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Internal Audit Quality and Financial Reporting, 39 Page
Internal Audit Quality and Financial Reporting, 39 Page
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Accounting Research
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DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X. 12099 W0B80TH3
Journal of Accounting Research
Vol. 54 No. 1 March 2016
Printed in U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
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4 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
1. Introduction
1 The NASDAQ subsequently tabled the proposal as registrants expressed concerns over
the costs and benefits of the proposal. An objective of the current study is to provide evidence
concerning one aspect of the benefits.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 5
2 As compared to other extant IAF research, our sample follows the implementation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 on the
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), a period when substantial
IAF resources were diverted to ICFR testing.
3 In contrast, prior research commonly utilizes a dichotomous influence variable based
upon whether the LAF's formal reporting line is to the audit committee (e.g., Prawitt, Smith,
and Wood [2009]). However, Abbott, Parker, and Peters [2010] note that 96% of Chief Inter
nal Auditors agreed with the statement "the Internal Auditor reports to the audit committee."
As such, the utilization of the formal reporting arrangement as the sole IAF independence
characteristic leads to the possibility that the dichotomous identification of the reporting line
could simply capture a ceremonial structure and may not be indicative of a significant degree
of IAF independence.
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6 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
(Kothari, Leone, and Wasley [2005], Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009]),
and whether the firm just meets or beats analyst forecasts (Koh, Mat
sumoto, and Rajgopal [2008], Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009], Mande
and Son [2012]). Our abnormal accruals are further segregated into
income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Consistent
with IAF quality being a two-factor, interactive function of independence
and competence, we document several statistically significant relations be
tween financial reporting quality and our interacted competence and in
dependence variables. We find that interactions between the IAF compe
tence and (1) the relative degree of audit committee IAF oversight and (2)
the lack of a substantial OSP presence curtail both income-increasing and
income-decreasing abnormal accruals. We obtain similar results when we
examine the firm's proclivity to just meet/beat analysts' forecasts.
In contrast, when independence is proxied by whether the IAF is not
used as an MTG, the interaction between the IAF independence factor and
competence exhibits a statistically significant, mitigating impact on income
decreasing abnormal accruals. This finding is consistent with lower likeli
hoods of IAF reporting of inappropriate income-decreasing opportunistic
reserve behaviors when the IAF is used as an MTG. In this manner, internal
auditors hoping to move into a non-IAF position may endeavor to ingrati
ate themselves to management, or demonstrate their ability to be a team
player when they perceive a lower downside of doing so.4
Our paper contributes to the IAF literature in several ways. Our study is
the first to establish IAF characteristics as separate, distinct constructs that
act jointly in creating IAF quality. In doing so, this study contributes to our
understanding of IAF quality and the determinants of the IAF as an effec
tive internally based financial reporting monitor. Second, our results sug
gest that there are at least three factors that can impact IAF independence
and that these factors have differential interactive effects with IAF compe
tence in influencing financial reporting quality. In contrast, prior IAF liter
ature generally uses a dichotomous, single-variable independence measure
and implicitly ignores other potential independence determinants (e.g.,
Ahlawat and Lowe [2004]). Moreover, we find that our IAF independence
characteristics are either not correlated or only weakly related to each other
or to our IAF competence measure. This is consistent with (1) IAF indepen
dence being characterized as a multifaceted attribute with at least three de
terminants and (2) IAF independence and competence being separate and
distinct constructs. While there is a very rich literature on threats to external
auditor independence, there is a paucity of archival evidence on the poten
tial determinants of internal auditor independence. With respect to internal
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 7
5 We address this issue by conducting our analysis over the years 2010-2011, assuming that
our test variables would remain consistent over a short horizon. We find that our results con
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8 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
6The AICPA's Statement of Auditing Standards 65 (SAS 65) discusses indicators of IAF
competence and independence; however, very little overlap exists among the factors that SAS
65 describes as competence-related versus independence-related (AICPA [1991]).
7 They explain the unexpected result on IAF size as the possibility that IAF size proxies for
the difficulty of monitoring the firm, and, when monitoring is more difficult, managers may
be able to find avenues to exercise more discretion to increase income.
8 During the sample period involved (2000-2005), Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009] find
significant variation in this measure: 69% of sample lAFs reported to the audit committee and,
as such, this was likely to be an appropriate and parsimonious proxy for IAF independence.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 9
3. Hypothesis Development
3.1 IAF MECHANISMS FOR IMPACTING FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY
The focus of this paper is on the association between IAF quality and
financial reporting quality. Therefore, an important antecedent to our re
search question is a description of the specific mechanisms by which an
IAF can influence financial reporting quality. We posit that these opportu
nities arise within at least four activities: assisting with the financial state
ment audit, financial statement audit of subsidiaries, compliance auditing,
and special consulting projects.9 Within the areas of financial statement
audit assistance and audits of subsidiaries, the IAF performs specific audit
procedures that allow it to potentially influence accrual decisions. These in
clude review of the financial closing process, reviewing procedures for non
standard journal entries and postclosing adjustments, and specific reviews
of critical accruals such as accounts receivable valuation and inventory re
serves (IIA [2005]). Compliance auditing can involve testing transactions
or journal entries for compliance with the company's financial reporting
policy. Special consulting projects may also involve the IAF delving into ac
counting matters that require greater judgment on the part of the preparer,
such as asset impairments, warranty reserves, collectability reserves, and/or
inventory write-downs (PwC [2009]).
It should be noted that, in any of the prior tasks, the IAF may encounter
high-level accruals choices. More specifically, the IIA advises that, as a part
of the quarterly financial reporting process, the IAF should engage the IAF
should review the policies, procedures, and process for reporting and re
lated disclosures. In particular, the IIA advises that, as a part of the quarterly
financial reporting process, the IAF should engage "special or specifically
targeted reviews of high-risk, complex, and problem areas; including ma
terial accounting estimates, reserve valuations, off-balance sheet activities,
major subsidiaries, joint ventures, and special purpose entities" (IIA [2005,
p. 236]).
9 We developed this list from a review of the prior literature, examination of IAF profes
sional guidance, and discussion with CIAs. As discussed in our results section, respondents
indicate a nontrivial budget allocation to these four activities.
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10 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
10 For example, the internal auditors may be charged with reviewing the proper application
of the firm's policy for recording an inventory reserve. Divisions within the firm with sepa
rate profit targets may have incentives to either under- or overstate the reserve in order to
maximize internal rewards.
11 This mechanism may operate in two ways. First, the CEO/CFO may effectively pressure
the IAF to "filter" any IAF-generated reports that are forwarded to either the audit committee
or external auditor. Second, to the extent that the CEO/CFO can influence IAF budgets or
activities, the CEO/CFO may direct the IAF toward other activities that have an immediate,
beneficial impact on current earnings such as the examination of vendor rebates or other
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 11
When the IAF is an MTG, the IAF may be less likely to report
cial misstatement to the appropriate channel. If the misstateme
negatively on the division's management, those managers may b
to offer that particular internal auditor a position within that d
itive internal references may be less likely for an internal audi
a position at a different division within the same company. In o
misstatement to be corrected prior to the consolidation of resu
parent level, both IAF competence and independence must
As with our prior hypothesis, we consider the financial report
operational concerns, etc. (Abbott, Parker, and Peters [2010]). In doing so,
fectively precluded from collecting evidence that might serve to repudiate oth
deviations involving financial reporting decisions.
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12 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
H2: The interaction between IAF competence and an IAF that is not
used as an MTG is positively associated with financial reporting
quality.
3.4 OUTSOURCED INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERACTIVE IAF
QUALITY MODEL
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 13
4. Research Design
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION
Our study utilizes a survey questionnaire (see appendix) sent to 909 non
bank members of the FORTUNE 1000 (in terms of total sales) ,13 Consistent
with most prior internal audit research (e.g., Pelfrey and Peacock [1995],
Scarbrough, Rama, and Raghunandan [1998], Raghunandan, Read, and
Rama [2001], Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan [2005], Abbott,
Parker, and Peters [2010, 2012]), the survey targets Chief Internal Audi
tors (CIAs) or Chief Audit Executives (CAEs). The survey includes ques
tions about the types of IAF services provided (whether in-house or out
sourced) , assistance to the external auditors, presence and activities of any
OSPs, the reporting relationship between the IAF and the audit commit
tee, and whether the IAF serves as an MTG. We asked recipients to provide
responses based upon fiscal year 2009.
The first survey mailing (sent October 2009) resulted in a total of 118
usable responses. A follow-up mailing (December 2009) produced an ad
ditional 99 usable responses, for a total of 227.14 However, we were unable
to obtain complete Compustat data for 38 of these firms, bringing our to
tal sample to 189. Table 1 provides a distribution of observations by two
digit focus industry membership (Hogan and Jeter [1999]). To test for po
tential nonresponse bias, we compare the characteristics of the early and
late responders with each other and test for significant differences in size,
leverage, return on assets, presence of a loss, and cash flow from opera
tions. None of the differences are significant.15 We also compare our re
spondents to the industry makeup of the original population of nonbank
Fortune 1000 firms. We conduct a test of differences of proportions com
paring the industry sample representation to the population and find only
the underrepresentation of the energy and manufacturing sectors to be
significant.
13 Banks are excluded since they do not possess inventory and have unique regulatory envi
ronments. We identified 909 nonbank firms within the Fortune 1000.
14 Our effective response rate of 20.7% (or 189 responses/909 total companies) compares
favorably with the 12.7% rate obtained by Felix, Gramling, and Maletta [2001] in their internal
audit study. However, the Felix et al. rate may have been depressed by the need for survey
responses from both the internal and external auditors to constitute a complete sample pair.
Our response rate is higher than that reported in previous studies of senior managers. For
example, Graham and Harvey [2001] report a 9% response rate.
15 As with all surveys, there is a possibility of unknown response bias and of incorrect re
sponses. While we tested our early and late respondents for differences on a number of di
mensions, as previously discussed, it is possible that undetected bias is present.
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14 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 1
* Banks are excluded from both the population and the sample as these firms face additional regula
tion unique to their industry and do not have significant inventory accounts (making the model unfit for
regression purposes). The remaining Fortune 1000 firms (in terms of total assets) serve as our sampling
population.
We also provide descriptive statistics about what activities IAFs are per
forming. We note that 100% of survey respondents allocated a portion of
their annual IAF budget to Section 404-related work. Second, the mean
percentage of in-house IAF budgets allocated to Section 404 assistance
was 27.5%—the highest budget allocation percentage among IAF activities.
Sample results indicate that over 65% of our sample IAFs have an outsourc
ing agreement in place and that, on average, close to 31.8% of outsourced
IAF budgets are dedicated to Section 404 assistance. Thus, if an outsourced
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 15
To test the relationship between financial reporting quality and the inter
active nature of IAF competence and independence, we adapt the following
regression model from prior research:
ABNACC = b0 + bjtACOMP + b2ACIAFINF + b3NONMTG
big~2&INDUSTR.Y + £. (1)
16 Our sample size, though small compared to many discretionary accruals studies, is similar
to other survey-based work in the area (Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009], Prawitt, Sharp, and
Wood [2012]).
17 In separate untabulated tests, we also limited data for the estimation model to only For
tune 1000 firms. However, there were a total of 47 firms (almost a quarter of our sample)
for which we could not estimate a reliable accrual estimation model. Thus, our tabulated AB
NACC variable based upon the Compustat population represents a tradeoff between capturing
additional business norms that drive transactional accruals within a given industry (popula
tion based) versus transaction accruals that might be limited to only a large-firm environment
(large-firm subsample).
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16 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 2
Variable Definitions
Description
The Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) version of the modified Jones
model measure of abnormal accruals. Abnormal accruals is the error
Coded "1" ("0") when the following ratio constructed from survey
question #4 is less than (greater than) 0.20: (Budgeted OSP$)/(Budgeted
OSP$ + Budgeted in-house IAF%).
Total assets in millions (Compustat Data Item #6).
Number of years the firm was listed on Compustat, truncated at 25 years
The sum of long-term debt (Compustat Data Item #9) and current
liabilities (Data Item #5) of a company divided by total assets (Data Item
#6).
Number of disclosed segments in which the company operates.
Cash flows from operations (Compustat Data Item #308).
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 17
TABLE 2—Continued
Variable Description
SALESGROW One year sales growth (Compustat Data Item #12fy2o<» - Item #12 mim/
Item #12 fhoos)
MTB A company's market-to-book ratio (Compustat Data Item #24 * Item #25
/Item #216).
CFOVOL Standard deviation of operating cash flows for 2005-2009.
ROA Return on assets (Compustat Data Item #172 / Data Item # 6).
LOSS Coded "1" if the firm experienced a loss in fiscal year 2008, "0" else.
MATWEAK Indicator variable coded "1" for client firm disclosing a material
weakness in internal controls over financial reporting during the prior
two years and "0" otherwise.
INDUSTRY Coded "1" if firm's two-digit SIC code is included in specific focus
industry per table 1, "0" otherwise. Focus industry groupings per Hogan
and Jeter (1999).
*Variable used only in additional analysis section.
18 We believe our composite IACOMP measure offers other certain advantages, as it incor
porates many different IAF elements (i.e., experience, certification, training) into one sum
mary measure, is continuous in nature (allowing for easier comparison between different-sized
IAFs), and does not require an implicit equal weighting of inputs. Due in part to the underly
ing relationship between budgets and hours, we include additional subsequent tests to ascer
tain whether our proxy is correlated with various dimensions of competence. See additional
analysis discussions. Utilizing per hour amounts strengthens our ability to capture individual
auditor traits that might otherwise be lost when utilizing a measure of competence based upon
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18 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
IAF budgets deflated by firm size. Defining IACOMPas Budgets / Firm size yields inconclusive
results, likely due in part to its lack of correlation with individual auditor competence traits
that drive per hour costs. We thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.
19 Ernst and Young [2008] notes that audit committees take different approaches to the
level of active oversight of the internal audit department, in which the internal auditor may
perceive different levels of actual influence or authority exhibited by the corresponding over
seer.
21 Within upper management, the IAF can report to either or both the CEO and CFO. We
combine the CEO and CFO responses since both share common risk preferences (compared
to the Audit Committee) and are required by SOX Section 302 to certify the financial state
ments (SOX [2002]).
22 Survey responses to questions #12a-12i can range from 1 to 5, but are recalibrated
to a scale of 0-4. By doing so, our ACIAFINF variable captures the intuition behind the
relative IAF influence. For example, assume that the CIA respondent strongly agrees with
the audit committee's influence over IAF reporting, termination, and budgeting (i.e., re
sponds with a "5" for survey questions 12a, 12d, and 12g). Also assume the CIA respon
dent also strongly disagrees with the CEO and CFO's influence over IAF reporting, termi
nation, and budgeting (i.e., responds with a "1" for survey questions 12b/12c, 12e/12f, and
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 19
12h/12i). Without recalibration to a 0-4 scale, the ACIAFINF value would equal 0.833 (e.g.,
(5+5+5)/(5+l+l+5+l+l+5+l+l)). With recalibration, the ACIAFINF value becomes 1 or
((4+4+4)/(4+0+0+4+0+0+4+0+0)). A second example further illustrates. In this case,
assume that the CIA strongly disagrees with the audit committee's IAF reporting, termina
tion, and budgeting influence (i.e., responds with a "1" for survey questions 12a, 12d, and
12g) and also strongly agrees with the CFO's reporting, termination, and budgeting influence
(i.e., responds with a "5" for survey questions 12b. 12e, and 12h). Also assume that the CIA
strongly disagreed with the CEO's IAF reporting, termination, and budgeting influence (i.e.,
responds with a "1" for survey questions 12c, 12f, and 12i). In this case, ACIAFINF equals 0
(e.g., (0+0+0) / (0+4+0+0+4+0+0+4+0)).
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20 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
of accruals (Dechow and Dichev [2002]). For this reason, we predict a pos
itive association between company size and positive accruals and a negative
association between company size and negative accruals. AGE (number of
years the company has been listed on Compustat, truncated at 25 years) is
included because firms may experience different accrual patterns as they
age (Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009]). We expect that LEVERAGE (to
tal debt/total assets) will be associated with more income-increasing ac
cruals to allow for nonviolation of debt covenants (Press and Weintrop
[1990]) and income-decreasing accruals (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skin
ner [1994]) to reduce earnings for contractual renegotiations. We include
a variable that proxies for firm complexity using the number of operating
segments a firm discloses in its 10K (SEGNUM). Firms with greater complex
ity may have greater financial reporting latitude due to the inherent com
plexity of their operations. We therefore expect that SEGNUM will be pos
itively (negatively) associated with income-increasing (income-decreasing)
abnormal accruals. CFO (operating cash flows), SALESGROW(sales growth
from the prior year), and MTB (market to book) are included to control for
growth, and CFOVOL (operating cash flow volatility) is included because it
may impact the accrual calculation (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996],
Matsumoto [2002], Menon and Williams [2004]).
Low performance provides an incentive for accruals management, so we
include ROA (net income/assets) and LOSS (coded "1" if the firm experi
enced a loss in the preceding year, "0" else). In terms of income-increasing
abnormal accruals, increases in ROA may impact the calculation of ab
normal accruals and we expect a positive relation. In terms of income
decreasing accruals, positive ROA provides incentives to "smooth" earnings
and we expect a negative association between ROA and income-decreasing
abnormal accruals. Firms with a net loss may have an incentive to magnify
income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid debt covenant violations and
magnify income-decreasing abnormal accruals to "take a bath." We there
fore expect a positive (negative) association between LOSS and income
increasing (decreasing) abnormal accruals. We also include an indicator
variable for the presence of material internal control weaknesses. Mate
rial weaknesses have been shown to be associated with an increase in ab
5. Results
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 21
TABLE 3
Descriptive
Descriptive Statistics
Statistics
$ budget
IAFs with OSP budget > 20% 0.338 0.00 0.00 1.00
of overall budget
(NON08P20)
IAF used as a management 0.8465 1.00 1.00 1.00
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22 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 3—Continued
annual budget
The CFO determines Internal 3.75 4.00 3.00 4.00
*** ACIAFINF = The ratio of the total agreement points for the audit committee in the numer
vided by the total agreement points for the CFO and CEO in the denominator. The numerator is t
of agreement points (per the 1-5 Likert-scale responses) on survey questions #12a, 12d, and 12g.
nominator is the sum of agreement points (per the 1-5 Likert-scale responses) on survey question
12i. The 1-5 Likert-scale responses are recalibrated to 0-4 for purposes of computing this variable.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 23
TABLE 3—Continued
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24 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
23 In the interest of brevity, we do not report the coefficient estimates on our INDUSTRY
dummy variables.
24 We are careful to not overinterpret our stand-alone variables, as they are not necessarily
reflective of main effects due to the continuous nature of some of our test variables (Jaccard
andTurrisi [2003]).
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 25
TABLE 4
Univariate Comparisons
Panel C: Univariate comparison of firms that just meet/beat analyst forecast to other firms
Firms that Just
Meet/Beat All Other Mann-Whitney
Variable Name Analysts' Forecasts Firms Difference Statistic
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26 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 4—Continued
Significance levels (one-tailed if in predicted direction): *•**• *** = Rvalue < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively.
IACOMP equals average IAF resource expenditure per hour. ACIAFINFis the relative audit committee
IAF influence vis-a-vis management (CEO and CFO). NONMTG is an indicator variable coded "1" when the
IAF does not serve as a management training ground per survey question #13 and 0 otherwise. NONOSP2O
coded "1" ("0") when the budgeted outsourced IAF services are less than 20% of IAF total budget. ASSETS
equals total assets in millions. AGE is the number of years the firm was listed on Compustat, truncated at
25 years. LEVERAGE equals sum of long-term debt and current liabilities of a company divided by total
assets. SEGNUM equals number of disclosed segments in which a company operates. CEO equals cash flows
from operations. SALESGROWequals one-year sales growth percentage. MTB equals market-to-book ratio.
CFOVOL'is the standard deviation of operating cash flows for 2005-2009. ROA equals return on assets. LOSS
is coded "1" if the firm experienced a loss in fiscal year 2008, "0" else. MAll/VEAKis coded "1" for client firm
disclosing a material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting during the prior two years and
"0" otherwise.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 27
TABLE 5
Adjusted If 0.2399
Significance levels (one-tailed if in predicted direction): *•**• *** = Rvalue < 0.10, 0.05,0.01, respectively.
ABNACC is the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) version of the modified Jones model measure of
abnormal accruals. IACOMP equals average LAP resource expenditure per hour. ACIAFINF is the relative
audit committee IAF influence vis-a-vis management (CEO and CFO). NONMTG is an indicator variable
coded "1" when the IAF does not serve as a management training ground per survey question #13, and 0
otherwise. NONOSP20 is coded "1" ("0") when the budgeted outsourced IAF services are less than 20% of
the IAF total budget. ASSETS equals total assets in millions. AGE is the number of years the firm was listed on
Compustat, truncated at 25 years. LEVERAGE equals the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities of a
company divided by total assets. SEGNUM equals the number of disclosed segments a company operates in.
CFO equals cash flows from operations. SALESGROWequals one-year sales growth percentage. MTB equals
the market-to-book ratio. CFOVOL is the standard deviation of operating cash flows for 2005-2009. ROA
equals return on assets. LOSS is coded "1" if the firm experienced a loss in fiscal year 2008, "0" otherwise.
MATWEAK is coded "1" for a client firm disclosing a material weakness in internal controls over financial
reporting during the prior two years and "0" otherwise.
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28 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 6
Adjusted R2 0.201
Significance levels (one-tailed if in predicted direction): *,**, *** = Rvalue < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively.
All variable definitions can be found in table 2.
ABNACC is the Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) version of the modified Jones model measure of
abnormal accruals. IACOMP equals average IAF resource expenditure per hour. ACIAFINF is the relative
audit committee IAF influence vis-a-vis management (CEO and CFO). NONMTG is an indicator variable
coded "1" when the IAF does not serve as a management training ground per survey question #13, and 0
otherwise. NONOSP20 is coded "1" ("0") when the budgeted outsourced IAF services are less than 20% of
the IAF total budget. ASSETS equals total assets in millions. AGE is the number of years the firm was listed
on Compustat, truncated at 25 years. LEVERAGE equals the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities of
a company divided by total assets. SEGNUM equals the number of disclosed segments in which the company
operates. CEO equals cash flows from operations. SAIJESGROW equals one-year sales growth percentage.
MTB equals market-to-book ratio. CFOVOL is the standard deviation of operating cash flows for 2005-2009.
ROA equals return on assets. LOSS is coded "1" if the firm experienced a loss in fiscal year 2008, "0" oth
erwise. MATWEAK is coded "1" for a client firm disclosing a material weakness in internal controls over
financial reporting during the prior two years and "0" otherwise.
accruals are less likely to be associated with cash flow considerations, and
also that they are less (closer to zero) when sales are growing. This is consis
tent with fewer incentives for "big bath" behavior when growth is present.
We note that, in order for IAF quality to impact financial reporting qual
ity, it is necessary for the IAF to be involved in the monitoring of the fi
nancial reporting process. Per survey question #3 in the appendix, such
opportunities include financial statement audits of subsidiaries and/or as
sisting the external auditor with the financial statement audit. We observed
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 29
that all respondents had nonzero budget allocations to these activities, indi
cating that all sample IAF departments had the opportunity to monitor the
financial reporting process.25 In summary, the evidence of tables 5 and 6
is consistent with the characterization of a two-factor IAF quality function,
whereby competence and independence must combine with each other
to promote the IAF as an effective, internally based financial reporting
monitor.26
25 Our survey respondents reported spending 15.4% of in-house audit hours on assi
with the financial audit, 10.3% on audits of subsidiaries, 6.8% on compliance auditing
9.8% on special projects. For comparison, the highest single percentage of time was de
to SOX-related controls work (27.15%).
26 Breusch-Pagan tests failed to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity.
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30 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
TABLE 7
Logistic
Logistic Regression
RegressionResults:
Results:Just
JustMeet/Beat
Meet/BeatAnalysts'
Analysts'
Forecasts
Forecasts
Independent
Expected Coefficient Chi-Square Coefficient Chi-Square
Variable Sign Estimate Statistic Estimate Statistic
Significance levels (one-tailed if in predicted direction): *•**• *** = Rvalue < .10, .0
Column A present results when the dependent variable is defined as JM/BEAT
dent variable coded "1" in instances where the firm met the consensus annual EPS f
at the beginning of the year or exceeded the forecast by more than 0.0005; "0"
results when the dependent variable is defined as JM/BEAT,lirr, coded "1" if the fi
analysts' forecasts, without abnormal positive accruals, "0" else. All other variables a
described.
27 In untabulated results, we isolate those firms that appear to have utilized abnormal accru
als to just meet/beat forecasts, and find similar results, though at lower levels of significance.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 31
28 Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan [2005] also find that the presence of an OSP
negatively impacts overall the IAF budget. Instead of using a dichotomous OSP "presence"
variable per Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan [2005], we use NONOSP2O, which is
substantively similar to the variable used in Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan [2005].
We note that neither NONOSP2O nor a dichotomous OSP presence variable is significantly
associated with IACOMP.
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32 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
correlated with each other and do not appear to significantly influence IAF
competence, our primary focus is predicting IACOMPin a first-stage regres
sion. Similar to Prawitt, Smith, and Wood [2009], our objective is to utilize
instrumental variables that are correlated with IACOMP, but not correlated
with our measures of financial reporting quality. Our two instrumental vari
ables include an average IACOMP score by industry and the amount of in
ventory relative to assets.29 We then use the predicted IACOMP value in a
second-stage regression using the same set of dependent variables found in
tables 5-7. We obtain virtually identical results to those reported in tables
5-7.
We also considered numerous categories of potentially omitted corre
lated variables. With respect to auditor-related variables, prior research has
indicated that auditor tenure (Davis, Soo, and Trompeter [2009]), auditor
industry specialization (Reichelt and Wang [2010]) and the magnitude of
non-audit fees (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson [2002]) may impact financial
reporting quality. Our results remained unchanged when we included: (1)
a continuous variable defined as total auditor tenure (capped at 25); (2)
a dichotomous variable coded "1" when the external auditor audited the
largest percentage of client assets per the two-digit focus industry per t
1, and "0" otherwise and (3) a continuous variable defined as the ratio
non-audit service fees to audit fees.
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 33
The time period of our study was a recession year, and, thus, our results
may not be generalizable to other years. We assumed that our test vari
ables would remain relatively constant over a short horizon, and tested our
model for 2010 and 2011. We also included abnormal returns and a dummy
variable for negative abnormal return to our regression as a control for ac
celerated recognition of losses in a recession year (Ball and Shivakumar
[2006]). Our results remained qualitatively similar in both these tests.
Last, we attempted to separate the relative influence of the CEO and
CFO over the IAF. In our first test, we created a dichotomous variable
(CFODOMAIN) coded "1" in instances where the survey respondent in
dicated a strong level of agreement with survey questions 12b/12e/12h,
while simultaneously indicating strong disagreement with survey questions
12c/12f/12i. We then interacted IACOMP*ACIAINF* CFODOMAIN Inclu
sion of these variables in our regression did not substantively alter the re
sults of tables 5-7. In a second set of analyses, we redefined CFODOMAIN
as "1" in instances where the sum of survey responses to 12b/12e/12h
was greater than survey responses to 12c/12f/12i (that is, in observations
where the CIA noted that the CFO had relatively greater IAF influence).
CFODOMAIN occurred in slightly more than 80% of our observations—
indicating that the CFO has relatively greater influence over the IAF vis-a-vis
the CEO in the overwhelming majority of instances. Inclusion of this rede
fined CFODOMAIN variable in our regressions did not impact our overall
results and the coefficient estimates on CFODOMAIN on a stand-alone or
interactive basis were statistically insignificant.33
6. Conclusion
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34 L. J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
APPENDIX
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 35
4. Please indicate the total fiscal year 2009 internal audit-related expen
ditures for:
5. Please indicate the total Section 404-related fees paid to your external
auditor in 2009. $
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56 L.J. ABBOTT, B. DAUGHERTY, S. PARKER, AND G. F. PETERS
6. Please indicate the percentage of your staff who have the following
certifications:
Dollar materiality
Ethical tone set by management
Changes in upper management
Complexity of the operation
Quality of application-level controls
Physical controls over assets
Quality of manual controls
Complexity of accounting guidance
Financial condition of the entity
Program level changes since last audit
Asset liquidity
Controls over period-end reporting
Complexity of controls
Budget variances of auditable entities
Changes in nonmanagement personnel
Downsizing
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance
Currency fluctuation exposure
Political risk
Environmental regulation
Exposure to financially distressed
third parties (i.e., customers, vendors)
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INTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 37
12. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements
Level of agreement
Statement (circle one number)
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