (which is the swage and the swage
tube)
Ten floating back plate pads are attached to the end plate assembly, which
is attached to the torque tube and back plate sub assembly. This torque tube • The self-locking nut (which attaches the swage to the brake return
and back plate sub assembly is a one-piece forging, which has 10 drive pin)
keys. Two of these drive keys have channels for a brake-temperature mon- • The spring holder sub assembly
itoring sensor. • The retaining ring (which keeps the spring holder sub assembly in
the piston)
There are three rotors and two startors, which make the heat stack. The heat • O-ring seals (at the piston/cylinder and piston/brake return pin in-
stack goes on the torque tube, between the pressure plate and the end terfaces)
plate. Keys on the stators engage with the drive keys on the torque tube so
that they can not turn. Slots in the outer edge of each of the three rotors en-
gage with keys on a wheel, to transmit braking forces to that wheel.
The pressure plate goes between the housing sub assembly and the inboard
rotor, while the pressure plate and the end plate assembly give surface fric-
tion for the outer faces of the rotors at each end of the heat stack. The heat
stack must be kept as a unit during the wear cycle, and replaced when it is
worn.

Figure 1: Brake assembly
A R OT OR S
ZONES
731
WEAR
INDIC AT OR A
741 P IN
C YLINDE R B
S LE E VE
S UB AS S EMBLY
C
S PR IN G
HOLDE R P RES S UR E
P LATE
C C YLINDE R
S LE E VE
E NDPLAT E S PR IN G P IS TON
B RAKE
T EMPE RATURE
S ENSOR
S TATORS
B RAKE AS S EMBLY
R ET UR N P IN
R ET AINE R-PLAT E
S HUT T LE
V ALVE
C -C
T OR QUE T UB E B RAKE R ET UR N
AND B AC KP LATE P IN S WAGE
WEAR
INDIC AT OR B AS S EMBLY T YP IC AL T UB E S WAGE
P IN

190
Brake temperature sensor and Shuttle valve
A brake temperature sensor is installed into the brake assembly at the top
of the piston housing. The rotating discs are keyed to the wheel. The station-
ary discs are keyed to the brake torque tube.
The brake assembly is interchangeable for left and right hand installation by
rotating the shuttle valve and repositioning the brake temperature sensor.
The carbon heat sink allows refurbishment by alternating different sets of
carbon discs.
Note: The refurbishment cannot be done on the wing.

Figure 2: Brake temperature sensor and shuttle valve
HOS E
C ONNEC TIONS
NOT E:
T HE P OS IT ION OF T HE
S HUT T LE V ALVE C HANG ES
F OR A LEF T OR R IG HT
B RAKE AS S EMBLY
B RAKE UNIT
T UR N S HUT T LE V ALVE -
DO NOT R EMOV E IT F ROM
B RAKE AS S EMBLY B
SPRING
HOLDER PRESSURE
CYLINDER PLATE
SLEEVE
SPRING PISTON
RETURN PIN
RETAINER-PLATE
BRAKE RETURN
C-C PIN SWAGE
TUBE SWAGE
TYPICAL

190
Self-retracting and self-adjusting pistons
Each brake has seven self-retracting and self-adjusting pistons. The self-ad-
justing mechanism compensates for brake disc wear and keeps the piston
travel constant as the brake wears.
The piston housing is attached to the torque tube. The cylinder sleeve is in-
stalled inside the housing. The spring loaded piston moves inside the cylin-
der sleeve, forcing the insulator against the pressure plate during brake
application. An internal spring and swage tube return mechanism provides
precise adjustment of the brake. The mechanism adjusts to maintain con-
stant clearance by deformation of the steel swage tube. A hardened steel
swage tube is anchored in place at the end of the steel return pin. As the
brake wears, the pistons are forced out. The piston pulls the swage tube
past the swage, deforming the tube as it travels. This deformation of the
swage tube progresses until the brake wears out.

Figure 3: Pistons, spring and swage tube
7 pistons
Spring
Swage tube

190
32-50 Steering System

In the normal mode, the cockpit crew actively steers the aircraft using either
Introduction the steering hand wheel or the rudder pedals. In the free-castor mode, the
NLG steers in response to the external forces applied.
The normal steering mode cannot be activated if the actual steering angle is
The steering system gives directional control of the aircraft on the ground. more than +/- 76 degrees. When switching from the free-castor mode to the
The aircraft has “steer-by-wire” steering. normal mode, the steering command from the NWSCM is gradually changed
The steering is electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. from the actual steering angle to the hand wheel or rudder pedal command
angle.
Subsystems/Components
Normal steering mode
The steering system has the following sub-systems/components:
– Steering Hydraulic System
– Steering Electrical/Electronic System In the normal steering mode, the cockpit crew actively steers the aircraft us-
ing either the steering hand wheel or the rudder pedals. The normal mode is
engaged if:
– the NLG is on the ground, and
General Description: – the NWSCM detects no system failure
The cockpit crew commands the steering system by using either:

– the steering hand wheel
– the rudder pedals
The steering hand wheel is used for low speed steering control. The rudder
pedals are used for high speed steering control. The brake control system
gives wheel speed to the steering control system. Sensors on the hand
wheel and rudder pedals give position signals to the Nose Wheel Steering
Control Module (NWSCM).
The NWSCM controls the steering hydraulic system. The hydraulic steering
system gives hydraulic pressure, as required, to the steering motor on the
NLG.
There are two modes of steering operation:
– normal mode (active steering)
– free-castor mode (passive steering)
Figure 1: The Embraer steering control system
A E F S TE E RING R AMP INP H H WIR IN G DIA GR AMS

C KP T C ALL
32-53-50
D
I
S
E
N
32-53-51
AC G PU G
G ROUND
SERVICE S W MIC /P HONE
E
RH CBP COCKPI T N
G
A
IN USE G
E
DC BUS 2
B
NW S 5
B
D C
ASC B
NOSE LANDING GE
AR
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
FEEDBACK SENSOR 1 MAU 2 (SSM 31-41-80)

FWD RAMP PANEL
, LEFT FWD FU S
K STEERING DIS
ARM SWITCH
(FUSELAGE)
NWSCM
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-09) H
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-07)
COPILOT PEDAL
RVDT 1
PILOT YO
KE LEFT
COCKPIT
(SDS 32-50)
ASC B
(MPP 32-53-03)
(SDS 32-50) STEERING DIS
ARM SWITCH
G
(MPP 32-53-01) (PILOT)
BACKPLANE BUS
F
J K
(SDS 32-50)
PILOT PEDAL
RVDT 2
COCKPI T
(MPP 32-53-07)
G
EICAS PILOT YO
KE RIGHT COCKPI T
L A
(SDS 32-50)
8O.O MTO 8O.O
(MPP 32-53-03) ATTCS STEERING DIS
ARM SWITCH
G
(COPILOT)
F
2O.7 N1 2O.7
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
R EV
MAU 1 (SSM31-41-80)
IGN IGN
(SDS 32-50)
NOSE LANDING GE
AR A 463 û ITT 463 û
A
9O.O N2 9O.O
(MPP 32-53-07 )
1OOO FF P P H 1OOO
FEEDBACK SENS
OR 2 FUE L QTY
LANDING G EAR
UP
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO
CMC
K
1
ASC B
BACKPLANE BUS
VIB APU
1OO % 1O2O û C
C ABIN
ALT -5 FT
R ATE -5 FPM
12 81 11û 1O6 û P -64.6 P SI
P RE SS TEMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT
C
TRIMS
S PDBR K R OLL P ITCH
(SDS 32-50) S F
(SSM 45-45-80)
UP
(MPP 32-53-09 ) 22
2 YAW
S /F
NOSE LANDING EAR

G BAY
COCKPI T (SSM 31-53-80)
STEERING NOSE WHEEL TEERING

S
HANDWHEEL RH CENTREFUSSELAGESTUB WING
MANIFOLD
(SDS 32-50) (SSM 32-30-
80)
D
(MPP 32-53-05 ) FWD AVIONICS COMPT
LDG DOWN LANDING G
EAR
E MAU 1 (SSM31-41-80 )
(SDS 32-50)
SELECTOR VALVE
No. HYDRAULIC
2 YSTEM
S
(MPP 32-52-
01)
NOSE LANDING GE
AR PSEM 1 ASC B NOSE LANDING EAR
G
L EG END:
BACKPLANE BUS
STEERING OVER
TRAVEL TOWING LIGHT BOX
SENSOR
ELECTRICAL
HYDRAULIC
L (SSM 32-60-80)
J
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-13) (SSM 32-60-80 )
190
Steering hand wheel
The steering hand wheel is attached to the left side of the cockpit. It has a
switch and a rotary-variable displacement-transducer (RVDT). The hand
wheel must be pushed down to activate the switch.
Pushing the hand wheel down and turning it clockwise makes the aircraft
turn to the right. Pushing the hand wheel down and turning it counter-clock-
wise makes the aircraft turn to the left.
The RVDT changes the physical position of the hand wheel into electrical
signals. The electrical signals from the RVDT are transmitted as steering
commands to the Nose Wheel Control Module.
The maximum steering angle possible using the hand wheel is +/- 76 de-
grees. The NWSCM limits the maximum possible steering angle as aircraft
wheel speed increases.
The steering angle response to hand wheel position is non-linear:
– turning the hand wheel from 0 degrees to 40 degrees gives a steering

angle of 10 degrees
– turning the hand wheel from 40 degrees to 80 degrees gives a steering
angle up to 76 degrees
Figure 2: Steering Hand wheel
190
Steering pedal input
The steering hand wheel is attached to the left side of the cockpit. It incor-
porates a switch and a rotary variable displacement transducer.
Pushing the hand wheel down and turning it causes the aircraft to turn left
or right. The RVDTs transmit the position of the hand wheel to the NWSCM.
The maximum steering angle possible using the hand wheel is 76 degrees
and is limited further by the NWSCM as aircraft wheel speed increases. At
taxi speeds from 40 to 100 knots the steering angle will be reduced down to
7 degrees.
Steering angle response to hand wheel position is non-linear:
• turning the hand wheel from 0 to 40 degrees results in a steering

angle of 10 degrees and
• from 40 to 80 degrees results in a steering angle of up to 76 de-
grees
Figure 3: Steering pedal input
7 degrees
Nose Wheel Steering Control Module

(NWSCM)
76
de
gr
ee
s
190
Pedal RVDTs
The steering input of the rudder pedals is sensed by 2 RVDTs installed in

the cockpit control linkage. Rudder pedal position is transmitted from the 2
RVDTs to the NWSCM. Pushing the left or right steering pedal turns the air-
craft left or right respectively.
Steering deflection using the pedals is limited to 7 degrees left or right with
weight on wheels. Whenever the steering hand wheel is pushed down, the
steering pedal mode is automatically disengaged, and vice versa. Transition
from one mode to the other will be smooth.
The steering pedal mode is automatically active after powering up and if no

failure in the steering system is detected.
Figure 4: Pedal RVDTs
RVDT
Nose Wheel Steering

Control Module
(NWSCM)
190
The steering manifold components
Relief valve
The primary components of the steering manifold are the:
This valve gives protection to the chambers of the actuator from over pres-
Selector valve sure (which can occur if you tow the aircraft with the steering in the active
This is a three-way valve with two positions, which is usually closed. It has mode)
a three-way solenoid.
Filter
EHSV
The filter gives protection to the components on the manifold from contami-
This is a two -stage, four-way valve, with a slide and a dry-torque motor. A nation.
LVDT is attached to the second stage spool valve, to give indications of the
position of the spool.
Anti-shimmy valve
Bypass valve
The two anti-shimmy valves are retrictor valves, which are in parallel with the
cylinder line.
The bypass valve connects two ports of the steering manifold to give the
free-castor mode.
Compensator
The compensator is a spring-loaded piston, with a low-pressure relief-valve.

It is in the manifold.
Inlet check valve
This low-pressure check valve keeps the fluid in the manifold if the supply
decreases.
Anti-cavitation check valve
This low-pressure check valve causes return fluid to go into the actuator.
This prevents cavitation at the cylinder ports.
Figure 5: The steering manifold
Steering manifold
190
The manifold operation
The solenoid valve is a normally closed, two position three-way valve.
When energized, it moves to allow hydraulic pressure to reposition the by-

pass valve, allowing hydraulic pressure from the inlet to the servo valve. De-
pending on signals from the NWSCM, the servo valve directs pressure
through outlet C1 or C2 on either side of the steering motor to move the nose
wheels. At the same time the opposite side is connected to return.
The position of the servo valve is continuously monitored from the NWSCM
by a Linear Variable Displacement Transducer (LVDT).
Whenever the solenoid valve is de-energized, the bypass valve connects

both nose wheel steering cylinder chambers hydraulically. This allows free
castoring of the nose wheels.
The compensator provides a minimum pressure and fluid supply within the
steering system in case of loss of supply pressure or free castor mode, nec-
essary for the damping function of the restrictors and to compensate thermal
effects.
The anti-cavitation valves ensure that fluid return pressure is always availa-
ble in the steering actuator chambers. This prevents cavitation during steer-
ing rates or oscillations.
The anti-shimmy valves or restrictors provide a damping effect by preventing

rapid fluid movements after, for example, a lateral shock or in the free castor
mode. These valves, together with the anti-cavitation valve and the compen-
sator, ensure effective shimmy damping in the free castor mode.
The relief valves open to prevent over pressure in the system in case of ex-
cessive external loads to the wheels, for example, during aircraft towing with
the system inadvertently active.
Figure 6: The manifold operation
Disarm Pilot Disarm Copilot

Switch Pedals Switch Pedals
(Pilot) (Copilot)
Sensor Sensor
Switch Hand Sensor
Wheel
Disarm
Switch EICAS
(Ground) Nose Wheel Steering
Control Module
Towing (NWSCM)
Lights CMC
EHSV
LVDT
Sensor
Sensor
Solenoid
Steering Valve
Motor
Anti
Shimmy
Valve
C1-4
CV Filter
P-4
ACV Hydr.
RV System 2
C2-4 Bypass R-4

Anti Servo Valve
Valve Comp.
Shimmy
Valve
190
The steering motor
The steering motor is attached to the NLG main fitting.
It consists of:
• two hydraulic cylinders with pistons attached to a

• geared rack, driving the
• circular gear on the main fitting
Hydraulic pressure from the steering manifold makes the steering motor
move, and torque links transfer the torque from the steering motor to the low-
er part of the sliding tube and axle assembly. Two steering - angle resolvers
are installed on the NLG, sensing the position of the sliding tube to provide
a closed loop steering control. One will feedback the position to the NWSCM
control channel., the other one to the NWSCM monitor channel.
The steering motor operates over a range of 76 degrees left and 76 degrees
right. The steering motor will not operate beyond this range. However, the
NLG can be steered passively during towing over a range or 170 degrees
left and right.
Figure 7: Steering motor
SCM
Monitor
Steering angel resolvers
udraulic cylinders with pistions
Steering maniflold
Steering motor
190
Feedback Assembly
Two feedback sensors are installed at the NLG for steering angle position
feedback. The sensors are mechanically linked to the sliding tube via a gear,
steering cuff and torque links.
One feedback sensor transmits actual steering angle position to the

NWSCM control channel., and the other feedback sensor transmits actual
steering angle position to the NWSCM monitor channel.
Figure 8: Feedback assembly
190
Steering system disengagement
The steering system can be disengaged manually using the pilot or copilot
disarming switch on the control yokes, or the fuselage disarming switch on
the L/H forward fuselage for ground handling.
As long as the disarming switch on the control yoke is actuated, the NWSCM
will switch to free castor mode. When the switch is released, the NWSCM
‘will go to the commanded steering operation. The disarming switch on the
fwd fuselage is installed above the electrical ground connector. It is a guard-
ed toggle switch, to either operate in NMSCM controlled steering in the “En-
gage” position or in the Free Castor mode in the disengage position.
Whenever the steering is disengaged a “STEER DISC” status message is

displayed on the EICAS.
Figure 9: Steering system disengagement
C F
D E D
STEERING RAMP
CKPT
INPH
CALL
I
S
E
AC GPU N
G
GROUND
SERVICE SW MIC/PHONE
E
N
G
A
IN USE G
E
RH CBP COCKPIT
A DC BUS 2
NWS 5
B
A
NLG
FWD AVIONICS COMPT FEEDBACK
PILOT YOKE LEFT COCKPIT
SENSOR 2 G
H
MAU 2 (SSM 31-41-80)
STEERING DISARMING
J SWITCH (PILOT) NLG
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-09
NWSCM FEEDBACK
SENSOR 1
M (SDS 32-50) H
(MPP 32-53-09)
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-07)
G
H
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-01)
COPILOT YOKE RIGHT COCKPIT
STEERING DISARMING BACKPLANE BUS

SWITCH (COPILOT)
COCKPIT
B
G N EICAS
8O.O MTO
ATTCS
8O.O COCKPIT
(SDS 32-50)
PEDAL SENSOR
(MPP 32-53-07)
1 RVDT
2O.7
REV
N1 2O.7
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-05)
K
IGN ° ° IGN
A 463 ITT 463 A
FWD RAMP PANEL LEFT FWD FUS 9O.O
1OOO
N2
FF PPH 1OOO
9O.O
ASCB
COCKPIT
LANDING GEAR
STEERING DISARMING UP
FUEL QTY
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO
SWITCH
1
PEDAL SENSOR
VIB APU
1O2O ° C
2 RVDT
1OO %
L
CABIN
ALT -5 FT
12 81 11 ° 1O6 °
RATE
P -64.6
-5 FPM
PSI (SDS 32-50)
N F (MPP 32-53-05)
TRIMS
SPDBRK ROLL PITCH
S F
M
UP
22
2 YAW
(SDS 32-50) S/F
(MPP 32-53-07) NLG

(SSM 31-53-80)
OVERTRAVEL
SENSOR
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-13)
J
COCKPIT
STEERING MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80)
HANDWHEEL FEEDBACK A
(SDS 32-50)
PSEM 1
(MPP 32-53-05) FEEDBACK B
D C
E
(SSM 32-60-80)
BACKPLANE BUS
190
The NLG towing light box
On the L/H side of the Nose Landing Gear a towing light box is installed. The
towing light box green indication will illuminate when towing is allowed, and
a red indication illuminates if towing is not allowed. The towing light function
is operative when DC BUS 2 or HOT BUS is applied, selected by a toggle
switch on the towing light box.
The NWSCM will bring up the red light to indicate that towing is prohibited if:
• either the brakes are activated,

• the park brake is activated or
• the steering system is active.
If the green light is illuminated, towing with a towbar or with a towbar less
system is permitted.
Please note that the maximum permitted angle for towing is 170 degrees to
each side.
Figure 10: The steering system
WIR IN G DIA GR AMS

C F
D E S TE E RING
D
R AMP INP H
C KP T C ALL 32-53-50
I
S
E
N
32-53-51
AC G PU G
G ROUND
SERVICE S W MIC /P HONE
E
N
G
A
IN USE G
E
RH CBP COCKPIT
A DC BUS 2
B NWS
A
NLG
FWD AVIONICS COMPT FEEDBACK
PILOT YOKE LEFT COCKPIT SENSOR 2 G
STEERING DISARMING
MAU 2 (SSM 31-41-80)
H
J SWITCH (PILOT) NLG
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-09
NWSCM
FEEDBACK
SENSOR 1
H
M (SDS 32-50)
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-07)
(MPP 32-53-09)
G
H
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-53-01)
COPILOT YOKE RIGHT COCKPIT
STEERING DISARMING BACKPLANE BUS

SWITCH (COPILOT)
B
C OC KP IT
E IC AS
G N 8O.O MTO 8O.O COCKPIT
ATTCS
(SDS 32-50) PEDAL SENSOR
(MPP 32-53-07) 1 RVDT
2O.7
R EV
N1 2O.7
(SDS 32-50)
K
(MPP 32-53-05)
IGN û û IGN
A 463 ITT 463 A
FWD RAMP PANEL LEFT FWD FUS 9O.O N2 9O.O
1OOO FF PPH 1OOO ASCB
COCKPIT
LANDING GEAR
STEERING DISARMING UP
FUE L QTY
9OO FQ LBS 3OOO
SWITCH 1 PEDAL SENSOR

VIB APU
1O2O û C
2 RVDT
L
1OO %
C ABIN
ALT -5 FT
R ATE -5 FPM
12 81 11û 1O6 û P -64.6 PSI (SDS 32-50)
N F
PRE SS TEMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT
S PDBR K TRIMS
R OLL PITCH
(MPP 32-53-05)
S F
M
UP
22
2 YAW
(SDS 32-50) S /F
(MPP 32-53-07) NLG

(S S M31-53-80)
OVERTRAVEL
SENSOR
J
(SDS 32-50)
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
(MPP 32-53-13)
MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80)
C OC KP IT S TE E RING
HANDWHE E L FEEDBACK A
PSEM 1
(SDS 32-50)
(MP P 32-53-05) FEEDBACK B
D C
E
(SSM 32-60-80)
BACKPLANE BUS
190
NLG overtravel
The maximum allowable steering angle of +/- 170 degrees is monitored by

an overtravel proximity sensor on the NLG shock strut. In case the maximum
towing range has been exceeded, a steering overtravel target will be
sheared off. Via the overtravel proximity sensor, the PSEM 1 will detect the
lack of this target. As a result, on the EICAS the caution message “LG NO
DISPATCH” will be indicated.
Figure 11: NLG overtravel
Overtravel proximity sensor
NLG
LG NO DISPATCH
END
PSEM1
190
Nose wheel steering Control module Align the nose wheel before retraction
The steering is controlled through the Nose Wheel Steering Control Module, When the aircraft is in flight, and before the landing gear is retracted, the
called NWSCM. NLG is fully extended. The WOW (Weight-On-Wheels) switches send a
weight-off-wheels signal to the NWSCM, which then removes the electrical
and hydraulic power from the steering manifold. At the same time, cams in
The NWSCM is installed into 2 slots of MAU 2 and electrically powered by the NLG put the sliding tube in the neutral position.
the DC BUS 2, or by selection in the towing light box from the HOT BUS. The
control module incorporates a control channel which commands the steering
system, and a monitor channel that communicates with the EICAS and the
CMC for system status and failure indication. System electronic rigging
Whenever the Air/Ground System and/or the nose gear shock absorber
proximity sensor indicate an aircraft in-flight condition, the NWSCM is After replacement of a component in the nose-wheel steering system, the
switched off. This prevents steering commands during gear retraction and NWSCM records the rigging offset of each RVDT. To do this, the steering
flight. The NWSCM controls the servo valve and selector valve in the steer- pedals are locked in the neutral position with rigging pins.
ing manifold, and the lights in the towing light box. It receives feedback in- The CMC (Central Maintenance Computer) then sends a signal to the
formation from the hand wheel unit RVDT, the 2 pedal sensor RVDTs and NWSCM (which is a manual selection on the CMC page), which measures
the three disarming switches, located on the pilots and copilots yoke and the the offset of each RVDT. It does this twenty times, then calculates the aver-
fwd fuselage. age of these values. If the result is a difference of not more than +/- 1 degree,
the NWSCM records the values and sends a “rigging successful” message
to the CMC. If the result is more than +/- 1 degree, it sends a “rigging not
A servo valve LVDT sends servo valve position information in the manifold, successful” message and no values are recorded. Additional trimming in-
and 2 position resolvers signal the actual steering position. In addition, park- puts can be entered in increments of 0.1 degrees, to a maximum value of 1
ing brake pressure, brake activation and Aircraft On Ground signals are degree.
monitored by the NWSCM.
Towing
The two towing-indication-lights (red and green) tell maintenance personnel

when the aircraft can be towed. When the green light shows, the brakes are
off, the emergency/parking brake is off, and the selector valve on the steer-
ing manifold is not energized. After operation of a nose-wheel steering dis-
arming-switch, the ports of the steering manifold are all connected to the
return line of the hydraulic system. The nose wheel steering is then in free-
castor mode.
Figure 12: Nose wheel steering
C No 2 HYDRAULIC RETURN
SYSTEM PRESSURE
NOSE LANDING GEAR BAY
STEERING MANIFOLD
(SDS 32-50)
(MPP 32-52-01) COMPENSATOR
B A
C FILTER
CHECK
VALVE
B BYPASS
SOLENOID VALVE
VALVE
SERVO
VALVE
ANTI-SHIMMY ANTI-SHIMMY
VALVE VALVE
RELIEF
VALVE
A
STEERING MOTOR
LEGEND:
D
190
Continuous Monitoring
The NWSCM monitors continuously for component and system failures. In

most cases, the NWS will operate in the bypass mode if a failure is detected.
After a failure, the NWS remains in the bypass mode until the next NWSCM
power-up.
The NWSCM monitors the following NWS components for failures:

– Hand wheel sensor-voltage
– Pedal sensor-voltage
– Steering manifold servo valve-voltage, current
– Steering manifold selector valve-current
– Steering angle sensor-voltage
– Sensor excitation-voltage
The NWSCM monitors the NWS system for failures:

– Pedal sensor 1 & 2 -asymmetry
– Steering angle sensor 1 & 2 -asymmetry
– NWSCM control channel command - compared to monitor channel
command
– NWS - runaway
– NWS - jam
– Wheel speed - out of range
– Steering angle - drift during flight
– Wheel speed data - not updated by the BCMs
– WOW data - not updated by the PSEMs
Figure 13: Continuous Monitoring
190
.
Demand Control I P
D EHSV Hydraulic Gear NLG
Limiter Loop Gain A Motor
Wheel-
speed
D U Demodu- U NLG
A lator Position
D D Handwheel Sensor
A A Enable
Demodu- Demodu-
lator lator
NWSCM
Command Command
Pedal Sensor Handwheel
Pilot / Copilot
Figure 14: Continuous monitoring
190
The pedal steering mode
Whenever the steering system is powered up, the pedal steering mode is ac-
tive. When the R/H pedal is moved forward, the NWSCM senses this move-
ment via the pedal sensor RVDT’s and energizes the solenoid valve in the
steering manifold. Hydraulic pressure from hydraulic system 2 can now
move the bypass valve, and hydraulic pressure becomes available at the
servo valve. The NWSCM then moves the servo valve to direct hydraulic
pressure via the connection C1 to the piston of the steering actuator. The op-
posite side of the actuator is connected at the same time via the servo valve
to return. The turning movement will be transferred through the torque links
to the nose wheels. The NWSCM will receive the actual deflection informa-
tion from the nose wheels, and will limit it to 7 degrees.
If the L/H pedal is now pushed forward, the NWSCM moves the servo valve
to the opposite side, connecting hydraulic pressure via C2 to the other side
of the steering actuator and draining off the opposite side. The wheel will de-
flect to maximum 7 degrees to the left side.
Figure 15: The pedal steering mode

(Pilot) (Copilot)
Sensor Sensor
Switch Hand Sensor
Wheel
Disarm
Switch EICAS
Control Module
Towing (NWSCM)
Lights CMC
EHSV
LVDT
Sensor
Sensor
Solenoid
Steering Valve
Motor
Anti
Shimmy
Valve
C1-4
CV Filter
P-4
ACV Hydr.
RV System 2
C2-4 Bypass R-4

Anti Servo Valve Comp.
+ - 7° nose wheel deflection Shimmy Valve
Valve
190
The hand wheel steering mode
When the steering hand wheel on the pilot’s side is pressed down, the
NWSCM will change to the hand wheel steering mode by energizing the so-
lenoid valve and allowing hydraulic fluid to the servo valve. An extended
range of up to +/- 76 degrees nose wheel deflection is now available.
If the hand wheel is moved to the right side, the NWSCM will move the servo
valve, and hydraulic pressure is available to move the steering actuator to
deflect the nose wheels to the right. Via the position sensors the NWSCM
receives the position feedback signal to control and limit the steering. If the
hand wheel is released, the system will automatically go to the pedal steer-
ing mode. In case the nose wheels are still deflected, they will be smoothly
moved to the pedal position related angle of deflection.
If the aircraft takes off, the NWSCM will be switched off and the nose wheel
will be centered by the internal centering mechanism when the shock strut
extends.
Figure 16: Hand wheel steering mode

(Pilot) (Copilot)
Sensor Sensor
Switch Hand Sensor
Wheel
Disarm
Switch EICAS
Control Module
Towing (NWSCM)
Lights CMC
EHSV
LVDT
Sensor
Sensor
Solenoid
Steering Valve
Motor
Anti
Shimmy
Valve
C1-4
CV Filter
P-4
ACV Hydr.
RV System 2
C2-4 Bypass R-4

Valve
190
The free castor mode
When the steering system is deactivated it enters the free castor mode. This
could happen either by manually deactivating the system by one of the three
steering disconnect switches, or automatically in case of a steering system
failure. Through the bypass valve in the steering manifold, the hydraulic
chambers of the steering actuator are connected, and the nose wheels may
deflect due to external forces. The anti-shimmy valves, anti-cavitation valve
and relief valves guarantee shimmy damping in the free castor mode.
The NLG has an inclination of 8 degrees forward to centre the nose wheels
automatically in the direction of ground run. Towing with angles of up to +/-
170 degrees is possible in the free castor mode. Whenever the aircraft is in
flight, the signal from the NWSCM to the solenoid valve in the manifold is de-
energized and the steering system is in the free castor mode. This allows the
centering of the nose wheels and inhibit steering commands.
If the maximum active steering angle of +/- 76 degrees is exceeded for any
reason, the NWSCM will also switch to the free castor mode.
Figure 17: Free castor mode

(Pilot) (Copilot)
Sensor Sensor
Switch Hand Sensor
Wheel
Disarm
Switch EICAS
Control Module
Towing (NWSCM)
Lights CMC
EHSV
LVDT
Sensor
Sensor
Solenoid
Steering Valve
Motor
Anti
Shimmy
Valve
C1-4
CV Filter
P-4
ACV Hydr.
RV System 2
C2-4 Bypass R-4

Valve
190
Steering failures
Whenever a safety-critical failure, such as a servo valve failure, or a power

supply failure, is detected by the NWSCM, the nose wheel steering is
switched to the free castor mode. On the EICAS a “STEER FAIL” caution is
displayed when the landing gear is down. After this system disengagement,
the nose wheel follows freely in the direction of ground run, and steering can
be carried out by use of differential braking and/or by rudder commands. Re-
activation of the system is only possible if the power up built in test is per-
formed successfully.
A “STEER FAULT” advisory message will be displayed on the EICAS in the

case of a degraded function of the steering system after a failure has been
detected by the NWSCM and the aircraft is on the ground.
The status message “STEER DISC” will be displayed if the steering system
is disconnected - for example with the steering disarming switches.
A “LG NO DISPATCH” caution appears in case of nose wheel steering over-

travel, PSEM or weight on wheel system fault.
For further fault investigation the CMC has to be used, which will indicate the
detected failure in detail.
Figure 18: Steering failures
Map Pl an Sys t ems
STEER FAIL
STEER FAULT
STEER DISC
LG NO DISPATCH
END
TCAS WX Checkl i s t
190
32-60 Position Indicating and warning

Introduction
The subsystem has three functions, which are to:

• Give indications of the position or condition of each landing gear unit and
of the NLG doors to the crew
• Supply WOW or WOFFW data for landing gear control, and to other air-
craft systems
• Give warnings of dangerous landing gear conditions to the crew or main-
tenance personnel, other landing gear subsystems, and aircraft systems.
General
Where there are two proximity sensors for a function, each of the two sen-
sors sends its outputs to a different PSEM. Thus the system will continue to
give indications or warnings if one component is defective.
Position
The subsystem uses proximity sensors to give indications of the position or

condition of the landing gear units (extended, retracted, in transit, WOW or
WOFFW to the crew (through the EICAS display). It also supplies position
data about the landing gear to other aircraft systems.
Warning
If a defect occurs, the PSEMs send messages to the EICAS and CMC.
There are two towing-indication lights (red and green) to tell the mainte-
nance personnel when the nose wheel steering is disengaged. Thus it tells
them when the aircraft can be towed.
Figure 1: Position indications and warning
190
The landing gear position indication
The landing gear indicating system processes the information coming from
the gear lock proximity sensors and control lever signals, to provide landing
gear position indication on the right side of the EICAS display.
Two proximity sensors which sense each locked condition, down-locked or

up-locked, are installed at each landing gear leg. They are segregated in
systems 1 and 2. The locking status from the proximity sensors and control
lever position are processed by PSEMs and sent digitally via ASCB to the
EICAS.
The landing gear indication system has the following components:
• 2 Proximity Sensor Electronics Modules,

• Nose Gear Down lock Sensors,
• Nose Gear Up lock Sensors,
• Main Gear Down lock Sensors,
• Main Gear Up lock Sensors,
• Nose Gear Door sensors and
• Towing Lights.
Figure 2: Landing gear position indication
LH CBP COCKPIT
DC ESS BUS 1 WIR IN G DIA GR AMS

RH ML G
32-61-52
DNLK SENSOR 2
32-61-51
(SDS 32-60-00)
LG SYS 1
5
LG S YS 2
5 32-61-50
(MPP 32-61-07)
PWR 1 P WR 1 32-33-50
2
28V DC C OC KP IT
28V DC E IC AS
RH MLG DOWN SENSOR

8O.O MTO 8O.O
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT ATTCS
MAU 3 (SSM 31-41-80)

RH ML G 2O.7 N1 2O.7
R H MLG UPLOC K B OX DNLK SENSOR 1

R EV
A F (SDS 32-60-00)
B E PSEM 2 IGN û û IGN

463 463
(MPP 32-61-07) A
ITT
A
ASCB 9O.O
1OOO
N2
FF P P H 1OOO
9O.O
LANDING G EAR
RH MLG FUE L QTY

9OO FQ LBS 3OOO UP
NLG UPLOC K B OX RH MLG UP SENSOR 2 1

UPLK SENSOR 1 VIB APU
1OO % 1O2O û C
(SDS 32-60-00) RH ML G C ABIN
BACKPLANE BUS
ALT -5 FT
R ATE -5 FPM
(MPP 32-61-09) NLG UP SENSOR 2 12 81 11û 1O6 û P -64.6 P SI
E UPLK SENSOR 2 P RE SS TEMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT

TRIMS
S PDBR K R OLL P ITCH
S F
(SDS 32-60-00) UP
NLG DOWN SENSOR 2 22

(MPP 32-61-09) 2
S /F
YAW
LH MLG UP SENSOR 2 (S S M31-53-80)
D LH MLG DOWN SENSOR 2

(SDS 32-60-00)
(MPP 32-61-01)
D
EXTEND
NLG RETRACT
UP
UPLK SENSOR 1 NLG D NK

C
L O EL
RETRACT FWD AVIONICS COMP T
(SDS 32-60-00) UPLK SENSOR 2 LANDING G EAR R
MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80)
(MPP 32-61-05)
(SDS 32-60-00) C ONTR OL-LEV ER EXTEND
(MPP 32-61-05)
F
DN
(SSM 32-30-80) PSEM 1
C FWD AVIONICS COMPT
RH MLG DOWN SENSOR 1 MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80)
NLG UP SENSOR 1
CMC
A
BACKPLANE BUS
NLG DOWN SENSOR 1
NLG
RH MLG UP SENSOR 1
C DNLK SENSOR 2
BACKPLANE BUS
(SDS 32-60-00) LH MLG UP SENSOR 1
(SDS 32-60-00)
ASCB
(MPP 32-61-03)
(MPP 32-61-01)
1
NLG
LH MLG DOWN SENSOR

DNLK SENSOR 1
(SDS 32-60-00) (SSM 45-45-80)
G (MPP 32-61-03)
28V DC
LH MLG RH CBP COCKPI T
LH MLG UPLK SENSOR 2 LH MLG DC ESS BUS 2

UPLK SENSOR 1
(SDS 32-60-00)
(MPP 32-61-09)
E DNLK SENSOR 1
(SDS 32-60-00) (SDS 32-60-00)
G (MPP 32-61-09)
LH MLG (MPP 32-61-07)
5 5
LG SYS 1 LG SYS 2
D DNLK SENSOR
(SDS 32-60-00)
2
PWR 2 PWR 2
B LH MLG UPLOC K B OX
(MPP 32-61-07)
28V DC
190
PSEM 1 and 2
Each PSEM is a dual slot, single channel MAU utility module. Each module
is provided with two front panel and two back plane connectors. Control Modules, the Actuator Control Electronics and the generic Input/
Output Modules.
PSEM 1 is installed in MAU 1, powered from DC Essential BUS 1, and

PSEM 2 can be found in MAU 3, powered from DC Essential Bus 2.
PSEM 1 receives inputs from the following proximity sensors:
• 4 Nose Gear Door Sensors,

• 1 Nose wheel steering travel position sensor,
• 3 forward passenger door,
• 3 service door, and
• 4 forward baggage door sensors;
• 3 landing gear up lock sensors,
• 3 landing gear down lock sensors,
• 3 WOW sensors and 2 landing gear control lever switches.
PSEM 2 receives inputs from the following proximity sensors:
• 4 Ground Spoiler position sensors,

• 4 aft baggage door,
• 3 aft service door, and
• 3 aft passenger door sensors;
• 3 landing gear up lock sensors,
• 3 landing gear down lock sensors,
• 3 WOW sensors and
• 2 landing gear control lever switches.
The PSEMs use the input signals to forward position information to the air-
craft via the ASCB and LAN. The WOW information is also sent to the Flight
Figure 3: PSEM 1 and 2
Nose gear doors position MAU 1 +28V aircraft power and return
proximity sensor 4 EA aircraft 28V essential bus 1
Nose wheel steering travel

position proximity sensor 1 EA
Forward passenger door

position proximity sensor 3 EA
Forward service door

position proximity sensor
3 EA
Forward baggage door Landing gear solenoid value

position proximity sensor 4 EA extend/retract solenoids
4 EA
SLOT
Landing gear control lever extend / 2 3 4 5 Flight Control Modules (FCMs)
retract position proximity switch 4 EA WOW inputs (Wire AND)
32 EA
LAN
Landing gear uplock position Actuator Control Electronics (ACEs)
ASCB left
proximity sensor 6 EA WOW inputs (Wire AND)
24 EA
ASCB right
Landing gear downlock position Generic I/O modules
proximity sensor 6 EA SLOT WOW inputs
12 13 14 15 2 EA
Landing gear weight off wheels
proximity sensor 6 EA
Aft passenger door position

Aft service door position

Aft baggage door position

Ground spoiler position +28V aircraft power and return

aircraft 28V essential bus 2
proximity sensor 4 EA MAU 3
190
Proximity sensor MLG proximity sensor
A proximity sensor uses variable reluctance technology, which senses if a The main landing gears are equipped with up lock and down lock proximity
ferromagnetic target or strong magnetic field is near. If a target is more than sensors.
1.5 mm (0.059 in) from its related sensor, the sensor sends a “far” signal to
the applicable PSEM. If the target is less than 1.5 mm (0.059 in) from its re-
lated sensor, the sensor sends a “near” signal to the PSEM. The two up lock proximity sensors per leg are installed in the up lock box to
sense the gear when it is up and locked. The two down lock proximity sen-
Because of the way that the variable reluctance technology is used, the tar- sors are attached to the lower locking stay.
get does not have to touch the sensor for the system to operate.
The proximity sensors send position and status signals to the PSEM for the:
When the gear is down and locked the metal targets of the upper locking
• Aircraft on ground, or in flight (2 sensors on each leg) stay can be sensed by the proximity sensors.
• NLG doors open or closed (one sensor on each door)
• Landing gear up and locked or not locked in the up position (2 sensors on
each up lock)
• Landing gear down and locked or not locked in the down position (2 sen-
sors on each down lock)
NLG proximity sensors
The position of the nose landing gear doors is monitored by 4 proximity sen-
sors. Two are installed on the left side and two on the right side of the nose
gear wheel well.
When the doors are closing, metal targets will end up in front of the proximity
sensors. The proximity sensors send the signal to the PSEMs, two for each
PSEM.
If at least one of the four nose gear doors is not closed after nose gear up
lock or one of the forward nose gear doors is not closed after nose gear
down lock the LG NOSE DOOR OPEN caution message will show up on the
EICAS. The message will also be activated in case of a failed nose gear door
sensor or loss of valid ASCB communication from one or both PSEM’s.
Figure 4: Proximity sensors
190
Landing Gear Position indication
The locking status from the proximity sensors and control lever position sig-
nal are processed by the PSEMs and sent via digital ASCB format to the EI-
CAS. EICAS indication of the Landing Gear Position consists of three
coloured symbols. From left to right, each box represents the position of the
left, nose and right landing gear.
For the landing gear locked down, green circles enclosing a green word
"DOWN" are indicated.
If the control lever is moved and the gears are in transition amber cross
hatches are shown.
If the landing gear is locked in the up position, white squares enclosing a

white word "UP" are shown.
A disagreement between the control lever position and any landing gear leg
position for more than 20 seconds will activate the message LG LEVER DIS-
AGREE and the position in disagreement will change its' colour to red. In
case of ASCB communication loss or invalid ASCB data from both PSEMs,
the parameters will be defaulted to FALSE condition, changing the indication
to red and indicating the LG LEVER DISAGREE message after 20 seconds.
Figure 5: Landing Gear Position Indication
93. 8 T 0- 1
T/ 94. 0 LG LEVER DISAG
LANDING GEAR SENSORS
R MLG DOWNLOCK OFF OFF
UPLOCK, WOW
0. 0 N1 0. 0
NLG DOWNLOCK
UPLOCK, WOW
L MLG DOWNLOCK
UPLOCK, WOW 26° I TT
T 28°
0. 0 N2 0. 0
0. 0 FF PPH0. 0 11 12 1
LANDI NG GEAR
FUE
U L QT
QTY
5510 5520
FQ LB
L
11030
DN DN
OI L VP APU
OFF
CABI N
CA
ALT 19000 FT
UP RATE
RA 0 FPM
1 45° 48° P 0. 0 PSI
PRE
RESS T MP
TE L
LP HP L E
LF 2915 FT
DN
LOCK SLA
LAT/ FLA
LAP/ SPDB
DBRK TRI MS
TR
REL SPD
DBRK PI TC
TCH
S F ROLL
RO
FUL
ULL
0
DN S F
S/
LANDING GEAR
CONTROL LEVER
190
Figure 6: Landing gear position indication
UP Condition
Number xUPLK1
Sensor / Discrete Inputs
xUPLK2 xDNLK1 xDNLK2 CMD_EXTEND
Sensor Sensor Sensor Sensor Sub-Eq.
Display Outputs
x
Disagree
x
Indication
1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TR*
2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TR*
3 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE UP UP
4 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE UP* UP UP
5 FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE DN* DOWN DOWN
DOWN 6
7
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
DN
UP
DOWN
UP
8 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TR*

9 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE UP
UP
UP
DOWN 10 FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TR*

11 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TR*
12 FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
13 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TR*

14 FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
15 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE UP UP
16 TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE UP* UP UP
17 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE UP UP
Gear Uplock (white): 18 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE UP* UP UP
- Gear uplock satisfied 19 TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE DN* DOWN DOWN
20 TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
21 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE DN*

Gear in Transit (amber) (less than 20 seconds): DOWN DOWN
- Gear in transit during extension / retraction 22 FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
23 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE UP UP
24 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
Gear Downlock (green):

25 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE UP
- Gear downlock satisfied UP
26 FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
27 TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE UP UP

Gear Unsafe (red) (more than 20(TBC) seconds):
28 TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN
- Gear unsafe condition DOWN
- CAS “LG LEVER DISAGREE“ warning message 29 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE UP UP
30 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
No Valid Data (red): 31 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE UP UP
- Erroneous / No Data from PSS 32 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE DN DOWN
190
Air/Ground (WOW) system
Introduction
The air/ground system is part of the position and warning system, controlled
by the 2 Proximity Sensor Evaluation Modules (PSEM). The PSEMs each
make an analysis of the proximity sensors for:
– Landing Gear System
– Ground Spoiler System
– Aircraft Doors
Subsystems / Components
The air/ground system has the following sub-systems / components:

– NLG Weight On Wheels Sensor
– MLG Weight On Wheels Sensor
General Description
The air/ground system uses proximity sensors on the NLG and MLG to de-
termine whether the aircraft is on the ground or in flight.
The proximity sensors are passive sensors. The proximity sensor has an
ohm-inductive impedance. When the target is near, the sensor changes the
impedance. The change of impedance is detected by the PSEM.
There are 2 weight-on-wheels (WOW) proximity sensors attached to the
NLG and each MLG.
Figure 7: Air/ground (WOW) system
FWD AVIONICS COMPT
(SSM 76-12-80) WIR IN G DIA GR AMS

RH ML G (SSM 76-12-81)
32-33-50
B WOFFW SENSOR 2
32-62-50
(SDS 32-60-00)
(MPP 32-62-03 ) (SSM 30-32-80)
A
LH CBP COCKPIT
RH ML G
WOFFW SENSOR 1 LH MLG WOFF W DC ESS BUS 1
WOW RELAY 1
(SDS 32-60-00)
(MPP 32-62-03 )
5 5
C FWD AVIONICS COMPT LG SYS
PWR1
1 LG SYS
PWR1
2
MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80 )
D 28V DC
PSEM 1
NLG
BACKPLANE BUS
WOFFW SENSOR 1 RH MLG WOFFW SENSOR 1
(SDS 32-60-00 )
(MPP 32-62-01)
NLG WOFFW SENSOR 1 C OC KP IT
E IC AS
D 8O.O MTO
AT T CS
8O.O
LH MLG WOFFW SENSOR 2
(SSM 32-61-80 ) 2O.7 N1 2O.7
R EV
EXTEND
UP RETRAC T
IGN û IGN
463 ITT 463 û
LANDING G EAR
A A
9O.O N2 9O.O
C ONTR OL-LEV ER DCNK 1OOO F F P P H1OOO

RETRAC T ASCB
A
LANDING G EAR
L RO EL F UE L QTY
9OO F Q LBS 3OOO UP
EXTEND
MIDDLE AVIONICS COMP T
V IB APU 1OO% 1O2O û C
C DN MAU 3 (SSM 31-41-80) 12 81 11 û 1O6 û

C AB IN
ALT
R AT E
P
-5
-64.6
-5
FT
F PM
P SI
E
P RE SS T EMP LP HP LFE 12OO FT
S PDBR K T RIMSR OLL P IT CH

S F
(SSM 32-30-80) PSEM 2 UP

22
2 Y AW
S /F
(S S M31-53-80)
NLG RH MLG WOFFW SENSOR 2
BACKPLANE BUS
WOFFW SENSOR 2 RH CBP COCKPI T
(SDS 32-60-00) NLG WOFFW SENSOR 2
(MPP 32-62-01) DC ESS BUS 2
LH MLG WOFFW SENSOR 1 (SSM 32-61-80)
LH ML G LH ML G MIDDLE AVIONICS COMPT 5 5

LG SYS 1 LG SYS 2
PWR2 PWR2
WOFFW SENSOR 1 WOFFW SENSOR 2
(SSM 76-12-80)
E (SDS 32-60-00) (SDS 32-60-00 )
(MPP 32-62-03) (MPP 32-62-03 )
(SSM 76-12-81)
(SSM 30-32-80)
28V DC
RH MLG WOFFW
B D
WOW RELAY 2
w-s s m1938
190
NLG Weight-On-Wheels Sensor
The NLG WOW sensor 1 and sensor 2 are proximity sensors. They are both
attached to the NLG main fitting.
Sensor 1 transmits a signal to PSEM 1 and sensor 2 transmits a signal to
PSEM 2.As the NLG shock absorber compresses, metal “targets” on the
torque-link move toward the WOW sensor. In the compressed position, the
sensor indicates that the NLG is “down and locked” to the PSEMs.
MLG Weight-On-Wheels Sensor
The RH and LH MLG WOW sensor 1 and sensor 2 are proximity sensors.
They are attached to the MLG main fittings.
As the MLG shock absorber compresses, metal “targets” on the torque-links
move toward the WOW sensor. In the compressed position, the sensor indi-
cates that the MLG is “down and locked” to the PSEMs.
Figure 8: WOW indications
target far
target near
target far
target near
On ground After lift off
190
WOW status
The weight on wheels (WOW) indication system indicates whether the air-
craft is in flight or on ground. It also makes use of the PSEMs and six prox-
imity sensors.
Two proximity sensors are attached to each landing gear shock strut to de-
termine when the struts are compressed, if the aircraft is on ground. The
nose landing gear proximity sensors face the toraue link. When the shock
strut is compressed, the torque link folds and metal targets are sensed by
the proximity sensors.
After lift off, the shock strut will extend, unfolding the torque link and moving
away the metal targets. This will end in the weight off wheel calculation. On
the Main landing gears, the proximity sensors are also installed on the shock
strut facing the torque link, and function exactly the same as on the nose
landing gear.
The inputs of these sensors are calculated and combined by PSEM 1 and
PSEM 2, and forwarded the aircraft systems requiring WOW status.
Figure 9: WOW status
Condition Result
No discrete outputs from PSEM 1 available. PSEM 1 shows unserviceable condition
No aircraft electrical power supply to PSEM 1
through ASCB
No discrete outputs from PSEM 2 available. PSEM 2 shows unserviceable condition
No aircraft electrical power supply to PSEM 2
through ASCB
No communication between PSEM 1 and PSEM 2. No EICAS message. PSEM 2 shows
No MAU electrical power supply to PSEM 1
unserviceable condition of PSEM 1 and shows unserviceable condition on ASCB
No communication between PSEM 1 and PSEM 2. No EICAS message. PSEM 1 shows
No MAU electrical power supply to PSEM2
unserviceable condition of PSEM 2 and shows unserviceable condition on ASCB
NLG WOW-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
NLG WOW-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
No indication for NLG WOFFW default indication message to EICAS, and landing-gear
NLG WOW-1 and -2 sensors are defective
control lever stays locked
NLG downlock-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
NLG downlock-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
NLG downlock-1 and -2 sensors are defective No indication for NLG downlock, default indication message to EICAS
NLG uplock-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
NLG uplock-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
NLG uplock-1 and -2 sensors are defective No indication for NLG uplock, default indication message to EICAS
MLG right-WOW-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
MLG right-WOW-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
No indication for MLG right WOW, default indication message to EICAS, and landing-
MLG right-WOW-1 and -2 sensors are defective
gear control lever stays locked
MLG right-downlock-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
MLG right-downlock-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
MLG right-downlock-1 and -2 sensors are defective No indication for MLG right downlock, default indication message
MLG right-uplock-1 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
MLG right-uplock-2 sensor is defective No effect - PSEM shows unserviceable condition
190
The Landing Gear Warning system
The Landing Gear Warning system will provide a “LANDING GEAR” voice
message if at least one gear is not locked down and there is an intention to
land the aircraft.
The landing gear aural warning logic is processed in the Monitor Warning 1
and Monitor Warning 2 simultaneously, which are located on the NIC 1/MAU
1 and NIC 2/MAU 2 respectively.
The landing gear aural warning logic uses the thrust lever angle, flap setting
and radio altimeter to define the intention to land the aircraft.
Figure 10: Warning System Schematic
MAIN INST PANEL
LG WRN INHIB PB/ANN

GND PROX LG WRN
G/S INHIB INHIB
FWD FUSELAGE
DIMMER
(SSM 33-12-80)
LDG WRN CUTOUT

(SDS 32-60)
FWD AVIONICS COMPT FWD AVIONICS COMPT
(MPP 31-17-02)
MAU 1 (SSM 31-41-80) MAU 2 (SSM 31-41-80)
BACKPLANE BUS BACKPLANE BUS

CONTROL I/O
CONTROL I/O
GENERIC I/O
GENERIC I/O
NIC + PROC
NIC + PROC
MODULE
MODULE
MODULE
MODULE
LDG WRN CUTOUT LAMP
AURAL WARNING AUDIO 2
ASCB
AURAL WARNING

AUDIO 1

FWD AVIONICS COMPT MID AVIONICS COMPT
AUDIO
MRC 1 CONTROL PEDESTAL CONTROL PEDESTAL RH AFT CONSOLE MRC 2
(SSM 34-02-80) (SSM 34-02-80)

PILOTS COCKPIT SPKR COPILOTS COCKPIT SPKR OBSERVER COCKPIT SPKR
DIGITAL AUDIO PANEL DIGITAL AUDIO PANEL DIGITAL AUDIO PANEL
(SSM 23-50-80) PHONE/BOOM MIC (SSM 23-50-80) PHONE/BOOM MIC
(SSM 23-50-80) PHONE/BOOM MIC
190
Landing Gear Aural Warning
The landing gear aural warning system function is to inform the crew that at
least one landing gear is unlocked down when there is an intention to land
the aircraft.
This warning provided through the voice message “LANDING GEAR” is ac-
tivated by a logic, which associates the intention to land the aircraft with the
position of the landing gear leg, when at least one landing gear leg is un-
locked down.The intention to land the aircraft associated with the position of
the landing gear active the LG Aural Warning which is defined by the logic
showed in Figure.
Basically, the LG Aural Warning logic uses the thrust lever angle, flap setting
and radio altimeter to define the intention to landing the aircraft.
The landing gear aural warning logic is processed in the Monitor Warning 1
and Monitor Warning 2 simultaneously which are located on the NIC1/MAU1
and NIC2/MAU2 respectively.
The Radio Altimeter information and TLA position are used to activate the
LG Aural Warning when the Landing Gears are not properly down and
locked.The invalid condition of the Radio Altimeter will enable the activation
of the LG Aural Warning independently of the aircraft altitude.The Inhibition
Switch “LG WRN INHIB” is used by the crew to cancel the LG Aural Warning
in this condition.
This switch is protected by a Guard in order to preclude the switch operation

by instinctive, inadvertent or by habitual reflexive action.This switch is an il-
luminated push-button.It is installed in the Main Instrument Panel below the
landing gear control lever.
When pressed, a white indication bar illuminates to indicate that a cancel ac-
tion was performed.This white indication extinguishes if the thrust lever are
advanced (releasing a new warning actuation) or flap selection is selected
either position Landing 1 or position Landing 2 or when the landing gear legs
are down and locked.
Figure 11: Landing gear warning
ALL GEAR DOWNLOCK

1
ALL GEAR DOWNLOCK

2
RA1 < 1200 FT
RA1 VALIDATE
RA2 < 1200 FT
RA2 VALIDATE
TLA1 < 45^

TLA1 < 59^ AURAL WARNING
"LANDING GEAR"
ENG RUNNING1
TLA1 < 45^

TLA1 < 59^
ENG RUNNING2
FLAP LANDING
1
FLAP LANDING
2
EMERG / PARK BRAKE ON
ACFT ON GROUND
AURAL WARNING
THRUST LEVER > 70^ "TAKE OFF BRAKE"
TAKE OFF CONF SWITCH ON
190
Landing Gear Warning
Thrust Lever Angle (TLA)
This condition exists because the aircraft flying below 700 Ft AGL and hav-
ing one or two engine thrust levers at reduced condition configures a landing
intention. The thrust lever angle is defined from the signal of the thrust con-
trol quadrant (TCQ), which is a fly by wire control that converts mechanical
pilot input to electrical signal, which are processed by FADEC.The TLA in-
formation is provided by FADEC through ASCB.The TLA information is con-
solidated according to the logic TLA1 and TLA2 respectively.
Two landing configurations are considered in the Aural Warning logic:

• Dual Engine Landing where the TLA1 and TLA2 are set in TLA < 38
• Single Engine Landing where one of TLA’s is set TLA < 57
For Dual Engine Landing Configuration:

When at least one engine thrust lever is reduced to less than 38 position and
ENG.RUNNING1 = TRUE and ENG.RUNNING2 = TRUE and at least one
aircraft radio altimeter indicating flight below 700 Ft AGL, the logic recogniz-
es a landing intention.The conditions ENG.RUNNING# provided by both
FADEC’s inform engine operative status.
For Single Engine Landing Configuration:

For one engine shutdown (ENG.RUNNING1 = FALSE or ENG.RUNNING2
= FALSE) the warning is activated by a greater position of the thrust power
lever (to compensate the no operative engine).This greater position of the
thrust lever is set in 57°.This setting changing occurs because when one en-
gine is shutdown the A/C will require more power of the operative engine to
maintain the speed during the landing.In case of landing with one engine in
Idle position the interlock between TLA1 and TLA2 will avoid the warning ac-
tuation during Go Around or Take Off.
Figure 12: Landing Gear Warning TLA Logic
190
FLAP SETTING
The FLAP setting to landing position also configures an aircraft landing in-
tention.A single control lever, located in the cockpit, sets the Slats and Flaps
positions.
The Flap/Slat Control Lever (FSCL) has 7 positions, each having a gated or
detented arrangement.There are two landing positions on the FSCL named
Landing 1 and Landing 2.
FSCL provides the information of the selected FLAP position through ASCB
to Landing Gear Aural Warning logic.This information is consolidated in ac-
cordance with the logic.For both cases of flap setting actuation, the aural
warning is not cancelable and there is not inhibition of radio altitude.
RADIO ALTIMETER INFORMATION

The radio altimeter altitude signal used to inhibit the warning is considered
by aural warning logic associated to radio altimeter validity signal.An invalid
condition of this validity signal will release the warning to actuate independ-
ently of the aircraft altitude.
In case of dual radio altimeter configuration, both radio altimeters shall pro-
vide an invalid condition to release the warning independently of the aircraft
altitude.The warning actuation due to an invalid radio altimeter condition is
cancelable by the switch “LG WRN INHIB”.
This switch is an illuminated push-button type, and is installed in the cockpit
panel.
When pressed a white indication bar illuminates to indicate that a cancel ac-
tion was performed.This white indication extinguishes if at least one thrust
lever is advanced for a position greater than 57° for single engine and 38°
for dual engine (releasing a new warning actuation) or flap selection is se-
lected either position Landing 1 or position Landing 2 or when the landing
gear legs are down and locked.
Figure 13: Landing Gear Warning-Flap Angle, Radio Altimeter
Mnemonic Description
SWITCH This signal comes from the momentary switch on the panel
OPEN/GROUND, ground means pushbutton pressed
allGearDownlock1 This information comes from PSEM1 informing all landing gears
down locked (True = All gear down locked)
AllGearDownlock2 This information comes from PSEM2 informing all landing gears
down locked is redundancy of the allGearDownlock1 signal.
(True = All gear down locked)
Ra1 < 700 ft Inform that the radio altimeter 1 is indicating altitude lower than
700ft (TBC). (True = altitude < 700ft)
RA1 VALIDATE Inform that the reading on the radio altimeter1 is valid.
(True = valid)
Ra2 < 700 ft Inform that the radio altimeter 2 is indicating altitude lower than
700ft (TBC) (True = altitude < 700ft)
RA2 VALIDATE Inform that the reading on the radio altimeter 2 is valid
(True = valid)
TLA1<38 (see note 1) Inform that the position of the thrust lever angle of the engine 1
is lower than maximum position for Dual-Engine landing. LABEL
133
(True = lower than maximum position for Dual-Engine landing.)

is lower than maximum position for Dual-Engine landing. LABEL
133
(True = lower than maximum position for Dual-Engine landing.)

is lower than maximum position for Single-Engine landing.
LABEL 133
(True = lower than maximum position for Single-Engine landing.)

TLA2<57 Inform that the position of the thrust lever angle of the engine 2
is lower than maximum position for Single-Engine landing.
LABEL 133
(True = lower than maximum position for Single-Engine landing.)

ENG RUNNING 1 Status from FADEC about engine 1. LABEL 272 BIT 28
(True = engine on, False = engine-shutdown)

ENG RUNNING 2 Status from FADEC about engine 2. LABEL 272 BIT 28
(True = engine on, False = engine-shutdown)
FLAP LANDING 1 Inform that the control lever of SFCL is in of the detent position
for landing. ( position 1, landing 1) LABEL 271 BIT 23
(True = lever is on detent)

FLAP LANDING 2 Inform that the control lever of SFCL is in of the detent position
for landing. ( position 2, landing 2) LABEL 271 BIT 24
(True = lever is on detent)

BUTTON LIGHT Logic output to button lamp
AURAL WARNING Logic output to aural warning
190
32-MEL (Example)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 32-1 ¦ ¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 32-2 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦ ¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 32 LANDING GEAR ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ 32 LANDING GEAR ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 33-01 Landing Gear B ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative locked in | ¦ ¦ 47-01 Brake Temperature C ¦ 4 ¦ 3 ¦ (O)One may be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ Control Lever ¦ ¦ ¦ the down position provided downlock | ¦ ¦ Sensors ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Landing Gear remains ¦
¦ Lock Solenoid ¦ ¦ ¦ release mechanism is verified to | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ selected down for four ¦
¦ (Applicable to ¦ ¦ ¦ operate normally once each flight | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ minutes after takeoff, ¦
¦ Post-Mod SB 170- ¦ ¦ ¦ day. | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) AFM Performance penalties ¦
¦ 32-0019 or with ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are applied. ¦
¦ an equivalent ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦
¦ Embraer ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ C ¦ 4 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ incorporated ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Landing Gear remains ¦
¦ modification) ¦ ¦ ¦ | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ selected down for four ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ minutes after takeoff, ¦
¦ 41-02 AutoBrake System C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)(O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Brake cooling time according ¦
¦ *** ¦ ¦ ¦ a) AutoBrake control knob is | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to AFM Quick Turn Around ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ selected OFF and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Weight limitations is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ deactivated, | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ complied with, and ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Brake temperature sensors | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) AFM Performance penalties ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ and indications operate | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are applied. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ normally, and | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) Alternate procedures are | ¦ ¦ 47-15 Brake Temperature C ¦ 4 ¦ 3 ¦ (O)One may be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ established and used. | ¦ ¦ Indication on MFD ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Landing Gear remains ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ selected down for four ¦
¦ D ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided: | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ minutes after takeoff, ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) AutoBrake Control Module is | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) AFM Performance penalties ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ removed, and | ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are applied. ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Procedures do not require | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ its use. | ¦ ¦ C ¦ 4 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Landing Gear remains ¦
¦ 44-17 Emergency/Parking C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ selected down for four ¦
¦ Brake ¦ ¦ ¦ associated accumulator charge is ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ minutes after takeoff, ¦
¦ Accumulators ¦ ¦ ¦ verified adequate once each flight ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Brake cooling time according ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ day. ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ to AFM Quick Turn Around ¦
¦ Transducers ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Weight limitations is ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ complied with, and ¦
¦ 44-30 Emergency/Parking C ¦ 4 ¦ 0 ¦ (M)May be inoperative provided ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ c) AFM Performance penalties ¦
¦ Brake ¦ ¦ ¦ associated accumulator charge is ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are applied. ¦
¦ Accumulators ¦ ¦ ¦ verified adequate once each flight ¦
¦ Pressure ¦ ¦ ¦ day. ¦ ¦ 49-13 Nose Wheel C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be missing or removed. ¦
¦ Indication on MFD ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ Spinbrakes ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MEL (Example)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ AIRCRAFT: ¦ REVISION NO: 3 ¦ PAGE: ¦
¦ ERJ-170, ERJ-190 ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦ DATE: 08/26/2005 ¦ 32-3 ¦
¦ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ 1. ¦ 2. NUMBER INSTALLED ¦
¦ SYSTEM & ¦ -------------------------------------------- ¦
¦ SEQUENCE ITEM ¦ ¦ 3. NUMBER REQUIRED FOR DISPATCH ¦
¦ NUMBERS ¦ ¦ --------------------------------------- ¦
¦ ------------------------- ¦ ¦ ¦ 4. REMARKS OR EXCEPTIONS ¦
¦ 32 LANDING GEAR ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 49-15 Tire Pressure D ¦ - ¦ 0 ¦ ¦

¦ *** Indicators ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 53-03 Rudder Pedals C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Nose Wheel ¦ ¦ ¦ Handwheel Nose Wheel Steering ¦
¦ Steering System ¦ ¦ ¦ System operates normally. ¦
¦ 53-07 Nose Wheel ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦

¦ Steering ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Disengage ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ Switches ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 1) Steering C ¦ 2 ¦ 1 ¦ (O)Left seat pilot side Steering ¦

¦ Disengage ¦ ¦ ¦ Disengage Button may be ¦
¦ Buttons on ¦ ¦ ¦ inoperative. ¦
¦ Yoke ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦
¦ 2) External C ¦ 1 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided: | ¦

¦ Steering ¦ ¦ ¦ a) Steering Disengage Button is | ¦
¦ Disengage ¦ ¦ ¦ pressed before towing the | ¦
¦ Switch ¦ ¦ ¦ airplane, and | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ b) Parking brake and steering | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ status are verified before | ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ towing the airplane. | ¦
¦ 61-11 Towing Indication C ¦ 2 ¦ 0 ¦ (O)May be inoperative provided ¦

¦ Lights ¦ ¦ ¦ parking brake and steering status ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ are verified before towing the ¦
¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ airplane. ¦
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

190


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190

53-00 The fuselage

53-10 Forward Fuselage

53-20 Center Fuselage

53-30 Rear Fuselage

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Intentionally left blank

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53-00 The fuselage

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The fuselage main sections

The fuselage has the following main sections:

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

53-10 Forward Fuselage

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

The stringers are manufactured with aluminium extruded Z-shaped sections

STGR STGR STGR STGR

STGR STGR STGR STGR STGR STGR

STGR STGR STGR

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

53-20 Center Fuselage

Center Fuselage III

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

53-30 Rear Fuselage

The rear fuselage contains 1 semiframe in the pressurized section, 9 frames

Access door Pressure bulkhead

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

The tailcone system

The tailcone system provides a fully integrated fireproof tailcone.It is created

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY

The wing to fuselage fairing

To reduce aircraft drag, the fuselage contains a wing-to-fuselage fairing.The

The aft panel contains:

Frame 27 - The center panel includes:

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Intentionally left blank

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Intentionally left blank

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The pylon main box is an all-metallic structure attached to the structure of

Pylon Box Structure

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Intentionally left balnk

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Intentionally left blank

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The horizontal stabilizer is an all moving surface attached to the fuselage

Horizontal stabilizer is movable,

Horizontal Tail Structure Vertical Tail Structure

Vertical Stabilizer Trailing Edge

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FRONT SPAR LOWER VERTICAL

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Intentionally left blank

56-10 Cockpit windows

56-20 Cabin windows

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Intentionally left blank

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Direct vision window

One window in each of the two service doors

Issue: June06 FOR TRAINING ONLY