The PRC's Violent Way and Consequences To Counterterrorism Against Islam in China

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Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)

Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña

The PRC's violent way and consequences to counterterrorism against Islam in


China: "Re-education camps" on Uyghur Muslims.

Chinese authorities have been persecuting Uyghur Muslims since almost over a decade
ago. Compared to the large ethnic Han Chinese group, of whom the majority of Chinese
are a part, Uyghur’s make up the minority of ethnic groups in China, particularly in the
Xinjiang area where they are mostly from.
China's largest province, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), borders
Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It is located on the
country's northwest frontier. The XUAR is marked by the Islamic world and culture as a
result of its close proximity to these nations. They all practice Islam as their primary
religion, making Xinjiang the region with the closest geographical ties between Islam
and China1.
Therefore, this region is essential to the large red since it also connects the Caucasus
and Central Asia. Because of this, Xinjiang is crucial to China's "Belt and Road
Initiative" (BRI), which intends to revive the country's historic "Silk Road" by linking
Central Asian and European economies into a "China-centered" commercial network2.
Also, the Uyghur Region is situated in a vitally significant economic zone because of its
vast oil and mineral resources, which are among China's primary energy sources3.
Therefore, it is evident that the XUAR is essential for China if it intends to maintain its
position as a global superpower. Without the Uyghur Region, the PRC would not be
able to maintain its trading and economic importance, as experts such as Buchholz
predict that China will have the largest economy in the world by 2024.
The People's Republic of China has been in charge of Xinjiang since its declaration of
subordination, and the XUAR was formally founded by the Chinese government in
19554. However, during China's administration, the Uyghur people in the region are
characterized by resistance. Numerous Uyghur uprisings against Chinese authorities
have occurred since the People's Republic of China assumed control of the area in 1949,
which has only prompted the PRC to adopt severe policies against this minority,
because to achieve their “Belt and Road Initiative” they need a unified nation.

1
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
2
Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s Uyghur Problem after the 2009 Urumqi Riot: Re-pression, Recompense,
Readiness, Resistance.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13 (2): (2018) 185–201.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1475746.
3
Downs, Erica Strecker. China’s Quest for Energy Security. (2000) Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
4
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in Xinjian targeted
Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs at Dartmouth College, 73.

1
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
Uyghur uprisings have been fed by the constant marginalization, discrimination and
segregation between the Han and Uyghur groups by the People’s Republic of China in
the XUAR Region. The Muslim’s marginalization is characterized by the oppressive
policies and rules that the PRC have applied only in Xinjiang (the home to the Uyghur).
The government's and the Han's misperception of Islam further supports this. Islam is
not well accepted by the People’s Republic of China since to accomplish their China-
centered commercial dream of recovering the great “Silk Road” (what they have named
as the “Belt and Road Initiative”) they base themselves on the ancient Chinese
Philosophy5 in which difference (to the Han society, which is considered the superior
culture, hence “the norm” throughout China, and who are mostly nationalist and free of
any religion, hence loyal to the PRC), in this case Islam, is considered as a threat and is
never tolerated. Since the earliest dynasties, the notion that eradicating ideological
conflict is advantageous to uniting the many populations has been in favor.
The People’s Republic of China discriminative and marginal measures that they have
imposed against Uyghur Muslims are divided into two groups:
1. Economic discrimination is committed by bringing in immigrants who are
primarily of the Han ethnic group and giving them advantages in housing,
employment, healthcare, education, and other areas (raising tensions between the
Han and the Uyghur and causing the latter's numbers to decline). Additionally,
proficiency in Han Putonghua is required for people who want to land higher-
paying, more prestigious employment, but Uyghur ability is viewed as
insufficient to attain economic success6.
2. Cultural discrimination through the prohibition of teaching Uyghur children
their real history, and instead one based on Chinese and communist traditions, to
fulfill the integration of Uyghur Muslims into Han society, the gradual abolition
of national Uyghur attire such as headscarves, the conviction on using tribal
names rather than Turkish ones7, etc.
Moreover, due to this group being a minority, they lack political authority in the region,
so they cannot affect change. Hence, they have used riots and uprisings, and in some
cases violent attacks, as a last recourse to try to speak up about the beforementioned
daily and continuous discrimination and get their wished separation of the Xianjiang
Region. Criminal activity like these riots is justified by the Strain theory, which some
Scholars like Ramdat (2022), Kasim (2021) and Hoff agree on. According to the Strain
theory, certain people will unavoidably turn to illegal ways of attainment, such as crime
or violent acts, if they are not given lawful access to society's cultural aspirations (such

5
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
6
Kaltman, Blaine. “Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China”. Ohio
University Research in International Studies. Global and Comparative Studies Series, no. 7. (2007)
Athens: Ohio University Press.
7
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.

2
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
8
as wealth, status, or power) . A small number of Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang area
have engaged in violent acts of rebellion in order to achieve autonomy and economic
independence. The Han Chinese majority and the Chinese government, in particular the
new Communist party leader Chen Quanguo, have, however, seen this deviation as
resulting from their Islamic faith rather than societal conflict9.
A conflict between the Uyghur and Han populations also broke out in 2009 as a result
of the intense hostility between the two caused by PRC sanctions targeting Uyghur
Muslims. Following the 2009 unrest, Uyghur extremists claimed responsibility for two
terrorist attacks that took place in China in 2013 and 201410.
In the first instance, on October 28, 2013, a four-wheel drive vehicle crashed through a
gathering of witnesses in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, murdering 5 people and
wounding many more11. Chinese officials recognized the driver as Uyghur, and the
Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a violent Islamist organization, claimed responsibility for
the assault. The strict, Uyghur-focused counterterrorism strategy adopted by China after
September 11 was partially justified as a result of this incident. The attack is highlighted
by China as one of the instances that have put the public's security in jeopardy12. Then,
on March 1, 2014, a stabbing at Kunming Station in China left 31 people dead and over
100 more injured13. The attack, which was carried out by violent Uyghur radicals, led to
a sharp rise in China's counterterrorism efforts in Xinjiang. The government increased
counterterrorism training and military security14 in the area in response to the attacks,
which also signaled the beginning of "re-education" based persecution of Uyghurs in
Xinjiang.
After September 11, 2001, the fight against "The Three Evils," which the People's
Republic of China described as terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, was

8
Ramdat, Seema "Present day Genocide: Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang," Jhon Jay’s Finest 37 (April
2022), 71-77.
9
Human Rights Watch. “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots.” (2021, April 20). Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-
humanity-targeting#_ftn7
10
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in Xinjian targeted
Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs at Dartmouth College, 73.
11
Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s Uyghur Problem after the 2009 Urumqi Riot: Re-pression, Recompense,
Readiness, Resistance.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13 (2): (2018) 185–201.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1475746.
12
“The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang.” (2019)
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2019/03/18/content_281476567813306.htm.
13
Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s Uyghur Problem after the 2009 Urumqi Riot: Re-pression, Recompense,
Readiness, Resistance.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13 (2): (2018) 185–201.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1475746.
14
Gracie, Carrie. “The Knife Attack That Changed Kunming.” BBC News, (July 16, 2014) sec. Asia.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28305109.

3
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
15
stepped up and included in the Global War on Terrorism . Therefore, the PRC began
implementing a number of extremely harsh and violent counterterrorist policies (which
directly affected the Uyghur Muslims) in an effort to eradicate terrorist attacks in Asia,
using as a pretext the 9/11 terrorist attack and the terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2014, for
which the Uyghurs accepted responsibility.
However, these policies are Uyghur Muslim-targeted instead of terrorism-targeted, due
to the PRC portrayal of Muslims populations as a terrorist threat and since the basis of
China’s counterterrorist policy is the construction of “re-education camps” which are
mostly filled by Uyghur Muslims. They have used these camps as a way to unify the
nation into one where “the Other” (Islam) doesn’t exist. They believe that introducing
all Uyghur population, and everyone that practices Islam or is sympathetic with that
religion, will make them believe in the authorities again, and the attacks will stop.
Hence, unifying China and accomplishing the BRI.
Due to the atrocities that are happening inside the camps, Chinese authorities are being
compared by scholars, like Ramdat (2022) or Ellis (2022), with the German Nazis of the
1940s. This is because the People’s Republic of China is, still, committing a mass
Genocide on Uyghur Muslims. They are likely to do an ethnic cleanse of this group if it
would mean achieving a greater mean for them, which in this case is economic strength
and power since they would be unified.
Chen Quango, the new secretary of the Uyghur Autonomous Region, established camps
there in the spring of 2017 under the false pretense of schools for vocational and
voluntary education in order to "detain those under the influence of religious
extremism"16 and imprisoned millions of people. Uyghurs, who make up 45% of the
population, are the primary target of the Chinese oppressors in this region17. In
Xinjiang, "re-education" institutions have kept more than a million Uyghurs since
201618. The Chinese Communist Party's ultimate goal with the "re-education camps" is
also to eradicate the Turkic and Islamic identities that are distinct from Han culture.
The State Council of the People's Republic of China emphasizes the value of education
in the region in its official white paper on counterterrorism, "Vocational Education and
Training in Xinjiang.": “[e]ducation and training centers have been established with the
goal of educating and rehabilitating people guilty of minor crimes or law-breaking and
eradicating the influence of terrorism and extremism, in order to prevent them from

Tobin, David. “Securing China’s Northwest Frontier: Identity and Insecurity in Xinjiang”. Cambridge,
15

United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (2020)


16
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in Xinjian targeted
Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs at Dartmouth College, 73.
17
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
18
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in Xinjian targeted
Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs at Dartmouth College, 73.

4
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
falling victim to terrorism and extremism.” Furthermore, the document emphasizes
19

China’s opposition to connecting terrorism and extremism with “specific countries,


ethnic groups or religions.” The Uyghur ethnic minority, on the other hand, has been
specifically targeted by China's "re-education" program for potential terrorist risks
because of its ties to the former East Turkestan and the Islamic faith.
This is demonstrated by the fact that non-Uyghurs carried out attempted bombings at
the Beijing airport in July 2013 and explosions near the CCP's headquarters in Taiyuan
in November 201320, which were not classified as acts of terrorism. Attacks committed
by Uyghurs, in contrast, have been labeled as violent acts of terrorism. This exemplifies
China's selective counterterrorism strategy and sheds light on the country's tunnel-vision
focus on battling Uyghur separatism rather than preventing terrorist threats generally.
China is worried that more Uyghurs would have separatist ideas as a result of their
common history of territory, religion, culture, and identity, which has led to the
securitization of the entire Uyghur ethnic community. The persecution of Uyghurs is
"legitimized" by the expression of worry that Uyghurs with ties to religion and the
Middle East could commit terrorist acts. The strategic component of China's
securitization of the Uyghur group is demonstrated here. In response, violent extremist
attacks were used by the Chinese government under President Xi and the regional
political leadership in the XUAR under representative Chen to imprison more than one
million Uyghurs in "re-education" facilities meant to suppress their identity and compel
allegiance to the CCP.
President Xi added that "effective educational remoulding and transformation of
criminals" [emphasis added] and "even after these people are released, their education
and transformation must continue"21 to his reaction to terrorism and religious
extremism. The CCP's vision of a preventative counterterrorism approach through "re-
education" is reflected in President Xi's declaration on educational remolding and
transformation.
Some conduct patterns—growing beards, abstaining from smoking and alcohol,
coloring one's hair red, and even conceiving more than three children—are classified as
indicators of religious fundamentalism. Similar to this, visiting 26 nations including
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan is regarded as evidence of
guilt and suspicion. Even refusing to provide a DNA sample, conversing with the
authorities in their mother tongue (a form of Uyghur-Arabic), and engaging in

19
“Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang.” n.d.
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201908/17/content_WS5d57573cc6d0c6695ff7ed6c.html.
20
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in Xinjian targeted
Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs at Dartmouth College, 73.
21
Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China
Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” The New York Times, (November 16, 2019), sec. World.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

5
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
22
argumentative behavior with them are considered crimes , and individuals who engage
in these behaviors are transported to the camps. Through its use of torture, forced labor,
sterilization, and involuntary detention, China's counterterrorism strategy in Xinjiang
resembles governmental political violence. Furthermore, rather than seeing Uyghur
violence as the result of marginalization and discrimination, this strategy is predicated
on the assumption that the Uyghur community poses a threat to the state. Instead, China
picks on Uyghurs based on their racial and ethnic characteristics. Chinese
counterterrorism policy specifically targets Uyghurs because they have different ethnic
and religious characteristics than the Han majority in China23.
Inside the PRC’s counterterrorist policy or what they call vocational “re-education”
camps human rights violations are being committed. There is limited information
regarding official documents about the reality of these places but there are statements of
detainees who have left “re-education centers” and have shared their experience.
Gulbahar Haitiwaji (2021) narrates her time inside one. She was detained and accused
of supporting separatism when officials discovered a picture of her daughter carrying an
East Turkestan flag.
Haitiwaji24 states that inside the centers’ cells there were no mattresses, furniture, or
toilet paper, which suggests that the conditions were purposely designed to make
detainees vulnerable to psychological manipulation. Due to the "re-education"
program's mandatory involvement in hours of "physical training" and "theoretical
classes," she refers to it as brainwashing. While "theoretical classes" required detainees
to repeat pledges of devotion to the nation and party as well as Han Putonghua language
instruction for Uyghurs who communicate in Uyghur, "physical training" for detainees
comprised eleven hours of marching within a classroom. They had to daily pledge
alliance to the CCP and President Xi with phrases like “I wish for my great country to
develop and have a bright future. I wish for all ethnicities to form a single great
nation…” The last statement refers to the systematic erasure of Uyghur identity via "re-
education" centers. Additionally, Haitiwaji said that forced injections of "vaccines"
were used to sterilize female captives. This shows that the centers aim to eradicate not
just Uyghur identity but also the entire population of the community. Therefore, as
some academics like Ramdat and Hoff concur, genocide is being committed as part of
China's counterterrorism strategy.

22
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
23
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East Turkistan,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
24
Haitiwaji, Gulbahar, and Rozenn Morgat. “‘Our Souls Are Dead’: How I Survived a Chinese ‘re-
Education’ Camp for Uighurs.” The Guardian, (January 12, 2021) sec. World news.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-
haitiwaji.

6
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
25
A report published by the Associated Press (2022) shows how the government's
regional birth control effort directly caused birth rates in the predominantly Uyghur
areas of Hotan and Kashgar in Xinjiang to drop by more than 60% between 2015 and
2018. According to the research, "the state frequently compels intrauterine devices,
sterilization, and even abortion on hundreds of thousands of minority women," notably
in Xinjiang. This would coincide with Haitiwaji version of events in the “re-education”
camps. Also, Han-dominated areas benefit from state-subsidized infant formula and
healthcare services that are intended to promote Han families to have more children,
whereas Uyghur-dominated areas perform the majority of sterilization procedures.
Also, Uyghur women who have more than three children, however, may be imprisoned
in "re-education" institutions.
It is considered Genocide as the 1948 Genocide Convention. Article 2 of the
Convention states that:
“[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such: […] (b) Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; […] (d) Imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group”26
Therefore, as Finley27 states in his work, The Uyghur population of Xinjiang is easily
distinguished as a distinct ethnic group by genetic differences between Uyghur and Han
people, distinct linguistic and cultural practices and traditions, and ties to an
independent East Turkestan. Additionally, due to their status as both an ethnic and a
religious group, Uyghurs meet the criteria for being the target group of genocide
because the majority of them are Muslims and the Chinese government regards religion
as a primary motivating factor behind terrorist acts28. Moving on to other genocide
tactics, Articles 2 (b) and (d), which refer to "inflicting substantial bodily or mental
injury" and "imposing measures intended to prevent births," respectively, support the
assertion that a Uyghur genocide occurred (“physical training” and “theory classes” for
11 hours, and involuntary sterilization).
As a consequence of the Chinese violent counterterrorist policy which has resulted in
genocide, hence a violation of human rights, many international organizations and states
have tried to stop PRC’s policies but failed. Primarily, aspirations to the United Nations

25
The Associated Press. n.d. “China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization.”
https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-
269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c.
26
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” n.d. United Nations.
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime
%20of%20Genocide.pdf.
27
Smith Finley, Joanne. “The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and Uyghur-Han Relations
in Contemporary Xinjiang”. Brill’s Inner Asian Library, volume 30 (2013). Leiden ; Boston: Brill.
28
Chung, Chien-peng. “China’s Uyghur Problem after the 2009 Urumqi Riot: Re-pression, Recompense,
Readiness, Resistance.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13 (2): (2018) 185–201.
https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1475746.

7
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
helping solve this catastrophe are null since China is a sitting permanent five-member
on the Security Council. A P5 member's rejection of a resolution prevents the UN from
assisting that nation or ethnic minority, and China has consistently opposed conducting
investigations on its territory29.
In all, as stated by Mooney30 in her work, a majority of the world’s human rights
organizations fall into three categories: “those that are making their best efforts but lack
an enforcement component, those that are acting avoidant and failing to deal with China
directly, and those that are either failing to condemn China’s actions or are overtly
supporting them. Those organizations that fall into the latter two categories are likely
either afraid of China, incentivized by China, or both”. These is a result of China’s
constant economic improvement and power, which are making the country a big rival
who cannot be defeated. This just serves to demonstrate that China is the world's
dominant economic force, and because no one has been able to hold them accountable
for their counterterrorist strategy, we are reluctant to challenge their commitment to
upholding human rights.
In conclusion, China's counterterrorism strategy demonstrates how state-centric
measures can worsen feelings of marginalization among Muslim minority communities
rather than reducing terrorist threats. Also, how trying to achieve a greater good (in this
case accomplishing the BRI and being the major global power) has consequently ended
in a series of violations of human rights though their counterterrorist policy, where
genocide can be found. Clearly, China will continue to keep doing this until they defeat
“the Other”, Uyghur Muslims are eradicated through their counterterrorism, and they
can ultimately achieve a prosperous and united country.

29
Human Rights Watch. “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots.” (2021, April 20). Retrieved from
https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-
humanity-targeting#_ftn7
30
Mooney, Megan. “Our Collective Failure: Why the International Community Has Not Intervened to
Protect China's Uighur Muslims”. International Research and Review, 11(1), (2021), 45-64.

8
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña

Reference List
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%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf.
“The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xin-
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tent_281476567813306.htm.
“Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang.” n.d.
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Chung, Chien-peng. 2018. “China’s Uyghur Problem after the 2009 Urumqi Riot: Re-
pression, Recompense, Readiness, Resistance.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and
Counter Terrorism 13 (2): 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2018.1475746.
Downs, Erica Strecker. 2000. China’s Quest for Energy Security. Santa Monica, CA:
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Haitiwaji, Gulbahar, and Rozenn Morgat. 2021. “‘Our Souls Are Dead’: How I Sur-
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education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji.
Hoff, Ada. “From Policy to Genocide: How Has Chinese counterterrorism Policy in
Xinjian targeted Uyghur Muslims?,” An Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs
at Dartmouth College, 73.
Human Rights Watch. (2021, April 20). “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots.”
Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-
roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting#_ftn7

9
Terrorism, Violence, and Religion, basic course (790G86)
Final Paper
Linköping Universitet Blanca Correro Graña
Kaltman, Blaine. 2007. Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the
Uighur in China. Ohio University Research in International Studies. Global and
Comparative Studies Series, no. 7. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Kasim, Mehmetali. “Chinese Oppressive Policies Towards the Muslims in East
Turkistan,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 41(1), (2021), 62-77.
Mooney, Megan. “Our Collective Failure: Why the International Community Has Not
Intervened to Protect China's Uighur Muslims”. International Research and Review,
11(1), (2021), 45-64.
Ramdat, Seema "Present day Genocide: Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang," Jhon Jay’s
Finest 37 (April 2022), 71-77.
Ramzy, Austin, and Chris Buckley. 2019. “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files
Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims.” The New York Times,
November 16, 2019, sec. World.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-doc-
uments.html.
Smith Finley, Joanne. 2013. The Art of Symbolic Resistance: Uyghur Identities and
Uyghur-Han Relations in Contemporary Xinjiang. Brill’s Inner Asian Library, volume
30. Leiden ; Boston: Brill.
The Associated Press. n.d. “China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Steriliza-
tion.” https://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-
health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c.
Tobin, David. 2020a. Securing China’s Northwest Frontier: Identity and Insecurity in
Xinjiang. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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