Ebrahimi - Lim - 2018 - NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG COUNTERNARCOTICS STAKEHOLDERS IN AFGHANISTAN

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Source: Romanian Journal of Political Sciences
Romanian Journal of Political Sciences
Location: Romania
Author(s): Mohammad Haroon Ebrahimi, Seunghoo Lim
Title: NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG
COUNTERNARCOTICS STAKEHOLDERS IN AFGHANISTAN
NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG
Issue: 1/2018
Citation Mohammad Haroon Ebrahimi, Seunghoo Lim. "NETWORK STRUCTURES OF
style: INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG COUNTERNARCOTICS STAKEHOLDERS IN
AFGHANISTAN". Romanian Journal of Political Sciences 1:8-42.
https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=707802
CEEOL copyright 2018
Romanian Journal of Political Science
NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG

Mohammad Haroon Ebrahimi 1 and Seunghoo Lim 2
ABSTRACT
Constraints on resources, staff, facilities, and other features of the multidimensional

problems of the cultivation, production, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs (or drug-
related activities) in Afghanistan require many organizations to work together. The
advantages of this cooperation include effectively and efficiently combating this
multidimensional phenomenon. Addressing this, this paper examines the patternized
interactions among counternarcotics stakeholders in the collaborative process of
combating drugs in Afghanistan based on a typology of network governance: shared
governance network, lead organization-governed network, and network
administrative organization. This study reveals that counternarcotics policies are
implemented in vast networks including governmental, nongovernmental and
international actors in the form of multilevel and multisectoral governance across
seven types of counternarcotics activities, comprising influence in decision making,
information and advice seeking, collaboration, resource sharing, funding provision,
and goal congruence. This research also improves our understanding of network
governance, in which counternarcotics stakeholders are actually collaborating within
several distinct networks across different areas of counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan.
Key Words: interagency collaboration, network governance, Afghanistan

counternarcotics, multilevel and multisectoral governance
1
Mohammad Haroon Ebrahimi is Head of Supervision and Tracking of Property Confiscation in the
Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Kabul, Afghanistan. He was also a former Japanese Grant Aid (PEACE)
Scholar at the International University of Japan. His specializations are network governance, policy
process, and international relations.
2
Seunghoo Lim (Corresponding Author) is Associate Professor in the Public Management and
Policy Analysis Program at the International University of Japan. His specializations are policy
process, collaborative and participatory governance, and public/nonprofit management. Email:
seunghoo.lim@gmail.com.

Introduction
The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) of Afghanistan was established in early

2005 to take a leading role in the development, coordination, monitoring and
evaluation of government counternarcotics (CN) strategy (MCN, 2005). According to
the Constitution and the Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, the MCN plays the leading role in formulating and
coordinating programs and policies with line ministries and organizations to combat
narcotics and other drugs in Afghanistan. The MCN has developed three policies to
target drugs from three different directions: alternative livelihoods, demand reduction,
and law enforcement policy (MCN, 2005). Notably, the MCN has established the
above policies and other action plans, including a campaign to eradicate cultivated
poppy fields, every year through coordination and collaboration with other line
ministries and concerned organizations. As the MCN itself lacks the operational
capacity and authority to implement these plans and policies, proper coordination
and collaboration among line ministries is essential for the successful
implementation of CN policies, plans and programs.
Despite numerous efforts to combat drugs in Afghanistan, the cultivation, production,

trafficking and use of illicit drugs remains a major challenge to Afghanistan‘s
socioeconomic development. The MCN cannot achieve its goals and objectives
without collaborating with other relevant governmental institutions and international
agencies. Therefore, the MCN needs to enhance interagency collaboration and
coordination, especially with key stakeholders, to effectively incorporate combating
drugs into priority programs and to increase operational capacity to implement plans
and strategies to achieve the goals of combating drugs and eliminating the
cultivation, production, traffic and use of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. To enhance
interagency collaboration, the existing patternized interactions in the collaborative
process of combating drugs among CN stakeholders in Afghanistan need to be examined.
Notably, this study employs social network analysis to describe the importance and
position of each CN stakeholder and the patternized collaborative affiliations among
multisectoral actors, including governmental organizations (GOs), international
organizations (IOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at different levels
and dimensions. These independent actors, which have their own goals and

priorities, form networks in order to attain outcomes that they could not achieve
alone (Isett et al., 2011, p. i161). To explain the distinct structural and institutional
properties of connectedness and interdependency of actors, Provan and Kenis
(2008) categorized the governance types of organizational networks into shared
governance network, lead organization-governed network, and network
administrative organization. Based on this classification, this study seeks to
understand the patternized interactions of stakeholders in policy networks regarding
seven main counternarcotics activities—i.e., influence in decision making,
information and advice seeking, collaboration, resource sharing, funding provision,
and goal congruence—and to identify the structure of each network based on the
classification created by Provan and Kenis (2008) using a degree centrality measure
and degree distributions. That is, the research question of this study is how the
structures of the seven types of networks regarding Afghanistan counternarcotics
activities relate to this given typology of network types. This paper will subsequently
offer mechanisms and policy recommendations to enhance interagency collaboration
between the MCN and other stakeholders, allowing them to better lead, collaborate,
and coordinate CN activities in Afghanistan.
Interagency collaboration
Greater complexity has made the world smaller, but interconnected problems have
increased in such a way that a single organization or, in some cases, even a country,
is unable to solve some of them. One such problem is the cultivation, production,
and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Despite government efforts to combat
and eliminate drug-related activities in Afghanistan, the cultivation and production of
drugs continues to increase. Additionally, we have not seen significant success in
combating drugs over the past one and half decades as this multidimensional
phenomenon has taken root in Afghanistan, the region and the world. Collaboration
among different stakeholders, including regional and international institutions, is
crucial in combating this multidimensional phenomenon. Numerous efforts have
been made to develop conceptual frameworks guiding the assessment of
interagency collaboration in public policy processes (Tseng, 2004). However, the
changeability and complexity of studying collaboration, the nature of cooperative
efforts, and diverse isotropic regularities make studying collaboration difficult (Knapp, 1995).
10

To improve our understanding of interagency collaboration, interagency operation

must first be clarified; that is, interagency operation ―involves more than one agency
working together in a planned and formal way rather than simply through informal
networking (although the latter may support and develop the former). This can be at
a strategic or operational level‖ (Warmington et al., 2004, p. 16). Similarly,
interagency collaboration is multidimensional and developmental rather than static.
Therefore, it may develop and change. However, considering the area and level at
which scholars study interagency collaboration, its definition may also refer to those
levels and arenas. For instance, Flynn and Harbin (1987, p. 35) suggested that at
the agency level, ―interagency collaboration is a general concept that describes a
variety of efforts to reform the current categorical service delivery system.‖
Mattessich et al. (2001, p. 39) defined collaboration as ―a mutually beneficial and

well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations with a
commitment to a set of common goals, a joint structure and shared responsibility, as
well as mutual authority and accountability.‖ Multisectoral or multiactor relationships
can be maintained based on trust and a shared vision that potentially enhances the
ability of the parties to achieve qualitatively better outcomes (Gray, 1989; Huxham,
1996). Other scholars, such as Melaville et al. (1993, p. 20), recognize collaboration
as ―a series of interrelated activities undertaken by stakeholders through five stages:
[1] getting together, [2] building mutual trust, [3] developing a common strategic plan, [4]
taking action, and [5] going to scale (i.e., implementing policies on public service delivery).‖
Collaborative network structures
There are a variety of collaborative network structures given the different types of
involved actors, network boundaries, and the presence or absence of various
relational types. Moreover, studies have shown that what a network can achieve is
indeed the outcome of its structural form (Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Burt, 2005; Cross
et al., 2002). Provan and Kenis (2008) define three basic models of network
governance: a shared governance network, a lead organization network, and a
network administrative organization (NAO). Each of these models varies in its
structure. None of these forms appears to be globally dominant; rather, each structure has
specific capabilities, which means that each network varies in what it can best accomplish.
11

In a shared governance network, several administrations work together as a network

without a specific governing organization. The administration of cooperative actions
remains entirely with the participants in the network (see Figure 1a). In this model,
the network members make every decision and control the activities of the network
on their own without separate official administrative bodies. However, due to an
excess of members in the network, a few members from the network may perform
certain coordination and organizational actions.
The strengths of the shared governance form are its adaptability, its ability to act
quickly based on member needs, and the inclusion and participation of all the
network members. The disadvantage of this model is its moderate inefficiency. This
is a form that appears to be perfect for networks that are geographically localized
and where members of the network will likely have functional and complete direct
participation (Provan & Kenis, 2008). According to Provan and Kenis (2008), shared
network governance is most efficient in attaining network-level results when ―[1] trust
is widely shared among network participants (high-density, decentralized trust), [2]
there are relatively few network participants, [3] network-level goal consensus is high,
and [4] the need for network-level competencies is low‖ (ibid., p. 241).
The lead organization model can arise in horizontal multidimensional networks,

especially when an organization has enough legitimacy and assets to take the
leading role (see Figure 1b). This model primarily arises in state-funded services in
which a central service provider with a central location in the network takes the
leadership position (Provan & Kenis, 2008). For instance, according to the Counter
Narcotics and Intoxicants Law, the MCN is the lead organization in making policies
and coordinating CN activities in Afghanistan. In addition to preserving their own
goals, all the affiliates in this network model have a shared purpose; they might also
interact and work with each other.
However, one member of the group functions as the leading actor, coordinating every
operation and making major decisions. That member administers the network to attain
its goals and simplify the activities of the associated groups (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
According to Provan and Kenis (2008), to attain network-level results, lead organization
network governance is most efficient when ―[1] trust is narrowly shared among network
participants (low-density, highly centralized trust), [2] there are a relatively moderate
12

number of network participants, [3] network-level goal consensus is moderately low, and
[4] the need for network-level competencies is moderate‖ (ibid., p. 241).
An NAO is an alternative model that may be used to avoid the inefficiency of shared
governance networks and the complications over supremacy and confrontation of
lead organization-governed networks. The main concept behind an NAO is that a
distinct managerial body is established specifically to manage and coordinate the
network and its activities (see Figure 1c). The main goal of forming an NAO is to
build network governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The NAO can be a GO or an
NGO even if the network participants are largely for-profit corporations (Human and
Provan, 2000; Provan & Kenis, 2008).
Groups and members of the network can cooperate with each other; however, a
distinct and sovereign organization coordinates the actions and makes the important
decisions. According to Provan and Kenis (2008), to attain network-level outcomes,
network governance with an NAO is most effective when ―[1] trust is moderately to
widely shared among network participants (moderate density trust), [2] there are a
moderate number to many network participants, [3] when network-level goal
consensus is moderately high; and [4] when need for network-level competencies is
high‖ (ibid., p. 241).
Figure 1a: Shared Governance Network Figure 1b: Lead Organization

Network
13

Figure 1c: Network Administrative Organization
Source: Kenis & Provan (2009, p. 447)
Multilevel and multisectoral networks
Hooghe and Marks (2004) classify multilevel governance from the perspective of
governance levels into two types: federalism and monocentric governance. As
federalism tends to share power between national and local governments, the most
important concern in this type of governance is the correlation between the central
government and local governments. By contrast, monocentric governance is an
approach in which the government is the centre of authority and political power
(Rhodes, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Kooiman, 2003). The government controls society and
resources in three main steps. First, the state groups social problems and sets the
agendas. Second, the state makes decisions concerning policy goals and means.
Third, the state implements policies through a top-down approach. However,
monocentric governance has been criticized from many recent governance
perspectives (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Hill and Lynn, 2004; Kooiman, 1993;
Rhodes, 1997).
More recent studies (Henttonen et al., 2016; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Raadschelders
& Vigoda-Gadot, 2015) argue that networks are not single-level horizontal structures
but rather multilayered and multidimensional structures. Rather than conceptualizing
and measuring relationships in networks based on the premise that the nodes and
14

links in networks lie on a single-level structure, they contend that networks inevitably
comprise a multilevel and multidimensional structure in which actors in different
layers of hierarchy are vertically distinct from each other, and actors in different
sectors—including state and non-state actors—are connected by inter-sector
relationships (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Curry, 2015; Park and Lim, 2018; Zeleznik,
2016).
Methodology
This paper studies interagency collaboration among CN stakeholders and the

different line ministries of the MCN. Many scholars have used a social network
analysis approach to study this kind of topic. For example, according to Rhodes and
March (1992), policy network analysis has been recognized as an effective
hypothetical instrument for understanding the complicated processes of making
public policies. In this type of analysis, the multifarious, decentralized, and
complicated facts of contemporary decision making and policy modification can be
concisely explained, and the dominant policy stakeholders and diverse interactions
among stakeholders in the policymaking processes can be classified by an SNA
approach.
Data
In order to consider the aspects of multisectoral and multilevel network governance

structures where multiorganizational collaboration on Afghanistan CN activities in
Afghanistan will be examined beyond a state-centric or monocentric governance
style. Instead, data collection was conducted in Kabul City by focusing on three
particular sectors—governmental actors, non-profits, and international organizations
at multiple levels including ministries, deputy ministries, and departments from 18
June to 30 August 2016 (see Figure 2).
15

Figure 1. Data collection design considering multilevel and multidimensional network

structures comprising of Afghanistan CN stakeholders and their relationships
Source: Authors’ own data collection design
In this study, snowball sampling was used to i) select the relevant respondents and
define the proper boundaries of the actors involved in the networks and ii) examine their
relationships with others. This approach starts with very carefully selected initial actors
with the most reliable information on and knowledge of the issues in which researchers
are interested and asks them first to nominate and recommend up to five other actors
which are included within the boundary of the targeted networks. Then, the
recommended actors are approached by the researchers and also given equal
opportunities to list the names of other organizations actually and potentially engaged in
the targeted networks.
Through several rounds of the repetitive referrals and nominations until the names of
actors are saturated, the boundary of networks is expanded and finally determined
(Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Scott, 2017). As the final step, all of the actors indicated as
the involved actors are asked to reveal their relationships with the other actors within the
targeted networks, which becomes the basis of constructing network/relational datasets
for research. Snowball sampling is a typical method for detecting and specifying the
boundary of networks—i.e., which actors compose the specific networks—in the
16

research areas in the field of network studies (Prell, 2012; Robins, 2015), and this
method renders the investigation of the targeted networking activities more feasible.
As part of the snowball sampling in this study, the MCN—determined as the original seed
actor that was the most relevant to administering counternarcotics issues after reviewing a
variety of materials, including the Constitutional Law of Afghanistan, the Counter Narcotics
and Intoxicants Law, CN policy documents, published literature, and publicly available
documents—was initially contacted to nominate other stakeholders involved in the
networks by conducting interviews with approximately 40 high- and mid-level bureaucrats
in the MCN, the line ministries, and other stakeholders (such as NGOs and IOs).
The careful reviews of relevant literature and documents as well as the earlier stage
interviews with public officials at multiple levels within the MCN and other stakeholders
also enabled the multiplexity of relationships over seven primary activities of
Afghanistan counternarcotics issues—influence in decision making, information and
advice seeking, collaboration, resource sharing, funding provision, and goal
congruence—to be recognized among the 93 organizations in total that were identified
as being engaged in counternarcotics activities from our multiple rounds of referrals and
nominations of the actors.
When the set of stakeholders was expanded to 93 actors, we returned to the previous
actors and supplemented their previous responses with the added actors repeatedly. All
of the interview respondents were the staff (mainly, high-ranking officials or
spokespersons at the decision-making level and the heads of departments at the
implementation level) in charge of counternarcotics issues representing these 93 actors.
A survey questionnaire was developed to detect the relationships of the 93 actual
stakeholders with the others by asking the interviewees to indicate their partner
organizations (up to five) in the specific counternarcotics activities among the seven
aforementioned (see Appendix 1 for survey questionnaire and Appendix 2 for the list of
93 actors and their acronyms used in this study).
Network methods
Through extensive data collection and relational surveys, network data on ties
among 93 organizations were collected. As each actor was asked to indicate the
17

most influential actors, the sources of information, advice, resources, or funds as

well as the collaborative or goal-congruent partners, the links observed in our
surveys are directional. Considering such a directionality of edges here, the in-
degree centrality measure was employed to detect influential actors in the seven
multiple networks regarding counternarcotics issues. In-degree centrality is a
classical measure of influence: as other actors nominate a high-degree actor, the
latter is classically interpreted as being prominent and respected and central in the
network (Borgatti et al., 2013). The in-degree centrality of focal actor i can be
systematically computed by counting the numbers of alters citing or referring to this
‗ego‘ (i) as the source of specific resources or partner of targeted activities (Prell,
2012, p. 97), as below:
() ∑ ( )
where,
= 1 if actor i is mentioned by actor j (binary number);
n = the number of nodes within the network.
To interpret the networks in relation to the categories provided by Provan and Kenis
(2008), in-degree distributions were utilized. The characteristic differences among
the three main types of network structure—shared governance, lead organization-
governed network, and network administration organization—could be captured by
distinct in-degree distributions. More specifically, i) the number of existing lead
organizations—a single (or two) or multiple distributed central actors; ii) the
differences in in-degrees between leading actors and the following actors—the
skewedness of in-degree distributions; and iii) the institutional property of the central
actor as a part of the substantial aspects of the central actors—whether it is an
insider actor within a network or a intervener or coordinator from the outside of a
network—are used for discerning the 3-type typology of network governance.
Results
This study identified 93 actors at multiple levels and dimensions that are involved in
seven different networks and different arenas of collaborative CN activities in
Afghanistan. Table 1 summarizes the in-degree centrality measures for the top ten
actors across the seven counternarcotics-related networks.
18

The seven network figures (Figures 3a through 9a) show the position of each actor in
the specific network. To better understand the patternized interactions of the 95
actors within these seven networks, this paper applies a multilevel and
multidimensional system of network structures and governance (Park & Lim, 2018)
of collaborative CN activities in Afghanistan. Moreover, this study tries to assess
each network structure based on the three types of network governance models
identified by Provan and Kenis (2008).
19

Table 1. Key actors across the seven collaborative networks regarding counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan
Resource- Financial Goal-
Influence Information Advice Collaboration
Ranks sharing Resource congruence
Network Network Network Network
Network Network Network
MoIA MoIA MCN MCN MCN INL-CN UNODC
1
(25, .272) (18, .196) (19, .207) (20, .109) (17, .185) (24, .130) (16, .087)
MAIL MCN MoIA UNODC MoIA UNODC MCN
2
(21, .228) (16, .174) (12, .130) (16, .087) (17, .185) (22, .120) (15, .082)
MoPH MoPH UNODC MoIA MoPH MoF MoIA
3
(19, .207) (14, .152) (12, .130) (12, .065) (13, .141) (13, .017) (15, .082)
MCN MAIL MoPH MoPH UNODC MoIA MoPH
4
(17, .185) (11, .120) (11, .120) (12, .065) (8, .087) (9, .049) (15, .082)
MoE UNODC MAIL INL-CN MAIL British-E INL-CN
5
(13, .141) (10, .109) (6, .065) (8, .043) (7, .076) (8, .043) (11, .060)
MRRD MRRD MRRD MAIL MoD Colombo-Plan MAIL
6
(12, .130) (6, .065) (4, .043) (4, .022) (7, .076) (8, .043) (10, .054)
MHRA INL-CN INL-CN MoE IDLG MCN MRRD
7
(9, .098) (4, .043) (3, .033) (4, .022) (6, .065) (7, .038) (6, .033)
MoD MoE MoLSAMD British-E MRRD MoPH Colombo-Plan
8
(6, .065) (4, .043) (3, .033) (3, .016) (6, .065) (2, .011) (5, .027)
MoLSAMD MoLSAMD MoD Colombo-Plan MoIA-DM WB MHRA
9
(6, .065) (4, .043) (2, .022) (3, .016) (6, .065) (2, .011) (4, .022)
MoIA-DM MCN-PAD MoE MHRA INL-CN CARD-F MoE
10
(4, .043) (3, .033) (2, .022) (3, .016) (4, .043) (1, .005) (4, .022)
Density .019 .016 .012 .015 .015 .013 .015
In-centralization .255 .182 .196 .051 .171 .062 .040
Notes: The first value in the parentheses indicates the in-degree centrality of each individual actor, and the second value is its
normalized in-degree centrality value in each network.
Source: Authors’ own calculations
20

Major actors in the influence network of CN policy in Afghanistan
The results in Table 1 indicate the ten most influential actors in the influence network
according to their in-degree centrality measures. The Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA)
is the most influential actor based on its highest in-degree centrality measure
compared with all other actors in the influence network. Furthermore, its central
position and number of ties in the network figure, as shown in Figure 3a, indicate that
the MoIA is the most central actor in the influence network and in the CN policy
process in Afghanistan. Due to its second rank for in-degree centrality, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) is another influential actor in this network.
As shown in Figure 3b, approximately four actors—located outside the right side of
the normal curve with fewer gaps in in-degrees among these four, which have in-
degrees that are significantly higher than the others—are the most important in this
network and may have more influence over CN policies despite having their own
priorities. The MoIA, the MAIL, and the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) are the
most influential actors followed by the MCN, which is responsible for leading and
coordinating the CN activities of the government of Afghanistan according to the
Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law. Based on the polycentric shape of the
network and the multiple observed network members that have more influence and
may perform coordination and organizational actions, this can be classified as a
shared governance network.
21

Figure 3a: Influence Network

Notes: The colours of the nodes are based on the type of actor: red for governmental
actors, green for nongovernmental actors, and blue for international actors. The
shapes of the nodes indicate the level of each: triangles for the first (i.e., ministry)
level, squares for the second (i.e., deputy ministry) level, and pentagons for the third
(i.e., departmental) level.
Figure 3b: In-degree distribution histogram for the Influence Network
Notes: The x-axis represents in-degree ties of the actors in the network, and the y-
axis shows their densities. A normal curve (coloured blue) is overlaid on the
histogram of in-degree ties.
22

Major actors within the information network of CN policy in Afghanistan
Governmental organizations were found to be the most reliable actors as the sources of
information about CN activities. Table 1 lists the top ten actors in this network based on
the in-degree centrality measure. The MoIA ranks first in in-degree centrality, indicating
that most other actors depend on this organization for reliable information when making
CN policies. The MCN, one of the most reliable members of this network and specifically
established to lead, manage, and coordinate CN activities in Afghanistan, ranks second in
terms of in-degree centrality. The MoPH, which ranks third in in-degree centrality, is also
an important governmental source of reliable information on CN activities in this case.
As shown in Figure 4b, approximately five actors—located outside the right side of the
normal curve with close distances in terms of in-degrees among these five—are the most
pivotal in this network. Therefore, based on the classification of network governance types
developed by Provan and Kenis (2008), this information network with multiple cores can
be regarded as a shared governance network.
Figure 4a: Information Network

Notes: The colours of the nodes are based on the type of actor: red for governmental actors,
green for nongovernmental actors, and blue for international actors. The shapes of the nodes
indicate the level of each: triangles for the first (i.e., ministry) level, squares for the second (i.e.,
deputy ministry) level, and pentagons for the third (i.e., departmental) level.
23

Figure 4b: In-degree distribution histogram for Information Network

Major actors in the advice network of CN policy in Afghanistan
The ten key actors in the advice network are indicated in Table 1 according to the in-
degree centrality. These are the five actors that have been identified by other actors
as the most influential organizations in delivering reliable advice about CN policy
processes in Afghanistan. The MCN is recognized as the most dominantly influential
actor in the advice network with seven more in-degrees compared with the MoIA and
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which is ranked second in
in-degree centrality. According to the Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law, the
MoIA is responsible for detecting and seizing drugs and arresting drug dealers.
Additionally, the MoIA is the key law enforcement and security organization in
Afghanistan. The UNODC is an IO providing technical and financial support for CN
activities in Afghanistan and has been recognized as one of the most influential
providers of reliable advice in this study.
Based on the distribution histogram of in-degree links observed in the advice

network, as seen in Figure 5b, the advice network can be regarded as a lead
organization network since the in-degree number of the MCN, as the predominantly
leading actor within the advice network, is the highest and the subsequent degree
metrics are significantly lower.
24

Figure 5a: Advice Network

Figure 5b: In-degree distribution histogram for Advice Network

25

Major actors in the collaboration network of CN activities in Afghanistan
As indicated above, collaboration among all stakeholders is crucial to the successful

implementation of CN policies in Afghanistan. Table 1 lists the top ten stakeholders in
the collaboration network according to the in-degree centrality. These are the actors
that were identified by the other actors as regularly collaborating partners in CN issues
and activities. The MCN, which ranked first for in-degree centrality, is considered the
most central actor collaborating on CN issues and activities. The UNOCD (ranked
second for in-degree centrality), the MoIA (ranked third), and the MoPH (ranked
fourth) are the other most influential actors in this network. Overall, the collaboration
network comprises two groups of actors from the two-dimensional categories of
governmental actors (the MCN, the MoIA, the MoPH, and the MAIL) and IOs (the
UNODC and the INL). Governmental actors play a major role in decision making and
the implementation of policies, while IOs collaborate to financially and technically
support certain CN programs. Figure 6a also indicates that these collaborative
interactions exist at all levels and dimensions in the collaboration network.
According to the in-degree distribution described in Figure 6b, multiple competing

leading actors exist—such as the MCN, the UNOCD, the MoIA, and the MoPH—for
which the in-degree numbers are similar. Thus, this collaboration network with
several sub-leaders can be categorized as a shared governance network.
26

Figure 6a: Collaboration Network

Figure 6b: In-degree distribution histogram for Collaboration Network

Notes: The x-axis represents in-degree ties of the actors in the network, and the y-axis shows
their densities. A normal curve (coloured blue) is overlaid on the histogram of in-degree ties.
27

Major actors in the resource-sharing network of CN policymaking in Afghanistan
Table 1 shows the top ten actors in integrating staff and resources for achieving the
purposes of CN activities. According to the in-degree centrality measure, the
outstanding three actors in this network are the MoIA, the MCN, and the MoPH. As
expected from the Counter Narcotics and Intoxicants Law, these are the key
stakeholders of CN activities sharing specific responsibilities regarding CN activities
in Afghanistan. The significantly higher in-degrees for these three actors can also be
seen in the in-degree distribution (see Figure 7b), and this network can be
considered a shared governance or participant governance network in which multiple
leading organizations cooperatively work together.
Figure 7a: Resource-sharing Network

28

Figure 7b: In-degree distribution histogram for Resource-sharing Network

Figure 2. The resource-sharing network of CN policymaking in Afghanistan
Major actors in the financial resource network of CN policymaking in Afghanistan
Table 1 represents the top ten actors in providing funds for CN activities in
Afghanistan. Based on in-degree centrality as a measure of the frequencies of ‗tie
nominations‘ from organizations—reflecting their financers—the two major financial
supporters of CN activities in Afghanistan are IOs—the International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs-Counter Narcotics (INL-CL) and the UNODC. Another
interesting point within the financial network is that the connections among the actors
from all three dimensions—governmental (such as the MoF), nongovernmental (such
as the Colombo Plan), and international (such as the INL, the UNODC, and certain
embassies)—are evident.
The INL works with the government of Afghanistan to support and address different
law enforcement issues and CN activities. The UNODC is the global leader in the
fight against crime and illegal drugs. That is, the leading actors in the financial
resource network in CN activities in Afghanistan (the INL and the UNODC) are the
international actors that work with the Afghan government to support CN activities
and the rule of law. Therefore, the financial resource network is multidimensional,
and many governmental and non-governmental actors rely on funds from outside of
Afghanistan, i.e., from international organizations, to implement CN activities in
29

Afghanistan. As this network is led by two outside international actors working to

manage, organize, coordinate, and financially support CN activities, it can be said
that they are the NAOs for this network.
Figure 8a: Financial Resource Network

Notes 8a: The colours of the nodes are based on the type of actor: red for
governmental actors, green for nongovernmental actors, and blue for international
actors. The shapes of the nodes indicate the level of each: triangles for the first (i.e.,
ministry) level, squares for the second (i.e., deputy ministry) level, and pentagons for
the third (i.e., departmental) level.
30

Figure 8b: In-degree distribution histogram for Financial Resource Network

Notes 8b: The x-axis represents in-degree ties of the actors in the network, and the
y-axis shows their densities. A normal curve (coloured blue) is overlaid on the
Major actors in the goal-congruence network of CN policymaking in Afghanistan
Table 1 presents the top ten actors in the goal-congruence network, which indicates a
shared vision and goals regarding CN in Afghanistan. The competing leading actors
with the relatively highest in-degree centralities in this network include governmental
as well as international actors, as expected. For example, the MCN, the MoIA, and the
MoPH can be regarded the major governmental actors with specific responsibilities to
combat drug-related activities in Afghanistan. They have also been found as the
influential actors that have a shared vision. Another group of major nongovernmental
international actors recognized in this network includes the UNODC and the INL-CN.
Therefore, the goal-congruence network comprises multidimensional leading actors.
Hence, among the three types of network governance, the goal-congruence network
can be classified as a shared governance network.
31

Figure 9a: Goal-congruence Network

Notes 9a: The colours of the nodes are based on the type of actor: red for
governmental actors, green for nongovernmental actors, and blue for international
actors. The shapes of the nodes indicate the level of each: triangles for the first (i.e.,
ministry) level, squares for the second (i.e., deputy ministry) level, and pentagons for
the third (i.e., departmental) level.
Figure 9b: In-degree distribution histogram for Goal-congruence Network

Notes 9b: The x-axis represents in-degree ties of the actors in the network, and the
y-axis shows their densities. A normal curve (coloured blue) is overlaid on the
32

Conclusion
This study has made a first exploratory attempt at applying descriptive SNA to
determine the major influential actors in the actual networks of CN activities in
Afghanistan and categorize the empirical networks into one of three types of network
governance. That is, this study identified influential actors in the different types of
networks and discussed the configurations and structures of each network to identify
the collaboration structure, forms of network governance, and influential
organizations collaborating in different networks and arenas of CN activities in
Afghanistan. Furthermore, this study emphasizes the policymaking and
implementation levels, as well as the governmental, nongovernmental and
international dimensions, to determine their positions in the collaborative network
structures for CN activities in Afghanistan.
Likewise, this study showed how the same set of stakeholders engaged in the
Afghanistan process of CN policymaking and implementation are connected through
multiple types of relations across the governmental, nongovernmental, and
international sectors in the form of multiactor and multilevel governance (van den
Berg, 2011, p. 17). Therefore, this study provides an understanding of the ideal types
of network governance (Kenis & Provan, 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2008) and their
applications in the settings in which CN stakeholders are actually collaborating within
seven networks in different areas of CN activities in Afghanistan.
Among the actors interacting to influence the CN policy process in Afghanistan, the
MoIA, the MAIL, and the MCN are the most influential. The configurations of
influence, information, collaboration, and goal-congruence networks can be
classified as shared governance forms, as several stakeholders work together to
form self-organizing networks without specific dominant governance organizations,
and network members make decisions and control activities on their own without
relying on a separate official administrative office for those collaborative activities. In
other types of networks, including advice and resource-sharing networks, several
competing central organizations such as the MCN, the MoIA, the MoPH, and the
UNODC have been recognized the lead organizations. Lastly, in the financial
resource network, two outside international actors, as NAOs, are the main providers
of funds to CN activities in Afghanistan.
33

The empirical findings of this study indicate that GOs have generally been the most
influential actors across the different networks of CN activities in Afghanistan.
Additionally, IOs, including the UNODC and the INL-CN, also play significant and
major roles in several networks. Furthermore, actors from multiple levels and
dimensions have been involved in different aspects of Afghan CN activities.
According to the laws, policies, and reported organizational structures, the form of
governance tends to have hierarchical and vertical arrangements of organizations.
However, this study empirically shows that the actors at different levels and across
different dimensions interact with one another to achieve common policy objectives
and goals regarding CN.
To address the complex and multidimensional issues of drug-related activities in

Afghanistan, collaboration among different line ministries, especially among key
stakeholders, is crucial. In particular, financial resources can play a critical role at
various stages of decision making through the implementation of policy. Since
Afghanistan lacks its own revenue sources to fund the expense of combating drug
problems and related activities, CN activities rely on foreign aid. The financial resource
network is mainly led and managed by outside international actors. Therefore, the
government needs to maintain its own sustainable funding source for its policies.
Above all, to enhance the interagency collaboration and governance of CN-related
activities in Afghanistan, eliciting support from key decision makers and direct service
providers is important. To gain such support, the government should establish a
mechanism through which it can request support from and collaboration with actors
from different levels and dimensions without disturbing the priorities of those actors.
As the empirical findings of this study show, CN stakeholders are collaborating in

distinct areas of CN activities of interest to us in Afghanistan; however, the
configurations or forms of those networks are not officially defined by law or
determined by a specific policy or mechanism. Moreover, formal and informal
interactions among stakeholders from the distinct levels and dimensions can be
identified within each network. In fact, Article 7 of the Law on Campaign against
Intoxicants, Drugs and their Control mandates the establishment of a ―High Counter
Intoxicants and Narcotics Commission‖ to better implement the provisions of the law
34

and effectively combat narcotics. The 8th Article of that same law defines the ―Duties
and Authorities of the Commissions‖.
Beyond the establishment of ―the High Counter Intoxicants and Narcotics

Commission‖, the results of this exploratory and descriptive study recommend that
the MCN and the Government of Afghanistan consider seven structures of
collaborative networks achieved in different areas of CN activities to improve the
coordination of CN activities and enhance interagency collaborations among CN
stakeholders. This, we believe, would provide a better understanding of the actual
networks around and beneath participating stakeholders to possibly improve the
capacity of policymakers and implementers to achieve policy goals as planned and
designed. Moreover, the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of each actor within
the actual networks should be codified and defined based on its observed position
and status as the centrality of each policy stakeholder in policy networks is directly
related to its abilities to complete missions and tasks regarding counternarcotics.
35

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Appendix 1: Survey questionnaire
a. Influence network: Which actors are particularly influential in decision making for
countering narcotics policies? Please choose the names of organizations, up to five.
b. Information network: From which actors does your organization obtain

information about the counternarcotics activities? Please choose the names of
organizations, up to five.
c. Advice network: From which actors does your organization seek reliable advice
about counternarcotics policy processes? Please choose the names of
organizations, up to five.
d. Collaboration network: With which actors does your organization collaborate

regularly concerning counternarcotics issues and activities? Please choose the
names of organizations, up to five.
e. Resource-sharing network: Which actors are particularly integrating their staffs

and resources for the purposes of counternarcotics activities with those of your
organization? Please choose the names of organizations, up to five.
f. Financial resource network: Which actors are particularly providing funds for the
purposes of counternarcotics activities to your organization? Please choose the
names of organizations, up to five.
g. Goal-congruence network: Which actors in particular have shared visions and
goals regarding counteringnarcotics in Afghanistan with your organization?
Please choose the names of organizations, up to five.
39

Appendix 2: List of actors and acronyms in this study
Name of Organization Acronym

Australian Agency for International Development AAID
Afghanistan Civil Service Commission ACSC
Afghanistan Civil Service Commission-Afghanistan Civil Service Institute ACSC-ACSI
Afghanistan National Bureau of Environmental Protection ANBEP
British Embassy British-E
Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development-Facility CARD-F
Criminal Justice Task Force CJTF
CJTF Court CJTF-Court
Counter-Narcotic Commission of the House of Representatives CNCHR
Central Statistics Organization CSO
Chinese Embassy Chinese-E
The Colombo-Plan Colombo-Plan
Decisive Support DS
French Embassy French-E
General Directorate of Physical Education and Sport of Afghanistan GDPhESA
Good Performers Initiative GPI
The Global-fund Global-fund
Independent Directorate of Local Governance IDLG
Independent Directorate of Local Governance-Directorate of Provincial Relations IDLG-DPR
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs US Embassy-Counter Narcotics INL-CN
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs US Embassy-DDA INL-DDA
Japan Embassy Japan-E
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock MAIL
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock-Department of Agriculture statistics MAIL-DAS
Ministry of Counter Narcotics MCN
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Alternative Livelihoods MCN-ALD
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Drug Demand Reduction MCN-DDR
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Deputy Ministry of Planning and Policy MCN-DMPP
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Finance and Administration Directorate MCN-FAD
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-General Directorate of Policy and Planning MCN-GDPP
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Human Resource Directorate MCN-HRD
40

Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Internal Inspection Directorate MCN-IID

Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Law Enforcement Directorate MCN-LED
Ministry of Counter Narcotics Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate MCN-MED
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Minister‘s Private Office MCN-MPO
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Public Awareness Directorate MCN-PAD
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Procurement Department MCN-PD
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Provincial Relations Coordination MCN-PRC
Ministry of Counter Narcotics Regional and International Coordination MCN-RIC
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Research and Studies Directorate MCN-RSD
Ministry of Counter Narcotics-Director of Survey MCN-SD
Ministry of Haji and Religious Affairs MHRA
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development MRRD
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development-AIRD MRRD-AIRD
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development-Directorate of Public Information MRRD-DPI
Ministry of Borders, Tribal, Ethics Affairs MoBTEA
Ministry of Borders, Tribal, Ethics Affairs-Directorate of Jirga's and Coordination Tribal Affairs MoBTEA-DJCTA
Ministry of Borders, Tribal, Ethics Affairs-Research and Study Directorate MoBTEA-HRB-RSD
Ministry of Borders, Tribal, Ethics Affairs-Research and Study Directorate MoBTEA-RSD
Ministry of Defence MoD
Ministry of Defence-Detection and Intelligence MoD-DI
Ministry of Defence-Directorate of Strategic Planning MoD-DSP
Ministry of Defence-Intelligence MoD-I
Ministry of Defence-Office on Drugs of Deputy Ministry of Policy and Strategy MoD-ODDMOS
Ministry of Defence-Office of Spokesperson MoD-OS
Ministry of Education MoE
Ministry of Energy and Water MoEW
Ministry of Finance MoF
Ministry of Finance-Afghan Customs Department MoF-ACD
Ministry of Foreign Affairs MoFA
Ministry of Higher Education MoHE
Ministry of Interior Affairs MoIA
Ministry of Interior Affairs-Border Police MoIA-BP
Ministry of Interior Affairs-Counter Narcotic Police Afghanistan MoIA-CNPA
41

Ministry of Interior Affairs-Deputy Ministry MoIA-DM

Ministry of Interior Affairs-Police 119 MoIA-P119
Ministry of Information and Culture MoIC
Ministry of Information and Culture-Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs MoIC-DMYA
Ministry of Justice MoJ
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled MoLSAMD
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled-Directorate of Social Facilities Adjustment MoLSAMD-DSFA
Ministry of Public Heath MoPH
Ministry of Public Heath-Drug Demand Reduction Department MoPH-DDR
Ministry of Public Heath-NACP MoPH-NACP
Ministry of Women‘s Affairs MoWA
Ministry of Women‘s Affairs-Directorate of Coordination of Social and Economic Services MoWA-DCSES
National Security Council NSC
National Directorate of Security NDS
United Nations Children‘s Fund UNICEF
Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRT
Regional Agricultural Development Program RADP
Russian Embassy Russian-E
Supreme Audit Office SAO
Sunless Council SC
United Nations UN
United Nations Organization-Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women UN-Women
United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS UNAIDS
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA
United Nation Development Programme UNDP
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC
United States Agency for International Development USAID
World Bank WB
World Health Organization WHO
42

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Source: Romanian Journal of Political Sciences

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NETWORK STRUCTURES OF INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AMONG

Constraints on resources, staff, facilities, and other features of the multidimensional

Key Words: interagency collaboration, network governance, Afghanistan

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The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) of Afghanistan was established in early

Despite numerous efforts to combat drugs in Afghanistan, the cultivation, production,

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To improve our understanding of interagency collaboration, interagency operation

Mattessich et al. (2001, p. 39) defined collaboration as ―a mutually beneficial and

Collaborative network structures

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In a shared governance network, several administrations work together as a network

The lead organization model can arise in horizontal multidimensional networks,

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Figure 1a: Shared Governance Network Figure 1b: Lead Organization

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Figure 1c: Network Administrative Organization

Source: Kenis & Provan (2009, p. 447)

Multilevel and multisectoral networks

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This paper studies interagency collaboration among CN stakeholders and the

In order to consider the aspects of multisectoral and multilevel network governance

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Figure 1. Data collection design considering multilevel and multidimensional network

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most influential actors, the sources of information, advice, resources, or funds as

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Source: Authors’ own calculations

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Major actors in the influence network of CN policy in Afghanistan

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Figure 3a: Influence Network

Figure 3b: In-degree distribution histogram for the Influence Network

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Major actors within the information network of CN policy in Afghanistan

Figure 4a: Information Network

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Figure 4b: In-degree distribution histogram for Information Network