REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR

ပြည်ထောင်စု သမ္မတ မြန်မာနို င်ငံ တော်‌

formerly Burma

HISTORY

1. The martial law government of Burma declared on June 18, 1989, that the country’s official
name (in English) would be Myanmar. The move attempted to separate the country from its
colonial past and to internationalize a locally used name more inclusive of the country’s non-
Burmese minorities. Critics viewed the name change as little more than a cosmetic ploy by the
military junta to legitimize its repressive rule. In respect for the wishes of persecuted opposition
groups, many foreign governments, news organizations, and international scholars rejected the name
change and continued to refer to the country as Burma. But many international organizations and
non-Western governments adopted the country’s new name, but the usage of either carried political
overtones.

MAP OF MYANMAR
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL GROUPS

1. MILITARY
Since independence, the Burmese military has played a central role in governmental affairs. No other
institutions or social classes have even been allowed to compete with the military. This reality is
highlighted even today by the fact that the military wrote the country’s current constitution, a charter
that ensures the military’s control over all security-related ministries, one-quarter of all legislative
seats, and the power to block any attempt by elected leaders to amend the constitution.

2. AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Known as “Daw Suu” (Aunt Suu) or “The Lady,” She remains unparalleled as a popular political figure
in modern Burma. With a Mandela-esque aura, she is beloved at home and admired abroad (at least
until recently). She is a figure of immense significance in the recent history of Southeast Asia. She was
schooled in Burma, where she spent her first 15 years.

A member of a prominent family, she was then sent to India, where her mother was ambassador, and
then went to England to study politics, philosophy, and economics at Oxford University. She later
published books on Burmese history and literature. Prior to 1988, she had no direct political
experience and was known primarily as the daughter of Aung San. Shortly before the 1988 Uprising,
she returned to Burma from England to care for her ailing mother. She joined the opposition and,
because of her name and oratorical ability, began to draw large crowds to her speeches. Burmese
women imitated her hair and clothing style. She was cheered for her straightforward attacks against
the government and against Ne Win. Her military adversaries, frightened by her mounting popularity,
suggested that she was being manipulated by communists. On July 20, 1989, the military placed her
under house arrest and cut off all communications between her followers and the outside world. While
still under arrest, she was awarded (in absentia) the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1991 for her
courageous struggle against the military dictatorship.

In 2012 by-elections, she won 85 percent of the votes cast in her Yangon township, which gave her
standing to serve in the legislature. In the 2015 general elections, her NLD party secured 255 of 330
elected seats, 225 more seats than the second most competitive party. Constitutionally barred from
the presidency because she had married a foreigner, she could serve as State Counsellor, a newly
created head of government position.

Aung San Suu Kyi has not visibly pushed for greater transparency or significant policy changes
regarding government and military policy toward the Rohingya Muslim minority. Her continued silence
on the matter has caused international resentment towards her. Although the Nobel Prize Committee
resisted public calls for formal renunciation, Amnesty International and other groups have stripped
her of various honors that formerly awarded her as a political prisoner and champion of human rights.
In Washington DC, some members of Congress urged the revoking of her Congressional Gold Medal.
Her defenders point to her lack of constitutional powers over security matters and her need to work
with an autonomous military to achieve other policy objectives.

3. LEGISLATURE
Before 2010, Burma’s legislature only had two periods of control: as a multiparty bicameral body
during the contentious U Nu era (1951–1962), and as a rubber-stamp unicameral body during the Ne
Win-controlled BSPP era (1974–1988). After the 1990 elections were overturned, military leaders under
SLORC and the SPDC removed all vestiges of legislative power and ruled as a military dictatorship.
Constitutional reform revived the legislature in 2010. To outmaneuver the NLD and annul any claims
to the electoral results of the 1990 election, the SPDC began to engage in constitutional reform in
2003. The new charter, approved by voters during the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008,
established a new bicameral Parliament, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Assembly of the Union). Currently,
the lower house, the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives), seats 440 representatives: 330 elected
from constituencies and 110 appointed military delegates. The upper chamber, the Amytha Hluttaw
(House of Nationalities), now seats 224 representatives: 168 elected and equally divided between
 Myanmar’s regions and states, and 56 appointed military delegates. So, by constitutional mandate, 25
percent of both houses are designated for the Tatmadaw, a convenient number since any
constitutional amendment requires over 75 percent approval in both houses. After the 2012 by-
elections, reforms permitted the inclusion of genuine opposition parties, and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
began to develop the feel of a more authentic legislature. Aung San Suu Kyi and opposition colleagues
played an important role by speaking out on issues without fear of legal recrimination. The
opportunity for Myanmar’s reformed Parliament to become a truly legitimate, democratic, lawmaking
institution had begun. Whether an NLD-proposed constitutional amendment committee is successful
in forming and breaking the military’s veto powers is an open question.

4. POLITICAL PARTIES
The National League for Democracy is the most important political party in Myanmar. The party was
founded in the wake of the 1988 Uprising by Aung Gyi, U Thura, U Tin Oo, and Aung San Suu Kyi.
Both Aung Gyi and U Tin Oo were dissident generals forcibly removed from the Tatmadaw for turning
on the regime. Aung Gyi later turned on the NLD itself, resigning after accusing it of being infiltrated
by communists. U Tin Oo, after a falling out with Ne Win in 1976, spent years in prison and endured
long stints under house arrest, much like Aung San Suu Kyi. After a decade of continuous detention,
he was released in 2009 and aged 90 remains party chairman of the NLD. That the NLD has survived
despite being denied power in 1990 by military fiat and suffering subsequent persecution from anti-
democracy SLORC and SPDC governments stands as a remarkable testament to its strength and
durability. Its victorious re-emergence in the 2012 by-elections (winning 43 of 44 contested seats) and
its landslide victory in 2015 (winning nearly 80 percent of all contested seats) indicates its current
popularity. The extent to which it can maintain this level of support is doubtful, given that it has never
governed. It currently controls 369, or 55 percent, of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw’s total 664 seats (of
which 166 are designated for the military and only 498 are contestable).

5. MONKS
Monks are highly respected as teachers and religious leaders, and their predecessors have toppled
kings. The number of monks in Burma is the same as in the military. Burma’s Buddhist sangha, or
monastic order, has been more politically active than the sangha in neighboring Thailand. Keeping the
monks from the rebellion was a key goal of SPDC policy. The SPDC even tried to infiltrate the
monkhood with its own agents, who reported to the junta any dissident activity. 19 The power of the
monks to put political pressure on the junta was demonstrated in 2007. Led by the All-Burma Monks
Alliance and other groups, the monks brought a moral legitimacy to the demonstrations greater than
that of Aung San Suu Kyi. At her gate, monks blessed Suu Kyi. In 2007, they also engaged in the rare
practice of thabeik hmauk , or overturning of the offering bowls, denying spiritual merit to immoral
leaders. When Than Shwe and the military refused to apologize for mistreatment at protests, leading
monks led several hundred monks on marches around Yangon’s Shwedagon Pagoda with offering
bowls turned symbolically upside-down, a nonviolent affront to the regime leaders. Buddhist monks
also are not immune to sectarian politics. In 2012, many marched in support of Thein Sein’s proposal
to deport the country’s 800,000 Muslim Rohingya minorities to other countries. Around that time an
ultranationalist Buddhist group dubbed the “969 Movement” led violent attacks against Rohingya
communities at the behest of its chief agitator, monk Ashin Wirathu. Recruiting adherents using
Facebook, Wirathu became known among his anti-Muslim followers as “WiWi,” and internationally as
the “Buddhist bin Laden.” His portrait made the cover of Time magazine in 2013 alongside the caption,
“The Face of Buddhist Terror.”

6. ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS

Burma’s ethnic minority groups have continued to view themselves primarily in terms of ethnic
nationalism. The Karens, Karenni, Shans, Kachins, and other groups that fought for state autonomy
do not trust the government. In their struggle for minority rights, these groups joined the National
Democratic Front (NDF) in revolt. The NDF assumed that the peoples of Burma were members of
ethnic-linguistic communities who voluntarily came together in 1947 to form the Union of Burma. In
this union, equality of communities was to be reflected in their organization as political units, each
having the power to govern itself, claim a reasonable share of the nation’s resources, an equal right to
develop its land and society, and equal representation in the national government. The states were to
 be strong, and the central government was weak. Despite promises to state leaders at the time of
independence, the central government became strong, and the separate states became weak. To
achieve their goals, the minority ethnic groups organized armed insurgencies to protect their
territories and pressure the central government to accept a federated Burma, with ethnic states having
autonomy under a federal umbrella government. The most infamous of such ethnic warlords was the
opium-trading Khun Sa, a Shan figure of Golden Triangle lore who eluded Burmese troops, Thai
rangers, and the US drug enforcement authorities for over two decades.

7. ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS

Burma’s ethnic minority groups have continued to view themselves primarily in terms of ethnic
nationalism. The Karens, Karenni, Shans, Kachins, and other groups that fought for state autonomy
do not trust the government. In their struggle for minority rights, these groups joined the National
Democratic Front (NDF) in revolt. The NDF assumed that the peoples of Burma were members of
ethnic-linguistic communities who voluntarily came together in 1947 to form the Union of Burma. In
this union, equality of communities was to be reflected in their organization as political units, each
having the power to govern itself, claim a reasonable share of the nation’s resources, an equal right to
develop its land and society, and equal representation in the national government. The states were to
be strong, and the central government was weak. Despite promises to state leaders at the time of
independence, the central government became strong, and the separate states became weak. To
achieve their goals, the minority ethnic groups organized armed insurgencies to protect their
territories and pressure the central government to accept a federated Burma, with ethnic states having
autonomy under a federal umbrella government. The most infamous of such ethnic warlords was the
opium-trading Khun Sa, a Shan figure of Golden Triangle lore who eluded Burmese troops, Thai
rangers, and the US drug enforcement authorities for over two decades.

8. ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

There is a striking historical similarity between Myanmar & Thailand: both have histories of absolute
monarchy, the practice of Theravada Buddhism, and comparable natural resources and fertile soils for
agriculture. They both shared a similar size of GNP in the 1950s. But it seemed that Thailand achieved
higher economic success than Burma.

One answer comes from the obvious difference: the Burmese were colonized by the British while the
Thais weren’t colonized ever. The Burmese have moved away from Western materialism and
commercialism which the Burmese believed ruined the Thai society.
Another answer is that the post-independence governments of Burma chose to isolate their nation
from the global economic system relying instead on government-controlled socialistic economics &
autarky. While Thailand opened its economy through a policy of greater market freedom and export-
driven growth.

The “Burmese way to Socialism”, a nationalistic ideology that mixed Marxism & Buddhism proved to
be an economic failure: it led to neither socialism nor development. Adding to the weakness of state-
controlled production, policies associated with ideology repressed the Chinese & Indian minorities, the
core of business & entrepreneurship in other Southeast Asian countries. It led to a dual economy with
a large unofficial black market where prices were inevitably higher than official prices.

9. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Burma has an emphasis on national security because of the following.

1. Its colonial heritage and the Japanese occupation are reminders that Myanmar has been a victim of
imperialism & aggression.
2. She is surrounded by nations with greater populations and stronger military sharing borders with
China & Thailand.
3. The country’s ethnic minorities have been supported by outsiders linked with the drug trade & the
Burmese Communist Party
4. The nation’s Indian & Chines minorities have an influence on the Burmese economy even if they are
only a few.
 5. The past military governments have viewed Westernization as a threat to Burmese traditional culture.
The government’s response to this insecurity is the policy of nonalignment. Earlier it maintained an
isolationist policy by refusing to participate in the Indochina conflict, refusing aid from various
nations, and until the late 1990’s foregone membership in ASEAN. Thein Sein modified isolation by
giving way to a new strategy to open the country. They have begun to prioritize economic prerogatives
over security concerns & paranoia.

REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
Republik Singapura  
新加坡共和国  
சிங்கப்பூர் குடியரசு  

MAP OF SINGAPORE

HISTORICAL TIMELINE
BACKGROUND

1. Singapore didn't have much of a political structure other than what Britain had when they were under
its control of Britain. A more stable government was established right after independence between
1945 and 1946. The British's political structure is a Parliamentary republic.

EVENTS

1819-1942 The British began ruling Singapore under a monarchy.

1942 Japan took control of Singapore in 1942 in the Battle of Singapore when the Empire of
Japan invaded. Singapore was the British military base in Southeast Asia, nicknamed
the "Gibraltar of the East." The fighting lasted from 8 February to 15 February 1942. It
resulted in the largest surrender of British-led military personnel in history. Japan took
over Singapore, ruling with a constitutional monarchy.
1945 Japan falls, and the British take over with military administration.
1946-1971 Singapore became its own colony and now self-governed by Lee Kuan Yew as prime
minister. In 1962, Singapore joins the Federation of Malaya. But two years later pulls
out due to political and ethnic tensions. Then becomes an independent republic and
joins the UN. British Military forces withdraw in 1971.
1984-1995 Two members of parliament on the opposition for the first time. PM Lee Kuan Yew backs
down after 31 years, but still exerts important influence. In 1990 the new Prime Minister
is elected; his name is Goh Chok Tong. Three years after he is appointed, he becomes
president.
1999-2003 The 6th president is elected by default. S R Nathan is his name. He rules Singapore
under a republic.
In 2001 month An anti-government rally breaks out. This rally was for the first legal demonstration
of April outside of election campaign. Many gathered to support J.B. Jeyaretnam who faces
bankruptcy and thus expulsion from parliament
In November of The general election won for having the People's Action Party to happen. This means
2001 that two of the 84 seats will be secured.
2004-2011 Lee Kuan Yew eldest son, Lee Hsien Loong became the new PM. April of 2005
Singapore's government approves a controversial plan to legalize casino gambling,
paving the way for the construction of two multi-billion-dollar casino resorts. President
S.R. Nathan continues his second six-year term after winning the elections again.
May of 2006 The first real test for the Prime Minister said by Lee Hsien Loong's ruling People's Action
Party.
2009 of October An appeal court ruled that the Far Eastern Economic Review broke the good reputation
of Lee Kuan Yew and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who were both the countries
founder.
May of 2011 The People's Action Party (PAP) won all but 6 seats in parliament. From this, PM Lee
Hsien Loong gets unprecedented gains in what calls a "watershed election". Finally, Tony
Tan is elected president, in the first election of its kind for18 years.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL GROUPS

1. The Lee family has dominated Singapore politics since 1959 independence from Malaysia. Few leaders
in Southeast Asia have ruled society with much effectiveness. Lee Kuan Yew was a brilliant &
pragmatic politician with more support than any other world leader of his day. He placed highly
educated & technically proficient officials in charge of his development programs & relied on his
subordinates to establish effective policies free from corruption. He combined select advantages of
Western-style democratic institutions with an Asian-style hegemonic political party system through
which he dominated the country’s politics & universal support & legitimacy.
2. In the late 1980’s he lost edge when he moved from open, pragmatic policies toward authoritarianism,
like jailing dissident politicians & restrictions on newspaper printing. He rationalized the tighter order
as necessary for the continued stability of the country, but his critics claimed politics in the city-state
has been reduced to loyalty & sycophancy surrounding Lee.
3. After resigning as PM in 1990, he continued to be the country’s most visible statesman, traveling to
meet world leaders & advising nations on how to achieve an economic miracle. He stressed the
importance of discipline & that Western-style democracy is inappropriate for developing countries.
4. When parliament passed the Elected President Act which provided for a stronger presidency but
retained the cabinet under A PM. When Lee Hsien Loong assumed the prime ministership in 2004, Lee
Kuan Yew stayed as minister mentor until his death at 87.
5. In 2015 after Lee Kuan Yew’s death, concerns were raised over the future leadership. On National Day
while delivering a speech on live TV, Lee Shien Loong collapsed. Although he recovered, it opened a
discussion about succession & debate on a dynastic rule. Lee Wei Ling openly criticized her brother for
seeking dynastic politics, but Lee Shein Loong said that he has no plan to push his son into politics.
Meritocracy is a fundamental value of society”

POLITICAL PARTIES

1. The ruling political party in Singapore, reelected continuously since 1959, is the
People's Action Party (PAP), headed by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. The PAP has held most seats
in Parliament since 1966.
2. The only party to provide credible opposition was the left-wing Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) which
split from the PAP in the 1960s. Opposition parties have been allowed to function, but none have had
a meaningful competition with PAP. PAP dominance is due to the effectiveness & incorruptibility of
most PAP politicians, fractured opposition & the rigid rules on the activities of political parties &
opposition groups.
3. Singapore’s most visible opposition politician is Chee Soon Juan of the Singapore Democratic Party.
His verbal attacks & publicity events that allege PAP corruption & undemocratic practices have
 tangled him & his sister in & out of jail on defamation lawsuits & bankruptcy. Barred from
international travel & run for office but draws support from Amnesty international & other rights
groups.

LEGISLATURE

1. The parliamentary system of Singapore of British colonialism although it is different in practice from
that of Great Britain. The SG parliamentary system is unicameral, not bicameral like GB & has no
meaningful opposition to the administration. They have a 5-year term unless the Parliament is
dissolved by the PM before the term expires. Voting is compulsory for all citizens
2. To ensure a semblance of bipartisanship, the Parliament provide for 3 opposition seats to opposition
candidates that did not win at least 3 in constituency races. These 3 non-constituency members would
be appointed from among the highest-polling opposition candidates. They were not given full voting
rights and can not vote on motions relating to constitutional amendments, money bills, or votes of no
confidence.
3. Another feature is the Team MP scheme where constituencies vote for a team of candidates instead of
only 1 candidate. Called Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs) and each is represented by 3
members of Parliament. The purpose is to institutionalize multi-ethnic politics to ensure that
minorities will be represented in Parliament.

FOREIGN WORKERS & PERMANENT RESIDENTS

1. Immigration issues animate Singaporean politics. Only 16 percent of SG active labor

force was composed of foreign workers. This reality creates policy challenges, social
tensions & human rights concerns. Although foreign workers are powerless in
representative politics, NGOs are emerging to address issues related to disadvantaged
nonresidents. Advocacy by such groups is beginning to make a difference. But still,
they remain barred from joining unions & lack the same labor protections as legal
citizens.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS & DEMOCRACY

1. The Chinese would view Singapore as a patriarchal state where traditional elders wield influence over
a compliant society. It is also a developmental state because of the state’s active management of
investment & trade-oriented sectors. Critics label it an authoritarian state due to its high degree of
centralization & power over dissenting voices. Its leaders may say that their state is altruistic
prioritizing solidarity & order over the interest-group competition.
2. Analysts agree that Singapore is a strong state although it does not have the requisites at first glance
looking at its geography & natural resources. Using standard criteria, it can be so considered.
2.1. Its leaders use the agencies of the state to get Singaporeans to do what they want them to do.
Taxes are paid, and young men accept compulsory military conscription & traffic rules are
followed. Few autonomous groups compete for influence in the society.
2.2. The small size is a major advantage in strengthening the state. Culturally homogenous. Urban
& united in their goals for their society.
2.3. It developed a strong sense of the politics of survival due to its expulsion from Malaysia & the
Cold War experience.
2.4. From a culturalist Chinese perspective, the paternalistic culture is appropriate for providing
law, order & economic achievement without relying on excessive oppression.
2.5. Legitimization is through technical performance. The critical factor in SG politics is the
technocratic power of the elite, not the government’s ability to ideologically mobilize its citizenry.
Technocrats, not democrats characterized SG hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime
2.6. Singapore is the most disciplined society in Southeast Asia due to fear of being fined but also
the belief that lawful obedience is the public interest.
 2.7. The Chinese tradition of centralized authority. A strong one-party system is the most conducive
to effective rule.

ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Singapore is a mixture of market-capitalism & socialist economics. It has the world’s busiest
transshipment port with its geographic location as its greatest economic asset. It ranks among the
world’s most-free economies. Its government controls large, state-owned holding companies investing
in manufacturing, communication & foreign securities markets.
2. SEA’s highest growth rates. Trade openness is the lifeblood of Singapore’s economic strategy. It has
negotiated 20 bilateral & regional trade agreements with major economic players & many smaller
countries. Joining GATT, & AFTA & CPA trans-pacific partnership. It has also pursued closer
economic ties with China, RCEP, ASEAN, etc.. It has a highly educated populace, world-class
infrastructure, superb medical care & peaceful relations with its neighbors.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

1. The basic theme of foreign policy is survival since 1965. It looked to the Western powers & Japan
during the cold war to balance the influence of the Soviet Union & China in Southeast Asia. It is a
member of ASEAN but often enunciated a policy of neutrality to avoid power conflicts. Singapore- US
relations.

LEADERS

PRESIDENTS PRIME MINISTERS

1. Yusof bin Ishak 1. Lee Kuan Yew
2. Benjamin Henry Shears 2. Goh Chok Tong
3. C.V. Devan Nair 3. Lee Hsien Loong
4. Wee Kim Wee
5. Ong Teng Cheong
6. S.R. Nathan
7. Tony Tan Keng Yam
8. Halimah Yacob
 KINGDOM OF THAILAND
ราชอาณาจักรไทย

HISTORICAL TIMELINE

MAP OF THAILAND
INSTITUTIONS & SOCIAL GROUPS

1. The Thai monarch is theoretically and legally apolitical and is the national symbol, the supreme
patron who reigns overall, and the leader of the Buddhist religion. His very being is a matter of
substantial cosmological significance. The crown today, King Maha Vajiralongkorn (Rama X), ascended
to the throne in 2016 at 64 after his father died, King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX). The king does
not stand above politics but, the notion is cultivated in Thai political culture to insulate the monarchy
so that when it intervenes in the political life, he remains beyond reproach.

CONSTITUTIONS

1. Thailand has undergone countless constitutional changes and claims of constitutional illegitimacy. It
shows at present that its troubled history with constitutional change will be resolved soon. Many of
the major incidents in modern Thai political history have included some dimension of a constitutional
crisis. While there is a value placed on the concept of the rule of law, a corresponding sense of victor’s
justice persists and enduring agreement on basic law has yet to be realized. The tendency to resort to
extraconstitutional means to resolve political crises undermines the consolidation of democratic
constitutionalism and the rule of law in Thailand.
2. Since 1932, Thailand has been governed under 20 constitutions, half of which were democratic and
based on a parliamentary model with an accountable executive. The 2019 political reform constitution
re-established semi-democracy and made Prayuth lay claim to civilian status as prime minister. At the
core of the country’s instability lies the fundamental inability of basic law to endure or be
institutionalized. Constitutionalism says Robert Dayley, is Thailand’s political disease. Until it is
cured, the practice of resorting to extraconstitutional measures to resolve constitutionally driven
political crises is likely to continue in the future.

MILITARY

1. The real and perceived threats to Thailand’s external and domestic security have made the military
proclaim itself as the only institution capable of protecting Thai sovereignty. Since the overthrow of the
absolute monarchy, it has played a dominant role in Thai politics. The hierarchical nature of the
military is congruent with the tendencies of Thai political culture. Civilian governments, especially
those coalesced around provincial parties, have traditionally faced difficulties maintaining good
relations with top generals. Because the military is factionalized itself, forging alliances with one set of
generals for political expedience can pose trouble later. The reasons for military dominance in
Thailand include the weakness of civilian governments and the fact that the military is the most highly
organized institution in the kingdom. They also have weapons of war to force compliance.
2. Moreover, because Bangkok, as Thailand’s primary city, dominates every aspect of the country’s
political and economic life, the military has needed to seize only this one city to control the entire
kingdom. A common justification for coups also enables repeated military intervention into political
life. Following each coup, the military and its supporters engage in international propaganda
campaigns to gain legitimacy for yet another power seizure. Invariably, claims surface that a military
coup was needed to (paradoxically) “protect” or “restore democracy.”

BUREAUCRACY

1. For most of the contemporary era, Thailand has been a bureaucratic polity with the arena of politics
remaining within the bureaucracy itself. The bureaucracy has been the bedrock of stability in a
political system where top leadership positions have changed unpredictably. Although elections and
coups may bring new factions into power, the bureaucracy continues its conservative policy role with
little change in direction. Thai bureaucrats remain major actors in the country’s political life because
of the continuity they provide to a system with frequent changes of leadership at the top, changes that
they often help to instigate out of political self-interest. The bureaucracy’s formerly exclusive role has
been widened in recent years by the new role of technocrats, who have attained important positions
and brought a more rational style to policymaking. These highly trained technocrats lost some of their
lusters in 1997 when the Thai economy collapsed, at least partly because they did not adequately
 interpret the warning signs of the coming disaster. Higher salaries in Thailand’s growing private sector
have increasingly depleted the talent pool in the bureaucracy that formerly boasted Thailand’s best
and brightest.

PARLIAMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES

1. Thailand’s bicameral Parliament evolved from a rubber-stamp body for a ruling party or strongman to
an arena of genuine political debate and legislative activity. It became less peripheral to governmental
decision-making during the democratic period in the 1970s as well as in the 1980s under Prime
Minister Prem, who allowed the Parliament to act more independently, particularly on economic
matters. Although characterized by frequent changes in its structure and membership, Thailand’s
national assembly has more actively engaged in public debate about important issues than many
other legislatures in the region. 30 One of the reasons that Thai political life is so lively and
contentious is because parliamentary power matters. Establishing a parliamentary majority, and the
corresponding right of that majority to choose a prime minister and cabinet, rank among the high-
stakes events in the Thai political system. Because governments change so frequently, coalition
forming can be more politically significant than actual lawmaking functions, which, though
consequential, are not prone to wide shifts in ideology following elections. Access to government coffers
is crucial. A crafty veteran politician once let slip that, “for a politician, being in the opposition is like
starving yourself to death.”
2. With few exceptions it has not been particularly useful to visualize Thai political parties as aligning
along a neat left-right political spectrum because many parties fall into the moderate or nonideological
middle or adopt populist platforms. Until the recent emergence of Thaksin-oriented parties, ideological
platforms have not been paramount in Thai campaigns, because voters tended to favor candidates who
served their district or regional interests first. Thai Rak Thai differed in this respect in that its populist
message appealed across districts and regions. It conceived its patronage system as national rather
than local or regional. A key distinguishing feature of TRT was not ideology, but its desire to expand
patronage in wider dimensions than previously successful parties had. Another key distinction of TRT
was its new “professional party” approach to electoral politics: that is, it prioritized savvy marketing of
the party as a media product over rigid commitments to ideals, platforms, or maintaining cumbersome
membership rolls. 32 Thai political parties today argue more about the rules of the game than about
ideologically-driven policies, although many now imitate Thaksin-style populism.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRACY

1. Until the 1980s, most scholars referred to Thailand as a “bureaucratic polity,” a polity in which
politics took place within the bureaucracy and where extra bureaucratic institutions were negligible.
External institutions, such as the Parliament and political parties, were deemed to have little influence
over the state’s policy decisions. The bureaucratic polity included the military, as many of the generals
held important government posts (including the position of prime minister). The state, then, was
considered strong and autonomous, and independent of societal organizations such as business
associations, farmers’ groups, and labor unions. The enduring pillars of the Thai state— “nation,
religion, and king”—provided the ideological troika upon which state supremacy was based. When
extra bureaucratic groups began to emerge, they were initially co-opted, manipulated, or oppressed by
the bureaucracy, which used the military as its controlling force. By integrating the military into the
political process, the government established a broad-based regime. Utilizing both collaborative and
coercive forces, the state increased its stability and capacity.
2. Following the student-led revolt against the military in 1973, however, Thai political institutions began
increasing in number and broadening their bases considerably. The roles of the legislature, political
parties, and business associations strengthened. As societal groups have come to play a more
important role in Thai politics, the state has lost some of its autonomy and consequently become
weaker and more reliant on allied societal groups. The expectation many Thai elites have for state
autonomy stems at least partially from the past success of Thai authorities in preserving the state’s
independence and sovereignty—that having averted colonial rule, established a generally peaceful
country, and met the basic needs of most of the citizenry, the Thai state had proven its effectiveness.
 Nevertheless, if autonomy is a key variable for assessing strength, the Thai state is weak in the sense
that officials who make authoritative decisions are not insulated from the state-based patronage
networks upon which they depend. Thailand’s state officials are integrated into some of the country’s
most established networks of patron-client exchange. These relationships act as links between
bureaucrats and traditional networks in old business, agriculture, labor, the aristocracy, and the
intelligentsia. Quasi-state enterprises, including public utilities and their unionized employees, are
also tied into long-standing networks of patronage that emanate from the state. The loss of these
networks threatens the erosion of associated state institutions and, thus, state strength.

ECONOMY & DEVELOPMENT

1. Thailand’s economic performance was unimpressive until a 1957 military coup ushered in a new set of
economic policies under the authoritarian leadership of General Sarit Thanarat. During much of the
Cold War, Thailand’s neighbors were embroiled in conflict and suffered economically. In this context, it
can be said that Thailand “won” the Vietnam War. While the war left Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
economically devastated, and left the United States a weaker global power, Thailand emerged with
improved economic infrastructure, roads, and airports, and with transferred technology—a result of
over a decade of US military aid, development projects, and circulated cash. During the 1970s and
1980s, Thailand sustained a 7 percent rate of annual economic growth, a pace equaled by only a few
other developing nations. More remarkably, the kingdom’s economic growth between 1987 and 1996
averaged close to 10 percent, higher than in any other country during that period. During these boom
years, inflation also stayed under 5 percent. The 1997 Asian economic crisis, which began in Thailand,
brought this rapid growth to a halt. Recovery under Thaksin returned Thailand to a pattern of growth,
but a sluggish economy has been the consequence of political instability since the 2006 military coup.
Coincident with these high growth rates in the boom years was an increase in the export sector, which
in the late 1980s grew by almost 25 percent each year. Foreign investment grew rapidly, with Japan,
Taiwan, the United States, Hong Kong, and South Korea as the leading investors. Manufacturing also
replaced agriculture during this period in terms of the share of the country’s GDP.
2. Although over 60 percent of the Thai people are involved in the agricultural sphere of the economy, the
number of those in rice farming is decreasing. Thai farmers have diversified into crops such as various
vegetables, fruits, maize, tapioca, coffee, flowers, sugar, and rubber, as well as livestock. The rise of
agribusiness processing and related industry has also pulled ruralites out of the fields. Although
farming areas have not developed as rapidly as urban areas, the standard of living in the countryside
has improved noticeably since the 1970s. A peasant class of rural producers no longer meaningfully
exists. 39 Nevertheless, the urban bias of Thai economic development is clear from both the emphasis
on manufacturing and the higher percentage of budget allocations centered on Bangkok.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

1. Following the Cold War, Thailand’s foreign policy perceptions shifted regarding regional or great-power
threats to Thai security and the decline of the US security role in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s sustained
economic development and the rise of nonbureaucratic interests in the political sphere have
unambiguously pushed foreign policy into the economic realm. For most of the 1990s and 2000s, the
military reduced its role in foreign policy in favor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cabinet ministers,
and political party leaders. The increased profile of some of Thailand’s top economic diplomats also
brought the country international esteem. One such diplomat served as head of the WTO for three
years and led the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for eight. Over the
past 20 years, trade issues have dominated Thai foreign affairs along with its relations with the United
States, China, Japan, the European Union, and ASEAN. Outside of Asia, especially among
democracies, perceptions of Prayuth’s junta-led Thailand were uniformly negative. The United States,
long a Thai ally, suspended some forms of military cooperation in the wake of the coup. However,
extended rule and political expediency forced more governments to accept Prayuth as Thailand’s
legitimate representative. With his 2019 election, democratic governments now have greater political
space to reconcile any lingering qualms from Thailand’s 2014 coup. Thailand increasingly relates to
the United States as a sovereign equal rather than as a client. As the Cold War ended, Thai foreign
 policy lessened security dependence on the United States, asserted equidistance in its relations with
allies and adversaries, and launched a dramatically new Indochina policy without seeking US support.
In economic relations with the United States, Thailand became more assertive in bilateral negotiations
over trade, intellectual property rights enforcement, and general economic policy independence (the
exception being the US-supported IMF rescue package for Thailand during the 1997 economic crisis).
2. The new international era has also witnessed Thai troops participating as UN peacekeeping forces in
East Timor. Thailand also won praise from the United Nations for the efficient handling of the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami. Following the disaster, Thailand led an international push to create an Indian
Ocean tsunami warning system. In 2008, when Myanmar’s military rulers initially refused foreign aid
following Cyclone Nargis, Thai diplomats helped to convince the regime to allow it to act as an
intermediary to funnel aid to the country. Thai relations with Muslim states, on the other hand, are
often strained due to perceptions of harsh, ineffective, and unfair policies toward Thailand’s Muslim
population in the deep south and general indifference to the plight of Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar.

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Cộng hòa Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam

MAP OF VIETNAM

HISTORICAL TIMELINE
THE TIMELINE OF POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIETNAM

258 BCE The end of the Hung Dynasty

257-208 BCE The Thuc Dynasty
207-111 BCE The Trieu Dynasty
111 BCE The Han Chinese Empire’s conquest of Vietnam'
39 CE The three Trung sisters lead a revolt against the Chinese occupation
544-602 The early Ly Dynasty
939-968 The Ngo Dynasty
969-980 The Dinh Dynasty
980-1009 The early Le Dynasty
1009-1225 The Ly Dynasty
1010 Citadel built, founding Hanoi
1225-1400 The Tran Dynasty
1400-1407 The Ho Dynasty
1407-1427 Chinese occupation
1427 Chinese occupation defeated by Le Loi
1428-1527 The Le Dynasty
1470-1471 The defeat of the Champa kingdom
1527-1592 The Mac Dynasty
1558 The beginning of the conflict between the Nguyen and Trinh clans
1627 Alexander de Rhodes, a Jesuit missionary arrives in Hanoi
1771 The Tay Son rebellion
1772 End of the conflict between the Nguyen and Trinh clans
1802 Nguyen Anh becomes emperor assuming the name Gia Long and thus establishing the
Nguyen Dynasty
1802 Hue is declared the new capital
1847 French bombard Da Nang from ships
1859 French troops capture Saigon
1873 French force tries to capture Hanoi
1874 Signing of the Philastre Agreement between France and the Vietnamese Kingdom which
permitted French traders to operate in the Red River Valley and the Tonkin Coast.
1882 A French force reoccupies the Hanoi Citadel
1883 Harmond Convention treaty makes Tonkin a French protectorate
1884 Treaty of Hue confirms Tonkin as a French protectorate
1887 Indochinese Union created by the French with Hanoi as its capital
1897-1902 Period of the rule of Paul Doumer as the Governor-General of the Indochinese Union
1930 The founding of the Indochinese Communist Party by Nguyen Ai Quoc, later known as Ho
Chi Minh
1940 The surrender of France to Germany and the establishment of a puppet government to
rule France and its empire
1940 A treaty between Japan and France signed
1941 The Viet Minh army for the Communist Party founded by Ho Chi Minh
1945 The end of World War II
 1946 The beginning of the revolution against France in Indochina
1954 The founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
1964 The Tonkin Gulf incident leads to U.S. intervention in Vietnam
1973 The Paris Agreement concerning Vietnam
1974 The capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese Army
1976 The annexation of South Vietnam by North Vietnam
1978 China invades northern border area of Vietnam
1979 China withdraws from the invaded border area
1986 At its Sixth Congress the Communist Party of Vietnam declares its economic system has
not worked and it announces a system involving markets called Doi Moi, a restructuring
1990 The Soviet Union withdraws from Vietnam
1994 The trade and investment embargo of Vietnam by the U.S. and its allies ends
1995 Vietnam is admitted to ASEAN
1997 The year of Asian financial crisis

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

 The President of the Republic is the head of state, elected to a five-year term by

the National Assembly, and is limited by the Constitution to a maximum tenure of 3
E terms. The President has influence on foreign policy, and has the right to declare
a state of emergency and to declare war.
X  The Government is the executive arm of the National Assembly and the highest
E administrative body of the Vietnamese state. It is headed by the president, prime
C minister and consists of deputy prime ministers, ministers and other members.
 The Government is a unified administration responsible for the implementation of
U political, economic, cultural, social, national defense, security and external activities of
T the state. It is also responsible for the effectiveness of the state apparatus itself from
the top down, stabilization in the country and the observance of the constitution.
I  As with the President, the Government is elected by the deputies of the National
V Assembly for a five-year term.
E  The Prime Minister of the Government is the head of government and is elected or
dismissed by the National Assembly, at the request of the president.

L  The National Assembly is a unicameral legislative body, and is governed on the basis

of democratic centralism. It is the highest representative organ and the highest state
E organ. 
G  The National Assembly is the only organ vested with constitutional and legislative
powers. It is responsible for fundamental domestic and foreign policies, socio-
I economic policies, defense and security issues, and it exercises supreme control over
S all state activities.
L  Delegates (or members) of the National Assembly are elected through secret ballots in
democratic elections which are held every fifth year.
A  The membership of the Standing Committee consists of the Chairman, deputy
T chairmen and other members; these members are elected by the National Assembly
 Standing Committee members cannot simultaneously be members of the Government.
I Members work on a full-time basis, and their terms of office correspond with the term
V of the National Assembly.
E  The Standing Committee continues to function until a new National Assembly is
elected. 
 According to the constitution, the Standing Committee is responsible for 12 duties. Of
these, the most important are the powers to announce, convene and chair the National
Assembly sessions, to interpret the constitution, laws and ordinances, and to issue
ordinances on those matters assigned by the National Assembly. It supervises and
guides the People's Councils and their activities, and directs, regulates and
coordinates the activities of the Ethnic Council and the committees of the National
Assembly.
 There are seven committees of the National Assembly. Committee membership is
determined by the National Assembly. They are responsible for the studying and
examination of bills, legislative initiatives, drafts of ordinances and other drafts of legal
 documents and reports assigned by the National Assembly or the Standing Committee.
 The committees provide the National Assembly and its Standing Committee with their
opinions on the legislative programme. The committees supervise and conduct
investigations within their respective competency and exercise powers which are
stipulated by law
 The National Assembly elects the Ethnic Council, which consists of a Chairman,
Deputy Chairmen and other members. The Ethnic Council studies and recommends
actions to the National Assembly; the National Assembly has to consult with the
Ethnic Council before issuing any decisions on ethnic policy. The Chairman of the
Ethnic Council has to attend meetings of the Government that concern ethnic policy.
The powers of the Ethnic Council are comparable to those of the committees.
 The judicial system of Vietnam comprises the "people's courts," military tribunals, and
people's procuracies.
 The highest court in the country is the Supreme People's Court.
 The superior courts are appellate courts based in Hanoi, Danang, and Ho Chi Minh
J City, each responsible for the northern, central, and southern region of the country,
U respectively. Provincial and municipal courts are both trial courts and appellate
D courts, while district courts are trial courts. 
 There are military tribunals established at various levels in the Vietnam People's
I Army, the highest one being the Central Military Tribunal, which is subordinate to the
C Supreme People's Court. The Supreme People's Court is headed by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme People's Court who is appointed by the National Assembly of Vietnam
I  The people's procuracies (also known as the people's office of inspection and
A supervision) serve as the prosecutorial authority in Vietnam.
R  They also have the responsibility to supervise and inspect judicial compliance by
government agencies and officials. There is a people's procuracy for every people's
Y court, and the military has its own military procuracies.
 The highest procuracy is the Supreme People's Procuracy, headed by the Chief
Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuracy who is appointed by the National
Assembly.

INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL GROUPS

1. HO CHI MINH THOUGHT

He fathered independent Communist Vietnam against the Japanese, French & Americans and founded
the CPV. He is the most important Vietnamese of contemporary times even in recent Southeast Asian
history. He remains a central institution, a symbol of united nationalist communist Vietnam. No
Vietnamese leader has subsequently received the adulation he received during his life. Although doi
moi and markets now dominate the political economy of Vietnam, “Ho Chi Minh thought “is nominally
the party’s guiding philosophy.

2. COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM

The Communist party id indigenous to the Vietnamese and was the vehicle for the independence
struggle against the French colonialists and later the Americans. In modern Vietnamese history, the
CPV has had an almost exclusive claim to represent the broader ideals of nationalism & patriotism.
For many, the CPV & nationalist struggle are identical.
Party membership is more than 4 million, more than 4 percent of the population. Although it
stagnated in the 1990s, it expanded membership quickly. For many youths, party membership is not
attractive.
Vietnamese politics as practiced in the Politburo is best understood by an analogy to the great game of
bung-di or faction bashing.