INDIA AND THE GREAT POWERS:

STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES,
NORM ATIV E NECESSITIES

MJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNJ

Six propositions drive this article. First, India's relations with the great powers as they evolve
over the next two decades are going to be conditioned by India's own emergence as a great powe1:
Second, it will take at least 15 zo 20 years for a balt1nce to re-eme1ge in the contemporary
hegemonic system; hence, India's emergence will be smwltaneo us with the relative decline of
the United States (US). Third, Indian policy makers and analysts need to think stmct11mlly
about India's external relations, especially with the US and China. Fourth, India's relations
with the great powers are inseparable from the broader issue ofemerging Asian balances "nd
security architectures. Fifth, India needs to keep a keen eye on other major powers, among
whom Russia, Japan, the European Union (EU) and Bmzil will be particular ly important.
Finally. while building its capabilities along II broad spectrum, India must not lose sight of
the normative componen t that 1s inherent ,n grct1t power status.

How SHOULD lNDJA"srracegisc its 1cl:1tiom wid1 the great powers in the international
system? In chis a1 cicle we make six broad points, which we en umera te as:

1. India's relarions w1th the great powers as chey evolve over the next two <lecades
are going to be condrnon ed by the increJsrngly obvious fact that India is itself
emergrng as a great power.
2. The inrernati onal sysrem roday 1s hegemonic because a single state has achieved
an acure preponde rance of capabilities. It will rake at least 15 to 20 years for
a balance ro re-emerge in rhe system, which is precisely rhe period in which
India will itself 'emerge'. Hence, India's emergence will be simultan eous with
rhe relative decline of the United Scares (US).

ACKNOWLE DGEMENTS : The auchors woulJ like co thank four anonymous referees from India Rtvuw to

which [his anicle was first senc, for cheir commenis and suggesc ions.

Rajesh Rajagop_aJan anJ Varun Sahni are Professors, lniernational Polirics, Jawaharl:il Nehru Unive~sity,
New Delhi, India . Varnn Sahni 1s ;ilso Ediror, SowhAs,nn Survey.

SOUTH ASIAN SURVEY 15: I (2008) : 5 32

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 6/RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

3. When ic comes co che greac powers, Indian policy makers and ana lysrs need ro
aec imo che habit of thinking s rruccurally. This is particularly so in the case of
0
India's relations with the US and China.
4. India's relations with the greac powers are inseparable from che broader issue of
emerging Asian balances and security archirectures. A bipolar system, in which
India has to choose between US global hegemony and Chinese continental
dominance, will obviously not be in India's interest.
5. India will also have to keep a keen eye on ocher major powers, among whom
Russia, Japan , the European Union (EU) and Brazil will be especially imporranr.
6. While the task of building its capabilities along a broad speccrum is of primary
importance, India must not lose sight of the normative component that is in-
herent in great power srarus. We must therefore ask: What will India bring ro
rhe table?

We explicate these six propositions sequehrially in the sections char follow.

I GREAT POWERS AND OTHER STATES

India is most appropriately conceived of in the contemporary international system as an

'emerging power' . The meaning of rhe emerging power concept is best arrived at via a
triangulation from the great power and middle power concepts. What great powers are
has never been in doubt: at any given moment of history, they arc the states•with system-
shaping capabilities and intentions. 1 The emphasis on both capabilities and intent ions
is imponant: Cuba has the desire bur nor the ability ro play a system-shaping role,
Japan is perhaps an example of the vice versa. From this conceptual vantage point,
the US berween th e rwo World Wars, despite its capabi liti es, was not a great power
because of its isolationist policy. Clearly, Indi a is curre ntl y not a great power.
In contrast to the great power concept, the middle power co ncept is nebulous, protea n
and lacking in clarity. Middle powers co uld be defined on the basis of relative power,
specific systemic and/or regional roles, a potential to emerge as future great powe rs ,
or just a vague sense of being 'in the middle' geographically, eco nomically, culturally or
diplomatically (Holbraad 1984: 67-75). We will define middle powers as the special
category of states that lack the system-shaping ca pabiliti es of the great powers, but
whose size, location, resources and role precludes them from being ignored by the great
po~ers. ln other words, middle powers may lack the capacity to challenge the way in
which the great powers run the international system, but they are sufficiently powerful
to de~ any gr~at power attempt to force them to behave in a manner against their
choosmg: For _mstance, India could not prevent the setting up of the global nuclear
non-pr~ltferanon archi~ecture, bur it could certainly choose ro opt out of rhe regime.
Thus, tt :'ould have, rill recently, been accurate to classify India as a middle power
or as an ' mterme d"tare state' (Vaz 2006). However, that is no longer rhe case: India is
now best classified as an emerging power.

South Asian Sur11ey 15, ·1 (2008): 5-32

 a n11d the Crent Powers/7 -
_ _ _ _ __ __ __ __ _ Indr
------------
n above, we
ula ting from the rwo definicions give
Wh at are eme~ging pow ers? Tri ang es tha t
rgin g pow ers as mid dle pow ers on che ascendanc; these are stat
can def ine eme
n to ma noe uvr e the ir way into
gre at pow er stat us. In
hav e the cap abd icy and inte ntio
regional pow ers' ;
mo re rha n 'int erm edi ate states' or'
oth er wor ds, eme rgin g pow ers are and are in var iou s
a sys tem sha pin g role in che futu re
rhe y hav e the pot enti al of pla yin g cfully com par ed
do so. Ind ia is 1herefore mo re frui
way s sign alli ng the ir inte ntio n 10
man n 200 8) 01 Brazil (Sa hni 200
5) than, say, wit h Ind one sia or
wit h Ch ma (Gi ess
Nig eria .
cep t. A par ticu -
ion abo ut the emerging power con
The re remains con side rab le con fus cep t of 'em erg ing
racurc has bee n to conflate the con
larl y egregious erro r in rece nt lite We ass en
h 'reg ion al pow er' or to use 1he cwo con cep ts inte rch ang eab ly.
pow er' wit y are cha rac teri sed
t eme rgin g pow ers arc not mer ely reg ion al powers; indeed, rhe
tha ir ow n reg ion and
ey app ear to be tran scen din g the
as 'em erg ing ' precisely bec aus e th ever, doe s not
al) pre sen ce and impacr. Thi s, how
acq uiri ng a sys tem ic (tra ns- region from the late
tha t trye reg ion al spa ce is irre leva nt. To rhe con trary, evi den ce
imp ly ing ly imp ort ant
reg ion al spa ce is bec om ing incr eas
rwe ncie th cen tury sug ges ts thac che y co em erg e as a
ds, an em e rgin g power is unl ikel
in pow er tran siti on. In orh er wor thro ugh a
er wit hou t firsr con soli d atin g an d pacifying ics ow n reg ion
sys tem ic play Eve n Ch ina ,
s of pos itiv e tran sfo rma tion , into a zo ne of growth and peace.
pro ces ate a ban dw ago n
er already, is wo rkin g har d to cre
wh ich pro bab ly is a sys tem ic play
our s.
effe ct am ong st its reg ion al nei ghb erg e as a
few yea rs, a num ber of stu die s hav e suggested tha t Ind ia wil l em
In the last inte rna tion al
er in the 202 0-2 5 tim efra me (NJ C 200 4). The con tem por ary
gre at pow wil l occ ur. Wh a~
pro vid es rhe sem ng wit hin whJC..h this pro ces s of eme rge nce
sys rem ·in wh ich Ind ia
sha pe of the inte rna tion al sys tem
can we say abo ut the nat ure and , tha t wo rd wo uld
le wo rd to cha rac ren se the sys tem
find s itself? If we had to use a sing
be 'he gem ony '.
2
l-IE GEM ONY
1J THE FAC T AND IMP ACT OF

orig ina lly use d

rd h ege mo ny is Gre ek inn s ety mo log y (17Eyc:µovw.), and was
Th e wo stat es of anc ien t
ote rh e pre pon der anr pos itio n of Ath ens vis a-vis the och er ciry
to den nce of one
D 198 3: 412 ). Hen ce, it imp lies ch~ leadership- or pre dom ina
Gre ece (OE and imp act
ide s (cir ca 460 BC E-3 95 BC E) por tray ed the ope rati on
sta te. Thu cyd tory ofthe
ver y dra ma tica lly; a par ticu larl y c hill in g mo me nt in The His
of heg em ony ing wa rni ng to
ertu l Ath eni ans give the foll ow
Peloponnesian Wtzr is wh en the all- pow r righ t, as the wo rld
e you kno w :is w ell as we do cha
rhe mu ch wea ker Me lian s: 's inc
ng do wh at the y can
s, is onl y in que stio n ber wee n equ als in pow er, whi le the stro
goe
er 17).
inu sr' (Th ucy did es 1950: Ch apt
and the wea k suf fer wh at rhe y ger ma ne to rhe
not ion of heg em on y-h ard mil itar y pow er- is esp ecia lly
Th is tem por ary
n and role of rhe US in wo rld pol icie s: the bed roc k of con
cur ren t pos itio es. In abs olu te
erio rity of its mil itar y cap abi liti
US pow er lies in rhe ove rwh elm ing sup
32
South Aszan Survey 15, 1 (2008): 5-
 8/RAJE SH RAJAGO PALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

-
poinr on the plane t
terms, the US today has military capabilities that can reach any
while its own forces
accurately, lethally and in real time, thereby crippling the adversary
nt dangers of war. In
are sheltered to the maximum extent possible from the inhere
on the plane t today
relative terms, and therefore more importantly, no other power
1, we comp are
can remotely match the capabilities that the US possesses. In Figure
the next 16 high-
US military spending in 2006 with chat of the rest of the world;
on its military, are
spending countries, each of which spent at least US$ 10 billion
military capability
listed separately. As can be seen, in 2006 the US spent more on its
435.0 billion); in
(US$ 528.7 billion) than the next 16 powers combined (US$
spend ing rhat year
fact, the US accounted for 46 per cent of coral world military
Brazil, the other 12
(SlPRl 2007a). Significantly, apart from China, Russia, India and
of rhe US.
states on the 2006 military high-spending list are all military allies
FIGURE I

A,mua l Defence Expenditure, 2006

!El All the rest

700
ffi Turkey
~ Israel
600
O Spain
~ Brazil
500 []] Canada
~ Australia
tA
V) 400 ~ South Korea
::i
.....
::; ~ I11Jia
,,
C
0 300 ~ Saudi Arabia

C!'i Ii!) Italy

200 881 Russia

~ Germany

El Japan
100
§ China
~ France
0
[] UK
Rest of the World PPP Perspective
0 USA

Sources: SIPRI 2007a; SIPRI 20076 for data on Turkey

and Israel.

sed in Purch asing

When _the militar y expen diture of rhe orher countr ies is expres.
Power Pamy (PPP) term h b h
. . s, t e gap erween t e US and rhe rest, while no longer quire
d eless h Ch· I d" .
so aunnng .
, is neverrh uge . ma, n Ia, Russia, UK, France and Saudi Arabia -
h h ·1· . .
t e nexr six countr ies on r e mi Itary spendi ng !1st- togeth er spent US$ 519.8 billion
in PPP .
into US milita ry
__termhs, margin ally less than the US$ 528.7 billion chat went
b 1
capa I tty t at year (SIPRI 2007a ).

South Asian 51,rvey J5, J (2008): 5 32

. ' . ,-
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COLLEGE & K.M.C &"HANSRAJ COLLEGE MOBILE: 8130462424
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India and the Great Poivers/9

.o imponanc co underline rhar a large chunk of rhe US defence budget goes

my technology (see Figme 2). An analysis of ,he US Na<ional l ncome and
P<c . .~ccoun<S (NIPA) estima<es fot 2008 show tha< 40 pc< cent of US mih<aty
sp• s (a huge US$ 248.6 billion out of wrnl defence consumption e,pendirnm of
US> b 17. 2 billion) is cu nen dy going in w op«a<inns and main «nance, which is not
sucpcising given tha< ,he US is embwikd in e,pensi,e wm in l<aq and Afgh,nis<'n.
Wha< is sucprising is tha< e,en in, time of wa< <he US IS ,bk w spend 18 P" cem of
i,s milirnry budge< on weapons pwcucemem (US$ 110.8 billion), with ,no<h« 11 pee
cem (US$ 69.6 billion) ,lloca«d w rnilimy ,esea«h, developmentJes<ing ,nd M iu·
a,ion. Wi rh nea dy 30 pc< cem of i" defen ce expend irn ce going w mili ta<Y «ch nology,
we e,n see tha< US milita<Y dominance is based nm jus< on high« rnilimy spending,
but on , qualiwiv, gap, ,heceby «wing, «chnologie,I chasm tha< no mhe< pow«

can ar present conceivably spa n.

F1cuR£ 2
US Nntio11nl Defence Co11s11111ptio11 Expmdi111res, 2 008 Es1i111ntes

Others US$ R&D. 1es1 :1 n<l

29.2 bn, 5% evalua11o n
Nuclear US$ 69.6 bn,
weapons 11%
US$ 23.3 bn,
4%
Mi\11ary
personnel
Arms \ IS~ 13'i 7 hn ,
pwcurcmcnl 22%
US$ll0Sb11,
}8%

Operauons :inJ . ' .

ma1nccnancc ) ~. ~ ~· : :,''·
_,. ,... . .. ... '
US$ 248.6 bn,
40%

Source: Roy •a nd Cairns 2007.

US miliracy capabilities ate burrresse<l by rhe siu, diversity and dynamism of its
economy. Self-evidently, rhe US is present in aH parts of rhe wmld, in all sectors of
rhe world economy and in all ateas of technology. Thete is nor a single secror of rhe
world economy in which an Ametican firm does nor fearure in rhe 'rop three' rLSr. With
a US$ I 3.2 trill ion economy, the US share of rhe world economy was an enormous
26 pet cent in 2007 (Figure 3). Even in PPP rerms (see Figure 4), rhe US share of
rhe worl d economy in 2007 was 20 pet cenr, which is exrremely large. The US also
accounts for 15 pet cenr orworld rrade, if iwa-European Union rrade is included in

world trade data. ·

South Asian Survey 15, 1 (2008): 5-32

,2oa&2424,9n~
 l r

10/RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

FIGURE 3
Gross Domestic Product 2006
------.
00 USA
[B Euro Zone

l?J Japan
:-
.:-..... ·. ~
' ... l!J China
··i· § UK
.... ,:_;.,r.

-~v. "'?, m Canada

' v· ~ Brazil
El Russia
~ India
B Or hers

Source: World Bank 2007a.

I •
FIGURE 4
Gross Domestic Product 2006
Puchasing Power Parity
-----~
00 USA
eil China
D Euro Zone·
~ India
Q jJpan
§ UK
~ Brazil
l:;;l Russia
m CanaJa
B Orhcrs

Source: World Bank 20076.

The global economic presence of the US is suggestive of a second sense of hegemony:

the provision of global public goods. The liberal international economist Charles P.
Kindleberger (I 973: 291-308) first put forward rhe idea that a hegemon or dominant
power was essential for the creation and existence of an· open liberal world economy.
The hegemon muse possess, according ro Kindleberger, both the abiliry and the desire
to establish certain norms for order and must thereby sustain the global structure. In
the -context of the world economy, the best example of a global public good are Sea
Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), rhe sea routes commonly used by merchant ships.
Free rrade in an open world economy would nor be possible "'.'irhour open SLOCs.
Ir is the naval power of the hegemon that underwrites the law of the sea by ensuring
freedom of navigation in international waters. Since the decline of British naval power

5011th Asinn S11rvry 15, 1 (2008): 5-32

~ XEROX CENTER HINDU COUEGE & K.M.C &. HANSRAJ 'COLLEGE NJOBl~E: 8130462424,111._,
rt : ·
 -:-:-,

wers/ 11
In dia an d the Great Po

ce an ic US Navy.
ch is rol e ha s be en pla ye d by rhe mulci -o
ar,
afr er th e Se co nd W or
ld W ln re rn et. Al rh ou gh ir
ex am pl e of a glo bal pu bl ic go od is th e
Yee an ot he r co nt em po
ra ry , we sh ou ld
l wo rld of th e W or ld \X'ide W eb possible
JS se en to da y as
m ak in g th e vir tua rch pr oje ct char
th e dir ec t ou tco me of a US mi lit ar y resea
te rn et is t relies on a global
no t for_get th at rh e In 95 ). Ev en today, rhe In ter ne
on d an d Ba res 19
be ga n m 1950 (D ia m are ow ne d by th e US
Go ve rn me nt .
es , m os t of wh ich tio n rhac
ne rw or k of sa tel lit uf ac tu re d co ns en t', 3 wh ich is th e no
ge mo ny is 'm an
A th ird m ea ni ng of he al resources to
no r on ly mi lit ary po we r bur als o ide olo gic
pl oy s ha vi ou r of rhe weaker
a do m in an t po we r de an d lesser po we rs. Th e be
ou r of co mp eti ng l country,
str uc tu re th e be ha vi fav ou r th e int ere sts of th e mo st po we rfu
d in wa ys rh at
co un cn es is in flu en ce r of th e work of
ma in pr e-e mi ne nt. Th is in sig ht Aows ou
e co re of th e
in pa rti cu lar ics de sir Gr am sc i, wh o arg ue d char rhe ascen da nc y
eo ris e An to ni o em phasised
th e lta lia n po lit ica l th on ly in irs ec on om i c do m in ance, as
ss is ro ot ed no t
pr op er ty-o wn in g cla larly ideological
bu t als o in rhe so cia l, po lit ica l an d pa rti cu
aly sis , es ha nd -in -h an d wi th,
in classicaJ M ar xi st an Co ns en t, in ot he r wo rd s, go
91 , I 99 6, 20 07 ). in an ce of che
sp he res (G ra ms ci 19 erc ion . Un su rp ris ing ly, rh e pr ed om
ec tiv e th an , co
an d is of ten m or e eff on om ic prowess,
se d no r on ly on irs mi lit ar y po we r an d ec
y is ba 'dre:im
US in che wo rld to da en tie th ce nt ur y Am er ica na is th e ul tim ate
l pr es en ce . Tw cti ve , an d
bu r also on its cu ltu ra y ro im bi be , ir tru ly is th e mo st se du j
::-
;-~
~:
t ho ld of, an d eas
ma ch in e'; ea sy to ge s att rib ur e 'so ft
ph Ny e has ca lle d thi
X
ltu re on ea rth . Jo se ;1
rfu l, cu
he nc e th e m os t po we (N ye 20 04 ).
ty to pe rsu ad e ra th er th an co er ce glo ba l co n-
po we r': th e ab ili
r~ e the me . Th ey have lo ng ar gu ed rh at
ria tio n on ar rh er e is no su ch
Realises su gg es t a va str on g. E. H . Ca rr ar gu ed ch
th e in ter es ts of th e
se ns us us ua lly m as ks \'<la lrz ha s puirnc:J
es t (C ar r 19 64 ); mo re recently, Kc:nnc:tl1
in ter an ce
th in g as hai m on y of pl y a wa y fo r th e US to ,1ssen irs do m in
of de mo cr ac y was sim ati ve an d
ou r char· pr om ot io n t fu rth er, Re ali sts sec m uc h of rh e no rm
in g rh ,s ch ou gh ni fe sta tio ns
(W a ltz 1991 ). Ex te nd ch e in ter na tio na l co m m un ity as ma
re s char su rro un d·
in sri ru rio na l str uc tu e di str ib ut io n
r sta tes in th e sy ste m, 'a re fle cti on of th
str on ge th e gr ea t po we rs'
of rh e in ter es ts of rh e e se lf- in ter es ted ca lcu lat io ns of
' ba se d 'on th
of po we r in che wo rld e of Gr am sc ians,
vie ws of th e Re al is rs th us are si mi la r to chos
7) . Th e 'co ns en su s ma nu -
(M ea rs he im er ] 994: e in di sc us sin g thi s pr oc es s of
sp en t ve ry lir rle rim
th ou gh Re ali sts ha ve ian an aly sis .
an d bu tte r of Gr am sc of ba la nc e of po we r,
fa ctu rin g', rh e br ea d mo ny ? Gi ve n th e log i c
us ab ou t he ge
W ha t do es hi sto ry tea
ch sim pl e
in in ter na tio na l af fa hs . Th is is fo r a ve ry
un us ua l co nd iti on se cu rit y
he ge m on y is a ra th er m en t, ev er y sta re m us t en su re irs ow n
e of wo rld go ve rn po we r
rea so n: in rh e ab se nc iva l. Th us , sta res ar e ac ut ely aw ar e of
sta nc es , its ow n su rv
an d, in ex rre me ci rc um rm al ly all ow a sin gle
io na l po lit ica l sy ste m, an d wo ul d no t no
te rn at
di srr ib ur io n in rh e in po se a m or ta l th re at ro
or he r ~rares.
ci en tly po we rfu l to
is am pl y
scare to be co m e su ffi na tio na l po lit ics , as ou tli ne d ab ov e,
r l~ gi c of in ter ve rei gn
Th e ba lan ce of po we ga rd I 64 8 as th e ye ar in wh ic h rh e so
re
. By co nv en tio n, we re e an d
su pp or te d by hi sto ry ac to r in wo rld po lit ics . In th e ov er th
4

ge d as th e pr in cip al en a sin gl e
ter rit or ial sta te em er en on ly tw o pr ev io us oc ca sio ns wh
rh en , th er e ha ve be
a ha lf ce nt ur ies sin ce
1 (2008): 5- 32
South Asian Survry 15,
 12/RAJESH R,\JAG OPALA N AND v,\RUN SAHN I

to a sim ilar degree as 1he US

srare succeedeJ in gaini ng preponderance in the sysrem
to 1713 in the contexr of European
predominates the system today. France from 1660
Britain w1th JtS global maritime
continental politics is the fi rst instance of hegemony,
.
empire from 1860 to 1910 is rhe second {Layne 1993)
t, hegem ony seems fo rmidable, ir
History also suggests chat although ar irs heigh
r politics over rime reduces che
does not last forever. To rhe contrary, balance of powe
Louis XIV was unchallenged;
relauve powe r of che hegemon. In 1660, France under
were co nres rmg French powe r.
by 17 13, England, Habsburg Austria and RuSSJa
Britanni ca looked secu re fo rever.
In 1860, rhe high noon of rhe Victoria n period, Pax
US had emerged as con rende rs
By 1910 , 1t was clear char Germany, Japan and the
now, anoth er great power, most
to British power (Layne 1993). T hus 20 years from
rs includmg China , rhe Europ ean
probably China, or may be a coal1r ion of grea t powe
US ca pabilities are declin ing in
Union, Brazil and India, could well emerge jusr as
are poor guides ro prediction be-
relauve terms. On rhe other hand, histor y and theory
onic order might lase. Am erica n
cause rhey provide lirde ro indicare how long a hegem
anticipated .
hegemony could, in acrual fac t, last a lot longer than

III STRATEGISING STRUC TURAL LY

the major powers. One is co

There are rwo ways of lookrng at India's relations wirh
ral pol1t1cs, as being determined
look at chese relations from rhe perspewve of bilate
invescmcnr each side is willing
by common inrerescs and rhe result of rhe efforr and
with rhe major powers were co
ro devote to char relarionsh1p.s If the srare of relations
arrempr ro find such are.is of
be solely derermrn ed by rhese focrors, we should rhen
to develop rhese rel:rnons. This h
common inreresrs w1ch chese powers and work hard
power~. rlllS 1s also rhe premise
rhe premise of New Delhi's policies towards rhc ma1or
the maior powers Tht• dlon w
of much writing on India's bilateral relations with
US India nucle.1r de.ti, .ind thc-
build a 'natural alliance' w1d1 the US 1ncludrng the
and rhc or her 111,1jor powers
efforr to promote closer economic rclauons wirh China
are good exemplars of rhis tendency (Mohan 2006)
1n determining rhe qu:ilicy
Bur common inrcrc.m should not be rhc starung pomr
non 1ntnrns .uc thernsdvcs deter-
of our relarions with rhe major powers. Rather, w111r
sy~trn1.c.·n1e.· lOrJCt :I quemon co
mined by the structure of power 1n the 111tcrnatwnal
'I low co build common interests
ask of India's relations with the major powers is not
on inrerrsts givrn a particular
wirh a ma1or power?' but rather 'What are India's comm
Trying ro build common interests
configuracion of powc:r in rhc: inrc:rnational system?'
ng configuration of power would
in a manner rhar ignores rhe impc:rnrivc:~ of the existi
rous. A good example is India's
be at the least furile and in extremes, potentially dange
diate aftermath of independence
attempt to build a united from wi1h China in the imme
anti-colonial resmance, agnonng
based on a shared history and perceived interesc in
compermon rarher rhan
the possibility that the balance of power m Assa suggested
cooperation between New Delhi and Peking (now
BeiJing). Though not all effons

S.tb Asuin S"rw, 15, I (2008)

 India and the Great Powers/ l 3

ld be fruit ful ro exam ine whar-srrareoic

have ro end as disas trous ly as rhar one, ir wou "'
patte rn of pow er relations.
possibilities are avail able with in a parti cula r
rime, rhe naru re of the grea t pow er
In the inrer nario nal syste m, ar any poin t in
s, inclu ding rhat of the grea t powers.
system frames the strat egic choi ces of all state
ly impo rtant for weak er srates in rhe
But the type of grea t pow er syste m is parti cular
marg in for error is so muc h lesser.
7
inter natio nal syste m such as Indi a, beca use their
rhis struc ture was char acter ised eithe r
Thro ugho ut the hisro ry of inrer srare relat ions,
('uni polar iry' or hege mon y) or a roug h
by the dom inan ce of a singl e grea t pow er
rs (mul ripol arity ). For brief perio ds, as
parit y betw een more than rwo majo r powe
m was dom inate d by two grea t powe rs.
durin g the Cold War, rhe inter natio nal sysre
nor deter mine the strat egic and forei gn
Such conf igura tions of grea t pow er polit ics do
rhe men u of polic y choi ces rhar rhey can
policy choi ces char stares mak e, bur it limits
8
prud ently rake.
been and will be fram ed by the natu re
India's rel ation s wirh rh e majo r pow ers have
it is not jusr rh e amo unt of effor t New
of the inter natio nal syste m. Put an o ther way,
ajor powers th at will d eterm ine the state
Delh i purs on bila teral relations with rhe m
factor. The state of lndi a's relat ions with
of these relat ions, th o ugh chat coul d be one
rh e natu re of th e dist ribu tio n of pow er in
th e majo r pow ers wi ll also be dete rmin ed by
to exa mine rhese intern ation al syste mic
rhe inter nati o nal syste m. We need , there fore,
issues that anim ate Indi a's relat ions with
impe ratives firs t befo re discu ssing the spec ific
g to bui ld natu ral al liances, we n eed ro
som e of th e majo r powe rs. Befo re attem ptin
·
ask who India's pote ntial natu ral allies are.
the glob al bala nce of pow er a nd rhe
Thus, our focu s shou lJ be on the state of
rise ro. The natu re of th ese sys tem s
naw re of the inter natio nal syste m that it gives
strat egic polic y choi ces of th e sca res in
exerr s a certa in amo unt of influ ence on the
rnati onal syste mic) press u res o n natio nal
th at particu lar syste m . Exam inin g such (inte
relat ions is d iffere nt fro m exam inin g rhe
p olicies and on the outc ome s of inter -stat e
ies of the regio nal actor s.~
fo reign polic ies of the grea t pow ers or the polic
nal polit ical syste m o n polic y is easil y
The impo rran ce of the effec t of the inter natio
r are diffe rent in a h ege m o ni c worl d as
illus trate d. The impe rativ es of stare beha viou
one.
com pared to a bipo lar one or a mulr ipol ar
pow ers o( roug hly equ al stren gth- no
A mult ipo hr wor ld is popu lated by man y
syste m . In such a n inter nati on al syste m,
one or rwo p owe rs d o min ate the inte rnat io nal
th e three or mor e pow ers in the syste m
the poss ibilit y of shift in g affia n ces b erwe en
and th e ally will be. This lead s ro loos e
prev enrs clari ty abou t who th e adve rsary
ys susp ect, whe re defe ction is a cons tant
alliances, whe re the loya lty of allies are alwa
rsari es tomo rrow . The poss ibili ty of such
threa t and whe re allie s tod ay mig ht be adve
b etween th e powers, increasin g inse curi ty
shift ing allia n ces 1ead s to cons ta nt ren•s ion
s
ase the strat egic choi ces rhat wea ker state
for all. Bur a mulr ipol ar sys tem will incre
ber of grea t pow e rs in the syst em, whic h
such as Indi a will have . The re will b e a num
partn ersh ips. On rhe orhe r hand , such a
wou ld perm it grea ter choi ces in srrar egic

Sout h A sian Survey 15, 1 (2 008): 5-32

 1 4/R.AJES H RAJAGOPALJ\N AND VARUN SAHNI

system would also in c rease instability and enhance the possibilicy of a wider, sysrem-
wide conflict char can drag in uns uspecting weak powers. The chaos of such a sysrem
would present great oppo rcunicies fo r weaker states such as India, bur char chaos will

also bring great dangers.

In bipolarity, by contrast, rhe management of global conflic t is fa r easier because
the re are only rwo do m ina n t powers (Waltz 1964). Because rhese rwo p owe rs are far
more powerful th a n an y ocher power, only [hey can threaten each o ch er. None of [he
och e r powers in th e system pose a significant threat to rhe polar powers. Moreover,
because of their d o m in ance over all o[hers, allies are less important and rhe shifting
of th eir allegia nces less catastrophic ro [he global balance. Nevertheless, th e two polar
powers compete fo r such allies, with regional conflicts frequently arising o ur of [heir
compe tirion . On rhe ocher hand, such cnses are unlikely to resulr in sysrem ic war,
rhus making b ipolari ty rela tively more stable than mulripolarity.
W hat are rh e co nseq uences_of bipolarity for weaker states~ In a bipo lar o rd er, rhe
rwo polar powers a re likely to find themselves on the opposite side of every region al
co nflict because even regio nal co n fl icts with local causes are seen as h aving larger
glo bal consequen ces. Th e loss of a Vietn am or an Afghanis tan , bo th wea k sca res chat
wo uld have added lirrl e w rhe o ve rall strength of either th e US o r th e Soviet Union,
were nevercheless seen as criti cal w rhe face of the Cold Wa r. But bipolarity also has
its advantages for weaker sta res: allian ces in a bipo lar system are likely to be more so lid
and lo n.ge r-lasring th an rhose in a m ultipolar world , and there is less fear of shifty allies
and shi fting alliances. When alli es do shift their allegiances, as happened in the Horn of
Africa, new allia nces are immediarely formed with the old adversaries. Bur such shifts
have been relarively rare. ln essen ce, bipo larity en co urages long-las ting alliances and
srabl e rela ri o ns, wh ile provid in g a modicum of auwnomy for weaker states because
rhey rend ro be pa m pered by the ir great power patron .
A hegem o ni c wo rl d, as we have already see n , is an unusual a nd ra re sys tem and its
consequences are sci II be in g debated. T he do min ance of a single power ca n ensure peace
(though this will be a peace o n terms acceptable to th e so le power), but this will be an
unsatisfactory peace fo r many of the other major powers in th e sys tem . H owever benign
the sol e polar power is, its do min ance will cause a ce rtain am o unt of dissa tisfac tion
1
which can lead o th er powers ro chall enge th e do mi na nce of th e hege m o ni c power. ~
But, on che ocher h and , oth er powers will also fa ce contradi c tory pulls: th ere will be
'.nce~tives to make peace o r ' bandwagon' with th e so le pola r power, if only because
It might be futile ro resist, but there will also be in centives co join ocher dissatisfied
states to try to balance th e polar power.
. _Hege~ony is nor friendly rowards weaker stares in rhe internation al sysrem. Em-
pmcal evidence irself is strong: che frequent hopes among middle and weaker states
~~er che _lase decade char a multi polar world could be fashioned even with in rhe current
mterna~ional system reAecc borh a certain amount of naivete {because polarity is
derern:u ned by the distribution of power, which cannot be created artificially) and a

South Asian Survey J5, 1 (2008): 5-32

 !

India nnd the Great Powers/ 15

considerable amount of disrress at the loss of ch . I . -

structure. J J The reasons are not diffi I deu re at1ve autonomy under the bipolar
.h h h . cu t to un erstand. In heoemony bandwago .
wn t e egemornc P b h o , rnng
national s stem Th ower ecomes r e preferred strategy for most stares in the inrer-
ll h yh . I e pola~ power thus faces a veritable feasr of alliance choices, while
a or ers . ave
h . on y a solitary oP ti on-r h e po Iar power. Thus, for most counrries
preservin°
Chi Fb r · h ,v,
e1r relat·io~s h.ip wit was h.mgton trumps all other imperarives. Russia,'
nda, ran_ce and India have all occasionally talked of rhe need for a multipolar
wor I . Talk 1s cheap , and to create mu Inpo · lanry,
· It. 1s
. also useless. Prudently none of
them let such talk clic~ate _policy, which stays firmly in lock-srep with the Wa:hingron
~andwagon. If defernon 1s futile, opposition is foolish . As Saddam Hussein learned,
1f you want to fi _o0 ht Wash·
. rn gron ·JO t h ese tJines,
· you w1·11 d o 1t
· alone. Others might
make symparheric noises from the sidelines about rhe injusri ce of it all bur they will
do so qu ietly, while ke eping their hands firmly in their pockets.
. \Y/e ~ave seen th at hegem ony will not las t; intern ational sysrems never do. Changes
rn relative power are inevitable, and as rh ey change so will che current sysrem. Bue such
changes cypi cal ly are slow because the basis of rhe change in power eguations- rhe
economi c and mil itary capability of stares-rakes ti me. Moreover, ch e US is so far
ahead of all ochers coday char the poss ibil ity of one or· more major powers catching
up with ch e US in the near future seems relatively remo te.

BAN DWAGONJNG WITH WASHINGTON

For all co untries of the world, their most important relationship is the one chat rh ey
have wi ch che hegemonic power. Afcer the collapse of Soviet power, New De lhi was
qui ck ro rea lise rhe importance of rhe US and did manage to change tracks to emphas ise
ties with rh e US over all the: other major powers. Although the relar ions did show
m ark ed im provement, there remain clear limits to the possibilities of th e rebrionship .
The cleares t limitation is char India needs the US much more than the US needs India .
Th ere is no rh ing peculiar or unique about this; it describes as well rh e relations of
most co untr ies wirh rhe US. Jndo-US relations cannot improve simpl y because rhey
are 'natural alli es'; that would be a rare beast in inrernarional poliri cs. Nevenheless , in
a hegemonic world India has lirrle choice but co seek closer ties with rh e US, fighring
ochers seeking a sea t on rhe same bandwagon.

BALr\NCING BEIJIN G

Given both China's power and rhe strategic culture-its 'para bell um paradigm' Qohnscon
1995: 30)-thar will direct char power, India's primary scrategic concern should be rn
balance. China. Chinese realism assumes an imprude·nr view of possible adversaries,
and there is little indication that _C hina's view of India has changed since rhe 1950s.
Bur balancing China is a process rhat is delicately done. India's nuclear arsenal gives it
a certain baseline power capability rhac China cannot afford to overlook; New Delhi

South J15ian Survey 15, 1 (2008): 5- 32

.. I

J6/RAJESH R.-1.JAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

should therefore be confident of handling irs securiry concerns regarding China ar

rhe military level. Ar rhe larger scraregic level, New Delhi needs co continue focusing
on improving irs economic power, which is rhe root of national power, and resolving
old border disputes with China. Bur New Delhi also needs ro pay greater anenrion
to porenrial allies such as Russia, Japan, Vietnam and South Korea co balance China.
Japan, in particular, is being driven by Chinese behaviour into revisiting its strategic
posture. India has much to gain 1f such a process were ro bear fruit.
In shorr, the nature of rhe incernarional system is important because it shapes rhe
strategic choices of states. Ir would be unnecessary to bandwagon wirh a great power
in a bipolar world; it would be futile, foolish and even dangerous to attempt balancing
the hegemonic power in a hegemonic world. In che current system, rhe preceding dis-
cussion suggests the sense of attempting to bandwagon with rhe hegemonic power;
it also points co the practical difficulty of doing chis when all ocher powers are also
competing to do so.
12
fV AsIAN BALANCES AND AACHITECTURES

If the nature of che international sysccm is important for India, so too is che nature of
the regi~nal_ sub-s'.stem i~ ,which. India is located. The regional sub-system provides
the ~emng m "."h1ch Ind1as relauons with the US and China will play themselves
out In the _coming year~. As India's capabilities increase over time, its region will also
I · to include
expand - • h I n d.1as'
a large part of the Asia-Pacific. This has everythinot> co do w1c
~e anons wit~ the US ~nd China: while China is rhe :irchetypal Asi:rn powe·r, the US
1s the pre-em inent P:ic1fic power.
A ·Till rece ntly, observers . and policy makers alike have rather ' f:ac·1lel y regar ded Sout h
fi s1aRor, ·evenI Cmore spec1fically,
· the territorial expanse of the So ut h Asian. Assoc1.anon.
orh heg10na I d. ' ooperar1on
. (SAARC), as India's region . I-1 owever, we now need co ask
w et 1er n ias region. remains . limited to Sou th As1a, . or h as .It expanded co include ,
l-cu ltural-strateg1c enti ty)· In pan1cu . Iar .1s Ch.. .
I d. ' arger· geograph1cal-h1storica
some - • ma rn
n ias reg10n, or 1s It ex tra- region al? '
· Forch·India,· the location of China (regional or extra-regional)) · .is nor an abstract q
non.
N I ma IS a country against
. . which I d' h r h
n ia as roug c-and lose . 196ues-
ear y half a million Indian soldiers are de lo d I . ' -a war m 2.
northern border with China Ind· 1· p yek on nd1 as long and long-disputed
· ian po icy ma ers have repea di d
concern about nuclear and missile cooperation . . between C h· red pyk.expresse their
1ast three decades, China has b ·1 1· . rna an a isran. Over the
.' u1 r strong po meal and ec . r k .
oflnd1as neighbours in South Asia Wh"I1 I d. h c . onom1c In s with nearly all
·· • '· e n 1a as rail ed to r •b
v1s1on and mvesc heavily in ic Ch. h k . present a reas1 le regional
, , ma as wor ed 111 a · d :
co create an alternate incencive struct c I d. ' sys_remar1c an piecemeal manner
I b C ure ror n ias ne1ghbo .
resu r, y hinese design and I d. d r I unng countries. The net
· I fi n Ian e1au r has bee · I d
reg1ona ramework that has large! b d .' n to ue n ia -down within a
. y een etnmenral to its interests and am b..u10ns.

South Asian Siirvey 15, 1 (2008): 5--32

I .,JllEEPJmROK ~NTCD ....: ..... ___ ;_ . 1

 wers/ l 7
India an d the Great Po
which
So ur h As ia, a re gi on al frame of reference in
un de rc ur
In di a is no w rry in g ro on ly fro m its m os t im po rra nr ne ig hb
ou rs,
bb or n ho sri lit y no t
it h~s en co un te re d stu tra ted
m so m e of its sm aHer neighbours. Fr us
es h, bur also fro ARC
Pa ki sta n an d Ba ng lad di a is no w se ek in g to break our of th e SA
re ss in SA AR C, In ten de d
wi th th e la ck of pr og or k fo r its elf . Th e no tio n of an 'ex
ne w regional fra m ew
re gi on an d in ve nt a s rherefore be co me
clu de s Ce nt ra l As ia an d So ut he as t Asia ha
in
ne ig hb ou rh oo d' rh ar
's re gi on al policy.
13
rta nt as pe ct of In dia enral conrexrs.
an im po fa cr or an d pl ay er in conrin
nn in g ro em er ge as a
FinaHy, In di a is be gi e th at will have
a co nt in en t-w id e se cu rit y in re rd ep en de nc
cr ea tin g rd to signal to
Th e rise of Ch in a is Ch in a is, of co ur se , wo rk in g ha
on In di an po lic y.
an in ev ita bl e im pa ct on rhe ro ad to
'pe ac ef ul ', rh e od ys se y of a large co un try
rise is Online 2004;
its ne ig hb ou rs char irs rc h of a ris ing po we r (People's Daily
an rhe on wa rd ma
de ve lo pm en t ra th er th e is no r rhe
d in co nv in ci ng its ne ig hb ou rs that its ris
Ch in a su cc ee sun? M an y
Zh en g 20 05 ). W ou ld in e Ge rm an y se ek in g irs place in the
version of W ilh el m
rw en ty -fi rsr ce nt ur y g: Eu ro pe 's
co m pa rin g Ch in a wi th Ge rm an y is wr on
gu in g th at est rh ar rhe
As ian sc ho la rs ar e ar 03 ; M ah bu ba ni 2006). H Th ey sugg co -::·.··'
s fu tu re (K an g 20
pa st will no r be Asia' to a pr e- m od er n
and pr e- Eu ro pe an C
.-,-
di ca te re ve rsi on
merely in Ch in a th at .... - j--
rise of Ch in a wo ul d ch y an d tri bu ta ry re lat io ns hi p wi th
no tio ns of hi er ar
As ian or de r ba se d on rs ta nd .
in sti nc tiv el y recognise an d un de de ep historical q
as se rti on . Th er e is no
s (j
all As ian tab le
1 ·. . . . .

ecrive, th is is a :C on res - . C, .:· '

Fr om an In di an persp in te ra ct io n ,~:. (· ~~~

in In. dia : th e Hi m al ay as en su re d th at .-, ·':"-

as ce nd an ce ly lim ite d
m em or y of Ch in es e ly- sp ars e ac ro ss th e ce nr ur ies an d large
In di a was rel ari ve ' 5 Pr im iti ve
be rw ee n Ch in a an d dd hi st pi lg rim s al on g rhe Silk Route.
va ns an d iti ne ra nr Bu
to m er ch an t ca ra as, no r di d
rm it fo rce pr oj ec tio n across th e Hi m alay !.
di d nor pe es . Th e first
m ili ta ry te ~h no lo gy ns hi p ex ist be tw ee n rhe rwo co un tri
e a tri bu tar y re lat io .. j

an yt hi ng re m ot el y lik st- co lo ni al u
d In di a as sta re s wa s in th e im m ed iat e po
n Ch in a an re ce nt ly sov-
real en co un te r be tw ee d (e sp ec ial ly in th e c::ise of India)
re large, we ak an Asia by
pe rio d, w he n bo rh we a re gi on , In di a an d C hi na -a n d all of
co nr in en r be co m es po we r
er eig n. As rh e As ia n te d to th e sa m e lo gi c an d dy na m ics of
likely to be su bj ec
ex te ns io n- ar e no w fo r a m uc h lo ng er rime
span .
ed Eu ro pe an hi sto ry
chat ha ve ch ar ac te ris to th e se cu rit y
es se s in Eu ro pe an hi sto ry th at are relevant
or proc re e se cu rit y
Are th er e an y ev en ts er n Eu ro pe suggests th at th
sto ry of m od
ia? Th e hi
of co nt em po ra ry As
sa ge d for Asia:
fu tu re s could be en vi
of th e
an d ba lan ce s, sp rin gi ng ou t of rhe lo gi c
1. Asia as a re gi on
of op po sin g axes
(1648);
Peace of W es rp ha lia of gr ea t po we rs, a la
rhe Co nc er t of
m an ag ed by a dir ec 1o ire
2. As ia as a re gi on "4-15); or
er ge d fro m rh e Co ng re ss of V ie nn a (181
ar em
Eu ro pe (1 81 4- 48 ) ch iv e se cu rit :y -a rra ng em en t su
ch as th e
in a co op er at
en m es he d er ge d
3. Asia as a re gi on er at io n in Eu ro pe (O SC E) rh ar em
cu rit y _and Co op
Or ga ni sa tio n for Se
ocess (] 97 3- 75 ).
ou r of rh e He lsi nk i pr

l (2 00 8) : 5- 32
South As ia n Survey l 5,
 18/RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

There are plenty of reasons ro expecc that a balance of power in Asia will emerge
over che next decade and a half. Currencly, it is the poliricaJ logic of realism, wah ics
power balances and securicy dilemmas, which is driving incer-srace policies in mosr
pares of Asia. Two opposing axes of power in Asia would emerge, obviously, from
American acrempts co contain the rise and consolidation of Chinese power. We can
also be reasonably certain about New Delhi's policy preferences regarding a possible
Washingrnn-Bei jing bipolaricy in the future. India will not be drawn into che con-
tainment of China, at lease openly. The principal reason is that India is roo large co
be a member of America's security communiry. Also, it's a security community rhac
has nor considered India's security interests as its own interests. Bue India will nor be-
come a parry co an Asian alliance against rhc west, for rhe simple reason rhar such an
axis would be led by China. India 1s unlikely co swap American global hegemony for
Chinese concinencal hegemony.
Thus, faced with Washmgcon-Beij1ng bipolarity, iris not difficult ro foresee a new
non-alignment for India. After all, India is good at fence si~ting. However, chis new
non-alignment would be much more difficulc for India co pull off for two reasons.
Firstly, one of the poles of the new bipolar order, China, would be a neighbour wirh
which India shares a huge and as yer unresolved border. Secondly, India will not be a
weak stare chis rime bur rather, like Chi na and rhe US, a sysrem shaping power in its
own right India would be coo big ro hide bur unwilling ro bandwagon with China
or ~~r involved in the American balancing game. C hoosing between Washingcon and
BeiJJng would also divide Indian public life internally, as we have recently seen in che
conrexr of rhe nuclear deal wirh rhe US. Thus, there are compelling reasons why .in
Asia of opposing axes and balances 1s go ing w be bad news for Ind ia
The second furure is char of a directo,re 1n Asia The cssenc1al norion in rh,~ sc ·
. f fi I d. . Cll,HIO
1s ~ a e_w ea •~g scares rogechcr raking respons1bd1ry for order .rnd subtliry in the
Asia-Pacific. For msrancc, a future Asia n 'scc.urity rrinicy' c.ould consist of ('f I 1·
dJ (W"l I, llll.l, lltll.l
~n apa~ 1s~n l 99 !). On ch~ face of_1t, the As1,rn directoire 1s an cminenclr sensible
idea
f . and n . mdeed have
docs . an 1mpress1ve hiscory. In parucu · I.,r, r fie e11tirmous m.bs
~f ;hmah India and _Russia has often mggered ~pcudauon .,bouc wh,H would h.ippcin
J t ese c ree councnes were ever ro au in l0nu:rr. 1cn1n for in,c llllc• I, l I l I
. 1923 h ' h ' · , · l n )\(':fVCl
;n d. Che_ at t e outcome of rhe struggle will he dccnmint"d hy clw f.1 C'1 rh.ir Rmsi l
n Ja, ma. •• account for rhc overwh<.:l · , · f h · •'
(Lenin 1923) S r. r. rnrn1, maior 11 YO c e popul.11ion of the globe'
· · evenry-nve years arrcr Lenin\ obsnv · , ,
~fRussia, India and China was proposed by Rmsia,:H11,:1;;;,:: ~r.'l!cgt,l ~1,111gl<'. u>nsisring
m 1998 co counterbalance rhc . .. .. 1111s1n it•vgeny Prnnakov
lflCr<.:.ISlllg ·1~St'r!IV . J 0 rt
Alliance (rediffcom 1998) A <l • t ,Ill! cns1ve North Adanuc
. · Seu Y sponsored by the US I)
m 2000 characterised Chm I d" dR , • cp.ut menr of Defence
. a, n •aan ussia rhela d
Eurasia', as the three 'Transit" S ' h ' • rgest an mosr important scares In
. d ton rates t ar were un I · c h'
a1me at creating the foundations fi . < crgomg rar reac mg transitions
or regional and even global power' (JNSS 2000).

Sou1hA11an S11r11ry 15, I (2008) 5-32

 India and the Great Powers/ 19

v, Li Zhaox ing and Narwar

In June 2005, a m eeting in Vladivostok betwe en Sergei Lavro
respectively, briefly revived
Singh , the Forei gn Mini sters of Russia, Chin a and lndia
ow-B eijing -New Delhi
conje cture of 'the three counr ries comb ining forces into a Mosc
axis' (Blagov 2005; Zygar 2005) .
a directoire in Asia. The
There are, however, three serious probl ems with the idea of
a gener al one. A directoire
first probl em , as m ani fes ted in the Co ncert of Europ e, is
does not reflect dynam ic
either 'freezes up' th e security archit ecrnre in a ma nn er that
gets dividea intern ally
chang es in capab ilities a nd interests over rime, o r altern ately
directoire is const ructe d
on rhe qu estion of change versus stabili ry. Secon d , if rhe Asian
C hina, an outco me that
minu s the US , it wo uld in effect be an ant i-U S axis led by
third probl em with the dir-
India woul d b e very h esitan t about . T here is, h owever, a
Sou th Asia. Small er states
ectoire, and chis flows ou r from l ndia's own exper ience in
~o re so than they were in
in rhis peri o d of worl d history are au tono m ous actors , m uch
m edi ate neigh bourh ood in
nineteenth cen tury Europ e. lnd ia's own exper ience in its im
graph ically, geogr aphic ally
Sou ch Asia bears ch is out. India is three rimes larger demo
comb ined. Whil e three-
and econo mically, than all of che other count ries in South Asia
or ninet eenth centu ry, it
ro-o ne super iority was overkill domi nance in rhe eight eenth
doesn 't am ount to all char much roday.
is an idea thar wo uld
Thus, the Asian directoire, altho ugh super ficial ly appea ling,
dange rous game of move s
be divisive and could well trigger off a futile and ultim ately
In other word s, o nly t he
and co unrer move s to set up count ervail ing allian ces in Asia.
colla psing inro a balan ce o f
most astute diplo macy could preve nt a directoire from
ire notio n that the re can b e
p ower syste m. We shoul d therefore probl emari se the ent
a directoire in rhe Asia-Pacific.
of a coope rative secur i ty
What 's rhe rhird furur e for Asia~ We can ;-ilso conce ive
of such an arran geme nt? Un-
arran gem ent in Asia. Whar would be rhe pros and cons
for India in the long ru n ,
like rhe firs t rwo scena rios, which could prove dang erous
intere sts. An 'Asian Helsi n k i
coop era tive secur ity in Asia would clearl y be in lndia 's
Asia, enme sh C h inese and
process' coul d poren rially reduc e the size of arsen als in
proce ss, lead to the evolu tion
Amer ican cap abil ities in Asia withi n a large r coope rative
coop erativ e behav io ur on the
of a new an d a uth ent ic Asian identi ty, build habit s of
ocrat isatio n' of C hina.
Asian conti nent and perha ps even play a role in the 'dem
to be easy, bur neith er w as
Cons truct ing ·an Asian Helsi nki proce ss is not goi n g
O rga nisati o n fo r Secur ity and
the origin al Helsi nki p rocess. W e often forge t that the
e end poin t o f a long- draw n,
Coop eratio n in Euro pe (OSC E) as it exists today is th
. T here is no reaso n to assum e
conte ntiou s and tortu o us process (Vo n Bredo w 200 1: 42)
ent in Asia is going to be any
that the const ructi on of a coope rative secur ity a rrang em
n in the Asia- Pacif ic (CSC AP)
easier. Unfo rtuna tely, the Coun cil for Secur ity C oope ratio
a Trac k 2 setup that has, with
is a pale shado w of its Euro pean coun terpa rt: it rema ins
offici al polic y in any coun try.
a few excep tions , not been able to shape and inAu ence

. South Asian Survey 15, 1 (2 008): 5-3 2

 20/RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

The East Asia Summit, even after the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and India,
is a flawed organisation because of the exclusion of the US (Malik 2005).
Clearly, there is a lot riding on a possible reconfiguration of Asia over rime in a
more cooperative structure. This process could unfold over a ren to 15 year rime hori-
zon. Since this would be rhe time period in which US capabilities would probably be
beginning co decline in relative terms, ir would therefore be an opportune moment
in which ro actually imagine rhe US also getting enmeshed in this new cooperative
security process. Likewise, an Asian Helsinki process coming into being would depend
crucially on China, which has the capacity to either make or break the process. While
there could be no Helsinki process on rhe Asian landmass without China, India
could play a very important role in signalling and nudging China in that direction.
Indeed, in rhe years ro come we may well find China well disposed towards an Asian
Helsinki process, particularly if ir emerges as rhe only alternative to bipolarity and
containment. Of one thing we can be certain: cooperative security will not emerge
in rhe Asia-Pacific without the-acquiescence, if nor rhe enthusiastic participation, of
both China and rhe US.
India, therefore, has the opportunity to play a historic role in shaping the future
of Asia. By building robust political and economic links with both China and the US,
India cpuld be the catalyst in bringing both countries together in a new cooperative
Asia. Indeed, there can be few diplomatic tasks more challenging and worthwhile
than ro begin the groundwork for the construction of a cooperative mechanism of
Asian s'ecurity. As Table I suggests, it is also in India's interest to do so: transcending
would be a more efficient and effective strategy for India than hiding, balancing or
bandwagoning. 16

TAB I F. I
!ndin's Options in Asin

·: ~· ' ,, \ 1\~; ~:~~,-;-.:-.._1. . ~~l.p':{;-' -

- :~ ~'. ~-..::r~~~: ~'-~ . ·. ~ 'c1 .
'
;. , •• ..-q --1•hd. 11,,, .. <·i_,1(J_t--~t~·-\. · · c, 1,!.h~·. I-<['.:- .. j ••• ' •

•; I ~ _. -c ,:; •

TRANSCENDING (Building ·, :·, -,, ·· ,- .- ,

cooperative security in Asia) ., , : ~ ' -,, •-- , , _
; '<"I.\: _-! ~ •I,_, ~~

Source: Adapted from Schroeder 1994.

V THE SIGNIFICANT OTHERS

There-are two other major powers, on both flanks of Asia, whose roles could be po-
r~nrially decisive in India's favour: Russia and Japan. Both are rrerriendously strong
bur face peculiar problems wirh the fungibility of their power; and imporranrly, India
shares no conflict with either. Mose imporranrly, both these powers share, or should,

South Asian Survey I 5, I (2008): 5-32

4
'PR4DEEP XERO)( CENTER HINDU COLLEGE & K.M.C & HANSRAJ COLLEGE IVIOBILE: 8130462424197114b132
 Im/ in and the Great Powers/21

· dJ - h
con cer n abo ut Ch ina 's rise and its con seq uen ces . Bo th R uss1a an apa n ave
lndia's . . . . . viewed with
ron es, and this lim ns the ir freedom con side rab ly. Jap an is
crou~led h1s Jap ane se em pire
era ble sus pic ion in all of Eas t Asia where the scars left by the
con sid the Sov iet em pire ,
yet hea l. Ma ny of the for me r republics tha t con stit ute d
have to
t me mo ries tha t seriously
ma ny of the for me r alli es of rha t empire, hav e unp lea san
and d.
m in its imm edi ate nei ghb our hoo
con stra in Mo sco w's elb ow roo

Ru ssu
an power. In
los ion of the Sov iet Un ion , Russia was und oub ted ly an Asr
Un ril the imp Eur ope an and No rch
yea rs, how eve r, Rus sia has bec om e increasingly focused on
rec ent the Rus sian eco nom y
anr ic dev elo pm ent s. Th e pilf erin g of an eno rmo us chu nk of
Atl ogr aph ic profile are
rap idly dec lini ng and agi ng dem
dur ing the Yeltsin yea rs and its 200 2:
dou bti ng Rus sia' s re-e mer gen ce on the Asian sce ne (Sti glit z
oth er rea son s for ing to regard
is et al. 200 3: 242 -53 ). Th e biggest factor in favour of con tinu t. ; -· r .
133 -65 ; Zon has an end uri ng imp act ~-.}

its arm s transfer policy, wh ich - ' '~.J

Russia as a key Asi an sta te is ly larg e arm s rransfers
eed , there have been som e real
on Asi an bal anc es of pow er. Ind ola rs on arm s rransfers
in Asia since 199 9. As two sch
from Russia ro var iou s reg ion s e deg ree of
e Rus sian arm s ind ust ry is still cha rac teri sed by an exr rem i.
have not ed, 'Th h of wh ich are pri ma rily the '• '
end enc e on exp orts , bot
ove r-ca pac ity and a stro ng dep in 199 2' (Skeins and
lt of the col lap se of dom est ic arm s pro cur em ent tha t beg an
resu ng und er Vla dim ir Put in:
er, the situation is slowly cha ngi
We ida che r 2002~ 35] ). Ho wev cur em ent ,
200 3 Rus sian def enc e bud get has a stro ng focus on arm s pro
'As in 200 2, the e 200 3: 269 ) .
we; ipo n :icq uis itio ns ;rnd milir;iry R& D' (M ilit my Hnlnnc
inc lud ing ry ind ust ry: milir:iry
eles s, arm s exp orts rem ain s a ma jor driver of Russian milir.1
Neverth sian ord er boo k ove r rhe
pon s in 200 2 wer e US $ 4.3 bill ion , and rhe v;i]ue of rhe Rus
ex ance 200 3: 27 1-7 2) . Of
che d $ I 6 billion (Military Bal
nex t five yea rs has alre ady rea of the Rus sia n arm s
ia acc oun t for a large pro por tion
the se, exp ort s to Ch ina and lnd t player.
e is obv iou sly ano the r area in wh ich Russia is a sig n ifi can
trade. Ene rgy rrad now is.
how eve r, sho w jus t how nar row Rus sian inf lue nce in Asia
The se exa mp les, ng spr ee. In
rs bot h Ind ia and Ch ina have bee n on an arm s sho ppi
ln rec ent yea $ 1.4 bill ion
and Ch ina imp ort ed arm s wo nh US $ 1.6 bill ion and US
200 5, Ind ia ion in 200 5
Ind i a sig ned arm s tran sfe r agr eem ent s wo rth US $ 5.4 bill
respectively. 200 7: 412 ). Bo th
iso n to US $ 2.8 bill ion by Ch ina (M ilit ary Balance
in com par Ind ia's arm s
end hea vily on arm s imp ort s fro m Rus sia. ln 199 9'-2 0-0 3,
cou nrr ies dep rin e, 242 S6
agr eem enr s fro m Rus sia inc lud ed one Kilo class sub ma
acq uis irio ns/ and SS -N- 27
s, 6 11- 78 ran ker airc raft , SS- N-2 5 ant i-sh ip mis sile s
air def enc e gun , thr ee Krivak
mis sile s, 172 Su- 30M Kl fig hte r/g rou nd arra ck airc raft
ant i-sh ip cru ise
s airc raf t car rier ,
ates , 12 KA -31 hel ico pte rs, one Ad mir al Gorshkov clas
III clas~ frig 31 0T -90 ma in
K fig hte r/g rou nd atta ck airc raft, 40 Mi -18 iB hel ico pte rs and
24 Mi G 29- 00 sur fac e-to -
Du rin g the sam e per iod Ch ina acq uir ed/ sig ned for 30 S-3
bat de ranks. 200 Su- 27,
ht Kil o clas s sub ma rin es, 35 SA -15 sur fac e-to -air mis sile s,
air missiles, eig
5-3 2
South Asian Survey 15, 1 (2008):

A I COLI B LE: 813 046 242 4,9 711 l91 J2

 22/RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

28 Su-27UBK , 78 Su-30MKK and 28 Su-30MK2 fighter/gro und attack aircraft,

four Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers, BMD-3 armoured infantry fighting
vehicles, 12 Ka-28 helicopters , FT-2000 surface-ro- air missiles, four Il-78 ranker
aircraft, 24 SSN-24 surface-ro- surface missiles, six A-50 airborne early warning
aircraft and Kh-35 air-ro-surfa ce missiles from Russia (Military Balance 2003: 280-83,
291-93, 303-09).
India's long ties with Russia were beneficial tQboth, and the warmth in rhar old rela-
tionship still lingers, especially (bur not only) in the respective governmen r structures.
However, other Indians and Russians are now raking a more realistic and nuanced
look at rhe relarionship . 17 Furthermor e, Russia roday has other immediate concerns,
most pressingly rhe need ro re-establish its economy and internal stability. Russia also
needs peace on irs borders while it rebuilds itself Many of these facrors, and hard cash
besides, motivate Russian relations with Chma, particularly its rroubling arms supply
relations. Russia hopes ro postpone any potential conflict with China until Russia is
ready; China's calculus may be similar.
India has much ro gain by Russia's rise, but wishing it will not make it so. Russia
will rem ain a relatively minor power for some rime to come, bur there are good rea-
so ns to nor discard Russia nevertheless . Despite the irritation and unhappines s feh
by borh sides in some recent arms deals, rhe relationship has sufficiently deep roots
ro survive. There is a comfort in the relationship that might usefully be p;eserved for
rhe f'urure; Russia's weapons laboratories still produce some of rhe world's besr military
equipment, and Mos~ow is willing ro sell chem to India. Furthermor e, l:lespite its
relative weakness, Moscow still has a useful presence in places like rhe UN Security
Council, which is beneficial to India. Russia does worry about lndia's increasingly
close ties with Washington . But unlike Ch ina , Russia has little to fear directly from
thi s relati o nship. Neverrheless, Indi a needs ro work harder wirh Russia given 1\lfoscow's
imponance in India's strategic calculus.

jAPAN

Many of these advantages will be found in a close relation ship with Japan too, bur it
will be harder ro engineer than is rhe case of Russia . Unlike Russ ia and India, th ere is
no history of common perceptions on global politics between India and Japan. Indians
no doubt shared in Asia's pride as one of its own stood up ro the west successfully
while much of the rest of Asia and Africa were under colonialism's yoke, but rhat pasr
is litrle recalled today. Japan, on the other hand, looks to India :is one of the sources of
ics religious and cul rural heritage, buc linle else besides . Du1 mg chc Cold War, Tokyo
and New _Delhi found themselves on the oppositc sides of the fcncc . There has been
no indicarion of any grear sympathy towards each other's concerns.
Building a strategic relationship with Japan under such trying circumstances could
hav~ been dif.ficulc, bur changes in Japanese circumstanc es might make ir easier rhan
earlier thought. The best word co describe Japan during rhc Koizumi administrat ion

South Asian Survey 15, l (2008): 5-32

,JDEEP XEROX-CENTER HINDU COLLEGE & K.M.C & HANSRAJ COU.EGE MOBILE: 813046242 4,9711.UM
 India anti the Great Powm/23
-
hing
is 'normalisarion' . Wh ether ir involved visiting rhe Yasukuni war shrine or dispatc
bur surely
forces to Iraq, Japan under the leaders hip of Junichiro Koizum i slowly
expans ion
normal ised irs role in rhe interna tional order in the strategi c sense with the
on Japanes e
of the scope of its military activities. A host of factors are having an impact
blatant
foreign and security policy, includi n g an inter-generational change in Japan,
ping of
misbeh aviour by North Korea both on th e nucl ear question and on the kidnap
the alliance with
Japanese citizens, as well as changin g atticu<l es in Japanese society about
Koizum i's
th e US an-d-dre presence of Ameri can forces on th e island of Okinaw a . Under
ation of an
success or, Shinzo Abe, th e p rocess of reasse rtion intensified with th e enunci
conduc ted
'Arc of Freedom and Prosperity' in Asia, culmin ating in a joinr naval exercise
res ignatio n
by Japan , Jndia, Australia , Singap o re and th e US in Septem b er 2007 . Ab e's
th e process
soon thereafter and his repl acem en t by Yasuo Fukud ;i have slowed down 8
ne; the
of Japan's norm alisa tio n . N everth eless, it is safe to say th at th e Yoshid a Docui
ed, probab ly
corners rone ofJapanese foreign policy durin g th e Cold War years, 'h as fad
to di sa ppear altoget her' (Emmo tt 2008: 11 8). .
is in ~reasin gly
' - Fro m a st ructura l perspec tive, th e m os r import ant fa ctor is that Japa n
T his process
w"'b rried about both C hin ese aggress iven ess and Amencan depend ab il ny.
d e we re to
w6 ul d only accelera te in th e com ing yea rs if th e trends of the last deca -.j)
rh e U S and
con tinue, leading ro a strengt hening of C hin a, a further weaken ing of :'J
are o f its own
con tinuing stagn ation in Japan . As Tokyo co nsiders bearin g a larger sh
the pa ran o ia
security, it is likely ro become an even more norm al nation -s tate, with all
19 Jap a n ese
an d security dilemm as that afflict mo~t o ther states . As Tokyo weighs
than ove rl oo k
op ti ons, India needs ro see Japan as a s~rious p layer and co urt rath er
In di a's ru le
Japan 's po tent ia l. Japan, of course, also needs to be more pragma li c aboul
r <1 sig ni fica nt
in Asia and th e world, and more imporr ancly, realise its own po tenti al fo
to h:we sta rt ed
role in Asia and th e conseq uences o f su ch a role . That process appear s
in Tokyo; N ew Delh i needs to follow sui c.·

THE EuROPE AN U N ION

US eco n o m y
The Europe an Union (EU) econom y (US$ 14 .1 trillion) is larger tha n the
clea r tha t th e
(US$ 13.2 trill ion) (World Ban k 2007a) . Nevert h eless, it is far from
, we co uld as k
El) will play a signific ant system ic role in d epe nd ent of th e US. Indeed
ul<l b e willing
under what circum stances , if any, th e elites and peoples of E u rope wo
· to make the invesrm enrs amr sacrific es needed ro esrabhs h amhen
ti-c and autono mous
co uld prom o t e
capabil ities. AJterna cely, it wo ul d be impor tant to know h ow th e EU
er g rea t power s .
the idea of being a 'civilia n power' as a n idea tional challen ge to o th
Curren tly, there is no convin cing a n sw e r to eith er qu es tion.
It therefo re appear s th at for many years to come th e EU will rem a in o b se·ssed with
that has resulte d
its interna l transfo rmatio ns. Nevert hel ess , the inspired experi me nt
of th e Europ ean
in the impress ive institu tional, policy and even cultura l archite cture
sing social life
Union is not, and perhap s never ~ill b e, th e politica l norm for organi

South Asian Survey I 5, 1 (2008): 5- 32

 24/RAJES H R.AJAGOPALAN AND VARUN SAHNI

at local, national , regional or global levels ..Most of the world is still in , rhe throes of
modernit y: the state retains the lead role in the social drama. The project of political
moderni ty is about the state perfectin g its sovereign territoria lity, which Europe alone
has seeminglytranscen ded. Indeed, in the fullness of time we may come to regard
European post-mo dernity as an essential artifice, a carefully designed and consrruc red
bridge that connecte d Europe's past-a Europe of states-t o the European state of rhe
future. However , in the 2020-25 rimefram e the EU will remain a hybrid entity in an
internati onal system of sovereign territoria l states, and thus play at best a margina l role
in great power politics.

BRAZIL

One country that India does not often think of as a future peer cornpeti ror is Brazil.
However, Brazil resembles India in many significant ways. It is by far the largest counrry
in its region . Like India, it has no doubts char it deserves a pl.ace at the high table of
world politics. Although it has renounce d the nuclear option, it remains obsessed with
the notion of acquiring strategic auronom y. It has a large and diverse economy that has
gained significan t technolo gy-produ ction capabilities in several critical secrors.
Neverthe less, there are also major differences with India that are worth noting. To a
far greater degree than India, Brazil is suspicious of the Washing ton bandwag on. This
is because Brazil has lived under the US sphere of influence for most of its independ ent
history. With good reason, Brazil is determin ed to resist the esrablish menr of a single
integrative project in the American continent s, which would necessari ly be US-led.
Brazil's alternate project is co integrate South America under its own leaJershi p. Ir is
becom111g clear wirh each passing day that Brazil will be the first great power ro emerge
l==== ====~fr~o~m ~ c~h~e so u rhern hemi~ here.
Since the Brasilia Declarati on of 6 June 2003, India has calibrated irs bilateral reb-
tionship with Brazil largely through the instrumen tality of the India, Brazil and Sourh
Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), a new trilateral initiative involving rhree significan t
countries of the global South. As emerging powers, rhe IBSA T hree are similarly si tu -
ated in the internatio nal system and also have similar aspira tions regarding a furure
global role for themselves.
Intuitively, it makes a lot of sense to expect ch at India, Brazil and South Africa can
not only learn a lot from one another's experiences but also coordinat e their respective
external policies. Funhei:m ore, rhe coordinat ion of their policies and. srraregies in rhe
context of world trade negotiatio ns has been rruly impressive in recen c years. Ir is clear
that the significance ofIBSA in issues of international political economy will increase
even further in the coming years. IBSA has strong legs: it is an initiative rhat aggregares
power, enhances cooperation and builds communiry. Ir speaks to issues central to fndia's
future place and role in the world and will therefore remain imporran t. ·
However, ~ve need to ask some importan t questions regarding Brazil. Are we likely
to see the habns of cooperati on between India and Brazil in the realm of internatio nal

South Asian Survey 15, J (2008): 5 32

 lndrn nnd the Great Powen/25

p oliti cal econ om y spill over in to rhe international security domain as well? Or wi ll
Brazil rem ain irrelevant from th e perspective oflndia's security concerns, which remai n
a fundamental driver of India's external pol icy?
Even more important, in rhe comin g years Brazil and India w ill surely becom e
genuine peer co mpe ti tors in a num ber of d ifferent issue areas. Ir therefo re becomes
even more important to fig ure ou r just wh ere Brazil will fit in srrucrural terms in
In di a's future.

VI INDIA AT T ll E TABLE

In chis article we have fo cused almost excl usively o n th e ma terial bases of power. We
have sugges ted ch at lndia has no option but to steadily a ugment its capabiliries (' keep
irs powder dry') and ride our th e mom ent of h egemon y, much as other emerging
powers are do ing. For structural reasons, rhe U S could wel l be positively disposed
rowards India, bur rhere is a point beyo nd whi ch a large srate like India cannot be
accommodated within ·rhe Wash ingto n bandwago n. While keepi ng an eye our for
Ch ina, India should try ro avoid getting into an arms race rh at is li kely ro w o rk ro irs
disadvantage. Ar the sam e rime, if C hin a works actively ro impede rh e inregra ri o n and
pacification of India's neighbourh ood by offering alternate incentive srru crures ro all
ofindia's neighbours, ir wo uld be difficulc for India to sir idly by and !er rhar happen .
At rh e global and continental level, if India could m irigare rhe im pact of balan ce of
power pol icies in the Asia-Pacific, a cooperative secur!ry arrangeme nr co uld em erge
over rime in the continent and its surrounding oceans.
However, we m ust end by drawing attention to a normative ques ci on. Ar rh e glo b a l
and conrinenral levels, a leadersh ip role requires nor only a preponderance of ca pabili ti es
in one's favour but also the arricubtion of an arrracrive vision. \'<le can reAect, for in-
stance, d1ar we are living not just in a mom em of hegemony b ut ofAmerican h ege m o ny.
Glo balisation is a by-product of American hegemony, jusr as empire was th e ourco m e
of British hegemo ny. W e ca n on ly guess what the concrete m ani fes tati o ns of a Nazi
h egem ony o r a Soviet hegemon y w o ul d have bee n h ad either b een achieved . A ll
hegem on ic powers and great powers h ave p repon d erant capabil ities, yet they have
sig nifica ntly di fferent visions of the type o f inte rn at io n al sys tem that their capabilities
should und erwri te.
As India em erges and becomes a s tare with system-shap ing capabiliti es and inren-
r'.ons , rhe world is enti~ledrn
ask- an d will increasingly ask-a Stra igh t forward ques-
tion : What would India bnn g to the cable? C hi na h as already seized the idea that it
must si_gnal its differe_n ce fro m previo us g rea t powe rs in history; hen ce, its u nremirrin g
campaign to project Itself as a d evelo ping co untry mindfu l of the needs and in terests
of t_h~ wretched of the earch. M any coumri es in A frica n ow look to China to p ro tect
their interests, although there are also new voices in Africa suggesting th a t the dragon's
embrace should be treated with caution (Alden 2007) . W h y should any o ther cou ntry
welcome India's emergence ror c any reason, apart from obvious balance of p o wer ·

South Asian Survey 15, 1 (2008): 5 32

 q

26/ R,\JES H RAJ AGOPALAN AND VARUN SAH N I

calculacions? le is ooino co be in Ind ia's inceres t co suggest co che res t of th e wo rld-

0
with due subtl ety, of c~urse-chat ics emergence would also help resolve existing and
emerging global problems instead of creacing new ones. . .
An important niche is opening up in world politics that India 1s well .placed to
occu py. The fragiliry of the planetary ecosystem is poised co replace te~ronsm as the
in cernati onal issue of our ti mes. 20 1t is also becoming obvious that the logic and dynam-
ics of sovereign cerricorialiry, as currently configured, cannot tackle this anthropogen_ic
existential challenge that, by ics very nature, cranscends scace borders. The only wa~ in
which the tragedy of the global commons is going robe mitigated is mher by pooling
sovere ignty-Patricia Mische calls it 'sovereignry of the Earth' (Mische 1989: 426)-or
by evolving a new form of trusteeship. . .
le is easy co be sceptical about both ideas. The likelihood that states would willingly
transfer thei r sovereignry co some supra-state en ti Ly, that is empowered at the global
level co make and enforce public policy regarding production and consumption in
diverse locales, is virtually nil. The notion of a global trusteeship, in contrast, could
be feasi ble; states themselves would act as the trustees of rhe global commons. There
are th ree imponant reasons why the notion of rrusreeship shou ld not be peremptorily
di smissed as being unrealistic.
The first_reason is chat trusteeship has been tried before in world policies, with
significant s'uccess. After the Second World War, trusteeship emerged as a solution
co the problem of non-self-governing territories and was an important element in
the world hiscoric process of decolonisation. The Trusteeship Council, now almost a
vestigial organ of the United Nations, is a concrete institutional manifestatio n of the
co mpatibility berween sta te sovereignry and trusteeship (Chowdhu ri 1955; Hall 1948;
Murray I 957; To ussa int I 976).
Secondly, trustees hi p as an idea is making a comeback in wo rl d policies, specifica ll y
as a means to deal with rhe prob lem of fa iled and fa iling states (Bain 2003, 2006;
Caplan 2002; Wilde 2007). Trusteeship is a co mponent in rh e quest for an 'e thi cal
foreign policy' (Chandl er and Heins 2007) and is a fund amental aspect of the noti on
of a 'responsibility co protect' (I C ISS 200 l) . Bue the re-emergence of trusteeship trans-
cends the issues driving world politics. Ir is beco ming a core idea in calls to reform
global and local ·capitalism (Barnes 2006); in reaction to predatory corporate behaviour,
there is renewed emphasis upon 'ta~ing trusteeship seri ously' (Turner 1995) as also
the 'moral responsibilities' (Smith l 995) chat it entails.
Finally, trusteeship has deep Gandhian roots (Gandhi 1970; Kapoor 1993;
Mehr~ 1977; ~ethi 1~86; Upadhyaya 1976), which could make it a 'natural' component
oflnd~an _foreign policy: ~evelop_ed by Mahatma Gandhi to smoothen the rough edges
of capit~lism, trusteeship 1s adm1ttedly a difficult concept to put into practice. Never-
theless, it holds the key to some of the most pressing global commons concerns in
the c~nte~porary world, including environmental breakdown, scarcity of renewable
:esources like fresh water and pandemics. A central notion in Gandhian trusteeship
is the value of non-possession. This goes hand-in-hand with the notion that we, as

5011th Asian Survey 15, 1 (2008): 5 32

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India an d the Great Powers/27

som eth ing lar ger tha n

rit uri on s an d gro up s, are always -em be dd ed in
ind ivi du als , ins 'wh om do
r ask ing no t on ly 'wh at do we wo rk for?' bu t als o
our sel ves . Th is inv olv es ou cry ing ou r for a ne w wo rld
pol itic s based
gil e pla net ary eco sys tem is
we wo rk for?' Th e fra sp of a tra nsf orm ati on
ide a of tru ste esh ip. We ma y well be on rhe cu
in pa rt up on the ira tio n an d
rhe co mm on go od cea ses rob e an alt rui sti c asp
of wo rld po liti cs, in wh ich Op era tio na lis ing
ar. ego ist ic int ere st for rea son s of she er sur viv al.
bec om es, ins tea d, in the fuw re.
cou ld hav e a dis rin cr vo ice
tru sre esh ip is wh e1e lnd ia

EN D No TE S

profiles and roles, J foc us 1ha c o ur defini1ion

s of gre ar pow er; focus upon 1heir ;em rity
I. Mos1 def inir ion y 1983: 8-18.
powers can be found in Lev
dcfini1ion of grcac
seeks ro avoid. Th e classic 2008.
secrion on Bajpai and Sahni Edw ard He rma n
2. We have based a parr of this Wa her Lip pm ann in I 922 and pop ularised by
coi ned by 1988).
3. Thi s resonant phrase was and He rm an and Ch om sky
am Ch om sky six dec ade s larer (see Lippmann 1922 r-W esr ph: tli:.in, sovere ign
and No s1ares rarh er rhan on mo der n, pos
foc us mo re on
No re char Re:tlisrs, in genera
l, mo der n s1:11e, Realis1
4.
y wo uld agre e 1ha r 164 8 marks 1he beg inn ing of d1c
1errirorial s1ares. Th oug h rhe phal ian scares (see Gil pin
1986: 30 4-05 and
app lies as mu ch ro pre -Wesrphalian as pos1-Wes1
rheory
Walrz 1979: 91).
3. s1a1e behaviour
5. See, for example, Kux 199 arional s1rucrural effecrs o n
'scrucr nra l rea fom ' rem aim 1he besr sraremenr ofinrern lism ~uc h as 'neo classica l
6. \X'alrz's
n par tly hec aus e mo re recenr variarions of rea
eno ic fac1ors
and i111ernd1ional phe nom ater imp orr anc c 10 dom csr
e mn vcd awa y from srru crural analysis ro giving gre
realism' hav
(see Schweller 200 3). weak lead per ilou s lives.'
194) clcganrly purs ir, 'Th e 10 resolve
7. As Kennerh WalrL ( I ')7' ): realism bur prc \'io us cfforrs
ind crc rm1 nac y is a wel l recognised pro ble m in nco
S. Tl11S srrnc111r:1l n and Sny der 199 0).
, for example, Chrisrense ~cc
have 1101 hcr n ,,1cccssf11l (,ee exp lain ing foreign policy,
pec 11v cs on wh crh cr s1ru c1ural rheor1es are useful in
'). For opp osi ng pcrs
Elm an 1996 and Walrz 199
6. lead ro counrervail ing
of rhe Co ld Wa r and Am eric an heg em ony wo uld
Rcalisr.~ predicred 1ha1 rhe
end erg enc e of ~uch balances
IO.
e yer ro eme rge , Rea lisrs con tinu e ro pre dic t rhe em
balances. Th oug h these hav
her powers
(see Layne 200 6). s and dec lar; nio ns wir h 01
li ipo lar wo rld arc freg uen r in India's joi nt sta1emem
11 . Calls for a mu
7).
(see, for example, ME A 200
ni 200 6 and Sahni 2008. anc e 11s defence rics wl[h
12. Thi s secrion dra ws on S.ih is ma kin g every effo rt to enh
enc e min istr y, 'Ind ia
Acc ord ing ro rhe Ind ian def rsian] G ulf and
13. Asia, Cen rra l Asia, the [Pe
ed nei ghb our hoo d in So111heasr Asia, No rth eas t
ir~ ext end
200 7: l I). -
Mi ddl e Easr rcgions' (M oO view: Tm am aze d ac the num
e Ma h bu ban i (20 06: 14) remarks, inc orr ect ly in our rob e rhe
14. For insra11 ce, Kishor e's past is Asia's fut ure ". Th
at see ms
of rim es l rea d We sre rn analysts saying rhar "Eu rop e ntia lly is com ple rely
her and rha t pre mis e ess
pre mis e wh er. cal kin g abo ur grc ar powers in Asia,
prevaili,ng
,vro ng. div crg enr opi nio ns. Recenr
of his rori cal jud gem ent on wh ich the re are
Th is is, of cou rse ,_a ma trer ina and Ind ia. Kishore
15.
ent pos itio ns on rhe his tori cal link s bet we en Ch
bo ob rake radically dif fer , wh ich exisred
ver sity tow n of Na lan da
i (20 08: 27 0-7 I) inv oke s the medieval Ind ian uni num ber of Ch ine se
Ma h bu ban was visired by a
CE 10 119 7 CE in rhe area of Bihar, and arry a
for 770 years fro m 427 uen Tsa ng) in 630 CE . Am
rs, mo st not abl y rhe .Ch inese mo nk Xu anz ang (Hs s, wh ich
srudenrs and sch ola o-I ndi an relarion
isrs cha r 'Bu ddh ism was nor 1he onl y vehicle of Sin
Sen (2005: I 65- 67) ir>s

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