Civpro Module 1 Outline Draft

CIVIL PROCEDURE OUTLINE
DRAFT
Orendain, Michelle Ann B.
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Based on Atty. Francesca Semester A.Y. 2022-2023)
Module 1:
CASE INDEX:
1. In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong, G.R. No. 150274, 4 August 2006
2. Colmenar v. Colmenar, G.R. No. 252467, 21 June 2021
3. Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010
4. Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019
5. Commission on Audit v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 218870, November 24, 2020
6. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Heirs of Marcos, G.R. No. 225971,June 17, 2020
7. Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054,15 June 2016
8. Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15- 2407, November 22, 2017
9. Vda. de Ballesteros v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010
10. Cang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998
11. Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil- Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009
12. Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598,16 August 2004
13. Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, 7 May 1987
14. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, G.R Nos. 79937-38, February 13,1989
15. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v. Alonzo Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006
16. Foronda-Crystal v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017
17. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002
18. Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao G.R. No. 195477, 25 January 2016
19. Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232,10 March 2014
20. Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, 29 September 2014
21. Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, 3 September 2012
22. Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020
23. De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416,31 January 2006
24. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October
9,2019
25. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450,15 April 1968
26. Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016
27. Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018
28. Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, 7 August 2017
29. Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159411,18 March 2005
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I. Preliminaries/ General Principles
CONCEPT OF REMEDIAL LAW
Remedial law is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
Remedial statute or statutes:
(1) Relating to remedies or modes of procedure;
(2) Do not take away or create vested rights;
(3) BUT operate in furtherance of rights already existing. (Riano citing Systems Factor Corporation v.
NLRC (2000))
Source
Remedial law is basically contained in the Rules of Court. Circulars of the Supreme Court implementing the Rules
of Court (e.g. Rules on Summary Procedure) also contain remedial law.
The Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law (Inchausti & Co v de Leon (1913)]. The rule is subordinate to the statute, and in case of conflict, the
statute will prevail. [Shioji v Harvey (1922)].
Applicability
The Rules of Court is applicable in ALL COURTS, EXCEPT as otherwise provided by the SC [Rule 1, Sec. 2].
It governs the procedure to be observed in CIVIL or CRIMINAL actions and SPECIAL proceedings [Rule 1, Sec. 3].
It does not apply to the following cases:
1. Election cases,
2. Land registration cases,
3. Cadastral cases
4. Naturalization cases,
5. Insolvency proceedings
6. Other cases not herein provided for
Except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient [Rule 4, Sec. 4]
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Prospectivity/ Retroactivity
The Rules of Court are not penal statutes and cannot be given retroactive effect [Bermejo v Barrios (1970)].
Rules of procedure may be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. [In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court
Hon. Simeon Datumanong (2006)].
The Rules of Court shall govern cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings then
pending, EXCEPT to the extent that in the opinion of the Court their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice. [Riano citing Rule 114]
A. Remedial Law distinguished from substantive law
Substantive law Creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties concerning life, liberty,
or property the violation of which gives rise to a cause of action. [Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No.
L-2068 (1948)]
Remedial law Lays down methods by which the rights and obligations arising from
substantive law are protected, enforced, and given effect. [Bustos v. Lucero, G.R. No. L- 2068
(1948)]
Note: Procedural rules are not laws, for they are promulgated by the Supreme Court in their rule-
making capacity under the Constitution and do not originate from the legislative [Alvero v. Dela
Rosa, G.R. No. L-286 (1946)]. However, procedural rules have the force and effect of law, if not in
conflict with positive law, since procedural rules are subordinate to statute. [Inchausti & Co v. De
Leon, G.R. No. 7887 (1913)]
1. Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive Application of Rules of Court; Applicability to
pending actions
Force and Effect of Rules of Court

Rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with positive
law. The rule is subordinate to the statute, and, in case of conflict, the statute will prevail (Shioji v. Hon. Harvey,
citing Inchausti & Co. vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 18940, April 27, 1922).
Rules of procedure may be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor rise
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therefrom (In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong, G.R. No. 150274, August 4,
2006).
When Procedural Rules do not apply to pending actions:

1. Where the statute itself or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its
operation:
2. If applying the Rule to pending proceedings would impair vested rights;
3. When to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice; or
4. If doing so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts (Tan v.
CA, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002).
In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong, G.R. No. 150274, 4 August
2006
DOCTRINE: Rules of procedure may be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the
retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be violative of any personal rights because no vested
right may attach to nor rise therefrom.
FACTS: The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to
the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the anomalous payment of
P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the govt.
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty
On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification and two co-accused guilty as
charged and dismissed them from the service Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed
from the decision to the SC.
While appeal was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order
dismissing the petitioners from service.
Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner contends that
in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Secretary
Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an
unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court.
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
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salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final
after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A.
It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those
listed as final and unappealable An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay
the immediate implementation of the decision.
ISSUE: Whether Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court
RULING: NO. The issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a
contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration
of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the
different rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the
error to the higher court for review and correction. However, two events supervened since the filing of
this petition that would support its dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694
affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty, falsification of public
documents, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Second, Section 7,
Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 wherein the pertinent provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is now
essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service thus:
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any
personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom. In the case at bar, the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the
petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover,
in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an
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office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
Colmenar v. Colmenar, G.R. No. 252467, 21 June 2021
DOCTRINE: The application of the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must be done
with utmost caution and strict caution and strict adherence to its provisions.
Thus cautioned the Supreme Court as it reversed and set aside an Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which misapplied and used the said 2019 Amendments in dismissing a complaint for declaration of
nullity of deed of extrajudicial settlements (EJS) of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and
damages.
FACTS: Petitioner Frank Colmenar filed on September 11, 2018 a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Deeds of Sale, Cancellation of Titles, and Damages before
the RTC, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite. He claimed he was the second child of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar, who died and left real properties registered in his own name.
Frank Colmenar averred that respondents Apollo Colmenar, Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza, and Victoria Jet
Colmenar executed 2 extrajudicial settlements of the estate of Francisco where they made it appear that
they were the surviving heirs of Francisco, thereby allocating unto them the interests of his late father in
the properties. The subject real properties were eventually sold to respondent companies Philippine
Estates Corporation (PEC), Crisanta Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta Realty), Amaia Land
consent, thereby effectively depriving him of his successional rights.
ProFriends, PEC and Crisanta Realty filed their answers. Profriends invoked as affirmative defense lack of
cause of action, while PEC and Crisanta Realty averred that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action against them.
Apollo and Amaia, on the other hand, filed their respective motion to dismiss.
In its assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, the RTC stated that it was applying Section 12, Rule 8 of the
2019 Amendments, which states that the court shallmotu proprio resolve affirmative defenses within
ground that it failed to state a cause of action as against the respondent companies.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition raises pure questions of law? YES.
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(2) Whether the RTC committed reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent companies?
YES.
(3) Whether the RTC committed reversible error when it dismissed the complaint against respondent
companies on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them? YES.
RULING:
(1) YES, the petition raises pure questions of law.

A QUESTION OF LAW exists when the doubt hinges on what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances.
A QUESTION OF FACT exists when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
he
reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact.
Here, the question of whether the RTC committed reversible error when it applied the 2019
Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by the respondent companies, albeit the same
was already pending when these Amendments took effect, is one of law.
As to the issue of whether the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, states a cause of
action against respondent companies is also one of law.
As held in Daswani v. Banco de Oro, when only questions of law remain to be addressed, a direct
recourse to the Court under this remedy is the proper mode of appeal.
(2) YES, the RTC gravely erred when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses
pleaded by respondent companies.
It stressed that its application must be done with utmost caution and strict adherence to its provisions.
Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules provides:

Procedure shall govern all cases filed after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending
proceedings, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall
The SC stressed that the case commenced with the filing of the complaint in September 2018 and
remained pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect.
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The SC noted that the RTC motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses (complaint failed to state a
cause of action) on May 22, 2020, which was beyond the 30-day period from when respondents filed
their answer on February 27, 2020. Therefore, the RTC should have desisted from applying the 2019
Amendments to the case at bar, specifically Section 12, Rule 8, because when it did, the same was no
longer feasible.
Section 12, Rule 8. Affirmative defenses. x x x
(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within 30 calendar days from the
filing of the answer.
The Court added that it was inaccurate for the RTC to say that it was motu proprio acting on the
affirmative defense. In truth, the RTC had already resolved this common affirmative defense of failure to
state a cause of action, together with the other affirmative defenses in an earlier ruling. In its Omnibus
Order dated February 12, 2020, the RTC denied the motions to dismiss and motions to set the
affirmative defenses for h
The worst part was the RTC ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to
the case. For as a consequence, petitioner Frank Colmenar lost his substantial right to be heard on the
common affirmative defense of the respondent companies, and his right to seek a reconsideration of
the order of dismissal which were both granted him under the1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
(3) YES. The complaint stated a cause of action against respondent companies.
There are 2 sets of affirmative defenses raised by the respondents: (1) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, raised by PEC, Amaia and Crisanta Realty; and (2) lack of cause of action, raised by
ProFriends.
These two are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action, and are not interchangeable.
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading.
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings
through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court or raised as an affirmative defense
in an answer.
Dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time AFTER the questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Before then, it
cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal; much less can the court dismiss the case on that ground.
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The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is: admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the
relief demanded in the complaint?
Here, assuming the allegations are true, Frank Colmenar as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco
Jesus Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for (to declare as void the EJS of estate effected by the
respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to
declare as void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of
respondent companies which consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual
respondents.
No one can give what he does not have. Hence, whether respondent companies were buyers in bad
faith or had knowledge of the defect in the title of the seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise
to the complaint. Needless to state, the RTC cannot inject its own theory to take place of the actual
allegations in the complaint.
ADJUDICATION: The Court reinstated the complaint against the respondent companies, and directed the
RTC to resolve the case with utmost dispatch.
2. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 30
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: [xx] (5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. [xx]
3. Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court
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The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural Rules or to except a case from
their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corp., G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006).
Causes Which may Warrant the Suspension of the Strict Application of the Rules:
1. Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
2. To relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure;
3. Good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default;
4. The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
5. The merits of the case;
6. A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of a party favored by the suspension of Rules;
7. A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
8. The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
10. Peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;

11. In the name of substantial justice and fair play;
12. Importance of the issues involved; and
13. Exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances (Labao v. Flores, G.R. No.
187984, November 15, 2010).
Rules of Procedure are necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and
intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the
proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that
the said rules may be relaxed only in exceptionally meritorious cases (Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224,
November22, 2017).
Limitations on the Rule-making power of the Supreme Court: (SUD)
1. The Rules shall provide a Simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
2. The Rules shall be Uniform for courts of the same grade; and
3. The Rules shall not Diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)).
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DOCTRINE: While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even the
Court cannot trifle with.
FACTS: Petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents
were security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation (NPC-Mindanao). Petitioner issued a
memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated personal data files, security guard
directive, despite several notices to do so, the petitioner relieved them. Respondents filed individual complaints
with Labor Arbiter (LA) for illegal dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when
they were not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite their repeated requests. Petitioner
a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any valid reasons. The LA ruled in favor of the
petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. Counsel for the respondents appealed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) outside the reglementary period, yet the ruling was in favor of respondents. The petitioner and
SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for late filing,
opined that disregarding any procedural lapses

best served substantial justice.
ISSUES:
(1) -
YES
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions. YES
RULING:
(1) Yes. Late filing should not be allowed. Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. Procedural rules do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency
of, our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods
are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the
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orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that
even this Court cannot trifle with.
file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution. A decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and
laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of
right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.
After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality. Petition was granted and the decision of Labor Arbiter is reinstated.
B. Nature and Classification of Philippine Courts
Meaning of a Court
A court is an organ of government belonging to the judicial department, the function of which is the
application of the laws to controversies brought before it as well as the public administration of justice.
It is also the place where justice is administered [
Dictionary, Am. Jur. and C.J.S.]
CLASSIFICATION OF PHILIPPINE COURTS

General Classification
a. Regular Courts: Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
b. Special Courts: Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals
1. Classification of jurisdiction
a. Original vs. Appellate
A court is one with original jurisdiction when actions or proceedings are originally filed with it.
A court is one with appellate jurisdiction when it has the power of review over the decisions or orders of a
lower court. [1 Riano 47, 2016 Bantam Ed.]
Original Appellate
A court is one with original jurisdiction when A court is one with appellate jurisdiction when it
actions or proceedings may be originally filed has the power to review on appeal the decisions
with it. or orders of a lower court.
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Appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a
commencement of a new action [Morales v. CA, G.R. No. 126623 (1997)]
c. General vs. Special
General Special
Courts of general jurisdiction are those with Courts of special jurisdiction are those which
competence to decide on their own jurisdiction have jurisdiction only for a particular purpose or
and take cognizance of all cases of a particular clothed with special powers for the performance
nature. of specified duties beyond which they have no
authority of any kind.
c. Exclusive vs. Concurrent
Exclusive Concurrent
Exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of co- Concurrent jurisdiction is also called coordinate
existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to jurisdiction. It is the power of different courts to
the exclusion of others. [Cubero v. Laguna West take cognizance of the same subject matter.
Multi-Purpose Cooperatives, Inc., G.R. No. 166833 Where such jurisdiction exists, the court first
(2006)] taking cognizance of the case assumes
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other courts.
2. Constitutional and statutory courts
A constitutional court is one created by a direct constitutional provision, an example of which is the SC.
Only the SC is a constitutional court.
A statutory court is one created by a law other than the Constitution. All other courts are statutory
courts. [1 Riano 45-46, 2016 Bantam Ed.]
A constitutionally-mandated court refers to a court whose creation by Congress is mandated by a

constitutional provision, of which there is only one example: the Sandiganbayan [Sec. 4, Art. XI, Constitution].
While its existence is mandated by the Constitution, its creation was through and by P.D. 1486, issued by
President Marcos.
3. Courts of law and equity
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Philippine courts are courts of both law and equity. Both legal and equitable jurisdictions are dispensed with
in the same tribunal. [US v. Tamparong, 31 Phil 321-327 (1915)]
Equity jurisdiction is used to describe the power of the court to resolve issues presented in a case, in
accordance with the rules of fairness and justice, and in the absence of a clear, positive law governing such
issues. [1 Riano 41, 2016 Bantam Ed.]
never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis [GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, G.R. No.
156841 (2005)]
4. Distinguish court and judge
Court Judge
Tribunal officially assembled under Officer of such tribunal
authority of law
A being comparable to a corporation A physical person
A court is an office A judge is a public officer
A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it [People
v. Carlos, G.R. No. L-239 (1947)].
NOTE: Jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its
proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over
it [ABC Davao Auto Supply v. CA, G.R. No. 113296 (1998)]
5. Doctrine of hierarchy of courts
According to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, in case of concurrence of jurisdiction, a case must be
filed first before the lowest court possible EXCEPT if one can advance a special reason which would
allow a part to directly resort to a higher court. [1 Riano 43, 2016 Bantam Ed.]
Also known as Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

General Rule: A case must be filed with the lowest court possible having the appropriate jurisdiction.
For example, although the SC, CA, and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction over certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, a direct invocation of the SC is improper. A petition must be first made to the lowest
court - the RTC. [1 Riano 42, 2016 Bantam Ed]
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Exception: The Supreme Court may disregard hierarchy of courts if warranted by the following reasons:
1. Where special and important reasons are present
2. When dictated by public welfare and policy
3. When demanded by interest of justice
4. Where the challenged orders are patent nullities
5. Where compelling circumstances warrant, and
6. Where genuine issues of constitutionality must be immediately addressed. [1 Riano 44-45, 2016
Bantam Ed]
Rationale
1. It would be an imposition upon the limited time of the Court; and
2. It would inevitably result in a delay, in the adjudication of cases, which are remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum, or a trier of facts [People v. Azarraga, G.R. No. 187117 (2011)]
A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition
[De Castro v. Carlos, G.R. No. 194994 (2013)]
-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019
**take note of the Angara model
DOCTRINE:
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CAin the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to
this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by
the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not
equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the
primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on
the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed
aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause
raised.
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP) posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport development, operations, and
maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindigan, New Bohol (Panglao) and Puerto Princesa Airports
(collectively, Projects), the total cost of which is P116.23 Billion. The Projects will be awarded through
competitive bidding (as prescribed by R.A 6957, as amended by R.A 7718). The concession period would be for
30 years.
DOTC and CAAP issued Instructions to Prospective Bidders (ITPB), which provided that prospective bidders are
to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and maintenance of the airports, which are now
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bundled into two groups: namely: Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo and Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and
New Bohol (Panglao). Prospective buyers are allowed to bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle or for both Bundles.
Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, represented by its Chairperson Gerardo Malinao, suing as taxpayer and invoking the
transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present petition for prohibition. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin DOTC and CAAP from proceeding with the
bidding.
The petitioner argues that:
-dummy and the grant of opportunity to the
general public to invest in public utilities"
2. The bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Sec 19, Art. XII of the Constitution
because it will allow one winning bidder to operate the ports in a
bundle, establishing monopolies.
3. It restraints mid-sized Filipino companies to participate in the bidding as instead of participating in one of six
distinct projects, bundling them made them into two gargantuan projects.
4. Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it bundled the projects without legal authority.
5. Bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher than what it
would have been, had the projects been bided out separately.
The DOTC denied these allegations while CAAP asserted that the petition violated the basic fundamental
principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek
relief directly from the Court (SC). The case should have been filed with the trial court because it raises factual
issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not this petition submitted directly to the SC violates the hierarchy of courts
RULING: YES, in filing the case directly to the SC, this petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts and must be
dismissed.
1. Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects violates the constitutional provisions on monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling will create a monopoly, in
violation of the Constitution. By merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient
allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for. The bundling of the Projects is an
arrangement made by the DOTC and the CAAP in the conduct of public bidding. The question that arises is
whether the same constitutes an anti-competitive agreement prohibited by RA No. 10667. Similar to its
assertion that bundling will create a monopoly prohibited by law, we find that petitioner, again, utterly failed to
sufficiently state a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts to support its conclusion that bundling, as an
arrangement, is in restraint of trade or results in unfair competition under the provisions of RA No. 10667.
2. As to accusation that the bundling of the Projects violates the anti-dummy law and the constitutional
provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public utilities
In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-
Dummy Law. It did not identify what corporation or association falsely simulated the composition of its stock
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ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law limiting, reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or
development projects must be awarded only to corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which is
exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order (EO) No. 65 even exempts contracts for
infrastructure/development projects covered by the BOT Law from the 40% foreign
ownership limitation.
3. On Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady companies direct access to the Projects,
also raises questions of fact. Foremost, petitioner does not identify these "shady companies."
4. On the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a conclusion of law. As shown, no facts were
even alleged to show which specific law was violated by the decision to bunde the projects.
In these three above arguments of petitioner must be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a cause of
action. Even assuming that petitioner's causes of action were properly alleged, the resolution of said issues
would still require the determination of factual issues which this Court simply cannot undertake.
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to
this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by
the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not
equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the
primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on
the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed
aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause
raised.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts has exceptions as summarized by The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court (5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression; [and]
(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or
the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases of the foregoing exceptions would reveal a common
denominator the issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal. In the case at bar, petitioner argues direct
resort to us is proper because the issue raised is one of transcendental importance or of paramount
interest(that is bundling of the Projects violates the constitutional proscription on monopoly and restraint of
trade.)
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An examination of the cases wherein this Court used "transcendental importance" of the constitutional
issue raised to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts would show that resolution of factual
issues was not necessary for the resolution of the constitutional issue/s.
To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to tackle factual
questions and play the role of a trial court.The only circumstance when we may take cognizance of a case in the
first instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's proclamation of martial lawunder Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The case before us does not fall under this exception
Accordingly, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reiterate that when a question before the
Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will
refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the
transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper
trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED
6. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Exceptions

General Rule: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. [Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and
, G.R. No. 197592 (2013)]
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact [Paloma v. Mora (2005)].
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. [Province of Aklan
, G.R. No. 197592 (2013)]
Exceptions:
1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine,
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant,
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small,
5. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts,
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent,
7. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process,
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9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot,
10. When there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy,
11. When strong public interest is involved, and
12. In quo warranto proceedings.
[ , G.R. No. 197592 (2013)]
NOTE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
in which courts cannot determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal. [International
Service v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, G.R. No. 209271 (2015)]
Commission on Audit v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 218870, November 24, 2020
DOCTRINE: The principle of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction.
Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by that administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound discretion requiring its special knowledge, experience, and services to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
FACTS: During his term as Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, private respondent approved several
disbursements for the years 2006 to 2010 for various activities and projects of the provincial government. Upon
audit, the COA found several deficiencies. As a result, the COA, issued ten (10) Notices of Disallowance (NDs) on
the provincial government's disbursements for the foregoing transactions. Private respondent, however, did not
question the NDs before the COA. Thus, Notices of Finality of Decision (NFDs) were issued.
On 15 October 2014, private respondent filed two (2) petitions for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as Special
Civil Action Nos. P-155-2014 and P-156-2014 and raffled to Branch 33, RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur. The RTC
subsequently issued a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the prayer for a writ of injunction, one of
the grounds they cited is that the respondents have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a condition
precedent for the filing of the petitions.
Nonetheless, the RTC, in a 07 November 2014 Order, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners
from implementing any writ of execution pursuant to the NDs.
Petitioners are now before this Court assailing the RTC's Orders. Petitioners maintain that private respondent
should have appealed the decisions of the provincial auditors to the COA Commission Proper, and his failure to
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assail the same renders the NDs final and executory. They further assert that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
private respondent's petitions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petitions
before the RTC despite p
on audit
RULING: Yes. The principle of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction.
Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by that administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound discretion requiring its special knowledge, experience, and services to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law. The matter of
allowing or disallowing the requests for payment is within the primary power of COA to decide.
Verily, the Constitution and law bestow primary jurisdiction on the examination and audit of government
accounts to the COA. As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has the power to
define the scope of its audit and examination, and to establish the techniques and methods required therefor. It
also has the power to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures
or uses of government funds and properties.
In this case, private respondent is questioning the disallowances of various expenditures of the provincial
government for violations of procurement and auditing rules. Thus, the COA has primary authority to review
whether such disallowances were lawful and in accordance with their rules. Given COA's primary jurisdiction on
the matter, case law 47 posits that the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not
be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
The 1987 Constitution limits this Court's authority to review decisions of the Constitutional Commissions only to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process.
Guided by such precept, this Court cannot uphold private respondent's resort to the RTC. There is nothing in law
or jurisprudence that grants it the authority to directly determine questions on COA's grave abuse of discretion.
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In this case, the records are bereft of any explanation for private respondent's failure to question the
disallowances before the COA Commission Proper. He merely insists on the availability of judicial relief with the
RTC after the lapse of the reglementary period. Certainly, this Court cannot countenance private respondent's
absurd interpretation of the rules without transgressing settled principles in administrative and procedural law.
To allow litigants to bypass quasi-judicial bodies, and in this case, a constitutional commission, would not only
be a gross disrespect to their mandate, but also unduly subject courts to further clogging of dockets.
In any event, the circumstances of the case do not qualify as one of the exceptions to the general rule on COA's
primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government, viz.: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of
the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
7. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that courts cannot determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal. [International Service v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia, G.R. No. 209271 (2015)].
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Heirs of Marcos, G.R. No. 225971, June 17, 2020
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on practical
reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own
errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative
processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts.
FACTS: RCBMI is the registered owner of a parcel of land. upon the enactment of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.)
27, otherwise known as the "Tenants Emancipation Decree," portions of said land were awarded to Mariano
Marcos (Marcos), now represented by his heirs (Heirs of Marcos).
RCBMI sought the cancellation of the award of the above portions to Marcos, mainly alleging that those lots
were not devoted to rice production but to social and humanitarian programs.
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Ministry of Agrarian Reform granted RCBMI's petition and cancelled CLT No. 0392296 on the ground that the lot
it covered was vacant and uncultivated upon P.D. 27's issuance. Marcos filed for a reconsideration of the same
three years after, but the same was denied. Despite said cancellation, however, the Heirs of Marcos allegedly
refused to surrender possession of the subject property.
RCBMI filed a Complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages on February 2, 1994
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Malolos, Bulacan. The PARAD ruled
in favor of RCBMI, and issued an order for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate the subject property along with a
declaration of nullity of any sale made by the Heirs of Marcos involving the same. The Heirs of Marcos appealed
to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the PARAD's Decision and
restated the order for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate.
Still aggrieved, the Heirs of Marcos appealed the matter to the CAvia a petition for review. The CA denied the
petition.
SUBSEQUENTLY, THE RCBI FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS UNDER RULES 65. HOWEVER,
THE CA DISMISSED THE SAME FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing RCBMI's petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 for its
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
RULING: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on practical
reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own
errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through the administrative
processes and sparing them of the laborious and costly resort to courts.
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include situations where the very
rationale of the doctrine has been defeated.
The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain
exceptions, to wit:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
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(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) where strong public interest is involved; and
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.
As applied to the factual backdrop of this case, with the peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted,
this Court concludes that RCBMI's action falls within the temporal exempting circumstance, or where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant. Specifically, the
exempting circumstance is the suspension of RCBMI's enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by
the MAR in 1982, but to date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.
8. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
The Doctrine of Non-Interference/ Doctrine of Judicial Stability holds that courts of equal and coordinate
Lapu-Lapu Devt Corp v. Group Management Corp 388
SCRA 493, 508]
It also bars a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no
appellate jurisdiction or power of review. [Villamor v. Salas 203 SCRA 540, 543]
Note: Such doctrine applies also to administrative bodies. When the law provides for an appeal to the CA or SC
from the decision of an administrative body, it means that such body is co-equal with the RTC and is then
beyond the control of the latter. [Philippine Sinter Corp v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. Inc., G.R. No.
127371 (2002)]
When not applicable

The doctrine of judicial stability does not apply where a third party claimant is involved this is in consonance
with the well-established principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger
[Sps. Crisologo v. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321 (2012), citing Sec. 16, Rule 39, and quoting Naguit v. CA, G.R. No.
137675 (2000)]
Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, 15 June 2016
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DOCTRINE: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by
the injunction.
FACTS: In 2001, respondents extended a loan to Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of P50,000,000 The loan was
When Dante failed to pay the loan, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC and
assigning the proceeds to Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), the individual lenders, and PentaCapital
(respondents). When he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante disappeared, leaving
his obligations unpaid.
The respondents filed an action for the sum of money against him before the RTC Makati. The RTC
Makati ordered Dante to pay respondents. The levied property of Dante was sold in an auction sale on March
29, 2005.
- filed before the RTC Paranaque a complaint
against respondents for the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale issued
in favor of respondents.
The Paranaque RTC initially dismissed the nullification case on the ground of res judicata. Upon M.R.,
The Paranaque RTC reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale,
and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before RTC Paranaque which was deniedfor having been filed out
of time.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, arguing that the Paranaque RTC
had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-equal court.
In the CA Ruling: the court granted the petition and directed the Paranaque RTC to allow respondents'
Notice of Appeal. Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments
of a co-equal court, the CA found that the affirmance of the Paranaque RTC's assailed issuances would allow
Petitioner Teresita's husband, Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated
by the Makati RTC, a co-equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the controversy, on the basis of
technicality.
Petitioner Teresita's MR was denied in the resolution, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether RTC Paranaque violated the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in nullifying the
judgement of RTC Makati YES
RULING: Yes. Thus, the petition is devoid of merit. In Barroso v. Omelio, the Court explained the doctrine of
judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the caseand renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment to the exclusion of all other coordinate court? for its execution and over all its incident? and to
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
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A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to
correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide
the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting
of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. The law and the rules are not unaware that
an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a
remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher
court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the
Constitution, under Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition
for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To summarize, the various branches of the regional trial
courts, having as they do the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
In this case, the Court finds that the Paranaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it
took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it
emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been
dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction, as the Paranaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and
sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court.
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Paranaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the
doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the
execution thereof, and all other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Paranaque RTC, a
court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify, or vacate the said
judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered
or issued. Consequently, the Paranaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all the proceedings
therein, as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon, void for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order rendered by the RTC Paranaque City, as well as all orders
issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.
Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15- 2407, November 22, 2017
DOCTRINE: Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are
not included within the purview of the words "other written instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
governing petitions for declaratory relief.
FACTS: Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, fled a complaint against then Mayor Enrico R.
Echiverri, and several other city officials (Echiverri, et al.) before the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged
violation of the Government Service Insurance System Act.
Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman issued an Order of Preventive Suspension (Order of
Suspension) on July 18, 2011 against Echiverri, et al. Aggrieved by the Order of Suspension, Echiverri, et al.
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). While Echiverri, et al. were able to obtain a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction from the CA Special 14th Division, nevertheless, in its
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Decision dated January 2, 2012, the CA affirmed the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman and lifted and set
aside the TRO.
On January 9, 2012, Echiverri, et al. fled a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Caloocan City. Named as Respondents in the Petition for Declaratory
Relief were Erice (Complainant in the present administrative matter) and the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG). Echiverri, et al. prayed that the RTC "make a defnite judicial declaration on the rights
and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their]
suspension.''
On even date, RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72-hour ex-parte Order to enjoin the DILG
and Erice from implementing the Order of Suspension. In the summary hearing held on January 10, 2012, Erice
and the DILG questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the matter, considering that the object of the
Petition for Declaratory Relief were the CA Decision and the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman. On the
same day, January 11, 2012, with the case now pending before Judge Sison, Erice and the DILG reiterated their
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve.
That afternoon, Judge Sison noted that the 72-hour TRO of the Order of Suspension would be expiring
the next day, on January 12, 2012, and that the parties ought to fnish with the presentation of evidence before
noon of January 12, 2012. Judge Sison proceeded with the hearing and allowed Echiverri, et al. to present their
evidence until 5:00 p.m. of January 11, 2012. The next day, at 8:00 a.m., the summary hearing continued. At
9:15 a.m., Judge Sison issued an Order extending the TRO to 20 days, inclusive of the 72-hour TRO earlier
granted by Judge Kwong. On the day scheduled for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, January 17, 2012,
Judge Sison stated that he would hear evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
This compelled Erice to fle an Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued the Order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against Erice and the DILG
to enjoin the latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension was proper
RULING: NO. The Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Pursuant to the principle of judicial stability or non-interference, where decisions of certain
administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their
actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC.
Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the
Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases, more so, because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on
January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the
enforcement of the Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of
Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012. In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been
aware that court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief.
They are not included within
Court governing petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of
quasi- judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata. Consequently, a judgment rendered
by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The losing
party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief.
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Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifcally prayed that the RTC "make a defnite
judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to
the implementation of the order of preventive suspension," effectively putting into question the CA-a ffirmed
Ombudsman Order of Suspension a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled
with the deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion than
that Judge Sison acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby fnds retired Judge Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law
under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, and is hereby ordered to
PAY A FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from his terminal leave benefts earlier
retained pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated August 5, 2015, with the remaining amount to be released to
Judge Sison immediately.
9. Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction, continuity of jurisdiction
Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction - also known as doctrine of continuity of jurisdiction
The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case
[Bantua v. Mercader (2001)].
As a consequence, jurisdiction is not affected by a new law placing a proceeding under the jurisdiction of
another tribunal, EXCEPT:
1. Where there is an express provision in the statute
2. The statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment [Riano citing People
v. Cawaling (1998)].
Vda. de Ballesteros v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010
DOCTRINE: The rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is
that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
NOTE: tion
proceedings before the RTC- Makati. A liquidation proceeding has been explained in the case of In Re:
liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly classified as
FACTS: Petitioner Lucia Barrameda vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her
children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce Rex and Adden, all surnamed Ballesteros, and the Rural Bank
of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.
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In the complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left 2 parcels of land located in San
Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur and that on Mar. 6, 1995, without her knowledge and consent, her children
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her husband wherein all the heirs,
including Lucia, agreed to allot the 2 parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico)
Further, still without her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate to RBCI which
mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was occupying
Parcel B and had no other place to live.
She prayed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver, and the subsequent mortgage be
declared null and void having been executed without her knowledge and consent. She also prayed for damages.
In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the 2 parcels to Rico which represented her
share in the estate of her husband and that the extrajudicial partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed
They further claimed that Parcel B had already been foreclosed way back in 1999 which fact was known
to Lucia through the auctioning notary public.
The case was set for pre-trail and during the pre-
being informed that Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already been
closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC and so the lawyers of PDIC took over the case of RBCI.
RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Iriga has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
RBCI stated that pursuant to Sec. 30, RA No. 7653 (New Central Bank Act), the RTC-Makati, already
constituted itself, per its Order dated Aug 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the
liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of the civil case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of such
liquidation court.
Lucia opposed the motion but the RTC-Iriga issued an order granting the Motion to dismiss on the
ground that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Lucia appealed to the CA on the ground that the RTC-Iriga erred in dismissing the case because it had
jurisdiction over the Civil case under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
CA rendered a decision setting aside the dismissal of the case and ordering the consolidation of the civil
case and the liquidation case pending before the RTC-Makati. Lucia filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to continue trying and ultimately decide on the civil case. NO
(2) Whether the the CA erred in ordering the consolidation of the civil case with the liquidation case as special
proceedings of the RTC of Makati. NO
RULING:
(1) No. -Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to continue trying the civil case until its
final disposition, evidently falls out from a strained interpretation of the law and jurisprudence. The Court
recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is
not without exceptions.
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This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character. Sec. 30 RA 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against
the bank.
jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the liquidation case before the RTC-Makati, her stance
of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other
creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as
well.
damages fall within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Sec. 30 of RA 7653. The jurisdiction
consolidated with the liquidation proceedings before the RTC-Makati. A liquidation proceeding has been
explained in the case of In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD Inc. v. BIR
properly class
It is clear therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims, including that of Lucia against the
insolvent bank. In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the liquidation court
consolidated with the liquidation case in order to expeditiously determine whether she is entitled to recover the
property subject of mortgage from RBCI and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive from the remaining
assets of the bank.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
C. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction, in General
Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case [Tolentino v. Leviste
(2004)].
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice: [Art 8, Sec. 1, Constitution]
1. To settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable;
2. To determine WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any government branch/ instrumentality.
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All courts exercise judicial power. Only the Supreme Court is the court created by the Constitution
[Art 8, Sec. 1, Constitution]. The Sandiganbayan is a Constitutionally mandated court, but it is
created by statute. [PD 1486]
Requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction

1. Court must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
2. It must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy
3. It must have jurisdiction over the res
4. It must have jurisdiction over the issues
1. Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
i. Cang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law the established rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, had three children, namely: Keith,
affair with Wilma Soco, she filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu. The court granted the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses.
Herbert Cang went to the United States where he sought divorce from Anna Marie After obtaining
divorce, he then had an American wifeand became a naturalized American citizen. Later on, he divorced his wife
and never remarried.
Then, Ronald Clavano and wife Maria Clara Clavano filed a special proceeding for the adoption of the
Cang children who at the time, were minors
The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna
Marie, the biological mother, likewise executed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded
his legal obligation to s
abandonment of the children by the petitioner was sufficiently alleged.
Upon learning of the petition, Herbert Cang immediately went back to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto.
RTC:
opposition rests upon a very shaky foundation and found that petitioner is morally unfit to be the father of the
children.
In the CA, petitioner asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest
him of parental authority because:
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(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption;

(b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent: and
(d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the DSWD who
made the case study report required by law.
CA: However, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption citing Art 188 of the Family Code which requires
the written consent of the natural parents however, the written consent of the parent who has abandoned the
children are not necessary
Petitioner appealed to the SC, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not
have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for adoption is defective for not con
RULING: Yes. When the Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption, the applicable law was the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child During the pendency
of the petition, the Family Code, which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code, took effect. Still, under the
Family Code, written consent of the natural parent is required Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law,
the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." Notwithstanding the amendment, the
written consent of the natural parent is still a requisite for the validity.
Nevertheless, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that the written consent may be dispensed with if the
natural parent has abandoned the child or is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that
the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove
that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his children. Based on the
evidence presented, which was surprisingl
claim, the petitioner did not abandon his children as to warrant the loss of parental authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano.
2. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts, BP 129, as amended by RA 11576
a. Supreme Court
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL CASES
General Rule: The SC is not a trier of facts.

Exception: The SC can look into the facts of a case:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [Aklan v. Enero, G.R. No.
178309, January 27, 2009]
Exclusive Original Jurisdiction

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against appellate courts, namely:
a. Court of Appeals, [Sec. 17, R.A. 296]
b.Commission on Elections, [Sec 7, Art. IX, Constitution]
c. Commission on Audit, [Sec. 7, Art. IX, Constitution]
d.Sandiganbayan, and [P .D. 1606, as amended]
e. Court of Tax Appeals (not en banc). [1 Riano 92, 2016 Bantam Ed.]
(if en banc, SC in appellate jurisdiction)
Concurrent Original Jurisdiction

1. With Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the RTC, CSC, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, NLRC, Quasi-judicial agencies, and
writ of kalikasan, all subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
2. With the CA and RTC in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
lower courts and bodies and in petitions for quo warranto, and writs of habeas corpus,
all subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
3. With CA, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
4. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the RTC in cases affecting ambassadors, public
ministers and consuls.
Appellate Jurisdiction
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1. By way of petition for review on certiorari (appeal by certiorari under Rule 45) against CA,
Sandiganbayan, RTC on pure questions of law and CTA in its decisions rendered en banc.
2. In cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation, legality
of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or penalty, jurisdiction of a lower court; and
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any court is in issue;
4. All cases in which an error or question of law is involved
5. The SC may resolve factual issues in certain exceptional circumstances (Josefa v. Zhandong, 2003):
a. The conclusion is grounded on speculations/ surmises /conjectures
b. The inference is manifestly mistaken/absurd/impossible;
c. There is grave abuse of discretion;
d. The judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. The findings of fact are conflicting;
f. There is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
g. The finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record;
h. The findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
i. The CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
j. The findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case;
k. Such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
b. Court of Appeals
JURISDICTION OF THE CA IN CIVIL CASES

In actions for annulment of judgments of the RTC
Concurrent Original Jurisdiction

1. With SC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC, CSC,
CBAA, other quasi-judicial agencies mentioned in Rule 43, and the NLRC (however, this
should be filed first with the CA as per St. Martin Funeral Home case), and writ of
kalikasan.
2. With the SC and RTC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
lower courts and bodies and writs of quo warranto, habeas corpus, whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and writ of continuing mandamus on environmental
cases.
3. With SC, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
where the action involves public data or government office
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Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction

1. By way of ordinary appeal from the RTC and the Family Courts.
2. By way of petition for review from the RTC rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
3. By way of petition for review from the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the
CSC, CBAA and other bodies mentioned in Rule 43 and of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
4. Over decisions of MTCs in cadastral or land registration cases pursuant to its
delegated jurisdiction; this is because decisions of MTCs in these cases are appealable in
the same manner as decisions of RTCs.
c. Court of Tax Appeals
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS

(RA 9282 and RULE 5, AM 05-11-07 CTA)
Exclusive Original or Appellate Jurisdiction to Review by Appeal:

1. Decisions of CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under
the NIRC or other laws administered by BIR;
2. Inaction by CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of IR taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or
other laws administered by BIR, where the NIRC or other applicable law provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed an implied denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local taxes originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
a) in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other charges, seizure,
detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in
relation thereto, or
b) other matters arising under the Customs law or other laws, part of laws or
special laws administered by BOC;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally
decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decision of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
government under Sec. 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7.Decisions of Secretary of Trade and Industry in the case of non-agricultural product,
commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural
product, commodity or article, involving dumping duties and counterveiling duties
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under Secs. 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under RA 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not
to impose said duties.

1. Over all criminal cases arising from violation of the NIRC and the TCC and other laws,
part of laws, or special laws administered by the BIR or the BOC where the principal
amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed is less than P1M or
where there is no specified amount claimed (the offenses or penalties shall be tried by
the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate);
2. In tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties claimed is less than P1M tried by the proper MTC, MeTC and RTC.
Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction

1. In criminal offenses
a) Over appeals from the judgment, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction, and
b) Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by
the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction.
2. In tax collection cases
a) Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax
collection cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
b) Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction.
d. Regional Trial Courts
1. SRC - RA 8799
2. Sec. 2, PD 1529
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration of
lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying
the Torrens system.
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Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its
clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits,
orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC IN CIVIL CASES

(BP 129: Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by RA 11576)
General Original Jurisdiction

All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court/tribunal/person/ body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

2. The action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
a. Such as rescission of contract, action to revive judgment, declaratory relief (1st
part), support, expropriation)
b. If the action is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will
depend on the amount of the claim. [RCPI v. CA (2002)]
c. If the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, if
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money. [Soliven v. Fastforms (1992)]
3. Title to, possession of, or interest in, real property with assessed value exceeding
P400,000
Except: Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
4. If the amount involved exceeds P2M in the following cases:
a) Admiralty and maritime cases
b) Matters of Probate (testate and intestate)
c) Other actions involving personal property
d) Demand for money
jurisdictional amount under Sec. 19(8) and Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129, as amended by RA
7691 (and RA 11576), applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, if the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.[Admin Circ. 09-94]
5. All actions involving the contract of marriage and family relations
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6. To hear and decide intra-corporate controversies, as per Sec. 52, Securities and
Regulations Code (RA 8799)
a) Cases involving devises or schemes employed by or any acts, of
the board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the
stockholders, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the SEC
b) Controversies arising out of intra- corporate or partnership
relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation , partnership or association and the state insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such
entity
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be
declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where
the corporation, partnership of association possesses sufficient
property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where
the corporation, partnership of association has no sufficient
assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
1. With the Supreme Court in actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls
2. With the SC and CA in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
lower courts and bodies in petitions for quo warranto, habeas corpus, and writ of
continuing mandamus on environmental cases
3. With the SC, CA and Sandigabayan in petitions for writs of habeas data and amparo
4. With Insurance Commissioner claims not exceeding P100,000
Appellate Jurisdiction
Over cases decided by lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions EXCEPT
decisions of lower courts in the exercise of delegated jurisdiction.
Special Jurisdiction
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SC may designate certain branches of RTC to try exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases not falling within the
jurisdiction of any quasi-judicial body and other special cases in the interest of justice.
Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil- Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009
DOCTRINE: The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts
which if true would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations.
FACTS: In October 1997, petitioners Heirs filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or
Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against
respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development,
Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Pi as.
The eight Complaints, which were later consolidated, were similarly worded and contained substantially
identical allegations.
Petitioners claimed that:
a. they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the afore-described parcels of land (subject
properties) for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991.
b. they had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same.
c. Respondents cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Pi as in
their names, to support their claim over the subject properties since, petitioners averred, the subject properties
were not covered by said certificates.
d. Said TCTs, purportedly derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6122, issued in favor of Jose
Velasquez, were spurious.
Petitioners thus sought from the RTC that an order be issued enjoining respondents from making any
developments on the subject properties, to recognize the rights of the petitioners, to vacate the subject lot and
peacefully surrender possession thereof to petitioners, that TCTs be cancelled by the Register of Deeds for Las
Pi
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the
grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
Respondents maintained that the Complaints should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Even
assuming that petitioners were able to prove their allegations of longtime possession and payment of realty
taxes on the subject properties, and to submit a sketch plan of the same, these cannot defeat a claim of
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ownership over the parcels of land, which were already registered under the Torrens system in the name of
respondents and the other consortium members.
On September 8, 2000, the RTC issued a Resolution granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss. The trial court
determined that the subject properties were already registered in the names of respondents, and that
petitioners were unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence their title to the said properties. The RTC
reiterated the dismissal of the Complaint in its June 30, 2003 Resolution.
On September 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC Resolutions
stating that the respondents' titles to the subject properties were indefeasible because they were registered
under the Torrens system. Thus, petitioners could not say that any claim on the subject properties casts a cloud
on their title when they failed to demonstrate a legal or an equitable title to the same. The appellate court
further decreed that the cases for quieting of title should be dismissed based on the allegation of petitioners
themselves that the parcels of land covered by respondents' certificates of title were not the subject properties
which
ISSUE:
RULING: YES. Complaints sufficiently stated a cause of action. The respondents contention that they maintain
their ownership of the subject properties, evidenced by certificates of title registered in their names, cannot be
defeated, is untenable.
Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners' Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their
Complaints was that while the subject properties were not covered by respondents' certificates of title,
nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom. Hence, it is not simply a question of whether
petitioners' possession can defeat respondents' title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to
be made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by respondents' certificates of title.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should
not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant.
This Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The
Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As
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owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same.
Petitioners averred that respondents had violated their rights as owner of the subject properties by evicting the
former therefrom by means of force and intimidation.
Resultantly, petitioners filed the cases before the RTC in order to recover possession of the subject properties,
to prevent respondents from using their TCTs to defeat petitioners' rights of ownership and possession over said
subject properties, and to claim damages and other reliefs that the court may deem just and equitable.
The Court notes that petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of respondents' certificates of title are inconsistent
with their allegations. While petitioners can seek the recovery of the subject properties, they cannot ask for the
cancellation of respondents' TCTs since petitioners failed to allege any interest in the land covered thereby. Still,
the other reliefs sought by petitioners, i.e., recovery of the possession of the subject properties and
compensation for the damages resulting from respondents' forcible taking of their property, are still proper.
Petitioners' Complaints should not have been dismissed despite the seeming error made by petitioners in their
prayer. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 16 September 2005 and
Resolution dated 9 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80927 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the records of the case be remanded for further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 253,
of Las Pi as City, which is hereby ordered to try and decide the case with deliberate speed.
e. Family Courts - RA 8639
JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS IN CIVIL CASES (RA 8369 )

a. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children and habeas corpus involving children
b. Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof
c. Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those
relating to status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together
under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains
d. Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment
e. Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of EO 209 (Family Code)
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f. Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected

children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, the suspension,
termination or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under PD
603, EO 56 (1986) and other related laws
g. Petitions for the constitution of the family home
NOTE: In areas where there are no Family Courts, the above-enumerated cases shall be
adjudicated by the RTC (RA 8369)
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598,16 August 2004
DOCTRINE: The Family Code Act of 1997 did not empower the family courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas
corpus and it did not revoke the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus.
In rel
understanding, the spirit of the law and intention of the lawmakers come first than legal technicalities.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if
so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Also, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with
certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines as provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rev. Rules of Court.
Sec.5 - Jurisdiction of Family Court - The Family courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following cases: b) Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the
latter.
Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors
provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
FACTS: Petitioner, an American and respondent, a Filipino was married in the Philippines and has a daughter.
After 3 years, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her friends,
leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.
2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter without notifying her husband and told the servant
that she is bringing the child in Basilan.
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Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court of Makati but was dismissed due to lack of
jurisdiction since the child is in Basilan.
Petitioner went to Basilan and search, but was unsuccessful. He again filed writ of Habeas Corpus in the Court of
Appeals but was denied on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
CA ruled that R.A. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed by R.A. 7902 ( An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Thus, this review on the resolution of CA dismissing the petition of habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of substance.
ISSUE: Whether CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions
RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
According to CA, Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction within such cases. SC disagree on that reasoning
because individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since
they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, the petitioner in a habeas corpus will be left
without legal remedy.
The Family Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions
of habeas corpus where the custody of the minors is at issue as based on Section 20 on the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to minors.
the right and welfare of the children.
Petition for habeas corpus is Granted. Serving officer shall search for the child all over the country.
f. MTC, MeTC, MCTC, MTCC
JURISDICTION OF THE MTCs IN CIVIL CASES

(BP 129: Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by RA 11576 Read)
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1. If the amount involved does not exceed P2M:

a. Actions involving personal property
b. Probate Proceeding (testate and intestate) based on gross value of the estate
c. Admiralty and maritime cases
d. Demand for money
and Costs (IDALEC). However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
2. Actions involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P400,000 exclusive on interest,
Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
3. Inclusion and exclusion of voters
4. Those governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure
a. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer (FEUD)
(2) With jurisdiction to resolve issue of ownership to determine
ONLY issue of possession (provisional only)
(3) Irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought
to be recover
(4)
P20,000
b.
does not exceed P100,000. P200,000 in MM, exclusive of interests and costs.
Special Jurisdiction over petition for writ of habeas corpus OR application for bail in criminal cases in
the absence of all RTC judges in the province or city
Delegated Jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases where:
1. There is no controversy over the land
2. In case of contested lands, the value does not exceed P100,000:
a. The value is to be ascertained:
(1)
(2) By agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one
(3) From the corresponding tax declaration of the real property
NOTE: MTC decisions in cadastral and land registration cases are appealable in the same manner
as RTC decisions
1st level courts:

a. Metropolitan Trial Court Metro Manila;
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b. Municipal Trial Courts in Cities situated in cities

c. Municipal Circuit Trial Court composed of multi-sala
d. Municipal in one municipality
3. Docket and Filing Fees
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action [Proton
Pilipinas v. Banque National de Paris, G.R. No. 151242 (2005)]
Payment of docket fees is mandatory and jurisdictional [National Transmission Corporation v. Heirs of Teodulo
Ebesa, G.R. No. 186102 (2016)].
The Manchester Rule
Automatic Dismissal
Any defect in the original pleading resulting in underpayment of the docket fees cannot be cured by
amendment, such as by the reduction of the claim as, for all legal purposes, there is no original complaint over
which the court has acquired jurisdiction [Manchester v. CA, G.R. No. 75919 (1987)]
Relaxation of the Manchester Rule (Sun Insurance Doctrine)
NOT automatic dismissal
Court may allow payment of fees within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the expiration of the
applicable prescriptive period of the action filed [Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 79937 (1989)]
Exception to the Sun Insurance doctrine The Sun Insurance rule allowing payment of deficiency does not
apply where plaintiff never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the Rules to pay the docket fee but
stubbornly insisted that the case filed was one for specific performance and damages [Gochan v. Gochan, G.R.
No. 146089 (2001)]
Further modification
Docket fees as lien
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the pleading and the payment of the
prescribed filing fee, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or cannot
then be estimated, or a claim left for determination by the court, then the additional filing fee shall constitute a
lien on the judgment [Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954 (2005)]
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Limitation on the claims covered by fees as lien
Claims not specified or claims although specified are left for determination of the court are limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof [Metrobank v. Perez, G.R. No. 181842 (2010)]
Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, 7 May 1987
DOCTRINE: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
FACTS: Present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary
restraining order, etc. ---i.e., petitioner MDC filed a complaint for specific performance against City Land to
compel the latter to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the former.
Petitioner also alleged that respondent City Land forfeited their tender of payment for a certain
transaction thereby causing damages amounting to P78,750,000.00.
Said amount was alleged in the BODY of the complaint but was not reiterated in the PRAYER. Petitioner
paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that their action is primarily for specific performance and is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court found that there is an under-assessment of docket fees, and thus ordered petitioner to
amend its complaint. With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the amount of claim for damages to
P10M, which was again not state in the PRAYER (but stated in the BODY).
NOTE: The designation and prayer of the present case clearly show that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. Hence the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the
original complaint.
ISSUE: Whether jurisdiction is acquired when correct docket fee has not been paid
RULING: No.
The Court held that in the present case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes, there is no original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
The order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the
trial court are null and void.
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CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complain and not in the amended complaint.
Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, G.R Nos. 79937-38, February 13,1989
DOCTRINE: The Court may allow payment of fees within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the expiration
of the applicable prescriptive period of the action filed.
FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation
of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums
and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally
paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
ISSUE: Whether the Court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct
or sufficient docket fees
RULING: Yes. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee
due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. A
more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
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Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v. Alonzo Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006
DOCTRINE: When insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply
FACTS: For the purpose of putting an end to a suit for sum of money Salvador and Intercontinental entered into
a Compromise Agreement dated 22 May 1998 alongside which is a joint manifestation and motion to dismiss.
However on Dec 18, 2000 petitioner commenced an action to declare the aforesaid Compromise Agreement null
and void. By that time, intercontinental was under a new management.
Petitoner alleged that aside from its non-existent cause or object, said agreement was entered into by its
erstwhile management without the requisite approval of the PCGG. Private respondent should refund the
P2,000,000.00 he received in virtue thereof and pay his overavailment of its 506.75 ROS spots amounting to
P1,140,187.50. Incor
On the other hand, private respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
petitioner for failure to comply with the compromise agreement.
The balance of 6,080-
market price and be made payable upon demand.
It prayed for the following:

1. P200,000.00 as actual damages;
2. P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
Plaintiff further prays for such other equitable reliefs as may be warranted in the premises.
Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment on September 23, 2003 his claim
already totaled P540,000.000. Salvador further alleged Intercontinental is guilty of gross insincerity and bad
faith in instituting Civil Case and that by the sale of its DMZ-FM Station to Blockbuster Broadcasting System,
petitioner manifested its determination to defeat his claim by leaving no sufficient security therefore.
Petitioner filed a motion styled as one for dismissal and/or suspension of all proceedings in the aforesaid
consolidated c
actually one for a sum of money his unpaid docket fees amounted to P5,452,237.50. Hence his action should
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or, at the very least, suspended until payment of the correct docket fees.
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. It held that petitioner is

estopped from raising the issue of deficient docket fee in view of its active participation in the proceedings. The
deficiency in the filing fees did not divest it of its jurisdiction hence the proceedings need not be dismissed or
suspended. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The CA found no abuse of discretion in the de

proceedings. It held that non-payment of the appropriate docket fees did not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction to try the case and that the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility to
make the deficiency assessment.
ISSUE: Whether the case should be dismissed for failure to pay correct docket fee
RULING: No. Jurisdiction was properly acquired in this case. To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
In the complaint respondent did not have a clear basis in computing the exact quantitative value of paragraph 4
of the Compromise Agreement.
The P8, 517.00 docket fees were computed on the basis of what was legally quantifiable at the time of the filing
of the complaint. Upon proof of payment of the assessed fees by the respondent, the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is
terminated.
In the case at bar, the respondent relied on the assessment made by the docket clerk which turned out to be
incorrect. The payment of the docket fees, as assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to
defraud the government by the respondent. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
respondent and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
Foronda-Crystal v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017
DOCTRINE:
assessed value in the complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of the
property is a violation of the law, and generally would be dismissed because the court which would exercise
jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.
Relevantly, Sec. 7 (b), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed filing and docket
fees, the payment of which bestows upon the courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be filed; and
second, the latest iteration of the same provision already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such
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that the determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on (a) the fair market
value stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation; or (b) the stated value of the real or
personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.
FACTS: Petitioner is the daughter of Foronda, the registered owner of a parcel of land. He derived his title over
the property from a successful grant of a Free Patent covered by an OCT. Respondent Son instituted an action
for reconveyance and damages against petitioner alleging that she has been the lawful owner and possessor of
the subject lot having bought it from a certain Arias for a sum of P200,00.00. She argued that she has been
religiously paying real property taxes and the tax declarations were issued under her name. She claimed that the
issuance of the Free Patent was due to gross error or any other cause. She supported this by alleging that there
is no tax declaration in the name of Foronda.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, which the RTC granted for lack of jurisdiction as the case should have been
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. However, the RTC reconsidered its initial decision and set it aside
ratiocinating that the Complaint stated that the property was worth P200,000.00 and that the Court has judicial
knowledge that under the BIR zonal valuation, the property carries the value that may summed up to more than
P20,000.00. Thereafter, the RTC decided in favor of respondent and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
OCT and to issue a new one under responden
ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction -YES
RULING: Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In
order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists.
In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power
to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and
not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
As provided in the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of
real property or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed
value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC,
MCTC, or MTCC.
To elaborate further, jurisprudence states that, generally, the assessed value of the real property serves as the
benchmark. In determining the assessed value, there must be an examination of the allegations in the
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complaint. These allegations serve as the basis for the court to determine whether it is competent to take
cognizance of the case. Failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in the complaint would necessarily
ther the RTC or MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the action. However, this admits of an exception, which is if, in the documents
annexed to the complaint, an allegation of the assessed value could be found.
Furthermore, in Barangay Piapi, the Court held that in the absence of an allegation of assessed value, the
alleged market value should be considered in determining the jurisdiction. Relevantly, Sec. 7 (b), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed filing and docket fees, the payment of which bestows
upon the courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be filed; and second, the latest iteration of the
same provision already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such that the determination of the
amount of prescribed filing and docket fees are now based on (a) the fair market value stated in the current tax
declaration or current zonal valuation; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal property in litigation as
alleged by the claimant. Notably, Barangay Piapi must be read in the context of the determination of the actual
amount of prescribed filing and docket fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, respondent failed to allege the assessed value of the subject property, which would generally be a
violation of the law and would warrant a dismissal of the case. However, due to a liberal interpretation of the
law, a perusal of the attached Tax Declaration would reveal that the property was valued at P2,826.00. Due to
this, MTC
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.
Hence, RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the case.
*Take note of the two-tiered rule see highlighted portin
4. Aspects of jurisdiction
Venue vs. Jurisdiction
Venue Jurisdiction
It is the place, or geographical area, in which an It is the power/authority of the court to hear and
action or proceeding should be brought. determine a case.
Procedural Law Substantive law
Venue may be waived if not invoked either in a CANNOT be waived by the parties
motion to dismiss or in the answer
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May be conferred by the act or agreement of the Conferred/fixed by law

parties
The court cannot dismiss motu proprio for improper The Court may dismiss motu proprio in case of lack of
venue jurisdiction over the subject matter
*Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at

any time during the proceedings.
i. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action, and
means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court but jurisdiction of
the class of cases to which the particular case belongs (Riano citing CJS).
It is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong
[Reyes v. Diaz (1941)]
Jurisdiction versus the exercise of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction: the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. [Arranza v. BF Homes
(2000)].
Jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise thereof. Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case and not the
decision rendered therein. When there is jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction. [Herrera v. Baretto et al (1913)]
Error of Jurisdiction as distinguished from Error of Judgment
Error of Jurisidiction Error of Judgment

It is one where the act complained of was issued by It is one which the court may commit in the exercise
the court without or in excess of jurisdiction [Cabrera of its jurisdiction [Cabrera v. Lapid (2006)].
v. Lapid (2006)]. It includes errors of procedure or mistakes in the
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Savings v. CA (2000)]
Correctible only by the extraordinary writ of Correctible by appeal [Cabrera v Lapid (2006)]
certiorari [Cabrera v Lapid (2006)]
Renders a judgment void or voidable [Rule 16 Sec. 1, Ground for reversal only if it is shown that prejudice
Rule 65] has been caused [Banco Espa ol-Filipino v Palanca
(1918)]
Objections to Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
When it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the same. (Sec. 1, Rule 9)
The court may on its OWN INITIATIVE object to an erroneous jurisdiction and may ex mero motu take cognizance
of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case and has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction
[Fabian v. Desierto (1998)].
Earliest opportunity of a party to raise the issue of jurisdiction is in a motion to dismiss filed before the filing or
service of an answer. Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If no motion is
filed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. [Riano citing Sec.
1(b) and 6 of Rule 16].
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal. When the court dismisses the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is common
reason that the court cannot remand the case to another court with the proper jurisdiction. Its only power is to
dismiss and not to make any other order.
1. Conferred by law; determined by the allegations in the complaint
How conferred and determined:
1. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.
2. It is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
3. Jurisdiction CANNOT be:
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a. Fixed by agreement of the parties;
b. Cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the
parties;
c. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court [Regalado citing De Jesus v
Garcia (1967)].
d. Cannot be subject to compromise [Civil Code, Art 2035]
4. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for. [Gulfo v. Ancheta (2012)]
5. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in the answer or in the answer or in a motion to
dismiss. [Sindico v. Diaz (2004)].
6. Once attached to a court, it cannot be ousted by subsequent statute.
a. Exception: The statute itself conferring new jurisdiction expressly provides for retroactive effect.
[Southern Food v. Salas (1992)]
7. The filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action [CB v. CA
(1992)](2008 Bar Exam).
Exception: Non-payment of docket fee does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
rules prescribing such payment. [Go v. Tong (2003)]
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002
DOCTRINE: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the
action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
FACTS: Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for breach of contract of lease with
damages against petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending
that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint was basically one for collection of
unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for
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Regional Trial Courts. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, but the latter dismissed the same. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent
RULING: Yes. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the
action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent's cause of action is
breach of contract.
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts
The Court held that actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Here, the averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed
by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year
lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject
contract of lease was breached.
The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent
to the breach is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance.
Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to
be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The
trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Sps. Erorita v. Sps. Dumlao G.R. No. 195477, 25 January 2016
DOCTRINE: The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time
on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.
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FACTS: Spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land located. The San Mariano Academy
structures are built on the property. The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. Because the former owners, Spouses Erorita, failed to redeem it, the title was consolidated in the buyers'
name. The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the school on the property.
The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San Mariano Academy's administrators.
The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of P20,000.00, but had failed to pay
rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the school
without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Spouses
Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school without clearance from the DECS to
whom they are accountable. Subsequently, Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before
the RTC. The RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao's favor. The Eroritas appealed to the CA arguing that the
complaint patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
RULING: No. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully
possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff's tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that
his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered
as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to
continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the
Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate
the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last
demand to vacate (February 12, 2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the
MTC's exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value. In the present case, the complaint
clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the
MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void,
the RTC's decision is void.
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Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous
to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost 15 years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the
proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant. In Figueroa v.
People, we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply.
When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for
laches to apply. Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application of the estoppel by
laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC's jurisdiction in their appeal before the
CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of
an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings
contemplated in Tijam. Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's
jurisdiction.
Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232,10 March 2014
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.
FACTS: -patent land located in Davao

Oriental. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents. Three
years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC, anchoring his
cause of action on Section 119 the Public Land Act which (CA No. 141) which allows the right of repurchase.
During the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania G. Bautista.
Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby
they agreed to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m. portion of the property as well as to withdraw all claims and
counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC.
Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of
the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is
only PhP 16,500 and the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed value.
Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title
to or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is more than PhP 20,000, then the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is
below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
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Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners argue that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it
being founded on privity of contract between the parties. According to petitioners, what they seek is the
enforcement of their right to repurchase the subject property under Section 119 of CA 141.
ISSUE: Whether the action filed by petitioners is one Involving title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein, or one incapable of pecuniary estimation and is thus cognizable by the RTC
RULING: The instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. His action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder under
Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil,
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is
in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the
lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in
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reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the
performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express provision of CA
141.crallawlibrary
Decision of the RTC is reversed.
Heirs of Julao v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, 29 September 2014 - Note the jurisdictional amounts as
amended by RA11576
DOCTRINE: For the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
aint the assessed value of the subject property, the
CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In
fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
(*N.B.: By virtue of the amendment provided in RA 11576 enacted July 30, 2021, for the RTC to exercise
jurisdiction, the assessed value must exceed P400,000.)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties; nor can it be
cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
FACTS: In 1960, Telesforo Julao filed before DENR two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his death on June 1,
1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs. On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of
Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V-6667 to respondent
spouses Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on the property
they acquired from Solito. In 1986, Solito went missing.
On December 21, 1998, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2446, covering a 641-square meter property, was
issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before the RTC of
Baguio City, a Complaint or Recovery of Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses. Petitioners
alleged that they are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land located at Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, covered by OCT No. P-2446; that the subject property originated from TSA No. V-2132; that
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RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of petitioners
to identify the property sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
RULING: No. Section 19 (2) and Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, provide:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases . Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property
sought to be recovered determines the court's jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the
CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In
fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by respondents in
their Appellant's Brief. And the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment. Under Section
1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
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deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, which must be
apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
ii. Jurisdiction over the Parties
The manner by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the parties depends on whether the party is the
plaintiff or the defendant.
The mode of acquisition of jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant applies both to ordinary and special
civil actions.
How jurisdiction over the PLAINTIFF is acquired

Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by filing of the complaint or petition. By doing so, he submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court [Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v CA (1991)].
General Rule: No court has the authority to interfere by injunction with the judgment of another court of
coordinate jurisdiction or to pass upon or scrutinize and much less declare as unjust a judgment of another court
Exception: The doctrine of judicial stability does not apply where a third party claimant is involved
How jurisdiction over the DEFENDANT is acquired
1. By voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or
2. By coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons [de Joya v. Marquez
(2006), citing Regalado]
NOTE: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case, while in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided the latter has jurisdiction over the res [Alba v. CA
(2005)].
The mode of acquisition of jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant applies to both ordinary and special
civil actions like mandamus or unlawful detainer cases.
Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, 3 September 2012
DOCTRINE: If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An authorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. In order for the court
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to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties. Courts acquire over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint and to be bound by a decision, a
alid complaint was ever filed, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
.FACTS: Respondent-appellee Constatino Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land. Jelly Galiga
leased the subject parcel of land from 1979 to 1993. Subsequently, petitioner SALVADOR alleged that she
bought the said land on September 7, 1993. Then, on October 12, 1994, ANGELES through DIAZ filed a complaint
for ejectment before the MeTC against SALVADOR when the latter heeded the letter of ANGELES demanding her
to vacate the subject property. The MeTC ruled in favor of ANGELES. SALVADOR appealed in RTC averring that
DIAZ has no authority whatsoever from ANGELES at the time of filling of the suit. The RTC denied his appeal.
When the case was elevated to the CA via petition for review, the same affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the averment of SALVADOR has effect to the complaint filed by DIAZ who was alleged to have
no authority from ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit
RULING: Yes. This is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as
DIAZ failed to
present proof of his authority to represent ANGELES in filing the complaint. This prompted SALVADOR to raise in
ey (SPA). However, the said

SPA was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed appearing to
have been notarized by one Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County. No certification from the Philippines
Consulate General in California that the said person is indeed a notary public. Verily, the court cannot give full
faith and credit to the official acts of McGuire, and hence, no evidentiary weight or value can be attached to the
document designated as an SPA. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that DIaz has been authorized by
respondent to initiate the action against SALVADOR.
The Court held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do
so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. In order for
the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. Jurisprudence also provides that Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the
If no valid complaint was ever filed, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
iii. Jurisdiction over the Issues
It is the power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the pleadings of the parties.
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An issue is a disputed point or question to which parties to an action have narrowed down their several
allegations and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a decision. Where there is no disputed point, there is
no issue.
Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and determined by:
1. The pleadings of the parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and determine whether or not
the issues are of fact or law.
2. Stipulation of the parties as when in the pre-trial, the parties enter into stipulations of facts and
documents or enter into agreement simplifying the issues of the case.
3. Waiver or failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Here
the parties try with their express or implied consent or issues not raised by the pleadings. The issues
tried shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020
DOCTRINE: Compliance with jurisdictional requirements is strictly mandatory in a special proceedings case as it
is the operative fact which vests a court with the power and authority to validly take cognizance and decide a
case.
Jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which are either
disputed by the parties or simply under consideration. This aspect of jurisdiction is closely tied to jurisdiction
over the remedy and over the subject matter which, in turn, is generally determined in the allegations of the
initiatory pleading (complaint or petition) and not the result of proof.
However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, jurisdiction over the issues may be conferred by either
express or implied consent of the parties.
FACTS: Constancio and his common-law wife Isabel Luna had several parcels of land in Davao in under their
collective names in which they were issued aforementioned OCTs sometime in November 1925. When both
Constancio and Isabel passed away intestate during WWII, they left no direct heirs and were survived by Heirs of
Constancio Guzman Inc, a corporation whose stakeholders were the children and grandchildren of Constancio's
only sibling, Manuel Guzman.
On June 8, 2001, HCGI filed four separate petitions for reconstitution of title of lost/destroyed OCT nos 219, 337,
67 and 164 before the RTC. On July 25, 2002, Davao City's Acting Register of Deeds, Atty. Florenda Patriarca
submitted a report that OCT 337 in the name of both spouses had already been canceled and had been subject
to several transfers, the latest being to RPh. OCT 219 was canceled and was currently in the hands of Antonio
Arroyo. OCT 164 was also registered to Arroyo and OCT 67 was transferred several times before Madeline
Marfori.
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On May 12, 2003, RTC dismissed all the petitions for reconstitution as it was clear from the report that the OCTs
were just cancelled as a result of voluntary and involuntary subsequent transfers. Aggrieved, HCGI directly
elevated the case to SC via petition for review on Certiorari, which was denied for blatant disregard of the
hierarchy of courts and that no exceptional or compelling circumstance had been cited.
On June 22, 2004, petitioner filed an amended petition for reconstitution of OCT nos 164, 219, 220, 301, 337,
514, and 67, alleging that a certain Bellie Artigas had been authorized to recover, administer and dispose of all
properties of the Constancio estate and that the parcels of land under the subject titles were sold to her by
Artigas as Constancio's attorney-in-fact by way of a deed of sale. That she is currently in possession of the lands
covered by the subject OCTs.
Petitioner alleged that the original copies of the subject OCTs were kept inside the repositories of Davao City's
RD, but that RD issued certification which stated that the subject OCTs were not among its available files and
that they may be mutilated or destroyed. RTC granted the petition for reconstitution on March 4, 2008.
On April 18, 2008, petitioner filed an urgent motion for execution claiming that since no MR was filed by the
adverse parties within the reglementary period, her motion must be granted, and on April 23, 2008, the motion
was granted by Judge Omelio.
On May 26, 2008, the Republic through OSG filed petition for relief from judgement with RTC, seeking to set
aside the March 4, 2008 decision. The case was then eventually re-raffled to Judge Tanjili who later
unexpectedly inhibited himself from handling the reconstitution case.
Despite absence of any raffle and without conducting a hearing, Judge Omelio reassumed jurisdiction over the
case on September 3, 2009 and issued order denying the republic's petition for relief for having been filed 16
days beyond the reglementary period. Judge also denied the public prosecutor's MR in an order dated October
1, 2009.
On October 22, 2009, republic filed a petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order with CA
pointing out that Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the 2 orders. CA issued a TRO via
resolution enjoining Judge Omelio from enforcing the decision as well as the orders. CA later issued a Writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent any grave and irreparable injury to the rights of the republic.
Despite pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the CA, Judge Omelio issued an order directing the Davao
City Engineer's Office to issue a fencing permit over the properties. On June 30, 2010, Atty. Cruzabra filed a
Manifestation with the CA informing the latter of Judge Omelio's highly contumacious May 25, 2010 Order
which directly violated the May 18, 2010 Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The CA, in a Resolution and in view of petitioner's move for clarification, assented to Judge Omelio's May 25,
2010 Order for the issuance of a fencing permit as well as a Writ of Demolition. Here, it opined that the issuance
of a Fencing Permit would not violate or injure the rights of all parties for it is a necessary measure for
preservation which would, instead, tend to "preserve and protect" the area in question from trespass and
depredation by third persons.
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On July 25, 2012, CA rendered a decision against petitioner ratiocinating that republic had seasonably filed the
petition for relief since the reglementary period should be counted from the date of receipt of the OSG not
the Davao City's Office of the City Prosecutor; the present reconstitution case as regards OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67
and 164 cannot prosper for it is barred by res judicata pursuant to this Court's ruling in the case of Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. which Judge Omelio should have taken judicial notice of; and, petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 26 (R.A. No. 26) because she failed to notify the intervenors-private
respondents of the present reconstitution proceedings before the RTC and her petition is not based on an
existing owner's, co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate OCT.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the petition for
reconstitution of title despite the failure of petitioner to comply with some jurisdictional requirements
RULING: No. Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. It is simply defined as the power and
authority conferred by the Constitution or statute of a court to hear and decide a case. Without
jurisdiction, a judgment rendered by a court is null and void and may be attacked anytime. Indeed, a void
judgment is no judgment at all it can neither be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation; all
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
In adjudication, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (a) jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) jurisdiction over the parties; (c) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (d) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. Additionally, a court must also acquire
jurisdiction over the remedy in order for it to exercise its powers validly and with binding effect.
As in this case, special proceedings are creatures of statutes (or constitutional provisions in the case of
extraordinary writs like habeas corpus) that do both confer jurisdiction on specific courts while providing for a
specific procedure to be followed in order for the resulting judgment to be valid. The reason is that a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
It is unlike ordinary civil actions in which a party called a "complainant" who seeks for either the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Here, the case has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
As such, the trial court must have jurisdiction to take cognizance of such petition or application in compliance
with the specific procedure provided by law. The authority to proceed is conferred by a statute which is why the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and the same must be strictly complied with.
One must be mindful that the acquisition of jurisdiction is not a direct result of the inherent power of courts to
settle actual controversies involving injured or conflicting rights per se it traces its source from substantive
laws which set or fix jurisdictional requirements for petitioners to not only allege but also prove in order to vest
and validate the handling tribunal's authority as well as the proceedings already conducted.
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iv. Jurisdiction over the Res
the action.
Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired by the court:

1. By placing the property or thing under its custody (custodia legis)
a. The seizure of the thing under legal process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law
b. Example: attachment of property.
2. Through statutory authority conferring upon it the power to deal with the property or thing within t
territorial jurisdiction
a. Institution of a legal proceeding wherein the power of the court over the thing is recognized and
made effective
b. Example: suits involving the status of the parties or suits involving the property in the Philippines of
non-resident defendants.
De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416,31 January 2006
DOCTRINE: In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action
involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an
interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply
with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or
proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of
arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Supplemental Affidavit of
private complainant included the incorporators and members of the board of directors of State Resources
Development Management Corporation as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of syndicated
estafa. Among those included was petitioner Chester De Joya.
Petitioner Chester De Joya asserts that respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez erred in finding the existence of
probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
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Hence, he filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the
warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner. He likewise continuously refuses to submit to
finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-
accused.
ISSUE: Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: Yes. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the
court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory
pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:
This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by
coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot
be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by
the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by
the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule
10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation).
This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in
custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power
to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings
or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a nonresident defendant.
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such
cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process
requirements.
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Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a
license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or
administrative tribunals. Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief
from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.
His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be
on.
v. Jurisdiction over the Remedy
Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and jurisdiction over the subject matter. These types of
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the remedy
pertains to the court's competence over the process. This should not be confused with the relief, which the
party filing the case wants the court to declare, and which addresses the breach of the right or obligation.
Illustration: A case for forcible entry was filed before the MTC on August 22, 2022 over a property with an
assessed value of PhP 100,000. The dispossession and discovery took place on January 1, 2021. Petitioner alleges
dispossession and want to recover possession over said property. Will the case be dismissed?
A: No. Since the 1-year period within which to file a case for forcible entry (as provided under the ROC) has
already lapsed, the MTC no longer has jurisdiction over the remedy for an action for forcible entry. BUT since
the case involves a real action over a property with an assessed value of 100,000, the case still falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC, as the MTC still has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the case should not be
dismissed but it must be re-docketed (as provided under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level
Courts) since the case is not anymore covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure (not anymore a case for
forcible entry but accion publiciana or recovery of possession over a real property since jurisdiction is not
determined by the caption of the complaint but by the allegations), and after being re-docketed it will be raffled
to the court where there will be ordinary procedure.
[xx] However, if the case does not fall under this Rule, but falls under summary or regular procedure, or if the
case is filed under summary or regular procedure but falls under this Rule, the case shall not be dismissed.
Instead, the case shall be re-docketed under the appropriate procedure, and returned to the court where it
was assigned, subject to payment of any deficiency in the applicable regular rate of filing fees. xx [Rules on
Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts].
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Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October
9,2019
DOCTRINE: Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and jurisdiction over the subject matter. These
types of jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
The source of jurisdiction is important. Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court.
Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this Court the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court
may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper cases.
FACTS: Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in Cebu City. In 2003, it decided to construct a 16-
storey commercial building on it. The Cebu City Zoning Board (CCZB) required Citi Appliance to construct a one-
level parking area consisting of 26 parking slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a
deep excavation to lay the foundation of the parking lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines, cables,
and manholes underground, which had been placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983. These encroached on Citi
Appliance's property, preventing it from excavating the land. In April 2003, Citi Appliance applied for exemption
from the parking requirement, which the CCZB eventually denied.
On 26 April 2004, Citi Appliance wrote PLDT, demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables,
and manholes, or to shoulder the parking exemption fee. On 28 May 2004, Citi Appliance made a final demand
on PLDT to comply until 15 June 2004, otherwise, it would file an appropriate action in court.
When PLDT still refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) a
complaint for ejectment against PLDT. In its Answer, PLDT alleged that its telephone lines, cables, and manholes
did not encroach on Citi Appliance's property as they were properly positioned alongside and underneath a
public sidewalk. It later filed an Amended Answer, arguing that the case should be dismissed since the action for
forcible entry had prescribed. Moreover, PLDT argued that the area in question was part of public domain, it
being a sidewalk. Assuming that the property did belong to Citi Appliance, PLDT claimed that it had the right of
eminent domain
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the issue of lack of jurisdiction was deemed waived by PLDT
(2) Whether MTCC has jurisdiction over the case; subsumed under which are the issues of whether:
(a) the element of prior physical possession is present; and
(b) the one-year prescriptive period of an action for forcible entry through stealth should be reckoned
from the time the unlawful entry is discovered or from the last demand to vacate
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RULING:
PLDT is not barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
Courts are vested with jurisdiction over the remedy and jurisdiction over the subject matter. These types of
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties.
The source of jurisdiction is important. Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court.
Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this Court the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court
may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper cases.
The key to the first issue in this case is, therefore, determining whether the one-year requirement within which
to file forcible entry or unlawful detainer is provided only by the Rules of Court rather than by law. Certainly, this
pertains to jurisdiction over the remedy. Generally, therefore, objections to this type of jurisdiction must be
seasonably made.
In cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Rules of Court provides the one-year prescriptive period.
Under Rule 70, Section 1, a party may file a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful detainer "at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, . . . against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession[.]"
The Civil Code also provides the prescriptive period for forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits. Particularly,
Article 1147 provides that an action must be filed within one (1) year.
In the case of Amoguis o. Ballado (G.R. No. 189626, 20 August 2018), the Court pronounced the case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is based on the doctrine of equity, which applies only in cases "where jurisdiction was raised at the
very last minute when the parties have alreadygone through years of litigation." The Tijam doctrine will apply
only when circumstances of a case, allowing the belated objection to the jurisdiction of the court will
additionally cause irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party that relied on the forum and
the implicit waiver.
In this case, PLDT raised the issue of jurisdiction when it filed with the MTCC its Amended Answer with leave of
court. Further, even if the Court disregards PLDT's Amended Answer, PLDT is not deemed barred by laches since
it immediately questioned the MTCC's jurisdiction without allowing trial to stretch into years. The unique
circumstances in Tijam are absent here. As the Court noted in Amoguis, raising the lack of jurisdiction a little
under a year, or even after the laps of four (4) years, will not operate as estoppel against a party. Thus, as PLDT
seasonable raised the lack of jurisdiction, there is neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue nor estoppel against
it.
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2.The MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the three (3) elements that
must be alleged and proved are the following: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b)
that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the
action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of
the physical possession of the property.
In this case, two (2) elements of forcible entry are absent: first, Citi Appliance has no prior physical possession of
the property; and second, the action was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
On lack of physical possession

Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material possession, not legal possession. It
is not required that the complainant is the owner of the property.
vi. Estoppel Jurisdiction
While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since it is
conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel.
A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of the court over a particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot
be permitted to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape liability.
The active participation of a party in a case is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and will bar a
party from impugning the court's jurisdiction.
Effect of Estoppel on Objections to Jurisdiction
General Rule: Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the
rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. [SEAFDEC-AQD v.
NLRC (1992)]
Exception: Participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in
[Soliven v. Fastforms (2004)]
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450,15 April 1968
DOCTRINE: Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
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either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
FACTS: Spouses Tijam filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover the
sum of P1,980. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants although this was
countered by a counter-bond of the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. being the Surety of the Sibonghanoys. As the
trial ensued, the CFI ruled in favor of the Tijams. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI but an
affirmative relief by the Surety company was made. This was likewise denied by the CFI which prompted the
Surety to appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein the latter affirmed the decision of the CFI. Quickly thereafter,
the Surety filed a motion to dismiss to the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that the Tijams filing
to the CFI on July 19, 1948 was not proper. Since one month before the filing to the CFI, the Judiciary Act of 1948
was passed into law wherein it stated that Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts (MTC) all civil actions where the value of the subject- matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the case may be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction
RULING: No. The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
Although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses, the Surety became a quasi-
party therein when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin. Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a
written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief that it be
relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack
of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. Then, at the hearing on the second motion for
execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file
an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety
filed the motion to dismiss.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense,
is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not
a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
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A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.
After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc.; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride).
In Littleton vs. Burgess, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse as
well as in Pinda gan etc. vs. Dans et al., G. R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative
relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were We to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for
the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.
FACTS: Spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land located. The San Mariano Academy
structures are built on the property. The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. Because the former owners, Spouses Erorita, failed to redeem it, the title was consolidated in the buyers'
name. The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the school on the property.
The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San Mariano Academy's administrators.
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The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of P20,000.00, but had failed to pay
rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the school
without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Spouses
Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school without clearance from the DECS to
whom they are accountable. Subsequently, Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before
the RTC. The RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao's favor. The Eroritas appealed to the CA arguing that the
complaint patently shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction
RULING: NO. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully
possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff's tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that
his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property. A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered
as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to
continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the
Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate
the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last
demand to vacate (February 12, 2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the
MTC's exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value. In the present case, the complaint
clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the
MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void,
the RTC's decision is void.
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous
to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost 15 years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the
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proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant. In Figueroa v.
People, we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply.
When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for
laches to apply. Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application of the estoppel by
laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTC's jurisdiction in their appeal before the
CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of
an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings
contemplated in Tijam. Thus, the general rule should apply. The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's
jurisdiction.
D. Katarungang Pambarangay (Sec. 399- 422, Local Government Code)
NOTE: Particularly a condition precedent, just like earnest efforts and arbitration, NOT on jurisdiction, as LGC on
jurisdiction to hear and decide a case.
Text of Secs. 399-442 of LGC
Cases Covered by Barangay Conciliation
The Lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
municipality or city for amicable settlement of all disputes.
EXCEPT:
1. Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding P5,000
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party
5. Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon
6. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon
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7. Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
[Sec. 408, Local Government Code]
8. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships, or juridical entities, since only individuals shall
be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents, [Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules; also see SC Administrative Circular No. 14-93]
9. Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically:
1. A criminal case where the accused is under police custody or detention,
2. A petition for habeas corpus by a person illegally detained or deprived of his liberty or one
acting in his behalf,
3. Actions coupled with provisional remedies, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, replevin
and support pendente lite, or
4. Where the action may be barred by the Statute of Limitations
10. Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relationship,
11. Where the dispute arises from the CARL, or
12. Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be directly filed in court.
[Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 14- 93]

Note: Barangay conciliation is a condition precedent for filing a case. However, failure to comply with a
condition precedent is no longer a ground for a motion to dismiss under the Amended Rules. It is now included
in the enumerated Affirmative Defenses that may be set out in the answer under Sec. 12(a), Rule 8. Being a
waivable defense, the failure to raise non-compliance with condition precedent in the answer constitutes a bar
from raising such defense later in the proceedings.
1. Civil Code, Art. 2041
Condition Precedent
be sufficient.
Condition precedent are those matters which must be complied with before a cause of action arises. The
compliance of the same must be alleged in the complaint or petition.
Examples of Condition Precedent
See also Art. 151, Family Code earnest efforts toward compromise between member of the family
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Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
(222a)
Art. 2041 of the Civil Code

If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
Lansangan v. Caisip, G.R. No. 212987, 6 August 2018
DOCTRINE: Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent [of prior barangay conciliation] could affect
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on [the] ground
of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent Caisip. Respondent
comply. Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default and
for the MCTC to render judgment. MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to
comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation as mandated by the Local Government Code. When the
case reached the review of the CA, it affirmed the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
RULING: Yes, the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal o
Thee grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the
motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
The motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's failure to refer the matter for
barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in
court. It is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon.
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Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay, as in the parties herein, shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
The ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation
proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for
failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to
order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court
finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its
resolution on the merits.
Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, 7 August 2017
DOCTRINE: In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in
the LGC pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement
cannot be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS: Wenceslao Abagatnan and his late wife Lydia Capote acquired a parcel of land designated as Lot 1472-B
located at Brgy. Cogon, Roxas City.
to which the latter agreed but subject to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should
he need the same for his own use.
When Lydia died in 1999, her children (co-petitioners in this case) succeeded into the ownership of her conjugal
share of said property.
In 2006, the petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472B including the subject property which was then still
being occupied by respondents. Said portion was first offered to the respondents, but the latter declined.
Thereafter, a Demand letter was sent to the respondents requiring them to vacate the subject property within
15 days from receipt.
For failure to heed such demand, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful detainer and Damages before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay
conciliation proceedings are not required as a precondition for the filing of the case given that not all petitioners
are resident of Roxas City (Jimmy resided in Laguna; Jenalyn resided in Pasig).
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In their answer with counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in
favor of co-petitioner and sister Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
MTCC: Rendered judgement in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove structures they erected
and to vacate the same.
parties raised the issue of ownership to justify

their claims of possession, and the evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was
justified in ruling the case in the latter's favor.
ack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. CA also
ISSUE: Whether there is still a need to comply with prior barangay conciliation requirement under Sec. 412 of
LGC despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality
RULING: NO.
Section 412 of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman as a
precondition to the filing of a compla
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
ispute involves parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and
prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and copetitioner,
Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC
pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot
be construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a
"real party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated June 20, 2013 and the
Resolution dated February 3, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03283 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated January 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-
47-07 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
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Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159411,18 March 2005
DOCTRINE: The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an
amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in
nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code.
The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the
amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes
the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
FACTS: Petitioner Chavez and respondent Trillana entered into a contract of lease whereby the former leased to
the latter his fishpond for a term of six (6) years. The contract provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the
lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not
immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three weeks later, respondent
was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of
a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient with
his delay in commencing the work.
Respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. He
complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the
leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After
conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the "Kasunduan," respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City which rendered a decision in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent
considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, was
already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain. Petitioner argued that respondent should
have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter
was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain.
RULING: YES. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached after
barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a
petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten days from its date. It
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further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six
months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.
This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code: A compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise.
Thus, a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of
res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of
consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of
the same Code, which provides: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. In exercising
the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an
action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof
of the other party.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of
an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in
nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial.
However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code.
The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the
amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes
the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay
Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for
the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted a civil case for recovery of unrealized
profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondent
was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is
axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a
dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions,
adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the
"Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease
contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein petitioner did
not.
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E. Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts, OCA Circular No. 69-2022
Text of A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, MARCH 1, 2022 Annexed by OCA Circular No. 69-2022
1. Small Claims
Cases Covered by Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
This Rule shall govern the procedure in actions before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) for payment
or reimbursement of a sum of money where the value of the claim does not exceed One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00). [ March 1, 2022 Resolution in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC] [OCA Circular No. 69-2022]
Applicability
Small Claims Cases, as defined hereunder, where the claim does not exceed One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
exclusive of interest and costs.
A "small claim" is an action that is purely civil in nature where the claim or relief raised by the plaintiff is solely
for the payment or reimbursement of a sum of money. It excludes actions seeking other claims or reliefs aside
from payment or reimbursement of a sum of money and those coupled with provisional remedies.
The claim or demand may be:
1. For money owed under a contract of lease, loan and other credit accommodations, services, sale of
personal property, excluding the recovery of the personal property, unless it is made the subject of a
compromise agreement between the parties
[For liquidated damages arising from contracts, or ]
2. T h e enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards, where the
money claim does not exceed One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been
enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date of receipt of the
award or from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable, pursuant to Section 417, Chapter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991. [A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, March 1, 2022]
2. Summary Procedure, Civil Cases
Cases Covered by Rules on Summary Procedure
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1. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (FEUD), irrespective of the amount of damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. here attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
2. All civil actions, except probate proceedings, admiralty and maritime actions, and small claims cases
falling under Rule IV hereof, where the total amount of the plaintiff's claim does not exceed Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
3. Complaints for damages where the claim does not exceed Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), exclusive
of interest and costs.
4. Cases for enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements and arbitration awards where the
money claim exceeds One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), provided that no execution has been
enforced by the barangay within six (6) months from the date of the settlement or date of receipt of the
award or from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the arbitration award becomes due and
demandable, pursuant to Section 417, Charter VII of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The
Local Government Code of 1991.
5. Cases solely for the revival of judgment of any Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court
6. The civil aspect of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), if no criminal
action has been instituted therefor. Should a criminal action be later instituted for the same violation,
the civil aspect shall be consolidated with the criminal action and shall be tried and decided jointly under
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
All other cases not included herein shall be governed by the regular rules of procedure.
[Sec. 1, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, March 1, 2022]
Prohibited Pleadings:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint or the statement of claim except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or failure to comply with the requirement of barangay conciliation, pursuant
to Chapter VII, Title I, Book III of Republic Act No. 7160;
2. Motion to hear and/or resolve affirmative defenses;
3. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment on the merits, or for reopening of
proceedings ;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement. Any motion for postponement shall be presumed dilatory
unless grounded on acts of God, force majeure, or physical inability of a counsel or witness to
personally appear in court, as supported by the requisite affidavit and medical proof;
10. Rejoinder;
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11. Third-party complaints; and

12. Motion for and Complaint in Intervention;
13. Motion to admit late judicial affidavit/s, position papers, or other evidence, except on the ground of
force majeure or acts of God;
[Rule II Sec. 2, Prohibited pleadings and motions, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, March 1, 2022]
Allowed Pleadings in Summary Procedure:

1. Complaint
2. Compulsory counterclaim (edit))
3. Cross-claim pleaded in the Answer
EDIT EDIT
100, 252, 253, Family Code)

Summary Procedure Summary Proceeding
Immediate process issuing and taking effect Court action in which the formal procedures
without intermediate applications or delay. normally applicable to matters are dispensed
with
As to Cases Covered
Cases falling under the MTC Cases falling under the Family Code
Example: declaration of presumptive death for

purposes of remarriage
Relevant FC Provisions:
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not
have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse and us
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter
insofar as they are applicable.
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings
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Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n)
Module 1 Annex:
TABLE SUMMARY, B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 11576
As to Jurisdiction of RTC in Civil Cases
B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691 R.A. 11576

incapable of pecuniary estimation:
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
The assessed value of the property The assessed value exceeds
involved exceeds P20,000.00 or for P400,000.00, except for forcible
civil actions in Metro Manila, where entry into and unlawful detainer:
such the value exceeds 50,000.00
except forcible entry into and
In admiralty
unlawful and maritime, the The demand or claims exceeds
detainer
demand or claim exceeds P2,000,000.00
P300,000.00 or , in Metro Manila,
such demand or claim exceeds
400,000.00:
The gross value of the estate exceeds The gross value of estate exceeds
P300,000.00 or, in Metro Manila, such P2,000,000.00:
gross value exceeds 400,000.00:
In all other cases, the demand, In all other cases, the demand,
exclusive of IDALeC, the value of the exclusive of IDALeC, the value of the
property in controversy exceeds property in controversy exceeds
P300,000.00 or, in Metro Manila, such P2,000,000.00,
other abovementioned items exceeds
P400,000.00.
Expanded Jurisdiction of the First Level Courts in Civil Cases (MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs)

Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
The value of the personal property, estate, or amount The value of the personal property, estate, or amount
of the demand does not exceed P300.000.00 or. in of the demand does not exceed P2,000,000 exclusive
MM, does not exceed P400,000.00 exclusive of of IDALeC, the amount of which muct be specifically
IDALeC, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided , That IDALeC shall be included in
alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims the determination of the filing fees: Provided,
or causes of action between the same or different further, That where there are several claims or
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
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of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all causes of action between the same or different
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the parties, embodied in the same complaint, x x x
causes in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions;
The assessed value of the property or interest therein The assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed P20.000.00 or in MM, does not does not exceed P400,000 exclusive of IDALeC:
exceed P50,000.00 exclusive of IDALeC: Provided, provided, That in cases of land not declared for
That in cases of land not declared for taxation taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. lots;
In admiralty and maritime actions where the demand
or claim does not exceed 2,000,000.
Delegated Authority of the SC to Adjust Jurisdictional Amounts for First and Second Level Courts
1. Extraordinary supervening inflation or deflation;
2. Change in land valuation; or
3. Proportion of caseload
Secs. 399 422, LGC

SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. (a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong
tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed of the punong barangay, as
chairman and ten (10) to twenty (20) members. The lupon shall be constituted every three (3)
years in the manner provided herein.
(b) Any person actually residing or working in the barangay, not otherwise expressly disqualified
by law, and possessing integrity, impartiality, independence of mind, sense of fairness, and
reputation for probity, may be appointed a member of the lupon.
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon, which shall include the names of proposed members who
have expressed their willingness to serve, shall be prepared by the punong barangay within the
first fifteen (15) days from the start of his term of office. Such notice shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay continuously for a period of not less than three (3) weeks;
(d) The punong barangay, taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed appointment
or any recommendations for appointment as may have been made within the period of posting,
shall within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint as members those whom he determines to be
suitable therefor. Appointments shall be in writing, signed by the punong barangay, and attested
to by the barangay secretary.
(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay
for the entire duration of their term of office; and
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(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural
communities, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be
recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.
SECTION 400. Oath and Term of Office. Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take an
oath of office before the punong barangay. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted on
the third year following his appointment unless sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of
residence or place of work, or withdrawal of appointment by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the members of the lupon.
SECTION 401. Vacancies. Should a vacancy occur in the lupon for any cause, the punong
barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified person who shall hold office only for the
unexpired portion of the term.
SECTION 402. Functions of the Lupon. The lupon shall:

(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation panels provided herein;
(b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a forum for exchange of ideas among its members
and the public on matters relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various
conciliation panel members to share with one another their observations and experiences in
effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed
by law or ordinance. aisa dc
SECTION 403. Secretary of the Lupon. The barangay secretary shall concurrently serve as the
secretary of the lupon. He shall record the results of mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay and shall submit a report thereon to the proper city or municipal courts. He shall also
receive and keep the records of proceedings submitted to him by the various conciliation panels.
SECTION 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo . (a) There shall be constituted for each dispute
brought before the lupon a conciliation panel to be known as the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo,
hereinafter referred to as the pangkat, consisting of three (3) members who shall be chosen by
the parties to the dispute from the list of members of the lupon. cd i
Should the parties fail to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be determined by lots
drawn by the lupon chairman.
(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect from among themselves the
chairman and the secretary. The secretary shall prepare the minutes of the pangkat proceedings
and submit a copy duly attested to by the chairman to the lupon secretary and to the proper city
or municipal court. He shall issue and cause to be served notices to the parties concerned.
The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any public record in his custody that is not
by law otherwise declared confidential.
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SECTION 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat. Any vacancy in the pangkat shall be chosen by the
parties to the dispute from among the other lupon members. Should the parties fail to agree on a
common choice, the vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the lupon chairman. aisa dc
SECTION 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon Members. (a) The lupon members,
while in the performance of their official duties or on the occasion thereof, shall be deemed as
persons in authority, as defined in the Revised Penal Code.
(b) The lupon or pangkat members shall serve without compensation, except as provided for in
Section 393 and without prejudice to incentives as provided for in this section and in Book IV of
this Code. The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall provide for a system of
granting economic or other incentives to the lupon or pangkat members who adequately
demonstrate the ability to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to them. While in
the performance of their duties, the lupon or pangkat members, whether in public or private
employment, shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer from any diminution in
compensation or allowance from said employment by reason thereof. aisa dc
SECTION 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of Law. The provincial, city legal
officer or prosecutor or the municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on matters involving
questions of law to the punong barangay or any lupon or pangkat member whenever necessary in
the exercise of his functions in the administration of the katarungang pambarangay.
SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance
of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless
the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; aisa dc
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial,motu proprio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.
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SECTION 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality
shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually
resides, at the election of the complainant. cdtai
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. cdasia
SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. (a) Who may initiate proceeding Upon
payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who has a cause of action against another
individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in
writing, to the lupon chairman of the barangay.
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall,
within the next working day, summon the respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for
them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If he
fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before
him, he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under
existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the
filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification The pangkat shall convene not
later than three (3) days from its constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to
hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for amicable
settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify any member of the
pangkat by reason of relationship, bias, interest, or any other similar grounds discovered after the
constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the affirmative vote of the majority of
the pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting
vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
e) Period to arrive at a settlement The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or resolution of the
dispute within fifteen (15) days from the day it convenes in accordance with this section. This
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period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which shall not
exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious cases.
SECTION 411. Form of settlement. All amicable settlements shall be in writing, in a language or
dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested to by the lupon chairman or the
pangkat chairman, as the case may be. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same
language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language known to them. cdt
SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a)Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint,

petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed
or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. The parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation Among Members of Indigenous Cultural Communities The customs and
traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between
members of the cultural communities.
SECTION 413. Arbitration. (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing
that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. Such
agreement to arbitrate may be repudiated within five (5) days from the date thereof for the same
grounds and in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed. The arbitration award shall
be made after the lapse of the period for repudiation and within ten (10) days thereafter. acd
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties. When
the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be written in
the language or dialect known to them.
SECTION 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception. All proceedings for settlement shall
be public and informal: Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as
the case may be, may motu proprio or upon request of a party, exclude the public from the
proceedings in the interest of privacy, decency, or public morals.
SECTION 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings,

the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.
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SECTION 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. The amicable settlement
and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been
made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
However, this provision shall not apply to court cases settled by the lupon under the last
paragraph of Section 408 of this Code, in which case the compromise settlement agreed upon by
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman shall be submitted to the court
and upon approval thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court.
SECTION 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution by the lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of
such time, the settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
acd
SECTION 418. Repudiation. Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of
the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect
sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such
repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as
hereinabove provided.
SECTION 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration Award to the Court. The secretary of
the lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the appropriate city or
municipal court within five (5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day
period repudiating the settlement and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the
settlement and the lupon chairman.
SECTION 420. Power to Administer Oaths. The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong
tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby authorized to administer oaths in
connection with any matter relating to all proceedings in the implementation of the katarungang
pambarangay.
SECTION 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations. The city or municipal mayor, as the case
may be, shall see to the efficient and effective implementation and administration of the
katarungang pambarangay. The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary to implement this Chapter.
SECTION 422. Appropriations. Such amount as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall be provided for in the annual budget of
the city or municipality concerned.
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 69-2022, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, MARCH 1, 2022 Relevant Provisions
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Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, Family Code (FC)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death
of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances
on their legitime. (n)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement,
the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only
on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
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In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in
good faith. (117a)
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (206a)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a)
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
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(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
93

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CIVIL PROCEDURE OUTLINE

I. Preliminaries/ General Principles

CONCEPT OF REMEDIAL LAW

Remedial statute or statutes:

(1) Relating to remedies or modes of procedure;

(2) Do not take away or create vested rights;

It does not apply to the following cases:

A. Remedial Law distinguished from substantive law

Force and Effect of Rules of Court

When Procedural Rules do not apply to pending actions:

ISSUE: Whether Sec. Datumanong should be cited for contempt of court

Colmenar v. Colmenar, G.R. No. 252467, 21 June 2021

consent, thereby effectively depriving him of his successional rights.

(1) Whether the petition raises pure questions of law? YES.

(1) YES, the petition raises pure questions of law.

Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules provides:

Section 12, Rule 8. Affirmative defenses. x x x

2. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court

Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 30

Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)

3. Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court

10. Peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;

Limitations on the Rule-making power of the Supreme Court: (SUD)

opined that disregarding any procedural lapses

B. Nature and Classification of Philippine Courts

CLASSIFICATION OF PHILIPPINE COURTS

a. Original vs. Appellate

c. General vs. Special

c. Exclusive vs. Concurrent

2. Constitutional and statutory courts

A constitutionally-mandated court refers to a court whose creation by Congress is mandated by a

3. Courts of law and equity

4. Distinguish court and judge

A court is an office A judge is a public officer

5. Doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Also known as Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, 12 March 2019

**take note of the Angara model

6. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Exceptions

Commission on Audit v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 218870, November 24, 2020

7. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) where strong public interest is involved; and

(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

8. Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

When not applicable

Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, 15 June 2016

Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15- 2407, November 22, 2017

9. Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction, continuity of jurisdiction

Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction - also known as doctrine of continuity of jurisdiction

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction

1. Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action

i. Cang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998

(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption;

2. Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts, BP 129, as amended by RA 11576

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL CASES

General Rule: The SC is not a trier of facts.

Exclusive Original Jurisdiction

Concurrent Original Jurisdiction

JURISDICTION OF THE CA IN CIVIL CASES