John Locke and the Law of Nature

Author(s): James O. Hancey

Source: Political Theory , Nov., 1976, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), pp. 439-454
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/191130

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 JOHN LOCKE AND
THE LAW OF NATURE

JAMES 0. HANCEY
University of British Columbia

Salus populi suprema lex esto

John Locke's theory of natural law is central to his major works, yet it
is perhaps the theme least understood by his students. His theory of
natural law provides the central core to an interpretation of the Treatises;
and his quest for establishing the certainty of natural law provides the
impetus for his Essay Conceming Hwnan Understanding. While most
students claim an understanding of these later works, few purport to fully
comprehend exactly what Locke means when he speaks of "the law of
nature." This may be because Locke himself never fully articulated his
theory, or theories, of natural law. Modern Lockean scholars, therefore,
begin with a handicap.! Nevertheless, one can attempt to "get a feel" for
what Locke had in mind by the term legis naturae (although even in his
Essays on the Law of Nature,2 he never directly confronts the question of
the content of natural law in terms of a codified set of principles which
derive out of the essence of man). He is, however, more clear with regard
to other questions concerning the law of nature, such as its obligation,
knowability, and basis.
Locke's theory of natural law is basically a continuation of the
traditional conceptions of natural law deriving from the classics and
continuing through medieval scholasticism and the Reformation.3 The
Essays abound with references and parallels to Cicero, and many of the

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 4 No. 4, November 1976

? 1976 Sage Publications, Inc.

[439]

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[4401 POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

arguments presented by Locke can, in fact, be found in the political

writings of Aquinas. Locke's contribution to the theory of natural law is
not its debasement to a form of egoistic utilitarianism as some have
argued; nor is it an attempt to legitimize the rising bourgeoisie through
what has come to be called a theory of "possessive individualism;"4 rather
it is his assertion of the universal knowability and obligation which derive
from its basis. Locke's law of nature is a moral standard which, by its very
essence, is capable of demonstration: "Morality is capable of demonstra-
tion, as well as mathematics; since the precise real essence of the things
moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity or
incongruity of the things themselves can be certainly discovered, in which
consists perfect knowledge."5 Locke brings to natural law a rationalist
position and, like Aquinas, achieves one of the more curious unions in the
history of philosophical thought, that of the rationalist and the fideistic
positions. That Locke's conception of natural law is more appropriately
categorized as one of continuity than innovation is pointed to by Philip
Abrams in his discussion of Locke affd Aquinas: "The priest was to
expound the pattem of moral obligation which was God's plan for man;
the scholar was to expound expound the complementary pattern in
nature."6 Essentially, the law of nature for Locke is the same universal law o
reason valid for all men because of their human nature, which can be traced
from the Stoics, through the Roman lawyers, the Christian era, the school o
Naturrecht, and ultimately through "the judicious" Hooker.7
Locke's major efforts directed at a statement of his conception of
natural law are in the form of eight essays written in 1664 while he
occupied the position of Censor of Moral Philosophy at Christ Church,
Oxford. Of the eight essays, one is directed to an affirmation that there
does exist a "rule of morals, or law of nature"; four are given to a
discussion of its knowability; two concern the obligation of the law of
nature; and the last discusses the basis of natural law. None of the essays
speaks directly to the content of Legis naturae, and they have been best
characterized by Dunn as "exploratory" and representing "the mind at
work and not merely the finished results of such work."8 Although the
Essays were written approximately two decades before the Treatises, there
appears to be no great disparity between these early conceptions of the
law of nature and those of the more mature Locke. The Essays formed the
basis for his further work. "His initial need for access to natural law
triggered off a long exploration of the sources of knowledge and produced
eventually a new conception of the status of moral laws, a new conception
of political society."9 Throughout his formulation of "a new conception
of the status of moral laws" and a new conception of political society, his

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [4411

theory of natural law appears to remain that of the Essays. The fact that
Locke has gone back to "square one" by basing his political writings on a
particular view of natural law and human nature, lends to his work an
internal consistency not readily apparent to those who fail to investigate its
bases in his earlier works. The Essays are, therefore, integral to any
exposition of Locke's view of the law of nature, and they provide the
framework of this paper.
Locke's most innovative deviation from the traditional conception of
the law of nature was his assertion that the tenets of natural law were
capable of demonstration, and that all who would use their God-given
faculties of sense-perception and reason could attain a knowledge of that
law. Man was to be judged by a sovereign God, according to the law of
nature. Therefore it was only logical that that law be promulgated in such
a manner as to make it intelligible to all who sought an understanding of it
and the obligations it imposed. The search for a demonstrable law of
nature reflects Locke's great (and perhaps, undue) faith in the ability of
men to come to grips with their world:

There is nothing so obscure, so concealed so removed from any meaning that

the mind, capable of everything, could not apprehend it by reflection and
reasoning, if it is supported by these faculties [reason and sense-percep-
tion .1o

Locke shared with Hobbes the belief that natural law, like mathematics,
is capable of logical demonstration. His journal entry for June 26, 1681, is
reminiscent of Aubrey's account of Hobbes' introduction to geometry:

The first and great step, therefore, to knowledge is to get the minde furnished
with true ideas which the minde being capable of haveing of morall things as
well as figure I cannot but thinke morality as well as mathematiques capable
of demonstration if men would imploy their understanding to thinke more
about it and not give themselves up to the lazy traditionall way of talking one
after another. ... Our knowledge of generall things are eternal veritates and
depend not on the existence of accidents of things for the truth of
mathematiques and morality are certain whether men make true mathe-
maticall figures, or suit their actions to the rules of morality or noe.1 I

For Locke, then, the tenets of natural law, which will guide man in
living a moral life, are no less demonstrable than the Pythagorean theorem.
Through the combined use of reason and sense-perception, man no longer
need stand in awe of a law of nature he does not understand, yet to which
he is obligated.

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[442] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

Given Locke's assertion of the knowability and demonstrability of the

law of nature, the avenues to this knowledge must be explored further-and
it is here that the exploratory nature of the Essays manifests itself. The
early Locke-the Locke of the Essays-identifies only one avenue to a
knowledge of natural law, and this is the "light of nature."

We have proved above that natural law can be known by the light of nature,
which, indeed, is our only guide when we are entering the course of this life,
and which, amid the various intricacies of duty, avoiding the rough roads of
vice on one side and the by-ways of error on the other, leads us to that height
of virtue and felicity whereto the gods invite and nature tends.12

Locke describes the light of nature as follows:

But since, as has been shown elsewhere, this light of nature is neither tradition
nor some inward moral principle written in our minds by nature, there remains
nothing by which it can be defined but reason and sense-perception.1 3

For the early Locke, we gain experience of the law of nature through
our faculties of sense-perception. These experiences are ordered in our
minds through the use of our rational faculties; assuming that we do not
err, we can gain an understanding of natural law. The correct ordering of
sense-perceptions and rational deliberation about their import are matters
for the individual. Locke explicitly states that "the law of nature cannot
be known by tradition."14 This essentially individualist route to an
understanding of natural law lends credence to Dunn's interpretation of
Locke as (at least partially) a product of Puritanism and its emphasis on
the 'calling" of the individual.
While reason is, for Locke, of paramount importance in gaining an
understanding of the law of nature, it is important to keep in mind that
the law of nature is not the dictate of reason. The law of nature is prior to
human reason, and reason discovers that law rather than creating or
determining it.1 ' Reason cannot give us laws since it is only a discursive
faculty within ourselves, and it can never be a maker of laws or a legislator
since it lacks will.1 6 Reason is that capacity which makes man
self-sufficient in the quest for knowledge of the law of nature, something
which is external to man himself.
In contrast to the strict rationalism of the early Locke, the later or
more mature Locke admits of the value of tradition and faith in gaining a
knowledge of the law of nature. Whereas the greater part of mankind are
"not incapable of passing political judgements according to the standards
of natural law,"' 7 there are those "aberrant few" who "cannot know and
therefore must believe."' 8 Locke appears to move back toward a

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [4431

Thomistic position by admitting the value of revelation and tradition for

those who are either incapable of, or reluctant to, use their God-given
rational faculties. It is perhaps useful to draw the distinction here between
an awareness of natural law (an awareness of the tenets of natural law),
and knowledge of natural law (a comprehensive awareness of the tenets of
natural law combined with an understanding of their derivation and
obligation).19 For example, I may have an awareness of that tenet of
natural law which states that I ought not harm my neighbor and although I
know that harming my neighbor is defined as "bad," I may not fully
understand why I ought not harm him. Comprehensive knowledge of the
tenet requires more than mere awareness of the fact that harming one's
neighbor is a "bad" thing; it requires a knowledge or understanding of the
derivation of its being defined as a "bad" thing, as well as of the
obligations imposed by this rule. While Locke acknowledges the value of
faith and tradition in giving us an awareness of the tenets of natural law, a
full understanding or knowledge of natural law can only be gained through
the "light of nature." Revelation and tradition may give us a set of
sense-perceptions in the form of positive law, and these are useful to us in
that they provide us with a guide to moral action provided they are
founded upon the law of nature, but revelation and tradition can never
give us a comprehensive knowledge of the law of nature unless aided by
reason. It is with this distinction in mind that we can accept Seliger's
statement that "the Treatises thus point to faith and tradition as
consistent with natural law, and as supporting avenues of knowledge."
And it is only with this distinction in mind that we can make sense of
Locke's earlier position in the Essays where he states that the law of
nature cannot become "known" by tradition.

For whatever among men obtains the force of a law, necessarily looks to God,
or nature, or man as its maker; yet whatever man has commanded or God has
ordered by divine declaration, all this is positive law. But since the law of
nature cannot be known by tradition, all that remains is that it becomes
known to men by the light of nature alone.2 1

The distinction which I have drawn between "awareness" and "knowl-

edge" is, I believe, essentially what Locke had in mind when speaking of
those who "cannot know and therefore must believe,"22 because as Dunn
points out, what they cannot know is "the full deductive system of the
obligatory law of nature."2 3
The predominant role of reason in understanding the law of nature
derives from the divine basis of natural law (discussed below in section II).
It is sufficient here to point out that natural law is promulgated by God

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[4441 POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

and its precepts are in accordance with His rationality. Because God has
given the faculty of reason to men, and because the precepts of natural law
are grounded in reason, men can, by the use of their faculties, discover
what those precepts are. Since God gave us reason, we can discern the law
of nature-its precepts being rational. The efficacy of reason in disceming
natural law seems to echo Hooker's faith in the capabilities of reason:

The main principles of reason are in themselves apparent, [and] in every kind
of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind
doth presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and
manifest with proof.24

That Locke later moved to an accommodation with tradition and

revelation as sources of knowledge of natural law may indicate, on the one
hand, a certain "mellowing" with age which culminated in a near return to
a Thomistic position of "reason informed by faith," except that Locke
would have the order reversed. On the other hand, the shift away from an
exclusive rationalist position may represent a growing disillusionment over
the ability of men to come to grips with their world. The passionate belief
in man's reasonability, characteristic of the young Locke, may have been
tempered over time; in 1697 Locke could write "It is plain, in fact, that
human reason, unassisted failed men in its great and proper business of
morality. It never from unquestionable principles, by clear deductions,
made out an entire body of the 'law of nature'."25

II

An understanding of natural law, according to Locke, had to be

grounded in reason because it was upon the principle of reason that that
law was founded. Seventeenth-century intellectual thought, along with its
emphasis on rationality, had also been dominated by the causality
principle with its twofold axiom: (1) nihil sine causa, and (2) the cause
must be more perfect than its most perfect effect.26 Locke's theory of
natural law is, in this sense, characteristic of the seventeenth century, as is
evident in his fourth essay on the law of nature:

Certain facts must first be set forth, because they are necessarily presupposed
in the knowledge of any and every law. First, in order that anyone may
understand that he is bound by a law, he must know beforehand that there is a
law-maker.... Secondly, it is also necessary to know that there is some will
on the part of that superior power with respect to the things to be done by us,
that is to say that the law-maker, whoever he may prove to be, wishes that we
do this but leave off that, and demands of us that the conduct of our life
should be in accordance with his will.27

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [4451

He continues the argument by stating that the existence of God can be

inferred from the magnificence of creation, and we cannot suppose God to
have created man without some purpose in mind for him. "For it is
contrary to such great wisdom to work with no fixed aim."28 The law of
nature is therefore external to men, and it consists of the dictates of divine
will concerning the manner in which men should act. God, or the Creator,
is the author of the law of nature, and through natural law He has given
men a guide to live by. Further, he has provided us with the faculties
necessary to understand those rules of conduct.
Perhaps more telling still is the fact that natural law is tied to the very
essence of man. The law of nature cannot be other than it is precisely
because of the rational nature of man: "Natural law stands and falls
together with the nature of man as it is at present."29 Furthermore,
"human nature must be changed before this law can be either altered or
annulled."3 0 Whereas men are created with the same basic nature, they are
all subject to a universal law of nature which derives from that common
creation. The law of nature is concomitant with the nature of man, and
both concepts have universal applicability. "Hence, this law of nature can
be described as being the decreee of the divine will discemible by the light
of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with
rational nature, and for this reason commanding or prohibiting."3 1
Because Locke conceives natural law as intimately bound up with the
very nature of men, confusion has arisen over the question of consent as a
means of establishing the dictates of the law of nature. This confusion has
been exacerbated by the manner in which Locke's ideas have been put to
use in the unfolding of history. Although man's conscience plays an
integral part in the disceming of natural law, for Locke this is not the basis
of that law. Conceming the question of establishing the precepts of natural
law via consent, Locke offers one of his more vivid portrayals.

For is there anything so abominable, so wicked, so contrary to all right and

law, which the general consent, or rather the conspiracy, of a senseless crowd
would not at some time advocate?

What immorality would not be allowable and even inevitable, if the example
of the majority gave us the law? Into what disgrace, villainy, and all sorts of
shameful things would not the law of nature lead us astray, if we had to go
whither most people go?32

Clearly, we can not rely upon mere majority interest to give us an

understanding of the law of nature; nor can we allow majority-rule to
determine it. "The validity of the law of nature remained for him [Locke]
independent of consent."33

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[4461 POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

The problem of consent is further complicated by the fact that

Locke, society is the sum of the individuals who compose it; we can
assume that each will act in his own best interest, and further, that in the
conclusion of positive law, the will of the majority is to prevail.34 This series
of positions is only coherent if we assume Locke to have made the classical
distinction between public and private. Given his reliance upon the
classics, this avenue should not be dismissed out of hand. Locke states
explicitly that private interest cannot be the basis of natural law.

Yet, if the private interest of each person is the basis of that law, the law will
inevitably be broken, because it is impossible to have regard for the interest of
all at one and the same time.35

And again:

Yet if it were the principal law of nature that each man should be mindful of
himself and his own affairs, those noble examples of virtue which the records
of history have allowed would have to be .consigned to oblivion, so that the
memory of so much folly, of so much perversity, would be completely blotted
out.36

No less inefficacious, it would appear, is the mere majority interest in

the determination of positive law. Majority interest must qualitatively shift
from a collection of private interests to a majority opinion based on public
interest. That is, the citizen, when participating in the political life of the
community, must be guided by his conscience to look beyond mere
private interest to consider the common good. "For the end of
government being the good of the Community. . . nobody in Government
can have a right tending to any other end."3 7 Not only is private interes
inappropriate to the actions of those participating in the government, no
man has a right to act in accordance with his private interest while
operating in a public capacity if that private interest is at odds with the
good of the community. The participating citizen is to guide his actions in
the "forum" by the greater good of mankind which is the law of nature.
This may appear naive, but it is the standard which guided political
philosophy from the classical age. The good of the community was not
coterminous with private interest, nor did Locke ever maintain that it
was.38 With this distinction the tone of the Treatises changes from a mere
doctrine of majority-rule to a philosophical treatise inspired by the
seemingly more noble end of a fulfillment of the law of nature.
Closely related to the misconception of a natural law based on consent
is another misconception, that of a law of nature based on utility. Again,

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [447]

critics who attack Locke for basing his theory of natural law on utility
have misdirected their efforts. The relationship between the observance of
natural law and utility in the writings of Locke more closely parallels that
of the classics than the writings of the later utilitarians. To be sure, Locke
is not as clear on this point as he might be, but he does explicitly deny
that utility is to be considered the basis of a law of nature. Confusion has
arisen because there are many passages in Locke similar to the following
statement which Gough makes in drawing upon the papers in the Lovelace
collection:

Morality is "the rule of man's acting for attaining of happiness," and happiness
and misery consist of pleasure and pain.39

From this it has been incorrectly inferred that whatever produced pleasure
could be considered moral, and whatever produced pain was, in fact,
immoral. This inferrence can only be made by reversing the causal
sequence that Locke explicitly uses: "Utility is not the basis of the law or
the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it.'A0
Locke's position here is is expressly that of Cicero in On Duties, 1.41
While there may indeed be an hedonistic motivation to moral action and
observance of the law of nature, this does not destroy the objective status
of that law. The law remains extemal to man and its tenets are not
dependent upon its consequences. Singh dispels this confusion quite
concisely:

Though he defines good and evil in terms of pleasure and pain, they are to him
only the consequences of a morally right action; they never constitute its
essence. A moral law is eternal and universal and it is obligatory independently
of its pleasurable consequences.42

Natural law for Locke, then, depends neither upon capricious consent
of a majority of individuals, nor upon a utility which is ephemeral in the
life of man. It is based upon the will of a divine Sovereign and is
concomitant with the very essence of created man. The law is prior to
human reason, yet is grounded in the creation of rational man. Locke's
theory of natural law is much closer to the traditional conceptions of the
law of nature than is most often supposed. Natural law, for Locke, as for
Aquinas, is external to men. "Traditional natural law, no less than that of
Locke, identifies the judgement of individual conscience with observing
the 'eternal rule' which is external to men inasmuch as it is not made by
them."4 3 The consequences of obedience to the law of nature are in the

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[448] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

long run, essentially utilitarian, as they are for Cicero. The basis o
law creates the obligation of that law, in the tradition of Grotius:

In fact, this law does not depend on an unstable and changeable will, but on
the eternal order of things. For it seems to me that certain essential features of
things are immutable, and that certain duties arise out of necessity and cannot
be other than they are.... In fact it seems to me to follow just as necessarily
from the nature of man that, if he is a man, he is bound to love and worship
God and also to fulfil other things appropriate to the rational nature, i.e., to
observe the law of nature, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that, if it
is a triangle, its three angles are equal to two right angles.... 44

Locke may then be more appropriately viewed as one of the last

defenders of a traditional natural law than as its first corrupter.

III

All men are obligated by the law of nature by the very fact of their
creation as rational beings.45 Locke sees this obligation in terms of a
moral duty to "render what is due" to the law of nature.4 6 The origin of
this obligation is to be found in God's omnipotence and his magnanimity
in the act of creation, and the relationship between man and God which
these two factors engender:

For, in the first place, since God is supreme over everything and has such
authority and power over us we cannot exercise over ourselves, and since we
owe our body, soul, and life-whatever we are, whatever we have, and even
whatever we can be-to Him and to Him alone, it is proper that we should live
according to the precept of His will.47

The nature of the relationship between God and man is the formal cause
of the obligation to obey the law of nature, which is the will of God.48
Because the relationship of each individual to God is equal to that of other
men, the law of nature is universally binding.
While all men are obligated by the law of nature, they are often
obligated to different tenets of that law, depending upon their position
among their fellow men:

Those precepts of the law of nature which are absolute ... are binding on all
men in the world equally, kings as well as subjects.... But those decrees of
nature which are concerned with the various conditions of men and the
relations between them are binding on men exactly in proportion as either
private or public functions demand; the duty of a king is one thing, the duty
of a subject is another.49

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [4491

That the law of nature embodies different tenets for king and subject
makes Locke prone to misinterpretation by those who would see Locke as
a defender of class interest and as spokesman for the rising bourgeoisie.
What these critics overlook, however, is the distinction between "public"
and "private" made in section II. What makes the obligatory tenets of
natural law differential among positions is the very fact of differential
"publicness." The duties of a king are essentially related to the "forum"
and therefore most of his actions must be judged from the point of
"common good" or "public actor." The subject, on the other hand, is
essentially a private being and enters the "forum" seldom, if ever. The bulk
of his actions then are to be judged on different standards than those of
the king. He is not held to a constant vigilance of the "common good"
because this is not his "function." He will be judged by this standard
"exactly in proportion" to his public function. Besides these differential
tenets relating to the "publicness" or "privateness" of individual positions
in society, there exist those absolute norms which obligate all men
regardless of their position. Kings and princes can claim no special
privileges in this sphere. "Nobody, no power can exempt them [princes]
from the obligation of that eternal law."5 0
Aside from obligation as a moral charge to fulfill one's duty, Locke also
argues an a posteriori case for the observance of natural law-that of
utility. Happiness will be the long-run result if we observe the obligations
of natural law,s 1 keeping in mind however that "utility is not the basis of
the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to
it. "t5 2

The obligations of natural law are morally binding, according to Locke,

in the pre-political, as well as the political society. Again, this is a
continuation of the classical tradition. The promulgation of the law of
nature is effected outside the bounds of civil society, and therefore its
validity is not dependent upon a mere man-made organization. In this
sense Locke differs from Hobbes, who posits a moral obligation only in
the first law of nature while men live outside the bounds of civil society.5 3
The obligations of natural law extend also into civil society, and
provide the pattern for the formulation of human positive law. The law of
nature should serve as a guide to the actions of every man in the course of
his private life; further it should serve as a guide to those men who exercise
public functions not only in their private affairs, but also in the "forum."

The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society but only in many
cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed to
them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an
Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they

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[450] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

make for other Mens Actions, must, as well as their own and other Mens
Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e., to the Will of God, of
which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the
preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against
it.54

Thus formulated, the obligations of the law of nature serve not only as
standards in an eschatological sense, but also provide a working pattern for
the establishment of a harmonious society. It is not only a rule in that if
transgressed, it brings punishment, but also in that it is a guide to men's
actions.
The preceding passage also points to an hierarchy of obligation, in
which obligation to human law is subordinate to natural law; i.e., if there
exists a discrepancy between the dictates of the law of nature and human
law, the dictates of natural law take precedence because the dictates of
human law are ipso facto invalid: "Municipal Laws of Countries . . . are
only so far right, as they are founded on the Law of Nature, by which they
are to be regulated and interpreted."55 The only sphere in which human
laws can exert their power of obligation, and create an obligation where
none previously existed, is in the realm of "things indifferent." In all other
realms the obligations imposed by human law are merely duplicative in
nature, and serve to enforce the observation of obligations of the law of
nature. The obligations of natural law, then, exist in the pre-political
society as well as the civil society. They can be negated by no one,
although they may be reinforced with positive human law. They serve not
only as a standard of ultimate judgment, but also as a guide to temporal
action in the service of a harmonious community.

IV

A clear formulation of the content of natural law was impossible for

John Locke. All that can be said of it is that which Strauss cites as as the
motto of the Theatises: Salus populi suprema lex esto.56 It is apparent
that Locke conceived of a set of principles which necessarily followed
from this supreme axiom, but it is doubtful that he ever had a clear idea of
a complete code of the law of nature. In this respect he leaves us no better
off than we were with the classics. Unfortunately Locke's statement in the
Treatises, that the "Law of Nature being unwritten, and so no where to be
found but in the minds of Men . . . ,5 7 still held true after he had finished
his writing career.

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [451]

Despite the fact that Locke devotes four of the Essays to the
knowability of natural law, he fails to give us this completed code of the
content of that law. In terms of the Essays themselves, this failure would
seem to derive from the nature of the work; which was essentially
exploratory. More importantly however, the failure would seem to derive
from the essence of natural law itself, and from what appears to be a shift
in Locke's position with regard to the ability of men to come to grips with
their world through the use of their rational faculties. Natural law, for
Locke, is a product of divine will, and hence reflects the rationality of
God. Men, as God's creation, share in that rationality and are obliged to
conform to His will; but given the seventeenth-century view that the cause
must be more perfect than its most perfect effect, it would seem to follow
that the rational faculties of men simply are not equal to those of God.
Reason and sense-perception are the only avenues to a complete
understanding of natural law. Since natural law is not to be found in
action or majority rule these must be directed toward a contemplation of
man's relationship to God. Yet it is here that these faculties seem to begin
to fail us. It is perhaps this which brought Locke to his later
accommodation with the fideist position and his recognition of the
value of tradition and custom in gaining a knowledge of the law of nature
Once the value of faith and tradition are admitted, the strict rationalist
position must give way to accommodate the variance found both within
and between societies. The formulation of the content of a universal
natural law valid for all men becomes much more complex once the strict
rationalist position has been abandoned, and well-nigh impossible once the
value of tradition, faith, and custom in determing that content are
acknowledged.
Although Locke's account of natural law fails to give a clear content of
that law, it does provide us with a clearer understanding of the Treatises. It
is here that he makes the essential distinction between public and
private-a distinction borne out in his account of obligation in terms of
differential tenets of the law of nature (depending upon functional realm).
For Locke the law of nature provides everyone with a set of standards by
which to guide private actions. It also provides an additional (yet not
contradictory) set of standards by which to guide public actions. A study
of the law of nature in Locke's writings is most valuable in making this
distinction between public and private. That the crucial distinction has so
often been neglected has indeed been a disservice to Locke.

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[4521 POLITICAL THEORY I NOVEMBER 1976

NOTES

1. Nevertheless, as Weldon points out, "The prevailing tendency. . . is to

misunderstand and therefore to undervalue the moral sentiments which political
theories formulate, and it is desirable that this tendency should be corrected." T. D.
Weldon, States and Morals (London: John Murray,1946), p. xiv.
2. John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, edited by W. von Leyden (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1954).
3. See Richard Cox, Locke on War and Peace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), p. 50;
and Aaron, John Locke (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955), pp. 271-272.
4. See Harry Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (Toronto: Macmillan, 1950),
Ch. 1; and C. B. Macpherson's The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). A close scrutiny of Macpherson's exegesis
of the text of Second Treatise should be sufficient to alert one to the hazards of
accepting his argument.
5. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, ii, 16.
6. Philip Abrams, Locke: Two Tracts of Government (London: Cambridge
University Press), p. 50.
7. See J. W. Gough's John Locke's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon,
1950), Ch. 1.
8. John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), p. 21.
9. Abrams, Locke, p. 6.
10. Locke, Essays, p. 147. It is interesting to note the contrast between this
position and that of Paul Anderson: "I have yet to see any problem, however
complicated, which, when you looked at it the right way, did not become still more
complicated." Cited in Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Pan,
1967), p. 73,
11. Cited in R. Singh, "John Locke and the Theory of Natural Law," in Political
Studies IX: 2 (June 1961), pp. 109-110. See this article where Locke makes an almost
identical statement in the Essays, seventeen years earlier. See also J. Branowski and R.
Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) for a
discussion of Hobbes's search for mathematical certainty. Aubrey's account is as
follows:

He was 40 years old before he looked on geometry; which happened

accidentally. Being in a gentleman's library Euclid's Elements lay open, and
'twas the 47 El. libri I. He read the proposition. "By G ___" sayd he, (He
would now and then sweare, by way of emphasis) "By G .," sayd he,
"this is impossible!" So he reads the demonstration of it, which referred him
back to such a proposition; which proposition he read. That referred him back
to another, which he also read. et sic deinceps, that at last he was
demonstratively convinced of that trueth. This made him in love with
geometry. [p. 1951
12. Locke,Essays, p. 147.
13. Ibid., see also p. 123.
14. Ibid., p. 133.
15. See Sterling Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1918), pp. 82, passim.

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 Hancey / JOHN LOCKE [4531

16. See Locke Essays, I.

17. Martin Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locker (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1968), p. 56.
18. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, cited in Dunn, The Political
Thought of John.Locke, p. 234.
19. It is only fair to point out that Locke himself does not make this distinction
explicitly, and it can only be made on the basis of a comparison of his earlier writings
on natural law and the later Treatises. Throughout the Essays he used the term
"knowledge" in the sense that I have used the term "awareness."
20. Seliger, The Liberal Politics. .. , p. 54.
21. Locke, essays, p. 133. Note also that the later Locke has modified this earlier
position in another respect, i.e., with regard to the question of whether or not
revelation is properly considered part of the law of nature. The later Locke goes to
great pains to explain away discrepancies between scriptural principles and the
dictates of reason as being the product of human error with regard to languages.
Clearly in this later position he is admitting the efficacy of revelation providing it is
unencumbered by error. See Seliger, The Liberal Politics .. , ch. 2.
22. See note 18.
23. Dunn, The Political Thought. .. , p. 234.
24. R. Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, I, viii, 5.
25. John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, in Works, 1801, vii,
139-140. Cited in Locke's Two Treatises on Government, edited by Peter Laslett, rev.
ed. (New York: Mentor, 1960), p. 101. While one cannot logically infer from this
passage that Locke considered it impossible to attain an understanding of natural law
through the exercise of unassisted reason, the tone of the passage is radically
different from his earlier statements suggesting that an understanding of the law of
nature can be had if we but exercise our faculties of sense-perception and reason. See,
particularly, Essays, IV, "Can Reason Attain to the knowledge of Natural Law
Through Sense-Experience? Yes."
26. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor,
1959), Ch. 6.
27. Locke, Essays, p. 151.
28. Ibid. p. 157.
29. Ibid. p. 201.
30. Ibid. p. 199.
31. I._id. p. 111.
32. Ibid. pp. 161, 165.
33. Seliger, The Liberal Politics. .. 'p. 67.
34. Ibid. See Ch. 2.
35. Locke, Essays, p. 21 1.
36. Ibid., p. 209.
37. Locke, Second Theatise, sec. 163.
38. That the distinction between "public" and "private" has been overlooked in
Locke is a product of our own loss of the sense of that distinction. While Locke has
been accused by many of failing to recognize this distinction, it is my opinion that its
loss is more the product of the way in which Locke has been interpreted by later
writers.
39. Gough, John Locke 's Political Philosophy, p. 8.

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[4541 POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1976

40. Locke,Essays, p. 215.

41. Cicero, Selected Works, edited by M. Grant (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin, 1960), 157-210.
42. Singh, "John Locke...," p. 114.
43. Seliger The Liberal Politics . . ., p. 66.
44. Locke, Essays, p. 199-201. It is interesting to note that Aquinas uses the
same example of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right angles in his
discussion of natural law. See Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, edited by A. P.
D'Entreves (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 125.
45. The only exception here is in the case of "children and idiots," and their
exemption derives from the fact that they do not enjoy the use of reason:

There is no reason that we should deal with the case of children and idiots.
For although the law is binding on all those to whom it is given, it does not,
however, bind those to whom it is not given, and it is not given to those who
are unable to understand it. [Locke, Essays, p. 203]

46. See Locke, Essays, p. 181.

47. Ibid., p. 187.
48. Singh, "John Locke...," states "Thus for Locke the will of God is the
formal cause of obligation without which an action is without moral foundation" (p.
112). He mistakes the will of God which Locke states is the nature of that obligation,
for the basis of the obligation. Singh has clearly misinterpreted Locke here. The
obligation derives out of the relative positions of man and God, and the will of God is
the form that obligation will take, i.e., the law of nature.
49. Locke, Essays, p. 197. The obligation to different tenets of the law of
nature, depending upon one's position among men, lends credence to Dunn's
interpretation of Locke's political philosophy as deriving at least partially from his
Puritan background (see note 8).
50. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 194.
51. Cf. Cicero's On Duties, III.
52. Locke, Essays, p. 215.
53. See Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 15.
54. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 135.
55. Ibid., sec. 12.
56. Leo Strauss, "Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law," American Political Science
Review III, 2 (1958), 500. See Second Treatise, sec. 158. Salus populi suprema lex
est; translated as "the good of the public is the supreme law" originally appears in
Cicero's De Legibus, III, iii.
57. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 136.

James 0. Hancey is a graduate student at the University of British Columbia.

He is currently working on his doctoral dissertation, which deals with
sixteenth-century Italian political philosophy.

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