Conover 1984

The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation
Author(s): Pamela Johnston Conover

Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 760-785
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
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The Influence
of
Group Identifications
on
Political Perception
and Evaluation
Pamela Johnston Conover

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Despite a recent resurgence of interest in the concept of group consciousness, relatively little
attention has been devoted to the political impact of group identifications. Consequently, in
this paper the effects of group identification on political perception and evaluation are in-
vestigated. Theoretically, a schematic approach is adopted in outlining the perceptual ef-
fects of group identifications. Empirically, data from the 1980 National Election Study are
used to test some of the hypotheses derived from this schematic approach. The results from
this analysis suggest that group identifications play an important role in defining the percep-
tual viewpoints that people bring to bear on politics; people identifying with different groups
focus on different things and evaluate political issues from different perspectives.
In its infancy the study of political behavior was characterized by a

strong focus on the group nature of politics. But this perspective was to
be relatively short-lived. Gradually, the focus of most research shifted
from people's group memberships to their political attitudes and
psychological predispositions. To be sure, social groupings continued to
play a role - albeit a secondary one - in many works. However, in such
studies social groups were treated primarily in terms of demographic
categories (Miller, Gurin, and Gurin, 1978). Meanwhile, as groups
slipped into the background, the study of mass belief systems and the
* The data analyzed in this paper were collected by the Center for Political Studies and
made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
neither of which bears any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
A special thanks to Stanley Feldman for his advice and comments on earlier drafts of this
manuscript. Several anonymous reviewers also provided helpful comments.
INFLUENCE OF GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS 761
search for ideology moved into the forefront. Yet, increasingly, the in-
escapable conclusion of such research has been that relatively few Amer-
icans think "ideologically" in the sense that they order their political be-
liefs according to certain basic ideological principles. Thus, as Kinder
(1982) has pointed out, the key question is no longer "do people think
ideologically?" but rather simply, "how do people think about politics?"
In addressing this question one approach is to return to "basics," to go
back to those ideas that originally fueled research on political behavior.
And, one of the more appealing of those is the notion that people's ties to
various groups help to structure their political thinking. It is not enough,
however, simply to revive our old interest in social groups. Rather, while
maintaining the spirit of that earlier research, we must simultaneously
broaden its scope by exploring the process through which objective
membership in a social group takes on both psychological and political
significance (Kinder, 1982). In this paper an attempt is made to do just
that. First, the concept of group identification is examined from the
perspective of schema theory. Then the influence of such identifications
on political perception and attitudes is explored.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS
The Concept of Group Identification

Most treatments of the concept of group identification incorporate the
idea of a psychological tie to some social stratum or more formal group
(e.g., Gurin, Miller, and Gurin, 1980; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malan-
chuk, 1981; Tajfel, 1981). Typically, discussions of group identification
also include the idea of an individual's perceived self-location in a group
(Miller et al., 1981; Tajfel, 1981). In keeping with such research, we for-
mally define a group identification as having two related components: a
self-awareness of one's objective membership in the group and a
psychological sense of attachment to the group. In so doing, we draw an
important distinction between objective group membership and iden-
tification: membership is treated as a necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tion for identification. Similarly, such a definition distinguishes the no-
tion of group identification from that of group consciousness-"a
politicized awareness, or ideology, regarding the group's relative positions
in society, and a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the
group's interests" (Miller et al., 1978, p. 18). As defined, group iden-
tification is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for group con-
sciousness.
The distinctions that have been made between group identification on
the one hand and group membership and consciousness on the other hand
762 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
are more important than they might seem at first glance. Simply because
people are objective members of a group, it is often assumed that they
must also have some sort of psychological tie to that group (Miller et al.,
1978). But, in many instances where objective group membership may
not have a very significant impact on political perception and attitudes,
identification with the same group could have an effect. Along the same
lines, research (e.g., Miller et al., 1981) that has gone beyond an examina-
tion of objective group categories has tended to focus considerably more
on group consciousness than on simple identification. This has been
justified on the grounds that the former is more crucial to understanding
the mobilization of a group and its impact on political participation. Yet,
while group identification might not greatly affect political participation,
it very well could have a substantial influence on the processes of political
perception and evaluation. Thus, one relatively easy step toward a bet-
ter understanding of the political significance of group identifications is to
distinguish the notion of identification from that of both group member-
ship and group consciousness, and concurrently to focus more on those
processes - such as perception - that group identifications are most likely
to influence.
A second, more difficult step toward understanding group identifica-
tion is to explore the transition from objective group membership to iden-
tification, and more important, the psychological effects accompanying
that transformation. In so doing, it is particularly useful to think of
group identifications in schematic terms. In general, a "schema" may be
defined as a cognitive structure of "organized prior knowledge, abstracted
from experience with specific instances" which guides "the processing of
new information and the retrieval of stored information" (Fiske and Lin-
ville, 1980, p. 543). A self-schema may be thought of as the merging or
intersection of two bodies of knowledge: information about the stimuli in
some domain and knowledge of one's self (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, and
Siladi, 1982). For example, a person may have a schema about the
"working class." If that individual begins to apply the working-class
schema to the self, a self-schema may be said to exist. Described in this
fashion, then, a group identification signals the presence of a self-schema.
In effect, in the process of consciously classifying oneself as a member of a
group, the individual takes the very first step toward blending together
the mental representation of the self with the cognitive stereotype of some
group. Subsequently, as identification with the group increases, the nas-
cent self-schema should become more developed and its importance
heightened.
The Perceptual Effects of Group Identification
What are the implications of linking group identifications to self-
schemas? Although our main interest lies in the empirical exploration of

the perceptual effects of group identifications, it is nonetheless useful to
consider briefly some of the implications of a schematic approach for
understanding the origins of such identifications. In the most general
sense, self-schemas derive from past experiences with the environment
(Markus, 1977). People are most likely to develop self-schemas with
regard to an attribute (1) that is important or salient, and (2) by which
people are distinguished (Markus and Smith, 1981; Markus et al., 1982).
Typically, the salience and distinctiveness of a particular social group will
change relatively gradually, and therefore, the traditional agents of
socialization (i.e., family, peer groups) will often play a major role in the
development of group identifications. Less frequently, dramatic
political events may produce a sudden rise in the salience and/or distinc-
tiveness of a group, thus encouraging an increase in group identifications
(Tajfel, 1981).
A schematic approach also has implications for our understanding of
the effects of group identifications on political perception. In general,
schemas have a wide range of perceptual effects. Self-schemas, in par-
ticular, direct attention toward information that is personally relevant;
they enhance the memory of such information; and they function as the
basis of future judgments and inferences involving one's self (Markus,
1977; Markus and Smith, 1981; and Rogers, 1981). Self-schemas also in-
fluence the processing of information concerning others. In this regard,
the self functions as a reference point in organizing and interpreting infor-
mation about others; people tend to evaluate others in those terms most
relevant to describing themselves (Kuiper and Rogers, 1979; and Rogers,
1981). Thus, self-schemas help define the perceptual viewpoint that an
individual brings to a situation.
To the extent that group identifications are inextricably linked to self-
schemas they also will be associated with the perceptual effects of those
schemas. That is, group identifications should be associated with distinct
perceptual viewpoints.' People who identify with different groups will
have different self-schemas and thus, in many cases, will not see the same
elements of the environment as being personally relevant. Consequently,
in the same setting, members of various groups are likely to pay attention
to different things; they will evaluate others according to different
criteria; and they will adopt different perspectives in making judgments
and decisions on policy matters. From this standpoint, then, group iden-
I Clearly, there should be individual differences in the distinctiveness of the political
perspectives defined by group identification. In particular, the stronger the group identifica-
tion, then the stronger the perceptual effects. For the most part, however, we will not be
concerned with such individual differences in this paper.
tifications-or more properly the self-schemas associated with

them -fundamentally shape how people look at politics.
In more concrete terms, the substantive impact of group identifications
on political perception and evaluation will be determined, in large part,
by the individual's perception of the group's interests. As explained
earlier, identification with a group signals the development of a schema
that blends together one's self-image with that of the group. In this proc-
ess, the group's interests come to have a personal relevance for the in-
dividual. This is not to say that a person's self-interest becomes
synonymous with that of the group; on the contrary, in many instances
people's self-interests may diverge dramatically from their perception of
the group's interests. Rather, it suggests that the group's interests take on
a personal significance for the individual which they previously lacked.
Thus, a group identification should influence an individual's political
perspective in such a fashion that the group's interests are especially
salient in the perception and evaluation of political phenomena.2
Despite the effects of the self on perception, the environment can also
play a role in the perceptual process. Occasionally, political events may
be so dramatic that they stimulate the widespread and sudden develop-
ment of a particular group identification. In such instances, one must be
especially sensitive to the dynamic interplay of both the environment and
the group identification in concurrently heightening the perceptual
salience of group interests. In effect, the environment may simultane-
ously encourage group identifications and raise the perceptual impor-
tance of group interests, thus creating a spurious relationship between the
group identification and the salience of group interests. Yet it is impor-
tant to recognize that under such conditions, the group identification
itself - once established - should also contribute strongly to the percep-
tual salience of group interests.3 More frequently, the political environ-
2 This viewpoint is consistent with recent arguments that fraternal (as opposed to egoistic)
deprivation may be more important in the development of group consciousness and ulti-
mately the political mobilization of a group (see for example, Guimond and Dubh-Simard,
1983). At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that we are only arguing that
group identification increases the salience of group interests in the perceptual process, and not
that group identification, in and of itself, increases perceptions of the relative deprivation of a
group.
3 Untangling the complex causal, and possibly reciprocal, relationships among en-
vironmental events, the development of group identifications, and an increase in the percep-
tual salience of group interests can be difficult during turbulent times. However, given the
timing of the collection of these data, it is unlikely that in this analysis the relationship be-
tween most group identifications and the salience of group interests is to any large extent a
spurious one produced by environmental effects. The dramatic events of the 1960s and 1970s
which may have contributed to a rise in many types of group identifications (i.e., blacks,
women, the elderly) are sufficiently in the past to preclude this possibility.
ment helps to determine which of an individual's many self-schemas is

used in a specific situation. In particular, by shaping the political en-
vironment so that it has more relevance for some groups than for others,
political officeholders, candidates, and the media may play an important
role in activating group identifications.
HYPOTHESES
With these arguments in mind, several hypotheses may be developed.

First, because people identify with different groups, they should have dif-
ferent self-schemas and therefore distinct perspectives on the political
world. Generally, people are expected to pay relatively more attention
to and to evaluate distinctively those issues concerning the group's in-
terests. In particular, the perceptual relevance of any one issue for a
specific group will depend largely on whether the language or symbols
defining the issue link it to the group. Group identifiers are expected to
be most distinctive in their attention to and evaluation of those issues that
political rhetoric connects to the group's interests (economic or social), in
terms of broad, emotionally charged symbols. Thus, for example,
women identifiers should be quite distinctive in their attention to and
evaluation of abortion and the E.R.A. Group identifiers are expected to
be somewhat less distinctive on those issues that are tied to the group's in-
terests but in less symbolic terms. For instance, business identifiers
should pay more attention to economic policies (i.e., tax, monetary
policy) than other group identifiers. Finally, group identifiers are not ex-
pected to be especially distinctive on those issues which are not explicitly
related to the group's interests in existing political discussions.
Second, because the political environment activates some groups more
than others, the impact of group identification on political perceptions
and evaluations should vary across groups. Those groups most activated
by the political environment should be most distinctive in their percep-
tions and evaluations. Which group ties are most likely to have been
stimulated by the recent political environment? Certainly, racial con-
cerns have played a dominant role in America over the last twenty years
(Carmines and Stimson, 1982). Therefore, a strong racial identification
should lead to an especially distinctive pattern of political perceptions and
evaluations. Similarly, the emergence of the women's movement over
the last two decades may have triggered the application of gender self-
schemas in the political arena. Age and class groupings may also have
received some stimulation, though not as much as racial and gender
groupings (see Kinder, 1982). Overall, then, it is expected that in-
dividuals having strong gender or race identifications will constitute the
most distinct groups in terms of political perceptions and policy stands.
Age and class identifications should have a less pronounced impact.
DATA AND MEASURES
Measuring Group Identification

In order to test these hypotheses, data gathered as part of the 1980 CPS
National Election Study are employed. In measuring group identifica-
tions, the first step is to determine which respondents are objective
members of the groups under scrutiny, and subsequently, the second step
is to ascertain which of the objective members of a group actually feel
psychologically close to the group. Accordingly, we began by identifying
the objective members of four different types of social groupings: race
(black and white), gender (women), age (old and young), and class
(business, middle class, working, and poor people).4 Obviously, it is con-
siderably easier to specify objective membership in the gender and race
categories than it is for the class and even age groupings, where objective
boundaries are more difficult to define. Consequently, in the case of
both class and age groupings, objective membership was defined rela-
tively broadly so that any individuals who "reasonably" could be con-
sidered objective group members would have the opportunity of being in-
cluded in the analysis as group identifiers should they meet the other
necessary qualifications. Details of the actual objective categories
employed for each group are provided in the Appendix.
Next, for each of the groups it was necessary to determine which objec-
tive members felt psychologically attached to the group. One way of
measuring such psychological attachments is the series of CPS group
"closeness" questions. Respondents are given a list of groups and asked to
inform the interviewer which ones they feel particularly close to -people
who are most like them in their ideas, interests, and feelings about things.
Once the respondents have finished rating how close they feel to all the
groups, they are asked to pick the one group to which they feel closest.
Ideally, in conjunction with objective group memberships, the "close to"
ratings should indicate a person's various group identifications; thus taken
together, they should provide a means of assessing the nature of that in-
dividual's overall social identity (i.e., white, Protestant male).
There are, however, several problems in focusing on multiple rather
than single group identifications. From a theoretical perspective, it is
considerably more difficult to predict the perceptual effects associated
with multiple identifications or a broad social identity than it is to predict
those effects that ought to be produced by a single group identification
that is presumably quite important to the individual. Furthermore, from
4Unfortunately, the "closeness" questions used in the measurement of psychological at-

tachment did not include "men," thus only identifications with women could be assessed for
the gender category.
a methodological standpoint there are two basic problems with using the
"close to" ratings as a partial gauge of multiple group identifications.
First, the meaning of the "close to" ratings is somewhat ambiguous, and
may vary significantly between respondents. People may say that they
feel close to a particular group because they are psychologically attached
to it; alternatively, "closeness" may merely indicate feelings of sympathy,
proximity, or even empathy for the group. Second, the "close to" ratings
provide no measure of the intensity of feelings, and consequently there is
no basis for assessing the relative importance of what are presumed to be
multiple identifications (Eulau, 1981). This further exacerbates the
problem of predicting the perceptual effects of the overall social identity.
To a certain extent, these problems can be eliminated or reduced by
focusing solely on the "closest to" ratings. By concentrating only on the
group to which a person feels closest, we eliminate the question of the
relative closeness of the individual to that group as compared to other
groups. Similarly, we simplify the problem of predicting the perceptual
effects of the group identification. Finally, as compared to the "close to"
ratings, it seems more likely that the "closest to" rating is a valid indicator
of psychological attachment to the group, rather than simply representing
feelings of empathy or sympathy.5 For these reasons, we focused on
single group identifications and used the "closest to" ratings as our
measure of psychological attachment.
Specifically, of those respondents who felt closest to a particular group,
84 percent named one of the nine groups chosen for this study. Further-
more, of these respondents 36 percent failed to meet the necessary re-
quirement of objective group membership, and thus they were eliminated
from consideration for most of the analysis. For the entire sample the
distribution of group identifications, psychological attachments, and ob-
jective group memberships is presented in table 1. As can be seen, class-
related identifications are most prevalent among our sample, with racial
and gender identifications occurring less frequently. Of course, the
presence of a particular group identification does not ensure that it will be
associated with substantial perceptual effects.
Measuring Political Perspectives

Measuring the perceptual effects associated with group identifications
using survey data primarily is a difficult task because the environment
5 Even if it is a more valid indicator of psychological attachment, the "closest to" rating
does not eliminate totally the problems of cross-subject comparability. The degree of actual
psychological attachment to the closest group could vary substantially across individuals, even
among those naming the same group. More in-depth measurement procedures are needed to
address this problem.
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plays a role in determining which schemas will be engaged in the process-

ing of information. Consequently, when perceptual effects are not found
it becomes difficult to assess whether it is because group identifications
are, in fact, not associated with perceptual viewpoints, or because the en-
vironment has failed to stimulate group-related self-schemas. Bearing
this caveat in mind, we argue that to the extent that any group identifica-
tions are activated by the political environment, there should be some dif-
ferences in group perspectives which are manifested in political discourse,
particularly in responses to open-ended questions about political objects.
This assumption is analogous to those commonly made in studies of social
cognition, where it is argued that what people focus on and how they
organize their discussion of a topic reflect the nature of the underlying
schematic organization pertaining to that domain (Ostrom, Pryor, and
Simpson, 1981).
Some might think that this assumption is identical to that underlying
the levels of conceptualization measure: a measure whose validity has
recently been seriously questioned (Smith, 1980). It is not. Like the sup-
porters of the levels of conceptualization measure, we do assume that
responses to open-ended questions reflect, to some extent, the nature of
the environment and its relevance to the individual. However, pro-
ponents of the levels of conceptualization measure also assume that such
responses reveal, in part, the underlying cognitive sophistication of the in-
dividual. Accordingly, they focus not only on the content but also very
much on the abstractness of political discourse (Hagner, Pierce, and
Wolsborn, 1983). In contrast, the key assumption guiding the analysis
here is that political discourse reflects, in part, the nature of the underly-
ing cognitive structures of a person. Thus, our concern lies entirely in
assessing the substance of political discourse: what is focused on by the in-
dividual, what policies are salient.
With this in mind, responses to four different sets of open-ended ques-
tions were used as the basis of our analysis of political discourse.
Specifically, the questions were (1) what about the candidates (Reagan,
Carter, and Anderson) would make the respondent vote for or against
him? (2) what did the subject like or dislike about the Democratic and
Republican parties? (3) what do the terms "liberal" and "conservative"
mean? and (4) what did the respondent perceive to be the differences be-
tween the major parties? This wide-ranging set of questions was used for
several reasons. First, taken together these questions provide the respon-
dent with the opportunity to respond to a variety of political objects, thus
minimizing the probability that any patterns of group differences are
primarily a function of the nature of the political stimuli. Second,
precisely because the nature of the political environment is expected to
have an impact on areas of personal focus, the differences between groups
are expected to be relatively subtle ones that may not be detected from
only one or two responses. Considering a number of responses enhances
the likelihood of identifying even relatively small differences in group
perspectives.
In analyzing responses to these questions, we focused exclusively on
domestic policies; responses pertaining to other political domains (i.e.,
the personality of candidates, the foreign policy stands of candidates and
parties, etc.) were not considered in the analysis. It was desirable to limit
the analysis to a political domain that was relevant to all three types of
political stimuli considered-candidates, parties, and ideological terms.
Domestic policy was one of the few domains fitting that description.
Given this, responses concerning domestic policy were coded into one of
fifteen categories of content.6 Thus, the direction (i.e., pro- or anti-
welfare) of the response was ignored since our primary interest lay in
identifying the substantive content of the group perspectives and not the
ideological direction. Responses were then summed across all the ques-
tions to form fifteen variables (the policy comment variables), each of
which represents the total number of responses the subject made in that
category.
Measuring Issue Positions

Because group identifiers differ in their viewpoints, it is expected that
they will evaluate public policies differently and subsequently assume
distinct positions on issues. In order to test this possibility, the
respondents' positions on twelve domestic issues were measured.7 The
issues deal with economic matters (the desired level of government serv-
6 The responses to the open-ended categories were placed into one of the following fifteen
categories which, themselves, represent combinations of the CPS codings: (1) Economic
Policy: government control of the economy, monetary policy, tax policy, labor policy, etc.;
(2) Economic Problems: inflation, unemployment, wages/salaries/income, the nature of the
times, strikes, etc.; (3) Welfare/Poverty: welfare/poverty problems, government aid to the
poor, etc.; (4) Women's Issues: abortion, birth control, E.R.A., women's rights, etc.; (5) Old
Age: social security, pensions, aid to old people, etc.; (6) Environmental/Energy Concerns:
ecology, pollution, public power, energy, etc.; (7) Refugees; (8) Racial Concerns: civil rights
issues, busing, etc.; (9) Urban Problems: housing, law and order, urban problems, etc.; (10)
Government Aid Programs: jobs programs, unemployment compensation, veterans' benefits,
etc.; (11) Health: health problems, national health insurance, etc.; (12) Education: aid to
education, aid to parochial schools, etc.; (13) Civil Liberties/Gun Control; (14) Morality
(New Right) Issues: public morality, gay rights, school prayer, drugs; (15) Farming: prices for
produce, farm policy, farm supports.
7 In the 1980 NES Codebook, the variable numbers of the issue questions are as follows:
government services (v291), unemployment/inflation (v301), tax cut (v323), guaranteed jobs
(villO), minority aid (v1062), busing (v1133), abortion (v311), E.R.A. (v1127), women's
equal rights (v1094), preferential hiring (v1137), school prayer (v1135), nuclear energy
(v1148), and environmental regulations (v1141).
ices, inflation/unemployment, and guaranteed jobs); racial questions

(busing and minority aid); social concerns (abortion, the E.R.A., sex
roles, preferential hiring, and school prayer); and environmental prob-
lems (nuclear energy and environmental regulations). The questions
were recoded so that in each instance low scores equal the "liberal"
response and high scores the "conservative" response.
FINDINGS
Group Identifications and Political Perspectives

Generally, group identifiers should vary in terms of what they focus on
and what they find salient about certain political stimuli. Those
elements of public policy which hold a special relevance for a particular
group should be focused on relatively more by those identifying with that
group than by those identifying with other groups. Thus, for example,
those respondents identifying with women should make relatively more
references to "women's" issues than other group identifiers. This is not to
suggest, however, that group identifiers will devote all (or even substan-
tial amounts) of their attention to those policies whose relevance to the
group is most immediately apparent. On the contrary, it must be
remembered that the political environment is expected to play some role
in structuring perceptions.
With this in mind, we first note that, on average, each respondent
made only 2.9 domestic policy responses.8 An analysis of variance in-
dicates that the between-group differences in the number of responses is
significant (.05 level). Furthermore, such differences cannot be at-
tributed simply to variations in objective group memberships, cognitive
sophistication, or political interest; an analysis of variance with five
covariates - political interest, education, age, sex, and race - reveals that
there are still significant differences between the groups even when these
variables are held constant. Because of such between-group variations in
the average number of policy mentions, new variables were created to
facilitate the initial comparisons among groups. For each individual, the
fifteen policy comment variables were converted into percentage terms (#
of mentions in that category/total # of domestic policy mentions).
Presented in table 2 are the group averages for each of these new variables
(referred to as the percent policy comment variables).
Looking at the group identifiers as a whole, it appears that the nature
of the political environment has influenced the content of people's
8 The range in the number of responses was none to twenty-four, with 98 percent of the
respondents making ten comments or less.
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responses.9 References to the economy dominate domestic policy com-

ments. This might be expected, however, given both the importance of
economic issues in recent years (Hibbs, 1979) and the state of the political
environment in 1980. With inflation approaching record rates and
unemployment on the rise, discussion of the economy constituted a large
portion of the political rhetoric generated by the candidates and parties.
In turn, such economically toned political discourse seems to have shaped
the nature of political perceptions. Beyond the economy, the category of
women's issues - abortion, the E. R. A., women's rights - was the only one
to have averaged more than 10 percent of the comments of the overall
sample. This, too, is understandable given the rise of the New Right and
their focus on such "family" issues. Finally, the remaining categories of
policy averaged only a few percentage points each. Thus, the political
environment appears to play some role in structuring perceptions, as sug-
gested by the dominance of economic issues in the political discourse of
our respondents.
Yet, despite the apparent influence of the environment, there are
detectable differences in the perspectives of the various group identifiers.
Analysis of variance indicates that of the five categories that account for,
on the average, over 80 percent of the individual comments, there are
significant differences between the groups on four of them (the one excep-
tion is the welfare/poverty category). 1O Moreover, such differences in the
groups' perspectives broadly reflect the nature of the groups' interests and
related variations in the salience of certain issues.
Looking at specific differences, some interesting patterns appear. With
respect to the economy, those individuals identifying with the business
community (38.1 percent) and middle-class people (35.2 percent) tend to
make relatively more comments about economic policy than other group
identifiers, particularly blacks (10 percent). The pattern reverses when
economic problems are considered; black identifiers make more
9 Technically, of course, a causal relationship between the nature of the political environ-
ment and that of the public's political discourse cannot be established with cross-sectional
data of this sort. Moreover, while we would argue that it is most likely that the environment
has shaped the nature of political discourse, there may be some reciprocal causation between
the two; that is, the public's concern may determine, in part, the nature of the parties' and the
candidates' rhetoric.
10 Of the remaining ten categories of comment, analyses of variance indicate that the
groups differ significantly on only one (gun control/civil liberties). At the same time,
however, a priori t-tests based on theoretical expectations indicate that often extreme groups
differ significantly from the sample as a whole, in the expected direction. No doubt the
relatively few comments pertaining to these latter ten categories dictated against finding very
many significant differences among the groups. Presumably, a political environment less
oriented toward the economy might provide the opportunity for more group differences to
emerge in those areas less frequently mentioned in 1980.
references (41.9 percent) to economic problems than any other group,

while business and middle-class identifiers make fewer such references
(13.5 percent and 17.6 percent respectively). Thus, different groups tend
to adopt one of two distinct perspectives on the economy; one is focused
more on economic policy and the other on economic problems. Further-
more, group interests seem related to which perspective is chosen. It can
be argued that tax and monetary policies are more directly tied to the
economic interests of the business community and the middle class than
other groups. Similarly, economic problems such as unemployment and
inflation may have more tangible effects and thus group (i.e., fraternal)
relevance for blacks and other disadvantaged groups (i.e., older people
and the poor).
The economy is not the only area of domestic policy where group iden-
tifiers differ significantly in their focus. In particular, with regard to the
discussion of women's issues, respondents identifying with women make
significantly more references than other group identifiers to the highly
symbolic issues of abortion and the E.R.A. In fact, women identifiers
average more references (28.2 percent) to women's issues than they do to
any one of the categories of economic policy. Similarly, those feeling
closest to the poor or older people make significantly more references than
other group identifiers to policies dealing explicitly with old age in in-
creasingly symbolic terms. Conversely, those identifying with the young
make significantly fewer such references. In summary, then, the
evidence suggests that people identifying with various groups do bring
different perspectives to bear on the political world, perspectives that
focus more heavily on those issues most explicitly linked to each group's
economic and social interests.
Yet, such differences in group perspectives could be attributed solely to
variations in objective group memberships and other background
characteristics, and not to group identification per se. Specifically, if ob-
jective group memberships account for all of the observed differences be-
tween groups, such differences should disappear when the objective
memberships are controlled for. To test this possibility, the fifteen
original policy comment variables were employed as dependent variables
in new analyses of variance in which group identification was the in-
dependent variable and five covariates were also included: total number
of domestic policy responses, education, age, race, and sex." These
11 The original policy comment variables (as opposed to the percent variables) were used
to maximize the N. A preliminary analysis indicated that income had no significant effects
on any of the policy comment variables and thus it was eliminated from the analysis. The
variable numbers of the covariate measures are as follows: age (v408), education (v436), sex
(v720), and race (v721).
analyses show that, for the most part, the between-group differences
decline somewhat when objective group memberships are controlled for,
thus indicating that categorical membership does account for some of the
perceptual effects. Nonetheless, there are still statistically significant dif-
ferences between the groups for all the categories where they were
originally different, with the exception of one: old age (see table 3). In
addition, these analyses also reveal significant between-group differences
for several less-frequently mentioned areas of domestic policy: govern-
ment support programs, gun control/civil liberties, and environmen-
tal/energy concerns. Critically, then, even when objective group
memberships and other factors are held constant, there are still significant
differences between the various group identifiers in what they focus on.
In effect, both objective group memberships and psychological attach-
ment contribute to the observed perceptual differences between groups,
thus suggesting that our conceptualization of group identification is em-
pirically valid.
Our confidence in this interpretation is bolstered somewhat when we
consider those people who are not objective members of the group they
feel closest to. (Recall that these respondents were eliminated from the
previous analysis.) If the perceptual effects that have been discovered
are due primarily to feelings of closeness and not to the combination of
objective membership and psychological attachment (i.e., group iden-
tification), the same pattern of group differences should appear among
those people who only feel psychologically close to the group. To test this
possibility, for the "feel closest to only" respondents the fifteen original
policy comment variables were employed as dependent variables in new
analyses of variance in which the group "felt closest to" was the indepen-
dent variable. To control for variations in background characteristics,
the five covariates used in the previous analysis were also included. In
contrast to the earlier examination of group identifiers, these analyses
reveal no significant perceptual differences between people who feel
"closest to" different groups, but who are not objective members of those
groups. Such findings lend some support to the interpretation that the
perceptual effects we have observed derive from group identifications - a
combination of objective membership and psychological at-
tachment -and not merely feelings of closeness.'2
12
These findings should be viewed with some caution given the relatively small number of
respondents who felt psychologically close to groups of which they were not objective
members. At the same time, however, an examination of the differences in the group means
for these respondents does reveal considerably smaller differences than does a comparable ex-
amination of the group identifiers, thus suggesting that the lack of significance is not purely a
function of the small numbers. Such a relatively small number of respondents also made it
44
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Our understanding of the differences in the perspectives associated

with various group identifications is furthered by the results of a multiple
classification analysis, also presented in table 3. There, it becomes
clearer which groups have the most distinctive patterns - a distinctiveness
that cannot be attributed solely to differences in objective group member-
ship. For each group, the average deviation from the mean adjusted so as
to control for the covariates can be used as a rough measure of the distinc-
tiveness of the group's perspective. Based on this measure, three
groups - business identifiers, blacks, and women - appear to be most
distinctive in their political perspectives. As compared to other groups,
the business group identifiers focus relatively more on economic policy
and government support programs, and relatively less on both economic
and environmental/energy problems. In contrast, black identifiers are
distinguishable by the relatively greater amount of time they devote to
economic problems, a devotion that results in their paying comparatively
less attention to economic policy and women's issues. Individuals identi-
fying with women present still a third quite distinct perspective. Con-
trasted with other groups, they devote considerably less of their attention
to both economic policy and problems, while at the same time concen-
trating more heavily on women's issues and other liberal causes such as
the environment.
The perspectives of the remaining groups, while less distinct,
nonetheless provide support for the general argument that group iden-
tification helps define what is personally relevant, which in turn shapes
the nature of political perception. Even when objective group member-
ships are controlled for, the remaining economic groups-middle-class
people, working-class identifiers, and the poor -differ in their economic
perspectives with the middle class's perspective resembling that of the
business group and the poor's that of the blacks. These groups also vary
in their attention to women's issues; both the middle- and working-class
identifiers make relatively fewer comments about such issues while the
poor make more. The relatively greater focus of the poor on women's
issues is quite understandable given the increasing feminization of poverty
and the concomitant increase in the group relevance of women's issues
difficult to conduct a second, more direct test: for each group a comparison of the group iden-
tifiers with those respondents who feel closest to that group but who are not objective
members of it. For some groups - especially those with really distinctive viewpoints - there
were too few people in the latter category to make very meaningful comparisons. For the less
distinctive groups in which there were sufficient numbers of the "closest to only" respondents,
such comparisons were made using t-tests. For most groups, the group identifiers differed
from the "closest to only" respondents on at least half (and often more) of the policy areas
where the group identifiers had been distinctive from the sample as a whole.
such as equal rights and abortion. Finally, those identifying with older
people or the young are most distinctive in terms of their economic
perspectives, with the old adopting the viewpoint of the disadvantaged
(blacks, poor, etc.) and the young that of the advantaged (business iden-
tifiers and the middle class).
In summary, then, the political perspectives displayed in open-ended
responses to political stimuli tend to reflect two basic factors. First, the
nature of the political environment -what is focused on and deemed im-
portant by politicians, parties, and the media -appears to leave an im-
print on political perceptions; people seem to respond to the political
world in those terms in which it is presented to them. Certainly, this is
not a new observation (see Hagner, Pierce, and Wolsborn, 1983; and
Smith, 1980). Nevertheless, it is useful to remember that the perceptual
effects of group identifications may be constrained by the existing
political environment. Second, responses to the political environment
also appear to reflect the nature of an individual's schemas. People with
different group identifications have different self-schemas, and thus they
adopt distinct and varied perspectives on politics which tend to mirror
what is relevant to their group's interests. This is especially apparent for
those groups, such as blacks and women, whose identifications have been
activated a good deal by the environment. Moreover, it is critical to
recognize that the distinctiveness of these perspectives cannot be at-
tributed simply to variations in objective group membership; black iden-
tifiers, for example, differ from others even when race is controlled for.
Nor, for that matter, are distinctive perspectives apparently produced
simply by feelings of closeness in the absence of objective group member-
ship.
Group Identifications and Issue Positions
Not only should they influence political perceptions, but the self-
schemas associated with group identifications should also affect the proc-
ess of political evaluation, and consequently the outcomes of that process.
Specifically, because they look at the world from different perspectives,
people who identify with different groups are expected to have different
patterns of issue positions. To test this hypothesis, for the group iden-
tifiers analyses of variance were performed on the twelve issue position
scales with group identification as the main independent variable. In ad-
dition, as in the earlier analyses, to control for the effects of objective
group memberships five covariates were also employed: income, educa-
tion, age, race, and sex.
As illustrated in table 4, group identification has a significant main ef-
fect (.05 level) on nine of the twelve issues.'3 In essence, for most issues
individuals identifying with various groups assume significantly different
issue positions -differences that cannot be attributed simply to variations
in objective group memberships and other background characteristics.
Nor does it appear that the differences are purely a function of
psychological closeness. As in the previous section, all those respondents
who felt closest to a group in which they were not objective members were
compared to one another to see if they exhibited differences similar to
those of the group identifiers. 14 Unlike the group identifiers, these
respondents differed significantly (.05 level) on only one issue - preferen-
tial hiring of women. Thus, once again, it seems that group identifica-
tion (i.e., membership combined with psychological attachment), and
not just feelings of closeness, is necessary to produce distinctive patterns of
issue positions.
For the group identifiers, also presented in table 4 are the results of a
multiple classification analysis for each issue (i.e., the group deviations
from the grand mean, adjusted to control for the effects of the covariates).
These analyses reveal definite patterns in the issue positions assumed by
various group identifiers. Furthermore, these patterns indicate a tend-
ency for group identifiers to adopt relatively extreme positions on those
issues which have the most obvious salience for their group's interests.
This is precisely what should occur if, indeed, the self-schemas associated
with group identifications are structuring what is salient and conse-
quently how political policies are evaluated.
To elaborate, overall on the three economic issues (guaranteed jobs,
unemployment/inflation, and government services) the most extreme con-
servative positions are adopted by those identifying with business and
middle-class people; conversely, relatively extreme, consistently liberal
positions are taken by those identifying with blacks, the poor, and, to a
lesser extent, older people. The divergence in the issue positions of these
groups parallels our earlier finding that the same groups have distinctly
different perspectives on the economy. The respondents identifying with
"disadvantaged" groups (blacks, the poor, and the elderly) focus on
13 In all instances where it has a significant effect, group identification continues to have a
significant impact even with the effects of party and liberal/conservative identifications con-
trolled.
14 For the respondents who only felt "closest to" a group (i.e., not objective members).
analyses of variance were performed on the twelve issue position scales with group felt "closest
to" as the main independent variable. In order to control for the effects of background
characteristics, five covariates were also employed in the analyses: income, age, education,
race, and sex. Again, some caution should be exercised in interpreting these results given the
relatively small number of respondents, though again an examination of the group means
reveals less variation as compared to the pattern in the means of the group identifiers.
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economic problems and adopt liberal issue positions reflecting the

economic interests of their groups. Likewise, individuals identifying
with economically more advantaged groups concentrate relatively more
of their attention on economic policy and subsequently adopt conserv-
ative issue positions reflecting their group's economic interests. And
again, such differences are above and beyond those attributable to varia-
tions in objective group membership.
Similar patterns appear for different groups on other issues. For exam-
ple, on racial questions such as minority aid and the symbolic issue of bus-
ing, black identifiers assume relatively liberal positions. Along the same
lines, on "women's" issues those respondents identifying with women con-
sistently adopt positions mirroring that group's interests: liberal, rela-
tively extreme stands on abortion, the E.R.A., women's equality, and
preferential hiring of women. Similarly, even though they tend to take
middle-of-the-road or relatively conservative positions on the other racial
and women's issues, those identifying with the poor adopt relatively ex-
treme, liberal positions on the economically related questions of minority
aid and preferential hiring of women. Finally, people identifying with
the young, though conservative on several economic issues, tend to adopt
liberal positions on most social issues, especially school prayer and en-
vironmental regulations.
In summary, the group differences in issue positions are consistent with

the idea that various group identifiers evaluate politics from different
perspectives, and therefore adopt distinct issue positions. By helping to
define the nature of personal self-schemas, group identifications con-
tribute to how an individual structures the political world; and in turn,
those cognitive structures shape the evaluation of political phenomena.
Furthermore, in this process the group's interests are likely to become per-
sonally relevant to the individual, and therefore the evaluation of
political issues may be from the perspective of group interests rather than
strictly the individual's own self-interests. Such an interpretation is con-
sistent with our repeated finding that, even when objective group
memberships are controlled for, identifiers tend to adopt relatively ex-
treme positions consistent with the group's interests on issues with salience
to the group. This is especially true for those groups that our earlier
analysis revealed had very distinctive political perspectives. Specifically,
as might be predicted based on the group's interests, black identifiers tend
to adopt extremely liberal positions on economic and racial questions;
those identifying with women assume extremely liberal stands on
"women's" issues; and respondents classifying themselves as business peo-
ple are quite conservative on economic issues.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, let us briefly consider the implications of this analysis.

From a theoretical perspective, these findings provide empirical confir-
mation of the utility of our conceptualization of group identification.
Specifically, in and of itself, neither objective group membership nor a
feeling of closeness entirely accounts for the perceptual differences that
we found. Rather, objective group membership acting in concert with a
sense of psychological attachment-group identification as we have
defined it-produces distinctive perceptual viewpoints and patterns of
issue positions. In a more general sense, these findings suggest that group
identifications may play an important role in determining how many
Americans look at their political world. Thus, although group identifica-
tion in the absence of group consciousness may be insufficient to produce
distinctive patterns of group participation, group identifications, in and
of themselves, do appear to have a significant impact on the process of
political perception.
Yet, not all group identities and their related self-schemas are politi-
cally relevant. To a certain extent, the political significance of various
group identities may depend on the nature of the political environment. If
the political rhetoric and issues that define the environment contain
references to particular groups, it becomes more likely that those group
identities will have an impact on political perception and evaluation.
Thus, for example, in an environment dominated by economic issues,
identifications with business people have become politically activated. In
summary, then, group identities can have a substantial influence on how
people view politics, though the political relevance of different identities
is likely to vary.
Along somewhat different lines, our findings also pertain to the debate
over whether self-interest influences policy attitudes. Over the past few
years, "rational" actor models of decision making have gained prom-
inence (e.g., Fiorina, 1981). Underlying such models is the basic
assumption that self-interest is the primary motivation shaping the policy
stands and decisions of voters. Yet, despite the popularity of such
models, empirically they have received only marginal support. In par-
ticular, a number of studies have found that self-interest has little effect
on attitudes toward a wide array of issues ranging from busing to the
energy crisis to the state of the economy. (For a review of some of this
literature see Kinder, 1982.)
Within the context of such research, our findings suggest something of a
middle ground. Specifically, in this study it was found that group iden-
tifiers focused relatively more attention than other respondents on issues
related to their group's interests, and they adopted issue positions consis-
tent with the group's interests on issues salient to that group. In effect,
group interests - rather than personal interests per se - appear to shape
the political perspectives and issue positions of individuals. As Sears et
al. (1980) suggest, such findings may be interpreted in two ways. On the
one hand, they may indicate that individual self-interests are influencing
policy attitudes indirectly through the perception that individual interests
are shared with the group. In effect, group interests may function as a
proxy for individual self-interests. Alternatively, people may be sensitive
to group interests because such interests, in and of themselves, have
become personally relevant. It is this latter argument that we think more
likely. Specifically, we posit that the process of developing a group iden-
tification fosters a sense of solidarity with the group and its interests. In
many instances, because group ties are more easily linked to politics,
group interests may actually become even more relevant than self-
interests in the processes of political perception and evaluation.
In summary, then, our analysis suggests that the group basis of politics
is perhaps as important as earlier political scientists posited. Just as
group consciousness may hold the key to understanding the mobilization
of various segments of the population, so may group identifications repre-
sent a critical factor in determining how people perceive the political
world. Certainly, it is a possibility that warrants further research.
REFERENCES
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson (1982). "Racial Issues and the Structure of
Mass Belief Systems." Journal of Politics 44: 2-20.
Coleman, Richard P., and Lee Rainwater (1978). Social Standing in America: New Di-
mensions of Class. New York: Basic Books.
Eulau, Heinz (1981). "A Theoretical and Experimental Program on Reference Behavior
in Connection with the Second Five-Year Grant Period." A report to the National Elec-
tion Studies Board of Overseers.
Fiorina, Morris P. (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fiske, Susan T., and Patricia W. Linville (1980). "What Does the Schema Concept Buy
Us?" Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 6: 543-57.
Guimond, Serge, and Lise Dub6-Simard (1983). "Relative Deprivation Theory and the
Quebec Nationalist Movement: The Cognition-Emotion Distinction and the Personal-
Group Deprivation Issue." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44: 526-35.
Gurin, Patricia, Arthur H. Miller, and Gerald Gurin (1980). "Stratum Identification and
Consciousness." Social Psychology Quarterly 43: 30-47.
Hagner, Paul R., John C. Pierce, and Kay G. Wolsborn (1983). "Ideological Conceptualiza-
tion and the Opinion Bases of Partisan Choice." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. (1979). "The Mass Public and Macroeconomic Performance: The
Dynamics of Public Opinion toward Unemployment and Inflation." American Journal
of Political Science 23: 705-31.
Kinder, Donald R. (1982). "Enough Already about Ideology: The Many Bases of American
Public Opinion." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci-
ence Association, Denver.
Kuiper, N. A., and T. B. Rogers (1979). "The Encoding of Personal Information: Self-
Other Differences." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37: 449-514.
Markus, Hazel (1977). "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self." Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 35: 63-78.
Markus, Hazel, Marie Crane, Stan Bernstein, and Michael Siladi (1982). "Self-Schemas
and Gender." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42: 38-50.
Markus, Hazel, and Jeanne Smith (1981). "The Influence of Self-Schema on the Perception
of Others." In Nancy Cantor and John Kihlstrom (eds.), Personality, Cognition, and
Social Interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, and Gerald Gurin (1978). "Electoral Implications of
Group Identification and Consciousness: The Reintroduction of a Concept." Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York.
Miller, Arthur H., Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk (1981). "Group
Consciousness and Political Participation." American Journal of Political Science 25:
494-511.
Ostrom, Thomas M., John B. Pryor, and David D. Simpson (1981). "The Organization of
Social Information." In E. Tory Higgins, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna (eds.),
Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 1. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Rogers, T. B. (1981). "A Model of the Self as an Aspect of the Human Information Process-
ing System." In Nancy Cantor and John H. Kihlstrom (eds.), Personality, Cognition,
and Social Interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen, Jr. (1980). "Self-
Interest versus Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." American
Political Science Review 74: 670-84.
Smith, Eric R. A. N. (1980). "The Levels of Conceptualization: False Measures of Ideo-
logical Sophistication." American Political Science Review 74: 685-96.
Tajfel, Henri (1981). Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
APPENDIX
OBJECTIVEGROUPCATEGORIES
Categories of objective group membership were defined broadly to pre-

vent the exclusion of any respondent who might reasonably be considered
an objective member of the group. In more specific terms, for some of
the class groupings the categories were overlapping since people on the
borderline might reasonably be considered members of either category.
Also, income was used in defining the objective boundaries for most of the
class categories because, for most Americans, that is the dominant con-
sideration in their self-placement on the status ladder (Coleman and
Rainwater, 1978). The actual income ranges defining the various

categories were determined by applying Coleman and Rainwater's (1978)
work to current Census Bureau statistics.
The actual objective categories were defined as follows:
Class:
1. Business people: all respondents employed in managerial and adminis-
trative accounting, sales, and public relations (Miller et al., 1981).
2. Middle-class people: all individuals (i.e., no dependents or family
members) with an annual personal income greater than or equal to
$11,000, and all family members with an annual family income equal
to or greater than $23,000.
3. Working people: all individuals (i.e., no dependents or family mem-
bers) with an annual personal income between $4,000 and $13,999,
and all family members with an annual family income between $8,000
and $29,000.
4. Poor people: all individuals (i.e., no dependents or family members)
with an annual personal income less than or equal to $6,000 and all
family members with an annual family income less than or equal to
$11,000.
Age:
.1. Older people: all individuals fifty-five or older as ascertained by self-
reported date of birth.
2. Young people: all individuals thirty-five or younger as ascertained by
self-reported date of birth.
Race:
1. Blacks: all blacks as ascertained by interviewer observation.
2. Whites: all nonblacks as ascertained by interviewer observation.
Sex:
1. Women: all women as ascertained by interviewer observation.

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The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation

Author(s): Pamela Johnston Conover

Pamela Johnston Conover

In its infancy the study of political behavior was characterized by a

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP IDENTIFICATIONS

The Concept of Group Identification

schemas? Although our main interest lies in the empirical exploration of

I Clearly, there should be individual differences in the distinctiveness of the political

tifications-or more properly the self-schemas associated with

ment helps to determine which of an individual's many self-schemas is

With these arguments in mind, several hypotheses may be developed.

DATA AND MEASURES

Measuring Group Identification

4Unfortunately, the "closeness" questions used in the measurement of psychological at-

Measuring Political Perspectives

plays a role in determining which schemas will be engaged in the process-

Measuring Issue Positions

ices, inflation/unemployment, and guaranteed jobs); racial questions

Group Identifications and Political Perspectives

x t-K cq _ C' _ ncN I

x l t clsr Vcc) oou DnX KKO Cl

-81aD C C> cq r oo c') u

m ~~~~~Cs c s cc --- Irc c nCI_ ni cc

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responses.9 References to the economy dominate domestic policy com-

references (41.9 percent) to economic problems than any other group,

Our understanding of the differences in the perspectives associated

Group Identifications and Issue Positions

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economic problems and adopt liberal issue positions reflecting the

In summary, the group differences in issue positions are consistent with

In conclusion, let us briefly consider the implications of this analysis.

Categories of objective group membership were defined broadly to pre-

Rainwater, 1978). The actual income ranges defining the various

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