How Does the Stability of Support Bases Influence the Severity of Government

Repression against Protests?

The Arab Spring, the Women’s March in America, and other protests in Hong Kong,

Ukraine, Turkey, and Brazil are significant markers of this millennium’s second decade. The

effects of the Arab Spring lasted throughout the decade, with countries, such as Syria, plunging

deeper into warfare and others like Tunisia finding their way to sustained democracy. Towards

the end of the decade, significantly more massive protests happened in Paris, Santiago, Tehran,

Ecuador, and many other locations. Government responses to these protests, depending on the

stability of the electoral support, range from less-lethal mechanisms, including rubber bullets and

water cannons, to more violent ones that lead to severe injuries and death. Governments with a

strong support base tend to implement more anti-protest cruel methods, while those with less

support are more careful about their actions. It raises the question, therefore, of whether the

stability of support bases influences the severity of tactics applied by governments to squash

citizen protests.

Literature Review

Theoretical Considerations for Protest and Repression

Governments may either back down, in response to citizen protests or aggravate the

situation further by using more force. The governments in some democracies applied stringent

measures against the “early risers” (McAdam, 1995). Despite the government’s expectations,

such actions only exacerbate the situation, empowering heightened protests and resulting in a

significant crisis for governments. A considerable area of scholarly study has been to establish

how authorities shift from “negotiated management” to “escalated force” and whether it is

irreversible (McCarthy, 2006; Earl, 2011). However, these scholarly resources have scarcely
addressed the significance of the type of government for the kinds of measures used to repressed

citizen backlash. Most research pits democracies against authoritarian governments and

compares their actions. However, Davenport (2007b) analyzes some of the elements of freedom

that may influence repression tactics (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). The study concludes that

transitional regimes are particularly vulnerable to violent responses against backlash movements.

It hints at the impact of democracy, even in small degrees, on the extent to which systems apply

extrication strategies during demonstrations.

Davenport’s work further indicates that it is more expensive to use repressive tactics in

democratic governments (2007a). The author argues that because people can vote leaders out of

office, democracies are slower to enforce repressive mechanisms to stop citizen protests. As a

result, an elected government will decide which strategy and severity to apply depending on how

accountable it is. If, for example, the electorate’s vote is substantial, the government will be

more responsible and, hence, less likely to use repressive extrication strategies. However, where

the voters have minimal impact, their governments are less accountable and more likely to apply

harsher strategies to quell uprisings.

Why Government Apply Different Strategies for Extrication

Future elections can be a way to shape the strategic decisions of different governments

through an emphasis on accountability. The accountability differs from one democracy to

another, depending on societal cleavages and their link to party competition. Countries divided

along sharp ethnic or racial lines have less liability for actions such as severe repression tactics

on protesting citizens (Powell, 2000). Likewise, secure governments in societies without

noticeable religious or ideological differences may have more liberty to use harsh extrication

techniques. An insecure government- one who knows it can be voted out at any time- will have a
higher regard for its people (Horowitz, 1985). Alternatively, when a government, such as an

authoritative government, is secure in its control of the populace, it tends to do whatever it

wants. These sources further provide a theoretical framework to understand the extent to which

electoral support may influence a government’s extrication strategies.

According to Little et al. (2015), elections provide citizens with an avenue to demonstrate

against or vote out leaders that do not fulfill their obligations or step down when required. The

authors further assert that when citizens can coordinate each other into a protest, the government

has little choice but to comply with electoral rules. This study asserts the scholarly findings that

establish electoral support as an indicator of the extent to which any government would react to

backlash movements by their people. For instance, in Turkey, the regime was secure in the fact

that the conservative portion of the population would not join the protests because of their

polarized party and socio-religious leanings. The citizens cowered under the powers that be,

giving the government the security to use harsh techniques to repress protests, without any fear

of being voted out or condemned. In contrast, weak party identities mean that citizens would be

more willing to gather and eliminate irresponsible leaders. They would, therefore, be more

careful, lest they lose their constituent’s support over harsh repression tactics.

The literature review demonstrates a significant link between the theoretical frameworks

for electoral support and how that influences the level of security a regime enjoys. Security here

is used to mean the freedom to use harsh extrication strategies without backlash from citizens. It

provides a background for further understanding of why countries, such as Ukraine and Brazil,

backed down from repressive responses to the people’s protests. At the same time, Turkey

persisted and got away with it.

Research Design and Case Selection Strategy

 The research will entail a comparison of the stability of electoral support in Ukraine,

Brazil, and Turkey and how it influenced their authorities’ responses to their citizen’s backlash.

The study focuses on these three cases because of the variation in the levels of government

accountability, even though they are all reasonably new democracies. It will involve interviews

from protest participants and political elites, as well as original and third-party surveys. One of

the core strengths of the small-n observational method is it facilitates the study of how political

phenomena manifest in the real world. The method of difference is the stability of electoral

support, which is relatively different in each of the three cases being studied. The observational

method is also advantageous because it provides greater accuracy and allows for the formulation

of the hypothesis. Another core benefit is that consistent observation of phenomena will enable

researchers to become well acquainted with the variables, and the greater understanding

facilitates the better formation of a hypothesis. Observation is also a universal method of

obtaining data across different fields.

The primary weakness of this study is that it is liable to personal bias and generalization,

making the information less reliable. Nevertheless, the findings of this research will be supported

by results from third-party surveys, hence making them more reliable.

Hypothesis

The literature review shows the relationship between the stability of electoral support,

willingness to join together in protest, and the severity of repression tactics applied. This study

evaluates the extent to which these ideas apply to Brazil, Ukraine, and Turkey.

Hypothesis 1: strong electoral support increases the likelihood of harsh extrication

methods by the government during citizen demonstrations.

 Previous research shows that regimes that enjoy significant support from their electorates

or substantial control over them are more likely to use bold and violent methods to silence

protests.

Hypothesis 2: Strong social cleavages, such as political or religious ideologies, make it

more difficult for citizens to be united in protest, hence create an environment for governments

to use brutal force.

The prior study demonstrates that intensely conservative environments like Turkey

empower the authorities to mistreat the people because the government is secure that the people

will hesitate.
 References

Little, A. T., Tucker, J. A., & LaGatta, T. (2015). Elections, protest, and alternation of

power. The Journal of Politics, 77(4), 1142-1156.