EN BANC
"Without prejudice to the filing of an ordinary action by the heir
[G.R. No. 45430. April 15, 1939.]
In the matter of the estate of the deceased Paulina Vazquez
Vda. de Garcia. TERESA GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
LUISA GARCIA, MARIETA GARCIA, and PURIFICACION
GARCIA, and BRAULIO DE VERA, guardian of the minors
Antonio, Lourdes and Ramon, surnamed De Vera,
Defendants-Appellees.
Anastacio R. Teodoro and Andres S. Nicolas for Appellant.
Pablo Lorenzo, Delfin Joven and Eulalio Chaves for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. TESTATE OR INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
JURISDICTION; PROPERTIES INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED.
— A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether
or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J.:
After Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix of the
properties left by the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de
Garcia, she filed with the competent court an inventory thereof
on May 13, 1936.
On May 23, 1936, the heir Teresa Garcia objected to said
inventory. taking exception to various items therein.
On June 20, 1936, the court issued the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Teresa Garcia de Bartolome, the petition to include in the
inventory certain properties of the estate, filed by Teresa
Garcia and others with the conformity of counsel for the
administratrix, is denied."cralaw virtua1aw library
On July 28, 1936, Teresa Garcia filed a motion asking that
she be appointed special administratrix of the intestate for the
sole purpose of bringing any actions which she may believe
necessary to recover for the benefit of the intestate the
properties and credits set out in her motion, as well as other
properties which might be discovered from time to time
belonging to the said intestate.
After hearing said motion and the administratrix’ opposition
thereto, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion by its order of August 19, 1936.
On motion for reconsideration filed by Teresa Garcia, which
was opposed by the administratrix, the court issued the
following order of September 28, 1936:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is a motion for reconsideration of the order of this Court
of the 19th day of August last, denying the petition of Teresa
Garcia, one of the daughters of the deceased, wherein she
asked to be appointed special administratrix in order that she
might bring an action for the recovery of certain properties
which she claims belong to the estate and are in the
possession of the regular administratrix and her other sisters.
"Before this petition was filed a hearing had been held to
determine the ownership of these properties as a direct result
of Teresa Garcia’s objection to the inventory filed by the
administratrix. in which, it was alleged, those properties
should be included. Now the same party upon whose
complaint that hearing was conducted repudiates the steps
taken by the court on the ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction.
"The interrupted proceeding which the motion under
consideration would have set aside was by no means
irregular. It is in accordance with the general practice
constantly followed in this jurisdiction. The jurisdiction to try
controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding
the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, is
vested in probate courts. In the last analysis, the purpose of
intestate proceeding is the distribution of the decedent’s
estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. It is in the
nature of an action of partition, and in a suit of partition it is
proper that each party be required to bring into the mass
whatever community property he or she may have in his or
her possession. To this end and as a necessary corollary, the
interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take
part in the distribution of the decedent’s estate are before the
court and subject to the jurisdiction thereof in all matters and
incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such
estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.
"The cases relied upon by the movant have no bearing on the
present case. In the cases cited, not only were the persons
alleged to have in their possession properties of the estate
strangers to the intestate, but their appearance had been
ordered under different provisions and for a different purpose.
The court was not aware of the fact that a proceeding under
section 709 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to try title to
property.
"However that may be, the jurisdiction involved here is one
over the person, not over the subject-matter; and it is a well-
established rule that such jurisdiction may be acquired by
consent. A general appearance, let alone going into trial
without objection, has been always held to constitute a waiver
of the party’s right to object to the authority of the court over
his person. The administratrix and other heirs have not
objected.
"The motion for reconsideration is denied. The movant may
however ask, if she cares to do so, that this proceeding be
reset for the continuation of the hearing of her inventory of the
administratrix and the determination of whether the properties
in question belong to the estate and should be included in the
said inventory for disposition according to law.
"So ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library
From the foregoing order Teresa Garcia took this appeal,
assigning four alleged errors committed by the lower Court in
its order, which errors boil down to the proposition of whether
or not a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the
exceptions which an heir takes to an inventory of the
properties left by a deceased referring to the inclusion or
exclusion of certain properties and credits.
It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or
regular, imposed by section 668 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his
appointment a true inventory of the real estate and all the
goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which
come into his possession or knowledge, unless he is
residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The
court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings, has supervision and control over the said
properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to
see that the inventory submitted by the administrator
appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also
inherent power to determine what properties, rights and
credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded
from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention
to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been
left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear
the observations. with power to determine if such
observations should be attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no
such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the
ownership of the said properties (23 C. J., p. 1163, par. 381).
The lower court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the
opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia to the inventory filed by
the special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the
observations made by the former as to certain properties and
credits, and to determine for purposes of the-inventor alone if
they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. As
Teresa Garcia withdrew her opposition after evidence was
adduced tending to show whether or not certain properties
belonged to the intestate and, hence, whether they should be
included in the inventory, alleging that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to do so, she cannot be heard to complain that the
court suspended the trial of her opposition.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold,
that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether
or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, reserving to
Teresa Garcia the right to ask for the reopening of the hearing
of her opposition to the inventory, as well as to ask for the
appointment of a special administrator in accordance with law,
with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Conception and
Moran, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56504. May 7, 1987.]
POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO,
Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-59867. May 7, 1987.]
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON.
MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Petitioners-Appellants, v. MANUEL
FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(Tenth Division), Respondents-Appellants.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Avelino T. Javellana, for Petitioners.
Dominador G. Garin for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PROBATE
COURT; HAS NO POWER TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
AND DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF TITLE TO PROPERTY
CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSON; EXCEPTIONS. — Settled is
the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all
the other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should
be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.,
probate, land registration, etc), is in reality not a jurisdictional
but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR DOES NOT FALL UNDER
THE EXCEPTION. — The facts obtaining in this case,
however, do not call for the application of the exception to the
rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the
Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being
taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for
the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently,
and writing" finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to
determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. This function of resolving whether or not property
should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one
clearly within the Probate Court’s competence, although the
Court’s determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action that may be instituted by the parties.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXAMINATION OF PERSON SUSPECTED
HAVING CONCEALED, EMBEZZLED OR CONVEYED
PROPERTY OF DECEDENT; REASON THEREFOR. — The
same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the
Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the
issue arising from the parties’ conflicting claims over the
fishpond. The examination provided in the cited section is
intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the
decedent from persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away the same.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY; CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT
OF EXECUTION AS AGAINST ITS POSSESSOR. — Since
the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title
to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the
property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of
execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an
appropriate action. These considerations assume greater
cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not
in the decedents’ names but in others, a situation on which
this Court has already had occasion to rule.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP INVOLVING ESTATE PROPERTY; MERELY
SECONDARY OF PROVISIONAL. — Since, both the Probate
Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition
of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the
premises only be appropriately determined in a separate
action, the actual filing of such a separate action should have
been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a
surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that
recognition is also the acknowledgment of the superiority of
the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed
over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now
be heard to complain that in such a separate action, the court
should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing
from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot
in any sense be considered as undue interference with the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise
of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving
estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed
superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate
Court in the exercise of what may be regarded as merely
secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the
administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on the one
hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their
lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings now
docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R.
Nos. 59867-68.
Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion
Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompillo Valera
had been appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a
deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a
motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in
contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her
administration. 3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be
submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa’s husband and the
movant heirs’ father, delivered to the administrator an 18-
hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to
the estate, 4 and she in turn moved for the return thereof to
the estate, so that it might be partitioned among the
decedents’ heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the
fishpond’s return to the estate, asserting that the property was
owned by his children and this was why it had never been
included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil,
viewed the Garin Heirs’ motion for contempt, as well as
Cabado’s prayer for the fishpond’s return to the estate, as
having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the
estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court. 5 It accordingly set said incidents for hearing during
which the parties presented evidence in substantiation of their
positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated
September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin
"to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question . . . to the
intestate Estate of the Spouses." 7
The Order was predicated upon the Court’s factual findings
mainly derived from the testimony of the two administrators
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and
had been given in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime;
2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the
fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was
fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might
use the property to provide for her children’s support and
education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the
fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of
the schooling of Teresa Garin’s Children; and
3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property
was eventually purchased from the Government by the Heirs
of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original
Certificate of Title issued in their favor.
Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had
been created, obligating Teresa Garin’s heirs to restore the
property to the Valera Spouses’ Estate, in accordance with
Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in
reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer
it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of
the person for whose benefit it is contemplated."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person
holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust funds for the
purchase of property and causes a conveyance to be made to
him or to a third person, a trust is established by operation of
law in favor of the person to whom the fund belongs."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based
on constructive trust had not yet prescribed, Cabado’s motion
for the fishpond’s reversion to the estate having been filed
well within ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on
which Teresa Garin’s heirs allegedly acquired title over it. 8
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court’s
pronouncement regarding the estate’s title to the fishpond
was merely provisional in character, made solely to determine
whether or not the fishpond should be included in the
inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by
the administrators who have more than once asserted that
"the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership
of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
properties." 9 So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself
which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter 10
was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond
should be included as part of the estate and whether or not
the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return .
. . (it) to the estate." 11 And so it was emphasized in another
Order, denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17,
1980, which states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finis to
the issue of ownership of the fishpond in dispute. The
movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the same
in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the
finding of this probate court that the fishpond must be
delivered to the estate.
"Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of
the power of this probate court under Section 6 in relation to
Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the contention of the movants
that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership should
be in a court of general jurisdiction." 12
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators’ motion for
execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff
to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the
fishpond to the estate. 13 The corresponding writ was served
on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker.
Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff
that he was a mere lessee, 14 Fabiana voluntarily
relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The
latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators. 15
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with
the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the
possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease
between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But
Judge Adil dismissed his complaint on the following grounds,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment
been rendered, but execution as regards transfer of
possession had already taken place; and
(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was
not binding as against the estate. 17
G.R. No. 56504
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction
and damages, with application for a preliminary injunction.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to
Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding.
18 Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining estate administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the
possession of the fishpond, as lessee. 19
The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order,
averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court’s
prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue
of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had
already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily
surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. 20
When Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion within what
the administrators believed to be a reasonable time,
considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators
filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari
and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and temporary restraining order, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 56504. 21 In their petition, the
administrators contended that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge
Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the
Probate Court (Branch II, Judge Adil, presiding) in the
legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction over the proceedings for
the Settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.
G.R. Nos 59867-68
In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil
(declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in
which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited
jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of
the fishpond, 22 which motion had been denied 23 — filed a
notice of appeal from said Order. 24 But he quickly
abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated, 25 Judge Adil
authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he
initiated a special action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus) with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court
of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-1154-R.
Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of
Appeals his own action for certiorari and injunction, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the
pendency in judge Inserto’s sala of the case he had earlier
filed. 26
These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the
Court of Appeals. The Court granted the petitions and ruled in
substance that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of ownership based merely on evidence
adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted
under Section 6, Rule 87;
2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the
fishpond stand in the names of the Heirs of Teresa Garin as
registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the
estate owns the fishpond is warranted to justify return of the
property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed; and
3. Even assuming the Probate Court’s competence to resolve
the ownership question, the estate administrators would have
to recover possession of the fishpond by separate action, in
view of the lessee’s claim of right to superior possession, as
lessee thereof.
From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken
separate appeals to this Court by certiorari, 27 docketed as
G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate
Court the following errors, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, presiding)
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue
of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely
to the decedent spouses;
2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a
separate action for the recovery of the possession of the
fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and
3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with
and overruling the final judgment of another branch, acting as
probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the
enforcement and implementation of said judgment.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate
Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, 29 the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate,
land registration, etc), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived. 30
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the
parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of
title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the
issue definitely and permanently, and writing" finis" thereto,
the question being explicitly left for determination "in an
ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it
should or should not be included in the inventory. 31 This
function of resolving whether or not property should be
included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly
within the Probate Court’s competence, although the Court’s
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that
may be instituted by the parties. 32
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section
6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the
Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the
issue arising from the parties’ conflicting claims over the
fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section is
intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the
decedent from persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim
to the property and manifests willingness to turn it over to the
estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues
the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the
estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to
the property contrary to the decedent’s, the Probate Court
would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate
action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the
property. 34
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the
Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of
Fabiana’s complaint in intervention, after obtaining the
consent of all interested parties to its assumption of
jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It
dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is
now water under the bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question
of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on
the property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of
inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of
execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an
appropriate action. These considerations assume greater
cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not
in the decedents’ names but in others, a situation on which
this Court has already had occasion to rule.

"In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold

that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when
as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title." 35

Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in

Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action

Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate

administrators are one in the recognition of the proposition
that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be
appropriately determined in a separate action 36 the actual
filing of such a separate action should have been anticipated,
and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the
latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also
the acknowledgment of the superiority of the authority of the
court in which the separate action is filed over the issue of
title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to
complain that in such a separate action, the court should have
issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the
assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any
sense be considered as undue interference with the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise
of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving
estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed
superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate
Court in the exercise of what may be regarded as merely
secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED,

for lack of merit. The petitions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No.
59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court,
subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining
order dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano,

Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN
B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and
ATTY. RICARDO REYES, Respondents.
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner.
Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTION NOT
BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 1147 of the
Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and
detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand
to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18
SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146,
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA
197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August
28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court
on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than
a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full
months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147
of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of
PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding
before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take
no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9)
months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case
before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it
cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would
want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508;
CONSTRUED. — Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a
dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the
parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a
single human being as contrasted with a social group or
institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole,
testate or intestate, estate, etc.
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST;
REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. — In
Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere
nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or
be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action
is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party
in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate
under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical
person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without
the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from taking
cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to
refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of
a building bearing the deceased’s name, located at F. Ramos
St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied
by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of
P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the
month.
On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes,
administrator of the estate and a resident of Cebu City, served
upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue
rentals corresponding to the period from March to September
1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner
failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982
an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial
Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent
judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case,
advancing, among others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial
court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same
city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner contended that the
court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of
respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay
Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified
the order in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for
filing same. That from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the
plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was
docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered
as meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so,
the Clerk of Court would not have accepted the filing of the
case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the
Letter of Instruction of the President of the Philippines that
civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions must
not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order dated
December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).
Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner
came to this Court through this petition for certiorari. In both
his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted
not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation
process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4,
section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action
in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory.
Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing
actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this
period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28,
1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on
September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a
month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full
months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147
of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of
PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding
before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take
no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9)
months — ample time indeed — within which to bring his case
before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it
cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would
want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation
process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing
of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this
reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT,
COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS,
MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT"
was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on
November 9, 1979. Said Circular
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister
of Local Government and Community Development that all
the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have
organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system
of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist
from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of said Lupons."cralaw
virtua1aw library
While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of
December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the
failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege
compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he
cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the
operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the
pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by the
clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been
sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court
that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or
Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint. 4
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed.
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the
Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are
"individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the
law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not
where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a
corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate,
estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere
nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or
be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action
is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party
in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate
under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical
person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly
in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil Case No.
R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.
SO ORDERED.