Comelec v ca scra 501 -refer to full case WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent judge
is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent judge dated
PEOPLE v. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, GR No. L-44205, 1993-02-16
Facts:
When Consolacion Naval... herein private respondent, was separately accused of
having committed the crime of estafa... and of falsification... both of the then
Court of
First Instance of Rizal... she sought the quashal of the latter charge on the
supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony
Her first attempt in this respect did not spell... success... but the Honorable
Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded to the contrary
thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of
committing estafa... he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty... to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial
payment of P130,850.00.
About two years later,... an application for registration under the Land
Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she
owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. For those reasons, the
corresponding title was issued in her name
These antecedents spawned the simultaneous institution of the charges... private
respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the information for falsification,
premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in    danger of
being condemned for an identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded
not... guilty to the charge levelled against her for falsification... the court a quo
denied her motion to quash... magistrate below thereafter reconsidered his
order of denial which gave rise to the corresponding... unsuccessful... bid by the
People for reinstatement of the information for falsification.
Hence the instant petition
January 23, 1976 quashing the information for falsification,... denying the
People's motion for reconsideration therefrom are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Issues:
whether the court below correctly quashed the information for falsification
Ruling:
for the simple reason that the theory of a single crime advanced by private
respondent in her belated; nay, "second" motion to quash couched as motion for
reconsideration is not synonymous with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or
jeopardy". In effect, therefore, respondent judge... accommodated another basis
for the quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in the
motion therefor. This should not have been tolerated because it is anathema to
the foregoing proviso
At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private respondent
concocted the sinister scheme of falsification in 1971 precisely to facilitate the
commission of estafa in 1973 such that both crimes emanated from a single
criminal impulse.
It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that
private respondent is in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal
act
, a circumstance recognized under Section 2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as
suggested in the motion to quash,... because this plea is understood to
presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had
pleaded... to the charge
Withal, the mere filing of two     informations charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case
without the... consent of the accused
Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned
in the previous case for estafa.
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 107125.      January 29, 2001
FACTS:
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that
time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas.
Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver side of the
car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were
injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed.
The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his
criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.
On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private
respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused
intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability.
RULING:
The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article
29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal
cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil damages
which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence.
Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not
give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present for double
jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for
the same offense as the first.
In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his
discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was
about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double
jeopardy.
People v Judge Nitafan G.R. Nos. 107964-66. February 1, 1999
MARCH 15, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
PD 115 is not barred by the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
non-payment of debt. The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and
abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of
another, regardless of whether or not the latter is the owner. The law does not
seek to enforce payment of the loan. There is thus no violation of the
Constitutional right imprisonment for non-payment of debts.
Facts: Allied Banking Corporation filed an information for estafa against Betty Sia
Ang, proprietess of Eckart Enterprises.  The comlaint alleged that Ang received
from the bank Goardon plastics amounting to P398,000 specified in a trust
receipt and covered by a Domestic Letter of Credit. Ang had the obligation to sell
the goods and to account for the proceeds, if sold, or to return the goods, if not
sold, on or before 16 October 1980, or upon demand.  Despite repeated
demands, Ang paid only P283,115. It was alleged that she misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the balance to her own personal use and benefit. Ang
filed a motion to quash the information, alleging that violation of the trust
receipt constitutes only a civil liability. Judge Nitafan granted the Motion to
quash. Ang also questioned the constitutionality of PD 115, contending that it
violates the constitutional prohibition for imprisonment for debt .
Issue: Whether or not PD 115 is constitutional.
Held: The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in
the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another, regardless of
whether or not the latter is the owner. The law does not seek to enforce
payment of the loan. There is thus no violation of the Constitutional right
imprisonment for non-payment of debts.
Section 1(b) of Article 315 states that one of the means by which to commit
estafa is “by misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods received by the offender in trust or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same.   It is the failure of Ang to
account for the balance that makes her liable for estafa.
Trust receipt arrangements do not involve a simple loan transaction. Apart from
a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement has a security feature covered by
the trust receipt itself. The second feature provides needed financial assistance
to traders in the importation or purchase of goods through the use of the goods
as collateral for the advancements made by the bank. The title of the bank to the
security is the one sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate
and distinct agreement. Like BP 22, PD 115 punishes the act as an offense against
public order, not against property. The offense is punished as a mala
prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or malice. A mere failure to
deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods constitute a criminal offense that
causes prejudice to another and, more importantly, to the public interest.
G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861 23 March 1984
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in
more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his
alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit
assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some
officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher's
Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks
for non-existent obligations of the Teacher's Camp resulting in damage to the
government of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on
July 25, 1978. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of
Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected. On
May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein
petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases
filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases
are now pending review in G.R. Nos. L-54645-76. However, on March 16, 1982,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
"to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would
be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto
law.
Issue:
Whether or not the retroactive application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195
would violate the Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto
law.
Held:
NO. The Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13
of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes
the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office
pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional
prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24
of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or
public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be
considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled
to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article
24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal
provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public
officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed
before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto
law.