In re Ashraf Gunting

Facts: On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian
Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned
over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with four counts of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC.

PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao requested the Chief state prosecutor to transfer venue from
Isabela City to Pasig, due to reported utmost effort of Abu Sayaf Group to recover custody of
Gunting and inadequate security facility of the municipal jail. On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued
an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not
turned over Kunting. Trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court. PNP
replied In a reiterating the request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the
transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the previous letter. He
added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the
escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go
scot-free. On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005,
citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of
Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this
Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005,
directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of
venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by
Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General
Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested
his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his
name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred
on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.

Issue: Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: No. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all case
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court
orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas
corpus proceedings terminate. 

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed: 

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by
the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch
2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with
the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged
since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that once the
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Velasco v. CA

G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995

Facts: A warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Padolina of RTC Pasig, against accused Lawrence Larkins
for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. But on 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed
before the NBI a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against
her on 19 November 1994. Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special
Investigators Resurreccion and Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati and arrested
him. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila. Two days later,
Larkins posted a bail for the BP 22 charged by which Judge Padolina issued an order directing the release
of Larkins from confinement unless otherwise detained for some other cause. However, Resurreccion and
Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause (rape), for which he
would be held for inquest. On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by
Alinea before the RTC of Antipolo. On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep,
filed an Urgent Motion for Bail and on 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty.
Theodore O. Te, filed another Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for
Immediate Release, based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. These two motions was
however denied. Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Cuyag, filed before the CA a
petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. After hearing the arguments of the parties, the CA held for
Larkin’s immediately release.

In the petition petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas
corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his
application for bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the private respondent contends
that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of an information, but by the issuance of
a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the only two processes recognized by law to
justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for
bail does not qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes
vs. Sandiganbayan 17 because that case did not rule that the writ is no longer available after an information
is filed against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan
vs. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance
of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."

Issue: 1. Whether Writ of Habeas Corpus is proper.

2. Whether Cuyag has personality to institute the action.

Held:

1. NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from
custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance
of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in
the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available.

It is to be noted that, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule
is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court of judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under
lawful judgment.

2. YES. Cuyag has personality to institute on behalf of her common-law spouse Larkins, on the habeas
corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified interest in the
freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
application. She is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only
Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside order the denying his motions for bail and for
the dismissal of the complaint against him.

Caballes v. CA
G.R. No. 163108. February 23, 2005
Facts: Glenn Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the RTC of Malabon City. Because the
petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. He was arraigned on February 7,
2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued. On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a
petition for bail. The trial was marred with many postponements for various reasons, most prominently
the continued failure of Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to appear as a witness.

Caballes then filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial under the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, as well as a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail. The court
issued an Order declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its resolution and denying the motion
for an earlier trial date. It then issued another order denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the
evidence of guilt against the petitioner was strong. MR denied. Caballes then filed an Motion to Dismiss
invoking his right to speedy trial, claiming that the trial now lasted close to 400 days, far longer than the
180 day reglementary period. It was Denied. The judge then inhibited himself.

Caballes thus filed a “Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition.” The CA required

him to inform the court of his choice of remedy. In compliance therewith, he filed a manifestation that he
had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice “to the concomitant
application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ
of habeas corpus.” CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for being the wrong remedy.

Issues: 1. Whether a petition for habeas corpus is the proper remedy. (No)

2. Whether the writ should issue. (No)

3. Whether the decision had already become final and executory (Yes)

Held: 1. No. A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the
Motion to Dismiss, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, as amended.  In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character.  It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.  Resorting to the writ is not to inquire
into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, even if the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.  The rule applies even when instituted to
arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. 

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on
the merits.  Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course
of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. 

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy.  It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for

the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause
of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The only parties before the court are
the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ
may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled theretoex merito justicias.

A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors.  It has no other use, except to bring before
the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction.  A writ of certiorari reaches the
record.  On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches
jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.  However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court,
and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished
by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding.

2. No. Caballes failed to establish his right to the writ of habeas corpus. He was charged with rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge. He failed to establish
that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional
circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

A petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of bail; a petition for
certiorari is. That is also the correct remedy from the voluntary inhibition of a judge.

Finally, as to a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the
remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119. 
Section 8 of the said Rule provides that a private counsel, the public attorney, or a prosecutor, who allows
the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial, files a
motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit, makes a statement for the
purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification is to be punished with a fine not
exceeding P20,000, and denying him the right to practice before the court trying the case for a period not
exceeding 30 days. Thus, habeas corpus is not the proper remedy. Once more, certiorari is.

While a petition for habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition
of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right to due process, first of
all, the delays in this case were not the fault of the prosecution, and secondly, Caballes only invoked this
right in his petition for habeas corpus before the CA.

3. YES. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of
any court in habeas corpus cases shall be 48 hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.  While
that provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Matter No.
01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, provides that appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from.

Thus, Caballes should have appealed from the CA’s denial of his petition rather than filing a petition
for certiorari. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.  The existence and
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. 
These two remedies are mutually exclusive.  An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and
adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the
CA was already final and executory.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos.  For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.  He
was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon,
Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen.  They separated from bed and
board in 1972.  Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City.  On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City. 

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. 
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate.  In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.  In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati.  In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that
the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.

Issue: Whether the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

Held: No. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.  To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.  The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ.  The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.  He still has the capacity
to discern his actions.  With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice.  Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband.  In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at
liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.  Coverture, is a matter
beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
the sheriffs or by any other process. 

Feria vs CA
GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000
Facts: Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981 by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. After discovering that his entire criminal records,
including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge
of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge
from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper
remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which
rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required
by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court
and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.

In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of
a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: Whther the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: No. Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient
evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for
his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged
with and convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a
legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and
under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is not a petition for habeas
corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial records.

 The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a
prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to
have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may
also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued
detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not
subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner
has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.