Haggerty, Sheryllynne - The British-Atlantic Trading Community 1760-1810

THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC TRADING COMMUNITY
1760-1810
THE ATLANTIC WORLD
Europe, Africa and the Americas, 1500-1830
EDITORS
Wim Klooster (Clark University)

Benjamin Schmidt (University of Washington)
VOLUME VI
THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC
TRADING COMMUNITY
1760-1810
Men, Women, and the Distribution of Goods
BY
SHERYLLYNNE HAGGERTY
BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2006
Cover illustration: The Tobacco Box, J. Fairburn (Publisher)
c. 1800. © National Maritime Museum.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haggerty, Sheryllynne.
The British-Atlantic trading community, 1760-1810 : men, women, and the
distribution of goods / by Sheryllynne Haggerty.
p. cm. — (The Atlantic world, ISSN 1570-0542 ; v. 6)
Originally presented as the author’s thesis (doctoral-University of Liverpool, 2002)
under the title: Trade and trading communities in the late eighteenth century
Atlantic : Liverpool and Philadelphia.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 90-04-15018-8 (acid-free paper)
1. Merchants—Great Britain—History. 2. Women merchants—Great Britain—
History. 3. Great Britain—Commerce—History. I. Title. II. Atlantic world (Leiden,
Netherlands) ; v. 6.
HF3505.6.H34 2006
382.0941—dc22
2005058171
ISSN 1570–0542
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15018-8
ISBN-10: 90-04-15018-8
© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

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In memory of Misha
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements .................................................................... ix
Abbreviations .............................................................................. xi
List of Maps, Figures and Tables ............................................ xiii
PART ONE
PROFILE AND STRUCTURE
Introduction Men and Women of the British-Atlantic

Trading Community .................................... 3
Chapter One Traders and the British-Atlantic Economy 15
Chapter Two What is a Trading Community? ................ 35
Chapter Three The Trading Communities of Liverpool
and Philadelphia ............................................ 67
PART TWO
NETWORKS
Chapter Four People, Trust and Information .................... 109

Chapter Five Finance and Failure ...................................... 142
Chapter Six Distributing the Goods of the Consumer
Revolution ...................................................... 183
Chapter Seven Risk and Risk Management ........................ 211
Conclusion One Trading Community ............................ 241
viii contents
APPENDICES
Appendix A The Trade Directories and the Database ...... 253

Appendix B Categories of Trader Included in Each
Trading Sector .................................................. 259
Bibliography .............................................................................. 261
Index .......................................................................................... 279
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research for this book has been made possible by funding from
a number of institutions. Firstly I should like to thank the University
of Liverpool for my PhD studentship. I should also like to thank the
Social and Environmental Science and Humanities Graduate Schools
at the University of Liverpool for various grants towards research
expenses. The Veitch Fund of the School of History and the Historic
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire assisted with expenses towards
research in Pennsylvania. Research conducted during an Economic
and Social Research Council Grant also contributed to this book.
Parts of chapter four have appeared in a slightly different form
in “A Link in the Chain: Trade and the Transhipment of Knowledge
in the Late Eighteenth Century”, which appeared in the International
Journal of Maritime History, Vol. XIV (2002), 157–172. The material
is incorporated here with the kind permission of the International
Maritime Economic History Association.
I would like to thank various people and institutions for their help
and support during the research for this book. The archive staff at
the Liverpool Record Office, Lancashire Record Office, Merseyside
Maritime Museum and Barclays and H.S.B.C. banks all provided
support. The staff in Special Collections at the Sidney Jones Library
at the University of Liverpool were very helpful, especially Maureen
Watry. I am also grateful to the staff at the Library Company of
Philadelphia, the Historic Society of Pennsylvania and the American
Philosophical Society. Daniel Richter, Director of the McNeil Centre
for Early American Studies in Philadelphia, kindly granted me a
non-stipendiary fellowship. This provided me with a temporary aca-
demic home and much support from the people at the centre dur-
ing my stay in Philadelphia. Paul Laxton generously gave me
computerised editions of the 1796 and 1805 Liverpool Directories,
which saved me many hours of data entry. Silvia Marzagalli kindly
provided me with a database of shipping between Philadelphia and
France, and John McCusker unselfishly answered questions about,
and provided material on, shipping ownership in Philadelphia.
Several people were very influential in guiding me through my
studies and research over the years. First my gratitude must go to
x acknowledgements
Michael Power for giving me my first chance and for always smil-
ing. There are no words to express my thanks to Graeme Milne for
believing in me from the very beginning. He has kindly and patiently
guided me throughout my studies and read my work so many times
that he probably knows the contents of this book by heart. More
importantly, he is a great friend. Trevor Burnard and Ken Morgan
also helped me to develop my understanding of the British-Atlantic
world. In addition, the following people have kindly read part or all
of versions of this book, and/or informed its content by giving advice,
support and encouragement: Diana Ascott, William Ashworth, Bernard
Bailyn, Tim Crumplin, John Haggerty, Jenny Kermode, and Mike
Tadman. I would also like to thank the participants of the Harvard
International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World 1500–1825
in 2002 and 2003, for their comments and discussions. All errors
are of course, mine alone.
However, special thanks must go to my friends outside the depart-
ment for putting up with my varying degrees of joy and despair dur-
ing all my studies; especially Karen Castle, Sandy Ditchburn, Jean
Haggerty and June Knowles. As always, the person who suffers the
most is the person we love the most. My husband John has endured
my rants and frustrations patiently and kindly. He has also always
been there to enjoy my successes with me. He is a wonderful friend
and advocate, and has provided endless amounts of encouragement
and support. Without him, and the calming love of the ‘boyz’ at
home, this book would not have been written.
SH, 2005
ABBREVIATIONS
ACP Andrew Clow Papers

AHA Arthur Heywood Archives
AHR American Historical Review
AJLH American Journal of Legal History
AJS American Journal of Sociology
APS American Philosophical Society
AQ American Quarterly
BGA Barclays Group Archives
BH Business History
BHR Business History Review
BPP British Parliamentary Papers
CEH Central European History
CWU Claude W. Unger Collection
DTP David Tuohy Papers
EcHR Economic History Review
EC Earle Collection
ECS Eighteenth Century Studies
EH The Economic Journal
HSBC HSBC Group Archives
HSP Historical Society of Pennsylvania
HR Historical Research
HT History Today
HW History Workshop
IHR International History Review
IJMH International Journal of Maritime History
JAH Journal of American History
JBS Journal of British Studies
JDS Journal of Development Studies
JEEH Journal of European Economic History
JEH Journal of Economic History
JFE Journal of Financial Economics
JHG Journal of Historical Geography
JIH Journal of Interdisciplinary History
JLE Journal of Law and Economics
JMH Journal of Modern History
xii abbreviations
JUH Journal of Urban History

LBP Leyland and Bullins Papers
LCP Library Company of Philadelphia
LH Local Historian
LivRO Liverpool Record Office
LRO Lancashire Record Office
MH Midland History
MMM Merseyside Maritime Museum, National Museums Liverpool
NH Northern History
NLJ National Library of Jamaica
OED Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.) CDROM
PH Pennsylvania History
PHMC Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission
PMHB Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
PP Past and Present
PRO National Archives at the Public Record Office
RMH Research in Maritime History
ROB Research in Organizational Behaviour
RP Rathbone Papers
SGC Simon Gratz Collection
SJL Sidney Jones Library—Special Collections
THSLC Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire
TP Tarleton Papers
UH Urban History
UHY Urban History Yearbook
WMQ William and Mary Quarterly
WRP William Roscoe Papers
LIST OF MAPS, FIGURES AND TABLES
Maps
1.1 Map of Liverpool, 1796 .................................................. 30

1.2 Map of Philadelphia, 1794 .............................................. 32
Figures
3.1 Total Traders: 1766–1805 .............................................. 70

3.2 Merchants: 1766–1805 .................................................... 77
3.3 Factors: 1766–1805 ........................................................ 80
3.4 Brokers: 1766–1805 ........................................................ 82
3.5 Wholesalers, Warehouse Keepers and Auctioneers:
1766–1805 ........................................................................ 84
3.6 Mercers, Drapers, Haberdashers and Hosiers:
1766–1805 ........................................................................ 88
3.7 Grocers: 1766–1805 ........................................................ 90
3.8 Dealers: 1766–1805 ........................................................ 92
3.9 Victuallers: 1766–1805 .................................................... 94
3.10 Shopkeepers: 1766–1805 ................................................ 95
3.11 Itinerant Dealers: 1766–1805 ........................................ 99
5.1 Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Sugar ...................... 148
5.2 Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Coffee ...................... 149
5.3 Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Flour ........................ 150
5.4 The Flow of a Bill of Exchange .................................. 156
6.1 Distribution Network for Flour ...................................... 192
6.2 Distribution Network for Manchester Goods .............. 201
6.3 Distribution Network for Metalware/Hardware .......... 203
7.1 Trade Networks of Ralph Eddowes .............................. 225
7.2 Trade Networks of David Tuohy .................................. 228
7.3 Trade Networks of William Rathbone IV .................... 233
7.4 Trade Networks of Andrew Clow ................................ 236
xiv list of maps, figures and tables
Tables
3.1 Share of the Trading Communities by Gender:

1766–1805 .......................................................................... 73
3.2 Share of the Trading Communities Comprised of
Merchants: 1766–1805 ...................................................... 75
3.3 Warehouse Keepers: 1766–1805 ...................................... 84
3.4 Auctioneers and Vendue Holders: 1766–1805 ................ 86
3.5 Specific Item Shops as a Percentage of all Shops:
1766–1805 .......................................................................... 97
3.6 Women General Shopkeepers as a Percentage
of all Women Shopkeepers: 1766–1805 .......................... 97
5.1 Bank Account Holding by Gender .................................. 162
6.1 Number of Vessels in Various Atlantic Trades .............. 189
PART ONE
PROFILE AND STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION
MEN AND WOMEN OF THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC

TRADING COMMUNITY
The theme of the Atlantic as a category of historical analysis is now

well established. Within the terminology posited by David Armitage,
this book is ‘trans-Atlantic history’.1 The idea of an Atlantic com-
munity has been used to explain the many different ways in which
this part of the eighteenth-century world can be understood; for
example, in terms of nation, empire, migration and goods. However,
in the context of trade this has often meant a community of men;
elite traders providing capital and credit and taking risks in order
to profit from the impressive economic growth around the Atlantic.
Very rarely does the literature reach beyond the elite of large-scale
importing and exporting merchants and with very few exceptions, it
completely ignores the contribution of women. This is extraordinary,
because in ports, through which imports and exports were routed,
many men were absent for long periods of time, leaving women to
provide for themselves and their families. Conversely, in a com-
mercial rather than a manufacturing or agricultural economy, there
were also opportunities for female entrepreneurs, including catering
for the high numbers of visitors and immigrants.2
1
David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic World,
1500 –1800 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), chapter one.
2
See for example; Ralph Davies, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675–1740: An
Exploration of Communication and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Atlantic history has famously been championed by Bernard Bailyn in his Harvard
Atlantic Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500–1825 since 1996, fol-
lowing which a plethora of material has been published including; Itinerario (1999);
John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (eds.), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Peter A. Coclanis (ed.), The Atlantic
Economy During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice and
Personnel (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press); there is now also the
journal Atlantic Studies. The few exceptions that deal specifically with women in ports
or in trade include: Elisabeth A. Dexter, Colonial Women of Affairs: A Study of Women
in Business and the Professions Before 1776 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin
Co., the Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1924); Elaine Forman Crane, Ebb Tide in New
4 introduction
This means that the history of trade and trading communities is

biased—the historiography to date does not tell the whole story. It
also leaves much unsaid about distribution per se, particularly as
performed by lesser ranks of traders. Rather than Thomas Doerflinger’s
enterprising merchants or David Hancock’s ‘Citizens’, this book is
about the men and women left out of the literature, but without
whose contribution the distribution of goods would not have occurred.3
It is the story of Philadelphia grocer Margaret Moulder, of Ann and
Mary Tuohy who worked as tea dealers and linen drapers in Liverpool,
and of James Astair and Alexander Black, both lower-scale traders
who were in debtors’ gaol in Philadelphia and Liverpool respectively.
Enterprising Andrew Clow, merchant of Philadelphia, who was
definitely a ‘Citizen of the World’, is also included in this story, but
he is only part of it. This book is about the men and women who
helped to distribute goods not only across the Atlantic, but around
the cities of Liverpool and Philadelphia and their respective hinter-
lands. It is the story of the distribution of five shillings worth of sugar
and of chintz valued at two dollars rather than high commerce and
thousands of pounds worth of credit. It is a messy and complicated
story. It is about the humdrum everyday experience of the major-
ity of traders.
Men and Women of the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic Trading Community
The tradition of considering elite (male) merchants as the “dynamic

economic force” in the historiography of commerce has a long his-
tory. Doerflinger presents Philadelphia merchants during the American
War of Independence as all-important, and argues that they deserve
much of the credit for the city’s flourishing commerce in the eighteenth
century. He does allow that the merchant community was “a large
England: Women, Seaports, and Social Change, 1630–1800 (Boston: Northeastern University
Press, 1998); Patricia Cleary, Elizabeth Murray: A Woman’s Pursuit of Independence
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000); Nancy Cox, The Complete Tradesman:
A Study of Retailing, 1550–1820 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
3
Thomas M. Doerflinger, Thomas M., A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and
Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1986); David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the
Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
the british-atlantic trading community 5
occupational group embracing both wealthy traders and many petty

capitalists”, but most of his book is concerned with the elite of that
group. Indeed, he spends only a few pages on suppliers and dis-
tributors, as if they were unimportant. More recently Hancock does
much the same; his ‘Citizens’ were all successful overseas traders in
the long term. He has a section on ‘Historical Writing on Trans-
Atlantic Traders’, but what he apparently means is trans-Atlantic
merchants. Cathy Matson extends her discussion of the trading com-
munity to include wholesalers and the hinterland trade; but again,
terms such as trader and merchant are used interchangeably with-
out considering whether these terms meant specific things to con-
temporaries.4
More importantly, these works are gender biased. They do not
include women. Indeed, most of the literature on women and work
in this period ignores urban women, let alone women in port cities
or working as traders. Much of the historiography on women in
eighteenth-century Britain has been to put them ‘back’ in history
rather than to integrate them into the mainstream. Where they have
been placed within an economic context it has often been in rela-
tion to the ‘Industrial Revolution’, as part of the agricultural or man-
ufacturing workforce, or within the context of changing gender roles,
rather than as part of a trading or mercantile community. With
regard to the history of American women in this period, existing
work concentrates on their experience of the War of Independence.5
4
Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge,
Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1955), preface; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 5,
15, 122–126; Hancock, Citizens, pp. 3–9; Cathy Matson, Merchants and Empire: Trading
in Colonial New York (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 3.
5
It has not been possible to fully consider the literature on women’s history here.
Classic texts regarding England include Alice Clark, The Working Life of Women in
the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 1919); Ivy Pinchbeck, Women Workers and
the Industrial Revolution (London: Routledge, 1930); Maxine Berg, The Age of Manufactures
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), chapters six and seven; Bridget Hill, Women, Work,
and Sexual Politics in Eighteenth Century England (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Pamela
Sharpe, Adapting to Capitalism: Working Women in the English Economy 1700 –1850
(London: MacMillan Press, 1996); Deborah Valenze, The First Industrial Woman (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Leonore Davidoff and Catharine Hall, Family
Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850 (London: Routledge,
1987). For America see Joan Hoff Wilson, “The Illusion of Change: Women and
the American Revolution”, in Alfred F. Young (ed.), The American Revolution: Explorations
in the History of American Radicalism (Dekalb, Il.: Northern Illinois University Press,
1976), pp. 383–445; Linda Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in
6 introduction
Yet we know that women could occasionally work as merchants,

as displayed by Patricia Cleary and the case of Elizabeth Murray.
Furthermore, the port economy presented particular problems and
opportunities for women as demonstrated in a rare work on women
and ports by Elaine Forman Crane. With up to 30 per cent of the
adult male workforce absent at any one time, women were often left
to fend for themselves for long periods of time; therefore, “few women
remained aloof from economic activities that extended beyond the
boundaries of their household”.6 At the same time, the fact that
sailors, immigrants and other visitors needed to be boarded, fed and
entertained meant that there were a multitude of employment oppor-
tunities available for women in ports, in addition to the commercial
nature of the port itself. Despite this, the main stress in the litera-
ture on traders, and indeed on ports, has continued to be concerned
with elite male merchants. This is not to detract from these excel-
lent works, but they do not tell the whole story. The successful men
discussed by Doerflinger and Hancock did not work in a vacuum;
many other men and women were involved in the distribution of
goods, and at all levels of society.
In starting to rectify this bias, this book argues for the inclusion
of all those who were involved in commerce in its widest sense: not
just elite overseas and male merchants, but anyone, male or female,
who was involved in buying and selling, ‘wheeling and dealing’.
Therefore, all those that made their living through the distribution
of goods rather than the making of them are included. They were
all entrepreneurs, at whatever socio-economic level. If we are to
explain how goods were distributed in the later eighteenth century,
we must understand who was involved in that process—at the local,
Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American Culture at Williamsburg

by University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters:
The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800 (Boston: Little Brown and
Co, 1980).
6
Cleary, Elizabeth Murray; Lewis found that mariners accounted for between 20
and 30 per cent of the male working population of Liverpool in 1745. Fiona Lewis,
“The Demographic and Occupational Structure of Liverpool: A Study of the Parish
Registers, 1660–1750” (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool: 1993),
p. 66, Fig 3.4. With regard to Philadelphia, Smith found that around 20 per cent
of the free working population were mariners. Billy G. Smith, The “Lower Sort”:
Philadelphia’s Laboring People, 1750–1800 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990),
pp. 64, 212; Crane, Ebb Tide, pp. 101–102, chapter three.
regional, as well as the trans-Atlantic level. This book uses the con-
cept of a trading community as anyone buying and selling, rather
than producing. Wherever they lived, either at home or abroad,
these people all had something in common with one another; they
made their living in commerce and trade rather than production.
This wider definition facilitates the discussion of the contribution
of the many men and women, rich and poor, who were part of the
trading community. A whole host of merchants, factors, brokers,
warehouse-keepers, wholesalers, auctioneers, dealers, grocers, shop-
keepers, hucksters and higglers were involved in the distribution of
goods around cities and their hinterlands. This is important because
although the significance of the ‘consumer revolution’ has been dis-
cussed within the context of the language of American Independence,
and for its role regarding the identity of the upper classes and their
emulation by the middle classes in England, very rarely has the story
of the distribution of these goods been told.7 In order to understand
how the rise of consumer goods, both manufactures and foods was
facilitated, it is necessary to understand how the distribution of those
goods occurred. For this link between supply and demand to be
made, many people were involved—and they were all part of one
trading community. This re-understanding, or re-conceptualisation of
‘trader’ is important for the lower classes of traders, especially women.
As has been noted, despite the fact that ports presented women with
particular opportunities and problems with regard to their involve-
ment in the formal economy, comparatively little has been written
on women in this context. However, looking at women in this way
facilitates a discussion of their very important contribution to the
economy, both in Liverpool and Philadelphia and the wider Atlantic
world more generally.
Something needs to be said here about the time period covered
by this book. It is deliberately not ‘colonial’ or ‘early-republic’ for
several reasons. This is a book about men and women, most of them
ordinary people trying to make a living the best way they could.
For most of them, and especially for women, historical ‘eras’ as set
7
Timothy H. Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped
American Independence (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Neil
McKendrick, John Brewer, and J.H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The
Commercialisation of Eighteenth Century England (London: Indiana University Press, 1982).
8 introduction
out by historians have little meaning. In the fervour of pre War of

Independence days in places such as Philadelphia there is no doubt
that the revolutionary rhetoric was useful and successful in engag-
ing ordinary people with the war effort. However, the onset of peace
meant that people just wanted to get on with their lives. It is there-
fore of interest to look at a period with a high incidence of conflict
to see in which ways the everyday lives of people were changed. Of
course, being separated from loved ones during a time of war, or
being displaced from their home had an immediate impact on fam-
ilies; but many people in this period spent several years away from
their families, as agents for merchants abroad or in a regional city,
or as sailors or supercargoes.8
Furthermore, people in the eighteenth century were used to conflict,
it was a century of wars. Indeed for traders, the many crises dur-
ing this period, whether actual wars, threat of wars, rebellions or
simply over-trading all had a similar effect on their working lives.
They disrupted the supply and demand of goods, altered prices, and
therefore credit, payments and profits. There were so many credit
crises and wars over the eighteenth century that although Independence
may have made a marked change in the American mindset or world-
view in the long term, in the eighteenth-century economic context,
it was just another disturbance. Trade continued as soon as hostili-
ties were ended, in much the same way, and under much the same
terms. Furthermore, avoiding the false break of 1776 to 1783 allows
us to disengage from literature that is often whiggish and pre-occupied
with the minutiae of revolutionary rhetoric.
Interpretations of the American War of Independence have of
course changed over time. However, the main preoccupation with
change has been concerned with ideas—that “political thought and
behaviour would never be the same again in America”, that ideas
were “radically transformed”. However, a rise in radical social con-
sciousness (if indeed there was one) did not necessarily transform
daily life. Indeed, political conflict ensued in the early republic because
8
Peter Thompson, Rum Punch and Revolution: Taverngoing and Public Life in Eighteenth-
Century Philadelphia (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Brooke
Hunter and Paul G.E. Clemens, “The Mid-Atlantic Grain Trade from the Seven
Year’s to the Napoleonic Wars” (Unpublished paper presented at a conference run
as part of the Programme in Early American Economy and Society, LCP, Nov.
2003), p. 33.
American leaders were not so sure about what they stood for, as
they had been about what they stood against. The fragile union was
held together only by the fear of disunion. The concentration on the
“exploration of ideas during the era of the American Revolution
often has divorced thought from social reality”.9
Indeed, in terms of day-to-day experience, circumstances changed
slowly. The distribution of wealth in America became more unequal
not less. Free labour was not the experience for all, and the cause
of indentured servants, slaves and female labour was severely hurt—
especially in the south. As late as 1812 the promotion of manufac-
tures was considered sound—but was still long overdue. With regard
to women, as with other disenfranchised groups, their exploitation
was abetted by the American War of Independence. Women were
only “coincidentally” members of the revolutionary generation. They
were given a new role, but this was a move towards separate spheres;
the revolution “had little meaning for women as women”. Whilst
some women did envisage a different life for themselves—their thoughts
did not make a new reality for them. Those few women that could
expand their sphere into politics were the few of the elite.10
9
For a good review of the debate over the Jameson thesis and the ‘transform-
ing hand’ of the revolution see Alfred F. Young, “American Historians Confront
the “Transforming Hand of Revolution”, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert
(eds.), The Transforming Hand of Revolution: Reconsidering the American Revolution as a Social
Movement (Charlottesville and London: Published for the United States Historical
Society by the University Press of Virginia, 1996), pp. 346–492; Gary B. Nash,
“Social Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Urban Radicalism” in Young,
The American Revolution, pp. 3–36, p. 32; Lance Banning, “The Problem of Power:
Parties, Aristocracy, and Democracy in Revolutionary Thought”, in Jack P. Greene
(ed.), The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits (New York and London: New
York University Press, 1987), pp. 104–123, p. 109; Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible:
The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution (Abridged ed.) (Cambridge,
Ma: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 246; J.R. Pole, “The Ambiguities of Power”,
in Greene, The American Revolution, pp. 124–130, p. 125; Melvin Yazawa, “Dionysian
Rhetoric and Apollonian Solutions: The Politics of Union and Disunion in the Age
of Federalism”, in Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf (eds.), Empire and Nation: The
American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2005), pp. 178–196, p. 186; Joseph Ernst, “ ‘Ideology’ and an
Economic Interpretation of the Revolution”, in Young, The American Revolution,
pp. 159–185, p. 167.
10
Trevor Burnard, “Freedom, Migration, and the American Revolution”, in
Gould and Onuf, Empire and Nation, pp. 295–314; Drew R. McCoy: The Quest for
Economic Independence in the Early Republic” in Greene, The American Revolution,
pp. 131–148, p. 133; Wilson, “The Illusion of Change, p. 386; Elaine Forman
Crane, “Dependence in the Era of Independence: The Role of Women in a
10 introduction
It is ironic therefore that whilst economic interpretations of the

War of Independence are powerful and persuasive, it was precisely
in the economic sphere of the early republic that the situation changed
most slowly for both men and women. There was not so much a
“shock of war” as a hiatus and slow development. As Ian Steele
noted when choosing an end date for his book on the English Atlantic,
“A study that ends in 1740 avoids the teleological preoccupations
that the American Revolution has imposed on much of the study of
American colonial history”.11 Equally, a study that straddles the self-
imposed (by historians) barrier of 1776 and the ‘new republic’ also
avoids that teleological view and presupposes that not everything
changed out of recognition on Independence.
This is not to say that relationships between the United States
and Britain did not change at all; they did, but gradually. The United
States was unable to substantially develop its manufacturing indus-
try until the early nineteenth century, and so continued to be reliant
upon English manufactures. This was because the economic situa-
tion had as much to do with resources as with British mercantilist
policies.12 Many of the ‘world goods’ such as spices, groceries, tea
and silk also continued to be distributed to the United States through
Britain. The early United States did make attempts to move away
from this reliance of course. For example, many efforts were made
to trade with France, but merchants in that country usually wanted
cash payment on delivery. The supply of basic foodstuffs to the West
Indies had provided the northern colonies with a positive balance
of payments, from which of course, after 1783 they were no longer
Republican Society”, in Greene, The American Revolution, pp. 253–275, p. 257; Norton,
Liberty’s Daughters, pp. 296–298; Susan Branson, These Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women
and Political Culture in Early National Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2001).
11
Marc Egnal and Joseph Ernst, “An Economic Interpretation of the American
Revolution”, WMQ, 3rd Ser., 29,1 (1972), 3–32; Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The
Origins of the American Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988);
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, chapter five; for a good summary of the debate on
American Exceptionalism, which also appears to swing on a social, political and
cultural versus economic axis see Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American
Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration”, AQ, 45 (1993), 1–43; Steele, The English Atlantic,
p. ix.
12
See John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America,
1607–1789 (Chapel Hill and London: Published for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture by the North Carolina Press, 1985), chapter fifteen.
able to benefit directly. However, efforts were soon made to resolve

this problem. Whilst the British Government was trying to promote
Canada as a substitute provider of foodstuffs to the British West
Indies, merchants in England, the West Indies and the United States
lobbied hard to obtain dispensations which would allow the United
States to continue trading directly with the West Indies.13 The
economies of what had been the thirteen continental colonies did
therefore change with Independence, but they developed slowly over
time. A comparative study which investigates these economies both
before and after the American War of Independence demonstrates
these changes, and their implications for female and other ‘lesser’
traders, far better that one which starts or ends in 1783.
This book is divided into two main parts. The first argues for the
term ‘trader’ to be understood as far more inclusive, that traders
from merchants down to hucksters and higglers were all part of one
trading community. Chapter one provides the framework for eigh-
teenth-century Atlantic trade, and demonstrates that Liverpool and
Philadelphia are good case studies for investigating the nature of dis-
tribution in this period. Chapter two argues further for the use of
a wider definition of a trading community. The work performed by
each sector in the hierarchy is detailed, with reference to the views
of both contemporaries and historians. Chapter three details the
numbers involved in each trading sector in Liverpool and Philadelphia,
and compares and contrasts them in detail. In examining the wider
trading community in terms of function and numbers, chapters two
and three demonstrate the importance of lesser traders, including
women, to the distribution process. The argument that the trading
communities of Liverpool and Philadelphia were interdependent rather
than in competition, is also posited.
13
Kenneth Morgan, “Business Networks in the British Export Trade to North
America, 1750–1800”, in McCusker and Morgan, The Early Modern Atlantic Economy,
pp. 36–62, p. 55. In Philadelphia, attempts were also made to trade with China
for example. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 287–293; Alice B. Keith, “Relaxations
in the British Restrictions on the American Trade with the British West Indies
1782–1802, JMH, 20,1 (1948), 1–18. On the difficulties facing American traders in
the early United States as perceived by a contemporary see John H. Reinoehl,
“Some Remarks on the American Trade: Jacob Crowninshield to James Madison
1806”, WMQ, 3rd Ser., 16,1 (1959), 83–118.
12 introduction
Part two considers the interaction of the trading community at

the local, regional and trans-Atlantic level. The contention of the
interdependence of the trading communities of Liverpool and
Philadelphia is proved by investigating the interconnected networks
of people, credit and goods, and how the trading community func-
tioned in detail. It also considers the way in which traders took con-
trol over their own lives, and those of others, as they sought to
manage their businesses and the risk inherent in commerce. Chapter
four investigates the networks of people and how traders managed
information in a volatile environment. Chapter five investigates the
prevalence of credit throughout society, the way in which networks
of capital and credit functioned, and what happened to traders when
these networks failed them. Chapter six demonstrates that the efficiency
of these networks of people and credit meant that the same goods
were to be found throughout the British Atlantic. By looking in detail
at the distribution process, it demonstrates how food and manufac-
tures were made available to those who both needed and desired
them. Chapter seven uses individual case studies to investigate what
life was like for a trader in the eighteenth century. In particular, it
examines how traders managed their own businesses and exercised
control over others in order to manage the risks inherent in trade.
The conclusion develops the theme of control between Liverpool
and Philadelphia, and concludes that not only were male and female
traders within a port dependent on one another, but that trading
communities around the Atlantic were interdependent and part of
one larger trading community. Indeed, the fact that trade both within
and between the two cities grew from strength to strength, despite
the many conflicts of the period, demonstrates the tenacity and co-
dependence of these traders. Several themes are developed through-
out the book which help to explain the wider world in which these
traders lived and worked. These are: diversity, risk and risk man-
agement, the centrality of reputation and credit, the world of goods,
and how people attempted to control or make sense of their place
within a volatile trading environment.
This book therefore fills important gaps in the historiography by
presenting new understandings of trade on many levels. It stresses
the role of distribution as opposed to demand or supply, and in
doing so it explains why and how so many consumer goods were
found at all levels of society. The role of lesser men and women in
this chain of distribution is highlighted, as well in their relation with,
and to, elite merchants. This book also explains where these lesser
traders fitted in to the hierarchy of this trading community and how
all traders, whatever their status, used networks of people and credit,
in order to provide the goods that people either needed or desired
in an increasingly urban and non self-sufficient society. This is the
reason why there is no separate chapter on women. They are inter-
woven into their place in the trading community, within its main
story, as indeed they would have been during the eighteenth cen-
tury. In putting women directly into this story, this book explicitly
uses a time frame that transgresses ‘accepted’ historical boundaries
to highlight continuities and change over the long term. Finally, but
by no means least, it expressly presents a positive past for these peo-
ple without painting a rosy picture or distorting the hard reality of
eighteenth-century life.14 In recognising the difficulties and inequali-
ties under which these many men and women laboured under, it
demonstrates their ability to overcome.
14
An early proponent of a positive past is Washington E.B. Dubois, The American
Negro: his Economic progress in Relation to his Moral and Religious Development (London:
T. Fisher Unwin, 1989).
CHAPTER ONE
TRADERS AND THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC ECONOMY
merely for money?

Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary
In 1786, Andrew Clow, merchant of Philadelphia, was in Liverpool.

In fact he had travelled all around England, including Birmingham
and London, in order to personally oversee the choice of goods for
his house in Philadelphia. He purchased mainly dry goods and tex-
tiles in England which he advertised as directly from the best man-
ufactories. Originally from Manchester, England, Clow used his
connections there and all over Britain in order to gain the best goods
and prices possible. He imported these goods on several vessels,
including the Pigou and Harmony from London, and the Grange from
Liverpool in 1787. His main shipping agents were William Rathbone
and Robert Benson, merchants in Liverpool, whom he used more
or less exclusively once he (part) owned his own vessels. These were
the Adriana, which he owned by 1789, and the Grange. He also traded
with Gibraltar, Cadiz, Madeira, Hamburg, Bordeaux and Grenada
as well as with other places in the United States.1 Andrew Clow was
a successful ‘hands-on’ merchant.
Thomas Leyland of Liverpool was also a very successful man, and
a lucky one! In 1766 he won a lottery prize of £20,000 which he
used to extend his business. Originally involved in the slave trade,
he dealt extensively with the West Indies and Ireland, and significantly
for our story, many of his contacts in the latter place were women.
By 1786, he had moved to the fashionable Duke Street, a favourite
place for merchants at that time, and by the 1790s was a success-
ful merchant in the slave and provisions trades. He later diversified,
1
See Folder Jan-Jun 1786, ACP, SGC, HSP; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit,
p. 245; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 19 Oct 1787; Folder Adriana, Sub
Folder Adriana, passim; Clow to Cay, 29 Jul 1790, Folder Admin 1789–1790;
Business Correspondence, H-R; and Folder 1785–1798 passim, all ACP, CWU, HSP.
16 chapter one
including setting up a banking house with William Roscoe, ironi-

cally an anti-slave trade campaigner. This partnership did not work
out, perhaps unsurprisingly, and Leyland eventually set up his own
bank in 1807 with his nephew Richard Bullin. He was mayor of
Liverpool three times and died in 1827 possessed of an estate some-
where under the value of £600,000.2
Margaret Moulder was a struggling grocer in Philadelphia at
roughly the same time that Clow and Leyland were active. She could
write up her own accounts, but was not sufficiently well educated
to keep them in good order. Apparently a widow at the end of the
American War of Independence, she lived at 24 Pear Street between
then and 1805. In common with many people, both men and women,
she wore many different ‘hats’ in terms of the work she did: grocer,
carter and boarding house keeper. Living in Dock Ward, near the
river, her boarding house probably catered for the many sailors and
other visitors to the port, which no doubt supplemented her income
from selling goods such as flour, pork, corn, salt, brandy, cyder,
bread and potatoes. She also carted goods including corn and house-
hold goods in to Philadelphia from the hinterland.3 This combina-
tion of various business options meant that she could provide an
income for herself whatever the season, or the state of the economy,
helping to ride out hard times.
Ann and Mary Tuohy lived and worked in the port of Liverpool
and also used a variety of options open to them. They may have
been the wife and daughter, or both daughters, of David Tuohy,
who had set up in Liverpool as a merchant around 1772 after four-
teen years as a captain in the slave trade. It would appear that he
died in the late 1780s or early 1790s, after which the two ladies
were listed as tea dealers, and later as tea dealers and linen drap-
ers. No doubt they capitalised on David’s connections. They pro-
vided goods for the outfitting of ships, including £23 17s. 5d. worth
2
John Hughes, Liverpool Banks and Bankers 1760–1837 (Liverpool: Henry Young
and Sons, 1906), pp. 169–177, 59–66. Thomas Leyland Letterbook 1786–1788,
passim, LivRO.
3
Philadelphia Federal Tax List for 1783 (not Southwark and Northern Liberties),
Pennsylvania Archives, 3rd Ser., Number 16; J. Robinson (ed.), The Philadelphia
Directory for 1805 (Philadelphia: Printed for the Publisher, 1805); Accounts of William
Ford, John Wall and William Pierce, Margaret Moulder Ledger 1794–1799, ff. 1,
20, 15 and passim, HSP.
traders and the british-atlantic economy 17
of slops (second-hand clothing) to the merchant Thomas Leyland in

1797. They also did considerable business with John Tarleton, another
slave trader. He owed them £422 11s. 5d. in 1804, and £562 0s.
8d. in 1807.4 They no doubt provided business support for each
other and shared living costs.
James Astair, who called himself simply a trader, was not so lucky.
He found himself in the Philadelphia debtors’ apartment in December
1799. He owed a substantial amount of money: $9–10,000 to the
merchant Francis Brevil, $575 to another merchant, Thomas Leuffer,
$950 to the cordwainer John Boissier for merchandise sold him, and
another $700 to a Mr Berguier. In return he was owed only $1,850.
Astair had obviously engaged himself in far more debts than he had
assets to pay with. Merchant Seth Willis may have met James Astair,
as he was also in the debtors’ apartment in 1799. A merchant, he
apparently had only one creditor, the Philadelphia merchant firm
Phillips, Crammond and Co., who may have been responsible for
having him put in gaol.5 In 1785 he had lived at the corner of Front,
Spruce and Water Street, although for some reason he was not listed
in the 1791 directory. Maybe his time in gaol proved too much for
him, because in 1805 his widow was listed at the same address as
a grocer. Maybe the business was no longer involved in importing
goods, or, just as likely, Seth had given himself a title that his socio-
economic status did not really reflect and his wife had simply carried
on his business.
Back across the Atlantic, and at the lower end of the socio-
economic scale was Alexander Black, dealer and chapman of Liverpool.
An itinerant trader, he was in Lancaster debtors’ gaol in 1772. He
was owed money in small amounts such as four, six and nine shillings
from people in Cheshire, on the other side of the river Mersey from
Liverpool. He was owed about £675 from his brother’s estate, appar-
ently due from a Mr Lindow [Lindo], who lived abroad, possibly
in Jamaica. However, he had not been able to get hold of his inher-
itance in time to prevent himself being gaoled for debt. Edward
4
DTP, LivRO, passim; Ann and Mary were listed in Liverpool’s trading direc-
tories as tea dealers in 1796 and as tea dealers and linen drapers in 1805; Log
Book for ship Earl of Liverpool (photocopy), 5 Apl 1797 to 17 Feb 1798, LBP,
HSBC; Tarleton Balance Sheets for 1804 and 1807, TP, LivRO.
5
Insolvent Debtor’s list of James Astair, 9 Dec 1799; Insolvent Debtor’s List of
Seth Willis, 4 Aug 1799, PHMC.
18 chapter one
Charnock was similarly unsuccessful. A timber merchant also of

Liverpool, he was in debtors’ gaol at the suit of George Eccles in
1794. Charnock owned several houses in Liverpool which he rented
out, and was owed money by other merchants, ship carpenters,
watchmakers and engravers around the city.6 Much of the money
he was owed was for promissory notes, perhaps for money lent or
bills not paid. His problem was not so much debt, as cash flow.
These stories highlight the range of trading activity of both men
and women in the ports of Liverpool and Philadelphia, and indeed
around the Atlantic littoral. They also highlight the fact that both
success and failure were equally possible whatever the scale or suc-
cess of the trader in question, or on which side of the Atlantic they
lived and worked. However, whilst the income produced by their
business varied widely, Andrew Clow, Thomas Leyland, Margaret
Moulder, Ann and Mary Tuohy, James Astair and Alexander Black
had one thing in common; they were traders. In Sheridan’s words,
they worked “merely for money” in that they did not produce any-
thing as artisans of the period might have done.7 They were bound
together in a common culture in which they bought and sold for
profit. They were all equally involved in a distribution process which
was high risk, based on trust and credit, and where a good reputa-
tion was necessary to engage in trade at any level. However, a strong
sense of business culture meant that to work merely for money was
not enough to survive and remain part of this trading community.
This is not to say that traders throughout the status scale did not
have different roles within this process. We have already seen that
Thomas Leyland was a merchant and then a banker and that Margaret
Moulder wore various ‘hats’ in order to gain an income. Survival
strategies such as these were common to international merchants,
grocers, shopkeepers, and itinerant dealers, all of whom were equally
liable to find themselves successful or in debtors’ gaol. It was only
6
Debtor’s List of Alexander Black, 28 May 1772, LRO; Alexandre Lindo was
a Portuguese Jew in Kingston, Jamaica. He purchased slaves off the vessels Elliot
and King Pepple from Liverpool 1786–1788. Jackie Ranston, The Lindo Legacy (London:
Toucan Books, 2000), pp. 41–42 and David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David
Richardson and Herbert S. Klein, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CDROM
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), voyages 81247–81255 and
82155–82164; Debtor’s List of Edward Charnock, 15 Jul 1794, LRO.
7
Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language, 2 Vols, II (1780)
(Menston, England: Scolar Press Limited, 1967).
the scale of success or failure that differed. As we shall see, this com-
mon culture bound them together in a variety of ways; through net-
works of people, networks of credit and in the distribution of goods
locally, regionally, and across the Atlantic. Manufactures, raw mate-
rials, peoples and food were distributed across the Atlantic by a trad-
ing community which was a microcosm of the larger one. Men and
women, successful and not, were all involved in making life possi-
ble and interesting. Traders distributed food, clothing, necessaries,
luxuries, and sometimes labour, in an increasingly urbanised and
global world.
The Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic Economy
Of course Philadelphia and Liverpool did not exist in a vacuum.

They were port cities located around the Atlantic basin, which by
the mid-eighteenth century, had become relatively ‘small’. To those
living in port cities such as these, or indeed Charleston, Kingston,
Bristol, Halifax (Nova Scotia) or New Calabar, it must have seemed
that everybody and everything was on the move. Diverse cultures
clashed and mutated as Europeans met native Americans and as
Africans were forcibly migrated, integrating two old worlds into a
new one. Improved communications, in terms of larger ships, more
trade on those ships, better postal services and the growth of news-
papers facilitated the quicker and more reliable transference of infor-
mation, and made distances seem far less. Consumer goods, whether
clothes or food, were not only desired, they were necessary when
very few people in towns were self-sufficient; “some would have been
utterly dependent on the urban food supply” and very few house-
holds had the tools to engage in activities that were necessary to
produce goods for home consumption.8
8
Donald W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective of 500 Years
of History, II Vols., Vol I, Atlantic America, 1492–1800 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1986), p. 65; classic texts include Gary B. Nash, The People of Early North
America (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974); Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and
Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought From Slavery to Freedom (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1977); James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in
Colonial North America (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter
C. Mancall and James H. Merrell (eds.), American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers
from European Contact to Indian Removal (New York: Routledge, 2000). On the West
20 chapter one
The trade in all types of goods and raw materials expanded greatly
within the Atlantic world during the period covered by this study.
In particular, Britain’s trade was ‘Americanised’, in that the focus of
its trade moved from the Mediterranean and the Baltic to the ports
of the Americas, such as New York, Charleston, Kingston ( Jamaica),
and of course Philadelphia. In 1710, the value of imports and exports
to northern and southern Europe accounted for 63.6 per cent and
87.6 per cent of all English overseas trade, whilst imports and exports
to the British Americas accounted for 29 per cent and 8.5 per cent
respectively. By 1810, trade with British America and the United
States accounted for 32.5 per cent of imports and 34.2 per cent of
exports, whilst northern and southern Europe accounted for 34.5 per
cent and 46.43 per cent. In particular, trade with the area which
was to become the United States saw huge growth in terms of exports.
Whilst exports to the thirteen colonies accounted for only 4.9 per
cent of total exports in 1710, the United States accounted for 18.5
per cent of all exports in 1810. This reorientation in trade was hugely
valuable. In 1760 British imports from the thirteen colonies was
officially valued at £1,150,493, whilst exports were valued at
£2,797,778. By 1791 these figures stood at £1,194,179 and £4,223,449
respectively. By 1810 imports into Great Britain from the United
States were £2,614,000 and exports £7,813,000.9
Indies see Gad J. Heuman, Between Black and White, Race, Politics, and the Free Coloreds
in Jamaica 1792–1865 (Oxford: Clio Press, 1981); Brian L. Moore, Barry W. Higman,
Carl Campbell and Patrick Bryan (eds.), Slavery, Freedom and Gender: The Dynamics of
Caribbean Society (Mona, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 2001); Verene A.
Shepherd (ed.), Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Africa and
the African Diaspora (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2002); Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 273;
John J. McCusker, “The Demise of Distance: The Business Press and the Origins
of the Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World”, AHR, 110,2
(2005), 295–321; Roger A.E. Wells, Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England 1793–1801
(Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1988), p. 21; Fernand Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce,
Vol II, Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century (London: Phoenix Press, 1982),
p. 54; Carole Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 54–56.
9
Figures calculated from B.R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British
Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 309–313.
British Americas includes the continental colonies (boundaries of 1822), British West
Indies and British North America. Exports include re-exports at official values.
England and Wales 1710–1758, Great Britain 1755–1822; Jacob M. Price, “New
Time Series for Scotland’s and Britain’s Trade with the Thirteen Colonies and
States, 1740–1791”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 32,2 (1975), 307–325, pp. 322–325. Price and
Mitchell and Deane discuss the many problems with using official and current val-
There was obviously an imbalance in trade between the two

regions. Increasing British demand for American produce after 1745
pushed up the prices of wheat and flour, producing a higher stan-
dard of living for the colonists, whilst the prices for English manu-
factures went up only slightly. However, much of Pennsylvania’s
produce went to the West Indies, thereby still producing the trade
imbalance with Britain. This was (partially) funded by the middle
colonies’ favorable balance of trade with the West Indies and south-
ern Europe and with invisible earnings from shipping. Despite the
various conflicts, credit crises, non-importation agreements, and indeed
the War of Independence, trade between Britain and the thirteen
colonies and states grew considerably during this period and indeed,
continued to do so throughout the nineteenth century.10
The eighteenth-century Atlantic world worked as an economic sys-
tem mainly due to comparative advantage. Pennsylvania’s mills pro-
duced flour, the American South produced rice and tobacco, the
West Indies sugar, Newfoundland provided fish, Britain cheap manu-
factures and Africa cheap labour. In addition to this, links across
other seas provided Chinese silk and tea, Mediterranean fruit and
wines and Asian spices. The distribution networks were so efficient
that the same goods that were available in Chester, Cheshire, were
also purchased in Chester County, Pennsylvania. This profusion of
goods was not without controversy. Indeed, it was the very avail-
ability of these goods that led to them becoming politicised, espe-
cially on the American side of the Atlantic. It has been argued that
an “Empire of Goods” anglicised America, and that the “desire to
purchase pretty ribbons or printed cloth revealed weaknesses” in the
character of the North American colonists. Contemporaries remarked
that “people, both in town and country, are shamefully gone into
the habit of tea-drinking”. It has been argued that it was exactly
this ubiquity of goods that helped to galvanise American support for
ues in the fuller text. See also John J. McCusker, “The Current Value of English
Exports, 1697–1800”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 28,4 (1971), 607–628.
10
Marc Egnal, “The Economic Development of the Thirteen Continental Colonies,
1720–1775”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 32,2 (1975), 191–222, pp. 203–208; James F. Shepherd
and Gary M. Walton, Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial
North America (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 138;
Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: US Bureau
of the Census with the cooperation of the Social Science Research Council, 1960),
pp. 552–553.
22 chapter one
the revolution; by finding a common language of dissent, “Thirteen

clocks were made to chime together”.11
The taxing of these articles, in an attempt to make the colonists
pay for their own defence, also promoted a confused mix of eco-
nomic and constitutional issues in resistance to British central power.
The Act of Trade (Sugar Act) (1764), Stamp Act (1765) and the
Townshend Act (1767) may have hurt the colonists financially, but
complaints were couched in terms of taxation without representa-
tion. “It was well known that the colonists universally were of opin-
ion that no money could be levied from English subjects, but by
their own consent”, groaned Benjamin Franklin.12 However, the
demand, and indeed necessity for these goods continued. In fact the
strong links in trade, both before and after the War of Independence,
are demonstrated by the fact that as soon as revolutionary hostili-
ties were over, these commodities were in strong demand once again.
Traders obliged, and these goods were quickly duly distributed around
the Atlantic.
Despite this conflict, and indeed, American Independence, con-
tinued and increasing demand was in many ways inevitable. Towns
were growing in number and size during the second half of the eight-
eenth century. Between 1750 and 1800, the population of Boston
increased from 16,000 to 25,000 and New York from 13,000 to
61,000. On the other side of the Atlantic, Bristol’s population increased
from 25,000 to 60,000 and Portsmouth’s 10,000 to 33,000 over the
same period. Towns and cities were by their very nature dependent
on their hinterland or overseas for food and clothing, whilst at the
11
Egnal, “Economic Development”, 191–222; Jacob M. Price, “The Transatlantic
Economy”, in Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole (eds.), Colonial British America: Essays
in the New History of the Early Modern Era (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984), pp. 18–42. For the popularity and desire for groceries see
James Walvin, Fruits of Empire: Exotic Produce and British Taste, 1660–1800 (Basingstoke:
MacMillan, 1997); for the trends in consumption on both sides of the Atlantic see
Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer; Wells, Wretched Faces, demonstrates that even
the very poor demanded sugar, tea and wheaten bread, especially in towns, chap-
ter two; Timothy H. Breen, “An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of Colonial
America, 1690–1776”, JBS, 25 (1986), 467–499, p. 478 and Timothy H. Breen,
“Baubles of Britain: The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth
Century”, PP, 119 (1988), 73–104, p. 104, quoting John Adams.
12
Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution, passim; Benjamin Franklin, The Causes of the
Present Distractions in America Explained in Two Letters to a Merchant in London (New
York?: 1774), p. 3.
same time encouraging commercialisation of agriculture of their hinter-

lands. This was exacerbated by in- and through-migration, especially
in port cities. In places such as Philadelphia and Liverpool the high
numbers of immigrants exacerbated the lack of self sufficiency of its
population.13
However, whilst the characteristics of ports produced a hard envi-
ronment for those living in them, they served important functions
in terms of trade. They provided a safe harbour for shipping itself
and fulfilled many important commercial functions. Exactly what
function(s) a port performed depended on its wider economy, both
regionally and at the trans-Atlantic level. Some ports were merely
shipping points, others were markets, or even communications and
financial centres as well. The more of these functions a port per-
formed, the more important it was likely to be.14 Ports such as
Liverpool and Philadelphia were ‘port leaders’ in that they performed
many functions; they were distribution centres, shipping points, com-
mercial and financial centres. Their multi functionalism as ports in
addition to being important regional trade centres, put them firmly
at the top of the Atlantic urban ladder. They, or more precisely,
the traders within them, therefore fulfilled a vital role in financing
and distributing goods that were being supplied from different points
around the Atlantic, and indeed the world.
In order to fulfil this varied role effectively, traders needed to be
efficient; not just elite merchants such as Andrew Clow and Thomas
Leyland, but grocers and shopkeepers like Margaret Moulder and
Ann and Mary Tuohy, less successful traders such as James Astair
13
Gary B. Nash, “The Social Evolution of Preindustrial American Cities, 1700–1820:
Reflections and New Directions”, JUH, 13,2 (1987), 115–145, p. 177; Fernand
Braudel, “Pre-modern Towns” in Peter Clark (ed.), The Early Modern Town (New
York: Longman, 1976), pp. 53–90; Jan de Vries, European Urbanisation 1500–1800
(London: Methuen and Co., 1984), pp. 240–247; Penelope Corfield, The Impact of
English Towns 1700–1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 96; Philadelphia
is described as a ‘type 1’ form in John B. Sharpless, “Intercity Development and
Dependency: Liverpool and Manchester” in John D. Wirth and Robert L. Jones
(eds.), Manchester and Sao Paulo: Problems of Rapid Growth (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford
University Press, 1978), pp. 131–156, p. 33; Timothy H. Maloney, River Towns in
the Great West: The Structure of Provincial Urbanization in the American MidWest 1820–1870
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter four.
14
Jacob M. Price, “Economic Function and the Growth of American Port Towns
in the Eighteenth Century”, in Perspectives in American History, 8 (Cambridge, Ma:
1974), 123–186, pp. 139–140.
24 chapter one
and itinerants such as Alexander Black. Traders of all levels were

required to distribute goods to consumers at all levels. Between them
they linked the goods coming in and through the port with its inhab-
itants, both poor and rich. This included goods distributed within
the town, regionally, and across the Atlantic. Major merchants were
of course required to help distribute goods across the seas, but they
did not work alone. In bustling port cities, there were many people
who could not buy in bulk, but were part of a prosperous section
of society, and many more on the margins of survival. All these peo-
ple needed to have access to clothes and food, partake of some lux-
uries when the possibility arose, engage in the new consumer market
and appear fashion conscious in terms of food and household goods
as well as clothes. In order to facilitate this, a wide variety of mer-
chants, factors, brokers, dealers, warehousemen, auctioneers, grocers,
shopkeepers and itinerant traders were required. The trading com-
munity was a microcosm of the wider community in which it worked,
characterised by rich and poor, men and women, and they consti-
tuted vital links in the chain of distribution.
Two Port Cities: Liverpool and Philadelphia
There are many reasons why these two cities are ideal candidates
for contrast and comparison. To begin with, both were vying for
reputation next to London, laying claim to high status within the
British-Atlantic world. Historians have claimed that “Independence,
trade and immigration made of Philadelphia the second city of the
British Empire”; whilst a contemporary thought that “Liverpool . . . in
point of commercial importance may be called the second sea-port
in the realm”. Indeed, these two ports were closely interconnected
precisely because the eighteenth-century Atlantic was a “functional
economic . . . universe”. One of Philadelphia’s most famous entre-
preneurs, Robert Morris, was even born in Liverpool.15
15
Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh, Rebels and Gentlemen: Philadelphia in the Age of
Franklin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. x; Joshua Montefiore, The
Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium; Containing the Laws, Customs and Regulations,
Relative to Trade, Intended for the Use of Wholesale and Retail Dealers, 2 Vols (London:
Printed for the Author, 1804), p. 476; Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 273; Liverpool
was not granted city status until a Royal Charter of 1880, but it has been discussed
The amount of trade and the number of ships increased between

the two ports in the later eighteenth century. British exports flowed
into Philadelphia, much of which went through Liverpool; they were
valued at £204,067 in 1761 and increased to £704,734 in 1791
despite a slump following post-war overtrading. In return, exports
from Pennsylvania into Britain were officially valued at £22,846 in
1760 and £54,141 in 1791. As with the national picture, Philadelphia
had a noticeable imbalance in trade with Britain. However, Philadelphia
traders had a favourable balance of payments with the West Indies
and southern Europe, and used the Bills of Exchange they received
in payment for flour and bread to pay for the manufactures that
their customers wanted from Britain. These goods were brought in
on an increasing number of ships sailing between the two ports over
this period. In 1766 and 1767 at least thirteen vessels were involved
in the bi-lateral trade between Liverpool and Philadelphia, by 1805
this had risen to forty, reflecting the growth in trade between the
two cities.16 As vessels also grew in size, the increase in the volume
and value of trade must have been considerable.
Liverpool’s location on the west coast of England placed its mer-
chants in a good position to capitalise on the ‘Americanisation’ of
trade. It also enjoyed a vibrant European trade, and much coastal
trade, especially with Ireland. Imports grew from only 14,600 tons
in 1709 to 450,000 tons by 1800. These predominantly consisted of
sugar, cotton, dyewood, coffee, cocoa, rum, tobacco, flour and tim-
ber. In terms of volume, coal and salt were the largest exports, but
earthenware, textiles, metal goods, hardware, glass, hops and leather
goods also made their way out through Liverpool. Liverpool was of
course central to the slave trade at this time. Certainly by the 1750s
Liverpool had taken over from Bristol and London as the leading
slaving port in Britain. There is no doubt that there were huge profits
and treated as a city because of its importance to trade and shipping; Robert Morris
was born in Liverpool on 20 Jan 1735. He was the son of an ironmonger and later
a tobacco agent to Maryland. Morris went to Maryland in 1747, and from there
was apprenticed to Charles Willing in Philadelphia. John A. Garraty and Mark C.
Carnes (eds.), American National Biography, Vol 15 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999).
16
Price, “New Time Series”, pp. 322–325. Unfortunately there are no figures
for the direct trade between Philadelphia and Liverpool; Doerflinger, A Vigorous
Spirit, p. 108. See also Walton and Shepherd, Shipping, p. 115; see chapter six,
pp. 187–195 for a more detailed analysis of the shipping between the two ports.
26 chapter one
to be made from the slave trade, but these were not consistent and
have often been exaggerated. However, Liverpool’s involvement in
the slave trade did provide access to sugar and other plantation prod-
ucts, promoted trade in terms of routes and other commodities in
Africa and boosted the Lancashire cotton industry.17 The fact that
Liverpool as a port continued to rise in importance after the slave
trade was banned in Britain in 1807 demonstrates that the port was
far from reliant on it.
Philadelphia was also a busy port. In addition to a strong posi-
tion in the trans-Atlantic trade with Britain and southern Europe,
Philadelphia had a considerable trade with the West Indies and a
vibrant coastal trade along the eastern sea board. The majority of
imports into Pennsylvania went through Philadelphia. During the
period 1768 to 1772 alone, Philadelphia’s wharves handled exports
to the value of £361,000, far larger than Pennsylvania’s exports to
Britain in 1791. Imports consisted predominantly of dry goods from
Britain, including woollens, hardware, metalware and pottery, and
groceries such as sugar, rum, tea, coffee, brandy, porter, spices, but-
ter, beer and cheese. Pennsylvania’s main exports were lumber, wheat,
flour and bread, but oats, pig and bar iron, and returned British
merchandise was also shipped through the port. A few Philadelphia
merchants were also involved in the slave trade, but many more
17
Sheila Marriner, The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside, 1750–1960
(London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 31; Francis E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: An
Economic History of a Port 1700–1970 (Newton Abbott: David and Charles, 1971),
pp. 32, 26, 12; the profits of the slave trade were sometimes exceptionally good,
but were also erratic, and often exaggerated. Francis E. Hyde, Bradbury B. Parkinson
and Shiela Marriner, “The Nature and Profitability of the Liverpool Slave Trade”,
EcHR, 2nd Ser., 5,3 (1952–3), 368–377. Kenneth Morgan argues that there was
sometimes enough profit on successful voyages that even poor businessmen could
prosper. However, it was a high-risk trade in which to be involved. Kenneth Morgan,
“James Rogers and the Bristol Slave Trade”, HR, 76,192 (2003), 189–216. Richardson
also demonstrates that profits from the slave trade were erratic in some cases and
overall did not always meet acceptable profit levels. David Richardson, “Profits in
the Liverpool Slave Trade: The Accounts of William Davenport, 1757–1784”, in
R. Anstey and P.E. Hair (eds.), Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition (Liverpool:
Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Occasional Series, Vol 2 (1976) pp.
60–90; Joseph E. Inikori, “Slavery and the Revolution in Cotton Textile Production
in England”, in Joseph E. Inikori and Stanley L. Engerman, The Atlantic Slave Trade:
Effects on Economies, Societies and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 145–182; Joseph E. Inikori, Africans and the
Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
were involved in the coastal trade. They were important in sending

food to the West Indies, imported rum and sugar in return, and
acted as an entrepôt for the intercontinental trade in various colo-
nial staple products. In December 1765, Baynton, Wharton and
Morgan supplied 500 barrels of bread to one contact alone, Henry
White of Jamaica.18
This trade continued despite many of the problems encountered
by the two cities. The Seven Years’ War meant huge territorial gains
for Great Britain, but also caused increasing hostility towards British
policy in the thirteen continental colonies as Great Britain attempted
to make the colonists pay for their own defence. The Act of Trade,
Stamp Act, Townshend Act and the Coercive (Intolerable) Acts also
cause disruptions and in particular non-importation in 1765 to 1766,
1768 to 1770 and 1774 to 1776. Britain experienced a credit crisis
in 1772, precipitated by a bank failure, which had ramifications in
Philadelphia and other continental ports as Liverpool overseas traders
tried to call in their debts. A Liverpool bank, Charles Caldwell and
Co., was one of many notorious local failures. There was an even
worse credit crisis in 1793. The merchants of Liverpool, represented
by the local Council (which included many merchants) petitioned
Parliament in April 1793 for an Act to enable the Council to issue
negotiable notes. The success of these notes, based on security, allowed
the Liverpool trading community to survive the storm of the fol-
lowing years.19
Whilst the War of Independence put a stop to much, if not all
trade between the thirteen colonies and Britain, over-importation to
the United States on the return of peace was massive. After nil
imports in 1782, £245,258 worth of goods were imported in 1783
and £689,491 in 1784. This seriously overestimated demand and
caused a slump in trade in Philadelphia in 1785, which was accom-
panied by a “rash of bankruptcies” in 1785 and 1786. Slave risings
18
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 97–111; Shepherd and Walton, Shipping, pp.
47; Henry White to Baynton, Wharton and Morgan, 10 Feb 1766, NLJ.
19
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 236–242; Anthony MacFarlane, The British in
the Americas (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 259–260, 287, 223–225; Richard B.
Sheridan, “The British Credit Crisis of 1772 and the American Colonies”, JEH,
20,2 (1960), 161–186, p. 162; Francis E. Hyde, Bradbury B. Parkinson and Shiela
Marriner, “The Port of Liverpool and the Crisis of 1793”, Economica, New Ser.,
18,72 (1951), 363–377; E.C.K. Gonner, “Municipal Bank Notes in Liverpool
1793–1795”, EJ, 6,23 (1896), 484–487.
28 chapter one
in 1795 in Grenada and St. Vincent also made many Liverpudlian

merchants jittery as demand and prices for slaves became erratic.
The onset of the Napoleonic wars also worried merchants on both
sides of the Atlantic, who hoped that the United States would remain
neutral. They did, but only until 1812 by which time Britain had
antagonised the United States by interfering with neutral shipping.
The Americans retaliated to the French Decrees and Orders in
Council with the American Congress Embargo of 1807 to 1809 and
its replacement by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 to 1810. These
seriously hurt Liverpool merchants who traded with the United States
such as William Rathbone IV.20
Throughout all these crises trade continued. Hostilities promoted
by politicians did not necessarily transfer themselves into grudges
between merchants; making money was better than making war. In
any case, some traders did benefit financially from the war. Merchants
such as Robert Morris in Philadelphia were keenly aware that the
price rises caused by war could aid those wily enough to buy the
right commodities at the right time. Others such as David Tuohy
of Liverpool found his activity curtailed because many of his exports
were guns and ammunition to Africa, forbidden during the American
War of Independence. A steady, predictable and reliable trade was
preferred by most. As soon as hostilities ceased in 1782, politics were
put aside and traders sought out their old trading partners and car-
ried on where they had left off.
This continuance of trade was both possible and desirable because
of increasing demand. Goods, both foods and manufactures, were
required in great quantities because of the rising numbers of people
in each city. In 1708, the population of Liverpool was around 6,500.
By the time of the first census in 1801 it was 77,653. About 80 per
cent of this growth was due to in-migration, the remainder being
by natural increase. Migrants to Liverpool came mainly from other
parts of Great Britain, especially Ireland, Wales and Scotland, as
20
Price, “New Time Series”, p. 325; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 262; Sidney
G. Checkland, “American Versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool, 1793–1815”,
JEH, 18,2 (1958), 141–160, p. 147; Economica, New Ser., 18,72 (1951), 363–377; see
also G.W. Daniels, “American Cotton Trade with Liverpool Under the Embargo
and Non-Intercourse Acts”, AHR, 21,2 (1916), 276–287. The non-intercourse act
also forbade trade with France and its colonies, pp. 277–278.
well as from the hinterland of Lancashire and Cheshire. There was

also a small minority of Jews. Many of these migrants, most of whom
were poor, lived in overcrowded dwellings such as cellars and courts
which had poor ventilation, even worse sanitation and little or no
water supply. Liverpool was busy and enclosed. “Every street near
the Town Hall was then narrow, irregular and ill-built . . . Numerous
dirty, confined, and mean courts and alleys were to be met with. . . . it
was with difficulty that two carriages could pass at the same time”.21
Philadelphians were experiencing much the same conditions. From
a small town of around 4,400 people in 1700, its population grew
to 18,600 in 1760, and increased further to around 67,000 in 1800.
Philadelphia’s immigration was also diverse. Between 1750 and 1775
around 26,000 Irish and Scots-Irish, and nearly 40,000 Germans
arrived in Philadelphia. Not all of these people stayed in Philadelphia
of course. It was a stopping off point for many, and the city devel-
oped a “human warehousing capacity”. Furthermore, in 1790, due
to their initial dominance, English people still accounted for 29 per
cent of the population in the south east of Pennsylvania, which
included Philadelphia; but other nations were represented as follows:
German speaking, 40 per cent, Scots and Scots-Irish, 18 per cent,
Welsh, 3 per cent and others, 9 per cent. Nor did William Penn’s
dream of wide-open streets last long. As in Liverpool, small alley-
ways such as Strawberry Alley and Elbow Lane were built in between
21
John Langton and Paul Laxton, “Parish Registers and Urban Structure: The
Example of Late Eighteenth Century Liverpool”, UHY, 5 (1978), 74–84, p. 76; see
also Paul Laxton, “Liverpool in 1801: A Manuscript Return for the First National
Census of Population”, THSLC, 130 (1981), 73–113; as late as the mid-nineteenth
century, Lancashire-born people still accounted for nearly half of the Liverpool pop-
ulation. 22.3 per cent were Irish, 5.4 per cent were Welsh and 3.7 per cent were
Scottish. The remainder were from other parts of Great Britain and areas of over-
seas trade. Richard Lawton, “From the Port of Liverpool to the Conurbation of
Merseyside”, in Alan. G. Hodgkiss and William T.S. Gould (eds.), The Resources of
Merseyside (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1982), pp. 1–13, pp. 2, 7; B.L.
Benas, “Records of the Jews of Liverpool”, THSLC, 51 (1899), 45–84; on Irish
immigration in Liverpool see Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience,
1819–1914: An Aspect of Anglo-Irish History (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1988); William Moss, The Liverpool Guide (Liverpool: Printed by Crane and Jones,
1796), p. 116; I.C. Taylor, “The Court and Cellar Dwelling: The Eighteenth Century
Origin of the Liverpool Slum”, THSLC, 122 (1970), 67–90, p. 75; Richard Brooke,
Liverpool as it was During the Last Quarter of the Eighteenth Century (Liverpool: J. Mawdsley
and Son, 1853), pp. 118–119.
30
chapter one
Map 1.1: A Map of the Town of Liverpool, John Gore, 1796. Reproduced with the kind permission of the
Liverpool Record Office.
the main streets, sanitary conditions worsened, and houses were small
due to high building costs.22
Living conditions did not improve in either city because both the
town councils took a very narrow view of their responsibilities. Policies
and responsibilities such as street cleaning, lighting, paving and night-
watch men were left to small ad-hoc committees. Often the areas
in most need were the most neglected because those on the coun-
cil looked after their own interests. These interests were mostly con-
cerned with trade and the docks due to fact that merchants dominated
the councils. In Liverpool, merchants constituted about 8 per cent
of the adult male population (as per the baptismal register), but
accounted for nearly 70 per cent of council members 1700–1750.
This situation continued because the Council was ‘close’ and self-
selecting. During the period 1780–1800, 78 per cent of the Council
was comprised of merchants. In Philadelphia, even the War of
Independence could not break the merchants’ hold on the Council
there. Many Quaker ‘grandee’ merchants had declined to continue
their involvement in local and regional politics in 1756 with the rise
in conflict regarding governance, but Anglican merchants took their
place. Even when the first Philadelphia charter was written in 1789,
it stated that “its government was to encourage private business”
and the Council remained a “club of wealthy merchants”.23
22
John K. Alexander, “The Philadelphia Numbers Game: An Analysis of
Philadelphia’s Eighteenth Century Population”, PHMB, 98,3 (1974), 314–324,
p. 324; Smith, The “Lower Sort”, pp. 42–43; see also Marianne Woceck, “The Flow
and Composition of German Immigration to Philadelphia, 1727–1775”, PHMB,
105,3 (1981), 249–278; Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An
Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. 55; it is difficult to break down
traders by nationality because many, especially Germans, anglicised their names.
James T. Lemon, The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern
Pennsylvania (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 14; A Letter from
William Penn Proprietary and Govenour of Pennsylvania in America, to the Committee of the
Free Society of Traders of that Province, residing in London (Printed and Sold by Andrew
Sowle, London, 1683); Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: A History (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), chapter two; Sam Bass Warner, The Private City
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 9–10, 17.
23
Michael J. Power, “Councillors and Commerce in Liverpool, 1650–1750”, UH,
24,3 (1997), 301–323, p. 311; Michael J. Power, “Politics and Progress: Liverpool
1660–1715”, NH, 35 (1999), 119–138; see also F.E. Sanderson, “The Structure of
Politics in Liverpool 1780–1807”, THSLC, 127 (1978), 65–82 regarding late eighteenth-
century politics; François Vigier, Change and Apathy: Liverpool and Manchester in the
Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 43–59; David
J. Pope, “Shipping and Trade in the Port of Liverpool, 1783–1793” (Unpublished
32 chapter one
Map 1.2: The State of Pennsylvania. This Plan of the City and Suburbs of
Philadelphia, A.P. Folie, 1794. Reproduced with the kind permission of
the Library Company of Philadelphia.
PhD thesis, University of Liverpool: 1970), pp. 450–451; many Anglicans were loyal
to Britain during the war, but they in turn were replaced by Anglicans who were
not prominent before the conflict. Whilst Anglican merchants families such as the
Shippens declined in importance, people such as Robert Morris came forward to
take their place. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 254–256. The radical faction
which took over from the Quakers increased the franchise and limited the control
of the council. Warner, The Private City, pp. 100–101, 9. This dominance of mer-
chants would appear to be the norm in trading towns, where they could be con-
fused with the government of the city. See Richard G. Wilson, Gentleman Merchants:
The Merchant Community in Leeds, 1700 –1830 (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1971), pp. 207–211; Frédéric Mauro, “Merchant Communities, 1350–1750”,
in James D. Tracey (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early
Modern World, 1350 –1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.
255–286.
There were of course differences between the two ports. Philadelphia

was a much newer city, having been ‘planted’ in only 1682, whilst
Liverpool was a medieval town. However, Liverpool’s role as a trad-
ing port had only really taken off after the English Civil War, and
especially with the completion of the first dock in 1715. Liverpool
was always run by an oligarchy of Anglicans, even though many of
its elite traders were non-conformists. In contrast, Philadelphia was
a ‘Quaker’ city in its early years, before being later taken over by
Anglicans and Radicals. Whilst Philadelphia’s in-migration was wider
geographically, both cities felt the social strain that high in-migration
produced. The similarities between the two cities were therefore far
more striking than their differences. Furthermore, these two cities were
closely connected by the Atlantic as British trade was ‘Americanised’
and as the thirteen colonies were ‘Anglicised’. Both cities were there-
fore ‘Atlanticised’ in the process. Liverpool and Philadelphia were
both busy ports with an extensive bi-lateral trade within the wider
trans-Atlantic and coastal trade. They were also vital nodes for the
exchange of ideas, people, information, credit and commodities. It
is precisely these links, similarities and differences that make it vital
to study these two port cities within the wider Atlantic context. It
has been said that “Liverpool is easier to understand as a European
port city than as an English provincial town” or in this case, as an
Atlantic port city.24 It is equally true to say that Philadelphia was
an Atlantic port city rather than simply an American eastern seaboard
city. Both aspired to a major role within the Atlantic economy, and
indeed helped each other to do so.
The structure of the trading communities of Liverpool and
Philadelphia were not the same, however, and this means that to
some extent they are not representative.25 These differences highlight
the effects that being part of the British Atlantic economic system
had on particular ports, their regions and their trading communi-
ties. Price has shown that the economic function of a port could
24
Power, “Politics and Progress”, passim; Nash, The Urban Crucible, pp. 240–246.
Large-scale bilateral trade was normal in the eighteenth-century Atlantic. See Kenneth
Morgan, “Shipping Patterns and the Atlantic Trade of Bristol, 1749–1770”, WMQ ,
3rd Ser., 46,3 (1989), 506–38, p. 511; Graeme J. Milne, Trade and Traders in Mid-
Victorian Liverpool: Mercantile Business and the Making of A World Port (Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press, 2000), p. 3.
25
The structure of the two trading communities is compared in chapter three.
34 chapter one
differ widely from being a mere shipping point to a fully developed

financial centre. These functions were a reflection of the character
of the port, its hinterland and of the goods produced and traded.26
This was of course determined by its place and role within the
British-Atlantic economy. At the same time, these differences had
enormous ramifications for the structure of the trading community
and the ability of lesser traders to participate. In this way, whilst
Liverpool and Philadelphia are not representative in as much as no
two ports and their trading communities would be exactly the same,
the experience of these two ports is highly indicative of what simi-
lar detailed studies of ports such as New York, Charleston, Kingston,
Bristol or Glasgow would find.
However, the differences found in the structure of the trading
communities of these two port cities were not mirrored in the way
that they functioned. Philadelphia and Liverpool were in fact part
of one Atlantic-wide trading community because they were so inter-
dependent. This could equally be said of Charleston, New York,
Kingston, Glasgow and Bristol. The networks of people, capital, credit
and goods interacted and worked so well because all the traders
involved understood them—wherever they were around the British
Atlantic. In respect of these networks, and the business culture or
mentalité which facilitated them, Liverpool and Philadelphia were
extremely representative. Furthermore, just because the structure of
these two trading communities differed, this does not mean that
Philadelphia’s trading community was ‘backward’. Far from it; traders
had to find ingenious ways of circumventing the enormous problems
they encountered. It was precisely because both trading communi-
ties were equally sophisticated that they could function so well together.
Liverpool and Philadelphia are therefore useful laboratories in which
to explore the wider trading community of this period, who was part
of that community, and how it worked: locally, regionally and across
the Atlantic.
26
Price, “Economic Function”, pp. 139–140.
CHAPTER TWO
WHAT IS A TRADING COMMUNITY?
Trader, One Engaged in merchandize or commerce

Sheridan, A General Dictionary
In both 1755 and 1780, a trader was described as “One engaged

in merchandise or commerce”. Thomas Sheridan also added that a
trader was one used in the methods of money getting, a practitioner,
and to that trade was “to traffic, to deal, to hold commerce; to act
merely for money; having a trading wind”. In 1804 Joshua Montefiore
wrote that trade had a wide meaning—including all commerce, even
barter. Conversely, ‘a trade’ implied a manual occupation—the use
of hands in the construction of goods. Sheridan wrote that “A mer-
chant is called a Trader, but not a tradesman”. Partly this had to do
with status, Sheridan, along with other contemporaries, and many
historians, put the merchant at the top of the status tree for reasons
which are discussed below; but the implication is clear. Generally,
a trader was someone that dealt in goods, but did not make them.
Furthermore, contemporaries agreed that merchandise was anything
to be bought or sold. They did not qualify this by saying overseas,
or to other nations. Even the word commerce could mean simply
exchange between men; and even though the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) does mention that this is especially between different coun-
tries or districts, it does not rule out local trade. Another contem-
porary dictionary defined commerce as the “exchange of one thing
for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick”.1
We can therefore safely state that to contemporaries, the term
trader meant anyone buying and selling, ‘wheeling and dealing’ and
certainly not, simply merchants. Indeed, merchants, as noted above,
could be called a trader, but the term implied a much wider group
1
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755) (rep. London: Times
Books, 1983); Sheridan, General Dictionary; Montefiore, The Trader’s and Manufacturer’s
Compendium, Vol. II, p. 655.
36 chapter two
of people. The use of this definition, as a trader as one engaged in

merchandize or commerce is useful in helping to decide who to
include, and conversely, who to exclude, in a trading community.
Therefore, this book is concerned with those buying and selling, not
making goods. By explicitly investigating this term we come to a
much wider understanding of what it meant to contemporaries and
we can begin to reconstruct a trading community that was diverse
and inclusive. No longer is the trading community a group of elite
male merchants, but also of factors, brokers, warehouse-keepers,
wholesalers, auctioneers, mercers, drapers, haberdashers, hosiers, gro-
cers, dealers, shopkeepers of specialist goods and general shops, and
itinerant and market dealers. This is important not so much because
these traders have usually been left out of the historiography, but
because their importance to the distribution of goods can be stressed.
In order to make sense of this disparate group of people it has
been necessary to place some arbitrary grouping upon them. These
groupings would not necessarily have been recognised by contem-
poraries, but they would have understood the rough socio-economic
strata in which they are framed. In the following discussion refer-
ence is repeatedly made to contemporary writings on trade so that
the structure loosely outlined is set out with explicit reference to
eighteenth-century connotations of these terms. This highlights where
these terminologies changed over time, and the roles performed by
these sectors in Liverpool and Philadelphia. Whilst it is recognised
that these groupings are therefore somewhat self-imposed, this has
been necessary in order to make some sense of the structure of the
trading community, and the relation of these traders to one another.
The efficacy of this will become obvious in chapter three, in which
it will become clear that perceptions of these terms by contempo-
raries (and historians) and reality, did not always coincide. Nor were
the people who worked within these sectors static. As we shall see,
new terms came into being, others changed their meaning over time,
and the traders within each sector moved up and down them accord-
ing to their life-cycle and success and failure.
Furthermore, discussing the eighteenth-century trading community
is complex, not only because there were so many sectors within it,
as we shall see, but because each person within each sector often
performed many roles. The eighteenth-century economy was con-
tinually diversifying, but was also subject to boom and bust, both at
the personal and trans-Atlantic level. For example, a debtor failing
what is a trading community? 37
to pay his debts or experiencing bankruptcy could affect his credi-

tors at a personal level, but if a large merchant house failed, such
as the Scottish banking house mentioned in chapter one, Neal, James,
Fordyce and Brown in 1772, the repercussions could be felt in many
ports around the Atlantic.2 People could also climb up the social
ladder: an itinerant trader might upgrade to become a permanent
shopkeeper, a captain of a slaving ship might become a merchant,
a shopkeeper might begin to sell wholesale and a small-scale mer-
chant might eventually own shipping. Simultaneously, markets and
workload were seasonal and unpredictable, and consumers could be
fickle when it came to fashion. Prices of goods went up and down
with supply and demand; buy and sell at the wrong time and you
could make a loss instead of a profit. Buy and not be able to sell
at all because you purchased the wrong colour or pattern of mate-
rial, and the outcome could be even worse. In order to combat the
vagaries of trade, many people working in commerce spread their
risk by involving themselves in different schemes or areas of trade.
For example, we saw how Margaret Moulder spread her risk by
running a carting business, a boarding house and working as a gro-
cer, which together produced an income all year around. In much
the same way, the Liverpool merchant Arthur Heywood bought and
sold manufactures and slaves, but also acted as a bank, thereby
spreading his risk and reinvesting his profits at the same time.3
The fact that these terms themselves changed their meaning over
time also complicates matters. For example, a chandler originally
meant someone who made and sold candles, but by the eighteenth
century could also mean someone who retailed provisions or small
wares. In order to distinguish themselves, candle makers might call
themselves tallow chandlers, and some chandlers specifically listed
themselves as ships’ chandlers (retailers). There were many examples
of this increasing distinction between maker and seller. In the early
eighteenth century a hatter meant someone who made hats in his
workshop and then sold them; by the end of the century, a hatter
was usually someone who either made or sold hats. This may also
have been the case with other trades people as specialisation increased.
2
Sheridan, “The British Credit Crisis of 1772”.
3
AHA, passim, BGA.
38 chapter two
Sometimes totally new terms came into being. Contemporary dic-

tionaries did not list the term ‘dealer’ as a separate occupation.
However, its increased listing over time in the trade directories demon-
strates that by 1805 it was in common usage. In terms of our ‘wheel-
ers and dealers’ therefore, people who were deemed to be makers
of goods, as opposed to distributors, such as hatters, tallow chan-
dlers and milliners were omitted from this study. Other examples of
people not included are pawnbrokers, who performed more of a
financial service.4
These factors all mean that traders are often difficult to categorise,
but in order to gain some sense of the structure and process of the
trading community, this had to be done. Furthermore, many peo-
ple have been left out who might have been included under another
definition of the ‘commercial’ sector. However, including more peo-
ple in the discussion here would have meant less time for the detailed
sampling and analysis of the ‘wheelers and dealers’ who are included.
It should be remembered that the trading community presented here
is already a far wider analysis of the distribution process than is nor-
mally given. Importantly, it has also facilitated a detailed discussion
of the contribution of women to the formal economy. What follows
is not a definitive explanation of the roles of these sectors, but an
impression of what role each sector performed within the distribu-
tion chain, and what its members contributed to the wider process.
The order of discussion, or strata, has been chosen in order to reflect
the status accorded to the holder of any given title. Whether each
individual’s socio-economic status actually warranted that title is
another matter of course. As will be demonstrated in chapter three,
many people called themselves by a title which their real role did
not warrant, as was the case with merchants. However, as we shall
see, these terms did mean something specific to contemporaries, and
so it is important to be particular when using these titles, even if
they often had a very wide meaning, and were used in various ways
to infer status.5
It is also worth saying something about how these terms were per-
ceived around the Atlantic. We have seen that new terms came into
4
See Appendix B for a list of which occupations are included.
5
Doerflinger also states that these distinctions were real and recognised, A Vigorous
Spirit, p. 17.
being, and older terms changed their meaning over time. Mostly
however, these terms meant the same thing around the Atlantic at
the same time. This was due to the fact that both people and goods
were transported around the Atlantic. Business culture and termi-
nology therefore also ‘migrated’ across the seas. Many books were
printed in London, but were used in Philadelphia, Charleston and
Kingston, as well as in Bristol and Liverpool, where they were con-
sidered fashionable items. Over a quarter of all English books went
to North America and the Caribbean. Books may have been com-
modities, “but they carried information and ideas” too. It has even
been argued that Independence helped to reinforce the Anglicisation
of print. Contemporary dictionaries were therefore transported around
the Atlantic, and so were self-help, ‘how-to’ and guide books. These
included basic introductions to the roles of traders such as The General
Shop Book of 1753 and the Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium of
1804. They described towns and cities around the world as well as
terms such as ‘mercer’ or ‘grocer’. More complex books and con-
cepts were also shipped around the globe. The Universal Accountant and
Complete Merchant was a two-volume guide to the merchant’s work.
The first volume explained basic terminology and the functions of
different persons such as merchant or supercargoes, and the second
the writing of formal accounts.6
Although the titles of these works apparently assumed that only
men would purchase them, that was not always the case. Cameto
Mary Mills of Arch Street, Philadelphia, inscribed her own copy of
the American Instructor on 5 June 1751, demonstrating that these vol-
umes were also used by women. The very fact that many traders,
and certainly all merchants used the double-entry book-keeping sys-
tem by the end of the eighteenth century proves that these concepts
travelled. Originally conceived in Italy, it was for many years called
the ‘Italian system’. Eventually of course, the American press started
6
James Raven, “The Importation of Books in the Eighteenth Century”, in Hugh
Amory and David D. Hall (eds.), A History of the Book in America, Vol. I, The Colonial
Book in the Atlantic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 183–198,
pp. 183–198, pp. 185, 196; Hugh Amory and David D. Hall, “Afterward”, in
Amory and Hall, A History of the Book, pp. 477–485, p. 482; Anon, The General Shop
Book: Or, the Trademan’s Universal Directory (London: Printed by C. Hitch and L.
Hawes, 1753); Montefiore, The Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium; William Gordon,
The Universal Accountant and Complete Merchant, 2 Vols. (Edinburgh: Printed by A.
Donaldson, 1763).
40 chapter two
producing its own volumes. For example, the American Instructor; or,
Young Man’s Best Companion and Daniel Fenning’s Ready Reckoner, a
book of tables which worked like an early calculator, assisting the
trader in his or her everyday accounts. Indeed, there were books for
all kinds of work. These ranged from those designed to help ships’
captains work out freight space and charges, to those which advised
people how much a liquor license might cost. Campbell’s London
Tradesman gave advice on many female trades as well, from milliners
to chandler-shop girls, often including some judgemental comments
in addition. Campbell bemoaned chandler shops as places where
“Maid-Servants and the lowest Class of Women learn the first
Rudiments of Gin-Drinking”.7
The terms used within this study then, basically meant the same
thing at the same time on either side of the Atlantic, and it was
only differences in the economy of the different cities that affected
the role of a specific sector, or determined the absence of a sector
entirely. There were only two differences between Liverpool and
Philadelphia, and these were minor. The role of brokers was slightly
different in function and meaning, although this anomaly became
less marked by the end of the eighteenth century as Philadelphia’s
economy diversified. The only other variance was auctions, or vendues.
They performed the same primary function, with the first term being
used in Great Britain, and the latter in the British Americas. It is
therefore correct to speak of a shared business culture in respect of
terminology, and as we shall see later, in many other respects as well.
7
Cameto Mary Mills’ copy of The American Instructor is held at the LCP; Iris
Origo, The Merchant of Prato: Daily Life in a Medieval City (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin, 1986), p. 115; G. Fisher, The American Instructor; or, Young Man’s Best Companion
(Philadelphia: Benjamin Franklin and D. Hall, 1748); Daniel Fenning, The Ready
Reckoner, or Trader’s Most Useful Assistant (London: J. Hodges, 1757), this was reprinted
as an American version in dollars in Philadelphia in 1793 at Chestnut Hill by
Samuel Sower; James Boydell, The Merchant Freighter’s and Captains of Ships Assistant—
Being Tables Calculated with the Greatest Accuracy (London: not known, 1764) which
helped ships’ captains to calculate and charge out freight space; Henry Sabine, The
Complete Cellarman; or, Wine Merchants, Innkeepers and Publicans’ Sure Guide (3rd ed.)
(Liverpool: Printed by J. Lang, 1811); Campbell, The London Tradesman, pp. 209,
280; see also Daniel Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman (1727) (1839 ed.) (rep.
Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1987). There was even a guide specifically for Liverpool
merchants; R. Williamson, The Liverpool Memorandum Book, or Gentleman’s, Merchants’
and Tradesmen’s Daily Pocket Journal, For the Year 1753 (London: Printed by C. Hitch
and L. Hawks, 1752).
The Roles and Relationships of Traders
The top of the trader status tree was reserved for the merchant. He
(women were rarely merchants) was a man of genius and gentility:
“the Life, Spring, and Motion of the Trading World” according to
Robert Campbell in 1757. The fact that by 1755 the term often,
but not always, implied someone “who trafficks to remote countries”
meant that the merchant was implicitly connected with mercantilist
concerns. Those who exported domestic products may have there-
fore had higher prestige than those bringing in luxury products. In
the hundred years or so before 1760, capital requirements grew faster
for merchants than for industrialists. This was a consequence of trade
reaching farther geographically, into the Americas and the East Indies,
which meant that returns on capital became slower. Ralph Davis
argues that this is one of the reasons for the increasing status of
merchants in this period. The high capital involved was one of the
reasons that this was usually a male concern, for very few women
would have had access to the large sums required to be a merchant.
Their importance was reflected in apprenticeship fees of the period.
They were not necessarily the highest, but £50 to £100 was a con-
siderable sum when a journeyman plaisterer or paviour might only
receive about £30 per annum. It was also expensive to set up your
own business or ‘house’, costing between £1,000 and £5,000. Liverpool
merchants Corries, Gladstone and Bradshaw invested a total of £4,000
to set up their partnership in 1787. Daniel Wistar and Owen Jones
of Philadelphia had an initial capital of £4,340 in 1759. As early as
1763, Christopher Hassell found out that £1,500 capital was not
enough to be a real ‘player’.8
8
Campbell, The London Tradesman, pp. 284–294, 169, 336; Johnson, Dictionary;
Cox argues those exporting domestic products may have had higher status. Cox,
The Complete Tradesman, p. 21; Ralph Davis, A Commercial Revolution: English Overseas
Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London: The Historical Association,
1967), p. 14; a journeyman’s wages based on 12–15 shillings a week, if they were
lucky enough to work the equivalent of 40 weeks. All apprenticeship and ‘set-up’
fees taken from Campbell unless otherwise stated; Sidney G. Chapman, The Gladstones:
A Family Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 16; Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, p. 96; E.M. Schofield and Maurice M. Schofield, “A Good Fortune
and a Good Wife: The Marriage of Christopher Hasell of Liverpool, Merchant,
1765”, THSLC, 138 (1988), 85–111, p. 87.
42 chapter two
These high set-up costs meant that merchants often worked in

partnership. In this way, costs and knowledge were shared. Having
set up a house, the merchant was often, but not always, charac-
terised by the commodity or region in which he dealt. He might be
known as a tobacco or timber merchant for example, or as a West
Indies or Levant merchant; mostly however, the merchant dealt in
such an eclectic manner that he was simply known as a merchant.
Within the Atlantic context of course, many Liverpool merchants,
as in Kingston or Charleston, would have been involved in the sell-
ing of slaves, although the trade directories show that this was one
commodity merchants never listed themselves as trading in. Although
the term merchant originally meant anyone who purchased and sold
marketable items for profit, the term as perceived by contemporaries
by the mid-eighteenth century, and by historians, has come to be
connected with overseas trade. This does not mean though, that all
those who denoted themselves merchant were involved in the impor-
tation and exportation of goods. Indeed, many more people listed
themselves in the directories as merchants than were involved in
major importing and exporting, if at all.
Furthermore, merchants often did more than simply buy and sell
goods, whether overseas or not. Ray B. Westerfield lists four main
branches of a merchant’s business: buying and selling for himself or
on commission, speculating in merchandise over time and place,
dealing in money and credit [proto-banking], and insuring goods
and ships in transit. A typical merchant house in the second half of
the eighteenth century would have been involved in any or all of
these enterprises. The Heywoods of Liverpool acted as merchants
and as a bank, and the Fishers of Philadelphia imported on their
own account, but also provided proto-banking services for some of
their customers. A merchant would normally be involved in the large-
scale selling of merchandise of either foreign or domestic commodities
(often in both), either on his own account or on commission (some-
times known as a commission merchant). Working on commission
meant that a merchant did not have to invest much of his own cap-
ital, but it also meant an income of a percentage of sales rather than
a profit. It was therefore a safer, but sometimes not so profitable
branch of business in which to be. He may have purchased from a
factor, dealer or wholesaler in special commodities, or indeed from
another merchant, especially when involved in overseas commodities.
Certainly forecasting demand of a distantly-produced commodity such

as sugar or spices required a detailed knowledge of the trade.9
Many merchant houses acted as prototype banks, a natural pro-
gression from the increased use of credit and financial paper. Arthur
Heywood and Thomas Leyland of Liverpool were both merchants
involved in the slave trade before moving into banking. Formal bank-
ing in Philadelphia may have been deferred until after the forma-
tion of the Bank of North America in 1781, but merchants such as
the Fishers performed much the same function as a bank. Another
way of investing profits was to underwrite insurance on either ships
or goods in transit. Even ships’ captains might be involved in under-
writing insurance as a way of gaining an extra income. John Stanton
of Liverpool who was involved in the slave trade to Jamaica did so
in the 1750s. However, this was quite risky, especially in times of
war, and so others invested in insurance companies to spread risk.10
A merchant could therefore perform a wide range of functions and
be involved in trade in a variety of commodities or geographical
regions. The high capital and credit requirements for entry into the
sector gave it a high status. As we shall see in chapter three, because
of this implied status, many more people applied this term to them-
selves than their actual socio-economic position warranted; its every-
day use was somewhat different from the connotation given it by
economic writers.
Hovering somewhere below the merchant was the factor. The
term factor is often used by historians to denote an agent, someone
working on commission on behalf on another. In fact, the term fac-
tor covered two separate and distinct roles of agent and wholesaler.
9
Ray B. Westerfield, Middlemen in English Business: Particularly Between 1660 and
1760 (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1915), p. 332; for details of the
day-to-day running of a house see: Hancock, Citizens, chapters three and four
(Hancock’s associates purchased stocks in insurance companies, pp. 259–275); Price,
“Directions for the Conduct”. For dealings with the Customs House see Anon, The
Merchants’ Guide (Liverpool: Printed by William Nevitt, 1774); Liverpool Trade
Directories; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 303.
10
AHA; LBP. The Bank of North America was founded to help finance the
American War of Independence based on the Bank of England model, Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 296–301; Insurance and Disbursement Book for Molly 1752–1756,
Derbyshire Record Office; for a brief introduction to the history of insurance see
Nicholas Lane, “The Growth of Insurance”, HT, 10 (1960), 788–794; Norman
Stanley Buck, The Development of the Organisation of Anglo-American Trade 1800–1850
(New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 4.
44 chapter two
The factor as agent was often indistinguishable from a merchant in

that he was involved in the importation and exportation of goods.
The main difference was that he worked on commission, often at a
distance from the principal who usually remained in the home coun-
try. A contemporary noted that “Factors are merchant agents, resid-
ing abroad, constituted by letters of Attorney to act for the constituents”.
He therefore sometimes worked exclusively for one house or mer-
chant but, unlike a pure agent could also work on his own account.
This lack of distinction is highlighted by a parliamentary report of
1833: “there are few merchants that are not factors, and few fac-
tors who are not also merchants trading on their own account”.11
Factors were often given letters of attorney in order to act on the
behalf of their employer or principal, usually a house in another
country or region, or on behalf of a friend. In this regard, factors
acted in much the same way as a commission merchant, importing
and/or exporting goods. Another type of factor was one involved in
the regional trade who provided a wholesaling function. He (women
did not work as factors) often dealt directly with the producer or
farmer, especially in goods such as butter, cheese or flour. In Liverpool,
Cheshire cheese was brought in to Liverpool by factors who were
often resident in the hinterland; it would be shipped via Frodsham,
or direct to Liverpool. This may be another reason why factors were
rarely included in the directories. Another example would be the
coal factor, who contracted with the coal-field owner.12
In Philadelphia, factors were very important in collecting flour
from the hinterland for consumption in the city, the region and for
export. Residing in the remote location of the producing or farm-
ing area was apparently the norm, and was perhaps the reason for
their expertise in, and constraint within, one commodity. According
to Harry Berg however, factors of this type were very important at
the speculative fringe of the market. This was because the farmer
11
Regarding historians’ use of the term factor see Hancock’s section on ‘Factors
and Principals’ which discusses agents. Hancock, Citizens, pp. 123–131; Matson,
Merchants and Empire, pp. 185–186, 190; Robert. C. Nash, “The Organization of
Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600–1830”, in Coclanis, The
Atlantic Economy, pp. 95–91, p. 97; Doerflinger uses the term in both senses, A Vigorous
Spirit, pp. 112, 123; Gordon, The Universal Accountant, p. 231; Buck, Anglo-American
Trade, pp. 6–7, 10.
12
Westerfield, Middlemen, p. 206; Campbell, London Tradesman, p. 287.
usually wanted cash for his produce, whilst the purchasing merchant
wanted credit. The factor in the regional trade was therefore an
important nexus in credit facilities. It certainly meant that he would
have had to have more capital than a merchant working purely on
commission. The term factor did not appear to draw any criticism
from contemporaries. However those acting as commission agents in
ports, rather than as regional wholesalers, did not command very
much respect either. This was because they were not putting their
own capital at risk. Many of the traders that historians call factors,
may have called themselves merchants when listing themselves in the
trade directories, because the latter term implied a much higher
status.13
A broker also dealt on behalf of other people, but unlike the fac-
tor, was completely independent. He, and occasionally she, brought
buyers and sellers together, and were an excellent example of what
Mark Casson calls an “intermediator”. Brokers were known as some-
one who did not produce anything, but rather, moved commodities
around, mostly from merchant to merchant without adding any value
or process to them. This gave them a bad reputation: Johnson com-
plained in his dictionary that “Brokers . . . having no stock of their
own, set up and trade with that of other men; buying here, and sell-
ing there, and commonly abusing both sides, to make out a little
paultry gain.” It was however, the link with the sale of stocks that
rendered them the worst image. A contemporary guide for mer-
chants wrote that stock-jobbing brokers “make their fortunes by bub-
bling their clients, and have entered into a kind of conspiracy to
keep the method of trading stocks a mystery.”14 Links with the South
Sea bubble also remained in popular conceptions of brokers:
Some South Sea Broker, from the city,
Will purchase me, the more’s the pity;
Lay all my fine plantation’s waste,
To fit them to his vulgar taste.15
13
Harry D. Berg, “The Organization of Business in Colonial Philadelphia”, PH,
10,3 (1943), 157–177, p. 164.
14
Mark Casson, “Institutional Economics and Business History: A Way Forward?”,
BH, 39,4 Special issue on Institutions and the Evolution of Modern Business (1997),
151–171, p. 155; Johnson, Dictionary, quoting Temple; Gordon, Universal Accountant,
p. 221.
15
Johnson, Dictionary, quoting Swift.
46 chapter two
Despite particular reference to a London-based crisis, this attitude

was especially relevant in Philadelphia where the role of broker was
quite limited. Most brokers in that city, such as the partnership of
Joseph Howell and John Lawrence sold “bank stock, securities of the
govt, canal and turnpike companies, bills of exchange”; they also
acted as real estate officers and dealt with soldiers’ land warrants.
The situation was very different in Liverpool however, where the
term denoted a far wider range of activity. Liverpool had ‘stock’
brokers, but they also had ship brokers, and those that specialised
by commodity such as cotton, corn or tobacco. Ship brokers sold
ships, or shares in them, and also arranged insurance for them along
with insurance brokers. Others dealt in less prestigious items such
as household goods, or doubled up as victuallers or slop shops, which
accounted for quite a large number of the brokers in Liverpool.16
This diversity, and the fact that some women worked in this sector
lowered its general reputation. Liverpool’s broking sector may conse-
quently have been perceived in a similar light as Philadelphia’s,
notwithstanding the general attitude to ‘stock’ brokers. Brokers there-
fore dealt with stocks, bills and commodities, and their prime role was as
intermediaries—they sold their knowledge of what others had to sell.
Wholesalers, warehouse keepers and auctioneers or vendue mas-
ters, are also quite difficult to define. The traders working under the
denomination of the last two terms performed identical roles—but
were called auctioneers in Britain and vendue masters in the main-
land and West Indian British-American colonies. Merchants were
also wholesalers as part of their business of course, and dealers could
be also, but some people listed themselves specifically as wholesalers.
This was often because they were not dealing in imported goods.
However, at the same time, many wholesalers were grocers, who of
course did sell imported goods; the difference being that they did
not usually import the goods themselves, as merchants did. Neither
wholesalers nor warehouse keepers were listed separately in contem-
porary guides. Sheridan’s Dictionary only states that a warehouse was
16
Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1796; slops originally
meant loose breeches for sailors, but eventually came to include the selling of second-
hand clothes, in which women were particularly active. Beverly Lemire, Dress, Culture
and Commerce: The English Clothing Trade before the Factory, 1660–1800 (Basingstoke,
MacMillan, 1997), pp. 55–120, 107–109; Campbell, London Tradesman, p. 301.
a store for merchandise. No doubt he was thinking of merchants’

warehouses as simply stores for their wares.
However, in both Philadelphia and Liverpool by the late eigh-
teenth century, warehouses were also places where particular items
were offered for sale by retail as well as wholesale. This was due to
rising urbanisation, the role of the cities as ports, and the increas-
ing number and variety of consumer goods. Thomas Wolfe of Liverpool
ran an outlet for remote producers in Staffordshire goods, sold retail
and to merchants and ships’ captains. This last point is important
because well-established merchants would have had their own sup-
pliers in the hinterland, and so many warehouses may have been
aimed at the smaller, less well-connected merchants and exporters.
Samuel Garrigues of Philadelphia advertised his warehouse which
specialised in wet goods (groceries) selling for ‘ready money’ only.
Others warehouse keepers listed the selling prices of their shoes,
thereby making price rather than quality their ‘unique selling point’.17
Whilst many warehouse keepers were therefore fulfilling a wholesal-
ing role in regional distribution, others were distributing regionally—
but retail, and may have been the equivalent of today’s discount
shops. Some were selling regionally-produced goods to exporters who
did not have their own supply channels. Most warehouse keepers
would have received their goods direct from the producer and from
merchants.
Auctioneers and vendue masters performed a special role in that
they were as popular for the spectacle they provided as for the poten-
tial to buy items at a competitive price. Many sales were ‘by the
candle’, in which a deal had to be struck by the time a specified
length of candle had burned. Professionalised in Britain by James
Christie in 1766, auction houses originally specialised in the selling
of books. However, household goods, land, mercantile stock and ves-
sels were soon also sold in auction rooms and in private houses.
Their use soon spread to British America, where one contemporary
likened them to brokers—except that the vendue master only ‘sold’
goods.18
17
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 19 Feb 1774; Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly
Advertiser, 21 Sep 1774; Thomas Morgan advertised his shoe warehouse in this man-
ner. Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 8 Apl 1774.
18
Cynthia Wall, “The English Auction: Narratives of Dismantlings”, ECS, 31,1
(1997), 1–25, pp. 4–10; for adverts ‘by the candle’ see Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser
and Mercantile Register, 2 Jul 1756, 24 Dec 1756; Anon, Office of Vendue Master, c. 1720.
48 chapter two
In Philadelphia, auctions, or vendues, catered primarily for mer-

cantile stock, whereas in Liverpool, land, housing and personal pos-
sessions were also often sold through auctions. Auctions were sometimes
controversial and thought to contribute to the misfortunes of mer-
chants by selling at low prices. This was especially the case in North
America where they were sometimes used to sell British imported
goods without using a local merchant, though this trend did not
really expand until after the war of 1812. There is no doubt that
they were used to buy cheap goods, as the stock of bankrupts were
often sold through vendues and auctions, where they would some-
times collect only a fraction of the real value. Goods seized by
Customs Officers were also sold at customs sales. For example, George
Parker was auctioning the goods of Ralph Hamer, a bankrupt of
Liverpool in 1774. In Philadelphia the City Vendue Store was auc-
tioning superfine and second clothes in aid of Samuel Baker’s bank-
ruptcy commission in 1787. These would not have sold for full market
price. Stock that was damaged was also sold through vendues such
as the Irish linens imported into Philadelphia on the snow Sam, from
Liverpool in 1774. They were also useful for visiting merchants who
did not have much time in the port. Wholesalers, warehouse keepers
and auctioneers therefore sold wholesale and retail often at cheaper
or more competitive prices than merchants. Those auctions that did
sell for cash also allowed merchants to remit the supplier more
quickly.19 The fact that auctions and vendues also sold damaged,
bankrupt and out of date stock meant that this sector was not always
in competition with merchants and other wholesalers.
Mercers, drapers, haberdashers and hosiers have been grouped
together because they were all involved in textiles and required large
sums in order to set up in business. This high capital requirement,
often of a similar amount to that of merchants, meant that they were
accorded a higher status than other ‘mere’ shopkeepers. Mercers and
drapers often sold wholesale, raising their socio-economic status
(whereas haberdashers and hosiers did not), and so are discussed first.
19
Nash, The Urban Crucible, p. 203; Pat Hudson, The Genesis of Industrial Capitalism,
pp. 171–173; Buck, Anglo-American Trade, pp. 135–150; William J. Ashworth, Customs
and Excise: Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640–1845 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), p. 185; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 15 Apl 1774; Pennsylvania
Packet and Daily Advertiser, 1 Oct 1787; Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 25
May 1774.
The mercer was usually known as a seller of silk, but just as often
would sell fine items for women’s clothes. They often sold retail from
fine shops, but also sold wholesale to country shopkeepers. Campbell
considered that skill was required in as much as the mercer had to
know about high fashion, and be a very polite man. It was also
important to humour the ladies—which means they must have had
customers of quality. Drapers were often listed by the type of tex-
tile they dealt in—such as linen draper or woollen draper. Sometimes
a draper was also listed a mercer, such as Arthur and Pryce Orton,
mercers and drapers of King Street, Liverpool in 1805, highlighting
the fact that these two terms had precise meanings. The woollen
draper also sold wholesale and retail, and was expected to be able
to keep good accounts of his purchases and sales of broad cloth.
The linen draper was sometimes considered a “mere retailer” despite
the fact that a precise knowledge of the manufacture of linen was
required. However, he was considered a useful member of society
because so many people were kept in employment by the linen
trade.20 Silks would have been brought from an importing merchant
or from London, whilst woollens and linens could be purchased from
a factory, clothier, or from a cloth hall in England. These were
expensive trades in which to enter. Between £50 and £200 was
required for an apprenticeship, with a further £1,000–5,000 required
to set up your own business. A mercer’s business might even require
£10,000.
Haberdashers and hosiers mostly sold retail. The haberdasher sold
various bits and pieces for making clothes, such as buckram, bind-
ing and hair cloths. The term came from the German ‘habt ihr das’
[have you this] suggesting a seller of small wares, or what might
now be called accessories. The hosier was a seller of stockings. This
was not as simple as it sounds in the eighteenth century due to the
increasingly fashion-conscious consumer. Occasionally the trades were
combined, as in the case of Mrs Ann Price, listed as a haberdasher
and hosier of Liverpool in 1796. As stockings became more of a
20
Campbell, London Tradesman, pp. 194–198, 282; Negley Boyd Harte, “The Rise
of Protection and the English Linen Trade, 1690–1790” in Negley Boyd Harte and
K.G. Ponting (eds.), Textile History and Economic History: Essays in Honour of Miss Julia
de Lacy Mann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973), pp. 74–112. Where
the text gives a person as ‘listed’, the information is taken from the trade directory
of that year.
50 chapter two
fashion item they had ever-changing patterns and became more

expensive as many were made of silk. Changing fashions meant that
the hosier, as with other textile traders, was kept on their toes and
at risk of holding out-of-date and expensive stock. Haberdashers and
hosiers would have purchased their stock from merchants, whole-
salers, warehouses and drapers. The nature of their stock meant that
it was expensive to set up in business. After paying apprenticeship
fees of between £10 and £50 for haberdashery, or £20 to £200
for hosiery, a further £2,000 or £5,000 was required to set up in
business in those trades respectively.21 Contemporary commentators
were quite clear that this sector was distinct from merchants. However,
the fact that they needed specialist knowledge and the trade had
high capital requirements accorded the sector relatively high status.
The term grocer originally came from ‘grosser’, meaning to sell
in large quantities. This suggests the wholesale nature of the sector,
but many grocers sold retail by the eighteenth century, as well as
wholesale to smaller shops in the city and hinterland. The grocer
dealt mostly in imported, and therefore more expensive and higher
status goods. These included: sugar, spices, tea, coffee, chocolate,
currants, figs, foreign fruit (not lemons or oranges) and dried fruits.
The link between grocers and sugar is highlighted by a sort of
eczema, know as ‘grocer’s itch’, which was developed by people
working too often with sugar.
Grocers were expected to know how to sort, process and blend
their products, especially tea, which required highly-developed skills.
Grocers, and indeed others that wanted to sell tea had to obtain a
license, and display a sign declaring ‘Dealer in Tea &c.’ on their
doors. The license cost keepers of such ‘Entered’ or registered shops
5s. 6d. in 1787. A good understanding of accounts in order to keep
their books and the ability to write a good hand was also required.
Grocers bought their wares from merchants, and were an important
link between importer, other retailers and the consumer. The fact
that many were retailers would have reduced the status of this sec-
tor. In London, the Grocers formed one of the main Companies or
Guilds which gave them higher status, but in Liverpool and
Philadelphia these guilds which preserved the status of certain trades
did not exist. Despite the uncertain status of this sector, appren-
21
Johnson, Dictionary; Campbell, London Tradesman, p. 199.
ticeships were still expensive at between £20 and £200, nearly as

much as for a merchant. It could take a further £500 to £1,000 to
set up in business and then they worked extremely long hours of
between 7am and 10pm.22 The grocer therefore had an ambiguous
place in the hierarchy, sometimes wholesaler, sometimes retailer, with
a status which was really dependant on the size and location of the
business.
The dealer is a rather vague character because the term is rarely
noted in the contemporary literature. One simply noted them as a
“trader or trafficker”.23 No listing was given for them as late as
Montefiore’s Trader’s & Manufacturers Compendium of 1804. However,
the rising numbers of traders listed as dealers in the trade directo-
ries of both cities suggests their growing importance as a recognis-
able sector. One reason for this anomaly may be a low status due
to a lack of apprenticeship or training. Another may be that the rise
of the ‘dealer’ was a function of urban growth, especially in port
cities where so many commodities were being transhipped. It would
appear that the dealer performed much the same function as the
commodity broker, but on a lower scale, and often retail. They would
have bought goods directly from merchants, or from wholesalers,
warehouse keepers and even larger shops for redistribution.
In Philadelphia, most dealers were listed simply as ‘dealer’, but
occasionally a specialisation was listed, from the prestigious tea, down
to shoes or beeswax. Many tea dealers were female, because this
was seen as genteel occupation for women. In Liverpool the range
of activity was much more diverse. There were dealers in flour,
earthenware, various foodstuffs and many miscellaneous articles such
as rope or quills. However, they fulfilled the same role on both sides
of the Atlantic. The diversity of this sector means that dealers were
active within quite a wide socio-economic group. The inclusion of
many day-to-day articles, possible retail status and the involvement
of women suggests that much of the sector had a lowly status.
22
Johnson, Dictionary; Anon, The General Shop Book; OED; Montefiore, The Trader’s
and Manufacturer’s Compendium, p. 366; Hoh-Cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, Shops
and Shopkeeping in Eighteenth Century England (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 95; I.G.
Doolittle, The City of London and its Livery Companies (Dorchester, Dorset: Gavin Press,
1982), p. 16; Campbell, London Tradesman, p. 335.
23
Johnson, Dictionary.
52 chapter two
A problematic sub sector of the dealer category is victuallers. The

original meaning of the term was that of a provider of victuals (food
and provisions) for ships. However, the large number of victuallers
in non-port cities such as Birmingham means that we cannot assume
that all victuallers performed this role. In Birmingham, obviously a
manufacturing city, the number of victuallers was double that of the
second occupation (shopkeepers and dealers in groceries) in both
1777 and 1830. By the mid eighteenth century a victualler could
still mean a ships’ victualler, but could also mean a keeper of an
eating-house, inn or tavern, a licensed victualler who sold alcohol
(to be consumed on the premises such as a publican). Women often
accounted for a large amount of public food provision, using their
home-related skills to their entrepreneurial advantage. At the same
time, many victuallers in Liverpool did provide provisions to ships
and these included women. Ann Leadbetter provided fowls worth
£4 13s. and Sarah Crutchley herbs worth £2 19s. for the ship Ingram
in 1784.24 This lack of clarity has resulted in these traders being
dealt with separately—although they were probably nearest to the
dealer category. It is therefore difficult to say exactly what roles were
being performed by this sector. However, they were evident in both
cities, in their various guises.
To be a shopkeeper in the eighteenth century meant many things.
Originally it meant someone who made and sold their product, but
the increasing diversity of available goods and the distribution sys-
tem itself meant that many shopkeepers were retailers only. As early
as 1757 Campbell said of the ironmonger and brazier shopkeeper
that he “neither makes nor is supposed capable of making all the
different Articles in his shop”. Sheridan also distinguished them as
“a trader who sells in a shop, not a merchant who only deals whole-
sale”. The rise in shops selling goods they had not made was noticed
by the excise, which in the eighteenth century increasingly attempted
24
OED gives three meanings of the term victualler; a purveyor of victuals or
provisions; specially. one who makes a business of providing food and drink for
payment; a keeper of an eating-house, inn, or tavern; a licensed victualler; one who
has a licence to sell food or drink, but esp. the latter, to be consumed on the
premises; a publican; one who supplies, or undertakes to supply, an army or armed
force with necessary provisions; plural, those engaged in bringing up victuals to an
armed force; Edward P. Duggan, “Industrialisation and the Development of Urban
Business Communities: Research Problems, Sources and Techniques”, LH, 11,8
(1975), 457–465; Tuohy Ships Papers—Ingram 1784, DTP.
to distinguish between the two in an attempt to increase revenue by

taxing those who sold only.25 The term shopkeeper therefore came
to mean anyone retailing from some form of fixed premises, and
this is the context used here.
There were also two broad categories of shopkeepers; those that
sold particular items or groups of items, and those of a far more
general nature. The list of shops that sold particular items could be
endless but would include: toyshops, book shops, tobacconists, iron-
mongers, earthenware and china shops, seedmongers, stationers,
fruiterers, butchers and cheesemongers. To a certain extent they are
only bound together by the fact that they are small-scale retailers.
Depending on the goods sold, these shopkeepers would have brought
their goods from merchants, dealers, wholesalers, direct from print-
ers or producers both locally and outside the region, farmers or
fishermen. Many shops were part of the proprietor’s living quarters,
selling ‘through the window’. If glazing was too expensive, some
shopkeepers would put a lattice over the window, which kept the
area private but allowed potential customers to see their wares. The
more up-market shops would have been in special rooms in shop-
ping streets over which the retailer may or may not have lived.
Others may have set up at a stall in the fixed booths such as in
Philadelphia’s covered Market on Market Street. Many of these shops
required an apprenticeship, which could cost between £5 and £100
depending on the trade, location and status of the shop, with a fur-
ther £50 to £500 required to set up in business. Those that required
more skill, higher fee or capital may have gained more status than
others. For example, Campbell thought that the tobacconist was a
respectable trader, but that the living of a fruiterer or cheesemonger
was precarious due to the perishable nature of their stock. Often the
status of the shop was dependent on its customers.26
You can almost hear the change in tone in Campbell’s voice when
he discusses retailers as opposed to merchants or wholesalers. He
25
Campbell, London Tradesman, p. 177; Sheridan, Dictionary; Mui and Mui, Shops
and Shopkeeping, p. 34; for attitudes towards retailers see Cox, Complete Tradesman,
chapters one to four.
26
Cox, The Complete Tradesman, pp. 77–83; some shops could cost more if set up
in a large way, such as an ironmonger, tobacconist or stationer; Elizabeth Sanderson,
Women and Work in Eighteenth Century Edinburgh (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996),
p. 101; Campbell, London Tradesman, pp. 274, 281.
54 chapter two
thought that retailing required little knowledge and skill, and was
often not worth the apprenticeship fee. However, all of the ‘single’
item shops were still considered more respectable than the more gen-
eral shopkeepers, because the latter rarely required an apprentice-
ship and very little capital. General shopkeepers were definitely in
a lower league, often setting up small stalls or shops attached to their
house, at the market, trading from part of a room in their house,
or simply through a window. They would have brought their goods
from dealers, grocers, wholesalers and other shops. These general
shopkeepers carried a wide range of articles in small quantities—
whatever they could get small amounts of credit for. These would
include small amounts of what a grocer would sell, such as tea, sugar
and currants, but also other things required on a daily basis such
as bread and butter, candles, cotton and soap. Their stock was there-
fore very general.
Not much capital was required, as general shopkeepers could use
space in their own house or rent a stall, and get credit from other
traders in the area. This and the lack of an apprenticeship gave
them low status, which was compounded by the fact that many
women worked in this sector. However, this low status should not
detract from the importance of small-scale retailers, especially to the
poor communities which they served. The fact that these small shops
would split commodities into very small parcels and extend limited
credit provided a lifeline for many on a day-to-day existence. As
Cox states, “Despite the range in their wealth and status they [shop-
keepers] do form a coherent group that has an importance out of
all proportion to their numbers”.27
Certain retailers were themselves often on the margin of survival,
and many of them were itinerant dealers. Hawkers and pedlars trav-
elled through lots of different places in a city’s hinterland, visiting
each for a short period of time. They could travel as far as seventy-
five miles between customers. Their very itinerancy meant that they
were seen as rogues and vagabonds, and efforts to license them had
been made the sixteenth century. By the eighteenth century however,
27
There is evidence that women in Edinburgh did sometimes serve an appren-
ticeship for shopkeeping, but rarely under a formal contract. Sanderson, Women and
Work, pp. 91–96; Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 126; Cox, The Complete
Tradesman, p. 59.
licensing was common, and therefore it is likely that itinerant deal-

ers were simply seen as a reality, however uncontrollable. Indeed,
licensing had been in place since the seventeenth century and had
cost £4. However, the fee went up in August 1785 to £8 without
a beast, and £8 more for each beast they used. Many did not bother
with the cost of gaining a license and traded illegally. More impor-
tantly, those that sold textiles had strong support from the manu-
facturers of those articles. Prior to the increase in the hawker’s license
fee, efforts had been made to abolish itinerants instead. However,
the manufacturers found them so useful in distributing their articles
that they supported the itinerants’ cause.28
Not all hawkers and pedlars were impecunious. Often an itiner-
ant dealer would buy goods on credit, which meant that he or she
had to be credit worthy in the first place, and those that dealt whole-
sale were not considered hawkers. They often brought their goods
from wholesalers, tradesmen, markets and pawnbrokers in cities and
travelled around on horseback, or on foot with a pack on their back.
These were often called chapmen (from cheapman). This term was
first associated with traders who sold books, but most sold other
small trifles such as spoons, ribbons and textiles as well. Those that
sold textiles were called ‘Manchester-Men’. Others were itinerant in
that they had no fixed shop, but sold their wares at various points
within towns and cities. These were called by various terms, accord-
ing to the goods they sold. Many urban itinerants were known sim-
ply as hawkers or pedlars. These often sold ‘dry goods’ items such
pottery, gloves, books, hats, woollens and paper. Other itinerants
sold food or provisions. A higgler brought goods such as poultry and
dairy produce from farmers and other country producers and sold
28
Cox, The Complete Tradesman, pp. 32–33; Margaret Spufford, The Great Reclothing
of England: Petty Chapmen and their Wares in the Seventeenth Century (London: Hambledon
Press, 1984), chapter five; Montefiore, Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium (1804
ed.), p. 388; Westerfield, Middlemen, p. 316; Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, pp.
76–80. Fontaine in his study of European pedlars uses a far wider meaning for the
term, within this framework he found that some pedlars did undertake apprentice-
ships. Laurence Fontaine, History of Pedlars in Europe (Trans. by Vicki Whittaker)
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), introduction and chapter four; Wendy Thwaites,
“Women in the Market Place: Oxfordshire c. 1690–1800”, MH, 9 (1984), 23–42,
pp. 24–25; see also Ian Mitchell, “The Development of Urban Retailing” in Peter
Clark (ed.), The Transformation of English Provincial Towns (London: Hutchinson, 1984),
pp. 259–283, pp. 268–270.
56 chapter two
from bundles, baskets or carts around the countryside and in the

towns. When in town they sold those provisions door to door and
then would often buy small items for sale in the countryside in return,
thereby making a profit on both legs of the journey.29
Huckster was a term used particularly for a female peddler or
hawker, and they had one of the worst reputations. She sold small
items around the towns and cities such as apples or other small items
and was often accused of regrating and engrossing. Many of the
goods she sold would have been perishables that were no longer
good enough to sell in shops. This gave them a bad reputation;
“There cannot be a more ignominious trade, than the being huck-
sters to such vile merchandise” quoted Johnson in his Dictionary; it
was often used as a term of abuse and the link with rotten goods
is implicit. In most cases, little or no capital was required in order
to set up, just a small amount of credit, and no apprenticeship was
required. Apart from those hawkers who were doing well enough to
afford a license, most itinerants must have traded on a day-to-day
basis and have been on the margins of survival and legality. However,
the fact that some were recorded as bankrupt, such as Samuel
Hodgson, a dealer and chapman of Pennsylvania, implies that at
least some had a considerable turnover because the value of trade
required to gain a commission was considerable.30
However, it should be noted that as with shopkeepers, these peo-
ple provided both the very poor in the cities, and many in the coun-
tryside, with their only contact with the wider consumer economy.
In terms of the poor quality of provisions they provided, this may
29
Fontaine, History of Pedlars, p. 2; different countries had different terms for ped-
lars and hawkers, Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II, p. 75; Westerfield, Middlemen,
p. 315; Lorna Weatherill, “The Business of Middleman in the English Pottery
Industry Trade before 1780”, BH, 28,3 (1986), 51–76, p. 67; Breen, “An Empire
of Goods”; Johnson, Dictionary; see also David Jaffee, “Peddlers of Progress and the
Transformation of the Rural North, 1760–1860”, JAH, 78,2 (1991), 511–535.
30
Regrating was buying up goods and selling them within a short distance at
an inflated price. Engrossing was buying up goods in order to corner the market;
Mitchell, “Development of Urban Retailing”, pp. 269, 261; Pennsylvania Packet and
Daily Advertiser, 30 Nov 1787; the minimum amount of debt to be able to claim
relief under the insolvency laws in Great Britain was £100 in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Hoppit, Risk and Failure, p. 24; I could not find an equivalent amount for
the short term of the American bankruptcy laws, although in 1765 insolvency laws
could be used for debts up to £150. Peter J. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America:
Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607–1900 (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1974), p. 144.
have been the only food that the very poor could have afforded in
any case. Itinerant dealers were therefore retailers on a very small
scale, and no doubt provided dreams and entertainment as much as
commodities. One eighteenth-century tract stated that one family
often diverted themselves by getting a hawker to take everything out
of his pack for their amusement, without spending a farthing.31 What-
ever their role, they were an essential part of the trading community.
During the eighteenth century, the number of markets, like shops,
increased greatly. They were held on particular days, and whilst
there would normally be one main market, satellite markets grew in
pace with the size of towns, and as early as 1640, England and
Wales had 800 market towns. One market might sell meat, another
fish, yet another fruit and vegetables or textiles, and others, horses.
Sometimes traders would spill out of the formal market place and
into the surrounding side streets. Many of the individual market sell-
ers sold meat, but others sold fish, butter, eggs and cheese, fruit, or
vegetables. Other goods on sale would include fowls, geese, pota-
toes, seeds and honey. Non essentials might also be found, such as
hats, prints, maps, gloves and glass. Many of these market sellers
were farmers and market gardeners who came into sell their pro-
duce, and some, but certainly not all, were specialised dealers, like
the higglers above. Many higglers in London for example, were cas-
tigated for going out on to the roads coming in to town and meet-
ing the market gardeners. They would purchase their goods from
them there for resale in the town. However, although the higglers
stole some of the market, the market places themselves remained
important in the selling of fresh food. The nature of markets did
change in some respects over the eighteenth century however. One
important development was the sale of corn by sample in the inns
and taverns rather than in the open from around 1750. This was
taken over by what became known as corn dealers.32
A few ‘token’ women could be found in the formal market place,
but they were only a small percentage. They would typically sell
wheat, malt, barley, dairy and eggs. Women rarely took out the
31
James C———l, A Letter from a Hawker and Pedlar, to a Member of Parliament
(London: Printed by T. Reynolds, 1731), p. 1.
32
Robert Scola, “Food Markets and Shops in Manchester, 1770–1870”, JHG,
1,2 (1975), 153–168, pp. 159–162; Mitchell, “Development of Urban Retailing”,
pp. 264–265; Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II, pp. 29, 52 39, 51.
58 chapter two
required licence, only accounting for around 4–5 per cent of all
licenses. Many would have been the wives or widows of existing
local businessmen but some managed to train their daughters so that
they could take over and provide an income for themselves. Many
women were accused of forestalling, that is, holding on to stock until
the price had risen. However, developments such as the sale of corn
by sample had important ramifications for women. In the inns, and
places such as the Council and coffee house, decisions were made
by men concerning weights and measures, and women were not part
of the decision-making process. In any case, they did not have access
to large capital and credit which would enable them to buy in bulk
from the sample. However, markets, like shops, were indispensable
to inhabitants of large towns and cities—especially for new immi-
grants. They provided spectacle; loud cries, strong smells, bustle and
business pervaded; people “made deals, quarrelled, perhaps came to
blows”. They were a chance to meet new and old friends, to catch
up on gossip. Farmers might come to town to sell a single pig, but
also to purchase a piece of silk for a dress, and peasants and respectable
townswomen mixed freely in this atmosphere.33
At the bottom of the status pile were those who dealt in goods
in a very informal manner; some legal, many illegal. Some of these
would be mariners of one sort or another, others might be porters,
dockers, or others associated with ports. Even wharfingers and water-
men would hang around the customs house in order to try and take
a slice of the trading cake from the brokers and merchants. Some
helped to transfer goods across the seas, though this would of course
be in small quantities when compared to merchants; others would
be part of a local distribution network around the port. Smuggling
was also a large, if unquantifiable trade—although many merchants
were engaged in this practice of course as well as lesser traders. Here
33
Thwaites, “Women in the Market Place”; Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II,
pp. 26–58, 30. Women of colour were very important in the market places of
Charleston and Kingston, Jamaica however. See Robert Olwell, “ ‘Loose, Idle and
Disorderly’: Slave Women in the Eighteenth-Century Charleston Marketplace”, in
David Barry Gaspar and Darlen Clark Hines (eds.), More than Chattel: Black Women
and Slavery in the Americas (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian University Press,
1886), pp. 97–110; Lorna Elaine Simmonds, “The Afro-Jamaican and the Internal
Marketing System: Kingston, 1780–1834”, in Kathleen E.A. Monteith and Glen
Richards (eds.), Jamaica in Slavery and Freedom: History, Heritage and Culture (Mona,
Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2002), pp. 274–290.
again, enumerated products such as tobacco, sugar, tea and wine

were the common targets. The smuggling trade in tea was drasti-
cally curtailed after the Commutation Act of 1784 greatly reduced
the tax on tea, but remained a problem for the authorities.34
In Virginia, hoops were cut and staves stripped away to allow for
tobacco sampling. When this occurred the coopers, pickers and atten-
dants felt it their privilege to take a small pick or roll for their own
use, that of their friends, or to sell to sailors and others who might
try it carry it for a small profit. Other mariners no doubt just picked
up whatever they could from loose bales or badly packed casks, such
as silk handkerchiefs, buttons or pieces of ribbon. Some even had
special undergarments made in which they could secrete consider-
able quantities of sugar, tea or tobacco. ‘Lumpers’, responsible for
unloading the vessel, would carry a sack of sugar with them on their
way to meals, and coopers would ‘send for some more nails’—send-
ing off the bag to carry such nails full of tobacco. In London, the
customs officers themselves were sometimes part of this illegal process,
taking pilfered goods as perks of the job. Sparling and Bolden, mer-
chants in Liverpool, wrote to their correspondents in Virginia in
1788 regarding untrustworthy workers. They said that “We shall also
try to get an abatement [refund] for the shoes and linen wanting in
the parcel P Bellona tho’ from the very particular circumstances
of the case we are still of opinion they must have been taken P [ by]
the ships Crew”. Porters and other dock workers might also help
themselves to a little tobacco, tea, sugar, and other enumerated goods
when they could. This might be for their own use or for small-scale
sales in the poorer parts of the town and to friends.35
34
Ashworth, Customs and Excise, p. 139, and on smuggling generally chapter ten;
Hoh-Cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, “The Commutation Acts and the Tea Trade
in Britain, 1784–1793”, EcHR, 2nd Ser., 16,2 (1963–4), 234–253.
35
Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged (London: Penguin Press, 1991), chapter
five; Ashworth, Customs and Excise, pp. 155, 148–149; Sparling and Bolden to Messrs
John Lawrence and Co, Virginia, 11 Mar 1788, Sparling and Bolden Letter Book
1788–1799, Liv RO; the practise of taking small quantities of goods from the docks
continued well into the twentieth century. See Colin J. Davis, “New York City and
London, 1945–1946”, in Sam Davies, Colin J. Davies, David De Vries, Lex Heerma
van Voss, Lidewij Hesselink and Klaus Weinhaur (eds.), Dock workers: International
Explorations in Labour History, 1790 –1970, Vol. I (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp.
213–230, p. 226; Huw V. Bowen, “ ‘So Alarming An Evil:’ Smuggling, Pilfering
and the English East India Company, 1750–1810”, IJMH, 14,1 (2002), 1–31.
60 chapter two
The same principle would apply in any industry where an employee

might have an opportunity to smuggle small items for sale out of
the workplace for sale elsewhere. So workers might have taken sugar
home from the sugar houses of Jonathon Blundell (1766) or Valentine
and Byrom (1796) in Liverpool, or that of Samuel Morris and Peter
Miercken of Philadelphia (1785). Women were especially important
as receivers of these stolen goods. Not all of these informal distrib-
ution systems were illegal however. Ships’ captains and mates were
sometimes allowed a privilege of a small amount of space in order
to sell goods for a profit for their own advantage. In the slave trade,
the captain, first mate and doctors were usually allowed the ‘privi-
lege’ of the value of one or two slaves. Patrick McAuslane, captain
of the Swallow in 1755 received the sales of “2 negroes” worth £61
13s. 1d. as his privilege on top of his commission. This was one way
in which captains and supercargoes saved up enough money to go
into business for themselves. The East India Company allowed a
certain amount of cargo space to be taken for ‘privilege’, or carriage
of goods for private sale by crew members. This allowance was made
for every crew member, but no doubt the captain received the largest
space. This privilege was not free, as freight space had to be paid
for, but it did allow sailors to supplement their wages. Many of these
goods would have been sold through friends and neighbours, but
efforts were also made to widen contacts if the person was hoping
to set up in business on their own account at a later date.36
The amount of goods handled by these ‘grey’ forms of distribu-
tion was obviously far smaller than the large shipments handled by
merchants (except for tea before 1784), but those involved in this
activity were an integral part of the distribution process. Neither were
merchants or even officials blameless in smuggling networks. Indeed,
much of Liverpool’s West India trade was based on the illicit trade
with the Spanish Empire. In London, tidemen, who were supposed
to ensure that no goods were smuggled in or out were extremely
lazy. The quality of their work was apparently reliant upon their
36
Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and Deep Blue Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), pp. 131–133; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 179; Linebaugh,
The London Hanged, pp. 142–145; McAuslane also received £113 16s. 5d. in com-
mission. Case and Southworth Kingston Invoice Book, f. 62, LivRO; Mui and Mui,
“The Commutation Act”.
diligence or drunkenness, and they were sometimes accused of actually

helping ships’ captains land duty-free goods or forging Customs House
documentation. In London and Scotland, the illegal distribution of
tea was highly organised by wealthy entrepreneurs. Importers and
wholesalers of tea followed the mechanics of legitimate trade, but
used large warehouses in order to conceal, rather than simply ware-
house tea. Whether legal or illegal these informal networks of dis-
tribution provided yet another layer or sector of trade. These networks
were especially important to the poor casual and badly paid sea-
sonal worker however, and they were another important way in
which the very poor in society could afford these goods. Certainly
the “common economy . . . was vast, entrepreneurial, and as com-
mercial as the licit economy”.37
The Importance of Mentalité: A Community of Traders
This brief outline of the various sectors of trader is not exhaustive.

Whilst nine broad categories have been outlined, many sub-sectors
have not been mentioned; for example, rum merchant, potato dealer,
druggist or mugman. Mostly these categories meant the same thing
at the same time all around the Atlantic littoral; brokers and auc-
tioneers excepted. Other terminologies changed subtly over time, but
for the period 1760–1810, we can accept these broad categories.
However, what has been made clear is the overall role of each sec-
tor and their relationship with one another. Importantly, this has
been made with reference to the ideas and conceptions of contem-
poraries. This discussion has made clear the fluidity of these terms,
both with regard to individuals, and the changing nature of terms
over time. This was a factor of the development of the wider econ-
omy as well as the ability of an individual to move up the socio-
economic ladder; or conversely, their failure in preventing their decline
down it.
37
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 207–210; Ramsey Muir, A History of Liverpool
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1907), pp. 182–236. See also Kenneth J.
Banks, “Official Duplicity: The Illicit Slave Trade of Martinique, 1713–1763”, in
Coclanis, The Atlantic Economy, pp. 229–251; G.V. Scammel, “ ‘A Very Profitable
and Advantageous Trade’: British Smuggling in the Iberian Americas circa 1500–1750”,
Itinerario, 24, 3–4 (2000), 135–172; Ashworth, Customs and Excise, pp. 147–149, 157,
154.
62 chapter two
Entry into this fluid community was reliant upon many factors
such as education, knowledge, access to capital and credit, the legal
and social environment, even being in the right place at the right
time. Entry into trade was not restricted in many cities around the
Atlantic because trade guilds were not always established. This was
the case with both Liverpool and Philadelphia. Therefore, anyone
could start up in business if they could find the means and where-
withal to do so. It should be noted that Freemen of each city were
at an advantage in not having to pay fines or fees for trading, but
there were no legal barriers. Knowledge and education were there-
fore extremely important. In the case of Philadelphia there were
many schools run by religious societies and charitable institutions,
but basic education would still not have been available to everyone.
In contrast, Liverpool was still considered “primitive” in terms of
culture, and only one main school existed in the city.38 Some prospec-
tive merchants would have been sent to special seminaries such as
the Warrington Academy to gain suitable knowledge such as arith-
metic, French and geography, before they even embarked upon an
apprenticeship. Many of the higher status traders such as mercers
and grocers would also have received an apprenticeship, but for
many even basic reading must have been a struggle. However, the
prevalence of ‘self-help’ and ‘how-to’ books suggests that many traders
who could at least read and write tried to teach themselves a basic
understanding of trade.
Many more traders learnt their skills ‘on the job’, for example as
clerk, supercargo, or even errand boy. However, a proper education
required money, apprenticeships were expensive, and as we have
seen, setting up in some businesses was even more so. This was when
access to capital and credit became vital. Often an inheritance was
used to set up a business, and family and friends were often, but
not always, a first point of capital and credit. Once a trader had
established his or her reputation, others could be induced to lend
large sums of money. For some, small, very short-term credit was
all that was available at first. This was especially true in the case of
women and other lesser traders. Once a few basic transactions had
38
Clement Biddle (ed.) The Philadelphia, Directory for 1791 (Philadelphia: Printed
by James and Johnson, 1791); Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, chapter one; Muir, A
History of Liverpool, p. 282.
been successfully completed, more credit was usually made available.

However, if a trader did not have capital funds to set up with, it
was likely that their business would have to remain small scale.
This was where women were at a serious disadvantage. Often the
only access to capital a woman would have was on gaining an inher-
itance, but if she was married this would often come under the con-
trol over her husband. When married, the legal fiction of feme covert
meant that as she was not legally responsible for her debts, she would
encounter difficulties in borrowing money or gaining credit in the
first place.39 However, as has been argued here, and will be demon-
strated further, the role of lesser traders, which included many women,
was of vital importance to the distribution of goods in cities, and
especially to the poor. We should not let the disadvantages that
women worked under disguise their very important contributions to
distribution patterns and indeed, the economies of each city and the
wider Atlantic economy.
The term community has been used many times so far in this
book, and having now said who was part of the trading community,
it is time to state what is meant here by the term community. The
word has many connotations, but it is meant here as something very
specific. Community can refer to a locality or geographic region,
and although this book is primarily concerned with Liverpool and
Philadelphia within the Atlantic world, traders in those ports were
by no means limited to that ocean, and certainly not their towns or
regions. Many traded with the Mediterranean, others with the East
Indies, some with the Baltic, others with Africa and the West Indies.
Conversely, most of the traders discussed in the following pages never
traversed the Atlantic, some probably never left their home town;
and yet a huckster in Liverpool had very much the same interests,
concerns and work pattern as her consociate in Philadelphia, Kingston
or London.
Therefore I do not mean a community as stressed for example
by Philip Curtin and Mauro, with their emphasis on alien minori-
ties and ethnic grouping. Nor is the term meant here as a cohesive
group of nations. Although for some of the period under discussion
much of the north-Atlantic world was under British rule, this period
39
For more on feme covert see chapter three, pp. 71–74; for more on women’s
access to capital and credit see chapter five, pp. 164–167 and passim.
64 chapter two
was also defined by conflicts concerning who should control parts of

the Atlantic, or indeed, all of it. Of course the two main port cities
discussed here were both affected by the American War of
Independence and the subsequent formation of the United States;
but trade continued between them under much the same terms and
conditions, even if under a significantly different political and legal
environment. Therefore, being part of a cohesive group of nations,
or conversely, not being so, did not have any real bearing on our
community of traders. Many traders would have used ethnic, reli-
gious or familial networks as a means of choosing whom they did
business with, particularly at an early stage of their career. This has
been stressed in much of the current literature on merchant groups.
Yet these rather limited contacts in no way defined the trading rela-
tionships in question, and traders were far from restricted to trad-
ing within them.40
So what did the higgler in Philadelphia have in common with a
Liverpool broker; or a grocer in Philadelphia have in common with
a Lancashire chapman? All shared a culture of trade, of profit from
the buying and selling for goods. According to Sheridan, they acted
“merely for money”, but if each trader had actually purely on self
interest and profit maximisation, the Atlantic economic system would
not have worked. It is true that these traders were working for a
profit on the simple exchange of goods, but there was far more to
their community than that. They were all reliant on trade, on the
open market, on goods often made or produced many miles away,
and were increasingly susceptible to boom and bust conditions as
the Atlantic trading world became more and more integrated. They
all shared the same culture of risk and uncertainty—what Doerflinger
called adversity. Indeed, Liverpool merchant John Tarleton would
have had issue with Doerflinger; Tarleton considered that British
trade was so successful “due to a Spirit of enterprise which is particular
to the British Merchant” [my emphasis].41 Although an uninsured
40
Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade; Mauro, “Merchant Communities”; Frederick B.
Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House: The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia
1681–1763 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1963); Søren Mentz, “The Commercial
Culture of the Armenian Merchant: Diaspora and Social Behaviour”, Itinerario, 28,1
(2004), 16–28; Mary B. Rose, “The Family Firm in British Business, 1780–1914”,
in Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (eds.), Business Enterprise in Modern Britain
from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century (Routledge: London 1994), pp. 61–87.
41
Sheridan, General Dictionary; Examination of John Tarleton, Board of Trade,
African Questions, Vol. I, ff. 214–238, NA.
ship being lost at sea may have lost more money per se for a merchant,
a small parcel of ribbons that were damaged in the rain, or a bas-
ket of apples just too rotten, could equally spell disaster for a hawker
or higgler.
There was also a strong culture of trust. This was obviously nec-
essary if people were going to do business with one another, espe-
cially at long distances around the Atlantic. Equally however, the
same trust was required for credit at the local level. Merchants gave
credit to other wholesalers and shopkeepers, warehouses gave credit
to shops and consumers, even the smallest shops and chapmen worked
on credit. Many of the poor in these cities would have gone hun-
gry for days if a small shopkeeper had not provided credit until the
bill could be paid. All were equally important in the chain of dis-
tribution from producer to consumer, whether at the local, regional
or trans-Atlantic level. In order for this system to work there had
to be an understanding, a ‘proper’ way of working and dealing with
other traders—an accepted standard of behaviour. Nor was this a
particularly British or even recent ideal; “guided and concerted action
had to be privileged over self interest and excess” wrote a Spanish
writer in the seventeenth century regarding trade.42 They were all
buying and selling, ‘wheeling and dealing’ for profit, in an environ-
ment of risk, trust and credit.
All these factors meant that traders had to have an agreement,
albeit unspoken. In fact, the intrinsic nature of these unwritten rules
is stressed by the fact that they only came to the fore when they
were transgressed. Therefore, when Thomas Leyland felt an account-
ing procedure was incorrect he wrote of “the Custom of Merchants
in any part of the World”.43 The international nature of trade meant
that many traders, especially those at the top of the status tree, were
outward looking. They had little care for geo-political borders. Trade
in the eighteenth century was much like the Internet today—cross-
ing nation-state boundaries easily—and was often just as uncontrol-
lable by the state.
42
Braudel argues for a mentality based on where the trader [merchant] was in
the social structure, but also human nature and luck. Braudel, Wheels of Commerce,
Vol. II, p. 402; Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, “Revisiting 1640: Or, How the Party
of Commercial Expansion Lost to the Party of Political Conservatism in Spain’s
Atlantic Empire, 1620–1650”, in Coclanis, The Atlantic Economy, pp. 152–185.
43
Leyland to Jos Green, 10 Aug 1786, Thomas Leyland Letterbook 1786–1788.
66 chapter two
Whilst individuals may have been concerned with their socio-eco-

nomic status vis-à-vis those around them, the wider trading commu-
nity was not so constrained. For example, in England, Manchester
and other textile producers had such a symbiotic relationship with
itinerant traders that the producers entered into a campaign to stop
attempts to ban hawkers in 1785. In times of conflict, such as The
Stamp Act or the run up to the American War of Independence,
traders in Liverpool and Philadelphia demonstrated their solidarity
through the newspapers, letter writing and parliamentary support.
After the war, traders in the thirteen states, the West Indies and
England worked together in order to gain dispensations from the
British parliament to trade with whom they wanted. It was impor-
tant for merchants, and also for shopkeepers and itinerants that goods
continued to be bought and sold; how otherwise would they make
money from distributing them? On top of the binding features of
risk, trust and reputation then, an interest in politics and govern-
ment also existed. This was the same for traders of all socio-economic
levels within Philadelphia and Liverpool, but also for the trade between
them, and indeed around the Atlantic. Traders therefore shared a
‘community of interests’.44 This is what is meant here by the term
trading community.
This community of interests will become more apparent as the
networks of people, credit and goods are investigated. Not only did
traders share a business mentalité, their businesses were intertwined
in terms of the distribution of goods. However, male and female
traders were not equally distributed throughout the sectors outlined
above. Access to credit, social and legal conventions, the local econ-
omy and the wider economy of the Atlantic world all affected the
way in which men and women worked within the trading commu-
nity. This chapter has discussed the perceptions of various sectors of
traders of the trading community. The next chapter investigates the
profile of each sector of the trading communities of Liverpool and
Philadelphia. In doing so it highlights the importance of sectors other
than merchants, and demonstrates the important roles played by
men and women in those lesser sectors.
44
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, pp. 76–77; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser,
4 Mar 1774, 7 Feb 1766, 28 Mar 1766. This is not to say that merchants within
each town did not differ in points of view on such issues. The debate over non-
importation in Philadelphia was especially vicious. See Manuscripts Relating to Non-
Importation Agreements 1765–1766, APS.
CHAPTER THREE
THE TRADING COMMUNITIES OF

LIVERPOOL AND PHILADELPHIA
Wholesale merchants look down upon the retailers,

who in return look down upon the green grocers,
who look down upon the market women,
who don’t care a straw for any of them.
Lopate (ed.), Writing a Literary Anthology
Philadelphia and Liverpool were port cities, trading cities, first and
foremost, but their traders also had to operate within the wider com-
munity. There were many artisans, mariners, servants, professionals
and others working within these urban areas. Many of these worked
symbiotically with the traders. Artisans built ships and provided con-
tainers for goods that merchants sent across the seas, mariners helped
to sail those ships across the seas, servants helped staff shops and
cooked food for many others and professionals looked after the legal
side of business or cared for wives and children. The knock-on effects
of trade swings had ramifications for these other workers at least as
much as traders, if not more so. If there was no trade, no ships
were required, nor sails, nor barrels. If there was no money to be
spent, consumer items were not purchased, ships not built, mariners
not required and servants laid off. It could be argued that the suc-
cess of the trading communities reflected the affluence of the port
communities as a whole.
Certainly the influence of merchants over the towns, through the
councils, dock promotion, banking and finance provision, far out-
weighed their numerical ‘insignificance’. The trading communities,
as represented in the trade directories, only ever accounted for
between 2.3 and 3.5 per cent of the total population in both Liverpool
and Philadelphia during this period.1 Of course many people were
1
Figures were not available for every year. Liverpool 1774–866 traders/34,407*100;
William Enfield, An Essay Towards the History of Leverpool (Warrington: 1773), p. 25;
68 chapter three
not entered in the trade directories. The 2,534 people listed in the
1774 Liverpool directory accounted for just over 7.4 per cent of the
total population, and in 1805 the 8,760 entries accounted for around
10 per cent. In the case of Philadelphia the c. 3,500 people listed
in 1785 accounted for around 8.75 per cent of the total population
and in 1791 about 16 per cent of the population were represented
by the c. 6,600 entries.
This low recording was due to a mixture of an emphasis on list-
ing heads of households, whom the compilers considered eminent
persons, and because the directories were most useful to business
people and visitors of various kinds. For example, mariners, despite
accounting for around 20–30 per cent of the adult working popu-
lation, were not entered, except for the occasional captain. Nor were
servants and indentured labourers entered, and yet they were an
essential component of the Philadelphia work force.2 For our pur-
poses, activities such as smuggling and other illegal activity, as well
as the number of people holding stalls at markets were not entered.
Last, but by no means least, the majority of women entered in the
trade directories were spinsters or widows, seriously underestimating
female contribution to family-run establishments.
Female listings in the Liverpool trade directory for 1766 were only
5.9 per cent of total entries. Some of this was due to its being the
first trade directory for the city, which made its compilation a little
haphazard; but this figure seriously underestimates even the number
of spinsters and widows. In 1805, female entries had risen to 17.5
Liverpool 1805–2,995/86,014*100, BPP, Census Reports, Abstracts of the Answers and

Returns, Enumeration (1801) (rep. London: Cass, 1968), p. 173; BPP, Census Reports,
Abstracts of the Answers and Returns, Enumeration (1811) (Ordered by the House of Lords
to be printed: 1812), p. 160; Philadelphia 1785–1,243 traders/40,000*100, Smith,
The “Lower Sort”, p. 43; Philadelphia 1791–992 traders/42,444*100, Census for 1790,
U.S. Bureau of the Census, A Century of Population Growth; From the First Census of the
United States to the Twelfth, 1790–1900 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company,
1970), p. 11.
2
Lewis found that mariners in Liverpool accounted for between 20 and 30 per
cent of the male working population of Liverpool in 1745. Lewis, Demographic and
Occupational Structure, p. 66, Fig 3.4; Smith found that around 20 per cent of the
free working population in Philadelphia were mariners. Smith, The “Lower Sort”, pp.
64, 212; Sharon V. Salinger, “Artisans, Journeymen, and the Transformation of
Labour in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia”, WMQ, 3rd Ser., 40,1 (1983),
62–84, p. 64. On female servants in England see Sharpe, Adapting to Capitalism,
chapter five.
the trading communities of liverpool and philadelphia 69
per cent of the total, which must have included some married women
as well, as about 12.9 per cent of households in Britain were headed
by widows at this time. The situation was much the same in
Philadelphia, where women accounted for 11.7 per cent of all entries
in 1785, and 13.5 per cent in 1791, compared to female heads of
household (widows and spinsters) of between 9 and 15 per cent.3
The fact that many women in ports had to fend for themselves
no doubt accounts for the high entry of women compared to their
numbers as heads of households. However, this still seriously under-
estimates the number of women actively working in the port.
Simultaneously, the popularity of the directories grew over time, with
an increasingly wide range of people entering themselves in the direc-
tories as they became more widely consulted. There is no doubt that
there are issues regarding using the trade directories as a source.
However, they are one of the few places in which lesser traders can
be traced. This is of course especially important in the case of women,
who are normally only listed in terms of their relationship to men.
Directories therefore facilitate a far more nuanced analysis of com-
mercial activity in both Liverpool and Philadelphia.
Figure 3.1 charts the growth of the numbers of traders listed in
the directories for 1766 to 1805 for Liverpool and 1785 to 1805 for
Philadelphia. These figures include all traders as detailed in chapter
two. That is: merchants, factors, brokers, warehouse keepers, whole-
salers and auctioneers, mercers, drapers, haberdashers and hosiers,
grocers, dealers, shopkeepers and itinerant dealers. Also included in
Figure 3.1 are estimated figures for Philadelphia for 1766 and 1774,
which are extrapolated from a combination of Doerflinger’s figures
and backward projection.4 However, please note that because these
are estimated figures, they are not used for further analysis in this chapter.
3
Liverpool women accounted for 66 out of 1,115 entries in 1766; 1,533 of c.
8,760 in 1805; Philadelphia women accounted for 409 out of c. 3,500 entries in
1785, 891 out of c. 6,600 in 1791 and 1,570 out of c. 8,970 in 1805. Carole
Shammas, “The Female Social Structure of Philadelphia in 1775”, PMBH, 107,1
(1983), 69–83, pp. 71, 73; females headed 21 per cent of households in busy High
Street Ward in Philadelphia, Karin Wulf, “Assessing Gender: Taxation and the
Evaluation of Economic Viability in Late Colonial Philadelphia”, PMBH, 121,3
(1997), 201–235, p. 219; the 1791 directory was accurate in recording female heads
of households, Claudia Goldin, “The Economic Status of Women in the Early
Republic: Quantitative Evidence”, JIH, 16,3 (1986), 375–404; for widows in Britain
see Hill, Women, Work and Sexual Politics, chapter twelve.
4
The Philadelphia figures for 1766 and 1774 are calculated thus. Merchants
70 chapter three
3500
2995
3000
Number of Traders
2500
2399
2210
2000 Liverpool
Philadelphia
1500 Doerflinger/Est
1444
1243
1000 992
866
727
500
393
330
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.1: Total Traders: 1766–1805
Source: Trade Directories for Liverpool and Philadelphia; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit,
p. 17.
It is immediately obvious that the numbers of traders increased over

the period, as would be expected given the rise in population. Both
trading communities were roughly on the same growth trajectory,
with Philadelphia’s being around 84 per cent of that of Liverpool’s.
The impact of post-revolutionary war over trading is clear in the
dip in numbers in Philadelphia in 1791, which was the first direc-
tory compiled after the crisis. However, by 1805 the number of
Philadelphia traders had recovered. Hidden amongst these figures is
the gender split of traders, and before going on to further compare
and contrast the trading communities by sector, it is necessary to
revisit the problem of women being under represented in the trade
directories. Whilst part of the reason women were under represented
in the trade directories was because they were not heads of house-
hold as often as men, they were of course also subject to the legal,
cultural and economic framework of the wider community in which
they lived.
accounted for around 44 per cent of the trading community in 1785. Doerflinger
notes 320 merchants in 1774; 320/44*100 equals 727 traders. This makes the
Philadelphia trading community c. 84 per cent of that of Liverpool in 1774. Projecting
84 per cent back to 1774 makes 330 traders. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 17.
The rules and regulations of that wider society impacted upon

female traders, as other women, more than it did men. This seri-
ously affected their ability to take advantage of opportunities avail-
able to them in the port. By law, married women on both sides of
the Atlantic were considered feme covert. This was a legal fiction which
meant that their separate legal identity was suspended whilst they
were married, which was often of course, for most of their lives.
Husband and wife were considered one person. Legally, married
women could therefore not make contracts and could not be sued
for debt. Only single female adults (spinsters) and widows had the
same legal status as a man. This murky status meant that women
found their access to capital and credit curbed. Other traders were
understandably reluctant to give credit to women when their legal
claims to that debt was uncertain. Obtaining capital was even harder.
Women were only likely to have access to capital on the death of
their father or spouse. Moreover, large sums of money bequeathed
or gifted to women usually became the property of her husband if
married, or became so when she did marry.5
In reality, the legal fiction of feme covert, if held to, would have
ground commerce to a halt. Although in many cases there must
have been a reluctance to deal with women on these grounds, the
need to work within a commercial environment on a day-to-day
basis meant that women were an integral part of the trading com-
munity, married or not. Women often acted as an ‘agent’ for their
husband, and many were far more than simply ‘deputy husbands’.
Those women who worked alongside their husbands often made busi-
ness decisions either in conjunction with him, or on their own.
Practicalities determined this. Husbands might run one side of the
business and the wife the other, or the husband might be away on
business or be ill. In these circumstances, the tacit consent of the
husband was the important factor. If he did not challenge a deci-
sion taken by his wife quickly, the contract became binding as if she
5
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (15th ed.), 2 Vols. Vol. 1
(London: 1809), pp. 441–442; For good introductions to women and the law of
property see Susan Staves, Married Women’s Separate Property in England, 1660–1833
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990); Marylynn Salmon,
Women and the Law of Property in Early America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1986).
72 chapter three
were a full partner. In England at least, many married women, acted

on local custom and general knowledge and traded on their own
behalf, working de facto feme sole—even when not so legally. In London,
for example, this practise was well known. Women who were gen-
erally known to be trading feme sole were regarded as being so—and
contracts became binding.6
Holding on to those profits as her own separate income could be
problematic however, if relations between spouses were strained. The
lack of a guild system in Liverpool prevents us from knowing whether
or not women in that city traded feme sole when married, but it is
likely that many did so. In Philadelphia, although provisions were
made for married women to trade feme sole, they were restrictive
rather than inclusive. The General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed
“An Act concerning feme-sole traders” in 1718. However, married
women were only allowed to trade in their own right if they were
the wives of mariners and others forced to go to sea. This would
have included quite a few women, as at least 20 per cent of the
adult male work force were mariners, but positively restricted the
remainder.7 Many other women would have worked alongside their
husbands of course, where profits would clearly belong to him. This
was particularly prevalent in shopkeeping (in its widest sense) where
wives and daughters often helped at the counter. It is of course
difficult to say whether the inability to hold on to their own profits
curbed the female entrepreneurial spirit, or whether the wish to pro-
vide for their family was incentive enough.
Cultural attitudes towards the place of women in society also
shaped perspectives towards their economic responsibility, and some-
times even affected how women represented themselves. In Philadelphia,
single women were often taxed relatively lightly because of cultural
6
Laurel T. Ulrich, Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern
New England, 1650–1750 (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), chapter two. See also
Peter Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in
London 1660 –1730 (London: Methuen, 1989), chapter six on wives in business;
Salmon, Women and the Law of Property, pp. 44–53. General knowledge that a woman
was working feme sole was extremely important. Without it a husband could claim
all her earnings for himself—even if he returned after years of desertion. Hill, Women,
Work, and Sexual Politics, pp. 201–202 and 211–213.
7
Salmon, Women and the Law of Property, p. 45; Diana E. Ascott, Wealth and
Community: Liverpool 1660–1760 (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool:
1996), p. 302 (footnote 305); Smith, The “Lower Sort”, pp. 64, 212.
assumptions about female responsibilities. For some wives, social aspi-

rations meant that whilst they worked alongside their husbands, they
hid the fact from wider society. At least some women must have
taken social ideals to heart. As early as 1726 Daniel Defoe was cas-
tigating some wives for their reluctance to help their husbands.
Deeming themselves too good to help in the shop whilst their hus-
bands were alive, would mean a troublesome lack of knowledge on
his death, and leave them open to abuse.8 Conversely, for most
women, there would have been no choice regarding social aspira-
tions—producing an income was a necessity not an option. Therefore,
although hardly any working wives were entered in the trade direc-
tories, it is inconceivable that, except in the case of elite merchants,
most women were not working alongside their husbands. These fac-
tors all mean that it is likely that most of the women in the direc-
tories, although certainly not all, were spinsters or widows. It also
means that the number of women working as traders in Liverpool
and Philadelphia are seriously under represented. Having said that,
as the trade directories are one source in which women are listed
as they saw themselves, they are still invaluable.
Table 3.1: Share of the Trading Communities by Gender: 1766–1805

Year Liverpool Philadelphia
m% f% m% f%
1766 94.7 5.3 n/a n/a
1774 86.7 13.3 n/a n/a
1785/87 82.3 17.7 91.2 8.8
1791/96 80.7 19.3 87.8 12.2
1805 81.9 18.1 89.6 10.4
Source: Trade Directories for Liverpool and Philadelphia
Table 3.1 highlights the under representation of female traders in

the directories. As mentioned above, the number of women listed
suggests that more women than only spinsters and widows were
8
Wulf, “Assessing Gender”, p. 234; Hunt suggests that many married women
worked feme sole, as well as alongside their husbands, but hid the fact. Margaret
Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 1680–1780 (Berkley,
Ca: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 128–129; Defoe, The Complete English
Tradesman, chapter twenty-one.
74 chapter three
usually listed in the directories, although the contribution of women

as a whole is of course, underestimated. However, in Liverpool in
1766, and for Philadelphia in 1785, the number of women is espe-
cially low. This is likely to be partly accounted for by the way in
which the first directories were compiled. However, there is a marked
difference between the two cities by 1805, with Philadelphia women
accounting for 10.4 per cent, and Liverpool women 18 per cent of
all traders. This does not mean that women’s activity was spread
throughout the various trading sectors at this rate. As is discussed
below, women were usually found in particular trading sectors and
not others. Furthermore, there were significant reasons for the much
higher proportion of women acting as traders in Liverpool than in
Philadelphia.
Men, Women, and their Place in the Trading Community
The trading communities of Liverpool and Philadelphia had much

in common over this period. They had a common business culture
and language, and worked closely with one another both within each
city and across the Atlantic. However, there were also differences
between them. This was mainly in the structure of the trading com-
munity of each port as opposed to the way in which they worked.
Philadelphia’s trading community was far less diversified than that
of Liverpool, which had enormous ramifications for the ability of
women and lesser traders to function within it. Apart from the legal
and social sanctions under which women traded, the wider nature
of the economy also affected the opportunities available to them.
This does not mean that the way in which the Philadelphia trading
community functioned was simple or unsophisticated, far from it;
but it did have a far less diverse structure.
The trading communities of both Liverpool and Philadelphia were
dominated by merchants, as shown in table 3.2. This is partly due
to the fact that higher social status people were more likely to have
been entered in the trade directories than others; but the high num-
bers of shopkeepers listed, especially in Philadelphia, means that
skewed recording cannot account for all of this trend. In fact the
very high status of the merchant no doubt partly accounts for the
high numbers listed; traders wanted to be seen as a merchant—with
its connotations of an elite overseas trader. Here we see the first
signs that perceptions of the hierarchy of traders as discussed in

chapter two were not always reflected in reality. Many people called
themselves a merchant even though it is highly unlikely that so many
traders were importing or exporting goods on a large scale. For
example, Doerflinger thought that fifty-two “traders” were the “great
oaks” of the Philadelphia community, and that whilst 250 other mer-
chants imported dry goods, the largest proportion of ‘merchants’
operating in the 1780s were wholesalers rather than overseas traders.9
Table 3.2: Share of the Trading Communities Comprised of Merchants:

1766–1805
Year Liverpool % Philadelphia %
1766 56.0 n/a
1774 41.0 n/a
1785/87 29.0 44.0
1791/96 30.0 36.0
1805 33.0 39.0
Source: Trade Directories for Liverpool and Philadelphia (includes victuallers)
Yet 552 merchants were listed in the 1785 directory alone. This
phenomenon was also found in Liverpool. Francis Hyde et al. found
that in the 1790s around 330 Liverpool merchants “were men of
substance with overseas connections”, when the 1791 directory clearly
list 666 merchants.10 This is not to dispute the numbers of overseas
merchants as assessed by Doerflinger and Hyde, but to stress the
point that many more traders used the term merchant to describe
their activity than perhaps the contemporary understanding had come
to mean. Therefore, the merchants discussed here are not just the
elite overseas merchants, but all those who were listed as a mer-
chant—whatever the scale of their activity. The wide use of the term,
the varying roles carried out by a merchant, and the influx and exit
of traders due to trade and life cycles means that we have to come
to terms with the fact that the merchant was not always the elite
figure that he is often perceived to have been.
9
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 20, 28.
10
Hyde, Parkinson and Marriner, “The Port of Liverpool”, p. 366.
76 chapter three
It is also clear from figure 3.2 that the number of merchants listed
in both cities increased in a steady manner over the period. Liverpool
had 219 merchants in 1766, and 986 by 1805. Philadelphia proba-
bly had around 145 merchants in 1766, and had 946 in 1805. The
only year that Philadelphia had more merchants that Liverpool was
in 1785/87. This was due to a large number of people entering
trade at the end of the War of Independence as peace offered new
opportunities. This caused a great deal of overtrading in Philadelphia.
Merchants on both sides of the Atlantic overestimated the true
demand for British goods and as early as 1784 some merchants were
worried about the market being overstocked. This was followed by
a “rash of bankruptcies” in 1785 and 1786. This occurred too late
to be recorded in the trade directory of 1785, but accounts for the
dip in the number of merchants in 1791 when the next directory
was compiled.11 Merchants, along with shopkeepers, were the biggest
losers in the post-war crash.
This does not mean of course that the merchant sector was nec-
essarily losing ‘market share’ in the economy. It may have been pos-
sible that individual merchants or merchant houses were consolidating
and specialising, meaning that fewer firms were able to control much
more of the import/export market. However, also at work was the
increasing diversity of the trading communities in both Liverpool
and Philadelphia during this period. This led to a widening range
of opportunities for lesser traders, which would have led to a clearer
distinction between roles. The percentage of Liverpool merchants
calling themselves by the simple term merchant fell from 87 per cent
in 1774 to 76 per cent in 1805. In Philadelphia, 85 per cent of mer-
chants called themselves by the simple terminology in 1785, and 79
per cent in 1805. There is therefore a small move over the period
towards a larger proportion of merchants listing themselves with some
particular commodity, or perhaps, as importing dry goods, or export-
ing food, but the trend is far from clear.12
11
The number of traders in Philadelphia was usually around 84 per cent of the
number in Liverpool, whilst merchants were around 44% of total traders. With 393
traders in Liverpool in 1766—there would have been around 145 merchants in
Philadelphia ((393*84/100)*44%); Sitgreaves to Charles Wood and Co., 27 Apl
1784, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook, 1783–1794, f. 55, HSP; Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, p. 262.
12
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 82.
1200
1000 983
939
800
Number of Traders
Liv M
Liv F
666 Phil M
600 Phil F
549
418
400 357
355
219
200
0 3 1 3 7
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805

Year
Figure 3.2: Merchants: 1766–1805

In fact, in both cities, the majority of merchants listed themselves

simply as such—‘merchant’. In 1785, 467 of the 552 merchants
termed themselves in this way, whilst in Liverpool in 1787, 309 of
418 merchants did the same. Throughout the period, only eight mer-
chants called themselves commission merchants. Three in Liverpool
and five in Philadelphia did so, all in 1805, despite the fact that
many merchants worked on commission rather than at their own risk.
William Rathbone IV of Liverpool imported very little on his own
account and William Pollard of Philadelphia appeared to be selling
goods on commission for Thomas and Clayton Case in Liverpool,
amongst many others, but both were listed in the directories simply
as merchant. Neither of these men listed themselves as commission
merchants, probably due to the status factor. Furthermore, very few
merchants listed themselves as specialising by commodity or region,
or indeed by import or export—even though many did so. For exam-
ple, William and John Sitgreaves, a father and son team, were listed
as merchants in 1785 and 1791 at South Front Street, Philadelphia.
In fact, their records show that they specialised as dry goods importers.13
13
Sales off the Adriana for 1793, 18 Feb 1794, Folder Business Correspondence,
78 chapter three
Some merchants did list a specialism however. In Philadelphia,

this was mainly timber or lumber and flour, in keeping with the
wider economy. In all three years sampled, these were the largest
sub-sectors of merchants. Other specialities included iron, stave, sugar
or wine merchants, of which there were only a few in each cate-
gory. In Liverpool, corn merchants were the largest sub-sector, with
timber and liquor merchants a close second. Some of the timber
merchants would have handled timber imported from Philadelphia,
but much timber also came from the Baltic. There were not many
flour merchants in Liverpool, although the high numbers of corn
merchants may point to a difference in terminology. Equally, the
rise in corn merchants might be a reflection of the famine condi-
tions in Europe generally and in Britain between 1794 and 1796.
Britain became a net importer of grain in the late eighteenth cen-
tury with English provincial ports handling just over half the vol-
ume of corn at the end of the century.14 The corn merchants in
Liverpool were probably therefore handling imports.
In contrast, the term merchant hides the wide variety of functions
carried out by some traders in this sector. For example, Ralph
Eddowes emigrated from Chester, England, to Philadelphia in 1794.
He was listed as a merchant in 1805 at 43 North Sixth Street.
However, as early as 1798 he had purchased an eighty acre farm
about ten miles out of town, which he ran alongside his mercantile
business. Other merchants changed their focus over time. Thomas
Leyland of Liverpool went into the slave trade after having won
£20,000 on a lottery. He then went into banking, first with William
Box 12, CWU; Pollard to T. and C. Case, 19 Jun 1772, William Pollard Letterbook
1772–1774, HSP; Sitgreaves to Alexander Armstrong, 6 Jul 1783, William and John
Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794.
14
In 1785 Philadelphia there were fifteen flour merchants, twenty-four lumber
merchants and ten timber merchants listed. Thereafter no timber merchants were
listed. In 1791 and 1805 there were thirteen and twenty flour merchants and eleven
and fifty lumber merchants respectively. The number of Liverpool corn merchants
in years 1766, 1774, 1787, 1796 and 1805 were six, seven, six, fifty-one and fifty-
eight respectively. Timber merchants were numbered at eight, nine, sixteen, twenty-
nine and forty three; and liquor merchants at nil, six, one, forty-three and twenty-eight
respectively. The number of brandy and wine merchants swelled the numbers of
merchants dealing in alcohol considerably; Wells, Wretched Faces, pp. 1, 9–10, 26,
198.
Roscoe, and then with his nephew Richard Bullin, but was still
involved in the slave trade all the while.15
The number of women listed as merchants was minimal; only
three in Liverpool in 1805, and a total of eleven in Philadelphia
over the whole period. It would appear that the high entry costs
effectively deterred women who did not have easy access to capital
and credit. This was compounded by the fact that many merchants
‘networked’ in socially male environments such as the Council, coffee-
houses and male-orientated clubs. All these were effectively, if not
legally, denied to women. Those women that were merchants were
widows—gaining the business on the death of their husband. Five
of the seven female merchants in Philadelphia in 1805 listed them-
selves specifically as ‘widow of ’ their husband. However, Margaret
Duncan appeared to be a married women trading on her own account
in 1791. She may have been the wife of David Duncan, as they
were trading next door to each other at South Water Street. She
may have used his ‘credit’ to run her own business. Mrs Warbrick
of Liverpool listed herself as merchant and widow of George. It has
not been possible to say whether the other female merchants were
widows or not.16 Sometimes women were able to gain credit from
family members, but gaining access to capital remained a problem.
The top of the status tree was restricted to men.
Whilst the term factor covered two aspects, as agent or hinter-
land wholesaler, it would appear that factors in Liverpool and
Philadelphia did not call themselves as such, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Whilst many traders acted on behalf of principals, such as William
Pollard on behalf of Thomas and Clayton Case, only three people
listed themselves as factors in Philadelphia, and seventeen in Liverpool.
In Philadelphia, a flour factor was listed in 1791, and a factor and
15
Ralph Eddowes to William Roscoe, 3 Nov 1794, WRP, LivRO; John to James
Perhouse, 18 Jun 1806, John Perhouse Journal 1800–1838, APS; for more on
Leyland see Hughes, Liverpool Banks, chapter fourteen.
16
This lack of female merchants was not the case everywhere. In Stralsund,
Germany, women accounted for 11 per cent of merchants between 1755 and 1815.
Widows accounted for fifty out of fifty-four of these women, but they were losing
market share over the period. Daniel A. Rabuzzi, “Women as Merchants in
Eighteenth-Century Northern Germany: The Case of Straslund, 1759–1830”, CEH,
28,4 (1995), 435–456, pp. 438–439. For more on social networks see chapter four.
80 chapter three
50
45
40
35
Number of Traders
30 Liv M
Phil M
25
20
15
10
7
5 4 4
3 2 2
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.3: Factors: 1766–1805

nail factor in 1805. It is worth noting that in Liverpool too, most

factors listed were linked to produce—corn and cheese. Only one
factor was listed as a commission factor.
It would appear then that the term factor was not used in the
ports in relation to an agent, but as Westerfield describes—as a
wholesaler linking hinterland produce and the ports together. It is
worth noting that Levi Hollingsworth, a major flour distributor in
the Philadelphia area, was performing the role of a middleman or
wholesaler, as suggested by Doerflinger and Westerfield. However,
he listed himself as a merchant in all three Philadelphia directories.
This confusion between terms and roles is also present in the his-
toriography: “Hollingsworth used the war to make himself into one
of Philadelphia’s leading merchants [my emphasis] without shipping a
single good overseas”. It is likely therefore that factors in ports such
as Liverpool and Philadelphia were really middleman wholesalers,
and not agents. Perhaps there were more factors like Hollingsworth
who called themselves merchant because of the prestige conferred.
The decline in the use of the term factor in the trade directories
may therefore be partly accounted for by many factors calling them-
selves merchants, many of whom would have lived in the hinter-

land. Furthermore, factors effected “exchanges of commodities by
bringing buyer and seller together”; they used their knowledge.17 This
sort of activity may have come under the umbrella of commission
brokers whose numbers grew enormously at the end of the eigh-
teenth century, especially in Liverpool.
Factor was never a term used by female traders. This may be
because it was linked with the export trade (however the term was
understood), and required large amounts of capital. Furthermore, if
a factor was acting as an agent, this would have required working
away from home, and married women would have found their legal
status a barrier to acting as a formal agent. Women may also have
found factorage as a wholesaler in agricultural products difficult due
to the need to work away from home periodically in the hinterland
of the city. Either way, social attitudes, access to capital and credit,
and family commitments would have worked against women being
active in this area. The absence of women would appear to confirm
however, that factors were high up the socio-economic scale of traders.
In contrast to factors, the number of brokers was not only larger
and increasing in both cities, but their role was diversifying as well.
Growth rates were similar in both cities, as highlighted in figure 3.4.
However, it must be said that both the size and diversity of this sec-
tor differed quite widely between Liverpool and Philadelphia despite
the fact that most brokers listed themselves by that simple termi-
nology. In 1805, 126 of the 196 brokers (64 per cent) in Liverpool
were listed as broker, and twenty-six of the thirty-four brokers (76
per cent) in Philadelphia did the same.
However, it is the sub sectors which highlight the differences. In
Liverpool in 1766, there were only three sub-sectors: broker, broker
of the flats (inland and coastal vessels) and broker of old goods. By
1805, there were fifteen. Many of these were specialisms in com-
modities such as cotton and ship brokers who were listed separately
from 1774 onwards. In Philadelphia the same trend was occurring
but was far less marked and lagged behind Liverpool. Most brokers
17
Westerfield, Middlemen, pp. 206, 226, 152; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp.
123–124; Hunter and Clemens, “The Mid-Atlantic Grain Trade”.
82 chapter three
200
189
180
160
140
Number of Traders
120 Liv M
Liv F
Phil M
100
83
80
60 55
40 34
22
20 13 18
10
1 2 8 7
1
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.4: Brokers: 1766–1805
in Philadelphia dealt with bills, bonds and ships rather than com-
modities. For example, Joseph Howell and John Lawrence went into
partnership as brokers in 1796 to sell bank stock, securities, shares
in canals and turnpikes and bills of exchange.18 As late as 1805
Philadelphia had only three ship brokers and three commission bro-
kers specifically listed.
This lack of diversity and stress upon financial brokering in
Philadelphia accounts for the complete lack of women involved in
that city. In contrast, Liverpool brokers were a diverse group in which
a few women participated. Isabell Pratt was listed as a broker in
Gore’s directory in 1774. In the same year, an I. Pratt advertised a
vessel in London loading for Liverpool. She may have taken over
from her husband, John, who had been listed as a broker at the
same address in 1766 and died sometime before June 1770. Isabell
also died sometime between January 1779 and February 1780, leav-
ing goods worth around £300. She was therefore reasonably suc-
18
Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1796.
cessful and had run the business for about ten years. Another Liverpool
widow, Mary Wetherherd, ran the family brokerage business until
her sons came of age in 1805. In the 1760s and 1770s it would
appear that brokerage, especially when conducted by women, included
some form of commodity. However, after 1787 household broker-
age was the only term ascribed to women brokers. Household bro-
kers sold second-hand furniture and other household items retail.
They were particularly confined to Stanley Street in Liverpool, an
area of cheap cellar dwellings.19 Women were therefore fulfilling a
role sanctioned by homemaking activities, but at the low end of the
market. Increasing diversity consequently benefitted women, but they
were still at the mercy of culturally perceived roles. The term broker
covered a very wide range of activity, including wholesaling and
retailing, from stocks and shares to household bric-a-brac.
Wholesalers, warehouse keepers and auctioneers or vendue hold-
ers also sit uncomfortably somewhere between wholesale and retail.
This was a male-dominated sector, as demonstrated in figure 3.5,
and played a far more significant role in Liverpool than in Philadelphia.
This was due to the varying degrees of diversity in each city, and
to demonstrate this it is necessary to consider each sub sector separately.
The majority of wholesalers were wholesale grocers in both cities,
and the few other wholesalers sold items such as shoes, earthenware,
drugs, Sheffield or Birmingham ware. Wholesalers did not really
appear as a separate nomenclature until the late 1780s. It is likely
that the wholesaling of groceries was dominated by merchants until
that time. However, it would appear that other types of goods were
mostly handled by warehouse keepers, at least in Liverpool.
Whilst warehouse keepers were no more a prominent feature in
Philadelphia than wholesalers, they were an important mode of dis-
tribution in Liverpool as demonstrated in table 3.3. Whilst lots of
people had warehouses, such as merchants, ironmongers and ship-
builders, only warehouses as separate trading entities in their own
right are discussed here.20 By 1805 there were 111 warehouse keepers,
19
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 19 Aug 1774. Isabell Pratt was the only I. Pratt
listed in Gore’s in 1774; Will of John Pratt, 15 Jun 1770, Will of Isabell Pratt, 24
Sep 1777, LRO; Taylor, “The Court and Cellar Dwelling”, pp. 75–76.
20
See Appendix A for how merchants’ warehouses and other secondary listings
were accounted for in the database.
84 chapter three
160
149
140
120 110
Number of Traders
100 Liv M
Liv F
Phil M
80 Phil F
69
61
60
40
28
20 15
10
5 4
1 1 1 2
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.5: Wholesalers, Warehouse Keepers and Auctioneers: 1766–1805

compared to only fifteen in Philadelphia. The principal reason for

this disparity is the nature of the goods catered for by the ware-
house keepers in each city, which was in turn driven by the wider
economy. In Liverpool, warehouse keepers sold imported items such
as rum, liquor, silk, tobacco and tea; but these were completely over-
shadowed by warehouse keepers selling regionally manufactured goods
and locally produced food. These included items such as mugs,
Manchester and hosiery goods, a massive eighteen shoe warehouses
in 1796, and cheese and flour (some flour was imported by this time
in addition).
Table 3.3: Warehouse Keepers: 1766–1805

m f m f
1766 8 0 n/a n/a
1774 56 1 n/a n/a
1785/87 56 1 3 0
1791/96 101 1 0 0
1805 107 4 13 2
Warehouses in Liverpool therefore performed two functions: they

sold items that had been imported from overseas and collected region-
ally for retail sale, and collected items for export as well. For exam-
ple, P. Orton was selling silk and drapery for ready money at his
warehouse in 1774, whilst Thomas Wolfe was advertising earthen-
ware from his manufactory in Staffordshire direct to merchants and
ships’ captains. Some Liverpool warehouses sold both wholesale and
retail, such as Leay, Nonne and Co., who took over an earthenware
warehouse from Mr Forbes in 1766.21 Fulfilling a dual function, ware-
house keepers in Liverpool were an integral part of the distribution
process, compared to their more limited role in Philadelphia.
Although there were relatively few warehouse keepers in Philadelphia,
their role can still be established from the directories and newspaper
advertisements. Warehouse keepers listed in the directories all catered
for imported items such as shoes, hats, tea and earthenware. Whilst
some of these could have been produced regionally (tea excepted),
most of them would have been imported from places such as Liverpool.
However, there were no warehouses for the dominant Philadelphia
hinterland goods such as timber, flour, or iron despite the increase
of mills in the hinterland. Advertisements in the newspapers confirm
this bias. Robert and C. Desgrove advertised the opening of their
hat warehouse in May 1796, the goods all imported from London.
Another hat warehouse had goods suitable for re-export to the West
India market in 1805. Edward Harvey’s goods had been imported
on the William and Mary, probably from London. In contrast, the
export of flour was mostly handled by specialist middlemen such as
Levi Hollingsworth. As noted above, he should most properly have
been called a factor.22 It is likely, however, that the difference between
the two cities is due to the fact that elite factors and merchants in
Philadelphia had control over regional imports and exports in addi-
tion to international ones, whereas merchants in Liverpool did not.
Auctions, termed vendues in the British Americas, have been the
subject of much controversy. They have often been blamed for under-
cutting supposedly more legitimate traders such as merchants and
21
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 15 Apl 1774, 19 Feb 1787, 14 Mar 1766.
22
McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, chapter fifteen; Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 151–157, 329–334; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser,
12 May 1796; Relf ’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 12 Oct 1805.
86 chapter three
shopkeepers, especially in eighteenth-century continental America.

However, in table 3.4 it is clear that they were no larger as a group
in Philadelphia than in Liverpool. Furthermore, they were not always
in direct competition with other traders, as they often sold unfash-
ionable, bankrupt or damaged stock. They also often sold for cash
or on short-term credit, whereas merchants and shopkeepers usually
sold on reasonably long credit terms of a few months.23
Table 3.4: Auctioneers and Vendue Holders: 1766–1805

m f m f
1766 0 0 n/a n/a
1744 5 0 n/a n/a
1785/87 4 0 2 0
1791/96 4 0 9 0
1805 10 0 14 0
This is not to say that some auctioneers in both cities were not
‘guilty’ of directly competing with other traders. James Loughead of
Philadelphia advertised textiles for sale at his vendue store which
had been imported on the Lydia from Liverpool in October 1774.
In the same year, Thomas Houghton of Liverpool, who had imported
planks of oak from Philadelphia, sold them by auction through
Thomas Ryan’s office in Exchange Alley. However, in the majority
of cases, auctioneers fulfilled a more complimentary role. Many of
the goods on sale were the stock of bankrupts and insolvents. In
1774, a Liverpool auctioneer was arranging for the sale of goods
belonging to Ralph Hamer, a bankrupt. In 1787, the Philadelphia
city vendue store was selling superfine and second brown clothes on
behalf of the creditors of Samuel Baker. Nor were auctioneers immune
to trade cycles. Some went bankrupt themselves, such as Liverpool
man Andrew McEwen, described as a broker, auctioneer, dealer and
chapman in 1805.24
23
Nash, The Urban Crucible, p. 203; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 171.
24
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 19 Oct 1774; Williamson’s Liverpool
Advertiser, 19 Aug 1774, 16 Sep 1774, 15 Apl 1774; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily
Advertiser, 1 Oct 1787; Gore’s General Advertiser, 16 May 1805.
Some auctioneers did sell goods on credit, perhaps by necessity

due to the shortage of cash, but not always to their advantage.
Thomas Lawrence, the Philadelphia public vendue master had to
place a strongly worded article in the newspaper in 1767; all
“persons indebted to the public Vendue Office of this city . . . unless
they pay off their respective balances . . . will be put into the hands
of an attorney, without respect to persons”. However, the general-
ity of cash payments for goods bought at auction could present prob-
lems, even for merchants. Nathan Trotter attempted to do business
on his own account whilst a clerk for his elder brother. In 1804 he
borrowed $15.22 in order to purchase some linens from York and
Lippencott’s auction house. It took him six months to pay his brother
back. Sometimes women banded together in order to purchase from
auction houses such Mary Coates, Elizabeth Paschall and Rebecca
Steele, but women did not work as auctioneers themselves.25 This is
no doubt due to the very public nature of the role, the auctions
themselves, and indeed the authority required to keep the public in
check. Auctions therefore fulfilled a similar role in both Liverpool
and Philadelphia. Whilst the numbers of wholesalers also differed, it
was the role and number of warehouse keepers which highlight the
differences in diversity between the trading communities of Liverpool
and Philadelphia.
Mercers, drapers, haberdashers and hosiers also focus attention on
the differences in diversity between the two cities. Although they
were predominantly ‘shopkeepers’, they often acted as wholesalers in
addition, particularly to country or small-scale shops. This may be
one of the reasons that there were few traders in this sector in
Philadelphia. As many of the goods sold by this sector would have
been imported into Philadelphia, the merchants yet again would have
controlled the wholesaling and indeed much of the retail function of
these items by default. In contrast, this was a significant and diverse
sector in Liverpool in which women also participated, as shown in
figure 3.6. Many traders ran ‘joint’ operations such as draper and
slopman, linen draper and milliner, draper and haberdasher, or
woollen draper and tailor. It is noticeable that these were all related
25
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 12 Feb 1767; Tooker, Nathan Trotter,
p. 9; Wulf, Not All Wives, p. 146.
88 chapter three
textile trades, requiring similar skills and expertise, but does high-
light the socio-economic range within this sector.
Furthermore, whereas a few women worked in this sector in
Liverpool, the comparatively worse access to capital for women in
Philadelphia is highlighted by their absence in this sector, despite
textiles being a ‘feminised’ area of trade. Only one female in
Philadelphia was listed in this area, Mary Jones, who was a haberdasher
and milliner in 1785. At first glance the numbers look promising for
women in Liverpool, but closer inspection reveals further ‘feminine’
bias. Most Liverpool women in this sector worked as linen drapers.
Only in 1787 do a few women appear as hosiers and haberdashers,
and never as a mercer. The main reason for this is probably the
nature of the stock of linen drapers. They sold material for items
such as petticoats, aprons and table linen, arguably feminine items.
It was therefore a socially acceptable occupation for women. The
linen trade was also well protected by import duties and the trade
was in the hands of large-scale linen drapers in London rather than
merchants. This combined with the growth of the domestic indus-
try in the Liverpool hinterland may have provided women with rel-
120
100
100
Number of Traders
80
65 Liv M
58 61
60 Liv F
Phil M
Phil F
40 38
19 18
20
15 13
10
7
2 1
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.6: Mercers, Drapers, Haberdashers and Hosiers: 1766–1805
atively easy access to local suppliers than if they had had to deal
with merchants, as Philadelphia women were forced to do. The rel-
atively few women in this sector, despite it being ‘feminised’, sug-
gests problems with access to capital. However, a few Liverpool
women did manage to have a reasonable career in this sector. Ann
Martin ran a linen drapery shop in the fashionable Castle Street
area of Liverpool between 1766 and 1787. Isabella Jameson worked
as a linen draper and grocer at Cleveland Square 1766 to 1774 and
Ann and Jannet Hutton as linen drapers at the Old Dock (possibly
wholesale) between 1796 and 1805.26
Philadelphia’s trading community did begin to diversify in the early
nineteenth century—and one area in which this helped women was
grocery. The term grocer covered a wide range of activity, from
large-scale wholesale grocers to tiny side-street retailers. Wholesale
grocers were dealt with above, and so this section details those gro-
cers who were not listed specifically as such. In rural areas, grocers
carried a very wide range of goods, but in cities it would appear
that grocers were more likely to concentrate on imported foods.27
Figure 3.7 demonstrates clearly that there were many more grocers
in Philadelphia than in Liverpool, and that some women were active
in this sector. It is noteworthy that the grocer sector in Philadelphia
does not appear to have suffered as badly as the merchant sector
by the collapse of the 1780s; although there is no doubt that its
growth was retarded. The number of grocers in Philadelphia was
still over half that of merchants however, whereas in Liverpool gro-
cers were only about 11 per cent of the number of merchants. The
large number of grocers in Philadelphia may be a feature of the lack
26
In 1756 the top 4 per cent of people held 25.4 per cent of all wealth. Billy
G. Smith, “Inequality in Late Colonial Philadelphia”, WMQ, 3rd Ser., 41,4 (1984),
629–645, pp. 633, 642; inventories left by ‘dealers’ in Liverpool tended to be for
higher amounts, but people in the manufacturing and transport sectors were quite
likely to leave wills as well. Wealth may have been becoming less evenly distrib-
uted in Liverpool, but was not perhaps yet as severe as in Philadelphia. Ascott,
Wealth and Community, Table 5.2, p. 202; Harte, “The Rise of Protection”, pp. 86–96.
27
Thomas M. Doerflinger, “Farmers and Dry Goods in the Philadelphia Market
Area, 1750–1800” in Ronald Hoffman, John J. McCusker, Russel R. Menard, and
Peter J. Albert (eds.), The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary Period, 1763–1790
(Charlottesville: For the United States Capitol Historical Society by the University
Press of Virginia, 1988), pp. 166–195; Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 158.
90 chapter three
of diversity in that city. Many grocers may have been carrying out
the small-scale retail function carried on by warehouse keepers and
lesser dealers (discussed below) in Liverpool. Although not denomi-
nated as wholesalers, some may also have been carrying out a whole-
saling function, by breaking bulk to lesser shops both in Philadelphia
and the hinterland.
Grocers in Philadelphia very rarely listed a secondary occupation.
In 1805 only 3 per cent of grocers listed themselves with a ‘dual’
occupation, such as grocer and dry goods store or grocer and clerk
of the market. Liverpool’s case looks a little more muddled at first,
with 24 per cent listing secondary occupations in 1805. However,
most were grocer-related, such as grocer and tea dealer or grocer
and flour dealer. In both cities therefore, grocery was a compact
trade. A number of women were active in this sector, especially in
Philadelphia. Although it cost considerable sums to set up in busi-
ness and buy an apprenticeship, these hurdles did not effectively
debar women. Indeed, it is likely that most women did not under-
take an apprenticeship, at least formally. Many may have taken over
from their husband or father, or received some sort of legacy in
500
471
450
400
350
Number of Traders
300 Liv M
Liv F
250 Phil M
Phil F
200
159 165
150
100 93 93
79
58 61
47
50 24 20 24
6 6 18
2
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.7: Grocers: 1766–1805

order to invest in their business. For example, Robert Hankey was

listed as a grocer in Mersey Street in Liverpool in 1774 and 1787,
whilst Elizabeth Hankey is listed at the same address as a grocer
and flour dealer in 1796 and 1805. Certainly quite a few female
grocers in Philadelphia were listed specifically as widows, including
Mrs Bowen of 358 South Second Street in 1805. In 1805 over 16
per cent of female grocers were widows.28 No doubt many had worked
alongside their husbands for many years beforehand. Of course dur-
ing their coverture they were not normally listed in the directories,
stressing the way in which the contribution of women is under rep-
resented in them.
Dealers and general traders are very difficult to place within the
trading hierachy. This term was not listed in the contemporary dic-
tionaries and guide books, but the high numbers shown in figure
3.8 demonstrates that many traders were using this term to describe
themselves. Yet again we see differences between perceptions and
reality. This anomaly may be due to the fact that many dealers per-
formed a function that was a mixture of broker and retailer, with
their rise being a function of increasing urbanisation. This explana-
tion is reinforced by the commodities in which this sector of traders
dealt. In Philadelphia, by 1805, there were dealers in shoes, milk,
watches and silk, as well as ‘export’ commodities such as flour. In
Liverpool, as was the case with brokers, the comparative diversity is
striking. There were dealers for coal, mugs, tallow, tea, tobacco, old
ropes and slops. Another reason for the increase in the number of
dealers in Liverpool may also be that tea dealers had to be licensed
after the Commutation Act of 1784. Dealers in brandy and coffee
also had to register for a license.29 Most notable in terms of num-
bers were the flour dealers. There were thirteen in 1766, thirty-eight
by 1787 and ninety-three by 1805. This may be linked to the fact
that flour was such a basic staple food.
One point not made clear in figure 3.8, is the impermanence of
this sector. Much of this sector was low level and unprofitable, and
many dealers, such as Benjamin Hemmings of Philadelphia went
28
10 widows of 61 female grocers.
29
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 161; Montefiore, Trader’s and Manufacturer’s
Compendium (1804 ed.), p. 367. Although Montefiore mentioned tea and coffee ‘deal-
ers’—he does not list dealer as a separate term.
92 chapter three
250
199
200
Number of Traders
150 Liv M
134 Liv F
Phil M
Phil F
100
84
64
58 57
50
40 33
21 20
10 6 1 4
1 1
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.8: Dealers: 1766–1805

N.B. Does not include victuallers—see below.30
bankrupt. In Philadelphia, only two men, William Boswell and Samuel

Savill [or Saviel], both lime traders, were positively traceable in the
trade directories. Of seven flour dealers, only three were found to
have possible linkages to another year. One had become a grocer,
another a flour merchant and another was running a feed store. The
situation was similar in Liverpool. This sector may have been a short-
term occupation because of its low-level retail nature. Only fifteen
men were positively traceable over more than one year, and given the
higher numbers overall the rate is comparable to Philadelphia. Seven
of these were flour dealers, suggesting that this was the safest sub
sector in which to be involved. The main secondary areas were tea,
earthenware and clothes. In fact it was a tea dealer, George Crooke,
who was the only dealer listed in more than two directories. He,
and then possibly his son, were listed in all the directories sampled.31
Victuallers are included in total traders in figure 3.1.

30
31
Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1787; the three men with possible
linkages were Michael Omensetter [Omenfetter?], Daniel Miller and John Rudolph.
Women dealers did not fare much better. In Liverpool many were
tea dealers and there were always more female than male tea deal-
ers. These included Ann and Mary Tuohy in 1796 and 1805, about
whom we shall hear more in chapter seven. Some women were also
flour dealers, but like male dealers, very few women could be traced
from one directory to another. Mary Blackley had the longest record
of all female dealers, listed between 1787 and 1805. Sarah Jones
and Elizabeth Wilson were both listed as earthenware dealers in
1796 and 1805. Of course many more women were dealers, but for
a far shorter period of time. There were ten female flour dealers in
both 1796 and 1805, and twenty-five tea dealers in 1796. The high
number of female tea dealers was no doubt because it was deemed
a ‘feminine’ occupation, being associated with the domestic rituals
of the tea table. Furthermore, many more tea dealers applied for a
license after the Commutation Act of 1784 made tea cheaper.32
The dealer sector was a short-term occupation for both men and
women, with flour dealing the only sub sector with reasonably good
prospects. This lack of permanence and the reliance on foodstuffs
and second-hand clothing confirms that this was predominantly a
low-level retail area. Women could therefore work in this sector, but
were more likely to be involved in ‘feminine’ areas, as was the case
with broker sector.
Whilst the meaning of nomenclatures within each sector changed
subtly over time, one sub sector of traders causes a real problem for
this analysis. The high number of victuallers, especially in Liverpool,
means that they cannot be ignored, even though they are far from
easy to categorise. Figure 3.9 shows that victuallers were numerous
in Liverpool throughout the period, and that there were also many
in Philadelphia by 1805.
These numbers are no doubt distorted by the high numbers of
victuallers who were providers of ‘fast-food’ and drink rather than
traditional victuallers. In both Liverpool and Philadelphia, high immi-
gration would have meant that there would have been many recent
The linkages were only possible because both addresses and occupations had been
changed. A positive linkage was where address and/or occupation were the same
in different years.
32
Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace, Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, and Business in
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), chapter ‘tea’;
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 161.
94 chapter three
450
413 421
400
350
308 303
300
Liv M
Number of Traders
Liv F
250 Phil M
224
Phil F
200
164
150 147
100
60
50
26
4 1 6
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.9: Victuallers: 1766–1805

arrivals, mariners, sailors and other visitors who needed catering for.
In the case of Philadelphia, the high immigration of the 1790s may
account for the sudden appearance of victuallers in 1805. However,
as women were distinctly absent from this sector in Philadelphia, it
is possible that many of these traders were in fact traditional ship
victuallers. It is likely that the diversification of the trading commu-
nity allowed some traders to take over the provision of ships from
merchants, who had provided this service beforehand. In both cities
there were many victuallers listed in the dock areas, or in the first
couple of streets back from the wharves, but there were also many
listed further back, away from the merchant houses.33
It is therefore impossible to say how many traders listed as vict-
uallers therefore qualify as traders under the definition used for this
study. It is this lack of clarity that has resulted in these traders being
33
OED; Duggan, “Industrialisation and the Development of Urban Business
Communities”; Smith, The “Lower Sort”, p. 43; Tuohy Ship’s Papers, Ingram 1784,
DTP.
dealt with separately here—although they are probably nearest to

the dealer category. It is difficult to say exactly what services were
being provided by this sector, and how many of either gender were
traders under the definition used here. There is no doubt that some
victuallers were very successful. Elizabeth Maddocks was a victualler
in the 1790s and died with an estate worth between £2–5,000.34
However, it is only really possible to say that victuallers were evi-
dent in both cities, and that women, in Liverpool at least, were
involved in all aspects.
Victualling may have provided many opportunities for women,
but the largest sector in which women definitely worked as traders
was shopkeeping as demonstrated in figure 3.10. This is also the
largest recorded sector apart from merchants, but there were no
doubt many many more that were unrecorded due to the small-scale
nature of many of these businesses. Shopkeeping included a wide
range of enterprises, both specialised and general, and the large
500
454
450
402
400
350
Liv M
Number of Traders
313
Liv F
300 Phil M
269
Phil F
250
207
200
144
150 128 128
103 100
100 84
68
42
50 31
4 3 11
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.10: Shopkeepers: 1766–1805

34
Will of Elizabeth Maddocks, 26 Jun 1796.
96 chapter three
numbers in Philadelphia was at least partly accounted for being, like

grocers, the obverse effect of a lack of lower-scale brokers and deal-
ers in that city. Furthermore, the very high numbers of shopkeepers
in Philadelphia in 1791 may be accounted for by many people enter-
ing the sector in the post-war clamour for trade. Shopkeepers were
hit hard by the problems of the 1780s, but the sector quickly recov-
ered encouraged by the sharp rise in population. Liverpool also
encountered a population surge between the 1770s and 1801. In
fact, Liverpool entrepreneurs were not able to keep up with demand
for new shops in this increasing urbanisation. They had a person to
shop ratio of 141:1, when the norm for the north of England was
69.7:1.35 Some of this demand was dealt with by the lesser brokers
and dealers.
As was noted in chapter two, shopkeeping covered a wide range
of specialist and more general shops. In Philadelphia, shopkeeping
was one area in which specialisation and diversification was definitely
occurring. In 1785, 83 per cent of all shopkeepers were listed by
the generic term ‘shopkeeper’. Some of this may have been due to
a peculiarity of nomenclature, especially as this was the first direc-
tory. However, by 1805, only 54 per cent termed themselves in this
simple way. Despite the population growth in Philadelphia, general
shopkeepers were in decline, compared to the growth of more spe-
cialist shops such as tobacconists and ironmongers. There were 325
general shopkeepers in 1805, compared to 422 in 1785. In contrast,
the growth in shops selling consumer durables is impressive, as shown
in table 3.5. By 1805 Philadelphia had looking-glass stores, hardware
stores, shoe stores, china stores, tobacconists, fancy silk and ribbon
stores, fruiterers and print and glass stores.
Table 3.5 also makes it clear that the trend regarding specialist
shops was exactly the opposite in Liverpool. Whilst no general shop-
keepers were listed in 1766, and only one in 1774, 60 per cent of
all shopkeepers were listed as such in 1805. Again, some of this may
be due to the peculiarity of the early directories, or a wider socio-
economic group entering themselves in the trade directories, but the
trend is clear. Specialist shopkeepers were increasing in real terms,
but not in the way that general shops were. This is not to say that
35
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 89.
Table 3.5: Specific Item Shops as a Percentage of all Shops: 1766–1805*

(n) % (n) %
1766 45 100.0 n/a n/a
1774 78 98.7 n/a n/a
1785/87 104 65.0 83 16.4
1791/96 160 55.0 129 35.0
1805 176 40.0 273 45.6
* Those that were not listed simply as ‘shopkeeper’ or ‘storekeeper’.
Liverpool did not have a wide range of specialist shops, there were
more than in Philadelphia in both 1785/87 and 1791/96. Demand
for consumer goods was equally high with Staffordshireware shops,
hardwaremen, booksellers, druggists, slopshops, stationers and music
shops all being listed consistently by 1796.
Whilst the number of women involved in the shopkeeping sector
appears impressive at first glance, close analysis demonstrates that
they were mostly working within a limited area—the small-scale and
less profitable general shopkeeping sub sector. Women in both cities
did work in the higher status specialist shops as tobacconists, iron-
mongers, booksellers, Staffordshireware and toy shops. However, as
a percentage of all female shopkeepers, those working as general
shopkeepers far outnumbered those working in specialist areas, as
shown in table 3.6. It was noted above that all shopkeepers were
listed as general shops in Philadelphia in 1785, so that year is an
anomaly, but the trend in 1791 and 1805 for women is quite clear.
Table 3.6: Women General Shopkeepers as a Percentage of all
Women Shopkeepers: 1766–1805*
Year Liverpool % Philadelphia %
1766 0.0 n/a
1774 9.0 n/a
1785/87 64.5 100.0
1791/96 83.0 74.0
1805 92.2 86.8

* Shopkeepers and Storekeepers
98 chapter three
Furthermore, many men also worked as general shopkeepers. In

1791/96 men accounted for 53 per cent of ‘shopkeepers’ or ‘store-
keepers’ in Liverpool and 69.2 per cent in Philadelphia. Many more
male shopkeepers worked as specialist shopkeepers compared to
women. Although the range and size of general shops could vary, a
closer look also tells us that in Philadelphia low-status huckster shops
grew in number, as did flour and feed stores.36 It would therefore
appear that the number of persons selling low quality and cheap
food to the poor increased, and that many of them were women.
There are many reasons why this was so. Access to capital would
have barred many women from higher status shops and many more
women would have found it hard to get the credit required as well.
At the same time, general shopkeeping, often run from the home,
fitted in well with other familial responsibilities. Last, though impor-
tantly, the women listed in the directories were most likely to be
spinsters and widows, the poorest sector of the community.
Itinerant dealers were the lowest socio-economic sector of traders
to be recorded in the directories. Not many of them were listed, but
this does not mean that we should ignore them. Many, if not most
itinerant dealers linked the city with the hinterland and would not
have considered an entry in the trade directories worthwhile. Others
may have found their personal networks more useful in a mobile
environment than entries into the directories. However, even the
most mobile traders would still have used the city shops and mer-
chants as suppliers, coming into town to purchase their stock, before
returning to the countryside. Still more itinerants worked within the
city, without a shop or stall, and so were itinerant in nature, if not
in terms of geographical space. The low-scale and mobile nature of
this sector is the reason for the few numbers entered in the trade
directory, as shown in figure 3.11.
Some itinerants may therefore have been ‘urban hawkers’ selling
goods such as pottery or wooden spoons. This is quite possible for
the case of Liverpool where pottery remained an important indus-
try throughout the eighteenth century, and many would have taken
such items for sale into the countryside as well. Such traders remained
36
Hucksters, as opposed to huckster shops, are included in the itinerant dealer
category. There were no huckster shops listed in the Liverpool directories, although
they were referred to in the newspapers.
50
45
40
35
Number of Traders
Liv M
30 Liv F
Phil M
25 Phil F
25
20
15
13
11
10 9 10 10
6
5 4 3
1 0 1
0
1766 1774 1785/87 1791/96 1805
Year
Figure 3.11: Itinerant Dealers: 1766–1805

important in pottery until at least 1770, although only one man was
listed as a mugman in Liverpool in 1766. In 1805, three were listed
as newsmen. It would appear that newsmen travelled quite long dis-
tances. Chester newspapers were distributed in Liverpool, as well as
North Shropshire and north-east Wales. Many Liverpool traders were
listed with chapman as a secondary occupation—where they were
often found advertised as bankrupts. These included Peter Trotter,
a woollen draper, dealer and chapman, held in Lancaster gaol, and
James Lowe, dealer and chapman, both in 1774.37
In Philadelphia, itinerant traders were listed as ragmen, travelling
stationers, tinkers or pedlars. The demand for English manufactured
goods was so high throughout British America that itinerant dealers
such as Samuel Hodgson must have been a common sight around
Oxford County before his bankruptcy in 1787. Many others in both
cities were listed as hucksters, which could involve the selling of any
small goods from a basket or backpack. Others may have taken food
37
Mitchell, “Development of Urban Retailing”, p. 261, Williamson’s Liverpool
Advertiser, 14 Oct 1774.
100 chapter three
that was no longer fresh enough to be sold in shops, and sold it on

to the very poor. A bruised apple would have been better than no
apple at all. Certainly hucksters in Liverpool purchased food such
as butter, eggs and fish from people at the markets for resale to the
poor. Some, as in London, might have gone out on to the road out-
side town to buy goods from those intending to sell their produce
in town. Cheap food must have been in demand in poor areas of
both cities and such traders would have provided an “essential link
in rapidly growing areas”.38
Itinerant traders therefore acted symbiotically with fixed-place shop-
keepers. It is worth noting that the only nomenclature by which
women were listed as in this sector was huckster—the term of abuse
towards such traders. Hucksters in Liverpool were certainly associ-
ated with regrating, and accused of selling at high prices on Saturdays.
Despite the important contribution that female traders in this area
made, we again see signs of hostility or ambivalence towards them.
It has been argued that itinerant traders were in decline in the eigh-
teenth century, but they survived in both towns and rural areas.
They were very adaptable and changed to suit their environment.39
Markets traders added another layer of distribution to the retail
sector, as well as fun and spectacle. They were not normally listed
in the directories and so we cannot estimate their quantitative con-
tribution. However, it is possible to gain some idea of their contri-
bution to daily life in the ports. Liverpool had various markets
supplementing the shops—especially for fresh goods brought in from
the hinterland. Derby Square was the principal market by 1775 and
the centre for provisions and vegetables, and there was a smaller
38
Breen, “Baubles of Britain”, passim; Lorna Weatherill, “The Business of
Middleman”, p. 67; Mitchell, “Development of Urban Retailing”, p. 269; The Liverpool
General Advertiser; or, the Commercial Register, 28 Nov 1766; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily
Advertiser, 30 Nov 1787; Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II, p. 49; Hinterland itin-
erants were also common enough in New England for urban shopkeepers to adver-
tise specifically that they sold to them. See Margaret Ellen Newell, From Dependency
to Independence: Economic Revolution in Colonial New England (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1998), p. 242.
39
The Liverpool General Advertiser; or, Commercial Register, 28 Nov 1766; Fontaine,
History of Pedlars, chapter seven; Maloney, River Towns, p. 209; there were many
urban itinerants in the nineteenth century, see John Benson, The Penny Capitalists:
A Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Entrepreneurs (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan,
1983), chapter ten and conclusion; Braudel, Wheels of Commerce, Vol. II, pp. 79–80.
general market at White Cross. There was a pig market at Preeson’s

Row, two fish markets, one at the upper end of Pool Lane and
Redcross Street and a covered fish market opened in 1792. Many
hucksters tried to use the markets to regrate goods (buy goods and
resell at increased prices nearby). The fish market in particular caused
problems in this regard, and the council tried to curtail this sort of
activity in 1766 and 1774. The potato market was in Castle Ditch
and in 1787 a covered ‘market’, perhaps much like the one in
Philadelphia, was opened and sold Manchester and Birmingham
goods.40
The covered market in Philadelphia was in fact the first and was
built in 1720, on High Street (later Market Street). This was mainly
used to sell dry goods such as those of W. Shute. He sold good tal-
low candles there in 1774. There was also a market on South Second
Street, and a variety of meat and vegetables were sold there. A fur-
ther market called ‘Hill Market’ was also on Market Street at which
fish was sold, especially by women. These markets were an impor-
tant part of daily life because ordinary women shopped daily. At the
same time, the markets were important to the sellers as well. Some
would travel into town in order to sell very small amounts, such as
a dozen eggs, a fowl, or half a quartern loaf. In Philadelphia, not
even heavy snow could stop the market, even if people had to bring
their goods to market on sledges.41
Another category not listed in the trade directories was smugglers
and those illegally removing stock from ships and dock areas to sell
to their friends, family and others. It is impossible to estimate the
number of merchants involved in the smuggling of tea, how many
captains used their privilege to import a little sugar on their own
account, or how many mariners brought in some pieces of silk or
tobacco from their voyage for sale in the back streets of Philadelphia
and Liverpool. We can only surmise that, along with the large num-
bers of wives who helped their husbands in the shop, even more
40
Brooke, Liverpool as it was, pp. 114–119; The Liverpool General Advertiser; or, the
Commercial Register, 28 Nov 1766; The Liverpool General Advertiser, 16 Nov 1774.
41
Billy G. Smith (ed.), Life in Early Philadelphia: Documents from the Revolutionary and
Early National Periods (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp.
23–26 (excerpt from James Mease, The Picture of Philadelphia, 1811); Pennsylvania Journal
and Weekly Advertiser, 16 Nov 1774; Warner, The Private City, p. 19; Wells, Wretched
Faces, pp. 31–32; Eliza to Jack, 3 Jan 1774, Eliza Farmer Letterbook 1774–1789, HSP.
102 chapter three
men and women were involved in petty and indeed illegal trading
than can be found in the sources. Perhaps George Powditch, a bank-
rupt Liverpool mariner had been engaged in this sort of activity
prior to his demise in 1787. In 1761 Philadelphia merchant Daniel
Clark complained that mariners and ships’ captains that sold goods
directly to shopkeepers and others were a nuisance. He moaned that
because they did not pay any freight (not always true) they could
undersell the merchants.42
This practice continued into the early nineteenth century. However,
merchants were not completely innocent either. Philadelphia mer-
chant Thomas Riche was not only involved in illegal trade with the
West Indies, he also attempted to supply the French colonies with
foodstuffs as well. He got his comeuppance, as the French bills of
exchange were not honoured. David Tuohy turned down a suspi-
cious opportunity concerning beef barrels in 1775, but only because
he thought he would get caught. Mr Onslow, the Surveyor at
Liverpool, kept the British Treasury informed of illegal activity in
Liverpool and the Isle of Man, a stopping off point. Large quanti-
ties of tea were landed on the Isle of Man from a Dutch Vessel in
1764 for example, some of it no doubt bound for Liverpool. Some
resorted to stealing in order to have goods to sell. Thomas Jones
was caught and condemned at the Assizes Court in Lancaster,
England, for having stolen various satins and other textiles from
P. Orton’s shop.43
The scale of this irregular trading was certainly perceived to be
a threat by the trading elite. In Liverpool, the American Chamber
of Commerce colluded with the courts to clamp down on the sale
and receipt of ‘stolen’ goods from ships. There were also efforts to
invoke a formal dock police service in the early nineteenth century.
The potential scale of illegal activity at the end of the eighteenth
century is tantalising. The Liverpool Customs Officer wrote to the
Dock Committee in 1814 that a “regular system of plunder [was]
42
Gore’s General Advertiser, 9 May 1805; Clark to Dromgoole, 16 Oct 1761, Daniel
Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763, HSP.
43
Account of Captain Kennan, Herculaneum Potteries Ledger 1806–1817,
f. 229, LivRO; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 146–147; Tuohy to James O’Brien,
10 Sep 1775, Letters from David Tuohy, DTP; Notes from Mr Onslow to the
Treasury, 1 May 1764, 16 Dec 1766, NA; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 2 Apl
1787.
now carried on upon the Dock quays . . . A gang consisting princi-

pally of women & in number from forty to fifty are in constant
attendance . . . Some of these Women I have known for fifteen of
sixteen years and during that time, thieving on the quays has been
their sole occupation”.44 The numbers of lesser traders considered
here, male and female, are therefore only the tip of the iceberg.
Wholesale merchants . . . grocers . . . market women45
The trade directories as a source are not without problems. However,

they have facilitated a detailed analysis of the trading communities
of Liverpool and Philadelphia. Importantly, they have highlighted
the vital and integrated role played by lesser traders, especially women.
The burgeoning demand for food and consumer goods spurred by
urbanisation “generated forums in which opportunities existed for
countless numbers of people to create an entrepreneurial function”.46
The nature of the trade directories mean that the numbers of lesser
traders presented here must be regarded as an absolute minimum;
but this only serves to make the contribution of women all the more
remarkable.
It is quite clear that there were marked differences in the struc-
ture of the trading communities of Liverpool and Philadelphia. Most
noticeable was the absence of a sizeable middleman sector such as
brokers, warehouse keepers and dealers in the latter city. The roles these
sectors performed in Liverpool were carried out by the dominant
sectors of merchants, grocers and shopkeepers in Philadelphia. This
was due to the wider structure of the economy. Liverpool’s trading
community collected, exported, imported, re-exported and redistributed
44
Although it is not really possible to estimate the amount of tea smuggled into
Britain, it was large enough that after the commutation act of 1784 was passed,
the East India Company could not estimate the size of the true demand for tea.
Mui and Mui, “The Commutation Act” p. 235; American Chamber of Commerce
Minute Book 1801–1908, p. 61, LivRO; Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, Dock
Police, Miscellaneous Box, MMM. My thanks to Rachel Mulhearn for this last ref-
erence. For more on David Tuohy see chapter seven, pp. 226–230.
45
Phillip Lopate (ed.), Writing a Literary Anthology: New York (New York: The Library
of America, 1998), p. 10. My thanks to Graeme Milne for pointing out this refer-
ence to me.
46
Wells, Wretched Faces, p. 31.
104 chapter three
a far wider range of goods than did Philadelphia’s. As the Liverpool

hinterland had a far wider range of manufactures, and indeed had
a more ‘global’ economy, the degree of specialisation may be part
of a more mature, diversified economy. It took time for Philadelphia
to catch up after Independence, but these changes were highlighted
by signs of diversity in 1805.
Differences produced as part of the colonial economy were exac-
erbated by other factors in Philadelphia. Access to wealth appeared
more restricted. They city’s quick growth may have meant that wealth
stayed firmly in the hands of a small group of elite families, many
of whom were merchants. This would have given a few merchants
in Philadelphia even more control over commercial activity than they
had simply by virtue of being importers and exporters as a group.
Networks and know-how may also have been a factor. Whilst some
Philadelphia merchants had very good contacts with the hinterlands
of Philadelphia, and indeed Liverpool, many did not. Partly this may
have simply been due to life cycle, as many merchants were immi-
grants. Conversely, migrants who had developed good contacts in
England before they migrated to Philadelphia would have had good
access to information. At the same time, Liverpool was an older
town, if not port, and trading and ‘class’ distinctions may have had
more time to develop. Lesser traders may also have simply been in
a better position to compete for local manufactures, capital, credit,
and passed-on knowledge.47
These factors, in conjunction with law and social mores, had a
profound effect on the ability of women to participate in commercial
entrepreneurship. Options such as general shopkeeping and dual
occupations were ways in which women could use “autonomous sur-
vival strategies” to cope with an unstable economy and ambiguous,
and sometimes hostile, social attitudes towards their inclusion within
the formal economy.48 The large number of women discussed here,
despite under representation and various disabilities, is a testament
to their ability to overcome. This bias in entrepreneurial opportu-
47
These themes are picked up in more detail throughout the following chapters
and in Sheryllynne Haggerty, “The Structure of the Philadelphia Trading Community
on the Transition from Colony to State”, BH, 48,2 (2006).
48
Hilary McD Beckles, “White Women and Slavery in the Caribbean”, HW,
36 (1993), 66–82.
nities available for single women, should not however, belittle their
contribution to the economy as a whole. Small general shops pro-
vided vital access to goods and indeed credit for those goods to the
working masses and those on the margins of survival. Petty shop-
keeping grew hand in hand with urbanisation and “such shops per-
formed indispensable services without which a take-off into sustained
growth would hardly have been possible”.49 As so many of the gen-
eral shopkeepers were women, they were making an enormous con-
tribution to the economy.
Both Liverpool and Philadelphia were buffeted by growing and
migrant populations, financial crises and wars; but their trading
communities not only survived, they thrived. There were differences
in structure between them, although by the end of the period, Phila-
delphia’s community was starting to show signs of increasing diver-
sity as efforts to vary the economy were made after Independence.
This was a slow and ongoing process however, and the structure of
Philadelphia’s trading community remained simple until at least 1805.
This is not to say however, that the way in which that community
functioned was unsophisticated. A commercial economy is not nec-
essarily a simple one, neither was commercial capitalism simply a
precursor to industrial capitalism.50 In fact, the networks of people,
credit and distribution of goods were very complicated and the
Philadelphia trading community worked in much the same way and
closely in tandem with the Liverpool trading community. The fol-
lowing chapters will demonstrate that although Philadelphia and
Liverpool may have been different in structure, they were interde-
pendent and indeed were more part of one trans-Atlantic trading
community than two separate and competing ones.
49
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, pp. 289, 6.
50
Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce, Vol. III, p. 601.
PART TWO
NETWORKS
CHAPTER FOUR
PEOPLE, TRUST AND INFORMATION
It wou’d be of a great consequence to your correspondents,

were you to clap down the day of the month at the
head of your letter
John Perhouse to James Perhouse, 30 Jun 1801
Historians have adopted the concept of networks within their work

for some time now. Usually these are understood to be predomi-
nately about people, including family, friends and associates with
geographic, religious or ethnic ties. Furthermore, these networks are
usually presented as a positive or innate good.1 This stress on fam-
ily, religious and ethnic links, I would argue, is a naive interpreta-
tion of how people worked together in the eighteenth century. In
an increasingly impersonal world, in which trade was already global,
there was no way that traders could know everyone that they dealt
with, be assured of their nationality, religious or ethnic affiliation,
or indeed know of everyone in their distribution chain. Indeed, some
historians have noted this ‘modernisation’ of networks and noted that
“to succeed, a firm had to move well beyond the base of family,
kin, and ethnic relations”. Indeed, business connections were increas-
ingly ruled by simple merchant practice and the need to acquire a
partner with the correct capital or knowledge base. Many more sim-
ply worked their way up the hard way.2
Furthermore, familial networks could often be a burden rather
than a help; being a brother or nephew of a successful trader did
1
See for example; Frederick B. Tolles, Quakers and the Atlantic Culture (New York:
MacMillan, 1960); Ann Prior and Maurice Kirby, “The Society of friends and the
Family Firm”, BH, 35,4 (1993), 66–85; Rose, “The Family Firm”; Peter Mathias,
“Risk, Credit and Kinship in Early Modern Enterprise”, in McCusker and Morgan,
The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, pp. 15–35; Mauro, “Merchant Communities”;
Mentz, “The Commercial Culture of the Armenian Merchant”.
2
David Hancock, “Self-Organized Complexity and the Emergence of an Atlantic
Market Economy, 1651–1815: The Case of Madeira”, in Coclanis, The Atlantic
Economy, pp. 30–71, p. 35; Steele, The English Atlantic, p. 216; Doerflinger, A Vigorous
Spirit, pp. 49–52.
110 chapter four
not miraculously imbibe them with an entrepreneurial spirit or good

business sense. John Perhouse in the quote above, a merchant in
Philadelphia at the turn of the nineteenth century, was worried about
who his brother back in England might place his trust in. Andrew
Clow’s letters to his co-religionist partner in post-revolutionary
Philadelphia are full of remonstrances concerning bad decisions.
Samuel Rainford in Kingston, Jamaica, had an alcoholic brother in
Liverpool who must have been a constant worry to his reputation
during the latter part of the eighteenth century.3 This is not to say
that familial, religious and ethnic ties were not important, but that
their use in day-to-day reality has been over stressed. There is no
doubt that familial capital and introductions were important at the
start of a trader’s career, or indeed at times of crisis—but traders
constantly dealt with people outside of these circles. Many potential
traders did not have families who could invest in their future, oth-
ers might have had the money but not the contacts, and many more,
especially at the lower end of the socio-economic scale may have
entered trade through some chance meeting or occurrence. As will
be demonstrated below however, once in trade, these connections
became less and less important because networks of people worked
in different ways and used different forms of communication, some-
times at a very impersonal level.
This chapter moves beyond the rather unsophisticated notion of
networks in the present historical literature and looks at networks of
people as they functioned within the day-to-day life of traders.
Furthermore, this chapter is not so much about networks of people
per se, but the different ways in which people within networks used
the various channels or opportunities for information open to them
in order to conduct their businesses. It appears amusing and rather
silly that James Perhouse was told off by his brother for not having
dated his letters, but this hides a very serious aspect to the discus-
sion of networks here. Information itself was important—but it also
had to be correct and timely. Out-of-date information was useless.
The thoughtless error by James Perhouse of not dating his letter
meant that John in Philadelphia could not gauge the usefulness of
the information contained within it. This would have had serious
3
John to James Perhouse, 30 Jun 1801, John Perhouse Journal 1800–1838; Folder
March–April 1788, Letters from Clow to Cay, passim, SGC; Samuel Rainford Papers,
ECC, LRO.
people, trust and information 111
consequences if important business decisions were to be based upon

that information.
Good information gave a trader a competitive advantage, both in
opening opportunities up in the first place, and by ensuring that
costs were kept to a minimum. These costs were of two types. First
there were the costs of gaining information in the first place, or
‘information costs’. These included simple things such as time spent
at the exchange or coffee house, postage costs and time writing let-
ters—basically the opportunity cost of gaining information before
entering a deal or transaction. They are the costs involved in “mon-
itoring competitors, in forecasting demand, and in the appraisal of
investment decision”. Second, there were the costs of enforcing deals
and transactions that went wrong—or ‘transaction costs’. These might
include going to court to sue a customer that would not pay, or
insurance premiums paid in case of disaster. “They are the costs
involved in capturing the gains from trade”.4 Correct and timely
information was therefore important in reducing information costs—
and in turn transaction costs as well. In this way traders could be
more efficient and profitable.
Trust was essential to the way in which this information was trans-
ferred, received and accepted. The importance of information meant
that traders required a trusted source. At the very broad level peo-
ple had to trust the system in general. With printed information such
as newspapers and Lloyd’s list, there was an institutional level of
trust. People trusted the men at Lloyd’s and editors of newspapers
to print news to the best of their knowledge and ability. At the more
personal level traders placed trust in their correspondents—that they
would send correct information, and importantly, that agents and
factors would make the right decisions when transacting business on
their behalf.5 Choosing the right business partner, factor or agent to
work on your behalf was an important decision—especially for elite
merchants working at long distances, both across and around the
4
Sometimes information costs were transaction costs when they were to combat
mistrust rather than being strategy based. Mark Casson, “Institutional Economics
and Business History”, BH, 39,4, Special Issue on Institutions and the Evolution of
Modern Business (1997), 151–171, pp. 151–152; Douglass C. North, “Transaction
Costs in History”, JEEH, 14,3 (1985), 557–576, p. 558.
5
A good introduction to the literature on trust and neo-institutional economics
is John Humphrey and Hubert Schmitz, Trust and Economic Development (Institute of
Development Studies Discussion Paper, 255, Aug 1996).
112 chapter four
Atlantic. Conflict could occur for example if an agent in Philadelphia

handling goods for a Liverpool merchant sold quickly in order to
ensure his commission, when if he had waited a while the price
might have risen and ensured more profit for the merchant in
Liverpool. A supercargo on a Philadelphia ship might equally sell
timber to his friends in Liverpool, when in fact another firm might
have paid slightly more.
Sometimes bad choices might be made simply due to poor judge-
ment or risk aversion—many traders were not ‘rational’ profit max-
imisers; conversely some agents might act malevolently, due to personal
greed. The merchant working at a distance was, and still is, there-
fore at risk of these ‘moral hazards’ or ‘adverse selections’ and so
trust in choices other people made, as well as the information pro-
vided, was extremely important.6 Equally, further down the chain,
shopkeepers and itinerant dealers were also reliant upon wholesalers,
grocers and larger shopkeepers to provide them with good mer-
chandise, to provide credit, and to speak well of them to others—
to guard their reputation. In turn, those suppliers had to trust that
their customers at the local and regional level would pay them on
time with barter, cash or good bills of exchange.
The general rise in population, trade, and therefore the number
of traders, meant that it was impossible to know, let alone know of,
everyone in your distribution chain. Therefore it was not always pos-
sible to ensure the trustworthiness of those people with whom a par-
ticular trader dealt. To counteract this, there were various social
constraints on the activities of traders which supported a level of
generalised trust in the wider system of trade.7 The reputation or
creditability of a trader was essential in gaining credit. As credit was
the backbone of almost all transactions, it was important to have
access to it. Therefore, in the most part, traders adhered to the busi-
6
For more on moral hazard, adverse selection and the use of agents see Norman
Strong and Michael Waterson, “Principals, Agents and Information”, in Roger Clark
and Tony McGuiness (eds.), The Economics of the Firm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd,
1987), pp. 18–41.
7
Lynne G. Zucker, “Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic
Structure, 1840–1920”, ROB, 8 (1986), 53–111; Susan P. Shapiro, “The Social
Control of Impersonal Trust”, AJS, 93,3 (1987), 623–658; Mari Sako, Prices, Quality
and Trust: Inter-firm Relations in Britain and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
ness norms of the time because they faced social and professional
exclusion if they acted otherwise. These included keeping regular
hours at the exchange, paying within an accepted period of time,
working diligently, not getting drunk (at least too often), and per-
haps most importantly—owning up when you were in financial
difficulty. If these norms failed there were institutional back-ups such
as small claims courts, debtors’ prisons, Courts of Chancery and
assignees in insolvency and bankruptcy cases. Issues such as these
are dealt with in detail in the next chapter, but it was preferable to
avoid such consequences of the failure of trust, as they were expen-
sive in terms of time and money and interrupted normal trading
activity.
Networks of people were therefore very important because they
provided information about potential business options and trading
partners, but these networks themselves had to be trusted. Often it
was more difficult to work out what the options were than to weigh
them up because the transference of information was relatively slow
compared to today’s standards. This is what made having the right
access to reliable and timely information so important—even down
to writing the date at the top of a letter.
Four main means of communication will be considered: first, printed
information such as newspapers were vital for keeping up to date
with local, regional, national and international information; second,
letters were essential for directing business with agents, partners, sup-
pliers and customers of a business, and for recording decisions; third,
local informal and formal organisations such as the exchange, coffee
houses or clubs were forums to hear and overhear gossip about
friends and competitors; fourth; family, friends and religious contacts
were often used as a first contact point for information, advice, cap-
ital, credit and if needs be, support. Together, these various means
of communication ensured that information was shared at the local,
regional and trans-Atlantic level. Sometimes this information was at
the personal and first-hand level, at others it was second- or even
third-hand gossip, at other times again it was impersonal informa-
tion meant for many to access. Whole trading communities might
communicate with other trading communities, such as in the run up
to the War of Independence. In this way people built up relationships,
learnt to trust one another, and transferred information. This basic
network of people was the foundation stone for networks of credit,
which would never have functioned without the trust engendered by
114 chapter four
the networks of people. These in turn facilitated the networks of

goods which held the Atlantic world together.
The Printed Word
The printed word was an essential source of information at the local,

regional and trans-Atlantic level. It came in various forms, such as
trade directories—already discussed in detail, but also broadsheets,
books, magazines, flyers and newspapers. Some of these, such as
broadsheets and flyers were predominately distributed at the local
level, however, books and newspapers were distributed regionally and
internationally. The most important of these for our traders were
the newspapers. Many traders had books as well—elite merchants
often had a whole library consisting of items such as ‘how-to’ guides,
reference works, town histories and literary works. However, from a
trade point of view, newspapers were essential. Included in this area
of newspapers would be marine lists, bills of entry and price-current
listings.8 However, the most concise repository for a wide range of
trading and shipping information was the local newspapers, and this
section will therefore concentrate on them.
The newspapers were of use to traders of all socio-economic stand-
ing. A reflection of this is the rise in newspapers throughout the
Atlantic world in the eighteenth century. Boston had its own news-
paper as early as 1704, New York first had its own newspaper in
1725, and Bristol had newspapers from the late seventeenth century
onwards. Liverpool’s first lasting newspaper was established in 1756.
Set up by Robert Williamson, Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser was a
weekly publication. It was followed by the Liverpool Chronicle and Marine
Gazetteer in 1759[?] and the Liverpool General Advertiser in 1765. Phila-
delphia had its own newspaper from 1719 and much of the early
press material was political. However, by the time that the Pennsylvania
Journal and Weekly Advertiser was published in 1767, the concerns of
Philadelphians were more encompassing. The newspapers of both
cities conformed to the standard format of court and political news
followed by trade and shipping information. There were a few adverts
8
John J. McCusker, European Bills of Entry and Marine Lists: Early Commercial
Publications and the Origins of the Business Press (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University
Library, 1985); ibid., “The Demise of Distance”.
for non-trader items as well, but the trade section took up the largest
proportion of the text. Newspapers quickly became vital nodes of
communication in, around and between both cities.9
For traders, the newspapers contained a wide variety of vital infor-
mation: incoming and outgoing vessels and other shipping news; what
was imported on those vessels and by whom; advertisements for
traders at various levels; notifications of auctions; notifications of
insolvents and bankrupts; the formation and end of partnerships; and
social and political news, especially concerning the many wars of the
eighteenth century. They were also relatively cheap, and available
to all levels of society. Stamp Duty did add to the cost of newspa-
pers of course. The cost of a newspaper in Liverpool in 1796 was
4d, to which duty in both England and America would have been
added. Of course some traders would not have been able to read
and write. However, newspapers were often read out publicly, espe-
cially at taverns, inns and coffee houses. These spaces were not only
useful for political discourse. Many adverts placed in the newspapers
concerned the sales of shopkeepers and smaller dealers, and many
lesser traders had their bankruptcies listed there, just as elite mer-
chants did.10
Perhaps one of the most useful functions of the newspapers, from
a trader’s point of view, was the listing of incoming and outgoing
shipping. In the Liverpool newspapers, the shipping column listed
the vessel, importing merchant and the amounts of the various com-
modities imported on each vessel. This was the case for coastal ship-
ping as well. In Philadelphia, the equivalent listing only noted the
ship and last port. Very rarely were the goods imported given, and
never the amounts imported. However, traders could glean what
commodities had been imported on each ship by reading the sub-
sequent adverts of merchants and other traders, which usually men-
tioned the name of the vessel imported on and where it had come
9
Nash, The Urban Crucible, pp. 3, 183, 245; in 1757 the duty on all newspapers
in England was one penny. Liverpool had a newspaper in 1712, but it only lasted
for two years. J.R. Harris, and Bruce L. Anderson, “The Founding of an Eighteenth-
Century Newspaper: The Partnership Agreement of Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser”,
THSLC, 116 (1965), 229–234; on the Pennsylvania Gazette see Charles E. Clark and
Charles Wetherell, “The Measure of Maturity: The Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728–1765”,
WMQ , 3rd Ser., 46,4 (1989), 279–303; Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United
States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad (2nd ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,
1989), p. 15.
10
Thompson, Rum Punch, chapter four.
116 chapter four
from. Often, the brokers and wholesalers who dealt in these goods
would also advertise. Furthermore, traders would send out handbills
advertising their wares. For example, William Coats of Philadelphia
put out a handbill advertising that his store, at the sign of the Sugar
Loaf, sold West India rum, Tenerife wines, tea, spices etc.11 Therefore,
despite the lesser detail in Philadelphia, traders in both ports could
follow the distribution of incoming goods and know who to approach
should they wish to purchase them.
The prices of goods were often listed in newspapers as well, but
if anyone was in doubt about how much they should be paying
wholesale for these goods, price-currents were available. These were
one-off sheets distributed locally and around the Atlantic to other
ports so that associates on the other side of the ocean were aware
of the state of the markets. Some gave very detailed instructions
regarding the state of the markets such as that sent by Hobson and
Bolton of Liverpool to Daniel Fisher in New York in 1810. Many
price-current listings were also reprinted in the local newspapers, and
it is most likely that these figures were wholesale prices “which con-
temporary merchants . . . acted upon”. Often these listings were repro-
duced in the newspapers. For example, the wholesale price for
common flour in Philadelphia in October 1787 ranged from 30–31s.
a barrel, whilst people could expect to pay 22d. for a bushel of
Liverpool salt. As newspapers and the various price-current listings
were sent across the Atlantic merchants could kept up to date with
overseas prices quite well. This was supplemented by individual mer-
chants writing to one another with similar and even more up-to-
date information. This was vitally important in periods of crisis.
These would include wars of course, which always affected distrib-
ution patterns, but also in times of bad harvest or credit crises when
flour prices might be pushed up abnormally, or dry goods prices
would fall with a lack of demand. This would often lead to mer-
chants withholding goods until the price reached its peak or con-
versely rose out of the trough.12 Latest price information was therefore
11
Handbill of William Coats, “William Coats takes this method”, LCP.
12
Hobson and Bolton’s Handbill, 1810, LCP; Jacob M. Price, “Notes on Some
London Price-Currents, 1667–1715”, EcHR, 2nd Ser., 7,2 (1954–5), 240–250,
p. 240; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 8 Oct 1787, 1 Oct 1787; Anne Bezanson,
“Inflation and Controls, Pennsylvania, 1774–1779”, JEH, 8, Issue Supplement: The
Tasks of Economic History (1948), 1–20; a good example of a price-current listing
very important, as well as news of which goods were being imported

by whom.
Other vital information—especially for those with goods on board,
were the listings of vessels ‘clearing’ or leaving the port. Merchants
knew the estimated times of travel to the stated destination and so
would have a rough of idea of when their goods would reach port.
Those vessels that completed their journeys in quick times were often
noted. For example the Philadelphia newspapers noted that the Rose,
Dysart master, had “arrived at Liverpool, [and] has made a remark-
able short voyage, being but eleven weeks and five days going from
Londonderry to Philadelphia, and thence back to Liverpool”. In this
way traders could gauge whether their goods would arrive at an
overstocked market, which would occur if the vessel had been delayed
and left late. The Lydia, Thomas Dean master, sailed from Liverpool
to Philadelphia on 19 August 1774, and took about eight weeks to
complete the journey. James Loughead advertised the cargo for sale
in Philadelphia by 19 October 1774. Textiles of various kinds were
included in the cargo, and Loughead was offering them for sale at
his vendue store. The Lydia’s ‘husband’, that is the merchant in
charge of her administration in Philadelphia was efficient, as the
Lydia had cleared the port of Philadelphia by 23 November 1774,
bound back for Liverpool. She probably arrived back in Liverpool
at much the same time as she had done in 1774, early January, and
with much the same cargo of flour, wheat, apples and deer skins.
As Rawlinson and Chorley were the main consignees of the Lydias’
cargo in Liverpool, they were mostly likely the agents or husbands
for her. This does not necessarily mean that they were importing
the goods ‘at their own risk’.13 Many agents—such as William Rathbone
IV of Liverpool acted mostly on commission, arranging the ship-
ment of goods for third parties.
Other shipping news was second hand. Vessels would meet other
vessels on the sailing routes and talk to one another—thereby exchang-
ing the latest news and gossip, which was later printed in the news-
papers. For example, in 1787, the ship Hall, travelling to Philadelphia
can be seen at Lowe v Cohen, PRO. Note that even on Independence, account-
ing in America was mostly continued in sterling because of the predominance of
British imports.
13
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 1 Oct 1767, 19 Oct 1774, 23 Nov
1774; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 26 Aug 1774, 14 Jan 1774, 1 Jul 1774.
118 chapter four
from Liverpool was reported as having been spoken to by the Lion

of Bristol on 6 November.14 Her owners at least knew she was still
afloat, if not yet arrived at her destination. Any news that would
promote peace of mind was gratefully received.
Of course the newspapers were not just used by elite merchants
concerning the import and export of goods. They were used by a
wide range of retailers, including women. Earlier in the eighteenth
century retailers such as Hannah Dubre sold seeds in the Northern
Liberties at the northern edge of Philadelphia. She advertised that
she had “A Choice assortment of garden seed’s of this year’s growth
where merchants and others may be supplied at a very reasonable
rate”. By 1805, when women had a few more opportunities for retail
in Philadelphia, Rebecca Taylor advertised her store at 87 North
Second Street. She had for sale “a general assortment of fancy goods
of the latest importations, which will be disposed of wholesale and
retail . . . [the] Latest fashion ladies elastic silk turbans . . . kid
gloves . . . ladies pocket books” and so on. Adverts by women such
as those were above were quite common—especially later in the
period, but many also specifically advertised that they were contin-
uing their husband’s business. For example, Mrs B. Sharp was the
widow of Mathias. She continued the tea dealing and perfumery
business with her daughter in Pool Lane, Liverpool, perhaps on her
own account, and, or, with the intention of passing the business on
to her daughter.
Other common advertisers in the newspapers were brokers and
auctioneers. Despite the fact there were far less brokers in Philadelphia,
they did use the press. In 1796 Joseph Howell and John Lawrence
noted that they had “gone into partnership and opened a brokers
office, to sell bank stock, securities of the govt, canal and turnpike
companies, bills of exchange, real estate officers and soldiers land
warrants etc.”. Adverts for auctions were also common in both cities.
In this way traders were aware of sales of reduced-cost items (often
because they were damaged in some way), as well as, for example,
ships or timber that was to be sold.15 As will be demonstrated in
14
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 17 Dec 1787. For more on William Rathbone
IV, see chapter seven, pp. 230–234.
15
The Pennsylvania Gazette, 31 Dec 1754; Relf ’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser,
4 Nov 1805; Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 26 Dec 1796; Philadelphia
Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1796.
chapter six, goods were distributed through a wide variety of avenues—

auctions were one way in which lesser traders could access many
goods. Adverts such as these facilitated the tracing of the distribu-
tion of goods throughout the distribution chain by lesser traders (and
historians) and helped them to gain access to these goods for fur-
ther distribution.
It has been argued that reliance on family and religious networks
was declining. One consequence of this was that sometimes people
had money to invest, or vice versa, wanted more investment, but did
not have the prerequisite networks through which investment needs
could be matched. Professionals such as attorneys were sometimes
used in order to match funds required and offered—this was often
the case in Liverpool for example. However, occasionally these chan-
nels also failed. When this occurred people simply placed adverts in
the newspapers. In Philadelphia for example, an advert stated that
“a single, active man, of good character, who can advance £500
will be taken into Partnership in as profitable business as any in the
city”. Similarly, in Liverpool, a gentleman who wished to settle in
that port had “1000l to 2000l [guineas] to enter. A ready money
business would be preferred”.16 Note that this man was already aware
of the dangers of credit.
People who wanted to enter trade, but did not have the means
to invest in it also gained employment in this manner—by working
up the hard way. One man who described himself as a gentleman,
but obviously without the means to support himself as one, adver-
tised that he had been actively engaged in Southern ports, and wished
to engage as a supercargo. On the other hand, a Liverpool mer-
chant advertised for “a boy about 14 or 15 years of age, to attend
in a Counting-House, who can write a tolerable hand and who knows
something of accounts”. The situation was the same in Philadelphia,
where a young man wanting a situation advertised himself as “A
Young Man Who was bred to the grocery business, can write a good
hand, understands book-keeping”.17 These young men had the skills,
but not the people networks, capital or credit to set up on their own
account.
16
Gore’s General Advertiser, 17 Jan 1805.
17
Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 18 Jul 1796; Philadelphia Gazette
and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1796.
120 chapter four
The newspapers were also important on the dissolution of busi-

nesses. Not only was it important to let other traders know your
current situation, but the end of partnerships also meant that debts
needed to be collected and creditors paid. Robert Stewart and James
Scott of Liverpool advertised that their partnership was to be dis-
solved in January 1805 by mutual consent. All claims on the part-
nership were to be produced at their counting house at 18 Paradise
Street. Montgomery and Caldwell of Philadelphia dissolved their
partnership in 1787, and made a similar request for people to send
in their payments or accounts. Other traders did not end their busi-
nesses through choice, but their demise was also recorded in the
newspapers. George Meade of Philadelphia is a good example of
someone who was unsuccessful in business, but was also constrained
by and conformed to, the common business culture of the period.
He announced in advance that his business was failing. In this way
he prevented the situation getting even worse and the debts he owed
becoming even larger. Meade first invited those indebted to him to
meet him in the City Tavern (one of the merchants’ haunts) in
October 1796, presumably in order to persuade them to pay up as
soon as possible. A few days later he asked his creditors to meet
him at the same place on business of importance. The fact that he
advertised his assignees, George Latimer, William Bell and Peter
Blight made it obvious that he was insolvent. However, he was try-
ing to make it clear that he meant to do “strict justice” as he put
it—by which he meant he would sort everything out as best he could
to everyone’s satisfaction. In this way he could preserve his reputa-
tion and possibly be allowed to continue in business afresh, despite
the fact that he apparently had to sell his house to cover his debts.18
All this could be gleaned from just three adverts—demonstrating
how useful the newspapers were.
Finally, but by no means least—newspapers were used for the dis-
semination of a wide range of trade-related and political informa-
tion. This included a lot of day-to-day practical information such as
moving premises, or opening or closing shops. Other examples are
the coaching and postal services. The Liverpool and Manchester
coaches sent their ‘flying machines’ to London every Monday and
18
Gore’s General Advertiser, 10 Jan 1805; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 13
Oct 1787; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 17 Oct 1796, 20 Oct 1796,
11 Nov 1796.
Friday—taking three days each way in 1774. By 1796 it cost 5s. 6d.
to go to London Bridge if you travelled inside the coach, and 3s. if
you could bear the cold and travel outside. The coaches also ran
from Liverpool to Preston (2s. 6d./1s. 6d.), Warrington (5s. 0d./3s.
0d.) and Manchester (10s. 6d./6s. 0d.). In the same year in Philadelphia
a new coach, or stage, the “new line endeavour” was set up in
addition to the three existing ones: the ‘Industry’ left from George
Lesher’s Inn at 11pm; the ‘Diligence’ from the George Inn at 8am,
and the Mail coach left the Indian Queen Tavern stage office at
2pm on various days. All went to New York, highlighting the impor-
tant ties with that city, and the need for several services to cope
with demand. The ‘Endeavour’ started at 3pm on 11 September.
There were also a variety of personal advertisements concerning run-
away slaves, men who did not want to be responsible for their wives’
debts, outbreaks of disease such as yellow fever, and reports on the
quarter sessions.19
Political and military news was also of interest, whether national
or international, because both usually affected trade in some way.
War increased the likelihood of ships being taken by the enemy and
interrupted the supply and demand of markets. In terms of our trans-
Atlantic trading community, in times of political stress, newspapers
could be used to foster specific relationships and to support one
another from afar. For example, at the regional level, the activities
in Boston concerning the ‘tea-party’ were reported in Philadelphia
in order to drum up support for these actions, as well as to criticise
and bully those that would not conform and continued to import
tea. Mercantile interest groups also used the newspapers to encour-
age or declare support for merchants on the other side of the Atlantic,
highlighting their interdependence. A letter entitled “To the Merchants
in great Britain trading to America” and signed “Ratio” had been
printed in an English newspaper, but was in turn also reprinted in
Philadelphia in 1769. Another letter was reprinted in 1767 from
the London Gazette which had commented that taxing the Americans
was against the British Parliament. Similarly, a statement signed
19
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 2 Nov 1774; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily
Advertiser, 4 Oct 1787; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 10 Oct 1766; Billinge’s Liverpool
Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 1 Aug 1796, 21 Mar 1796, 14 Sep 1796; Philadelphia
Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 1 Oct 1796; Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser,
6 Jul 1774; Relf ’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 24 Oct 1787.
122 chapter four
“Impartialis” was printed in the Liverpool newspapers, supporting

the argument that trade with the colonies was more beneficial than
taxing them. Another letter to the printer was in particular refer-
ence to the Stamp Act, arguing that the American colonists had
been taxed unrepresented and unheard, signed “A Friend to my
Country”.20 These letters may have originated on either side of the
Atlantic, as merchants on both sides were more interested in con-
tinuing to make money than in making a stand over taxation. The
printed word also demonstrates a level of interdependence that was
also understood and appreciated by contemporaries.
Newspapers were therefore invaluable in making available a wide
range of information. It was often at an impersonal level, but was
no less important because of that. From shipping to distribution,
from the formation of partnerships to insolvency, from post to pol-
itics, the newspapers helped hold together the trading communities
at the local, regional and trans-Atlantic level.
The Written Word
The written word, like the printed word, was also used for trans-
mitting information across long distances; but it was of course, often
of a more personal nature, in that each correspondent was address-
ing only one other correspondent. Mostly these people already knew
each other, but often people introduced themselves to another per-
son and at other times they were introduced by a third party.
Contemporaries placed great importance on the written word, both
explicitly and implicitly. Letters were seen as an important way in
which traders projected themselves or their business, but also for giv-
ing, receiving and recording correct and timely information.
Extreme care was required in correspondence wrote one advisor—
as people will judge a trader on his letters. In a memorandum writ-
ten for staff by a London firm, Herries and Co. in 1766, instructions
were given that letters consulted should be replaced carefully and
that “no loose papers were to remain on the Desks, lest they be mis-
20
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 23 Jul 1774, 12 Jan 1774; Pennsylvania
Gazette, 18 May 1769, 4 Jun 1767; Williamson’s General Advertiser, 7 Feb 1766; Liverpool
General Advertiser, 24 Jan 1766.
laid”. All letters were to be marked with the number of pages and
copied and marked by the copiers. Detailed instructions were given
about the tasks to be carried out each morning and afternoon depend-
ing on the day. The very fact that a partner in this merchant firm
thought it necessary to write such detailed instructions demonstrates
the importance attached to information and the smooth running of
the business. Herries and Co., in common with many other mer-
chant houses had a large bureau in their office with boxes and a
filing system marked ‘A to Z’. These could be as large as 7’ by 9’
tall.21 Perhaps not every merchant in Philadelphia and Liverpool had
such a grand piece of furniture, but any business that wanted to be
taken seriously had to take care in their style of business writing and
in keeping copies of all inward and outward letters safe. Business
letters promoted your image at a distance, and so had to be written
with judgement, confidence and with regularity. Some people did
not follow these rules, especially when letters were sent to family or
friends, in which case gossip and family news were also included;
but most letters were quite formal.
The bulk of traders’ letters concerned the daily details of business:
orders for goods, letters covering Bills of Exchange and other pay-
ments, enquiries about prices and the state of various markets. Some
letters were sent regarding renewing relationships—for example after
the War of Independence, others were introductions in order to start
a new relationship. Still more were sent to give encouragement or
relay political and personal correspondence. It is worth noting that
this sort of correspondence and networking relates to regional and
long-distance communication—local trading and networking was done
face-to-face. Nor was letter writing restricted to traders of course;
Richardson’s eighteenth-century heroine Pamela was typical of her
class in her letter writing—if not in her experiences.22 However, for
traders involved in any way in the distribution of goods over some
distance, with every inward and outward letter being copied into
ledgers, and many being sent in triplicate to ensure delivery, the
written word was central to their business world.
21
Gordon, The Universal Accountant, Vol. II, pp. 9–10; Jacob M. Price, “Directions
for the Conduct of a Merchant’s Counting House, 1766”, BH, 28,3 (1986), 134–150,
pp. 140–141; Hancock, Citizens, pp. 101–103.
22
Samuel Richardson, Pamela; or Virtue Rewarded (1740) (rep. London: Penguin,
1985).
124 chapter four
Most letters were for orders of some sort of commodity—whether

dry goods such as manufactures, or groceries such as flour or sugar.
A good example of this is the Letter and Invoice Book of Daniel
Clark of Philadelphia. Clark was trading in Philadelphia in the early
1760s, and copied all his letters and invoices into his ledger. Often
the invoices were quite large—one to his suppliers in London took
up seven pages alone. The reason for this was the varied nature of
the order, with all the different types of textiles, hardware and gro-
ceries being listed by style, quality and price. Some were shorter, as
when Clark ordered from Haliday and Dunbar of Liverpool for the
first time. Having met one of the partners in Philadelphia, Clark
thought that he would try the firm out. Further and larger orders
were placed once the first transaction was successful and trust was
established. The detailed invoice reflected a detailed order. American
consumers knew exactly what they wanted and conflict could arise
when orders were not fulfilled as requested. Clarke was not back-
ward in coming forward in expressing his displeasure in such a sit-
uation. Neale and Co. in London had been in charge of an order
of textiles which did not turn out to Clarke’s satisfaction. Clarke told
them off: “I order that care be taken in the Choice of my goods . . . I
meant but 20 pcs [pieces of Romalls] Which your people Constructed
for 240 ps which is really Sufficient for all the provence for 10
years”. His indignation is all the more apparent in the original text,
in which he has crossed out ‘one’ year and replaced it with ‘ten’.23
In some ways Clark is expressing his frustration at the lack of con-
trol he has in this matter, but it also highlights the importance of
good communication with your correspondents.
Communication was equally important between partners and branch
houses as between supplier and customer. The partnership of Andrew
Clow and Co. of Philadelphia, trading in the decade after Independence
is an excellent example of this. Although Clow was the senior part-
ner he chose to be the one transversing the Atlantic rather than
sending a clerk or supercargo. This had partly to do with the fact
that his partner, who was bankrupt, was not welcome in England,
but mostly to do with Clow’s own nature. He visited England every
year in order to personally choose the goods that he ordered, which
23
Clarke to Neale, 25 Sep 1760; Clarke to Haliday and Dunbar, 26 Sep 1760,
Clarke to Neale, 16 Oct 1760, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763.
meant that he did not tend to find himself in the same position as
Clark. However, he did have to constantly write to his partner back
in Philadelphia to keep him up-to-date on what he was ordering. In
return of course, his partner, David Cay also had to write to keep
Clow informed of the state of play of the house generally.24
The letters between William and Thomas Earle, corresponding
between Liverpool and Livorno, Italy in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, are also enlightening. The Livorno branch of this Liverpool
house sold Staffordshire pottery, Manchester textiles, American and
West Indian goods, all re-distributed through the Liverpool house.
On top of the usual correspondence regarding orders, the Liverpool
house would send instructions on how to conduct business, inform
them of political news and other gossip. This included the failure of
the Philadelphia houses of Simon Walker and George Dobson in
the winter of 1801–2. In December 1801, due to concern over the
increasing conflict with France, instructions were sent to Livorno to
sell only for cash. In February and March 1802 they wrote further,
entreating them “to sell, convert into Cash, and remit as expeditiously
as possible what we have advanced on the different consignments
gone and going”, “let your coffers be drained, send all you possibly
can to England”.25 The urgency and importance of these instruc-
tions is obvious.
Another important use of the written word was letters of a more
discretionary nature. This included letters of introduction and encour-
agement, and also those that confirmed (or otherwise) the good rep-
utation of potential business partners. Getting started in business was
often difficult—and so letters from one well-known trader introduc-
ing a beginner to another established trader were essential. This has
been called the “dressing up of one man in the reputation of another”,
and indeed this ‘lending’ or guaranteeing of a reputation was such
an activity. William Roscoe, a well-known Liverpool figure ‘dressed
up’ a Mr Wrigglesworth and introduced him to Ralph Eddowes of
Philadelphia. In a similar vein William Rathbone, also of Liverpool,
24
See Andrew Clow and Co., passim, CWU; Andrew Service to David Cay, 21
Oct 1786, 4 Oct 1786, Folder Jan-Jun 1786, and passim, SGC. See the case study
on Andrew Clow in chapter seven, pp. 234–239.
25
Earle and Co and Earle and Co., 27 Jan 1802, 27 Dec 1801, 20 Feb 1802,
10 Mar 1802, Letterbook Livorno, EC, MMM.
126 chapter four
introduced John Bispham, possibly a distant family member, to his

friends in America.26
Some recommendations were more indirect. The Earle house
send a letter to its Livorno branch requesting that they give Mr
Hirtzel, “son of our friend Mr Geo Hirtzel in Exeter . . . every proper
encouragement”. They were not so keen to help a Mr Crokar who
was the supercargo of the brigantine Locknell. They thought him
worth giving commission work to—but not credit. Some people, for
whatever reason, were obviously worth some more risk and effort,
and others not. This might have been because such activity was time
consuming as well. An agent of a London house known to the Earles
was visiting Livorno. They moaned that he would probably require
some attention. Others introduced themselves by association. Thomas
Leyland of Liverpool wrote to George Barnewall in New York stat-
ing that “Our mutual friend Mr Robt Barnewall” had told Leyland
that he should send vessels to George’s care in New York, and
solicited favours from him in return. In turn, Leyland also encour-
aged others, including women. Leyland used to import oats and other
goods from a Mr Hifferman in Dungarvon, Ireland. When his wife
Mary was widowed, Leyland repeatedly encouraged her to keep send-
ing him cargoes. Leyland had other contacts in Ireland and so at
least part of this was simply friendly encouragement. He also sent a
letter wishing Mary Collinge of Sunderland luck in her new venture
after she had sold her share in a ship through him in order to
finance a new venture.27 These encouragements were therefore use-
ful for merchants and lesser traders, both men and women. They
were especially important at the start of someone’s career—but were
also extremely helpful when trying to redirect trade, or indeed when
disaster struck.
Of course many letters were of a far more personal nature. In
this case writers were far less likely to follow the strict rules laid
down by Herries and Co. When traders corresponded with people
26
North, “Transaction Costs”, p. 562; Eddowes to Roscoe, 7 Dec 1804, RP;
Rathbone to Eddowes, 2 Feb 1807, William Rathbone Letterbook, p. 271, WRP, SJL.
27
Earle and Co. to Earle and Co., 5 Feb 1802, 16 Dec 1801, 23 Dec 1801,
Letterbook Livorno, EC; Leyland to Hifferman, 15 May 1787, 21 May 1787, 30
May 1787. Unfortunately Mrs Hifferman had also died by mid July 1787. Leyland
to Morson, 17 Jul 1787, Leyland to Collinge, 29[?] May 1788, 9 Sep 1788, Thomas
Leyland Letterbook 1787–1789.
who were also friends or family, their letters were often a mixture
of trade, political and personal gossip and other news. Ralph Eddowes,
already mentioned, definitely fell into this category. In one letter
alone to his friend William Roscoe in Liverpool, Eddowes thanked
him for sending some books, for legal and credit advice, for a rec-
ommendation that had led to some commission business, railed against
the state of English politics, asked Roscoe to pay some bills on his
behalf, and related some other mercantile gossip. Another person
guilty of such letter writing ‘abuse’ was Eliza Farmer, also of
Philadelphia, who wrote to her nephew Jack, probably living in
London. Jack was apparently trying to trade in a small way with
Philadelphia and she reported to him on a wide variety of issues
over a period covering both before and after the Revolution. These
included notifying him that a ship carrying tea into the port of
Philadelphia had been refused. Eliza was well informed on the pol-
itics of tea at this time. She wrote to him that if the duty was
removed “we shall gladly take the Tea, if not they will have none
of it but do as they have done all [along?] that is Run it from the
Dutch”. For many years she continued to advise Jack on how his
business activities (his reputation) were perceived in Philadelphia, the
state of different commodities and of her experiences during the
English occupation in Philadelphia.28 In these various ways she acted
as an agent for Jack in Pennsylvania.
We can perhaps forgive Ralph and Eliza for not keeping to the
strict rules of Herries and Co.; they were writing to friends and fam-
ily after all. Furthermore, the fact that their letters are not so for-
mal does not lessen the importance of the information contained
within them. Whether formal or informal, the written word was
essential to the running of businesses whether through agents or fam-
ily, for ordering, directing business in calm and crises, for introduc-
tions and gossip, and even for simply keeping in touch.
28
Eddowes to Roscoe, 11 Jul 1796, RP. See the case study on Ralph Eddowes
in chapter seven, pp. 223–226; Farmer to Jack, 3 Feb 1774, 16 May 1774, 17 Feb
1775, Oct 1783 and passim, Eliza had left London to live in Philadelphia, Eliza to
Jack, 16 May 1774, Eliza Farmer Letterbook.
128 chapter four
The Spoken Word
Whereas the printed and written word were important in the for-
mation and continuation of regional and long-distance relationships,
the spoken word came into its own at the local level. Of course,
long-distance and regional networks were also reinforced by face-to-
face visits, but the spoken word was especially important in the con-
solidation of local alliances. The forum could be formal such as the
local Council, Exchange or trade associations, or informal, through
coffee houses, clubs or even the local market. The use of many of
these spaces was restricted to the more elite traders, as discussed
below. Merchants on both side of the Atlantic used the local Council,
Exchange, trade associations and clubs to full advantage in pursuance
of their own designs. However, the coffee house, tavern, market,
local shops and informal friendships on the street were open to every-
one, male and female. Elite merchants may have had their own
offices, but a visit to one or all of these various spaces was neces-
sary in order to keep up to date with the latest gossip and prices
and keep contacts ‘sweet’. Many merchants took the need for face-
to-face contact to another level. Andrew Clow, discussed above, trav-
elled across the Atlantic every year between 1785 and 1793 in order
to choose goods and ‘butter-up’ contacts. In fact many Americans
did the same in order to better co-ordinate demand in this period.
Jabez Maud Fisher travelled to England, including Liverpool, over
the period of the War of Independence, staying with friends and
further fostering existing relationships. Being a Quaker, Fisher actu-
ally stayed at William Rathbone’s house for four days.29
Probably the most important forum in both cities was the Council.
This was not only because the merchants ran it by themselves for
themselves; but because the actions they took had important
ramifications for the rest of the trading community. As explained in
chapter one, both councils took a limited view of their responsibili-
ties and were very business orientated. In Liverpool for example, in
acting to promote the dock system, including the building of the first
commercial enclosed wet dock in England in 1715, the council was
obviously a prime place for interaction. In both cities, the Council
29
ACP, SGC; Morgan, “Business Networks”, pp. 41–46; Kenneth Morgan (ed.),
An American Quaker in the British Isles: The Travel Journals of Jabez Maud Fisher, 1775–1779
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 81–82, 232.
was dominated by merchants, whether Quaker, Anglican or Radical.

Their elite place within society would have reinforced their status as
a group and as proactive mercantile citizens.30
The critical place for merchants to interact on a daily basis how-
ever, was the Exchange. In Philadelphia, the importance of such a
place was recognised as early as 1754. Not having quite the funds
to construct a whole new building, 234 subscribers nevertheless con-
tributed between twenty and thirty shillings each to establish an area
which would function as one. This was to be within the Old London
Coffee House, where a whole floor was to be for the use of the mer-
chants as a coffee house and exchange. The predominant use by
merchants gave them a strong sense of ‘ownership’ of this space;
those not obsessed with business matters often found the place bor-
ing because more trade was done than drinking. By the 1770’s this
‘exchange’, on the corner of High and Front Street, was well estab-
lished as a place where merchants (and no doubt shipowners, fac-
tors, brokers and wholesalers) could buy and sell, exchange information,
rent freight space, and in the modern parlance, ‘network’. The impor-
tance of the exchange is demonstrated by the growth of ‘satellite’
businesses nearby. These included an ‘Intelligence Office’ ran by
William Bradford in 1774 for the registration of those seeking to
hire or be hired, an office which exchanged money and extended
loans and a ‘Vendue House’. By 1805, Hannah Wigmore had opened
another ‘Intelligence Office’ around the corner in Walnut Street.31
In Liverpool a new Exchange was opened as part of the new town
hall in 1754, the same year as the need for one was recognised in
Philadelphia. It was not so immediately popular as its counterpart
however. Merchants and brokers continued to meet just outside at
the ‘High Change’, at the junction of Castle, High and Dale Streets.
However, the Exchange was in demand enough to require a new
building, opened in 1808. The importance of the exchange as a
place to do business—and indeed its links with other organisations
was made explicit by a Liverpool merchant in 1806. He complained
30
Power, “Councillors and Commerce”; ibid., “Politics and Progress”; Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 254–256; Warner, The Private City, pp. 99–102.
31
William Bradford was editor of the Pennsylvania Journal and would therefore
have had access to up-to-date news. Thompson, Rum Punch, pp. 106–107. James
Hume ran the Intelligence Office, Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 13 Apl
1774; Relf ’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 12 Dec 1805.
130 chapter four
that the irregular hours kept by some at the ‘Change’ meant that
others had to spend longer than they wished there. He suggested
that the American Chamber of Commerce encourage its members
to attend within the hours of 1 and 2.45 pm in order to cooperate
with other associations and merchants. As their business rendered
“a daily attendance at the ‘Change’ necessary” he was no doubt try-
ing to promote efficiency.32
Trade associations such as Chambers of Commerce were being
set up all over England in the eighteenth century and were impor-
tant in many port cities. Glasgow established a Chamber of Commerce
in 1783, although Bristol had had its Society of Merchant Venturers
since 1552, reflecting its importance as a port in an earlier period.
The first Liverpool Chamber of Commerce was set up in 1774, per-
haps as a reflection of the difficulties many merchants were experi-
encing due to the increasing conflict with the Americas. However,
the American Chamber of Commerce was set up as a separate insti-
tution in 1801. Its second rule expressly declared that its purpose
was to “redress the existing and the prevention of future Grievances
which may affect this Branch of Trade generally”. Its members
included many respectable and well-known merchants, and the
Chamber became an active pressure group, meeting once a month
to settle various disputes. These included setting commission per-
centages on various goods, settling disputes between merchants them-
selves, liaising with other organisations and promoting the interests
of its members in Parliament.33
In 1784 the merchant Tench Coxe tried to set up a Chamber of
Commerce in Philadelphia. He expressed his view that a Chamber
was needed to “unite the mercantile interest”, but his words appar-
ently fell on deaf ears. Doerflinger has suggested that there was a
lack of unified spirit due to religious faction. However, networks
through the informal atmosphere at the Old London Coffee House
and other taverns and inns and the more formal ones through the
Council were perhaps deemed adequate. The Bank of North America,
32
Brooke, Liverpool as it was, pp. 71–73, Baines, History of the Commerce, p. 535;
Thomas Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain (London: Frank Cass, 1968), pp.
172–178.
33
T.M. Devine, “The Golden Age of Tobacco”, in Devine and Jackson, Glasgow,
p. 165; Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic, p. 7; A.H. Arkle, “The Early Coffee Houses
of Liverpool”, THSLC, 64 (1912), 1–16, p. 8; Liverpool American Chamber of
Commerce Minutes 1801–1908, 2nd Rule, not dated (c. Jul 1801), Vol. 1, p. 2.
founded in 1781, also provided another layer of cohesion in the early

national period, possibly rendering a formal trade association unnec-
essary. This may have been a reflection of the wider variety of trad-
ing interests as the economy diversified towards the turn of the
century, as highlighted in chapter three. However, a Philadelphia
Chamber of Commerce was eventually set up in 1801. Members
were charged $8 to join, and $5 [per annum] thereafter. Members
had to be a citizen of the United States and either a trading mer-
chant, shipowner or marine insurance broker of Philadelphia. The
Chamber was used to petition the United States Senate and House
of Representatives on matters such as debt relief, duties on tonnage,
arming of vessels and banking.34
The use of the Old London Coffee House in Philadelphia as a
formal exchange may have been exceptional, but the use of coffee
houses for trade generally was certainly not. Like the Council,
Exchange and trade associations, they were mostly ‘male’ spaces.
Although women ran many coffee houses and inns, they did not fre-
quent them as much as men. Nine women were listed as running
coffee houses, taverns and inns in Liverpool, and thirty-three in
Philadelphia in 1805. However, in both cities, these spaces were trea-
sured precisely because they were male spaces. Here men could talk
about trade and politics, read the newspapers and get the latest ship-
ping news in a relaxed atmosphere without having to adapt their
behaviour and language for female company, or indeed hosts of
either gender. Whilst coffee houses and taverns were a masculine
environment, in Philadelphia at least, they were somewhere where
men of all socio-economic ranks could mix together. Unique licens-
ing laws in Philadelphia set a maximum price for alcohol, meaning
that price differentials could not be used to distinguish between
desired patrons. Until the opening of the Old London Coffee House
in 1754, and indeed the City Tavern in 1773, these places carried
34
Doerflinger, Vigorous Spirit, pp. 275, 19–20; Robert E. Wright, “Bank Ownership
and Lending Patterns in New York and Pennsylvania, 1781–1831”, BHR, 73,1
(1999), 40–60, p. 59; Articles of Association and Rules of the Philadelphia Chamber
of Commerce (Philadelphia: Printed by Zachariah Poulson Junr, 1801); Memorial
of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce (Printed by Order of the Senate of the
United States, 25 Jan 1803); Representation of the Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce, Signed by order and in Behalf of the said Chamber, by Thomas
Fitzsimmons, Their President (Washington, 1804); Memorial of the Members of the
Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia relative to the Bank of the United States
(Washington, Printed by R.C. Weightman, 1810); all LCP.
132 chapter four
little social pretensions. Even once these more merchant-orientated

establishments were opened, lesser traders could still mingle and
exchange information in one of the other 270 coffee houses, taverns
and inns listed in Philadelphia in 1805.35
Liverpool also had a mix of ‘mercantile’ and other establishments.
Pontack’s was the oldest, having been established after the Restoration,
but was still popular in the eighteenth century. The Merchant’s
Coffee House, established around the 1720s for merchants rather
than travellers, was similarly popular. Coffee-houses and taverns were
also where the post was delivered or taken from, and the stage
coaches all left from various taverns or inns. Other activities included
auctions and vendues. Traders such as those who ‘came clean’ over
their finances—and indeed, those who did not, would have their
affairs sorted out by their assignees at a coffee house. A public space
was the best arena to show your good intentions, which was why
George Meade had asked his creditors to meet at the City Tavern.36
These spaces were also good places to hear and overhear gossip.
Here was somewhere you might over hear news of the impending
failure of a debtor, or that prices were rising in another port, before
they were even reported in the newspapers. Toby Ditz suggests that
news written in letters was often meant for this sort of dissemina-
tion—writers knew that if a merchant did not gossip openly, his
clerks might. Certainly more people had access to letters than their
intended recipient. Daniel Defoe also warned traders not to “prattle”
but to listen; that to talk foolishly in a coffee house might endanger
your reputation. Status was also at issue here. “The merchant should
avoid too many words and circumlocutions in his dealings; such con-
duct has more the appearance of that of a retailer, than of one who
is not so” advised the Tradesman. However, even if a trader did not
talk foolishly about himself, there is a good chance that other traders
could find out plenty about him, good or bad, at the coffee house,
tavern or inn.37
35
The number of women running coffee houses, taverns and inns is surely an
underestimate, especially in this case of Liverpool, as men are also under-recorded;
Woodruff D. Smith, “From Coffeehouse to Parlour: The Consumption of Coffee,
Tea and Sugar in North-Western Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries”, in Jordan Goodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sherratt (eds.),
Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.
148–164; Thompson, Rum Punch, pp. 85, 91–110.
36
Brooke, Liverpool as it was, pp. 164–174.
37
Toby L. Ditz, “Shipwrecked; or, Masculinity Imperiled: Mercantile Representations
Taverns and coffee houses were also where many of Philadelphia’s

clubs and associations met. Apart from the many ethnic, religious
and sporting associations, these included two Masonic Lodges and
the Governor’s club. Although the main function of these clubs was
convivial they were well attended by the merchants and other elite
of the city, and much of the talk must have been trade related.
These included the Philharmonical Merchants (established 1769), the
Free Debating Society (1772), the Beefsteak Club which met at The
Tun Tavern and the Dull Club, which had its first meeting at Hardy’s
Tavern in 1796. There were also many more clubs attended by the
non-elite such as the ‘working man’s junto’. In addition to this were
ethnic societies such as the Welsh Society, St. Andrew’s Society and
the Hibernian Society. These ‘other’ sort of clubs and associations
for the ‘lower sort’ were not found in Liverpool to the same extent
and probably reflect the more radical tradition in Philadelphia. This
is not to say that they were not used for heavy drinking and social-
ising of course.38
In Liverpool too, there were many clubs enthusiastically attended
by merchants. These included the Ugly Face Club (established 1743),
the Unanimous Club (1753) and the Mock Corporation of Sefton
(1753). As in Philadelphia, the names suggest the conviviality of these
associations. However, the business and trade functions of these clubs
is clear from their membership. Merchants accounted for nearly half
of the original membership of the Ugly Face Club, and merchants
and other tradesmen accounted for two thirds of the total mem-
bership of the Mock Corporation of Sefton. Merchants also inter-
acted at the theatre, balls, pleasure gardens and other cultural activities
of course, but these clubs were very important to the ‘networking’
activities of merchants. Whilst these clubs were predominantly social
events, they were important for making new contacts and promot-
ing existing ones. Just as many a deal is hatched on the golf course
today—so it was in the associations and clubs of eighteenth-century
of Failure and the Gendered Self in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia”, JAH, 81,1
(1994), 51–80, p. 54; Defoe, The Complete Tradesman, pp. 35, 134 and chapter fifteen
passim; Various, The Tradesman; Or, Commercial Magazine (1808), p. 422.
38
A Welsh Society was set up in Philadelphia in 1729. Edward G. Hartman,
The Welsh Society of Philadelphia, 1729–1979: History, Charter and By-Laws (Valley Forge,
Pa.: Judson Printers, 1980); The Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 11
Oct 1796; The Pennsylvania Gazette, 22 May 1775, 3 Mar 1790; Thompson, Rum
Punch, pp. 84–88, chapter five.
134 chapter four
Liverpool and Philadelphia. This point is not lost on Peter Thompson

who tells us “for the merchant, the link between social standing and
fiscal credit was forged over beer or punch.”39
Many of these forums, such as the Council, the Chamber of Com-
merce, the ‘Change’, and most of these clubs were an elite, male,
preserve. Quaker female traders, such as Elizabeth Whartonby, a
shopkeeper, may have used religious meetings to some extent as a
networking forum. No doubt Quaker traders Mary Coates, Elizabeth
Paschall and Rebecca Jones caught up on news and planned to visit
the auctions together before and after meetings in addition to leisure
activities. Some of the more elite female shopkeepers may also have
networked at the various charities set up in Philadelphia. Between
1790 and 1810 at least 174 Quaker women were involved in char-
itable institutions of one kind or another. However commercial net-
working is less likely in this situation as many of those involved in
the charities and their subscribers were listed as gentlewomen in the
directories. For example, Anna Gibson and Sarah Stamper, both
involved in the Female Association of Philadelphia were noted as
gentlewomen.40
However, many of the other forums such as the tavern, inn or
coffee house were open to men and, to a lesser extent, women of
all socio-economic levels. Furthermore, in Philadelphia at least, the
strong sense of neighbourhood and place would have fostered friend-
ships. As Karin Wulf suggests, there is no reason why a female friend
who witnessed a will for example, could have not later become a
partner in some business venture. No doubt neighbours in Liverpool
had the same experience, especially if a ‘neighbour’ was considered
anyone with similar interests and socio-economic status. Other forums
where lesser traders would have met and caught up on gossip and
information were auctions, warehouses, counting houses, the market,
39
Arline Wilson, “The Cultural Identity of Liverpool, 1790–1850: The Early
Learned Societies”, THSLC, 147 (1998), 55–80, pp. 57–60; Thompson, Rum Punch,
p. 96.
40
Jean R. Soderland, “Women’s Authority in Pennsylvania and New Jersey
Quaker Meetings, 1680–1760”, WMQ , 44,4 (1987), 722–749, p. 729; Margaret
Morris Haviland, “Beyond Women’s Sphere: Young Quaker Women and the Veil
of Charity in Philadelphia, 1790–1810, WMQ , 51,3, Mid-Atlantic Perspectives (1994),
419–446, p. 422; Constitution of the Female Association of Philadelphia for the
Relief of Women and Children in Reduced Circumstances (Philadelphia: Printed
by William Young, 1801).
personal friendly and familial visits and even the shop. Many female
traders in Philadelphia shopped for goods in each others’ stores, and
even brought stock from one another if one of their group had
received a particularly good retail price.41 These encounters would
be used to foster relationships and alliances whatever the person’s
social status. Not all forums would have been open to traders of
lower socio-economic status, but that did not preclude them from
functioning in the same way as elite merchants in the forums that
they did enter. Whilst much of this is implied rather than made
explicit, it is clear that the spoken word was important in oiling the
wheels of commerce.
Religion, Family and Friendships
A lot of time has been spent here in stressing ‘modern’ and alter-
native networks to those traditionally highlighted in the literature.
However, we cannot discount the relevance of religious, ethnic and
familial networks, especially at certain points in a trader’s career,
such as at times of pressure or even crisis. Religious and familial
networks were still used, but as discussed above, secular friendships,
sealed by the spoken word, were increasingly important. Steele points
to a normalisation of communications and the fact that “business
connections were increasingly ruled simply by established merchant
practice and defended by laws that were comparable and related in
the whole English Atlantic Community”. Indeed, Doerflinger argues
that there is little evidence that religion was an important factor in
gauging creditworthiness. Hancock also points to the many factors
behind the apparently simple choice of a partner: risk spreading,
complementary skills or knowledge, reducing costs, matching invest-
ment needs, or simply the ability to get along with one another. If
traders restricted themselves to family and religious contacts, they
would not have been successful. In contrast, many people gained
apprenticeships through family friends as well as family members.
Women may also have developed their contacts in this way. Apart
from making ‘neighbourhood’ contacts as mentioned above, women
41
Wulf, Not All Wives, pp. 122–131, 146. She has a good section on female huck-
sters and retailers, pp. 144–147. For details on female traders see chapter seven,
pp. 218–223.
136 chapter four
also developed their networks through apprenticeships and experi-

ence. Lydia Whitehead was bound to Mary Brown, a shopkeeper
and milliner in Philadelphia in 1763. She would have met customers
there, learnt the trade, and no doubt used Mary as a referee later
on if she was ever able to set up business on her own.42
Of course religious networks were used. Steele argues that the
Quaker communication network “was among the best in the English
Atlantic”, but he does not suggest it was these types of networks that
held the commercial world together. However, whilst reliance upon
familial or religious networks was “no longer the norm”, many people
continued to expect help from their co-religionists. Quakers would
certainly expect a level of assistance from other ‘Friends’ on arrival
in a new city. When Pim Nevins travelled to Philadelphia from Liver-
pool during 1802–3, he primarily used Quaker networks. He travelled
there to resolve his financial affairs, but it was other ‘Friends’ who
introduced him to those with whom he needed to meet, gave him
accommodation and took him to the weekly meetings in Philadelphia.43
These networks could not be relied upon however. When Ralph
Eddowes emigrated to Philadelphia from Cheshire he did not meet
with such a positive response. The well-known Quaker family the
Fishers did not give him the encouragement he had expected and
he felt saddened by the experience. In a letter to his friend William
Roscoe he wrote that they were “not such men as Rathbone [William
Rathbone IV] and Benson”, his friends in Liverpool. This group of
friends did have some religious connections. Eddowes was a Quaker,
Rathbone had been a Quaker but eventually joined the Unitarians,
and Roscoe was a Unitarian. However, in their letters they always
stressed the secular, friendly, aspect of their relationships, rather than
the religious one. Women also used their co-religionists. Rebecca
Jones was widowed sometime around 1790. Although she had pre-
viously been listed in the directories as a gentlewoman, she forayed
into trade for a little while, perhaps to make ends meet. Already
known to Quaker circles in Philadelphia, she gained credit from the
42
Steele, The English Atlantic, pp. 213–216; Doerflinger, Vigorous Spirit, pp. 61–62;
Hancock, Citizens, pp. 104–108. Cox, The Complete Tradesman, pp. 170–176; Wulf,
Not All Wives, p. 104; see also Nuala Zahehieh, “Credit, Risk and Reputation in
Late Seventeenth-Century Colonial Trade”, in Olaf U. Janzen (ed.), Research in
Maritime History, No. 15, Merchant Organisation and the Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic,
1660 –1815 (1998), pp. 53–74, pp. 67–68.
43
Pim Nevins, Journal of a Visit to America 1802–1803, passim, APS.
Fishers, who either through true friendship, or a sense of obligation,

guided her through a difficult time in her life.44
Family members were often a starting point for someone’s career.
David Tuohy of Liverpool put his nephew Ned through school and
employed him as a supercargo on an adventure in a ‘Guinea-man’
in order to set him up in a career. After Tuohy’s death—two female
members of his family worked together. Ann and Mary carried out
a variety of businesses such as drapery and supplying ships with slops
which complemented each other, partly trading on David’s reputa-
tion, and partly supporting each other. Daniel Clark of Philadelphia
managed to help out a family member, maybe his mother, across
the Atlantic. He apparently helped her conduct a little trade “On
Account & Risque of Mrs Eleanor Clark” of Sligoe. Allowing her
the profit on the deal, he trusted her to pay the £121 Pennsylvania
currency she owed him. Eliza Farmer, discussed above, also helped
out her nephew with trade information and encouragement.45
Of course some family dynasties were successful, such as the Fishers
in Philadelphia and the Heywoods in Liverpool and Manchester.
However, family members were not always reliable, nor did they
always have the right prerequisites. Sparling and Bolden of Liverpool
sent the younger brother of a former partner to Virginia to control
their affairs there. George Sparling consistently failed to follow the
correct instructions, or even to write regularly. He did not send home
bills of exchange when he should have done, and sent low-grade
tobacco home after expressly being told not to. The Liverpudlian
merchant Samuel Rainford, trading in Kingston, did not trust his
brother to look after his affairs at all, he left them all in the hands
of his friend and merchant Edward Chaffers—including the educa-
tion of his nieces. Andrew Clow could not rely on his partner, despite
the fact he was a fellow Presbyterian. The Jamaican Proverb “Too
much Cousin bruk Shop” sums up this situation well. Often new
alliances were made from necessity, if they could be made more
44
Eddowes to Roscoe, 3 Nov 1794, and passim, RP; WRP passim; Account of
Rebecca Jones, Ledger of Thomas, Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 46,
HSP. As these transactions were some time after her widowhood, it would not
appear that this was simply tying up her husband’s affairs.
45
Tuohy to Sullivan, [7?] Apl 1772, Tuohy to Fagan, 18 Apl 1772, Letters from
David Tuohy, DTP; Invoice to Eleanor Clark, 20 Feb 1761; Clark to Mildred, 15
Nov 1760, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763; Leyland Ship Book—
Earl of Liverpool, LBP.
138 chapter four
palatable into the bargain by starting a new family, then all the bet-
ter. For example, Christopher Hassall of Liverpool found that money,
and the access to people and credit that might bring, was a very
important factor in his choice of wife. Whilst he had “a very par-
ticular regard for” the daughter of John Goad, it was also conve-
nient that Goad had been master on several vessels and had shares
in a ropewalk. Hassall apparently convinced his future father-in-law
of his own promising financial circumstances. Whilst he received
£1,000 from his own father on his marriage, he received a further
£1,500 worth of rope-walk shares from Goad, quite a fortune. He
also appeared to get another £500 cash from Goad at 4½ per cent
interest for investment.46
Friendships that were based on merely mutual camaraderie formed
at Council meetings, taverns, coffee houses, clubs and even on the
street were also very useful. William Roscoe and Arthur Heywood
would have met in various circles as both were prominent Liverpool
men. When Roscoe successfully ran for election in 1806, Heywood
helped him financially. He paid the expenses for a campaign ball
totalling a massive £2,208 9s. 7d. As Heywood had been a slave
trader before becoming a banker, he may have found Roscoe’s anti-
slave trade stance rather annoying after supporting him so hand-
somely. David Tuohy found mercantile friendships around Liverpool
very useful when investing in shipping. Equally though, Tuohy had
specialist knowledge of the slave trade which others would have found
useful. Having been a captain in the trade for many years, his expe-
rience would have complemented that of others who perhaps had
money to invest but not the correct knowledge. Perhaps mercantile
friendships were based around a common respect for each other—
certainly a good reputation was essential.47
The cross-linking between several associations or forums is explicit
in some cases. Many names on the Liverpool American Chamber
of Commerce for example can also be found in the sales accounts
of the Herculaneum Pottery. Samuel Holland, a trustee of the pot-
tery, no doubt found these connections useful. He also used (or
46
Sparling and Bolden Letterbook 1778–1789, passim, LivRO; Samuel Rainford
Papers, ECC, passim; Martha Warren Beckwith (coll.), Jamaica Proverbs (1925) (rep.
New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970), p. 110; Schofield and Schofield, “A
Good Fortune”, p. 91.
47
Annual Expenses of Arthur Heywood I 1779–1836, AHA, BGA; DTP, passim.
abused) this position in order to gain easy credit for his separate
partnership with Michael Humble. No doubt lesser traders also forged
such useful alliances. For women this may have been in the shop
or market place, others grouped together to buy goods from ven-
dues and auctions as well. These networks would have been based
on local friendships, reputations and similar needs rather than sim-
ply familial relationships. Often coming from the same town was an
excuse to strike up a friendship. Eddowes wrote to Roscoe in 1784
that his daughter had “married an old townsman of ours. Mr Peter
Barrett”. He does not say anything further suggesting that this sim-
ple connection had been equally as important as any other. William
Pollard, another Philadelphia merchant also mentions an Edward
Barrett who was trading with Liverpool in the 1770s. Nationality
and place therefore appears to have been important, and was so for
others as well. Stephen Girard, a Frenchman had good links with
other French traders, and imported on at least thirteen vessels from
Marseille and Bordeaux during the 1790s. Benjamin Fuller was an
Irishman who developed similar relationships along these lines. Daniel
Clark of Philadelphia and David Tuohy of Liverpool were both from
Ireland originally and kept strong trading links there.48 Therefore,
personal networks were sometimes based on family, religion, eth-
nicity or place, but friendships based on trust, reputation and mutual
respect were equally important.
Networks, Costs, Information and Trust
It is obvious that people, or rather, information networks in the eigh-

teenth-century Atlantic went far wider than family and co-religion-
ists, whether at the start, end, or crisis point of a trader’s career.
This was because the information, capital and credit required in
order to carry out trade successfully could not be gained from these
48
Herculaneum Pottery Ledger 1806–1817, passim; Liverpool American Chamber
of Commerce Minutes 1801–1908, passim; Cleary argues that spaces such as shops
represented an association in themselves for women. Patricia Cleary, “‘She will be
in the shop’: Women’s Sphere of Trade in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia and
New York”, PMHB, 119,3 (1995), 181–202, pp. 182–184; Eddowes to Roscoe, 7
Dec 1784, RP; Pollard to Holme, 16 May 1772, William Pollard Letterbook
1772–1774, Doerflinger, Vigorous Spirit, p. 59. Many thanks to Silvia Marzagalli for
this data on French shipping to and from Philadelphia.
140 chapter four
sources alone. The various forms of communication discussed here

demonstrate that the day-to-day experience of traders was in fact
very complicated. Yet forums of communication were refined enough
to support a highly sophisticated trading community which not only
stretched up and down the socio-economic scale of both Philadelphia
or Liverpool, but between them as well.
Newspapers were predominantly less intimate in their contact, but
the information within them was no less important because of it.
Letters, orders and invoices contained a mixture of personal and for-
mal information, and all such sources were very useful at the regional
and trans-Atlantic level. Personal and face-to-face relationships were
also very important—mostly for consolidating local relationships, but
trans-Atlantic visits became more common in the last quarter of the
century and these helped to personalise the more formal long-dis-
tance trade relationships. Religion, family and friendship networks
were also important, but more so at the beginning of a trader’s
career or in times of stress; they were not enough on their own to
support a commercial career, and in any case were not always reliable.
In fact, often more important were secular friendships, trust gener-
ated by working on commission, ‘banks of favours’, letters of intro-
duction, and even geographical links. Even a Quaker like Elizabeth
Paschall did not identify herself first by her religion, household, blood
or marriage. She looked to her socio-economic position within society.49
As ever, the survival of sources has meant that the examples given
here are often for those traders higher up the status tree. However,
most of these forms of communications were open to everyone. Lesser
traders and of course all women were kept out of associations such
as the ‘Change’, Council or drinking clubs, but everyone could either
read or have read to them newspapers and letters, could chat and
make deals over a glass of rum, borrow money from friends—even
if it was $5 to buy some old earthenware at an auction—or club
together with a friend for a market stall. Perhaps some traders met
at the alms house, the workhouse or debtors’ prison. Doerflinger
argues that it only took about two to three years to build up a good
network, because traders lower down the socio-economic scale did not
function in a qualitatively different manner from those at the top.
49
Wulf, Not All Wives, p. 129.
There is no doubt that elite male merchants had control over

their own lives, and those of others, much more than other traders
did; but we have seen how female shopkeepers advertised their shops,
how Eliza Farmer managed her nephew’s affairs, how women net-
worked at auctions and in the shop, or even in the tavern and street.
All traders, men and women, used these various forms of commu-
nication to their best advantage, and in this way information was
transferred and trust encouraged. In turn, information and transac-
tion costs were kept to a minimum, promoting efficiency and
profitability. Once a trusted network was in place, whether based
on family, friends or associates, credit could be gained, which was
the backbone of trade at any level in this period. This credit took
on an array of forms and will be the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
FINANCE AND FAILURE
but behold he has betrayed his cloven foot,

a Heart susceptible of Deceit, Extortion and Villainy
William Pollard to Thomas Simpson, 1 Jul 1772
Chapter four demonstrated that good networks of people produced

an environment in which people transferred information at the local,
regional and international level. A strong and generally understood
business culture also meant that traders were able to do business
with others that they had never met. There was a level of ‘imper-
sonal trust’ which aided business at the local, regional and trans-
Atlantic level. This was important because whereas today we buy
most things on credit cards, similarly in the eighteenth century, the
majority of business transactions were conducted on book credit.
Traders at all levels, from the female shopkeeper in the streets around
the back of the docks, to the elite merchant with his warehouse full
of imported spices, utilised credit. For a poor Liverpool docker, the
small shop which gave a few pence credit for some bread could be
a lifeline until payday; for the American trader, a lack of specie
meant that credit was essential whatever the scale of their business.
Only about 10 per cent of sales by merchants were for cash in
Philadelphia, and they were supposed to have better access to cash
than others. Indeed in 1783, contemporaries were trying to work
out ways of collecting taxes that avoided the use of cash because it
was so scarce.1
The use of book credit in everyday transactions was so taken for
granted that one historian noted that it “appears so regularly in the
accounts and inventories of businessmen of all kinds that it escapes
specific comment”. Yet book credit was one way in which traders
could make a little capital go a long way. Purchasing stock on credit
1
Shapiro, “The Social Control”; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 90; Pelatiah
Webster, A Sixth Essay on Free Trade and Finance (Philadelphia: Printed and Sold by
T. Bradford, 1783), p. 6.
finance and failure 143
often meant that a trader did not pay for those goods until the next
person in the chain, either another trader or the consumer, had paid
for them. The ability to get that credit was “one man’s measure of
another’s worth”. If granted, it reflected the fact that the creditor
was seen as reputable and trustworthy; the more credit a trader
could get, the better his reputation was seen to be. Credit relation-
ships stretched throughout each city and across the Atlantic. Locally
and regionally, credit was vital to the economy, whether it linked
Halifax merchants to country dealers in Yorkshire, or to country
dealers in the Philadelphia hinterland via Liverpool.2
In the literature, merchants, that is, elite overseas traders, have
often been attributed with being the main providers of credit in this
period. They have been awarded high status because of this, both
by contemporaries and historians. Montefiore thought merchants men
of genius. The high capital required to enter business and the sub-
sequent credit offered to lesser traders has led to the view that elite
merchants alone promoted commerce. Furthermore, they were often
involved in ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ integration—investing in textile
manufacture, sugar processing, shipping, plantations or flour pro-
cessing for example. However, this perceived exclusivity of merchants
in finance provision is misleading. Merchants were of course an
important source of capital, but they were far from being the only
providers of it. In fact, finance and credit provision was a mishmash
of short- and long-term finance from a variety of sources. Short-
term credit was available through book credit and through banks,
cash could be raised and invested by discounting bills of exchange,
long-term credit could be gained through merchants, wholesalers or
from banks, but also through mortgages given and received. Loans
and investments at interest could be made through family and friends,
bonds and notes of hand could be written to underwrite loans, even
defaulting or delaying payments could be a way of accessing or
lengthening credit. The informal capital market was therefore not
only integral to, but a very important part of, the overall web of
credit.3
2
Bruce L. Anderson, “Money and the Structure of Credit in the Eighteenth
Century”, BH, 12,2 (1970), 85–101, pp. 96, 100; Hudson, Genesis, p. 164; Wilbur C.
Plummer, “Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia”, PMHB, 66,4 (1942), 386–409.
3
Berg, “The Organisation of Business”, p. 157; Chapman, “British Marketing
Enterprise”, pp. 207–217; Montefiore, Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium, p. 506;
144 chapter five
This system was not fool proof of course, and failures could have
disastrous results. Traders occasionally could not or would not pay
their debts. In a trade slump the inability to pay might be forgiven,
but traders who abused the trust placed in them were vilified and
likened to the devil. Stepping outside the boundaries of good busi-
ness practise was often taken as a very personal insult and betrayal.
Thomas Leyland, on finding that he had been betrayed in business
wrote to his correspondent “but I have since discovered you were a
Partner with him in all these transactions, and to remove your dis-
tresses, at the time, you sacrificed me”. At the personal level, fail-
ure to honour debts might be an inconvenience and a loss of profit
for the creditor; for the debtor it could mean insolvency, bankruptcy
or even gaol. In periods of crisis, when the inability to pay became
widespread, thousands of traders could be ruined. In this case, it
was the lower echelons of traders who suffered most. They did not
have the credit or indeed the savings, to ride out hard times.4
Failure at the general level could have far-reaching effects. For
example, widespread financial failure was precipitated by the closure
of the Scottish banking firm, Neal, James, Fordyce and Brown in
1772. Panic spread throughout England, Scotland, the European con-
tinent and the British colonies in America. Similarly, there was over-
extension of credit in the early 1790s, both around England and to
the United States of America. The resulting crisis of 1793 was espe-
cially harmful to Liverpool merchants. Periods of political upheaval
such as the Seven Year’s War, the War of Independence or Napoleonic
wars brought worry and distrust. The general opinion of Philadelphians
in 1801 was apparently that “should that [French] war happen, one
of the first acts of this government wou’d be to seize all british
debts”. Crises such as these tended to lead to a contraction of credit
as people ‘played safe’; no merchant was going to extend credit to
American traders if their government would not enforce payment.
On the return of peace, speculation and overtrading often occurred,
Jacob M. Price, “What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade,
1660–1790”, JEH, 2nd Ser., 49,2 (1989), 267–284, pp. 273–274; Wright, “Bank
Ownership”, pp. 40–41; Pat Hudson, “Financing Firms, 1700–1850”, in Maurice
W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (eds.), Business Enterprise in Modern Britain (London:
Routledge, 1994), pp. 88–112; Nash, “The Organization of Trade and Finance”,
p. 125.
4
Pollard to Simpson, 1 Jul 1772, William Pollard Letterbook 1772–1774; Leyland
to Tallon, 24 Jun 1786, f. 21; see also Ditz, “Shipwrecked; or, Masculinity Imperiled”.
causing prices to fluctuate wildly, and catching many traders out

who bought at too high a point in the market. A decline in trade
hurt related industries too. Shipbuilding, cooperage, transport and
distribution could all be badly affected.5
The credit and finance market was therefore complicated and
underpinned by trust, both at the personal and general level. Central
to this trust was the spectre of failure. Credit was given on trust, if
that trust was abused, then the system failed. This was so generally
understood, that in the majority of cases, that trust was not abused.
In fact, the networks of finance and credit worked very well and
encompassed people of all socio-economic groups. Furthermore, these
ties were so strong, that despite Independence in 1783, the United
States continued to be part of an integral and interdependent British
Atlantic-wide credit system. The trading communities of Philadelphia
and Liverpool remained intertwined into the nineteenth century.
Credit and Finance
Local and Regional Credit

Book credit was therefore ubiquitous throughout the Atlantic world,
but it was neither simple nor standardised. For Philadelphia mer-
chants selling to country storekeepers during the 1760s, six months
was understood as “the Common time of Credit”.6 Whilst this may
have been the ‘official’ line, the actual times given for credit varied
widely according to the types of goods being sold, the regularity of
purchases, and the personal status of the potential debtor. Credit
times were often extended after short-term credit transactions had
been successfully concluded. Sometimes a mixture of cash and credit,
or part short-term and part long-term credit was given. Extended
credit was sometimes given to women—especially widows. Whether
this was altruism or a calculated effort to keep them out of the poor-
house we shall never know. But certainly, women, especially widows,
received extended credit.
5
Sheridan, “The British Credit Crisis of 1772”, pp. 171–172; Hyde, Parkinson
and Marriner, “The Port of Liverpool”, p. 364; John to James Perhouse, 5 May
1801, John Perhouse Journal 1800–1838; Smith, The “Lower Sort”, pp. 60–80.
6
Clark to John Clark, 15 Mar 1761, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book
1759–1763.
146 chapter five
At the local level credit times were often determined by the way
the purchaser looked, dressed or spoke; but long-distance transac-
tions were based on recommendations, or even how a merchant pre-
sented himself in his letters. As the Atlantic trading community grew,
it would have been impossible to know all of your suppliers and cus-
tomers. However, getting payment from local and regional sales was
often more difficult than the more standardised trans-Atlantic ones.
Payment times, whether expressly agreed or not, differed wildly, and
the many small sales by shopkeepers were extremely difficult to col-
lect. Often these were as little as £1 or $1. In local and regional
trade, payment times tended to vary quite widely making account
keeping difficult, and onward payment to suppliers even more so.
Daniel Clark wrote to his Liverpool suppliers Haliday and Dunbar
in 1762 that he was “really uneasy that I have not made you bet-
ter payment—but I assure you the disappointment I have met with
from my Country Customers has put [?] of my power”.7
In Liverpool too, country customers and consumers proved prob-
lematic. In 1766, the mariner Oliver Templeton, obviously carrying
on a little trade on his own account, was owed £1 5s. 6d. for goods
sold to John Lister, 5s. 6d. by John Gore (possibly the printer), and
an unspecified amount for ribbons and laces left with Elizabeth
Thompson, a bonnet maker, all of Liverpool. Travelling chapman
Alexander Black of Liverpool was owed money in shillings rather
than pounds from various people in Cheshire in 1772. The difficulty
in collecting money owed from retail sales continued into the early
nineteenth century. The Herculaneum Pottery in Liverpool sold their
own pottery and that brought in from Staffordshire retail and whole-
sale. In 1806 a sign was erected stating that “No Goods to be sold
here Retail but for Ready Money only”. However, in 1808 small
retail debts continued to be a problem, despite the efforts of the
company’s collection clerks.8
Indeed, the credit extended by the retail sector was very impor-
tant and yet is often overlooked. Small shops were increasingly impor-
tant in the provision of credit to the very poor. Female traders were
7
Cox, The Complete Tradesman, p. 156; Coleman, Debtors and Creditors, p. 148; Clark
to Haliday and Dunbar, 4 Jun 1762, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book
1759–1763. For a good survey of Philadelphia’s trading relationship with its hin-
terland see Doerflinger, “Farmers and Dry Goods”.
8
Insolvent Debtors’ Lists of Oliver Templeton, 14 Jan 1766; Alexander Black,
28 May 1772; Herculaneum Potteries Minute Book 1806–1812, ff. 4, 28, 29, LivRO.
instrumental here, as they both received credit from wholesalers and

merchants, and, as shopkeepers, were an essential part in the pro-
vision of credit to poor consumers. Female traders were present in
the books of many merchants, and although they were not as numer-
ous as male traders, they were still significant. In the 1790s many
women had accounts with Philadelphia merchants Thomas, Samuel
and Miers Fisher. In the early nineteenth-century books of Thomas
P. Cope, also of Philadelphia, women accounted for 24 per cent of
all his accounts. These included Elizabeth Jordan and Jane Bowie.
In Liverpool too, merchants such as Case and Southworth traded
with several women in the 1760s, including Jane Fryer. They sold
her a case of sugar worth £26 15s. in 1763. Thomas Leyland, also
of Liverpool, dealt with various women, including many in Ireland.
Ann Johnston imported rum and rock salt into Ireland from him
during the 1780s, and made payment with bills of exchange. The
accounts of Tarleton and Backhouse show women on the other side of
the equation. They owed Ann and Mary Tuohy £433 11s. 5d. and
Mary Watson £25 19s. 1d. in 1804, possibly for provisions for ships.9
Mifflin and Massey, wholesale grocers of Philadelphia, provide a
good case study of the complicated local and regional credit matrix.
Figures 5.1–3 detail their purchases of wet goods, specifically sugar,
coffee and flour from importing merchants and wholesalers and sales
to a variety of other merchants, retailers and consumers. Mifflin and
Massey often had to pay cash for their purchases and rarely received
more than one month’s credit. At the same time, however, they
offered credit to their customers—although the times given varied
widely. Andrew Doz, a regular customer and shopkeeper in
Philadelphia received credit of up to six months. Some country shop-
keepers also received long credit, although Edward Dawes of
Wilmington paid within one month for his sugar. During the same
period, Mary Dicas, a shopkeeper of Philadelphia only received one
week’s credit. A lack of specie meant that Samuel Litzenburger paid
for his sugar with bread. In fact, this lack of cash often affected the
way in which traders paid each other for their purchases.10
9
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, chapter eleven; Wells, Wretched Faces, p. 21;
Ledger of Thomas, Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797; T.P. Cope and Sons
Ledger 1803–1810, ff. 60, 71 and passim, HSP; Sales to Jane Fryer, 3 Aug 1763,
Case and Southworth Ledger 1763–1769, LivRO; Leyland to Johnstone, 26 Mar
1788, 8 Aug 1788, Thomas Leyland Letterbook 1786–1788; Balance Sheet of
Thomas Tarleton, 31 Dec 1804, TP.
10
Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 7, 46, 43, 11.
148 chapter five
Figure 5.1: Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Sugar

William Munay Cunningham & Nesbit
(Merchant?) (Merchants)
Cash Two months’

Mifflin and Massey part credit
(wholesale grocers)
Up to six months’ Part immediate

credit payment/part credit
Andrew Doz Half immediate Samuel Litzenburger

(Philadelphia payment/half (Germantown Cooper
Shopkeeper) Immediate four months’ Consumer)
payment credit
Alexander Montgomery One month’s

(Philadelphia Shopkeeper) credit
Consumer Andrew Crawford (n/g) Edward Dawes

(Wilmington)
Source: Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 1, 6, 7, 11, 46.
Traders contra’d, or set-off accounts by comparing what they each

owed and simply writing both debts off against each other. The per-
son who still had a debt outstanding would simply pay the balance—
or perhaps wait until the other owed him money again. Even
small-scale traders and artisans would do this. In March 1779, John
Foot, a cobbler in the Philadelphia hinterland contra’d his accounts
with a neighbour; “this day Recon’d with Samuel Elsworth and bal-
anc’d all Book accompts from the beginning of the World to this
date”. Sometimes people had receipts they received credited to the
account of someone they owed money to. In 1770, shopkeeper
Andrew Doz returned thirty-six bottles of snuff to his local suppli-
ers, on this occasion the Fishers, but had the credit of £6 18s. 0d.
put to the account of William Forbes, also of Philadelphia. In the
same year, and in the same way, Daniel Dingue cleared his debt to
Joseph Moulder by paying a bond of £125 18s. 6d. directly to the
Fishers (using them as a bank), putting Moulder in credit by 1s. 6d.11
11
Different kinds of debts could not be set off against each other, for example
Figure 5.2: Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Coffee

Js Beale
(Merchant?) Mifflin and Massey
Cash
(wholesale grocers)
Two and a half
months’ credit
One weeks’ Ann Suckness
credit (Widow of
Two One to two Burlington)
weeks’ weeks’
Mary Dicas credit
(Philadelphia credit
Shopkeeper) Long credit – balance
to new ledger
Thomas White Latham and Reid
(Philadelphia (Philadelphia Merchants)
Merchant?)
Mary Penrose (Widow

Other retailer of Philadelphia –
Consumer?)
Consumer
Source: Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 4, 42, 43, 45, 47, 51.
The prevalence of contra’d accounts and barter was due to a vari-

ety of reasons. A lack of specie, especially in America, meant that
barter was often the only way that a consumer could pay for his or
her goods. A paucity of surviving account books for Liverpool means
that is difficult to make a comparison. Certainly at the local level
cash was not such a problem, but even so, setting off accounts against
one another was a simple practice and no doubt practiced widely
in Britain too. At the regional and trans-Atlantic level, contra’d
accounts reduced the requirement to send bills of exchange, and was
therefore practised widely.
Local and regional credit was therefore a mixture of book credit,
cash on the odd occasion, payment in kind, barter and contra’d
accounts. Credit extended at the local and regional level was a ‘move-
able feast’. The amount of credit and time given to pay was apparently
a book debt and a bond. Montefiore, Trader’s and Manufacturer’s Compendium, p. 604;
John Foot Ledger 1790–1841, f. 30, HSP; Samuel and Miers Fishers Ledger 1769–?,
ff. 158, 160.
150 chapter five
Figure 5.3: Credit Networks in Philadelphia: Flour

Sutton and McCauley
(Merchants?)
Less than one
months’ credit
Mifflin and Massey

(wholesale grocers) Cash or less than one
months’ credit
Half cash, quarter at six
months’ and quarter at
two years’ credit Cash Jonathan
Mifflin
(Merchant)
Gabriel Davies (West Gilbert and Hunt

Jersey Shopkeeper?) (Philadelphia
Merchants)
Barter
Other retailer
Samuel Richards
(Shoemaker –
Consumer Consumer)
Source: Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 8, 13, 15, 18.
determined by judgment calls on the part of the potential creditor.

These were based on a mixture of commodity type, the proximity
of the buyer to the seller, gender, reputation and trust—both at first
impression and as built up over time. It is certainly not possible to
state that a certain commodity or area was characterised by partic-
ular credit terms.
Trans-Atlantic Credit and Bills of Exchange

The risk involved in long-distance trade was offset to some extent
by a slightly more standardised set of business terms than at the
local and regional level, although once again, the reality was com-
plicated. In the 1760s and 1770s six months was the ‘normal’ agreed
time of credit from British merchants to their trading partners in
the mainland colonies. As the eighteenth century drew to a close
however, times were extended to twelve or even eighteen months.
Interest was charged on over-due payments, and discounts given for
early payment, both at 5 per cent. Merchant houses in Philadelphia
usually imported manufactures from Britain at twelve months’ credit

from the date of the invoice. This could be ordered via a merchant
in Liverpool for example, or direct from the manufacturing area.
Indeed, towards the end of the century, efforts were made by man-
ufacturers in England to bypass merchants in the export trade. In
order to do this they offered generous credit to American merchants,
sometimes as long as eighteen to twenty-four months. However, the
provisions and regional trade from Philadelphia complicated the
picture.12
Doerflinger argues that the provisions trade in Philadelphia had
a much shorter credit cycle than that of manufactures and other dry
goods. This was because the trade did not go via London, and there-
fore was not subject to the long credit customary in the trans-Atlantic
trade. Furthermore, Pennsylvanian farmers and millers wanted cash
payment for their goods and merchants in this sector, wanting to
recoup their investment, gave shorter credit in turn.13 However, this
simple dichotomy does not work because so many of these goods
were re-exported from Philadelphia around the Atlantic—especially
to the West Indies, and of course, to Liverpool. A Philadelphia mer-
chant exporting flour to Liverpool would not receive his money
quickly, because the credit network would most likely involve British
manufactures and other American staples. For example, a Philadelphia
merchant might import sugar from the West Indies, rice from the
Southern continental colonies/states, rum from New England and
then export some of these goods to Liverpool, ship some to New
York and sell some locally. Equally he might import Staffordshire
pottery through Liverpool, sell some locally and send some to Baltimore
for example. Therefore, both dry and wet goods involved local,
regional and trans-Atlantic credit, and the credit given and received
for them crossed over and interlinked.
Despite this, credit terms were well understood and accepted on
both sides of the Atlantic. In 1759 Daniel Clark of Philadelphia
12
Nash, “The Organization of Trade and Finance”, p. 121; Morgan, “Business
Networks”, pp. 53–55; Stanley D. Chapman, “British Marketing Enterprise: The
Changing Role of Merchants, Manufacturers, and Financiers, 1700–1860”, BHR,
53,2 (1979), 205–233, p. 212; Hudson, Genesis, p. 164; Pat Hudson, “Capital and
Credit in the West Riding Wool Industry, c.1750–1850”, in Pat Hudson (ed.), Regions
and Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), pp. 69–99, esp. 84–92.
13
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 78.
152 chapter five
wrote to William Neale in London “I understand your time of credit

is Twelve months. I do agree to allow you Five PCt p Ann for what
sum or sums may not be paid by that Time, upon this cargoe as
well as Upon any future order I may send you”. Clark also wrote
to Haliday and Dunbar in Liverpool. He was not concerned at all
about the time of credit: “Whatever your time of Credit is, if I
should exceed it Do Allow to pay you the usual interest”. It was
obviously understood that the credit period allowed would be at least
twelve months. No doubt the usual interest was 5 per cent. Nor did
these arrangements change after the War of Independence. William
Sitgreaves wrote to Thomas Powell of London in 1783 setting up
business on the same terms, with commission of 2½ per cent, but
that he should be allowed 5 per cent interest on any monies paid
early.14 Merchants were stating these terms only for clarity and to
avoid misunderstandings that could possibly result in litigation; they
were the normal state of affairs.
However, twelve months’ credit given did not mean that the pur-
chaser really had twelve months in which to pay. The time period
was given from the date of the invoice—when the goods were pack-
aged in Liverpool or even Manchester, but it could potentially be
at least ten weeks before the recipient in Philadelphia saw the invoice.
The goods then had to be unpacked and checked against the bill of
lading and invoice. The recipient finally had to find and purchase
a bill of exchange (not always an easy task as we shall see), and
then remit it to the supplier or his banker. The bill also had to be
sent back across the Atlantic, and delays were often encountered in
finding a vessel that was going to the correct port. It would take
several more weeks before reaching its destination, and may then
have had to be sent to another city, often London, for acceptance.
If a Philadelphia merchant wanted to maintain his reputation and
pay on time, he therefore had far less than twelve months to actu-
ally remit for his goods.
New credit relationships were often constructed through a letter
of introduction, as discussed in chapter four. However, if that was
unavailable, and credit was not forthcoming, a ‘good faith payment’
14
Clark to Neale, 20 Dec 1759; Clark to Haliday and Dunbar, 26 Sep 1760,
Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763; Sitgreaves to Powell, 24 Sep
1783, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794.
was another way of establishing a new business relationship. An

American trader might send a bill of exchange in part payment of
an order. For example, in 1784 William Sitgreaves of Philadelphia
sent £200 in advance to Robert and Samuel Hibbert in Manchester,
the balance of the account being on twelve months’ credit. If trust
could not be established, traders might have to keep their account
in credit all the time. Thomas Leonard of Halifax, Nova Scotia,
started a trading relationship with the Herculaneum Pottery in this
way in 1812. He sent a bill of exchange for £72 4s. 3d. for goods
that were not despatched until June 1813. At the same time as the
first order was leaving Liverpool, the pottery received a further £100
from Leonard, which he drew on over the following year. Like
Sitgreaves, Leonard received interest on his credit balance. The other
side of the coin was of course, that customers would ‘extend’ their
credit time by simply not paying. This was attended by rates of
interest as noted above, but if this occurred en masse in times of cri-
sis, the supplier would have preferred to have the cash immediately,
rather than wait and have slightly more money due. Only those with
large savings or extremely lenient creditors in turn could afford to
wait for their money. Most traders agreed that “The Profit from
Trading does not arise so much from charging high, as ready sales
and quick returns”.15
Whilst contra-ing accounts was normal practice, not all traders
imported and exported goods via the same port, let alone the same
merchant in that port. Even when they did, at the end of the day,
some form of payment was necessary. The way in which most trans-
Atlantic traders received this final payment was through the use of
bills of exchange.16 These worked much like a modern cheque in
that they “combined a promise to pay with an order to pay”. A
more comprehensive definition is:
A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by
one person or firm to another, signed by the person giving it, requir-
ing the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a
15
William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794, f. 46; Herculaneum Potteries
Ledger 1806–1817, f. 131; Gordon, The Universal Accountant, p. 2.
16
Other forms of financial paper were used in Great Britain and the Americas,
such as bonds and promissory notes. However, little trade was financed directly in
this manner and so they are not discussed here. Morgan, “Business Networks”,
p. 52.
154 chapter five
fixed determinable future time a sum certain in money to or to the

order of a specified person or to the bearer.17
Unlike modern cheques, bills of exchange, once accepted (the payer
had agreed to pay the bill), were negotiable, meaning that the payee
(the person due to receive the money), could sign (negotiate) the bill
and pass it on to someone else for payment in turn. It did not have
to be cashed by the original payee, or person named. Furthermore,
they usually had a future payment date on them, similar to post-
dating a cheque; ‘at sixty-days sight’ was a common feature of bills
of exchange, meaning that once the payer or acceptor (the person
on which the bill was drawn) had actually seen and agreed to pay
the bill, the payee would receive the money in sixty days time. The
last difference between a bill of exchange and the modern cheque
was that it was drawn not on a bank, but on a particular person
or merchant house. This brings us back to trust. Technically, any-
one could write a bill of exchange, but in order for the system to
work, the payee had to trust the name of the payer as well as the
person remitting the bill (the drawee). If the payee did not believe
either the drawer (the person who wrote the bill) or payer was reli-
able, he would not accept the bill as payment.
Bills were usually drawn on prominent reputable merchant houses.
Often these were in London, but bankers such as Thomas Leyland
in Liverpool provided bills of exchange or were drawn on as rep-
utable firms. Merchant houses that were well respected could draw
on themselves. Thomas P. Cope of Philadelphia was able to do this,
and wrote bills of exchange payable by his own house. Lesser traders
had three options. First they could go to a merchant or banker who
could write their own bills with cash and purchase a bill for the
exact amount they wanted to pay. Those who could write bills were
happy to do so for no fee as they held the cash for a considerable
amount of time before the bills would be paid. David Tuohy of
Liverpool regularly purchased bills from Heywood’s bank for exam-
ple. Second, a trader could give cash to any merchant or banker
17
Eric Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1988), pp. 45–47. For more on bills of exchange see Larry Neal,
“The Finance of Business During the Industrial Revolution”, in Roderick Floud
and D.N. McCloskey (eds.), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, 3 Vols., Vol. I,
1700 –1860 (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 151–181,
pp. 157–162.
who held a bill of exchange that had been given to him in pay-
ment. The buying trader would just have to purchase a bill on which
the amount was as near as he could find to the debt he had to pay.
She or he might therefore end up sending a bill of exchange for
£90 5s. 8d. for a debt of £87 6s. 5d. The balance would remain
on the account until the next transaction. Third, if a trader had an
ongoing account with the person providing the bill, he may have
been able to simply have his account debited.18
There is no doubting the importance of bills of exchange in facil-
itating commerce at the regional and trans-Atlantic level. However,
whilst in theory they seemed simple enough, there were in fact sev-
eral problems associated with them. First, the very trust that made
them work could conversely cause problems. The more generally
known the payer was, the better. Large well-known London houses
were preferred. The bi-lateral trade between Liverpool and Philadelphia
often included bills drawn on Liverpool houses (very rarely Philadel-
phian ones because of the unequal balance of trade), but many still
preferred London houses. Daniel Clark paid Haliday and Dunbar
with bills drawn on London merchant Daniel Mildred, which he
may have purchased from another Philadelphia merchant who had
a credit balance with Mildred as shown in Figure 5.4.19
In contrast, West India merchant houses were seen as untrust-
worthy and their bills were often treated with suspicion. This was
because West Indian houses encountered so many problems with
payments from planters in the region. William Davenport, a Liverpool
slave trader, certainly complained that the bills he received from the
West Indies were at such long future sight.20 This was unfortunate
for Philadelphia traders who had a favourable balance of trade with
the West Indies and could have used them for payment to Liverpool
and London. Often however, they could not negotiate these bills,
and had to wait for payment on them, whilst purchasing another
bill to make payment to England. This fastidiousness over bills was
18
The Tradesman, p. 222; Going Out Book 26 Jan–28 Jul 1809, LBP; T.P. Cope
and Sons, Bills Payable and Receivable 1806–1808, passim, HSP; David Tuohy
Accounts, DTP.
19
Clark to Mildred, 14 Jan 1761, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763.
20
Davenport to John Sowerby, 30 Mar 1779, William Davenport Letterbook
1763–1785, f. 5, MMM; on the reputation of West India merchants see Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 95–96.
156 chapter five
Figure 5.4: The Flow of a Bill of Exchange

Daniel Clark – Haliday & Dunar in Liverpool –
Drawee or Bill sent to Liverpool
the Payee or person owed
Remitter in money by Daniel Clark Step 5
Philadelphia Step 2
Bill sent to
manufaturer
Step 1 – negotiated/signed by
Haliday & Dunbar?
Step 3
Step 4
Cash/ Bill Bill sent to
book London for Bill returned to
debt acceptance Liverpool signed –
and signed by it can now be
Mildred ‘negotiated’
Unknown Merchant in Daniel Mildred in London – the

Philadelphia in credit with Daniel Payer or Acceptor on whom the
Mildred in London – the Drawer Bill of Exchange is Drawn
Step 1a
who writes the Bill of Exchange
Letter of notification sent to
Mildred and Philadelphia Key:
Merchant’s account debited Flow of Bill
Source: Clark to Mildred, 14 January 1761, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book
1759–1763.
well stated by Philadelphia merchant William Pollard writing to Peter

Holme in Liverpool in 1772:
our Excha: is ruled by Bills @ 30 Days on Londo, but if a person
wants a Bill to remit to Londo. & I can only draw on Liverpool, he
will not take my Bill, unless he has it lower than he can get a Bill
upon Londo. for. & therefore I must either draw upon Londo some-
times or sell my Bills lower by half or one Pct, but I shall make it my
Business as often as possible to sell my Bills to persons who want to
send them to Liverpool.21
The preference for London bills meant that they were often at a
premium and purchasers had to pay over and above the usual
exchange rate in order to purchase them.
Second, the future time at which a bill could be paid also caused
confusion, and a lively market in discounting bills. A bill of exchange
was not instantly convertible into cash—it became due at the thirty
21
Pollard to Holme, 16 May 1772, William Pollard Letterbook 1772–1774.
or sixty days ‘sight’ stipulated within the text of the bill. Whilst lesser
traders might be simply happy to receive payment, however delayed,
some larger merchants were in a position to be able to negotiate.
For example, if the face value of a bill was £100, but there were
three months left until it would be paid, he might accept the bill as
payment, but at a discount, say 5 per cent. He would take the bill,
duly negotiated, and give the other trader a credit of £95, because
he could afford to wait for the cash and take the risk of non-pay-
ment. Some traders used this ‘problem’ with the future time to advan-
tage however. Many saw this ‘discounting’ as a positive practice
because they preferred to have the cash immediately. Thomas P.
Cope received over 338 bills payable to his merchant house in 1807,
233 of which (68.9 per cent) he discounted at various banks—includ-
ing the Bank of North America in Philadelphia. Whilst he was not
receiving the full credit value of the bill, he did receive the cash or
credit for investment elsewhere.22 This practice let Cope get on with
other business, and took away the risk of non-payment. Merchants
hated to see money laying idle.
A third problem with bills of exchange is that high demand at
peak times of payment meant that they became scarce. Then of
course, traders had to pay a premium for them—they went to the
highest bidder. Daniel Clark wrote to his London correspondent
William Neale in London in 1760 regarding his account. “I wish
you Could Discover to me some means of making Remittance besides
Bills for they [are] almost out of reach”. By ‘some means’ he was
requesting to send goods, such as flour or rum in payment—but not
all English merchants would accept this as a method of payment
because the prices of goods fluctuated so much. The problem con-
tinued after Independence. Ralph Eddowes found bills of exchange
hard to come by in 1794. Those available could only be purchased
at 9½ per cent over par. This meant that a bill with a face value
of £100 would cost him £109.50. His correspondent and friend,
William Rathbone IV in Liverpool was more accommodating than
Neale. He allowed Eddowes to make payment for his earthenware
“in such way as you may see best”—allowing him to remit by com-
modity if necessary. The scarcity of bills also exacerbated another
problem, that of the exchange rate between Pennsylvania currency
22
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 95–96; T.P. Cope and Sons, Bills Payable
and Receivable 1806–1808, passim.
158 chapter five
(and dollars) and pounds sterling. One year it might take £155
Pennsylvania currency to purchase a bill worth £100, and the next
year £195 currency to purchase the same bill. The balance of pay-
ments being in favour of Great Britain simply exacerbated the pay-
ment problems encountered by Philadelphia traders.23
Last, bills could be refused for payment. A bill was written by the
drawer (writer of the bill of exchange) and sent by the drawer or
remitter (occasionally the same person) to the house to which he
owed money. The payee then had to send it to the payer or accep-
tor (the house on which it was drawn) for acceptance. The accept-
ing house would sign the bill saying that they would pay the bill at
the due date. However, if the drawer did not have a credit balance,
or was not known or trusted by the drawee (sometimes known as
the acceptor), they might refuse payment. This reflected very badly
on the person trying to make payment with the bill as well and
could severely damage their reputation. The person owed the money
could ‘protest’ in order to secure payment. A protest was a legal
document drawn up by a notary public, who also wrote on the bill
that it had been refused. This was necessary in order to pursue the
matter in court.
Very occasionally traders would not pay a bill even though they
had accepted it. This was considered very bad business practise. The
Fishers had cause for concern over a bill drawn on and accepted
by Thomas Plummer of London. Protested bills might even start a
run of requests for payment if gossip spread that a trader could not
pay their bills. Yet no-one was infallible. The eminent Philadelphia
merchant Robert Morris tried to pay a debt with a bill drawn on
a London house, a Mr Rucher, in 1787, for £100. This bill may
have been negotiated (signed on) several times and was drawn against
Mr Rucher, not Robert Morris, but was refused for payment. This
did not necessarily mean that Morris did not have the funds, but
was embarrassing anyway because he had tried to make a payment
with it.24
23
Clark to Neale, 17 Oct 1760, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763;
Eddowes to Roscoe 10 Nov 1794; Roscoe to Eddowes, 13 Dec 1796, RP. For more
on exchange rates see also John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and
America, 1660–1775: A Handbook (Kingsport, Tennessee: Kingsport Press, 1978).
24
Various, The Tradesman, p. 223; Notary Public Form, 5 Oct 1778, Joshua Fisher
and Sons Ledger 1769–1773, Fisher Family Business Papers, Sarah Smith Collection,
HSP; Sitgreaves to Harrison and Ansley, 26 Jul 1787, William and John Sitgreaves
Letterbook 1783–1794.
Lesser traders could not afford to have such things happen to

them. Mary Hickie of Cork took over her husband’s business on his
death in the mid 1780s, but could not get a bill paid to Thomas
Leyland of Liverpool because some of her husband’s creditors were
withholding the money. Fortunately for her, Leyland was prepared
to be patient and wait to see if the bill would eventually be hon-
oured. In turn, Leyland did not want to send a bill for Catharine
Roberts to Bristol, as he did not know any houses (meaning —he
could trust) there. He requested that she suggest another house—in
London of course! In fact many women used bills of exchange rou-
tinely as part of their business throughout the period. These included
Margaret Duncan and Maria Ledlie of Philadelphia, and Eleanor
Moore and Sarah Packer of Liverpool. Despite the problems asso-
ciated with bills of exchange they were used precisely because they
were so flexible and widely accepted. Bills of exchange were mostly
created by merchants and bankers, but people throughout the social
scale, both men and women, made use of them.25
Banking
Bills of exchange were therefore extremely important within credit

networks. Whilst they were usually originated by merchants, a whole
host of traders and others also used them. Some merchant houses,
whether they were able to draw up their own bills of exchange or
not, were also used by other traders as proto-banks or clearing houses;
and merchant houses became one of many intermediaries for finance
and investment in this period. Successful merchant houses performed
many roles, as was noted in chapter two, and their ‘banking’ ser-
vice grew out of this ability to write and discount bills of exchange.
However, it was not necessary to be able to write your own bills of
exchange to act as a proto bank. For example, Rathbone, Benson
and Co. of Liverpool were the main commission merchants for Clow
and Co. of Philadelphia. During the 1780s they kept a running
account not only for commission services, but also for bills both
25
Leyland to Hickie, 17 May 1787, Thomas Leyland Letterbook 1786–1788;
Leyland to Roberts, 19 Oct 1787, Thomas Leyland Letterbook 1786–1788; Bank
of North America Personal Ledgers, 1791, ff. 620, 1373, HSP; Arthur Heywood
and Sons Ledger 1788–1797, ff. 68, 71, AHA.
160 chapter five
accepted for payment by other houses and received on Clow’s behalf.

A similar service was performed by the Fishers in Philadelphia at
the regional level. During the 1790s Elias Stockley of Millford used
his account with the Fishers to pay other merchants in Philadelphia.
The use of merchant houses as banks therefore persisted despite the
rise in formal banks during the second half of the eighteenth century.26
In Liverpool there were no banks listed in the trade directories of
1766, but six were listed by 1805. The first formal bank in Philadelphia
was the Bank of North America, founded in 1781, but by 1805,
there were three listed in the Philadelphia trade directory. However,
London remained predominant in banking at the trans-Atlantic level
into the early nineteenth century. Heywood’s bank of Liverpool used
Joseph Denison of London as their clearing house—partly because
they were in partnership with him, but Leyland and Bullin’s Bank,
also of Liverpool, used Masterman and Co., bankers in London. The
Fishers of Philadelphia used Harrison and Annesley of London as
their English banker in the 1790s, although they had an account
with the Bank of North America as well. By 1811 the Bank of North
America was also used as a clearing house having accounts with
other American banks such as Bank of New York, Bank of the
United States and the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Banks.27
There were of course some differences between the banking sys-
tems of Liverpool and Philadelphia. Banks in Liverpool were run by
men who used to be, or were still, merchants and were small-scale
enterprises. In contrast, the Bank of North America was set up by
merchants, but on a far larger scale and with a different remit from
the smaller, more personal, Liverpool banks. For example, the agree-
ment setting up Heywood’s bank in 1776 stated that its “Business
shall consist in exchanging Cash for Bills or Notes, in Discounting
bills or notes, Exchanging bills”, but expressly that no money was
to “be employed in stock-jobbing or other hazardous undertakings,
or adventures in trade”. Heywood’s chose to follow normal English
banking theory and ‘play it safe’. In contrast, the Bank of North
26
Clow and Co., Account with Rathbone, Benson and Co., 1 Sep 1794, Folder
Adriana, Box 60D, CWU; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797,
f. 27. The author could not ascertain whether this was Millford, Pennsylvania or
Millford, Delaware. Both are some distance away from Philadelphia.
27
Arthur Heywood and Sons Ledger 1787–1798, f. 5, AHA; Bills Sent for
Acceptance Book 1807–1809, passim, LBP; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers
Fisher 1792–1797, f. 303; Bank of North America Personal Ledgers 1791, ff. 751,
786.
America was specifically set up to help finance a national debt, gain

financial integrity for the United States government, issue paper, and
unite the national interest with the business interest.28
There is no doubt that banks in both cities were used extensively
by traders of all kinds. Doerflinger argues that during the period
1784 to 1785 merchants held 47 per cent of all accounts at the Bank
of North America, and 68 per cent of very active accounts. Retailers
held 14 per cent of all and 12 per cent of very active accounts.
Retailers also, like merchants, actively discounted the bills of exchange
they received. In 1790 to 1791, merchants accounted for 34 per cent
of all discounters, whilst retailers were 27 per cent, with grocers par-
ticularly dominant. This would suggest that as retailers grew in num-
ber, they used the bank to full advantage.
Women also used the banks in both cities as shown in Table 5.1.
At the Bank of North America, only 3 per cent of accounts were
held by women in 1791. However, with time women used the bank
more, accounting for 8.5 per cent of all accounts by 1811. In Liverpool
7.3 per cent of all accounts at Heywood’s in Liverpool were held
by women in 1789. Furthermore, during the period 1788–1797
women held 27 per cent of all accounts at Heywood’s, suggesting
that women were quite likely to hold accounts, but did not keep
them open for as long as men. The newly-formed Liverpool bank
of Leyland and Bullin’s also had less women in 1807, but once estab-
lished this small-scale bank also came to be more popular with them.
It should be noted that whilst these percentages look quite similar,
the number of women holding bank accounts, and therefore bank
usage more generally was much wider in Liverpool. Over the period
1789–1797, 113 women had bank accounts at Heywood’s and fifty-
eight women had accounts with Leyland and Bullin’s in 1812. Only
thirteen women held accounts at the Bank of North America in
1811.29 Overall however, women in both cities did not hold bank
28
Articles of Partnership, 25 Aug 1776, AHA; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp.
296–301; for English banking theory see J.K. Horsefield, “The Duties of a Banker,
1. The Eighteenth Century View”, in Thomas S. Ashton, Papers in English Monetary
History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 1–15. For more on banks in early
America see Wright, “Bank Ownership”.
29
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 304–305. There were only five female account
holders at the Bank of North America in 1791, nine in 1801 and thirteen in 1811.
Bank of North America Personal Ledgers, 1791, 1801, 1811; Arthur Heywood and
Sons Ledger 1788–1797, passim (based on a 20 per cent sample of all accounts in
the ledger). Leyland and Bullin’s Balance Book 1807, Leyland and Bullin’s Balance
Book 1812–1823, LBP (100 per cent sample).
162 chapter five
accounts as often, or for as long, as men. The reasons for this dis-
crepancy were no doubt marriage, money being held in trust for
them by male agents, the shorter duration of businesses run by
women and the small-scale nature of those businesses. Women how-
ever, did not appear to be deterred from using the banks when they
wanted to, whether they were derived from long-standing merchant
houses, or newly-formed businesses.
Table 5.1: Bank Account Holding by Gender
(selected banks) m% f%
Heywood’s (1789) 92.3 7.3

Bank of North America (1791) 97.0 3.0
Leyland and Bullin’s (1807) 97.4 2.6
Leyland and Bullin’s (1812) 94.4 5.6
Source: Heywood’s Balance Book 1787–1798, AHA; Bank of North America Personal
Ledgers 1791, 1801, 1811; Leyland and Bullin’s Balance Book 1807, Leyland and
Bullin’s Balance Book 1812–1823, LBP.
A glance through the extant ledgers does show that women were
also far less likely to use their accounts as regularly as men. However,
they did use them for a similar variety of purposes. These included
the acceptance of bills of exchange and writing cheques, and many
women received interest on investments by having them paid into
their bank accounts. Frances Smith used her account with the Hey-
woods to receive in and pay out both bills and cash during the
1780s. In the 1790s Martha Brown used her account with the
Heywoods to receive dividends on stock; so did Anna Maria Clifton
of Philadelphia through the Bank of North America in 1811.
Occasionally women used their accounts extensively. Mary Rhea, a
Philadelphia shopkeeper in 1785 and 1791 used her account very
frequently in order to discount incoming bills, pay other bills, and
receive and make cash payments. Some women also had large amounts
go through their accounts. Hannah Holland, merchant and widow
of Benjamin, had a total of $21,700.28 go through her account in
1791 with bills payable to many major merchants in the city. At the
end of the year her balance stood at $3,713.01. Rebecca Alweeks
of Liverpool had a balance of £2,889 with Leyland and Bullins in

1812.30
Some women continued to use merchant houses as banks how-
ever. In 1792 Phebe Vining of Wilmington had the sale of her bank
stock and sales of land dealt with by the Fishers, in addition to their
sales of merchandise to her. Men held the really busy accounts with
banks however. The Fishers had a very busy account and even man-
aged to have a debit balance (overdrawn) in 1791 of $81.71. A total
of $61,123.57 went through Andrew Clow’s business account the
same year. In Liverpool, the merchant and broker William C. Rutson
also had a busy account as did merchants John Brancker and Samuel
Thompson. At Leyland and Bullin’s in 1812, William Brown had
£3,256 4s.1d. in his account and Richard Tatham £2,938, both
most likely merchants.31
Banks also handled investments in stock, consuls and bonds and
gave out small loans. In 1767, Liverpudlian Mary Dougherty appar-
ently received a £40 loan from Heywood’s bank in order to pay a
small debt, paying cash for the interest she was charged. Various
people had the dividends from their ‘safe’ investments in bank annu-
ities, loyalty loans, Irish 5 per cents and Navy Bills through Heywood’s.
The Bank of North America functioned in much the same way. Elias
Boudinot received a dividend of $112, and Elizabeth Lawrence, pos-
sibly a shopkeeper, a dividend of $28 credited to their accounts in
1791. At the same time Stephen Agard was charged interest on a
loan he had received from the bank. Other people who received
loans from the Bank of North America included Hannah Holland,
who borrowed $1,000 in 1797.32
In fact in 1790 retailers alone accounted for 13 per cent of all
loans by the bank. However, high demand meant that the bank had
to find some method of preference. Rather than charging higher
interest and relying on the market, they chose collateral, which of
30
Heywood’s Ledger 1788–1797, f. 109, AHA; Bank of North America Personal
Ledgers, 1791, 1801, 1811; Leyland and Bullin’s Balance Book 1812, ff. 184.
31
Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 43; Bank of North
America Personal Ledgers, 1791, ff. 743, 396; Leyland and Bullin’s Balance Book
1812, ff. 136, 165 (a William Brown and a Richard Tatham are both listed in the
Liverpool Trade Directory as merchants, although I cannot definitely link them).
32
Arthur Heywood and Sons Ledger 1787–1798, f. 15 and passim, AHA; Bank
of North America Personal Ledgers 1791, ff. 230, 1301, 8.
164 chapter five
course benefited those who already had money. Smaller retailers lost
out; by 1800 they accounted for only 7 per cent of loans. At the
same time of course people owned shares in the banks themselves.
Many of these investors were merchants, some of whom had helped
to set up banks in the first place, such as members of the board of
the Bank of North America and Thomas Leyland and the Heywoods,
but many women also owned shares in banks. Other prominent
investors in banks were other retailers.33 Banks were therefore used
by men and women for a variety of purposes, although less people
appeared to use the banks in Philadelphia than in Liverpool. Women
used their accounts much less often than men due to a variety of
reasons, but when they did use them they did so in much the same
way as men; to pay and bills and cash, to receive interest and other
payments and to gain loans for investment.
Finance and Investment
There were many opportunities for investment in the eighteenth cen-

tury, and as just discussed, some of the interest from those invest-
ments was paid into bank accounts. Of course, one of the riskiest
investments was trade itself, and therefore many people, including
traders at some point, tried to find safer options. For many traders,
commerce was a way of getting rich (hopefully), not so much as a
way of life, but of progressing to another life. Putting excess profits
to use other than trade diverted money away from commerce, but
simultaneously allowed new entrants to make a contribution. Men
and women tended, overall, to invest slightly differently due to sev-
eral reasons: women were under certain social and cultural con-
straints as to what work and income options were available to them
in the first place; they tended to favour less risky options, perhaps
because they derived a fixed income from them; and last, but by no
means least, women had different access to capital and credit from
men with which to invest in the first place. This last point requires
some attention.
33
Wright, “Bank Ownership”, pp. 41–47, 54; see also Robert E. Wright, “Women
and Finance in the Early National U.S.”, http://womenshistory.about.com/gi/dynamic/
offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fetext.lib.virginia.edu%2Fjournals%2FEH%2FEH42%
2FWright42.html (2000) (accessed Jul 2005).
The legal situation in both England and America left women at

a serious disadvantage when it came to access to money. In England,
the extensive use of primogeniture meant that most land went to
the eldest male child, with daughters receiving little. When a woman
did receive money it was usually held in trust until she got married,
at which time the assets she owned, both realty and personalty,
became available to her husband for his use. In Pennsylvania a
statute was passed in 1794 giving equal shares to all children, but
girls’ shares were still available to her husband for his use. In the-
ory, the husband was not allowed to dispose of this property with-
out her written consent, although he could use the profits as he
wished. This restriction on the alienation of female property was
because women were entitled to dower (a life interest) in lands owned
by the husband at the time of this death; she therefore had an inter-
est in his maintaining a good level of property. An attempt was
made by the Pennsylvania legislature to ensure that women were
not “kissed or kicked” into signing their estate away. In both England
and Pennsylvania, the law provided for separate examinations in
which the woman’s free will was to be established. However, this
option was rarely used, and even less often enforced in Pennsylvania.34
Even if a woman’s property was protected, dower was not inalien-
able in any case. Creditors were paid first from a deceased’s estate,
and if there was no money left for the widow and her children, this
was simply hard luck. Women sometimes tried to raise money on
such land in order to pay off creditors so that she could remain on
it—but just as many were made homeless. One Philadelphia widow
was trying to sell her dower land on Petty Island in 1790.
Notwithstanding the difficulties with dower, Pennsylvanian law clung
to it, or monies in lieu of it, despite the growth and availability of
more ‘modern’ instruments. In England, dower was in decline, and
jointure and separate estates on the rise. Jointures were agreements
which allowed for a specific amount of money or property to be
kept aside for the use of the widow. This meant that instead of
living-in rights on the ‘family’ home or land, a woman received a
particular house if the husband was wealthy, an income from a
34
Staves, Married Women’s Separate Property, p. 135; Carole Shammas, “Early
American Women and Control Over Capital”, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J.
Albert (eds.), Women in the Age of American Revolution (Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1989), pp. 134–154.
166 chapter five
particular property or an annual income from the estate. This may

have meant that they received less value than would have been their
entitlement with dower, but was more suitable for a population that
was increasingly urban. However, in Pennsylvania, separate estates
were perceived as attempts to defraud creditors. This was because
money that was put aside for wives in this manner could not be
used to pay creditors. Indeed, an associate of Tench Coxe, Dr
Thomas Ruston, was accused of exactly this in 1796 when being
hounded by his creditors. He was found guilty and sentenced to a
year’s imprisonment. Furthermore, Pennsylvanian husbands appar-
ently demonstrated a lack of generosity towards their future widows,
often leaving their wives less than they would have received if their
husbands had died intestate.35 Women in Philadelphia therefore had
even less access to capital than Liverpool women, and even less con-
trol over that which they did have.
However, it does appear that as the eighteenth century progressed,
legacies left to women, however small, did make allowances for
whether they would be forced to survive in urban or rural sur-
roundings. Increasingly widows and single women were more likely
than men to have cash or credits than livestock as part of their
inventories at death, even in rural areas. Philadelphia widows were
more likely to be left a mixture of annuities, stock from bonds, per-
sonal property and some real estate, but not part of a house or live-
stock. In Liverpool too, husbands realised the difficulties widows
would face in an urban environment. Walter Cato, a Liverpool sur-
geon and apothecary, realised that his wife would not be able to
carry on his business. His will declared that she should sell every-
thing and have the money. Arrangements that were more monetary
also left women free of the conditions that often went with dower
such as not remarrying. Importantly for credit networks, this move
35
The Pennsylvania Gazette, 3 Feb 1790; see also the case of Hannah Carter in
Diana E. Ascott, “Family and Friends: Inheritance Strategies in a Mobile Population”,
in Diana E. Ascott, Fiona Lewis and Michael J. Power, Approaches to the History of
Liverpool Community, 1660–1760 (forthcoming, 2006); and Sarah Yerdsley, Will of
John Yerdsley, 19 Aug 1729, Chester and Cheshire Record Office. My thanks to
Paul A. Knight for this reference; Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture
Wiliamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Salmon,
Women and the Law of Property, pp. 22–35, 92–104, 160–168; Amy Louise Erickson,
Women and Property in Early Modern England (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 194;
Shammas, “Early American Women”, p. 141.
towards more liquid capital arrangements meant that widows and

other single women had cash to invest. Their comparative disad-
vantage individually should not therefore mislead us. As a group
female investors made a very large contribution to the investment
matrix of a region. In Yorkshire for example: “Apart from large
landowners and trusteeships, the most important single source of
investment funds was spinsters and widows”.36 Both rural and urban
women had money to invest in the trade of both cities, or at the
every least contributed to the general funds available.
‘Safe’ Money
When men and women had funds to invest, one of the safest ways
in which to invest that money was at interest, either in bonds, stocks
or annuities. A common way to place money for investment or con-
versely to gain finance, was through an intermediary such as an
attorney, broker, merchant or bank. In Liverpool, attorneys were the
most common middlemen. Trusted figures in the local community
who could ‘network’ at the local courts, they were integral to the
mortgage and other financial markets as well as overseeing trustee-
ships.37 Through them, varying amounts of money could be brought
together to finance loans of other sizes.
The Liverpool attorney and banker William Roscoe worked in
this way between 1799 and 1804. He handled the account for the
trustees of Elizabeth Fleetwood and her children. Roscoe also over-
saw the sale of land, distribution of legacies and investments on their
behalf. Margaret Weiss, perhaps the widow of Henry, broker of
Liverpool, invested £1,600 with Roscoe at 5 per cent interest. Monies
held in this way were in turn lent out to others, or invested in other
ways. Roscoe invested legacies for Robert, Bridget and Eliza Milnes
in 3 per cent annuities. A low rate for a low-risk investment. He
also lent out on mortgage sums as large as £6,000 to Dr. Peter
Crompton in 1801, and as small as £23 to Thomas Bennet in 1796,
both at 5 per cent, representing the slightly higher risk. In Philadelphia,
36
Lisa W. Waciega, “A ‘Man of Business’: The Widow of Means on SouthEastern
Pennsylvania, 1750–1850”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 34,1 (1987), 40–64; Hudson, Genesis,
p. 213.
37
Bruce L. Anderson, “Aspects of Capital and Credit in Lancashire During the
Eighteenth Century” (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Liverpool: 1966), chap-
ter two.
168 chapter five
brokers were the main financial intermediaries. Men such as Patrick

Duffey fulfilled a similar service to William Roscoe, procuring money
on loan during the 1780s. Brokers Joseph Howell and John Lawrence
sold bank stock, government securities, bills of exchange, canal and
turnpike company shares and dealt in land warrants and real estate.
Miers Fisher was also an attorney and he helped people with queries
and problems regarding land transactions although there is no evi-
dence that he acted as an intermediary for investment. He invested
at least some of his own money in the merchant house along with
his brothers.38
Another avenue for investment was the thriving market in per-
sonal one-to-one loans in the eighteenth century. Friendly and famil-
ial links were probably more important in this context. David Tuohy
had £500 lent out on various mortgages in 1772, and in 1787 David
Shaw, another Liverpool merchant had £1,000 loaned to Jacob
Spence, a shipowner. Women also lent on mortgage. Liverpool woman
Elizabeth Preston lent £100 to William Stag on security of a prop-
erty. She did not hesitate to pursue her debt through Chancery when
he defaulted and the property’s value did not meet the amount of
the loan. There was not such a thriving mortgage market in
Philadelphia, probably because only 20 per cent of people held real
estate there in the eighteenth-century, but many women lent money
to merchant houses instead. Hannah Catherall had only £100 invested
with the Fishers in the 1790s, but the widow Sarah Mifflin had
£1,000 invested in Mifflin and Massey, both received 6 per cent
interest. These arrangements worked to the benefit of both parties.
The women received a safer and more respectable return than invest-
ing in trade on their own behalf, and the traders received vital cap-
ital for investing in their business.39
Another investment that was safe, at least most of the time, was
land. It was more of a long-term investment though, often indulged
38
Account of Margaret Weiss, Roscoe Ledger 1799–1809, ff. 22–25, 8, 17; Arthur
Heywood and Sons Ledger 1763–1784, ff. 20, 21; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily
Advertiser, 4 Oct 1787; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Oct 1796;
Letterbook of Miers Fisher 1797–1806, APS; Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher
Ledger 1792–1797.
39
23 Jun 1771, David Tuohy Accounts, DTP; 10 Sep 1787, David Shaw Account
Book 1787; Pleadings of Elizabeth Preston, NA; Sharon V. Salinger and Charles
Wetherell, “Wealth and Renting in Pre-Revolutionary Philadelphia”, JAH, 71,4
(1985), 826–840, p. 828; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797,
f. 39; Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1761–1763 f. 38.
in by successful merchants at the height of their careers. Merchants

in Philadelphia, as well as others who had made their fortune, were
likely to invest their capital in “judiciously selected lots, houses, and
farms that would appreciate rapidly in capital value while paying a
good rent as well”. Whilst of course this was occasionally a specu-
lative and highly risky venture, mostly it was ‘safe money’. William
and John Sitgreaves certainly moved successfully from predominantly
mercantile affairs in the 1780s and early 1790s to landholding in
the later 1790s and early 1800s. They owned a variety of proper-
ties in Philadelphia on Second, Third, Fourth, Chesnut and Market
Streets. In Liverpool too, councillors, who were predominantly mer-
chants, owned an average of 8.1 properties, compared to 2.5 for
ratepayers as a whole. They were investing in urban redevelopment,
hoping for a quick profit. Merchants were not the only ones to invest
in land. Mary Usher of Liverpool purchased two leases from the
Corporation of Liverpool in the 1790s which she rented out to other
people.40 There was therefore a wide range of safe investments for
men and women in both Liverpool and Philadelphia.
‘Risky’ Money
Male and female traders took risks everyday of course, just by being
in trade. It was noted in chapter three that the higher up the social
scale the trader, the more likely the trader was to be male. This
pattern was reflected in investment patterns, the larger the invest-
ment, and indeed the riskier, the more likely the investor was to be
male. This was because men had better access to capital, but they
also appeared more likely to take risk as well. Whether this was sim-
ply a gender-based phenomenon, or purely down the fact that men
had much better access to wealth, is difficult to say.
Many male investments were also in trade-related enterprises involv-
ing some level of ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal’ integration. For example,
in Liverpool, some West-India merchants were involved in sugar pro-
cessing. In 1766 Jonathon Blundell, Peter Holme, Ralph Earle,
Thomas Hodgson, Patrick Black, Thomas Lickbarrow and John
Sparling invested together in a sugar refinery at the Haymarket. This
40
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 57, 127; William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook
1783–1794; Sitgreaves Ledger B 1806–1821; Power, “Councillor and Commerce”,
pp. 317–320; Will of Mary Usher, 15 Mar 1798, LRO.
170 chapter five
was no random investment, because most of them were involved in

sugar importation on a regular basis. They could therefore supply
the refinery as cheaply as possible and make profits from the sale
of refined sugar. Others were involved in ‘backward’ integration.
Samuel Holland, also of Liverpool, exported to Philadelphia in the
1790s. It is quite possible that he was exporting pottery as he was
a trustee of the Herculaneum Pottery at its inception in 1806. This
meant that he would have privileged access to good quality stock
and at the right prices.
In Philadelphia there were less options for manufacture, but traders,
and especially merchants, did the best they could. In 1772 Samuel
Morris and Peter Miercken invested £6,771 in a sugar refinery.
Listed in the trade directories as sugar merchants, they were obvi-
ously bringing in sugar from the West Indies and then integrating
their business. They had good access to sugar and made a profit on
the refining of it as well. At least two dozen merchants were involved
in iron manufacturing. These included Joseph Turner and William
Allen, one of their iron works alone was capitalized at £21,873. The
iron works part owned by Henry Drinker and Abel James was worth
£16,800. They positively noted that their involvement was directly
as a result of the difficulty of obtaining iron for trading purposes.
Thomas Clifford was also involved in shipping bar iron and pro-
vided capital to the Pine Grove Iron Works in Maryland in order
to secure his cargo. Occasionally middlemen, especially in the flour
industry, would invest in milling, such as Thomas Canby, who owned
part of a grist mill in Maryland. It would not appear however, that
timber merchants in Philadelphia were involved in backward inte-
gration to any extent. As with any investment, these attempts were
not always successful. The Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement
of Manufactures and the Useful Arts was not well thought out. It
was not until the early nineteenth century that Philadelphia’s manu-
facturing industry really developed.41
41
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, pp. 179, 330–332, 151–157, 123; see also David
J. Jeremy, “British Textile Technology Transmission to the United States: The
Philadelphia Region Experience, 1770–1820”, BHR, 18,1 (1973), 24–52; Timothy
Pitkin, A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States (1816) (rep. New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1967); for the role of Tench Coxe in promoting manufactures
see Jacob E. Cooke, “Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton, and the Encouragement
of American Manufactures”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 32,3 (1975), 369–392; regarding ver-
tical integration see Steve Davies, “Vertical Integration” in Roger Clarke and Tony
Women also invested in manufacture, though less often. Mrs Need-

ham, Ann Core and George Warrington all had money at interest
invested in another sugar house in Liverpool, but whereas Arthur
Heywood had put his money as a risky investment in the profits,
theirs was placed at interest. Miss Hird was more unusual. She had
one share of £500 in the Herculaneum Pottery, sharing in the profits
and losses the same as male investors did. She received a £15 divi-
dend (3 per cent) on her investment in 1807, which was not high
for this more risky investment.42
One main form of horizontal integration was of course shipping,
which only became a specialist occupation in the early nineteenth
century. In Philadelphia and Liverpool during our period, besides
merchants, many women, artisans, gentlemen, shipwrights, mariners
and shopkeepers owned shares in ships. The three owners of the
Thetis built in Liverpool in 1777, were a merchant, a mariner and
a sailmaker. The widow Jane Watson of Liverpool owned shares in
the Peggy in the 1780s, and the seven owners of the Hazard included
three Liverpool women, Elizabeth and Deborah Hunter, both spin-
sters, and Catharine Sutton, a widow. In Philadelphia, women were
far less likely to own shares in vessels. In the period covered by this
study only one Philadelphia woman owned a share in any vessels
registered at Philadelphia. Margaret Duncan owned a third of the
Patty and Peggy along with William Duncan and Robert Hardie in
1773. Indeed only four other women owned shares in vessels regis-
tered at Philadelphia before 1776. Not all these enterprises were suc-
cessful. In the 1770s James Fazakerly had trouble recouping his
money from his stint as master and co-owner of the Alice; but there
is no doubt that many people increased their profits and/or income
by investing their surplus capital in shipping. Many women and
women may have come to own shares in vessels as payment for
debts outstanding. More women may have come into their shares
McGuinness (eds.), The Economics of the Firm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp.
83–106; Simon Ville, “The Expansion and Development of a Private Business: An
Application of Vertical Integration Theory”, BH, 33,4 (1991), 19–42.
42
Articles of Partnership, 31 Mar 1766, EC; Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine
Intelligencer, 4 Jan 1796; Herculaneum Pottery Minute Book, 24 Nov 1806 and
Resolution No. 2. p. 5; Private Ledger of Arthur Heywood 1763–1784, ff. 10, 11,
AHA; Herculaneum Pottery Ledger 1806–1817, f. 16. See Hancock, Citizens, chap-
ters five to seven for the investments of his London merchants.
172 chapter five
by virtue of their inheritance. It is difficult however, to say how often

women invested in shipping as a positive action.43
There were of course many risks associated with owning shipping
such as loss by bad weather, and ships being taken as prizes dur-
ing war. The Lydia, an American built ship was taken as a prize by
Liverpool sailors in 1782 and was registered to the merchant James
Kenyon, but it was taken in turn by the French in 1793. This was
a common occurrence. However, shipping was an important invest-
ment for merchants because it guaranteed them freight space, at a
cheap rate, as well as profits from others renting space on their ves-
sels. Many merchants tried hard to get into shipowning despite the
risks, because the rewards were potentially high. Daniel Clark of
Philadelphia, despite admitting being new to merchanting in 1760,
was already involved in buying a share in the Sally in 1761. The
Fishers were one of the main competitors from freight in the 1770s
and 1780s and were much involved in the freight between Liverpool
and Philadelphia. Over 69 per cent of their vessels arriving in
Philadelphia came from Liverpool in 1796.44
The ownership of shipping was becoming increasingly concen-
trated in Philadelphia in this period, and importantly much of the
funding came from colonial capital. The largest investors in
Pennsylvania shipping were merchants. By the 1770s, the top thirty
investors controlled 23 per cent of the tonnage, which was more
concentrated than in Massachusetts for example. Furthermore,
Philadelphians owned three quarters of the tonnage registered at
Philadelphia, much of it by elite merchants. This concentration of
shipping in the hands of a few may partly account for the lack of
female investment in this area. In Liverpool, shipping was far less
concentrated than in Philadelphia. Although merchants collectively
owned 79 per cent of all Liverpool registered shipping in 1786, most
43
Frank Neal, “Liverpool Shipping, 1815–1835” (Unpublished MA thesis: University
of Liverpool, 1962), p. 73; Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London: MacMillan and Co., 1962), pp. 100–101;
Robert Craig and Rupert Jarvis, Liverpool Registry of Merchant Ships (Manchester:
Printed for the Chetham Society, 1967), pp. 102, 48, 93; Pleadings of James Fazakerly,
NA. My thanks to John J. McCusker for kindly providing information regarding
women owning shares in vessels registered in Philadelphia.
44
Craig and Jarvis, Liverpool Registry, p. 49; Clark to Neale, 10 Oct 1760, Clark
to Dromgoole, 22 Jun 1761, Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763;
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 88; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher
1792–1797, f. 356.
merchant houses tended to own a few shares in various vessels or

all of just one vessel. Some traders also invested in shipping in other
ports, including Philadelphia. Twenty-two vessels registered at
Philadelphia had shares owned by Livepool men before 1776. In
1773, Liverpudlians John Benson and John Postlethwaite, merchants
in partnership together, John Roberts, another merchant and William
Willock a captain, all owned shares in Philadelphia vessels. This
trend was ended when compulsory registration of shipping was intro-
duced from 1786.45
For traders, book credit and bills of exchange were extremely
important to the credit matrix. Capital was also invested through
channels such as attorneys, brokers, banks and merchant houses into
stock and bonds, annuities and shares in banks, land, manufactur-
ing enterprises and shipping. Sometimes investments were made to
ensure a safe pension for later in life, at other times it was a risky
venture in an attempt to secure a quick gain; sometimes it involved
life savings and at others surplus capital from trade provided capi-
tal for further profit making. What is important is the contribution
made by small investors and especially by women to the capital and
credit matrix as a whole. At one end of the scale £1,000 might be
invested; at the other, credit was given for as little as 60 cents.
Looking at the reverse side of the coin, when these capital and credit
networks failed, facilitates a further look at the part lesser traders
played in the credit market of Philadelphia and Liverpool.
Failure
The threat of failure was one of the reasons why the complicated
eighteenth-century credit system worked. The interdependence of
trading communities at the local, regional and international level
45
John J. McCusker, “The Shipowners of British America before 1775” (Paper
given at the International Symposium on ‘The Shipowner in History’ at the National
Maritime Museum, UK, Sep 1984), p. 18; ibid., “Source of Investment Capital in
the Colonial Philadelphia Shipping Industry”, JEH, 32,1, The Tasks of Economic
History (1972), 146–157, pp. 147, 153–154; Neal, “Liverpool Shipping”, p. 73;
Brian H. Tolley, “The American Trade of Liverpool in the Early Nineteenth cen-
tury and the War of 1812” (Unpublished PhD, University of Liverpool: 1967), pp.
90–91. Again, my thanks to John J. McCusker for providing data from his ship-
ping database on Liverpool ownership of vessels registered in Philadelphia. William
Willock was listed as a Liverpool merchant by 1787.
174 chapter five
meant that failure at any level was potentially disastrous. This encour-
aged a certain level of preventative commercial behaviour. However,
failure was not necessarily a trader’s fault, and therefore trust was
not only a beneficial part of the system, but a requirement. Individuals
could fail in business due to either endogenous or exogenous fac-
tors, and contemporaries were very aware of when blame could be
attached and when it could not.
Reactions to failure were therefore determined by the perception
of it by other traders. Whilst a trader might not have been able to
force debtors to pay on time and therefore experience cash flow
problems; it could also have been that he had been unwise in who
he extended credit to—it may or may not have been his own fault.
If his or her peers perceived that a trader was to blame for the sit-
uation, the reputation of that trader could be severely hurt, thereby
exacerbating the situation. An unwise trader would soon find that
credit was withdrawn and he or she even might eventually be forced
out of business. Conversely, a trader who had goods in a ship that
had been taken in war or by pirates would not been seen to be at
fault. Although he or she would also experience severe cash flow
problems, they might experience patience at the hands of creditors
whilst the situation was resolved, rather then persecution. If the trader
had been careless enough not to insure against such a loss in a time
of war however, creditors might not be so benign. These percep-
tions of blame, or abuse of trust, were at the very heart of the way
in which failure was dealt with. Certainly the legal system had not
developed to an extent that it was reliable enough to cope with all
miscreants in the commercial world, especially at the trans-Atlantic
level. However, several institutions, some formal, some informal, were
in place to cope with the situation when the system failed.
There were two main categories of failure, insolvency and bank-
ruptcy. Insolvency was basically a cash-flow problem, whereas bank-
ruptcy was a complete inability to pay. The former could be dealt
with inside or outside the law, formally or informally, whilst bank-
ruptcy was always dealt with by recourse to the law. Despite small
differences in detail, the systems were basically the same in both
Philadelphia and Liverpool throughout the period.
Insolvency
The choice between whether to deal with insolvency inside or out-
side the law literally depended on whether a trader’s creditor(s)
thought he or she had adhered to good business practise; had acted,
and continued to act, in a trustworthy manner.46 It was very impor-
tant for a trader to ‘come clean’ about their financial situation. In
doing so they were far more likely to avoid being put in gaol for
debt. It was also in the interests of the creditors to manage the sit-
uation and recoup as much money as possible, which was more
likely if the hapless trader was kept in business. If the debtor con-
tinued to make money the creditors were more likely to receive their
money in turn.
Hence the many adverts in the contemporary newspapers such as
that of Hannah Sandford of Liverpool. Her creditors were asked to
meet at the African Coffee House in Liverpool on the 28th February
1774 in order to sort out her affairs. In a similar manner the cred-
itors of Thomas Middleton, also of Liverpool, were required to meet
at the Globe Tavern on 25th October 1796, where his affairs would
be considered. These ‘declarations’ continued into the early nine-
teenth century. In 1805 George Davis asked his creditors to meet
at Hardy’s Tavern in Philadelphia, “when business of importance
will be laid before them”. In the same year, William and James
Steel, also of Philadelphia, gave all their goods and property to their
assignees. This method of saving a business was positively recom-
mended by contemporaries. John Sitgreaves wrote to Cornelius
Terbush of Poughkeepsie in 1783 that “Candour and a full decla-
ration of the State of your Affairs, will be the most likely means to
induce the leinty [leniency] of your Creditors”.47
If a trader’s creditors were convinced of his or her good faith they
would appoint assignees (sometimes known as trustees) to sort out
46
This section and the next on bankruptcy are heavily reliant on Julian Hoppit,
Risk and Failure in English Business 1700 –1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press), chapters two, three and five; S. Laurence Shaiman, “The History of
Imprisonment for Debt and Insolvency Laws in Pennsylvania as they Evolved from
the Common Law”, AJLH, 4 (1960), 205–225; Coleman, Debtors and Creditors, esp.
chapter eleven.
47
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 25 Feb 1774; Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine
Intelligencer, 24 Oct 1796; Relf’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 7 Nov 1805,
1 Oct 1805; Sitgreaves to Terbush, 25 Jun 1783, William and John Sitgreaves
176 chapter five
his or her affairs. These men, usually creditors themselves, had an

interest in collecting as much money as possible, and so the process
was usually dealt with quite efficiently. The assignees would take
over the debtor’s books, call for all debtors to pay, and for all cred-
itors to prove their claims in turn. In serious cases money would be
gained from selling off the trader’s real and personal property. When
the books were properly made up, the claims would be paid out
pro-rata. If possible, the trader would be left enough stock and cash
to continue in business. In this case, the previously unsuccessful trader
would be supervised by more experienced (or lucky) traders until the
previously insolvent trader was back on his or her feet. In 1779
William Davenport, a Liverpool slave trader helped out a bankrupt
by offering him salaried employment whilst he sorted out his affairs.48
Conversely, if the assignees felt that the business was not viable, the
trader would be helped in sorting out their affairs, but not supported
in continuing business—not in trade at least. This method was much
the same process as a bankruptcy commission, but it was much
quicker, more efficient, and therefore cheaper. It worked because all
sides worked within an accepted notion of good business practice,
and precisely because of this it needed everyone’s co-operation.
Of course not everyone did cooperate all the time, on either side.
Taking an insolvent through the courts required the initiation of only
one creditor. This sometimes meant that a trader who might have
been dealt with through assignees ended up in the courts or even
in gaol—either because neither side would not, or could not, agree
to the assignee process, or due to the vindictive behaviour of one
creditor. Insolvency was dealt with through the law when those with
small debts were perceived, rightly or wrongly, as obstinate or unwill-
ing to pay their debts, as opposed to unable. Many debts of this
kind were collected through the small claims courts. In Liverpool,
there was a Court of Requests and a Court of Passage. The first
dealt with debts under 40s, the latter with debts of up to £5. There
were many ‘standard’ debts of £4 19s., although the Court of Passage
did deal with larger sums on occasion. In Philadelphia, the County
Courts dealt with debts of under 40s. However, whereas in Liverpool
attendance at court and payment of the debt was deemed sufficient,
in Philadelphia, even small debtors were required to spend at least
48
Davenport to Jos Wimpey, 11 Mar 1779, William Davenport Letterbook
17863–1785.
thirty days in gaol. Non residents had to spend six months in gaol,
and fraudulent debtors at least twelve months. These courts were
very useful to smaller traders such as shopkeepers and dealers of
various kinds. They were not expensive and were held locally mak-
ing them accessible. In 1763 Elizabeth Prescott pursued a ‘standard’
debt of £4 19s. through the Liverpool Court of Passage, whilst
Elizabeth Jones was taken through the same court by Thomas Pierce
for a debt of £14.49
For larger debts (and all debts in Pennsylvania), the creditor could
resort to incarcerating the debtor in gaol. This of course only decreased
the debtor’s ability to pay the original debt; he could not earn money
and either the debtor, their family or friends had to pay bail or the
debt. Various Acts were passed under George III for the relief of
debtors which allowed for this anomaly. These were also applicable
in the colony of Pennsylvania, and the same procedure was adopted
by the state after Independence. In order to gain a release the debtor
had to write a complete list of his assets, including debts owing to
him. In Pennsylvania, the debtor also had to list his creditors. In
effect, the law did what the assignees did, by taking control over the
assets and distributing them to creditors if and when they were
realised. During the 1760s, a debtor released from debtors’ gaol in
Philadelphia was allowed items up to a value of only £5. The law
was a little more generous in England. In the 1770s a debtor was
released with assets of clothing and bedding for himself and his fam-
ily, the tools of his trade and no more than £20 in cash. This did
not mean that they were released from the debt, only that they were
no longer imprisoned for it.
A wide variety of people found themselves at the wrong end of
this process. Charles Cook of Liverpool was released from debtors’
gaol in 1772. Despite describing himself as a grocer, usually under-
stood as a reputable and middle-status trade, he owned only a few
personal items, and was owed only one debt of £7 15s. from a
49
Before 1786, there were many local variations in these small ‘Courts of
Conscience’, usually called Courts of Requests. The usual debt limit was 40 shillings
but individual courts could apply to have their jurisdiction raised. Margot Finn,
“Debt and Credit in Bath’s Court of Requests, 1829–1839”, UH, 21,2 (1994),
211–236, pp. 213–214; Hoppit, Risk and Failure, pp. 32–33; Coleman, Debtors and
Creditors, pp. 147–148; Brooke, Liverpool as it was, pp. 214–215; Court of Passage
Books, 21 Jul 1763, LivRO; unfortunately the quality of the extant records of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas did not allow a comparison to be made.
178 chapter five
William Winstanley. Two years later, Lawrence Worthington found

himself being sued by widow Mary Scott, but he had no effects
whatsoever which could go towards paying his debt. Mary Brandon
was imprisoned in the Philadelphia debtors’ apartment in 1798. Her
problem seemed to be cash flow rather than complete poverty. Her
declaration showed that she had several notes (probably bills of
exchange and promissory notes) to the value of $5,930. However,
she had no other property, and although she was wealthy on paper,
she had no funds with which to pay her debts. John Bazing was in
the gaol at the same time, at the behest of several Philadelphia mer-
chants to whom he owned various debts. His problem appeared to
be bad luck with a vessel. His main asset was a debt due to him
by a New York Insurance office regarding the Brigantine Mary, worth
£8,000. Therefore people could be placed in gaol due to complete
poverty or simply as a result of poor cash flow.50
Not surprisingly, Liverpool and Philadelphia, being ports and trad-
ing towns, accounted for a large number of insolvents in their regions.
Liverpudlians accounted for between 10 and 22 per cent of all insol-
vent debtors cases in Lancashire during the period 1761 to 1809.
Furthermore, Liverpool traders often accounted for a large percent-
age of the cases within the city itself. The 1790s were a calmer
period, when they accounted for only 10 per cent of all cases, but
at other times they usually accounted for around one third. During
the trading problems of the 1780s, they accounted for 80 per cent.
Of all debtors women accounted for only 5–10 per cent; but as they
were so central to the credit market, this is most likely to be a
reflection of the smaller individual debts they owed. Most creditors
probably felt the debts were not worth pursuing through the courts.
Due to the nature of the records in Philadelphia, it has not been
possible to make a comparison.51 However, as the numbers are com-
parable for bankruptcies, it is likely that the situation was similar for
insolvency in both places.
50
Insolvent Debtors’ Lists of Charles Cook, 4 Jul 1772, Lawrence Worthington,
9 Oct 1774, LRO; Insolvent Debtors’ Lists of Mary Brandon, 10 Dec 1798, John
Bazing, PHMC.
51
Figures for Lancashire and Liverpool taken from author’s database, formed
from the Lancashire Insolvent Debtor files.
Bankruptcy
In contrast to insolvency, bankruptcy was accompanied by a certain
tone of criminality. The term allegedly came from the Italian for
‘broken bench’, where dealers’ benches were broken when they were
no longer deemed trustworthy. Indeed, prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury, all bankrupts had been branded as dishonest.52 Whilst society
and indeed the law eventually recognised that some traders were
made bankrupt through no real fault of their own, it remained some-
what stigmatised. This was because a trader could not declare him
or herself bankrupt in the same way as insolvents could; they had
to commit an act of bankruptcy. These included running away,
remaining indoors and lying in gaol under the insolvent debtors’
laws; basically any action that denied the creditor access to his money.
In England, and in Pennsylvania before the War of Independence,
the debtor also had to be a significant trader reliant on credit, with
debts of at least £100. In 1785 Pennsylvania created its own bank-
ruptcy laws in response to the many post-war failures, although these
were only in force until 1793. Bankruptcy was a legal proceeding,
using procedures laid down by law in 1706. It commenced with a
creditor petitioning the Lord Chancellor, or going through the Courts
in the United States, who then appointed five commissioners. These
were usually merchants, attorneys and solicitors, some or all of whom
were owed money by the potential bankrupt. They would advertise
in the local newspapers for the debtor to give himself up, for all
their debtors in turn to pay, and for all creditors to register their
claims. If the debtor presented himself, cooperated and the estate
realised eight shillings in the pound or more, the trader would receive
a Certificate of Discharge.53
Unlike insolvency law, the debtor was discharged of all his debts,
was no longer considered liable for them, and was free to start up
business again as he wished. Although this was much the same as
the insolvency process, it took far longer, was more complicated and
52
Gordon, Universal Accountant, Vol. I, p. 211.
53
Pennsylvania had bankruptcy statutes between 1785 and 1793. The law was
then unclear until codified in 1812, which accounts for the very high number of
insolvency cases. Failure to make the bankruptcy laws permanent ensured confu-
sion in the US court system. It would appear that bankruptcy commissions were
pursed through local, state and the Supreme Courts. The position was still being
sorted out in early nineteenth century. Coleman, Debtors and Creditors, pp. 31–33,
153.
180 chapter five
associated with formal rules. Therefore, despite the absolution from

debts, people went to great lengths to avoid it. William Harris of
Yorktown wrote to Andrew Clow in 1787 begging for mercy. Harris
promised that he would be in Philadelphia in the next few weeks
and would convince Clow that he would do what was just and right.
Who could blame him? A trader, and indeed his creditors, could be
involved in bankruptcy cases for years. Haliday and Dunbar of
Liverpool went bankrupt in 1783, yet William Sitgreaves of Philadelphia
was still waiting for his dividend in 1787.54
The levels of insolvency were reflected in the levels of bankruptcy.
In eighteenth-century England, nearly one in four bankruptcies came
from the wholesale and retail sectors. Particularly at risk were those
who dealt in perishable goods such as grocers and victuallers, but
wine dealers also suffered. Furthermore, Lancashire (especially
Manchester), was one of the counties with the most bankruptcies
over the period 1701 to 1800. This of course reflected the dynamic
growth in the area, but opportunities for profit were also opportu-
nities for failure. In Liverpool itself, the percentage of traders who
went bankrupt rose from 7.3 per cent in the 1760s to 17.3 per cent
in the 1790s, again a reflection of the risky and competitive econ-
omy of the port. In Philadelphia, at least 108 traders became bank-
rupt or financially unviable between 1750 and 1791. For Pennsylvania
as a whole, Philadelphians accounted for 73.5 per cent of bank-
ruptcies during 1786 and 1790. During the disastrous post-war period
of 1786–1790, merchants alone accounted for 67 per cent of all
bankrupts.55
Failure affected traders at all levels; lowly mariners, unsuccessful
dealers and overseas merchants. All could equally find themselves
under the scrutiny of assignees, in debtors’ gaol, or bankrupt. The
high number of traders of all kinds in the insolvency and bankruptcy
figures demonstrates the risky and interlinking nature of trade, but
also, the willingness of people to try their luck in commerce. The
effects of failure were tragic at the personal level, but could also
have wide reaching effects. William Pollard of Philadelphia wrote to
54
Harris to Clow, 12 Mar 1787, SGC; Sitgreaves to Haliday, 26 Nov 1783,
Sitgreaves to Wood, 27 Mar 1787, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794.
55
Hoppit, Risk and Failure, chapter five; Philadelphians as a percentage of
Pennsylvania bankrupts 126/171*100, Philadelphia merchants 84/126*100, Doerflinger,
A Vigorous Spirit, p. 142.
his contact John Woolmer in 1772 warning him of the high num-
ber of traders entering business. Warn your friends in Liverpool,
Bristol and London that there are “hundreds more people in this
Trade (Importers and retailers) than can possibly support themselves
and families by it” he told him. The trans-Atlantic connections of
credit were just as strong in the early nineteenth century. Ralph
Eddowes reported the effects in Philadelphia of the failure of the
house of Barclay in London to his friend Roscoe. One house alone
was affected to the sum of £90,000.56 All traders were aware of the
vital and interdependent nature of trans-Atlantic credit networks, but
also of the drastic effects of failure.
Finance and Failure
Every trader, male and female, from the largest merchant to the
smallest higgler, was involved in credit relationships. Small shop-
keepers and wholesalers were equally integral to the web of credit.
Only the final consumer sometimes sat on just one side of the account
book, but even they often had to pay for goods with barter. Due to
the ubiquity of credit and the lack of cash, bills of exchange were
used at many levels of the trading community in order to pay off
debts. Despite the problems associated with them they continued to
be used, especially at the trans-Atlantic level. Finance came from
many areas. Merchants invested their capital and ploughed back
their profits, but also important were women, both locally and region-
ally, and the multifarious investments and cash raised via banks and
attorneys. All these channels were used by both men and women.
Women did not hold as many bank accounts, or indeed write bills
and notes as often; but this had more to do with their access to
money than their ability or desire to use these financial instruments.
The various methods by which capital could be raised meant that
small amounts were brought together, or vice versa, large amounts
of money could be invested through several small loans. A small
investment of £50 was equally as important as one of $5,000. This
made the credit and finance market very flexible and efficient, which
56
Pollard to John Woolmer, 1 Jul 1772, William Pollard Letterbook, 1772–1774;
Eddowes to Roscoe, 6 Oct 1803, RP.
182 chapter five
together with networks of people, facilitated in turn, efficient net-

works of goods.
The very ubiquity of credit spelt danger for everyone involved.
The threat of failure at the personal or group level was a powerful
incentive for everyone (more or less) to constrain themselves to good
business practise and not to abuse the trust placed in them. Sometimes
failure was due to bad judgement or even untrustworthy action, but
just as often it was simply bad luck. Unfortunately, that bad luck or
a poor decision could have international ramifications because the
consequences of failure were both personal and communal. At the
personal level Mary Brandon was gaoled for debt; at a community
level, the failure of Barclays was felt severely in Philadelphia, and
no doubt, in many ports around the Atlantic. Despite the Independence
of the thirteen colonies, the interdependent nature of trans-Atlantic
credit networks continued into the nineteenth century. This was noted
by Pim Nevins in 1802. He wrote: “at this unfortunate juncture, the
Estates of many Merchts here, who twelve months ago lived in splen-
dour & considered themselves qualified so to do, are, and will be
sold, to Satisfy in part, the claims of angry creditors whose sufferings
will be felt severely not only hear but in Great Britain”.57
The high level of failure in the eighteenth century was, as Julian
Hoppit notes, “an indicator of risk-taking that failed”;58 but traders
took these risks exactly because there were so many opportunities.
This was in turn a symptom of the huge growth in consumption
around the Atlantic. Efficient networks of people produced a level
of trust high enough to promote the circulation of capital and credit.
These together supported the phenomenon of the ‘world of goods’,
which is the subject of the next chapter.
57
Nevins, Journal of a Visit to America 1802–1803, 13th Ninth Month (Sep),
1802.
58
Hoppit, Risk and Failure, p. 53.
CHAPTER SIX
DISTRIBUTING THE GOODS OF THE

CONSUMER REVOLUTION
Just Imported . . . By the Pigou, Harmony and John . . .

and for sale on reasonable terms, by William and John
Sitgreaves, . . . blankets . . . calimancoes . . . Manchester
gown patterns . . . writing paper . . . playing cards . . .
needles . . . cutlery . . . powder and shot . . . window
glass . . . frying pans . . . &c.
Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 28 Oct 1787
The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed a proliferation

of goods for sale at all levels of society in England and colonial
America. Efficient networks of people and credit facilitated this devel-
opment. The same rice, rum, flour, textiles, hardware, pottery, tea,
coffee, chocolate, silk and spices were available all around the Atlantic.
There is now an extensive literature on the ‘consumer revolution’,
the classic text being The Birth of a Consumer Society in which Neil
McKendrick, John Brewer and John Plumb argue that this desire
for goods was driven by an emulative middle class. In the case of
the working classes, purchases were facilitated by an increase in earn-
ings by women and children working outside the home.1
However, this story does not account for the millions of poor peo-
ple who were drinking tea with sugar out of pottery mugs, spicing
up their food with cinnamon and doing so whilst wearing cotton
clothes. Furthermore, work since the publication of McKendrick
et al. has shown that the poorer classes both in England generally,
and in Philadelphia specifically, did not benefit from a rise in income.
In England, income and purchasing power did not rise until after
1820, and in both England and Philadelphia the poor got poorer.
How were these goods afforded when between 54 and 67 per cent
of household expenditure went on diet?2
1
Breen, The Marketplace of Revolution, esp. chapter two; McKendrick, Brewer, and
Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society, p. 11.
2
Peter H. Lindert, “Unequal Living Standards”, in Roderick Floud and D.N.
184 chapter six
For the poor, it was a matter of consumer choice. They did not
buy more goods, they bought different goods. Rather than purchasing
beer, people bought tea and sugar, rather than pewter, people bought
pottery goods that could withstand the heat of the new caffeine
drinks. In an urban environment where “up to one hundred per-
cent of urban inhabitants were dependant on the market”, it was
easy to swap between goods. The new time discipline of urban life
also meant that a quick ‘rush’ from a drink of hot tea sweetened
with sugar was a popular breakfast choice amongst the poor. Heating
water for such a drink was also relatively clean, quick and cheap
compared to making “hasty pudding” for example. Once tried, peo-
ple were quickly ‘hooked’ on the caffeine in these drinks.3
This is not to say that people did not spend more money on diet
when they could. Many people were so poor that a small increase
in income was spent on food—diet expenditures were elastic. If peo-
ple had a little more disposable income, it was possible to purchase
table linen, chairs and tables relatively cheaply, rather than make
these goods themselves—even if they had the skills to do so. For
those who could not afford these new, there were the ‘household
dealers’ who sold second-hand furniture, and the slop sellers who
sold second-hand clothes. The demand for goods fuelled by millions
of poor people, was added to by the better off and the rich. For
them, consumption was more of a conspicuous activity rather than
of necessity, and whole rituals surrounded the ‘taking of tea’ for
example. Fashion also went to new extremes, with the London ‘ton’
leading the way in ridiculously fantastic head wear. Nor were traders
immune. The importance of coffee houses was discussed in chapter
four, but they were also fashionable places in which to carry out
trade. An air of respectability went hand in hand with the sensible
discussion of business and politics.4
McCloskey (eds.), Economic History of Britain Since 1700 (2nd ed.), Vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 357–386; Billy G. Smith, “Inequality in
Late Colonial Philadelphia”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 41,4 (1984), 629–645, passim; Ramsey
Muir, A History of Liverpool (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1907), p. 236;
Shammas, Pre-Industrial Consumer, Philadelphia expenditure on food 54.2 per cent,
English expenditure 67 cent, pp. 127, 132.
3
The intake of many of these goods came with a heavy price on health however,
Shammas, Pre-Industrial Consumer, chapter five, p. 147; Wells, Wretched Faces, p. 21.
4
Kowaleski-Wallace, Consuming Subjects, chapter ‘tea’; Antonia Fraser, Georgiana,
Duchess of Devonshire (London: Harper Collins, 1999), chapter two; Ralph A. Austen
and Woodruff D. Smith, “Private Tooth Decay as Public Economic Virtue: The
distributing the goods of the consumer revolution 185
There is no doubt that these new consumer goods, both manu-

factures and foods, were to be found everywhere. Perhaps the stark-
est proof of the adoption of items such as tea and sugar into the
everyday life of the very poor is their inclusion in the workhouse
diet. As early as 1769 Philadelphia workhouse inmates received a
staggering 18.6 per cent of their daily calories from sugar and caffeine.
Even in England, with upper-class criticism of the poor enjoying
such ‘luxuries’, tea and sugar was still included in the Liverpool
workhouse menu by 1795. For those with a little more money, cook
books and household guides gave recipes which included sugar, cin-
namon, raisons and allspice. Popular food included ice cream, cin-
namon buns, Jamaican pepperpot (in Philadelphia) and Seville oranges,
German plums and cherries and mango pickle were all available.
Many of these goods had become necessities. Nor was it just in the
city environment that such goods were to be found. The credit given
by merchants in Philadelphia and Liverpool meant that “sugar was
everywhere. It was on sale in country shops and on the stalls of
travelling pedlars”. Tea and sugar could account for around one
third of purchases of shops in small towns and villages. In the
Philadelphia hinterland, sugar was sometimes used as what would
now be called a ‘loss-leader’ to tempt people into the shops. Foods
and groceries such as rice, potatoes, tobacco, tea, coffee, chocolate,
sugar, spices and fruits from all around the world were available in
all sorts of outlets.5
Manufactured goods were just as much in demand. As early as
1721 pedlars and chapmen were selling goods such as muslin, thread,
Slave-Sugar Triangle, Consumerism, and European Industrialization”, in Joseph E.

Inikori (ed.), The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa,
the Americas and Europe (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 183–203,
pp. 186, 193. For more on the cultural aspects of coffee, tea, sugar and chocolate
see; Jordan Goodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sherratt (eds.), Consuming Habits:
Drugs in History and Anthropology (London: Routledge, 1995).
5
Shammas, Pre-Industrial Consumer, pp. 142–143; William Woys Weaver, Thirty-
Five Receipts from “The Larder Invaded” (Philadelphia: The Library Company of
Philadelphia and The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1986), pp. 18–21; Mary
Anne Hines, Gordon Marshall and William Woys Weaver, The Larder Invaded: Reflections
on Three Centuries of Philadelphia Food and Drink (Philadelphia: The Library Company
of Philadelphia and The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1987), pp. 21–22, 26;
Rosamund Bayne-Powell, Housekeeping in the Eighteenth Century (London: John Murray,
1956) chapter seven; Walwin, Fruits of Empire, p. 120; the one third of purchases in
small-town shops (31.2 per cent) appears to be by value, Mui and Mui, Shops and
Shopkeeping, p. 208; Doerflinger, “Farmers and Dry Goods”, pp. 171–172.
186 chapter six
silk garters, books, watches, pens, clothing and stationary. Whatever

“smole trifles” people might want were on offer. Whilst the more
expensive china might be found in the houses of planters and mer-
chants, cheaper pottery was available, and made especially for, the
lower end of the market. Simple items, undecorated, were made for
daily use. Cups and mugs were made without handles, partly so they
would not break off when transported, and partly so that more could
be packed into a crate. No doubt more mundane durables such as
nails, shovels and pick-axes were in high demand in the frontier set-
tlements of Northern America as well as for building new houses in
Philadelphia and Liverpool. More fancy or celebratory items were
also on sale. Liverpool potters made items of a political nature
specifically for the American market. For example, for the first
American census of 1790, one piece proclaimed “Prosperity to United
States of America”. Obviously a small thing like Independence was
not going to constrain British entrepreneurship! The rush to provide
these items, and the low quality and therefore low price of many of
them—is also obvious. Potters in Liverpool did not always check the
spelling of wording on their work. One piece for the census spelt
Philadelphia’s state as ‘Pensylvania’.6
The items that epitomise the British ‘industrial revolution’ were
therefore also the embodiment of the Atlantic ‘consumer revolution’.
These goods were not only desired, they were in real demand. The
quality and quantity obviously varied according to a consumer’s abil-
ity to pay, but tea, sugar, textiles, hardware, household furniture and
books were distributed around the Atlantic, the ports, and their hin-
terlands precisely because there was a demand for them. In fact,
Shammas argues that tropical goods were so important that they
should be placed at the centre of our understanding of the world
economy at this time.7 How these goods were actually distributed
and made available in Liverpool and Philadelphia, from and to their
respective hinterlands, is the subject of this chapter.
6
Fontaine, History of Pedlars, p. 185; quoted in Breen, “An Empire of Goods”,
p. 467; Edwin Atlee Barber, Anglo American Pottery: Old English China with American
Views (2nd ed.) (Philadelphia: Patterson and White, 1901), p. 20.
7
Carole Shammas, “The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical
Goods”, in McCusker and Morgan, The Early Modern Economy, pp. 163–185.
Across the Ocean
The trade between Liverpool and Philadelphia reflected the larger

Anglo-American picture, with manufactures being sent from Liverpool
to Philadelphia, and staple goods being sent in return. Both also
acted as local or regional entrepôts. Whereas the West Indies trade
was important in this regard for Philadelphia, the Irish trade was
equally so for Liverpool. The shipping patterns between Liverpool
and Philadelphia also followed the wider patterns. By the mid-eight-
eenth century it took around eight weeks to cross the Atlantic, often
much longer, with the tortuous Westward voyage taking longer than
the Eastward one; because of this, most vessels only made one voy-
age a year. Ships arrived and left for the various colonies all through-
out the year. Most left Britain for the colonies in October, November
and December, and arrived back in England in June, July and August,
although they continued to trickle in until around October. Many,
but not all ships on a slaving voyage left Liverpool around May for
Africa, which in turn would get them to the West Indies in time for
the sugar harvest. Demand was highest for slaves in the West Indies
between November and May.8
The trans-Atlantic trade is infamous for the ‘triangular’ slave-trade
journey, but in fact far more voyages were bilateral. In the Bristol
trade between 1749 and 1770 around 62.8 per cent of tonnage was
involved in the bilateral as opposed to multilateral trade. Much of
this was due to the difficulty in timing voyages for the slave trade
and the markets of various crops. It was often easier to supply food
and manufactures to the colonies and transport staple crops to Britain
on different vessels from those involved in the slave trade. Ships in
the bilateral trade between Philadelphia and Britain followed the
same basic shipping patterns. Ships from Liverpool arrived in
Philadelphia throughout the year, with an increase in numbers in
the ‘spring’ and ‘fall’ shipments. Most vessels left between July and
October, July being the month most favoured. There was another,
smaller peak in January to March. March was originally the most
popular month in which to leave, but by 1796 the spring ‘peak’ was
far less pronounced. Most vessels arrived back in Liverpool in the
early part of the year, having left Philadelphia before the Delaware
8
For British-Atlantic shipping see Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry;
Steele, The English Atlantic, esp. chapter four; Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade.
188 chapter six
froze over, but as vessels left throughout the year, they also arrived
back in Liverpool throughout the year. A few vessels, if the ships’
husbands were both very organised and lucky, made two journeys
a year. This pattern appeared to increase over time as merchants’
organisation became more sophisticated. In 1766 and 1774, no ves-
sels carried out two journeys in one year. However, in 1787, two
ships, the Thetis and the Grange made two journeys. In 1805, the
Maria, Liverpool, Bristol Packet and the Annawan all made two trans-
Atlantic crossings in one year.9
The increasing trade between Britain and the Americas was reflected
in the size and number of ships involved in the bilateral trade between
Liverpool and Philadelphia. Although it has not been possible to esti-
mate the volume of trade between the two cities, the rise in trade
at the national level and the increasing size and growing number of
ships plying between the two cities means that the volume and value
of trade must have increased considerably. For example, the Tyger
built for the Africa trade in 1756 was only 170 tons and the Albion,
arriving in Liverpool from Philadelphia in 1774 was 200 tons. In
1805 the Annawan was 300 tons and the Fair Lady 305 tons, both in
the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade. Vessel size did not increase in a
steady manner however, and these may be the larger ships, although
ships in the slave trade were likely to be the biggest. However,
efficiencies gained through reduced men per ton could be outweighed
by problems encountered in gaining a large cargo quickly enough,
and small vessels remained popular.10
Vessels were often advertised as ‘constant traders’, such as the
Grange in 1787, which meant that they were involved in the same
trade year after year, but very few vessels were found in the same
9
Morgan, “Shipping Patterns”, p. 511; for the slave trade and problems of tim-
ing see Stephen D. Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits: Merchant
Decision Making in the British Slave Trade”, WMQ , 3rd Ser., 58,1 (2001), 171–204;
data on the bilateral trade between Liverpool and Philadelphia taken from the
author’s database. Liverpool’s shipping in the slave trade/West Indies also had ‘dual’
shipping. The Liverpool house of Case and Southworth controlled far more vessels
in the provisions and dry goods trade than the slave trade and the two areas oper-
ated completely separately from one another. Sheryllynne Haggerty, “A Respectable
Slice of a ‘Respectable’ Trade: Liverpool and Kingston, Jamaica, in the mid-Eight-
eenth Century” (Unpublished paper given at the University of Liverpool, Feb 2004).
10
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser and Mercantile Register, 15 Aug 1756; Williamson’s
Liverpool Advertiser, 16 Sep 1774, 23 Jul 1787; Gore’s General Advertiser, 25 Apl 1805,
Relf ’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 2 Oct 1805; the average tonnage of ves-
sels in the Bristol-Atlantic trade was 209 tons. Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic, p. 43;
Davies, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry, pp. 72–74.
trade over the long term.11 In some ways this mirrors the short-term
nature of the careers of many traders, as discussed below. Some ves-
sels in the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade may have been missed from
this analysis because many went via other ports and were therefore
not easily traced. If a vessel went from Liverpool to Philadelphia,
but stopped off at Jamaica first, it may not have been listed in the
incoming shipping as coming from Liverpool. However, the lack of
longevity in the trade is clear, in that no two vessels in this early
period were found in consecutive sample years.
This is not to say that the number of vessels in the trade did not
increase despite the high turnover, as demonstrated in table 6.1.
From a minimum of thirteen vessels at the start of the period, forty
were involved in the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade by 1805. In 1774,
eighteen vessels were recorded in this bilateral trade alone, com-
pared to fifty-four vessels going to Great Britain and Ireland from
Philadelphia annually 1770–1774.12 The slave trade from Liverpool
was also increasing during this period, and yet the number of ves-
sels in the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade grew even faster. In 1766/67
the volume of vessels in the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade was 22 per
cent that of the whole slave trade from Liverpool. By 1805 the
Liverpool-Philadelphia trade was 38 per cent as large. It is also worth
noting that after Independence, the trade between Liverpool and
Philadelphia was similar to that of the Philadelphia-French trade as
a whole. The Liverpool-Philadelphia trade was therefore a very sub-
stantial one.
Table 6.1: Number of Vessels in Various Atlantic Trades
Year Liv/Phil Liv/Slave Liv/Barbados Phil/French

Trade Trade & Jamaica Trade Trade
1766/67 13 60 18 n/a
1774 18 93 36 n/a
1787 20 69 13 17
1796 28 95 35 38
1805 40 108 20 49
Source: Newspapers for Liverpool and Philadelphia; Slave Trade Database on CDROM;
Figures for the French trade kindly provided by Silvia Marzagalli.13
11
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 23 Jul 1787.
12
McCusker, “Source of Investment Capital”, p. 151.
13
The figures for the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade for 1787, 1796 and 1805 may
be slightly under represented. This is because only the October to December
190 chapter six
It was not only the turnover in vessels that was noticeable. Many
merchants involved in the trade appeared in the newspapers only
once. This was no doubt at least partly due to the volatile and oppor-
tunistic nature of the trade and the high merchant turnover. It is
also a factor, especially in Philadelphia, of the control over the trade
by a relatively small group of merchants. Certainly major ‘players’
can be identified in the bilateral trade between the two cities. These
major players however, were not necessarily the largest importers at
their own risk; the merchant houses identified here are the ships’
‘husbands’ or managers—those involved in handling the freight for
the ship. Sometimes they might also own part of the vessel and
sometimes they might be shipping freight on their own account.
However, they were just as often simply the merchants in charge of
handling shipments for others. Even if they did own part of the ves-
sel or put freight on it, the practise of spreading risk meant that
much of their time would have been spent in arranging freight for
others. No merchant put all his own goods on his own vessel in case
of disaster. William Rathbone IV of Liverpool never owned any ship-
ping at all and was a relatively small importer at his own risk. He
earned his money from the commission he charged for providing
arrangement services for others.14
In Philadelphia, the dominance of the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade
by a few means that only three merchant houses were identifiable
in the trade for more than one year of those sampled, meaning that
they were active for more than ten years. These were Mease and
Miller (1767–1774), Jeremiah Warder and Sons/Warder Parker and
Co. (1774–1805) and our old friends, Joshua Fisher and sons Thomas,
Samuel and Miers (1769–1796). All three houses were also listed in
the directories in some form for a period of at least twenty-four
years. They were therefore long-standing houses, even if not always
involved in the Liverpool trade. In Liverpool this trend towards dom-
inance was also found, although it was not so pronounced. Six houses
were found in the management of the trade with some longevity.
Philadelphia newspapers were sampled for these years. However, most of the ship-
ping arrived during this period and vessels leaving Liverpool throughout the year
were noted; the figures for the French trade include all vessels in and out at records
at the HSP and PHMC. Some vessels are missing however because of missing reg-
isters and poor recording by contemporaries. My thanks to Silvia Marzagalli for
details from her database and this contextual information.
14
See the case study on Rathbone in chapter seven.
These were John and Samuel Brown (1796–1805), George Green

and Son/Green and Wainwright (1796–1805), Haliday and Bamber
(1766–1787), William Rathbone/Rathbone and Benson/Rathbone,
Hughes and Duncan (1774–1805), William Wallace and Co. (1774–
1787) and Warbrick and Holt (1787–1805). Variations of all of these
houses, Haliday and Bamber excepted, were identifiable in all the
Liverpool directories sampled.15 They were therefore trading for a
period of at least forty years—again, if not always with Philadelphia.
As discussed in chapter five, the expense of owning shipping meant
that it was held mainly in the hands of well-established merchants.
The knowledge and reputation required to manage such shipping
further skewed the trade into a small number of firms.
Of course this concentration of shipping and freight handling by
a few did not deter many other merchants from importing on these
vessels, or from being involved in the trade for short periods of time.
Indeed, the small numbers of ships’ husbands is startling next to the
total number of merchants, let alone traders, in each city. In chap-
ter three it was noted that about 250 merchants in Philadelphia and
some 330 merchants in Liverpool may have been involved in over-
seas trade during the 1780s and 1790s. It is not possible to say how
many of these were involved in the Liverpool-Philadelphia trade, as
many would have specialised by region or commodity. However, it
is possible to demonstrate that many more merchants were involved
than the small number of agents or ships’ husbands listed above. In
order to demonstrate this it is worth looking at the way merchants
handled goods ‘across the ocean’ in more detail.
Let us return to the Fisher family. A major player in the Liverpool-
Philadelphia trade, they imported on thirteen different vessels from
Liverpool in October 1796. Merchants did not just import in the
vessels they owned, they spread their risk around various vessels in
case one was sunk or taken. Whilst they therefore paid for freight
on the vessels of others, they also made profit from renting out freight
space on their own vessels. The Fishers were involved in importing
and exporting to and from Britain and coastal trading to North
Carolina, Virginia and elsewhere in order to keep their ships as busy
as possible—idle vessels cost money. They purchased flour for export
from specialised middlemen such as Levi Hollingsworth, saving them
15
From the author’s database of newspapers and trade directories; Samuel and
Miers Fisher Ledger 1769–?.
192 chapter six
the complication of haggling with farmers and hinterland dealers.

They sent this flour to Liverpool along with Indian corn, as is shown
in Figure 6.1. Not all their voyages were profitable. The Fishers
made a loss on the adventure of the Sussex —their two-thirds share
of the loss came to £1,518 11s. In return they imported a variety
of textiles and hardware. For example, in August 1793 they imported
‘goods’ (no doubt textiles) from Samuel Greg and Co. of Manchester,
on the Manchester. In the same year they also imported merchandise
from Samuel and Jonathon Hobson of Manchester, but in the Adriana,
part owned by Andrew Clow and Co., also of Philadelphia. They
also imported goods, probably hardware, from Welch, Startin and
Co. of Birmingham.16 As was discussed in chapter four, the Fishers
therefore had hinterland connections in Britain meaning that they
could order directly from the manufacturers, although in Philadelphia
they used a middleman wholesaler to procure their flour.
Figure 6.1: Distribution Network for Flour

Philadelphia Flow of Goods Liverpool
Pennsylvania Factor
Farmer Levi Hollingsworth
Samuel & Rathbone, Benson

Miers Fisher Ship & Co.
Sussex
(1796) Hinterland
Merchant/
Dealer
Wholesale Grocer Brokers & Auctioneers

Hughes & Duncan
Shopkeeper Flour Dealer Grocer
Consumer Consumer
Source: Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 4 April 1796 and 27 June
1796; Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 31.
16
Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 356, 63, 65, 356,
31, 78, 76, 77.
Another well-known Philadelphian merchant was Thomas P. Cope.

He was ship’s husband for the ship Susquehanna, bound for Liverpool
in 1810. Ten different merchants, including Cope, sent rice, bark,
cotton and staves to five different merchants in Liverpool—includ-
ing William Barber. Barber was not charged freight, being an owner
of the vessel. The situation was much the same with the ship Lancaster,
which sailed from Philadelphia to Liverpool in 1815. Eight Philadelphia
merchants, including Cope and the Fishers were exporting much the
same cargo as in the Susquehanna. Consignees in Liverpool included
William Barber and Co. and Cropper, Benson and Co. (Benson pre-
viously of Rathbone, Benson and Co.). In return, Cope imported
many items at his own risk. These included books, shovels, various
textiles, glasses, buttons and needles. He also had connections with
the Liverpool hinterland in places such as Leicester, Wakefield,
Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds and Rochdale. He imported these goods
through a variety of agents in Liverpool, including Rathbone, Hughes
and Duncan (this being William Rathbone V) and Hurry and Jones.
Cope did not confine himself to this trade however; he was also
involved in husbanding vessels that went to Canton, Lisbon, Cadiz,
Havana and Tenerife amongst other places.17
The bills of lading for a vessel part owned by Andrew Clow of
Philadelphia further demonstrate the practice of spreading risk between
supplying merchant house and vessel. The bills for the Adriana, sail-
ing from Liverpool in 1790 show a wide number of people on both
sides of the Atlantic having an interest in this vessel. In Liverpool,
the agents included Rathbone and Benson, Ellis and Robert Bent,
Cazneau and Marlin, Thomas and William Earle (slave traders as
well) and Iver McIver. However, a variety of inland traders, whole-
salers or manufacturers provided goods for this voyage. There were
a total of nineteen ‘agents’ or exporters listed on the Liverpool side,
and a total of fifty-seven in Philadelphia.18 There were therefore far
more people importing on each vessel than those listed as agents or
ships’ husbands in the newspapers. By managing imports and exports
in this way, risk was spread amongst various vessels, but also amongst
17
Freight List of the Susquehanna, Freight List of the Lancaster, T.P. Cope and
Sons Ship and Memorandum Book 1809–1825, and passim; Invoice to Bagge,
4 May 1807, T.P. Cope and Sons Domestic Invoice Book 1803–1807; T.P. Cope
and Sons Invoice Book 1803–1822, passim; all HSP.
18
Bills of Lading for the Adriana from Liverpool to Philadelphia, Aug 1790,
Folder Adriana (2), Andrew Clow and Co., CWU.
194 chapter six
various suppliers. Goods ordered from a particular supplier in Leeds

for example, might be split between various vessels, so that not all
their goods were lost if the voyage was unsuccessful. At the same
time, the importer ordered from various suppliers, spreading the risk
if they proved to be unreliable or sent incorrect or shoddy goods.
This helped the exporter as well, because if there were any prob-
lems with a particular vessel or importing merchant, he was still
likely to collect on the majority of the goods he had sent overseas.
Whilst elite, male, merchants dominated the overseas part of the
distribution of goods, they did not have an exclusive hold over it.
Other, smaller traders also transported goods across the oceans, albeit
in far smaller amounts. Sometimes these were very small-time
importers—in both value and over time. Rebecca Jones for exam-
ple, imported a small amount of goods on the Silvana, Grange and
Pigou, but by importing on various vessels she was still using the
same risk-spreading techniques that the larger merchants did. Ships’
captains and other mariners also traded a little on their own account.
In 1761, this was apparently collectively big business. Daniel Clark
complained that they were “able to Undersell Any importer, for they
seldom pay freight or Insurance”. Later in the century a Liverpool
master, Captain Kennan also carried goods for his own profit. He
purchased pottery items from the Herculaneum Pottery for sale in
Philadelphia. Ships’ captains were usually supposed to pay freight
on goods they carried for their own profit but many were not allowed
to carry any goods at all. This was usually made explicit to captains
in the slave trade for example, in their letters of instruction.19
Marcus Rediker has shown that mariners were allowed to carry
small amounts of tobacco and other goods on their own account to
supplement their wages. This suggests that the demand for these
goods was so high that captains found it worthwhile to illegally/
unofficially bring in these goods. The Liverpool Grand Jury was ap-
parently trying to stop activity of this kind in July 1804. Coffee,
indigo, cloves, pepper and liquor were being sold door-to-door they
19
Account of Rebecca Jones, Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher
1792–1797, f. 46; Clark to Neale, 16 Oct 1760, Clark to Haliday and Dunbar, 26
Sep 1760, Clark to Bentley, 29 Aug 1761, Clark to Dromgoole, 16 Oct 1761,
Daniel Clark Letter and Invoice Book 1759–1763; Account of Captain Kennan,
Herculaneum Potteries Ledger 1806–1817, f. 229; for a letter denying the captain
and crew any trade on their own account see Bostock to Captain Berne, 2 Jul
1787, Letterbook of Robert Bostock 1779–1790, LivRO.
said, at “inferior and reduced prices”. The smuggling of tea was a

huge problem, especially before the Commutation Act of 1784 was
brought in to curtail this illegal trade by reducing the tax on tea.
However, duties were increased during the Napoleonic Wars mak-
ing the smuggling of tea worthwhile once again. The Jury declared
that these goods were described to potential buyers as “the Adventures
of seafaring men”, but were in fact stolen or pilfered from the docks.20
It is of course, just as likely that the elite merchant group were
simply protecting their own interests by denying others a slice of the
trading cake and keeping prices high. Presumably some of these
goods did come into Liverpool, and indeed Philadelphia, by illegal
means; but much of the petty trading, which kept smaller shop-
keepers, hucksters and indeed friends of mariners in supply, came
via bona fide traders. For example, Mathew Stoward was a Liverpool
mariner who found himself in debtors’ gaol in 1794. His assets
included a list of small debts owed for goods sold and delivered.
Mostly these were to Liverpool people in maritime trades, perhaps
his friends, and a Ruth Bullock. Whether this was legitimate or ille-
gal trade is impossible to say.21 However, the very fact that the Grand
Jury in Liverpool felt it was worth while working against small-scale
trade such as this, demonstrates the (perceived at the very least)
importance and prevalence of these lesser transactions.
Whilst elite merchants were in control of the majority of the over-
seas shipping itself, especially in Philadelphia, very few were involved
over a long period of time. These few agents however, were sup-
plement by a far wider group of importers and exporters. Traders
on both sides of the Atlantic had good links with the hinterlands of
the opposite port, although for reasons discussed in chapter four,
some merchants in Philadelphia had even better connections than
those in Liverpool. This was reflected in the shipments across the
ocean. No doubt the volume of goods carried across the seas by the
mariners and ships’ captains was small compared to the formal trade
by elite merchants and other traders, but this sideline was an impor-
tant part of the ‘grey’ economy. It helped mariners to enhance their
wages, and provided vital—and maybe the only—access to exotic
goods for the very poor.
20
Rediker, Between the Devil, pp. 130-133; American Chamber of Commerce
Minute Book 1801–1908, ff. 60, 61, Jul 1804; Mui and Mui, “The Commutation
Act”, passim; Ashworth, Customs and Excise, p. 182.
21
Insolvent Debtor’s List of Mathew Stoward, 15 Jul 1794, LRO.
196 chapter six
Breaking Bulk
Elite merchants may have had the upper hand in distributing goods
across the seas, but when it came to regional and local distribution,
the situation became more complicated. The wide variety of traders
involved in distribution, the fluid and changeable nature of the ter-
minologies of each sector, and indeed the life cycle of a trader’s
career made this necessarily so. However, the relative lack of diver-
sity in Philadelphia had an important effect on the way in which
goods were distributed at the ‘bulk’ level in that city. There was an
absence of an intermediary sector of brokers, wholesalers and elite
textile establishments as demonstrated in chapter three. Looking in
detail at the distribution process of each city highlights this difference
still further and demonstrates how the distribution process functioned
at a day-to-day level. Because of the differences between Liverpool
and Philadelphia, it is convenient, just for this section, to discuss the
two cities separately.
Philadelphia
When the Philadelphia merchant received his imported cargo, he
had various channels through which to sell it. Merchants sold to a
variety of other merchants, shopkeepers and consumers. However,
they rarely sold through middlemen such as wholesalers, brokers and
dealers. For example, the Fishers sold direct to a wide range of peo-
ple. In the later 1760s they sold dry and wet goods to the merchant
Abraham Usher, dry goods to William Sitgreaves (then considered
still a shopkeeper), and snuff and textiles to shopkeepers Ann Powell
and Andew Doz. They probably also used auction houses to sell off
stock that was out of date, damaged or no longer in fashion. Others
such as Daniel Clark sold to a similar group of people, including
New York merchant William Baker, hinterland shopkeeper John
Clark and various ‘country customers’. Clark also participated on
the odd ‘adventure’, such as the Sally to Jamaica in 1761, which was
in fact taken by the French.22
22
Samuel and Miers Fisher Ledger 1769–?, ff. 53, 154, 16, 79; Mifflin and
Massey Ledger 1760–1763, f. 28; Clark to Wm Baker, 3 Dec 1760; Clark to John
Clark, 15 Mar 1761; Clark to Haliday and Dunbar, 4 Jun 1762; Second Adventure
in the Sally; Clark to Thomas Dromgoole, 2 Sep 1761; Daniel Clark Letter and
Invoice Book 1759–1763, ff. 31, 54, 84, 94.
As late as the early 1800s Thomas P. Cope sold to regional mer-

chants such as John and James Dunlop in Petersberg, Virginia, Chews
Landing shopkeeper Daniel Bassett, and a variety of female shop-
keepers in Philadelphia. Therefore, due to the lack of wholesalers,
merchants were also important in providing goods to back-country
shops, especially dry goods. As was demonstrated in chapter five,
merchant William Sitgreaves experienced many problems with debt
collection from country customers. Flour, which could be milled
locally, and many fruits grown in the region were less likely to be
found in the small country stores, but dry goods and imported gro-
ceries had to be sourced via Philadelphia.23 Merchants therefore per-
formed much of the higher distribution function—including the
breaking of bulk, because of the lack of middlemen.
As has already been argued, there were relatively few brokers in
Philadelphia, and most of them were stock or money brokers. However,
a few did advertise themselves specifically as merchandise brokers,
especially later in the period as the trading community diversified.
Thomas W. Pryor and John Milnor were both listed in the trade
directory of 1805 as commission brokers. Joshua Harlan was also
listed as a merchant broker. He lived in Walnut Street, but used the
coffee house as his office. This may have been because his residence
was too small for an office, but at the same time, the coffee house
was a good place to transact business. Whilst the numbers of mer-
chandise brokers were increasing by 1805 they were a relatively new
phenomenon.
The few wholesalers in Philadelphia were mostly wholesale gro-
cers such as Mifflin and Massey. Active in the 1760s, they purchased
groceries from other merchants and sold them on to shopkeepers,
and direct to consumers such as shoemaker Samuel Richards. The
variety of their credit relationships is of course reflected in their place
within the distribution network. They purchased sugar from
Cunningham and Nesbitt, tea, coffee and ginger from merchants
such as Joshua Fisher and Latham and Reid, sold rum to merchants
Sutton and McCauley from whom they purchased flour, and sold
on to shopkeepers like Andrew Doz (himself buying from a variety
of suppliers), widows like Margaret Butler and country stores. Butler
23
T.P. Cope and Sons Domestic Invoice Book 1803–1807, ff. 1, 46 and passim;
Diane Wenger, “Delivering the Goods: The Country Storekeeper and Inland
Commerce in the Mid-Atlantic” PMBH, 129,1 (2005), 45–72, p. 55.
198 chapter six
purchased a large amount of rum from them and may have been
running a tippling shop. They also sold salt (probably imported via
Liverpool) to William Sitgreaves, and sugar to Emelia, “A Negro
Wench of this city”, who appeared to be trading on her own account.24
Mifflin and Massey were no doubt trying to pull themselves up
the socio-economic scale, as they also embarked on some ‘adven-
tures’ on their own account—although this was by no means the
bulk of their trade at this time. They brought in sugar via New
York, which they sold on to the Fishers. In a smaller way, they too
were involved in the coastal trade. This would have required less
capital and credit and would have been an easier entry to trading
at their own risk. They also purchased rice, tea, sugar and rum from
Thomas Lawrence, who ran the public vendue. Mifflin and Massey
therefore used a wide variety of ways and means to purchase their
stock.25 The number of other warehouse keepers and wholesalers in
Philadelphia were insignificant numerically compared to those in
Liverpool and merchants in Philadelphia, and played a far smaller
role in the distribution of goods. There were none in the domestic
export industries such as flour. There were seven shoe warehouses
and three hat warehouses by 1805—demonstrating that merchant
were losing their exclusivity in the distribution of imported items,
but they were still few and far between before the expansion of
American manufactures in the early nineteenth century.
Auctions and vendues were popular and used by a wide variety
of Philadelphians throughout this period. The London Coffee House
was used often in the 1760s, but there were soon many more official
auction houses. The Public Vendue Officer opened a store on Front
Street in 1767, and John Baynard and James Loughead were amongst
others in the 1770s. They were often used for the sales of mer-
chandise, but also household and kitchen furniture on occasion. In
1787 John Patten had blankets, Wilton and Scots carpet, shawls,
hosiery and handkerchiefs for sale. Vendues were also sometimes
used to sell off the stock of bankrupts and damaged goods, such as
Irish linens off the Sam, which were sold for the benefit of the under-
writers in 1774. Some goods were brought in specifically for sale
at the vendues, which caused much controversy. James Loughead
24
Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 15, 7, 43, 51, 12, 37, 28, 46.
25
Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 205, 224, 19, passim.
imported textiles on the Lydia from Liverpool on both the spring

and fall shipment in 1774 and sold them directly from his vendue
store on Second Street.26
The situation was the same for dealers in Philadelphia. Whilst
there were more dealers than brokers in Philadelphia, there were
still far fewer than in Liverpool. Dealers, who distributed wholesale
and retail, were numerous in Liverpool, and indeed were growing
in Philadelphia too. However, the distribution of incoming flour was
in the hands of major middlemen such as Levi Hollingsworth, who
dealt directly with merchants. Dealers in flour, grain and corn were
in the minority, only thirteen in total were listed in 1785, 1791 and
1805 together. The remainder were dealers in imported goods such
as shoes, tea and wine.
Liverpool
In Liverpool, there were far more steps on the traders’ socio-eco-
nomic ladder, with a variety of brokers, warehouse keepers and deal-
ers engaged in the distribution process. This is not to say that a
different distribution process was in existence per se, but rather that
these were an additional and integral part of the ‘breaking bulk’ sys-
tem in addition to the merchants. Much of this was due to the far
more industrialised hinterland of Liverpool, which allowed for a wider
variety of distribution networks in a wider selection of goods.
Case and Southworth were slave traders in the 1760s. They also
imported Jamaican sugar which they sold to merchant and sugar
baker Thomas Wakefield (presumably of Skelhorn, Wakefield and
Co.), and others such as Mrs Roberts—possibly Mary Roberts of
the Merchant’s Coffee House. Case and Southworth also debited
their accounts with small purchases of commodities, such as a sin-
gle puncheon of rum taken by John Beckwith, or the two puncheons
taken by Richard Atkis—presumably for their own enjoyment. In
the 1770s, David Tuohy, also a slave trader, no doubt imported
goods such as rum and sugar from the West Indies, and also butter
and meat from Ireland. He purchased additional rum from merchant
26
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 19 Feb 1767, 10 Dec 1767, 25 May
1774, 11 May 1774, 19 Oct 1774; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 1 Oct,
1787, 8 Nov 1787, 1 Oct 1787.
200 chapter six
James Clemens, other merchandise from Gill Slater and sold sugar
to the sugar bakers and merchants Skelhorn, Wakefield and Co.27
John Tarleton, who had interests in Grenada and Dominica, sold
to a variety of persons between 1795 and 1804. These included bro-
kers George Drinkwater and James Hallsall, seed shopkeeper Ann
Collier, and a small amount of five shillings worth of goods to Hugh
Jones. This last sale was probably retail as a Hugh Jones is listed as
a roper rather than a shopkeeper, although Liverpool merchants sell-
ing at the retail level appeared to be rare. At the same time Tarleton
purchased items from merchants Henderson and Sellar. He owed
£422 11s. 5d. to grocers and tea dealers Ann and Mary Tuohy,
and money to various tradesmen for hats, jewellery and other items
exported or provisions for his ships. These merchants were acting
in a similar way to the Fishers and Thomas Cope in Philadelphia,
but without the retail sales. Occasionally merchants such as David
Shaw had their own separate shop, paying someone to run it for
them. However, whilst merchants in Liverpool acted in a similar
way to those in Philadelphia, they were far less active in the ‘break-
ing bulk’ and retail sectors.28
The lack of retail sales by merchants in Liverpool was due to the
fact that a wide array of middlemen redistributed these goods for
retail on their behalf. John Tarleton used George Drinkwater and
James Hallsall; other major brokers included Waterhouse and Sill,
Peter Kennion and George Dunbar. William Rathbone IV also used
brokers throughout the period. He sold ship supplies off the Three
Friends in 1766, and sugar and flour via Drinkwater in 1796. Drinkwater
was also used by William Wallace in 1787 to sell mahogany which
he had imported from Philadelphia. Brokers Waterhouse and Sill
were major cotton brokers roughly over the period 1799–1805,
although they occasionally dealt in items such as wine or ashes. They
had dealings with several major merchant houses including Rathbone
Hughes and Benson and demonstrate how brokers performed much
of the ‘breaking bulk’ function in Liverpool. Indeed, many of the
27
Case and Southworth Ledger 1763–1769, ff. 9, 12, 23; 2 Jul 1776, 12 Dec
1777, 30 Nov 1776, Accounts, DTP.
28
Balance Sheets, 31 Dec 1795, 31 Dec 1804, TP; 2 Jul 1787, 3 Jul 1787
Account Book of David Shaw 1787.
Figure 6.2: Distribution Network for Manchester Goods

Thomas Cornell Hinterland Manufactories
Charleston
Manchester Merchants
Andrew Clow & Co. James, Ben & John Potter
Watsons, Myers & Co.
Ship Adriana (1790)
Philadelphia Consignees incl. Liverpool Consignees
John Sitgreaves incl. Ellis & Robert Bent
Knox & Henderson George Green & Co.
Jeremiah Warder, Parker & Co. Thomas & William Earle
Thomas, Samuel & Miers Fisher
Rathbone & Benson
Auctioneers &
Warehouses incl. Liverpool
City Shopkeepers incl. Peter Wikoff Merchants
Captains Warehouses
John Abraham John Mease Dealers
Jane Taylor Robert & A. Degrove Mariners
Drapers etc.
Country
Shopkeepers Consumer Consumer Shopkeepers
Source: Bills of Lading for the Adriana, July 1790, Folder Adriana, James, Benjamin
and John Potter to Clow and Co., 21 August 1790, Folder 1785–1798, Myers,
Watson and Co. Invoice to Clow and Co., 24 July 1790, Folder 1785–1798, all
Andrew Clow and Co., CWU; Cornell to Clow and Co., 27 October 1784, Folder
October-December 1784, Andrew Clow and Co., SGC; List of letters to debtors,
10 January 1787, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794; Ledger of
Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, ff. 62, 90 and passim; Pennsylvania
Packet and Daily Advertiser, 1 October 1787; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily
Advertiser, 5 December 1796; Trade Directories for Liverpool and Philadelphia.
auctions in Liverpool were conducted by brokers, including George

Drinkwater. William Rathbone sold 120 barrels of American flour
(some damaged) through him at auction in 1774. Drinkwater also
auctioned sugar from the Molly in 1766—damaged not by the sea
but by the carelessness of the excise officers! No doubt by putting
this information in the advertisement, the agent or owner of the
Molly wanted to make clear that the damage was not due to his bad
management. There were also specialist auctioneers in Liverpool, as
in Philadelphia. Mills and Co., sworn appraisers, were one such firm
which gave money in advance for goods brought for sale such as
stock in trade, household furniture, effects of bankrupts and debtors
“At their Real commissioned Auction Room” at the top of Pool
Lane. Auctions also sold goods direct to ships’ captains, allowing
202 chapter six
them to purchase goods on their own account and by-pass the mer-
chant.29 As in Philadelphia, no doubt many lesser traders, male and
female found the auction houses helpful in purchasing lesser qual-
ity, damaged or out-of-date goods at a cheaper price.
Whilst there are no extant accounts for Liverpool of wholesale
grocers such as Mifflin and Massey, there in no reason to expect
that groceries were not distributed in exactly the same way. The
high numbers of dealers—who often worked retail, and the large
numbers of general shopkeepers would suggest that grocers dealt with
much of the retail trade at the higher end of the market. However,
many dealers sold wholesale as well. Most prominent were the flour
dealers—who may have sold to and from small-scale shops, and those
in tea, earthenware and clothes. Again, with the lack of accounts
listing such persons, this is difficult to prove, but such traders must
have purchased their goods from merchants, brokers, auctions and
wholesalers and warehouse keepers.
The high numbers of warehouse keepers in Liverpool was due to
their role as collectors and distributors of exports and imports and
of regionally imported goods. The high industrialisation of the Liverpool
hinterland meant that many import and exports goods were filtered
through Liverpool. Furthermore, many of the manufactures that came
to Liverpool from places such as Sheffield and Birmingham were for
local consumption, not export, and so did not even have to go any-
where near the hands of a merchant or shipping agent as highlighted
in figure 6.3. Duncan M’Lean had a warehouse through which he
sold a large assortment of drapery and millinery goods, just arrived—
no doubt from the Manchester area. He also had a shop, so the
warehouse appeared to be for wholesale purchases. John Robinson
was a cheese factor who ran a warehouse at the corner of Ansdell
and Darwen Streets which he used for the cheese, flour and corn
trade.30 Again this would have been a wholesale business, and he
29
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 14 Nov 1766; Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine
Intelligencer, 4 Apl 1796; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 27 Aug 1787; Waterhouse
and Sill were obviously active before 1799 as their account books have mainly
brought forward balances. Waterhouse and Co. Accounts 1799–1802, f. 137, SJL;
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 11 Feb 1774, 19 Sep 1766, 26 Nov 1787; Auction
Advert, Letters from Tuohy, DTP.
30
Liverpool General Advertiser, 12 Dec 1766; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 4 Mar
1774.
Figure 6.3: Distribution Network for Metalware/Hardware

Merchant Ship’s Russel & Smith

Robert Husband [?] Birmingham
Usher ?
Three Friends (1759) John Hoyland
Adriana (1792) Sheffield
Sussex (1795)
William & John Haliday & Dunbar
Sitgreaves Rathbone & Benson
Warehouses & Wholesale

Country Thomas, Samuel Ironmongers incl. Robert
Shopkeepers & Miers Fisher Preston
Ironmongers &
Hardware Shops
Consumer Shopkeeper Consumer Shopkeeper
Source: Haliday and Dunbar Invoice to Usher, 10 September 1759, Invoice Book
of Robert Usher 1759–1761, PHMC; Sitgreaves to Russels and Smith, 16 March
1784, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794 and passim; Account of
John Hoyland, Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher 1792–1797, f. 76;
Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 2 May 1796; Trade Directories for
Liverpool and Philadelphia.
would have sold to exporting merchants as well as local shopkeep-

ers and dealers.
The process of breaking bulk therefore differed in each city because
the Philadelphia trading community was less diversified. In some
ways the process was similar; merchants brought and sold from other
merchants, wholesalers, warehouses and auctions, retailers and con-
sumers in both cities. However, it would appear that merchants in
Philadelphia were far more likely to sell retail as well as wholesale,
and were far more active in ‘breaking bulk’ due to the lack of a
middleman sector.
Retail Sales
Whilst some merchants did sell retail, the majority of retail sales
in both cities were carried out by a mixture of warehouse keepers,
204 chapter six
mercers, drapers, haberdashers and hosiers, grocers, dealers and a

variety of shopkeepers and itinerant dealers.
In Philadelphia, the goods sold in warehouses were mostly import
items. In Liverpool, many goods were imported regionally directly
from the manufacturer which meant that many warehouse keepers
also sold retail. For example, Thomas Wolfe, mentioned above,
brought in goods direct from Staffordshire, as well as buying prod-
ucts from the Herculaneum Pottery. The Herculaneum Pottery sold
wholesale to merchants and ships’ captains, but also sold retail from
its warehouse in Duke Street. It sold goods of its own manufacture
as well as those of Josiah Spode of Staffordshire. In Philadelphia,
warehouse keepers were more likely to buy from importing mer-
chants, but some managed to have access to their own or other’s
regional manufactories. Robert and A. Degrove opened their hat
warehouse in 1796 at 90 South Second Street, Philadelphia, selling
hats imported from London and their own manufactory in New
York—at least some manufacture of goods previously only imported
were by then being carried out regionally. Some concentrated on
the retail market—advertising price over quality in order to attract
customers. Thomas Morgan of Liverpool listed the prices of shoes
on sale at his warehouse, whilst Samuel Garrigues of Philadelphia
advertised that he had a “Ready Money Ware-House” in Market Street.31
Selling textiles retail to the better off in Liverpool society were
the mercers, drapers, haberdashers and hosiers. They also sold whole-
sale to country shops; but in town were usually located in the fash-
ionable streets, selling to fashionable people. Liverpudlian P. Pritchard
advertised in 1766 that he had previously been a silk mercer in
London, but now had a shop in Old Hall Street, Liverpool, where
he was showing nothing but what was “fashionable and genteel”.
He would have used his contacts in London in order to procure the
most up-to-date patterns and materials. Some traders gained stock,
or perhaps even started off in business, on the back of the misfor-
tune of others. In 1774, Mary Stanford was selling off all the stock
from her linen drapery shop in Castle Street, Liverpool. In the same
year John Farrington was also selling the entire stock of his shop on
31
Accounts of Wolfe, Spode, Herculaneum Potteries Ledger 1806–1817, ff. 14,
226; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, 3 Dec 1796, Williamson’s Liverpool
Advertiser, 15 Apl 1774, 8 Apl 1774.
the High Street.32 Large sell-offs of stock like this may have been
gained at a reduced rate and enabled someone with a smaller cap-
ital to engage in this usually very expensive retail business. As men-
tioned above and in chapter three, in Philadelphia, the function of
distributing elite textiles was performed mostly by merchants until
the early nineteenth century. The rise of these shops in the United
States may have been hindered by their preference for cash when
merchants were still offering credit for the same goods.
Grocers were especially numerous in Philadelphia because of the
lack of a diverse distribution structure. They performed the function
of brokers and dealers as well as some shopkeepers. They sometimes
also sold to ships, acting as victuallers in addition. Grocers mostly
brought from importing merchants such as the Fishers in Philadelphia,
or Case and Southworth in Liverpool, no doubt augmented by auc-
tion and warehouse sales. Grocers sold retail to a wide variety of
people—often dependant upon the status of their own shop. John
Blanchard of Philadelphia stocked Madeira sherry, Lisbon port,
London porter, Jamaica spirits, best Holland gin, candles, sugars,
coffee, chocolate, raisins and spices of all kinds “At his Wholesale
and retail Grocery Store”. Grocers with such a wide range of liquor
would have provided for the better-off consumers. No doubt T.
Clarke of Liverpool, who was upgrading to a bigger shop and new
warehouse in Marshall and Cable Street, was also trying to attract
higher-status customers. Some grocers, such as Margaret Moulder,
were less prestigious. Acting part time, she sold flour and fruit as
well as cider, brandy and pork. Some of her customers even paid
her with country produce such as peaches—a sure sign that she was
selling to the less well off and those without access to specie or paper
forms of payment. Perhaps Liverpool grocers Alice Pratt of Elbow
Lane and Elizabeth Voss of Frog Lane, both active in 1774, were
in similar situations to Margaret Moulder.33
Whilst many dealers performed a wholesale function in items such
as flour and tea, many also sold retail in goods such as earthenware,
coal, tallow and second-hand clothes. It was all a matter of degree. In
Liverpool, many, such as David Bell, corn and flour dealer, purchased
32
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, pp. 237–238; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser,
28 Mar 1766, 4 Feb 1774, 29 Apl 1774.
33
Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 16 Nov 1787; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser,
9 Apl 1787, Margaret Moulder Ledger 1794–1799, ff. 2, 14, 20.
206 chapter six
their stock from merchants such as Joseph Bury or John Robson, or

from factors like Duncan M’Lean. Others would have bought from
a variety of wholesalers, grocers, auctioneers and shopkeepers for
retail sale. Pottery dealers for example purchased from warehouses,
wholesalers, shops and auctions before selling their stock on to the
consumer. In Liverpool, many must have purchased from the
Herculaneum Pottery or Thomas Wolfe. In Philadelphia, dealers
would have bought mostly from merchants or those ships’ captains
that imported semi-illegally. Many dealers would have sold door to
door almost acting in an itinerant capacity. The marginal and often
part-time nature of the employment of these traders is evident by
the fact that many of them went bankrupt. Jacob Barlow was a
Liverpool chandler, soap boiler, dealer and chapman who went bank-
rupt in 1766. Equally, William Waltman, dealer of Philadelphia, went
bankrupt in 1787.34
The majority of retailers were shopkeepers, whose numbers rose
enormously in both cities over the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Many of them were specialist shopkeepers in chinaware, earth-
enware, books, music, jewellery or ironmongery. In Liverpool,
shopkeepers in non-food goods would have purchased from local
artisans, warehouses that imported regionally, or from London.
Earthenware in particular could have been purchased locally. Some
of these shopkeepers diversified into a little export trading when they
could—as opportunity arose. Hannah Rigby was an ironmonger who
fell on hard times in 1781. A widow, she may have taken over from
her husband, but found herself in debtors’ gaol at the behest of
Edward Gatley and Joseph Walker. She probably owed Gatley for
her supplies, which she had sold to a wide variety of people includ-
ing Captain Peter Martin of Galloway, Ireland, Captain Rew of
Scotland and William Lowther of New York. They owed her £26,
£6 and £91 6s. 2d. respectively.35
Quite a few women also ran tobacconist shops. Susannah Carmalt
of Philadelphia may have been running a small shop of this kind in
1770, as she purchased snuff (the only commodity she bought from
them) from the Fishers. Others sold snuff or tobacco as part of a
34
Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine Intelligencer, 22 Feb 1796; Weatherill,
“English Pottery Trade”, p. 57; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 22 Aug 1766; Pennsylvania
Packet and Daily Advertiser, 3 Dec 1787.
35
Insolvent Debtor’s List of Hannah Rigby, 2 Oct 1781, LRO.
more general stock such as Sarah Lloyd, also of Philadelphia. She

purchased snuff and textiles from the Fishers. Indeed, they appeared
to provide stock for quite a few women. Ann Powell also purchased
snuff, chintz and other merchandise through them. Powell was more
successful than Hannah Rigby however, running her shop at 15
South Third Street between at least 1785 and 1805.36 Many of these
small general shops, which provided so much of the employment for
female traders were small scale and would have carried a small stock,
but singly and especially collectively they had a high turnover, mak-
ing a large cumulative contribution to the economy.
General stores similar to those in the cities also distributed goods
throughout the countryside, again selling a wide variety of items.
William Scott, originally from Philadelphia, opened up a store “at
the Cross Roads in New Castle county, commonly known by the
name of Wetherspoon’s . . . for cash or country produce only”. Selling
dry goods and groceries, he must have used his knowledge in
Philadelphia to buy his stock, but realised that there was a market
for these goods in the countryside as well. The Fishers, with their
strong position in the city, also provided goods for country stores,
and may well have provided Scott with some of his stock. Country
storekeepers would buy from a variety of merchants in the city
though, partly spreading their risk in the way that merchants did,
and partly spreading their payments. When William McCord, a shop-
keeper of Lancaster, Pennsylvania went bankrupt he notified people
to bring the accounts or pay their debts to Joseph Swift of Philadelphia
or Jasper Yeates of Lancaster. His assignees were J. Swift, Cadwallader
Morris and Isaac Wikoff, all of Philadelphia. In line with normal
practice, these people were probably made assignees because McCord
owed them money.37
Complementing the country stores were itinerant dealers of vari-
ous kinds. Mostly absent from the trade directories, precisely because
of their more mobile nature, they were nevertheless an important
part of the economy. The county of Lancashire, which included
Liverpool, had sixty-five licensed hawkers in 1782–3; there is of
course no clue as to how many more were trading illegally. They
36
Accounts of Susannah Carmalt, Sarah Lloyd and Ann Powell, Samuel and
Miers Fisher Ledger 1769–?, ff. 150 155, 148, 16.
37
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 30 Jul 1767; Samuel and Miers Fisher
Ledger 1769–?, passim; Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 11 Jun 1767.
208 chapter six
were at the bottom of the socio-economic scale of traders, and many

such as Ellen Wood of Liverpool in 1766, and Samuel Hodgson of
Oxford Township, Pennsylvania in 1787, went bankrupt. However,
as a group they were not completely destitute because they required
credit from town shops between stocking their packs and returning
to the towns or cities, weeks, or even months later. Sometimes they
even gave credit in turn to their own customers. Chapmen selling
books may have brought them from specialist shopkeepers such as
Carey, mentioned above. Carey sold six dozen school bibles, three
dozen psalm books, and many other religious texts to one person
alone in September 1805. This large quantity must surely have been
to a lesser trader who was peddling in the Philadelphia hinterland.
Other chapmen may have purchased almanacs from the Company
of Stationers in London, although the Company wanted ready money
for their books! Certainly in England, itinerant pottery dealers were
important; “the final link in a long chain of distribution”. In Liverpool
there was good access through the Herculaneum Pottery and various
warehouses and specialist shopkeepers who brought in goods from
the region. Itinerant dealers therefore purchased their goods from a
wide variety of people, and were essential in providing consumer
goods to the hinterland.38
Last, but not least, were the markets. These added another layer
of distribution to the retail sector, as well as amusement. Unfortunately,
there is a lack of evidence to show how market traders fitted into
the distribution pattern to the level of detail available for those higher
up the scale of the trading community. The same situation applies
to smuggling and illegal importation which would have added yet
another layer on to this distribution of goods to the very poor—
especially in more exotic goods such as tea and tobacco. Retailing
was therefore a very varied sector, ranging from merchants to hawk-
ers, and even smugglers. Whilst some sold wholesale as well as retail,
the importance of the retail sector lay in distributing goods to the
lower levels of society, including the very poorest.
38
Mui and Mui, Shops and Shopkeeping, p. 100; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 22
Aug 1766; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 30 Nov 1787; Invoice of Mathew
Carey, 5 Sep 1810, Folder Booksellers and Stationers, Collection 71, Winterthur
Library; Gore’s General Advertiser, 24 Oct 1805; Weatherill, “The Business of Middleman”,
p. 67.
An Efficient Distribution Network
The network of goods between and around Philadelphia and Liverpool

was therefore complex and multi-layered. Looking in detail at the
distribution of goods has demonstrated the very important contri-
bution made by traders other than elite, male, merchants. There is
no doubt that the distribution process was simpler in Philadelphia
than in Liverpool. A quick glance at figures 6.1–3 highlights the
diversity in distribution according to the type of goods. This was due
to factors such as differing hinterlands and manufacturing output,
variations in the distribution of wealth and the networking capacity
of the traders in each city.
There is no doubt however, about the success of these traders in
distributing goods of all kinds. Efficient networks of people built up
efficient decision-making processes based on trusted networks of infor-
mation. This in turn produced an environment in which the neces-
sary credit required to underpin trade was extended. This facilitated
a network of goods which allowed people at all levels of society,
whether in Chester, England, or Chester County, Pennsylvania to
join in the ‘consumer revolution’ to some extent. This efficient mech-
anism distributed goods manufactured in Manchester, Sheffield,
Staffordshire or Birmingham to American consumers via Liverpool,
and for flour and timber to be provided from the Pennsylvanian
hinterland to hungry mouths in England. As Liverpool and Philadelphia
were ‘Atlanticised’ through the processes of ‘Americanisation’ and
‘Anglicization’, so too were the many people who distributed and
purchased these goods. It did not matter that they did not cross the
ocean themselves, the ‘world of goods’ acted as a proxy for them.
The distribution of goods presented here is of course a simplified
and partial version of what happened. Merchants in Liverpool and
Philadelphia were also involved in the distribution of goods across
the ocean from all over the world; sugar, tea, coffee, silks, tobacco,
rice, spices, china, even an unwilling labour force. The list is end-
less. Once in a port, the local and regional distribution was taken
up by a whole host of lesser traders, men and women. This is impor-
tant because it means that the ‘consumer revolution’ as identified by
McKendrick, Breen and Shammas, amongst others, is not a fanci-
ful invention. Nor was it confined to the rich and middle sort. As
goods were broken into smaller and smaller amounts they became
affordable even to the very poor. This was further assisted by credit
210 chapter six
being advanced throughout the distribution chain—even by hawkers

and peddlers. Looking in detail at the distribution process has demon-
strated exactly how lesser traders and especially women, fitted in to
that process, and how important they were to it. These traders pro-
vided the distribution that joined the supply and demand for these
goods. As Doerflinger says, “The Industrial Revolution had not yet
spread to the New World, but its twin brother, the Consumer Revo-
lution had”.39 The Atlantic trading community made this possible.
39
Doerflinger, “Farmers and Dry Goods”, p. 195.
CHAPTER SEVEN
RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT
I scarcely know any business [branch of trade]

which you cou’d go into with a prospect of
making a profit adequate to the risk.
John Perhouse to James Perhouse, 26 Feb 1802
Contemporary writer William Gordon wrote that: “Commerce is not

a game of chance, but of science”. Whilst he was correct in regard
to mixing knowledge of commodities, markets and languages with
good sense, he was wrong overall. Engaging in trade is, and always
has been, a risky business, and the eighteenth-century commercial
environment was especially so. With the growth in trade around the
Atlantic littoral, opportunities for profit through commercial activity
increased greatly. However, with slow communications and a rela-
tively unregulated environment, engaging in trade was an uncertain
task. Still, potential profits encouraged many people to try their luck.
John Perhouse, writing to his brother in England from Philadelphia
in 1802, made his view clear in the quote above.1 Whether you were
involved in dry goods, groceries, imports or exports, trade was a
risky business.
This was true for all traders, whatever their socio-economic status.
For example, Thomas Sadler of Liverpool was trying to keep body
and soul together by combining baking with the trades of dealer and
chapman when his business failed in 1766. Similarly, Samuel Hodgson,
dealer and chapman of Oxford township, Pennsylvania, appeared in
no hurry to face the bankruptcy charges against him in 1787.2 Those
1
Gordon, Universal Accountant, Vol. I, p. 4; there is a debate concerning what is
risk and what is uncertainty. I use the word risk because whilst trade could not be
accurately known or predicted (it was uncertain), traders continued to act under
conditions which included the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss (risk); others
posit the idea that there is no real trust or risk at all, Oliver E. Williamson,
“Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization”, JLE, 36,2 (1993), 453–486.
2
John to James Perhouse, 26 Feb 1802, John Perhouse Journal 1800–1838;
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 29 Aug 1766; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 30
Nov 1787.
212 chapter seven
such as John Perhouse, much higher up the trader tree, equally had
to deal with risk in managing their career. The more money you
had to invest, the more money you had to lose. However, those
traders with higher socio-economic status were more likely to have
the wherewithal to ride out hard times. Those nearer the margins
of survival would not have had access to the same extension of credit,
information, or even trading choices that more elite traders would
have had.
This chapter is about how individual traders coped with their busi-
ness on a day-to-day basis. Through the use of case studies it will
investigate the ways in which traders at every level managed risk,
their reputations, their obligations, their credit and sometimes the
actions of others. To a large extent, the ability to manage these var-
ious factors was dependent upon the trader’s place within the hier-
archy and where they were in their life cycle. Those at the beginning
of their career had less obligations to others, but had smaller net-
works and a reputation to build. For traders at the bottom of the
scale, control over their daily lives, of survival until the next meal,
may have been challenge enough. For some, the risk of being in
trade as opposed to paid employment may have been the real risk—
assuming that everyone had such a choice.
Most traders tried to manage the inherent risk in trade and con-
trol their environment in some way. For women this could be espe-
cially difficult. Their uncertain legal status led to problems in gaining
capital and credit, which in turn reduced their choices. Many of the
female traders discussed in this book were poor by way of being sin-
gle or widowed, although widows who were well provided for would
have had more options. The ability of women to control the actions
of others, especially men, was also curtailed because they did not
have access to formal networking institutions such as the Council,
Exchange, trade associations and male social clubs. However, this
does not mean that they were powerless. As was discussed in chap-
ter four, female networks worked at a more informal level, through
family, friendships, neighbourhood, marketplace, shop and home.
Furthermore, women did challenge or control the actions of others
by using family and religious obligations to their advantage, by defer-
ring and defaulting payment and via the court system.
Reputation was the most important attribute of a trader. If a
trader had a poor reputation or was an unknown quantity, access
to capital, credit and information would be reduced. The status of
risk and risk management 213
a trader’s reputation was one aspect of the information that was

transmitted through the various people networks. Coffee houses, inns,
taverns, the exchange, associations, clubs and shops were vital forums
for the exchange of gossip and information in addition to letters. In
these spaces, reputations were made and destroyed; “a small rumour
will overset a tradesman” wrote Defoe. Reputations could be based
on a wide variety of attributes; success in business, perceived moral-
ity at home and in the counting house, public and private virtue,
sociability, social status, and conforming to accepted social rules and
conventions. A good reputation put commissions and recommenda-
tions your way and opened access to credit. This was especially
important during hard times. Established merchants were usually
allowed to defer payment in times of crisis, which gave them the
ability to weather financial storms which ruined lesser traders. In the
aftermath of post-war overtrading in Philadelphia, it was the shop-
keepers and lesser merchants who suffered the most, whilst estab-
lished elite merchants survived. It was therefore important to be seen
as a fair trader, to live within your means and to pay your debts
on time. Therefore we see William Sitgreaves ‘puffing’ about his reg-
ularity in payment over twenty-six years of trade.3
Having gained credit, not everyone could or would pay on time.
As was discussed in chapter five, payment times for goods on credit
differed widely. Country shopkeepers were noticeably slower at pay-
ing their debts than those within easy distance of a merchant in
town. Rather than an inability to pay, this could often be a ploy in
deferred payment, as traders took advantage of the fact that they
did not have to confront the person to whom they owed money over
a glass of punch in the local inn. William Sitgreaves was a Philadelphia
merchant who faced this problem. He sold goods he had imported
from Britain to shopkeepers in the Philadelphia hinterland, as well
as around Philadelphia. These included to shopkeepers in town such
3
Defoe, The Complete English Tradesmen, chapter fifteen and passim; Craig Muldrew,
The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1998), chapter six; Ruth H. Bloch, “The
Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America”, Signs, 13,1, Women and
the Political Process in the United States (1987), 37–58; Jean-Phillipe Platteau,
“Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist—Part II: The Role of Moral
Norms”, JDS, 30,3 (1994), 753–817; Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and
Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, AJS, 91,3 (1985), 481–510;
Hudson, Genesis, pp. 30–36, 50; Sitgreaves to Samuel Greg, 13 Nov 1783, William
and John Sitgreaves Letterbook, 1783–1794, f. 39.
214 chapter seven
as Middleton, approximately eighty miles west of Philadelphia.

Sitgreaves sent thirteen country customers letters chasing for pay-
ment in January 1787 for goods delivered from the autumn 1786
importations. Some of the same people received letters in July,
October and November of the same year. It is likely that these were
for the same overdue accounts. Some of this ‘deferred’ payment may
have been due to the slump of the late 1780s, yet some had still
not fully paid as late as 1793.4
This type of ‘deferred’ payment can be seen amongst the accounts
of Mifflin and Massey, also of Philadelphia. To some extent, this
was due to debtors making payment on their next visit to town,
which may have been every few months. However, this ‘ploy’ was
not the preserve of lesser traders; it was also used by American mer-
chants during and after the War of Independence. Many debts due
to British merchants remained unpaid as late as 1795.5 Although this
was perhaps a ‘negative’ action, it is certainly one way in which
traders managed their payments and took control of their situation.
Traders at the bottom of the social scale also managed their sit-
uation by taking control out of the hands of others in other ways.
Certainly elite traders could not always regulate or control the action
of lesser traders. For example, mariners and ships’ masters often
traded on their own account, either legally or illegally, with or with-
out permission. When the mariner Oliver Templeton made a sec-
ondary career out of selling goods and lending out money to people
in Liverpool and Philadelphia in the 1760s, he may have been
involved in activity of this kind. Such petty trading was often con-
sidered illegal by local courts and merchants and was a major con-
cern of the Liverpool elite in 1804. The Liverpool Grand Jury enlisted
the help of the American Chamber of Commerce and the West
4
William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook 1783–1794, lists of letters sent 10 Jan
1787, 11 Jul 1787, 8 Oct 1787, 5 Nov 1787, 7 Mar 1788, 8 Mar 1792 and 17
May 1793.
5
Mifflin and Massey Ledger 1760–1763, ff. 43, 45; Sparling and Bolden Letterbook,
LivRO; in the same year the Declaration of Independence was signed, outstanding
debts to Britain by the colonies stood at £2,958,390, Pennsylvania owing £137,671
alone, of which only one third might have been recovered. Sheridan, “The British
Credit Crisis of 1772”, pp. 162, 167; in 1795 the Jay Treaty arranged for the
United States’ government to pay $600,000 to the British government in full pay-
ment for outstanding debts, which was to distribute the money as it saw fit. This
was estimated to represent a payment of only 2s. 6d. in the pound, Schofield, “The
Virginia Trade”, p. 126.
India Association in order to stamp out such activity. The Jury com-
plained about people selling goods door-to-door “at reduced prices
describing them to be the adventures of seafaring men, but which
in fact are stolen goods” and which has now “become a very seri-
ous and spreading Evil”. The Jury threatened to “punish with the
utmost severity” those householders who purchased, or ‘received’
such stolen goods.6 It is worth noting that the commodities they were
most concerned about were items such as coffee, indigo, cloves, pep-
per and liquors; expensive items relative to their weight and often
enumerated. Therefore the customs officials had an interest in con-
trolling these activities in addition to elite merchants.
In Philadelphia, lesser traders were also under attack from elite
traders and others. Hucksters, invariably women, were special cause
for concern. Hucksters were often accused of regrating. They were
“wretches in Petticoats” complained a writer to Relf ’s Philadelphia
Gazette. The complainer continued; “it is a well known fact, that
butcher’s meat excepted, we have to purchase every thing brought
to our tables of the huckster women, at an advance of from 50 to
100 per cent”.7 What is significant about these examples is the way
in which lesser traders were able to operate outside the more for-
mally regulated trade of the Exchange and Council. They took mat-
ters into their own hands and thwarted the attempts of elite traders
and the authorities to control their activities. The fact that efforts
were made to restrict their activity suggests they made more of a
contribution than the extant evidence suggests.
Elite traders were in a relatively powerful position. They were able
to manage their own career because they had more choices, but
could also control the outcome of town and port policy through their
personal networks. Especially useful were formal arenas via the
Exchange, town Council, Parliament or Assembly, Chambers of
Commerce and informal clubs and associations. Merchants controlled
the town councils of both Philadelphia and Liverpool and therefore
the way in which the ports responded to changes in trade, as well
as government policy, crises, immigration and sanitation. Elite traders
had very efficient personal networks through which they could control
6
Insolvent Debtor’s List of Oliver Templeton, 14 Jan 1766, LRO; Minutes of
the American Chamber of Commerce 1801–1908, p. 61.
7
Letter to Relf’s Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser, from an old citizen, 12
Oct 1805.
216 chapter seven
many aspects of their own lives, and those of others. Lesser traders,
male and female, also often wanted to regulate the actions of oth-
ers. A major way in which this was done was through the legal sys-
tem. The importance of the law regarding insolvency, bankruptcy
and debt repayment was demonstrated in chapter five. The legal
system was a major avenue through which traders could manage
and control the actions of others. The various courts in Liverpool
and Philadelphia were used extensively within the networks of credit
by both men and women. In 1766, Sarah Rigby, widow of an iron-
monger, challenged her late husband’s brother for her share in the
business and three shares in the Sankey Navigation through the
Lancaster Court of Chancery. She knew enough about the business
to want to inspect the books, accusing her brother-in-law of fraud.
Although these ‘equity’ courts were notoriously slow, people of many
social backgrounds used them to manage their business affairs.8
Sarah Rigby was not unusual. Many women used the Courts of
Chancery—especially for resolving issues concerning wills and main-
tenance deriving from their husband’s estates. For women, many
things were directly out of their control and they faced different risks
and problems in addition to those faced by all traders. Most mar-
ried women did not have access to large amounts of credit because
of their coverture. Although husbands were liable for their wives’
debts, men often placed adverts in the newspapers absolving them-
selves of responsibility for costs their so-called errant wives incurred.
In these cases, creditors would have difficulty collecting them. Jean
Hall had eloped in 1755, and her husband, a peddler in Philadelphia,
announced that he would not pay any debts contracted by her; in
a similar fashion, John Wilson of Liverpool absolved himself of any
of his wife’s debts.9
Conversely, even if a married woman traded feme sole whilst her
husband was absent, she stood the risk of him returning and claim-
ing all her profits for himself. This was not a risk men faced. For
single women too, access to capital and credit was usually restricted.
8
Pleadings of Sarah Rigby, NA. They were called courts of equity because
decisions took ‘fair play’ and justice into account, rather than relying purely on the
letter of the law. Many elite merchants used the Court of Chancery in London in
addition to that of the Palatinate of Lancaster.
9
The Pennsylvania Gazette, 22 May 1755; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 22 Aug
1766.
Partly this was due to the effects of primogeniture, and partly because
of the uncertain legal status of their debts should they marry. Women
also had different obligations. A lot of their time was taken up look-
ing after their family. The social identification of women with fam-
ily and the home may also have altered notions of what constituted
a good female reputation. In addition to being seen as a fair trader,
women may also have had to fulfil feminine roles expected by soci-
ety such as being a good wife and mother, or even simply being
virtuous if single. Notions of a woman’s virtue, even in business, may
have differed from what was expected of men.10
Female networks were also often informal which meant that their
knowledge base was different. Without direct access to the town
Council, Chambers of Commerce and male-dominated clubs, they
also lacked formal control over the environment in which they worked.
At the same time women had to work within rules and regulations
set by men, without representation and formal notification. Many
women worked within the formal economy, and indeed the grey
economy, at a disadvantage. However, this is not to say that women
did not exert any influence or have any control over their trading
choices and the risks that they took, only that these often took more
subtle forms.
Of course, many male traders were also at a disadvantage. Mariners
such as Oliver Templeton had little access to the credit and capital
required to set up a large import-export business, let alone the
Exchange. For many traders, making enough profit to buy the evening
meal may have been the only control they had over their lives. A
chapman may have considered himself or herself successful to have
survived a trade slump without having been sent to debtors’ gaol.
At the other end of the scale, elite traders could manage port and
town policy, besides having the choice of whether to deal in wet or
dry goods, specialise in importing or exporting, or to invest in ship-
ping. For some traders, moral issues, such as engagement in the slave
trade may even have been part of their ability to make choices; but
many lesser traders also managed their trade, at whatever level,
whether by avoiding the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce to
curtail their activity, or by deferring payment for a couple of months.
10
Bloch, “The Gendered Meanings of Virtue”; Hunt, The Middling Sort, chapter
five. Women’s access to capital and credit was discussed in chapter five, pp. 164–167.
218 chapter seven
For traders, the management of the risk inherent in trade was cru-
cial, but the ability to do so was dependant on the talent with which
a trader could manage many other aspects of their business: repu-
tation, access to capital, credit, knowledge and information via net-
works and the actions of others. Even gender affected how traders
were able to manage and control their own businesses.
In order to investigate these issues more clearly, several case stud-
ies will be discussed in detail to analyse the way in which particu-
lar traders managed and controlled their businesses. The records of
the majority of lesser traders, many of whom were women, have not
survived. However, a collection of vignettes has been framed to form
a study of how women managed and controlled their trading careers.
Unfortunately the remaining case studies by virtue of the extant
records are concerned with merchants—the elite of the trading com-
munity. Indeed, we have met many of these actors throughout this
book in various guises. Looking at these characters in more detail
however, demonstrates the issues which all traders had to confront,
and provides a window through which we can try to understand
what life was like for the eighteenth-century trader.
Female Traders
Mary Coates was the widow of Samuel, a Philadelphia Quaker. She

took over his shop after his death, selling luxury goods for two
decades to at least 1770. Rather than sell the business, she chose to
continue running it in order to provide an income. She was a mem-
ber of a “handful of elite women shopkeepers” during this period.
She, like other traders, including men, found her friends, family
members and religious networks a useful starting point in securing
trusted trading relationships and access to credit. These included her
sister-in-law Elizabeth Paschall and her co-religionists the Fisher fam-
ily. Mary purchased bottles of snuff from the Fishers, at two to three
month’s credit, sometimes in large quantities. In the Fishers’ January
sales of 1770, she was the largest purchaser of snuff, buying 170
bottles worth £27 12s. She also clubbed together with Elizabeth
Paschall in order to raise the money for purchases from vendue sales.
Women banded together in this way to buy from auctions in the
same way as men invested together to buy shipping. The scale was
different but the principal the same. Coates was successful enough
to pass on her business to (presumably) her daughter. A Margarett

Coates, purchased snuff from the Fishers in 1771. Mary therefore
successfully ran her business for two decades, leaving an appropri-
ate income and life-style for her daughter. She used her various net-
works in order to gain access to credit and larger amounts of money
for investment.11
Other women who purchased goods from the Fishers included
Sarah Lloyd. Although she purchased far smaller amounts than Mary
Coates, she purchased a wider variety of goods for her shop, includ-
ing snuff, silk and callimanco. Unlike Coates, who did not appear
in the tax lists of 1769 or 1774, Sarah was assessed for three ser-
vants in 1769 and paid £42 tax in that year, and £30 in 1774.
Another frequent purchaser was Ann Powell, who bought snuff, India
chintz and other merchandise over the period from 1769 to 1770.
For some reason she received (or took!) longer credit, paying for the
majority of merchandise in around six months, and up to one year
for her snuff. Powell was successful. She was listed in the trade direc-
tories in 1785, 1791 and 1805, always at 15 South Third Street.
Having been in business since at least 1767, she had a career of
nearly forty years!12
Coates, Lloyd and Powell were shopkeepers, but some Philadelphian
women did import goods on their own account—‘at their own risk’.
Rebecca Jones imported on ships husbanded by the Fishers. She
imported goods on the Pigou from London, the Silvana [London?]
and the Grange and the Manchester from Liverpool over the period
1792 to 1794. The Fishers also arranged the payment of her import
duties for her, and arranged a draft in favour of Philip Crammond.
For some reason, by 1795 she no longer imported at her own risk,
buying imported goods direct from the Fishers instead. A Rebecca
Jones is listed in the directories for 1785, 1791 and 1805. She is
listed as a gentlewoman, widow, and gentlewoman respectively.
Rebecca was also known to Philadelphia Quaker circles, including
11
Cleary, “‘She will be in the Shop’”, pp. 181–182; Wulf, Not All Wives, p. 146;
Snuff Sales, Account of Margarett Coates and Compy, Samuel and Miers Fisher
Ledger 1769–?, ff. 140, 170.
12
Account of Sarah Lloyd, Samuel and Miers Fishers Ledger, 1769–?, f. 148;
City of Philadelphia Proprietary Tax List 1769; Philadelphia Provincial Tax List
1774; women were often treated more leniently in tax assessments because of their
perceived role in society. Wulf, “Assessing Gender”, passim; Account of Ann Powell,
Snuff Sales, Samuel and Miers Fishers Ledger, 1769–?, ff. 16, 140.
220 chapter seven
being on friendly enough terms with the Fishers to dine with them
in 1802.13 She may therefore have been helped financially through
her widowhood by co-religionists through calling on a sense of oblig-
ation generally, and a patrician instinct, in order to gain credit
through hard times. However, at the same time, she may have come
under social pressure to ‘retire’ from trade once her finances were
more stable. Trade may not have been deemed a suitable occupa-
tion for a gentlewoman. Similarly she may have remarried as another
socially-acceptable option, changed her name, and/or withdrawn
from trade.
Thomas P. Cope, another Quaker merchant, also dealt with many
women at the beginning of the nineteenth century. His ledgers show
that 23 per cent of his accounts were with women. Of course they
were not the largest accounts, but nevertheless this demonstrates the
wide inclusion of women within the commercial environment. Some,
such as Jane Bowie and Elizabeth Harrison were listed as widows
in the directories but many were listed specifically as shopkeepers.
These included Margaret Kreps, Rachel Griscom and Martha Redman.
Other women noticeable in Cope’s accounts acted in partnership.
Esther and Sarah Crispin purchased goods from him at three to
seven months’ credit in 1803 and Ann and Sarah Ashbridge were
given one to two months’ credit to begin with, but were extended
three months’ credit once trust was established. As with the Fishers,
Cope showed lenience to women, perhaps as some form of social
obligation. This was merely enlightened self-interest. Women who
were working were not so likely to need the poorhouse, an institu-
tion funded by taxes paid by traders, amongst others. Mary Landell
made payments over one to two years for her merchandise in the
early nineteenth century.14 Philadelphia merchants therefore appeared
to trade with many women both before and after the War of
Independence, with those women using family, friends, co-religion-
ists and social obligation for access to credit throughout the period.
In Liverpool too, women traded directly with merchants. In 1789
Jane Garnet and Amy Molyneux both provided goods, perhaps vict-
13
Account of Rebecca Jones, Ledger of Thomas Samuel and Miers Fisher,
1792–1797, f. 46; Pim Nevins, Journal of A Visit to America 1802–1803, 12th of
ninth month, 1802.
14
T.P. Cope and Sons Ledger 1803–1810, ff. 71–73, 63, 166, 122, 146, 5, 56,
331.
uals, for the slave ship Kitty part owned by David Tuohy and Thomas
Leyland. Tuohy and Leyland worked this ship for quite a while
because Ann Davison had also provided items for the Kitty back in
1779. It would appear that Ann was a formal ships’ victualler (as
opposed to a food vendor) as she was listed in the 1796 trade direc-
tory at 1 Maghull Street as such, and was supplying food for ves-
sels. She was also therefore trading for at least seventeen years. Some
women managed various businesses for a long time. For example,
in 1766 and 1774 Elizabeth Fleetwood was listed as a broker and
was importing goods from Drogheda, Ireland in the latter year. At
the same time her sister, Mary, ran the Exchange Coffee House in
Water Street. In 1787 Elizabeth is listed at the same High Street
address, but with her sister Mary, and as a milliner. This would
have been considered a far more ‘genteel’ and suitable occupation
for women, but also required high start-up costs. Luckily for the sis-
ters, it would appear that they were left a property in Birkenhead,
on the other side of the river Mersey from Liverpool. They sold this
for £8,030 in 1781 and probably used the proceeds to invest in their
millinery shop. These sisters do not appear in the directories of 1796
and 1805, but they still ran their own businesses for at least twenty-
one years, pooling resources in order to move up the socio-economic
ladder during that period.15
Of course not all women were successful in trade. Hannah Jacobs
had been trading with the Fishers from some time prior to 1769.
However, her outstanding balance from 1769 of £9 6s. was left
unpaid until 1773 at which time it was transferred to the account
of Israel Jacobs. He was perhaps a son who had become of age or
another family member. It was possibly the same Israel Jacobs who
was a shopkeeper at 5 North Second Street in 1791. It may have
been some form of family obligation that compelled him to take
responsibility for Hannah’s obligations in turn. For some reason,
Hannah could not, or would not, pay her own debt, and may have
lost her reputation and been pushed out of trade as a consequence.
Elizabeth West, a widow of Philadelphia ran up huge bills with
Thomas Cope. In 1804 she ran up a debt of $697.28 before any
payment was made—and then her account was credited with only
15
Ships Book Kitty (photocopy), 1789, LBP; Account with Ann Davison, David
Tuohy Accounts, p. 68, DTP. Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 20 May 1774; Arkle,
“Early Coffee Houses”, p. 5. See the discussion on David Tuohy below, pp. 226–230.
222 chapter seven
$96.44 from a John Thomas. She then ran up a bill of $3,389.59

by December 1807 without making any other payment on the account.
Perhaps she played on social sensibilities of her role as a widow, she
appeared to be granted extreme lenience. She certainly seemed inca-
pable of, or unwilling to, pay off her own debts.16
Women faced various problems and social prejudices in trade, and
often had familial obligations and responsibilities as well. One way
in which this was circumvented was working at dual occupations.
Many men did this as well of course, but having a variety of small
occupations gave women the flexibility they needed to juggle family
responsibilities with the need to derive an income from any avenue
possible. Margaret Moulder of Philadelphia is a good example of a
woman employing a variety of strategies in order to ‘make shift’.
Margaret was apparently widowed before 1783, and lived at 24 Pear
Street in Dock Ward until at least 1805, where she was listed as a
boarding house keeper. One of the few women to have left a ledger
behind, she worked as a grocer and carter, selling and transporting
a variety goods from and to the hinterland. Her stock included flour,
pork, corn, salt, brandy, candles, nails, flax seed, cyder and bread.
Her books were not well drawn up so it is difficult to assess the
scale of her business, but she obviously had lots of contacts both
within Philadelphia and in the hinterland, which were far from
restricted to family and friends. Together her various activities con-
stituted a viable income for her for at least twenty-two years.17
It must be pointed out that many of these examples of female
traders are derived from Philadelphia records. This could be a mat-
ter of simple survival. However, the Fishers and Cope were Quakers,
and may have felt some sense of obligation for Quaker women, or
alternatively were less prejudiced against women traders. Certainly
there are very few mentions of women in the letters and accounts
of traders such as Presbyterian Andrew Clow; but many of his records
are letters, and women were far less likely to be involved in long-
distance trade which required letter writing. Equally however, the
letters and accounts of David Tuohy in Liverpool demonstrate that
16
Samuel and Miers Fisher Ledger 1769–?, f. 62; T.P. Cope and Sons Ledger
1803–1810, ff. 56, 331, 353.
17
Philadelphia Federal Tax List for 1783; Accounts of William Ford and John
Wall, Margaret Moulder Ledger 1794–1799, ff. 1, 20 and passim.
merchants did deal with women. The fact that more women appear
in the records of merchants in Philadelphia may also be due to the
less diverse trading structure there. Women in Liverpool may have
purchased from the large number of warehouse keepers, wholesalers
and dealers there in preference to elite merchants.
Once in trade however, women worked in much the same way
as men, despite the restrictions they encountered in gaining access
to capital and credit. Women used family, friends and religious net-
works to help out in hard times, although they were by no means
constrained within them. They had limited access to formal clubs
and associations, but the street, shop or home provided a network-
ing space from which women could swap information, call on oblig-
ations and arrange to club together in order to raise finance. Many
women also worked in various roles in order to secure a viable
income. The use of these “autonomous survival strategies” by women
was often a way of coping with an unstable economy and some-
times ambiguous, if not hostile, social attitudes towards them work-
ing within the formal economy.18 The fact that female traders were
so numerous and so vital to trade and the distribution of goods in
both cities, despite these issues, only underlines their tenacity.
Ralph Eddowes
Ralph Eddowes originally came from Chester, England. He was the

local leader of the opposition Independent group for the Parliamentary
elections in 1784. Although the Independents wrested control from
the local ruling family, the House of Lords did not award him his
expenses, thereby negating the victory. Jaded by this experience and
English politics generally, Eddowes emigrated to Philadelphia in 1794,
taking his wife and nine children with him. Arriving in December,
after a tortuous journey, he was stunned by the cold, the high prices
and the mode of dress of the ladies. He wrote “The ladies . . . gen-
erally clothe very little warmer than English women in June. If this
be their winter dress it quite alarms me to think what their summer
undress must be”. Indeed, the costs and the cold meant that he was
18
Hilary McD Beckles, “White Women and Slavery in the Caribbean”, HW, 36
(1993), 66–82, p. 80.
224 chapter seven
no longer sure that Philadelphia should be his final destination as

originally planned.19
The cold was not the only shock. He had left behind a good net-
work of ‘Friends’ in both senses of the word. These included William
Rathbone IV, an influential merchant and William Roscoe, banker,
attorney and anti-slave trade activist. Having found good support
and access to credit in Liverpool, he expected to have the same
experience in Philadelphia. Expectations for assistance were high
amongst non-conformist groups and he was therefore disappointed
to receive little encouragement from the Quaker family the Fishers.
Eddowes obviously felt that they had not lived up to their obliga-
tions. He complained that he had “Chiefly relied” on their assis-
tance, but they were “not such men as Rathbone and Benson”. Part
of this lack of help was no doubt due to the fact that Eddowes had
not yet built up a reputation for himself in Philadelphia. His early
letters reflect this concern. Realising that he was a stranger in his
adopted city, he knew that he could not afford to have bad credit—
that it would ruin him. He understood that the link between the
ability to pay and his reputation was explicit.20
Eddowes did slowly manage to build up a business however. He
began by trading in small bills and small commissions. By the autumn
arrivals of 1796 he was importing lead, sheet iron, wine bottles, cast
steel and knives on the Wilmington and Rebecca from Liverpool, and
had earthenware, hosiery and leather for sale as well. Building and
sustaining a reputation which could be easily ruined meant constant
vigilance. As late as 1802 he commented to Roscoe that “the safe
and seasonable arrival of my goods has so established my character
for punctuality as it is probable will double my orders for next sea-
son—[whereas] the consequence of a disappointment might have
been the loss of everything”. Of course he was relying on other
traders in Liverpool to send those goods on time, and in fact he did
not appear to develop his networks much further than his original
connections Liverpool, Chester and Warrington. As with all traders,
19
Thanks to Chris Lewis for this Chester reference. Chris P. Lewis, “Late Georgian
and Victorian Chester, 1762–1914: City Government and Politics”, in Chris P.
Lewis and A.T. Thacker (eds.), The Victoria History of the Counties of England: A History
of the County of Chester, 5 (Part I): The City of Chester: General History and Topography
(London: Boydell and Brewer for the Institute of Historical Research, 2003), pp.
147–171; Eddowes to Roscoe, 4 Feb 1795, 7 Dec 1804, 3 Nov 1794, RP.
20
Eddowes to Roscoe, 3 Nov 1794, 10 Nov 1794, RP.
Figure 7.1: Trade Networks of Ralph Eddowes
Source: Letters from Ralph Eddowes to William Roscoe, RP.
much of his reputation for punctuality was determined by the actions

of others. The fact that Eddowes did not concentrate on his mer-
cantile business may have been one reason why it took him so long
to build up a reputation. Despite going into the city daily, his real
love appeared to be his farm just outside Philadelphia. By 1804 he
appeared to be happiest when tending his fields in a liberating lack
of formal clothes, and acknowledging that he was lucky to have a
successful farm and all of his nine children still alive.21
Certainly Eddowes was not driven purely by the profit motive.
Far more important to him was the control he had over his reli-
gious and political choices. In contrast to England his religion did
not cause offence to anyone and he could vote and hold office (should
he want to). Even the Society of Friends was in a better condition
in America he thought. He wrote in 1805 regarding his friend
Rathbone’s expulsion from the Society in that year that he was
“more surprized that he has not long since disowned them . . . He
21
Eddowes to Roscoe, 3 Nov 1794, RP; Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily
Advertiser, 17 Oct 1796, 23 Dec 1796; Eddowes to Roscoe, 21 May 1802, 11 Jul
1796, 7 Dec 1804, RP.
226 chapter seven
has exposed their folly and bigotry and of course they will never
forgive him”. In contrast, he felt the small Quaker group in Phila-
delphia, of which he was an active member, was preferable. Eddowes
also had strong views on English politics, in which he considered
there were “monstrous forms of monarchical, aristocratical and eccle-
siastical power with all their various engines of oppression, party
prejudice and spite”. He was pleased for his friend Roscoe’s election
to Parliament in 1807, but warned him against finding a sad dis-
crepancy between the theory of the British Constitution and its practice.
At the same time Eddowes was amazed that the Americans found
so much to fight about when they had all (eventually) backed the
constitution. He chided Massachusetts merchants who broke the trade
embargo with England in the early nineteenth century. “Shame on
Massachusetts where the Revolution was born and nursed!” he cried.22
Eddowes was a merchant, but he was many other things as well.
This coloured his view of the world and the way in which he
approached his business. For him the risk in life was more about
personal choice and freedom. He certainly did not pursue his mer-
cantile career with especial vigour. He did not appear to extend his
networks wider than his original ones for his imports as other mer-
chants would have done, and invested his spare money in the farm
rather than the mercantile business or shipping. Maybe the risk for
him was taking up farming, but the control he gained over his per-
sonal life appeared to compensate for the risk that he did take in
relocating to America. He therefore successfully managed the vari-
ous strands of his life, built up a good reputation at the same time,
and seemed content. His wrote a suitable epitaph for himself to
Roscoe in 1811; “For my own part I still continue to do a little in
the threefold character of farmer, Merchant & Divine”.23
David Tuohy
David Touhy’s main asset was his knowledge of the Liverpool slave
trade, which he successfully used to his advantage. Originally of Irish
22
Eddowes to Roscoe, 11 Jul 1796, 23 May 1805, 24 Apl 1807, 4 Feb 1795,
1 Sep 1808, RP.
23
Eddowes to Roscoe, 11 Apl 1811, RP.
stock, he settled in Liverpool around 1771. Having married a Liverpool

girl around 1768, he reinvented himself as a merchant after four-
teen “tedious” years in the African trade. He had captained at least
four slave voyages between 1765 and 1769, one of which, the Sally,
was shipwrecked in 1768. His Irish networks and his slave trade
knowledge determined his second career. He used his Irish contacts
to start up in the provisions trade, importing beef, butter and tal-
low from Ireland, and exporting salt, beer and cheese in return.
Although he admitted he was a “young mercnt in the salt way”, this
trade would have been a relatively stable one compared to the slave
trade, and may have acted as a risk-reduction strategy. There were
also long periods of inactivity in the slave trade, and Tuohy liked
to keep himself busy. He worked the provisions trade on commis-
sion and used his own capital as investment in the slave trade, which
he conducted ‘at his own risk’—making profit not percentages. He
had an interest in the snow Etty, which sailed to Old Calabar in
1772, and by 1773 was making out “pretty handsome”.24
He conducted several successful voyages to Africa, exporting var-
ious merchandise as barter for slaves, which were then sold in Jamaica
and Barbados amongst other places. He was a demanding boss.
Knowing the slave trade intricately, he gave very precise instructions
to his captains. Captain Luke Mann was master of the brigantine
Nancy in 1774, of which Tuohy owned one sixth. He gave detailed
instructions about the sea route to Africa, ordered Mann to be cour-
teous to his translators in Africa, and to buy about 150 slaves at
Ambross before proceeding to Cape Binda for further purchases. He
advised that seven or eight pieces of India Goods would buy a good
slave at Ambross, and twelve to fourteen pieces at Cape Binda, but
Mann was to pay more rather than let a good slave go by.25
This detailed knowledge made Tuohy useful to other Liverpool
merchants, as did his capital, saved over his time served as a captain.
Following normal risk-reduction strategy he went into various short-
term partnerships for the journey of various vessels. He continued
24
Tuohy to Simpson, 4 Nov 1773, Tuohy to Sullivan, [?] Apl 1772, Tuohy to
Ingan, 28 Aug 1771, Tuohy to Cushin, 5 Sep 1772, Tuohy to Tennant and Co.,
30 Mar 1772, DTP; Eltis et al., Slave Trade Database on CDROM, voyages 91274,
91278, 91327, 91328.
25
Richard Woods to Tuohy, 6 Jun 1781, Speers and Tuohy to Capt Mann, 5
Apl 1774, DTP.
228 chapter seven
Figure 7.2: Trade Networks of David Tuohy
Source: Tuohy Ship’s Papers—Ranger; Letters to David Tuohy, passim; Letters from
David Tuohy, passim.
to co-own vessels with associates from his days as a captain, but he

was eventually interested in at least twenty-three voyages over his
whole career—nineteen of which were after he set up as a mer-
chant. His networks therefore increased accordingly. His associates
included William Speers, another ‘veteran’ of the slave trade and
Liverpool worthies such as Francis Ingram, Benjamin Heywood,
William Denison, James Clemens and Thomas Parke. He held shares
in ten slaving vessels including the Dick, the Ingram, the Blayds, the
Elliot and the Mary, always with the same loose group of influential
Liverpudlians. The fact that he had shared investments with such
men demonstrates that he had developed a good reputation for him-
self and used his money to advantage. His networks were therefore
widespread, not only around Liverpool but in Ireland, Africa and
the British West Indies. Many of the vessels he owned made a good
profit on their journeys. In 1772 his share of the profits of the Ranger
was £703 4s. ¼d., and his one-eighth share of the Sally earned him
another £476 11s. 4¼d. By 1789 his bank balance with Francis
Ingram was £609 16s. Nor did Tuohy sit idle on this cash. He lent
out this money on various loans around Liverpool, including a £400

mortgage to a Mr John Dobson.26
Despite his success, not everything went his way of course; many
things were out of his control. These included the weather at sea,
piracy, customs officers and the government concerns of the day.
The vessel Dick was lost in the Benin River in 1789, and the Ingram
was lost as well. He was lucky to have sold his share of the Blaydes
in 1788, as this foundered in the ocean in 1794. In 1775 some sort
of illegal scheme had apparently been put forward to him by one
of his Irish contacts. He was obviously not averse to the plan as
such, but wrote to his friend O’Brien that; “You may judge from
my long silence that the scheme with which you were so kind as to
communicate to me will not answer as I see the officers here are so
very knowing that they have a sharp instrument for putting into the
bungs[?] of beef casks”.27
Tuohy did not trade to any extent directly with the thirteen con-
tinental colonies, but the impending War of Independence did cause
him problems. In 1775 he found that most of the ships coming into
Liverpool were being laid up and not allowed to sail. In any case,
some of his main items of cargo, such as arms and ammunition were
forbidden from being exported. One of his few correspondents on
the American continent, William Summers of Charleston, was also
having problems. The increasing conflict meant that he could only
distribute goods around six miles inland, severely curtailing his trade.
In a small way Tuohy also had problems with non payment or non
compliance. Some of his Irish contacts were slow in remitting certificates
of cargo for the drawback of duties. In one case the drawback was
£8. As many individual sales of butter made by Tuohy were under
£10, this was a considerable amount. In common with other mer-
chants, he chased every penny to ensure his profit.28
26
Speers and Tuohy to Capt Mann, 5 Apl 1774; Craig and Jarvis, Liverpool
Registry, pp. 5, 112, 84, 9, 18; Balance Book of Arthur Heywood and Sons, 31 Dec
1789, f. 30, AHA; the full list of vessels he was involved in according to Eltis
et al. is: Blaydes, Dick, Edward, Elliot, Ingram, Mary, Nancy, Nelly, Sally and Kitty, Slave
Trade Database on CDROM; Tuohy Account with James Clemens, Jun 1772; A State
of My Estate as it Stands this day, 23 Jun 1772, DTP.
27
Craig and Jarvis, Liverpool Registry, pp. 5, 112, 84 (no date of loss was listed
for the Ingram); Tuohy to O’Brien, 10 Sep 1775.
28
Tuohy to Messrs Ryan and Begone, 5 Oct 1775, Summers to Tuohy, 27 Dec
230 chapter seven
Tuohy’s repeated involvement with the group of slave traders in

Liverpool demonstrates that not only did he have the knowledge
they required, but also that he became a trusted member of that
group. Many of his contacts would have been developed during his
time as a captain, but he increased his networks after settling in
Liverpool as well. He therefore successfully managed his reputation,
capital investments and contacts, rising up the socio-economic scale
quite quickly. He did not become involved in any trade associations
or government activity, and despite his many contacts in Liverpool
and a long association with the port, his name only appears in the
trade directory of 1787. In 1796 and 1805 there is only one entry
under the surname Tuohy, that of Ann and Mary. As this surname
is uncommon, it is likely that these women were family members.
Whether they were wife and daughter or two daughters the sources
do not say. The women supplied slops for ships in addition to act-
ing as tea-dealers and drapers (the latter the more gentile occupa-
tions). As their contacts included the slave trader and (then still a
merchant) Thomas Leyland, Ann and Mary Tuohy no doubt used
David’s contacts and money to invest in their own future. David
Tuohy may have died abruptly, but his success was passed on.29
William Rathbone IV
William Rathbone IV was thirty-nine years old when he took over

the Liverpool family business in 1789. He was a well-respected mem-
ber of the Quaker community, acting as a trustee of the meeting
house from 1777, and he served on the committee in charge of
building a new meeting house in 1791. In 1786 he married Hannah
Reynolds, the daughter of one of the proprietors of the famous
Coalbrookdale ironworks. William was trained by his father, who
ran the family business before him, and so with good a knowledge
base, money from his marriage, access to capital and credit via his
wife’s connections and plenty of religious and other connections in
Liverpool, William Rathbone had a good start in life.
1781, Tuohy to Fagan, 25 Feb 1776, Tuohy to McCarthy, Alex[?] and Co., 4[?]
Feb 1776, DTP.
29
Leyland Ship Book—Earl of Liverpool (photocopy), LBP.
His father had concentrated on importing timber for the ship-

building trade in Liverpool, but the firm gradually expanded. Rathbone
IV imported rice, flour, wheat, tar and barrel staves, mainly from
continental America, including Philadelphia. He acted predominantly
as a shipping agent, or ship’s husband for many different people in
Liverpool and abroad. He had various business partners during his
career. These included his sister’s husband, another Quaker called
Robert Benson in 1790. Later, a former apprentice, James Cropper
was briefly a partner in 1795, but this three-man partnership was
dissolved due to Benson suffering an illness. Rathbone was then in
partnership with William Hughes, and a Unitarian, William Duncan
in 1796. At this point, being in his mid-fifties, he took the chance
to become a sleeping partner. He invested the largest amount of
capital at a fixed interest rate of 5 per cent, but gave his prestigious
name to the partnership. Like Ralph Eddowes, Rathbone was more
interested in religion and politics than trade in his later years.30
The risk-reduction policy of taking 5 per cent interest was not a
new trend in Rathbone’s career. His business under the various part-
nerships was very busy, and it is possible that the firm had up to
twenty-five ships consigned to it at any one time. These included
various vessels part-owned by Andrew Clow, discussed below. A
glance at the newspapers hints that Rathbone was a major importer
and exporter, but this is misleading. In fact, Rathbone never took
the risk of investing in shipping at all, and very rarely traded in
commodities at his own risk.31 Most of his time was taken in arrang-
ing freight for others and working on commission. Rathbone had a
busy business because he, and his father before him, had a good
reputation.
Indeed, it may have been due to the success of his father that
Rathbone lacked a more entrepreneurial spirit. For example, in 1790,
Rathbone and Benson were ship’s husband for the Adriana, part-
owned by Andrew Clow in Philadelphia. The cargo bound for
Philadelphia was comprised of the ubiquitous ‘merchandise’. This
was no doubt made up of Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield
30
Lucie Nottingham, Rathbone Brothers: From Merchant to Banker, 1742–1792 (London:
Rathbone Bros PLC, 1992), pp. 5–25; Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 23 Sep 1774;
William Rathbone IV Letterbook, pp. 277, 278, 271, and passim, WRP.
31
No Rathbone is listed in the Liverpool Ship Registry between 1786 and 1808.
Craig and Jarvis, Liverpool Registry.
232 chapter seven
goods—the usual cargo of a Liverpool ship bound for America.

However, Rathbone and Benson were one of only twenty Liverpool
exporters (or agents), and Clow only one of fifty-five importing mer-
chants in Philadelphia. A return trip in 1793 tells much the same
story in reverse. The Adriana arrived in Liverpool with flour, barrel
staves, pig iron and rice consigned to Rathbone and Benson. Out
of the total cargo value of £3,583, Rathbone and Benson purchased
under £33 worth of rice at their own risk, less than 1 per cent. The
majority of their income came from the 4 per cent they earned on
commission for arranging the freight and onward distribution, total-
ling £143 6s. 10d. Even if they sold on the rice at a 100 per cent
mark up, their commission was still worth far more. The majority
of the cargo that Rathbone’s firm dealt with was in fact destined
for fifty-three other merchants in Liverpool.32 These examples tell us
not only about Rathbone’s risk strategy; they also highlight the way
in which all merchants spread risk by purchasing goods from many
different suppliers and then sending these many parcels of goods on
various ships. The large amount of shipping Rathbone’s firm han-
dled demonstrates his good reputation and management skills, but
he left it to others to take the risk on the profit and loss on the sale
of those goods. Rathbone in his various partnerships did not there-
fore have any control or influence over the goods shipped on board
the vessels he managed, but that does not mean that he was not an
influential man.
In fact, Rathbone had extensive networks at the local, regional
and trans-Atlantic level, as the number of people using his services
demonstrates. Within Liverpool, he and many of his business acquain-
tances were original members of the Liverpool American Chamber
of Commerce, set up in 1801. His sometime partners, James Cropper
and William Duncan were on the first committee. This worked as
a pressure group, along with the Council, the Dock Committee,
Members of Parliament and other Chambers of Commerce to influence
decision making at the local and national level on issues which con-
cerned merchants trading with continental America. For example,
32
Williamson’s Liverpool Advertiser, 23 Sep 1774; Billinge’s Liverpool Advertiser and Marine
Intelligencer, 25 Apl 1796; Bills of Lading for the Adriana Jan 1790, Folder Adriana,
Sales off the Adriana for 1793, 18 Feb 1794, Folder Business Correspondence, Box
12, ACP, CWU.
they colluded with the Baltic and West India committees to gain
permission for ships to be entered at the Custom House in Liverpool
on holy days; the Chamber wrote to Rufus King, the minister for
the United States in London in order to obtain bounties on imported
wheat, and worked with local magistrates in an effort to check pil-
fering from the docks and subsequent petty trading. Rathbone also
gave evidence before a House of Lords committee in opposition to
the Orders in Council of 1806. These forbade neutral ships trading
with French ports during the Napoleonic Wars, and Rathbone was
obviously trying to promote good relations with the then still neu-
tral United States.33
Figure 7.3: Trade Networks of William Rathbone IV
Source: Letterbooks of William Rathbone IV, 1801–? and 1805–1808, passim.

Note: This does not include his more personal correspondence.
33
Minutes of the American Chamber of Commerce 1801–1908, pp. 1, 10, 16,
22–25, 61–68; Nottingham, Rathbone Brothers, p. 17. His efforts regarding the United
States came to nothing of course, because war was declared with Great Britain in
1812. Daniels, “American Cotton Trade”, p. 278.
234 chapter seven
Rathbone also used his reputation to help others. In 1804, Rathbone

provided his cousin Thomas Rutter with a letter of introduction to
Thomas Walker of New York—asking him to give Rutter money
should he fall sick or disaster strike. He also asked his friend Ralph
Eddowes in Philadelphia to help out another young man, John
Bispham. He was prepared to defray expenses of up to £100 per
annum for two years, and maybe even set up Bispham in a partnership
if he received good reports on him. He did request though, that
Eddowes keep Bispham “from the contagion of harmful associates”—
by which he meant prevent him from coming under bad influences.
Rathbone therefore had extensive networks which helped him and
his associates influence important decisions. He also used those who
had obligations towards him, or created obligations for himself, by
asking for help on the behalf of others.34
For Rathbone, business management was a risk-reduction strat-
egy. He chose to trade in commodities and markets he knew well
and to work on commission as a shipping agent. However, this
worked well for him, he used his many connections and influence
in other, more subtle ways to provide as good a trading environment
for himself as possible. He was a ‘safe’ player, but was still success-
ful enough to put his son, William Rathbone V, into business in
turn. He had begun his training in the counting house by 1805.35
Andrew Clow
Andrew Clow was the complete opposite of Rathbone. He was ambi-

tious, tireless in his pursuit of profit, a ‘control freak’. Originally a
tradesman from Manchester, he set up his own ‘house’ in Philadelphia
after the War of Independence. He eventually went into business
with David Cay, who had moved to Philadelphia from London and
was a bankrupt. He had conducted business with him in England
and they were both Presbyterians. Clow used his knowledge of the
textile trade in order to buy the correct quality and quantity of
goods. He quickly built up a business importing manufactured goods
from Britain and wines from Portugal and Madeira, exporting flour,
34
William Rathbone IV Letterbook, pp. 277, 278, 271, WRP.
35
Rathbone to Ralph Eddowes, 8 Feb 1805, William Rathbone IV Letterbook.
wheat and other goods from Philadelphia back to Britain and all
around the Atlantic. He had dealings with Nova Scotia, New York,
Charleston, Jamaica, Cadiz and all around Britain.
Clow was extremely active in developing his networks. In 1784
he was in England drumming up business for his firm in Philadelphia.
He visited Manchester, London, Liverpool, Birmingham, many places
in Yorkshire, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Paisley in order to person-
ally choose the goods that would be sent to Philadelphia via William
Rathbone in Liverpool. Many of these connections lasted for many
years. These included Benjamin and John Potter, and Watson, Myers
and Co., both of Manchester, and Thomas and Stephen Wilson of
London, who all provided him with textiles of various kinds. Clow
made this journey each and every year until 1793. The fact that
Clow personally chose these goods meant that he could control the
quantity and more importantly, the quality of goods sent. He could
have gained the same goods through Liverpool merchants, but with
less control and with commission charges added on. Clow used this
direct purchasing as a selling point in his adverts in Philadelphia,
boasting that he could acquire the best goods on better terms than
many others.36
Clow’s use of his networks was extensive and sometimes his audac-
ity knew no bounds. He met a merchant named William Alder in
Liverpool, who later settled to business in Madeira. Clow managed
to convince Alder to deal with his Philadelphia house directly, even
for Manchester goods. In return, Alder sent Clow and Co. Madeira
wine to Philadelphia. In 1790 Alder wrote, “you may depend in
future we will do something to mutual advantage as any of Yr
Manchester and other goods would sell here”.37 Despite the fact that
it would take longer for Alder to receive his textiles in this way, a
mutual obligation was formed.
Clow followed the same practice of risk spreading by supplier and
vessel that Rathbone and others did. Most of his goods were trans-
ported on a variety of vessels, but when it came to ship husbanding
36
Folder Jan to Sep 1784, passim, ACP, SGC; Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser,
19 Oct 1787.
37
Alder to Clow and Co, 25 Apl 1790, Gallagher to Clow, 17 Oct 1785, Lithgow
and Harrison to Clow, 11 Feb 1785, Potters to Clow, 21 Aug 1790, Watson, Myers
and Co. to Clow, 24 Jul 1790, Thomas and Stephen Wilson to Clow, 20 Feb 1790,
Lithgow and Harrison to Clow, 11 Feb 1785, Alder to Clow and Co., 25 Apl 1790,
all Folder 1785–1798, ACP, CWU.
236 chapter seven
he dealt primarily, but not always, with Rathbone (and Benson). One
time he even had satins and taffities sent up from London to Liverpool
“to care of Rathbone & Benson” before trans-shipment to Philadelphia.
Clow also relied on the expertise of one man regarding insurance,
Joseph Hadfield of London. Between February and December 1792
Clow and Co. spent £1284 1s. 6d. on insurance alone. Hadfield
arranged the underwriting for voyages to Liverpool, Lisbon, Spain,
Hamburg, the West Indies and Cadiz.38 This reliance on certain peo-
ple as opposed to spreading risk amongst vessels may indicate that
Clow, and indeed other merchants perceived types of risk differently.
Whilst Clow realised that the sea, piracy and acts of war were out
of his control, he was prepared to trust people to act on his behalf.
Figure 7.4: Trade Networks of Andrew Clow
Source: Folder Correspondence 1785–1798, passim, Box 60D, ACP, CWU; Folders
October-December 1784, January-June 1786 and May-June 1788, passim, Business
Correspondence A-G, passim, Box 11, ACP, CWU.
38
Wallis Cook and Hammond to Clow, 2 Jul 1791, Hadfield to Clow and Co,
1 Jan 1793, both Folder 1785–1798, CWU.
Clow continued to rely on Rathbone and Benson when he pur-

chased his own shares in ships. In the first few years of trading from
Philadelphia he was forced to buy freight space on other merchants’
vessels. These included the Harmony and Pigou from London. However,
the vessels of other merchants for freight incurred a freight charge,
and Clow would rather be pocketing that for himself. By 1789 he
was (part?-) owner of two ships involved in the Liverpool-Philadelphia
trade, the Adriana and the Manchester—still using Rathbone and Benson
for the Liverpool end of the business. The Clow ‘team’ were all very
excited about the prospect of their first vessel sailing. His partner,
Cay, wrote to Clow, again in England, that Captain Robertson “will
watch the winds night and day . . . and is fired with emulation”. Cay
added in smug fashion that their competitor, William Crammond,
was also soon to put a ship into the Liverpool trade, but that he
had “been beforehand in getting the promises of everybody”. On
the other side of the Atlantic, Rathbone and Benson also urged them
to get promises for the Adriana, because a new American ship, the
Atlantic, meant as a constant trader between Liverpool and Philadelphia
was quick. In fact, this may have been one of the reasons that Clow
and Cay had thought about replacing the Adriana, they wrote to
Rathbone and Benson that “it seems to be a material point to have
fine ships, we must not be behind our competitors in this respect”.
The sense of urgency, minute arrangements, competition and even
apparently modern concerns such as image are immediate.39
This sense of competition apparently drove Clow to make promises
he obviously could not keep. Whilst in London during 1790, he
received a letter from Rathbone and Benson advising him against
advertising both his ships as “the first Spring ship”. The same advert
for two ships by the same house would be inconsistent they explained
[author’s stress]. Rathbone and Benson were no doubt worried about
Clow’s reputation in making silly promises when other traders would
check the newspapers very carefully and regularly. Furthermore, if
they were placing their name on this advert as the shipping agents,
they would have been concerned about their reputation in turn.
They did not want to get a bad reputation by default. Clow must
39
Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, 19 Oct 1787; Cay to Clow, 19 Jun 1789
(I have been unable to determine what proportion of each ship Clow owned),
Rathbone and Benson to Clow, 6 Nov 1790, Clow and Co. to Rathbone and
Benson, 2 Nov 1790, All Folder Admin 1789–1790, ACP, CWU.
238 chapter seven
have tried to insist upon this misleading advert, as he received another

letter from Rathbone and Benson insisting on letting the advert stand
as they suggested; although they would not object to; “Warranted
to sail with the first Spring Ship, or as early as any other ship,
because we have no doubt this will be the truth”.40 Clow must have
eventually taken the advice of Rathbone and Benson. He would have
been obliged to them for their very good service; his reputation does
not appear to have been damaged and he continued to be successful.
By 1793 Clow and Co. were successful enough to replace their
old vessel with the new Adriana, underwritten for a value of £5,000.
By this time the freight lists of their ships read like a ‘who’s who’
of both Philadelphia and Liverpool, such were their networks. The
income of the firm was also substantial. A total of $62,123.57 went
through the partnership’s bank account with the Bank of North
America in 1791 alone. Further money went through the accounts
they held with Peter Clement their insurer and contact in London,
and Rathbone and Benson in Liverpool.41
For the most part Clow was very much a hands-on businessman.
He adopted a high-risk and high-control policy. He personally chose
his goods each year, braving the Atlantic rather than have an agent
choose the goods on his behalf. In contrast to not trusting suppliers
and the vagaries of the sea, he placed significant responsibility in
the hands of certain people he did trust such as Rathbone and
Clement. He had only two weaknesses. One was his partnership with
David Cay, who was a bankrupt and apparently an inept business-
man; Clow was always chiding him on some decision or other. The
reason for this lapse of good management appears to be some oblig-
ation towards Cay, maybe via a sister who had married into Clow’s
family. The other weakness was his own body. Despite all the machi-
nations of Clow and his team, by autumn 1793, both he and Cay
were dead from the yellow fever epidemic of that year.42 Having
40
Rathbone and Benson to Clow, 15 Dec 1790, Rathbone and Benson to Clow,
20 Dec 1790, Folder Admin, 1789–1790, ACP, CWU.
41
Clement to Clow, 26 Feb 1793, Freight List of the Adriana, 29 Aug 1793,
Sales of Sundries off the Adriana, 29 Nov 1790, all Folder Adriana, ACP, CWU;
Bank of North America Personal Ledgers, 1791; Account Current with Peter Clement,
1 Jul–3 Dec 1790, Folder 1784–1790, SGC; Account with Rathbone and Benson,
Feb 1793–Sep 1794, Folder Adriana, ACP, CWU.
42
Clow chastised Cay for discussing business plans with New England merchants
thereby giving away a possible advantage. Clow to Cay, 14 Apl 1788, Folder Mar-
Apl 1788; Clow to Cay, 2 May 1786, Folder Jan-Jun 1786, both ACP, SGC.
built up a very successful business in less than ten years, despite the
crises in Philadelphia of the late 1780s, it would have been inter-
esting to see what he could have achieved with a little more time.43
Risk Minimization and Management
These case studies have provided an insight into the daily lives of
traders. It is clear that traders used a variety of strategies as they
attempted to manage and control their businesses in a period when
traders and their businesses were usually indistinguishable. The high
risk involved in trade meant that many failed completely and were
reduced to the debtors’ prison or bankruptcy. Far more moved up
and down the socio-economic scale, sometimes simply as part of their
life cycle, and sometimes due to the general economic climate. Traders
needed to manage and control many aspects of their business. All
traders needed access to up-to-date information through their net-
works. They also tried to control their reputations in order to gain
access to capital, credit and commissions. Some adopted a credit
payment policy which took control out of the hands of others. Many
others worked on the margins of legality and indeed of monetary
survival. Conversely, elite traders were able to control the actions of
lesser traders because they had access to rule-making institutions.
More traders still, used the courts as a device to force other people
to fulfil their obligations.
Women faced similar problems to men generally, but were encoun-
tered additional legal and social disabilities and obligations towards
family, which circumscribed their activities in relation to men. For
women such as Margaret Moulder it was necessary to resort to a
variety of strategies in order to survive, whereas the Fleetwood sis-
ters were lucky to gain access to vital capital in order to move up
the socio-economic ladder. Others such as Rebecca Jones and Margaret
Coates positively used their co-religionists in order to gain access to
credit instead. The four men discussed had different attitudes towards
their business and their personal lives, and very different priorities,
43
Unfortunately I have no information about their ages, and so cannot estimate
where they were in their life cycle. It would appear that neither were married how-
ever; Ruddack and Company’s Funeral Expenses, 25 Sep 1793 (Clow) and 3 Oct
1793 (Cay), Box 14, Business Correspondence 1790–1796, ACP, CWU.
240 chapter seven
knowledge bases, credit and capital access and indeed personal attrib-
utes. Ralph Eddowes had relatively little control commercially, although
the control he exerted over his personal life was transforming for
him and his family. For him, relative political and religious freedom
in the United States, and the ability to raise a healthy family were
obviously the most important factors in his life. He was really hap-
pier being a farmer than a merchant, which was probably why his
mercantile affairs were not very successful. Tuohy was a man of
more determination. Having saved up his capital over a number of
years, his knowledge of the slave trade put him in a good position
when he settled in Liverpool. He used both these factors to promote
his networks, investments and career generally. For Rathbone, risk
reduction was a priority. His strategies as such were an advanta-
geous marriage, becoming an influential member of business groups,
and specialising in commissions rather than importing or exporting
at his own risk. In contrast, for Clow, business was a high-risk and
high-control affair. His daily direction of the business and his back-
ground knowledge allowed him to manage his business extremely
successfully, despite the inadequacies of his partner.
Traders needed up-to-date and correct knowledge, good access to
capital and credit, a good reputation, the ability to control or com-
pel others to act, fulfil their own obligations and to be able to take
and/or manage risk. A trading career was not one in which you
could afford to relax too much. All the traders discussed here had
to manage all these aspects, even if they were unaware of it, and
albeit at different levels. Trade was a risky business, but many traders
managed to make a profit in various branches of trade. Whether
they thought that profit was adequate to the risk involved—we shall
never know.
CONCLUSION
ONE TRADING COMMUNITY
this country is infinitely more connected with the port of

Liverpool than London
John Perhouse to James Perhouse, 1806
This book has investigated the processes and institutions of the dis-
tribution of goods, and the men and women of the Atlantic trading
community who made it happen. The eighteenth century world of
goods was made possible by their efforts in circulating goods locally,
regionally and across the Atlantic. It has told at least part of the
story of those ‘wheelers and dealers’ who are usually left out of the
historiography, and demonstrated their important contribution to the
economy. This has been especially important for the history of women.
Margaret Moulder and Ann and Mary Tuohy were doubtless unaware
of their significant contribution to the wider economy, any more
than were James Astair or Alexander Black; and whilst Andrew Clow
and William Rathbone probably had a clearer sense of their own
importance, they could not have perceived themselves as forging an
Atlantic community of traders. However, they did all share a com-
mon business mentalité, an awareness of the nature of risk and uncer-
tainty of commerce, and of acceptable business practise within that
framework. This common understanding held these traders together
despite the many crises, both financial and physical, that marked the
second half of the eighteenth century.
The long view taken here has stressed continuity and slow devel-
opment rather than quick change, and the time frame for this story
was deliberately chosen to make this point. Several themes have held
this discussion on traders together: diversity, networks and a com-
mon business culture in the British-Atlantic commercial world. Liverpool
and Philadelphia and their trading communities may have been on
opposite sides of the Atlantic, but they were bound together by far
more than simply exchanges across that ocean.
242 conclusion
Diversity
Diversity has been present in many ways throughout this book: in

the range of socio-economic groups within the trading community;
in the comparative size and even existence of various sectors in
Liverpool and Philadelphia; in gender experience; and the multifarious
ways in which networks of people, credit and goods were integrated.
Using a wider definition of ‘trader’ has facilitated the contribu-
tion of an inclusive group of entrepreneurs, both male and female,
and has made visible chapman Alexander Black and grocer Margaret
Moulder, in addition to merchant and shipowner Andrew Clow.
They all played a similar role, buying and selling and ‘wheeling and
dealing’—it was only the scale that differed. Diversity was also evi-
dent in the experience of traders during the careers, such as that of
David Tuohy or Ralph Eddowes. Many merchants were bankers
and ship owners, whilst many lesser traders had dual careers as store
and tavern keeper or draper and tea and spirit dealer for example.1
A bit of good luck could promote the interests of a warehouse keeper,
but credit crises could destroy the fortune of a merchant as easily
as that of a small shopkeeper. As traders pursued their careers they
moved up and down the socio-economic ladder. Sometimes this was
by hard work or poor choice, sometimes through the peaks and
troughs of the economy, as their financial circumstances changed,
or simply due to good or bad luck. However, whatever their cir-
cumstances, all traders had a part to play in the distribution of goods
from producer or farmer to consumer.
The structure of the two trading communities of Liverpool and
Philadelphia also highlighted another aspect of diversity. Both cities
had trading communities of a similar size, which grew alongside the
general growth in population of each city. However, the numbers
of traders within each sector differed significantly. This was mainly
due to the absence of a middle-man sector in Philadelphia, which
only emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century. The legacy of
being part of the formal British Empire continued to frame the
Philadelphian, and indeed the Pennsylvanian economy, far longer
than political change would suggest. The structure of the Philadelphia
1
Andrew Ray was a store and tavern keeper in Philadelphia in 1805, and
Margaret Regan a draper and tea and spirit dealer in Liverpool in the same year.
one trading community 243
trading community may have been simple compared to Liverpool,

but this does not mean that it was unsophisticated. Nor does the
lack of a large-scale manufacturing trade suggest a pre-capitalist econ-
omy. We are talking about commercial capitalism here, which is one
important strand of capitalism, not simply a pre-cursor to industrial
capitalism.2
This is not to say that Philadelphians did not make efforts to
increase the diversity of their economy on Independence. Great efforts
were made to retain trade privileges with Great Britain and the
British West Indies, to learn new industrial technologies, to build up
their own finance industry and to develop trade networks that were
more sophisticated and knowledgeable. It is simply that these changes
took time to take effect, and during the period covered by this study,
Philadelphia still retained the economy of a colonial port. The more
simple trading structure of the Philadelphia trading community was
therefore a factor of the wider Atlantic economy, and to a lesser
extent, legal and social factors which affected the distribution of
wealth. These factors had a far greater detrimental effect on the
ability of women to enter the trading community in Philadelphia
than in Liverpool.
Networks
The diversity of the men and women of the trading community and
their experience as traders was reflected in the way in which traders
on both sides of the Atlantic communicated with one another, arranged
finance and distributed goods. Networks of people were particularly
important in the provision of reliable and up-to-date information.
Traders had to be able to trust their sources of information. Newspapers
provided mass coverage for the distribution of news regarding ship-
ping, imports, successes and failures of other traders and political
information. This was extremely important in an environment which
was becoming increasingly impersonal. The written word could be
between traders who were family and friends, but was just as often
between traders who had never met. Nevertheless, keeping in touch,
2
Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce, Vol. III, pp. 601–623; see also the discussion
in Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion
1688–1914 (London and New York: Longman, 1993), chapter two.
244 conclusion
keeping a record of decision making, giving precise instructions and

relaying gossip were all vitally important.
The spoken word helped to forge relationships, both between those
who had formerly corresponded at a distance and those developing
new and existing local alliances. This was equally true for the mer-
chant consolidating alliances in the Council as for the huckster who
met the market trader she bought apples from in the tavern. Whilst
religion and family may have provided a starting point for networks,
in an increasingly modern world, friendships and reliable informa-
tion, knowledge and reputation, along with a more reliable legal
framework were becoming more important when making business
decisions. Whatever their socio-economic status, the way in which
traders used these networks was basically the same—even if their
access was to different networks.
These personal networks were a precursor to gaining access to
credit. A trader’s ‘creditability’, or ability to gain credit was reliant
upon their reputation—which was most often relayed and confirmed
via personal networks. In fact, credit and reputation were so inter-
linked as to be indistinguishable. A trader could not gain credit with-
out a reputation, whilst the ability to command large credit suggested
a good reputation. Good reputations could be established in several
ways: a face-to-face relationship might instil enough trust for $1 credit
to purchase some tobacco or rum; a £250 investment would pro-
duce trust for an adventure from Liverpool to Philadelphia; letters
of introduction or bills of exchange in advance could also establish
the trust and reputation necessary for business; at the same time gos-
sip in the coffee house or tavern would spread rumour—though not
always to benefit of the person who was the subject of the discus-
sion. Reputations which had taken years to establish could be torn
down very easily—they were fragile and guarded with care.
Once capital and credit were in circulation, they were available
to traders through a variety of avenues. Attorneys and brokers, banks
and merchant houses, family and friends were all intermediaries who
concurrently brought together both long- and short-term credit and
small and large amounts of money into one functioning system. Profit
from trade might become the mortgage for a new warehouse, profits
from a warehouse might become a daughter’s legacy to set up a
drapery shop, the interest on a widow’s investment might become
the capital to start up a small store, which might in turn extend
credit to an itinerant dealer or a poor docker.
The networks of people and credit worked well enough to pro-

vide a very efficient network of goods based upon them. Pennsylvanian
wheat and timber, New England rum, Carolina rice and tobacco,
West India sugar and other commodities were all shipped through
the port of Philadelphia to Liverpool and its hinterland as well as
around the Atlantic littoral. In return, ‘Liverpool’ coal and salt,
Cheshire cheese, Manchester cottons, Yorkshire woollens, Staffordshire
pottery, Birmingham metalwares, China tea and Arabian coffee were
distributed through Liverpool to Philadelphia and its hinterland. The
same goods were available in Chester County, Pennsylvania as in
Chester, England. Consumers on either side of the Atlantic both
wanted and demanded these products. Furthermore they were becom-
ing increasingly sophisticated, demanding particular colours, quali-
ties and quantities from particular regions. This was made possible
because the wide variety of traders at all socio-economic levels ensured
that commodities were collected in the ports from the hinterland
and abroad, shipped across the Atlantic, distributed via wholesalers
and brokers, and then through a variety of grocers, dealers, shop-
keepers and hucksters and higglers.
This process of distribution was complicated but efficient. Goods
were broken into ever smaller quantities with a concurrent provision
of credit, meant that just about everyone, whatever their income,
could participate in the ‘consumer revolution’ to some extent. This
diversity of goods was distributed by the very diverse trading com-
munity in each city. Everyone from English royalty to Liverpool-
Irish dock labourers, from Virginia planters to German-Philadelphia
shoemakers was part of this ‘world of goods’. The same people all
ate bread made from Pennsylvania flour, heated their food with
‘Liverpool’ coal, ate it on Staffordshire pottery with Sheffield cut-
lery, whilst wearing clothes made in Manchester. They were truly
cosmopolitan consumers of Atlantic goods.
The Liverpool-Philadelphia Trading Community in the Long Term:

Crisis and Continuum
The continuity and sustained interdependence between traders in

Liverpool and Philadelphia despite the many crises of this period is
remarkable. Especially so, considering the Independence of the thir-
teen continental colonies. Some have argued that Britain continued
246 conclusion
to dominate the economic scene after Independence, despite the

United States being free from the ‘dubious’ benefits of the Navigation
Acts; “The new nation remained a slave to her former master” com-
mented Doerfinger.3 Indeed, it took some time for Pennsylvania and
her sister states to diversify their economies. It is true that until at
least the early nineteenth century Pennsylvania and her sister states
continued to rely on British manufactures. Only from around 1810
onwards did the efforts of Philadelphians at importing textile tech-
nology begin to pay off. They also had to fight to retain trading
privileges with the British West Indies whilst trying to promote trade
with other countries. The Bank of North America was only the first
of many United States banks, but whilst they were highly instru-
mental in developing an internal finance market, much capital and
credit continued to come from Great Britain.
But to call the United States a slave to Great Britain is too strong.
It is all a matter of perspective. The efforts and means by which
individual traders managed their own businesses and risk is reflected
in the wider patterns of relationships between the trading commu-
nities of Liverpool and Philadelphia over this period. It has been
asserted by some historians that British merchants remained in control
of the trade with the United States because they provided the necessary
credit which facilitated trade in the first place. By extending long
credit, British traders kept hold of the American market until their
domestic credit market was strong enough to cope. In the twenty
years following 1800, some hinterland manufacturers in Britain started
expanding credit from the more ‘normal’ twelve months to eighteen
or even twenty-four months; trying to not only keep the trade in
Britain, but to take it from merchants in ports such as Liverpool at
the same time. It is also true that British trade continued to be
attractive to the Americans, because France, whom the Americans
also wanted to trade with, wanted cash for their purchases.4
At the same time, the huge American market was not to be given
up lightly, and so we could ask, how much choice did the British
merchants and manufacturers really have? Furthermore, the ‘delay-
3
Stanley Engerman, “Mercantilism and Overseas Trade, 1700–1800”, in Floud
and McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain, pp. 182–204; Doerflinger, A Vigorous
Spirit, p. 329.
4
Buck, The Development of the Organisation, pp. 112–113; Hudson, Genesis, pp.
155–160, 193; Morgan, “Business Networks”, p. 53.
ing’ tactics practised by some hinterland traders in their payments

to merchants was also prevalent at the trans-Atlantic level. British
merchants often had to wait years for payment from American mer-
chants and shopkeepers, and many did not get paid at all. For exam-
ple, many British merchants never received what they were owed as
at the credit crises of 1772 and 1793, and many more suffered along
with the merchants and shopkeepers of Philadelphia in the crashes
of 1785. In 1776, outstanding debts to British merchants from the
thirteen continental colonies amounted to £2,958,390, although
Pennsylvania owed a relatively small £137,671. The wrangle over
these debts was never fully resolved. The Jay Treaty of 1795 arranged
for the United States to pay $600,000 to the British government for
redistribution as it saw fit. Even if this amount ever reached the
merchants who were owed money it represented only a payment of
2s. 6d. in the pound, not anywhere near the eight shillings required
for a respectable bankruptcy certificate. In any case, this money
would have been received far too late to have helped any British
merchants suffering from this non payment. Despite this state of
affairs, several Orders In Council passed in the 1780s mitigated the
effects of the United States no longer being part of the formal British
Empire and encouraged its continued trade with Great Britain.
Philadelphia merchants may have been “undercapitalized provincials”
but they had plenty of access to capital and credit which they did
not always pay back! How far then were the British in control to
have to concede such trading conditions when they were already
owed so much money?5
The situation regarding freight and shipping also developed in
favour of the Americans after Independence. Even before the war,
Philadelphians may have owned as much as 20 per cent of all colo-
nial shipping; and as the colonists as a whole owned one third of
British shipping in the 1770s, this was a substantial amount. In the
first few years following Independence, British vessels continued to
dominate shipping entering the port of Philadelphia, some of which
was owned by merchants in Liverpool. However, as time progressed,
5
Sheridan, “The British Credit Crisis of 1772”, p. 167; figures from the Jay
Treaty quoted in Maurice M. Schofield, “The Virginia Trade of the Firm of Sparling
and Bolden, of Liverpool 1788–99”, THSLC, 116 (1965), 117–165, p. 126; Keith,
“Relaxations in the British Restrictions”; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 140;
McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, chapter seventeen.
248 conclusion
American shipping became more important. In 1787, only 5 per

cent of shipping entering Liverpool was ‘plantation built’. By 1808
however, observers in Liverpool estimated that 90 per cent of the
shipping involved in the American trade was built in the United
States. This was assisted by the introduction of compulsory regis-
tration of shipping from 1786 which put an end to joint trans-Atlantic
ownership, and developments in finance which allowed the Americans
to build more of their own vessels. In any case, the Liverpool ship
owners felt threatened enough to establish their own association to
protect their interests.6
It was not only in credit and shipping that the ex-colonists displayed
the initiative. The tone of many letters sent out from Philadelphia
to Great Britain in 1783 were confident. William and John Sitgreaves
wrote to Thomas Powell in June 1783 stating their expectations;
To have our goods shipped at 12 months Credit, for a Commission
of 1 ½ percent; to be allowed 5 perCent per Ann: Interest for what-
ever money we pay before that time; and if the Time of Payment
should be prolonged, to allow you Interest at the same rate. We expect
proper attention to be paid to our Orders, and to have our Goods
shipped as low as any Persons in this place on the same terms.7
Hardly the words of a slave! Letters such as these also demonstrate
the continuity of links between Liverpool and Philadelphia despite
the recent violence and upheaval. Traders were anxious to trade
together again. The formal peace Treaty was not signed until
September 1783, but a preliminary treaty, signed in November 1782
meant that trade had recommenced far earlier. As early as June
1783, merchants in Philadelphia were having to sell some stock at
60 per cent of its value due to overstocking.8 Philadelphians also
moaned heartily when they did not receive the correct goods at the
correct time and were extremely explicit in their orders.
In the run up to the War of Independence, the British presses
churned out a mass of tracts castigating the Americans for their
betrayal of trust, as an uncle would a nephew. After the War of
6
McCusker, “Sources of Investment Capital”, p. 147; Tolley, “The American
Trade of Liverpool”, pp. 90–91; Neal, Liverpool Shipping, pp. 72, 61.
7
Sitgreaves to Powell, 24 Sep 1783, ff. 24–26, William and John Sitgreaves
8
Sitgreaves to Little, 4 Jun 1783, William and John Sitgreaves Letterbook
1783–1794.
Independence, however, Britain could no longer play the ‘wise uncle’.

The former colonists were confident, made strides towards diversi-
fying their economy, developed their own finance market, increased
their share of freight and shipping and extended and improved their
business networks. Of course, in the long term, it was not just
Philadelphia that grew from strength to strength. Local rivals at
Baltimore slowly absorbed the international trade of lesser Chesapeake
towns, and from 1790 New York merchants also increased their
trade and eventually took over as the largest United States port in
the early nineteenth century. However, this was also a slow process,
and the bonds that tied Liverpool and Philadelphia together in the
eighteenth century were so strong that Liverpool and Philadelphia
remained “infinitely more connected” until at least 1810.9
Merely for Money?
This book has attempted to tell the more personal stories of traders,
within a quantitative framework. In this way, it has been possible
to chart the development of the various sectors of the trading com-
munity and the important contribution made by women. Looking
at the networks of people, credit and goods has demonstrated the
interdependence not only of traders within a port city, but of trad-
ing communities around the Atlantic. Assessing how traders coped
with their careers on a day-to-day basis has been an important aspect.
Traders as diverse as William Rathbone IV, Mary Coates and
Elizabeth Paschall used their networks in a similar way in order to
gain information, capital and credit, to build trust, reduce risk and
establish reputations. The way in which traders worked was as diverse
as the nature of trade itself. An important part of this story has been
to put women back into the story of the formal economy, to give
them, and indeed all lesser traders, a ‘positive past’. Usually the story
of trade and traders is one of elite merchants; this book has gone
at least a small way to rectifying this bias by highlighting the wide
9
Anon., A Letter From a Merchant in London to his Nephew in North America, Relative
to the Present Posture of Affairs in the Colonies (London: Printed for J. Walter, 1766);
Anon., Common Sense: In Nine Conferences, between a British Merchant and a Candid Merchant
of America, in their private capacities as friends . . . (London: 1775); Doerflinger, A Vigorous
Spirit, pp. 335–344; John Perhouse to James Perhouse, 4 Apl 1806, John Perhouse
Journal 1800–1838.
250 conclusion
range of traders at all socio-economic levels and stressing the com-

plicated networks of distribution through which they all made a vital
contribution. The ability of traders at all levels to overcome the
difficulties inherent in trade is impressive indeed.
The trading practices within each sector were much the same; it
was only the scale that differed. The risk inherent in trade, mobil-
ity up and down the social scale, the centrality of credit and repu-
tation meant that all traders had a similar commercial mentalité.
This shared sense of entrepreneurship often came before differences
in geography, religion, political beliefs or social status. This is one
reason why merchants in Philadelphia were so torn over non impor-
tation as well as Independence itself. Lower down the scale, a shop-
keeper in Philadelphia who sold Manchester textiles had to counter
calls for ‘homespun’ in much the same way as her elite counterpart.
At the same time, newspapers in England called for trade rather
than taxation with the colonies, and post Independence, British mer-
chants also supported the trade with the United States and between
the United States and the British West Indies.10
Political factors often came second to financial expediency. Despite
the violence of war and the hardships of the many credit crises of
this period, the desire to trade and make money meant that traders
around the Atlantic soon forgot their differences and continued doing
what they were good at—distributing goods! Their shared sense of
common interests made them a coherent community; and here is
the irony in what Sheridan said of traders. Traders worked for a
profit, and no doubt for as much of it as possible; but they could
not betray their own community by thinking only of profit. It was
their very shared sense of entrepreneurship, risk, business practice
and values, of interdependence via people and credit which helped
the Atlantic economy to continue and grow. The fact that the
Liverpool and Philadelphia trading communities were so interdepen-
dent meant that they could never work “merely for money”.
10
Keith, “Relaxations in the British Trade”; see the discussions in Records of
the Board of Trade: America and West Indies: Commercial Intercourse Vols. I
and II, PRO.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
THE TRADE DIRECTORIES AND THE DATABASE
Town and city directories were first printed in London in the sev-
enteenth century. Their popularity in England increased throughout
the eighteenth century, along with the urbanization of this period.
They were adopted in continental America a little later, towards the
end of the eighteenth century. Not all towns or cities produced them
however. They were a reflection of the importance of the town as
a commercial or industrial centre, and of the civic pride of its citi-
zens. Usually they included a list of the names, addresses and occu-
pations of many of the inhabitants, often with various appendices
giving different information about the town. These might include
listings by street or occupation, information and costs about carriage
and postal services, banking facilities, tourist attractions, a list of civic
officers and maps of the area. They were meant to supplement the
popular histories of towns so much in fashion during this period.
However, they were prepared in an ad-hoc manner, according to
the predilections of entrepreneurial printers. This means that their
contents are not always comparable. They certainly did not include
all citizens, nor always even all heads of households. Elizabeth Raffold’s
The Manchester Guide, printed in 1772 states that she had striven to
include every “inhabitant of the least Consequence”; this still meant
that only 1,500 out of a population of 30,000 were included. Routinely
missing from most directories were servants, workers who did not
have a trade or run a business, and most married women. Spinsters
and widows were better accounted for, often being heads of house-
holds and/or running a business to support themselves. A study by
Benson et al. argues that craftsmen and labourers were the most
likely to be omitted, and so the directories are biased towards the
commercial community. In contrast, Scola found that small food dis-
tributors and shops were often under represented, but still thought
directories a useful analytical source. Conversely, Davies et al. argue
that double entry was a problem in the nineteenth-century directo-
ries, with many people being listed at their business and residential
address. People in partnerships were also likely to be entered twice
254 appendix a
or more, particularly in the professions. Despite these limitations his-

torians have used the directories to good effect. The directories were
not comprehensive, they were not meant to be. They were a mix-
ture of ‘puffery’ and the eighteenth-century equivalent of the yellow
pages.1
With regard to Liverpool and Philadelphia, trade directories have
only been used systematically in the study of the latter. Doerflinger
used them in his study of Philadelphia merchants, although not to
assess any other sector of the trading community, and not to con-
struct a time series. Warner also used them to study the spatial
organization of Philadelphia’s workers and occupations in the nine-
teenth century. Importantly, Goldin used them to study the eco-
nomic status of women in early republican Philadelphia. By comparing
the directories with the 1790 and 1820 Federal Population Censuses
she found that in the case of women at least, the directories were
not biased towards any particular occupation.2
As with all directories printed in this period, those for Liverpool
and Philadelphia had their own peculiarities. The first Liverpool
directory, printed in 1766, stated that it contained “An Alphabetical
List of the Merchants, Tradesmen, and Principal Inhabitants, of the
Town of Liverpool”. Printed by John Gore, a bookseller, it included
whom he thought worthy of entry, as well as others who made the
effort to enter themselves. Gore was aware that it was far from com-
plete and invited people to submit their details for entry so that the
subsequent version would be more correct. The compiler of the 1787
directory, William Bailey was less apologetic, and considered he had
“taken a regular survey”, but it was still informed by his own prej-
udices. The directories gradually became more inclusive, with entries
including slopsellers and cowkeepers, and frequent ‘vanity’ entries by
women as ‘Lady’ or ‘Mrs’. Yet women, mariners and servants con-
1
Penelope Corfield, “‘Giving Directions to the Town’: The Early Town Directories”,
UHY, 11 (1984), 22–35; Rosemary Sweet, The Writing of Urban Histories in Eighteenth
Century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); John Benson, Andrew Alexander,
Deborah Hodson, John Jones and Gareth Shaw, “Sources for the Study of Retailing,
1800–1900, with Particular Reference to Wolverhampton”, LH, 29,3 (1999), 167–182,
p. 172; Edward P. Duggan, “Industrialisation and the Development of Urban
Business Communities: Research Problems, Sources and Techniques”, LH, 12 (1975),
447–465; W.K.D. Davies, J.A. Giggs, and D.T. Herbert, “Directories, Rate Books
and the Commercial Structure of Towns”, Geography, 53 (1968), 41–54, pp. 42–43.
2
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, passim; Warner, The Private City, chapter three;
Goldin, “Economic Status of Women”.
the trade directories and the database 255
tinued under represented. As late as 1805, only 10 per cent of the

population was listed, with women accounting for only 17.5 per cent
of all entries. The author of the first Philadelphia directory in 1785,
Francis White, specifically tells us the purpose of the directory, which
was to provide an easy guide for strangers and others to find peo-
ple they wanted to do business; but he added the caveat that: “being
the first of its kind published here, it cannot be expected to be wholly
complete”. The second directory in 1791 was compiled by Clement
Biddle, who was also a marshal for the Pennsylvania District of the
first US Census. It has been argued that it was therefore “admirably
complete”, and that in the case of women at least, the Philadelphia
directories contained most household heads.3 As in Liverpool, their
popularity grew. However, the 1791 directory accounts for 16 per
cent of the population, and although this is a higher rate than the
1805 Liverpool directory, women only account for 13.5 per cent of
all entries.
There are therefore many problems associated with the trade direc-
tories as a source. Women in particular are undercounted, although
we have a good idea of what occupations widows and spinsters held.
We also know that many married women would have helped in the
family business, but how many, we can unfortunately only guess at.
The bias in the directories towards the commercial sector of course
works in favour of this study. However, within this problem, is embed-
ded another. Those higher up the socio-economic scale, such as mer-
chants and brokers were more likely to be entered. However, issues
such as double entry can be easily dealt with (see below). The num-
bers quoted throughout the book taken from the directories are there-
fore minimum numbers. As the book is interested in trends rather
than exact numbers, these numbers suffice, and the fact that they
are minimum numbers makes them all the more significant.
Central to the methodology of this book was the desire to track
and compare change over time. Therefore it was important to build
up a time series analysis of both trading communities. The directories
3
John Gore (ed.), The Liverpool Directory for 1766 (Liverpool: Printed by William
Nevett, 1766), p. 40; William Bailey (ed.), The Liverpool Directory for 1787 (Liverpool:
Printed by William Nevett, 1787) p. iv; Francis White (ed.), The Philadelphia Directory
for 1785 (Philadelphia: Printed by Young, Stewart and McCullock, 1785), adver-
tisement at front of the directory; Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit, p. 386; Goldin,
“Economic Status of Women”, p. 383.
256 appendix a
sampled were chosen to reflect decennial change over time, although

this was constrained by extant sources. The listings of every trader,
male and female, as defined in chapter two were taken as follows:
Liverpool, 1766, 1774, 1787, 1796 and 1805; Philadelphia: 1781,
1791 and 1805. In addition a full listing of the Liverpool directo-
ries was facilitated, and all women in the Philadelphia directories
were taken, which helped to trace their story further.4 A total of
34,088 entries were collected from the directories. The format of the
body of the directories was very simple, listing name, occupation and
address or addresses. The fields of entry in to the database followed
this pattern. There were many double entries—especially at the top
of the socio-economic scale. Merchants were often entered at their
business address, at another with a partner, and at their residence.
Often a secondary occupation was entered separately, such as banker
or broker, and sometimes the warehouses of merchants were listed
separately in addition. Conversely, partnerships were sometimes only
listed once, so that three separate merchants had only one entry.
These issues were dealt with by a number of processes. First, each
and every entry was entered. Second, partnerships were entered
under every name, so that each individual trader had an entry—
even where one or more of the partners had an individual entry as
well. For example, the merchant house of Greene and Gretham was
also entered into the database and Gretham and Greene. Mary and
Ann Tuohy, tea dealers, were also entered as Ann and Mary Tuohy,
tea dealers. This allowed for a count of individuals rather than firms,
but kept a log of partnerships as well. This of course led to the dou-
ble entry of many persons, in addition to the double entries originally
listed. There were also many entries in the directories of offices and
buildings which were not individuals, such as weighing machines or
customs houses. All these problems were dealt with by adding a ‘gen-
der’ column. Entries were noted as; ‘M’ for male, ‘F’ for female, ‘D’
for duplicate entries and ‘O’ for office. A decision had to be made
in many cases as to which was the primary residence or occupation.
Business addresses, where given separately, were taken to be the pri-
mary entry. Where a person had dual occupations listed, the first
was always taken to be the primary occupation, and denoted as such
when counting categories.
4
In the case of Liverpool for 1796 and 1805 a fully-computerised version of the
directories was donated. My thanks to Paul Laxton his generosity.
the trade directories and the database 257
The counting of categories was done via a separate classification

table. Within a broad category a dealer in furs would be denoted
as a dealer, and a timber merchant as a merchant. This allowed for
the counting of broad categories, but allowed the original entries to
be kept in tact, and for duality of occupation and partnerships to
also be analysed when looking in detail at particular sectors or indi-
viduals. When counting sectors or sub sectors, queries always included
a function to pick up only ‘M’, ‘F’ or ‘M and F’ entries, thereby
picking up individuals only once. The numbers of traders quoted
throughout are therefore individuals not businesses, but each person
is counted only once. The total number of persons in the database
after making these allowances were as follows: Liverpool: 1,115 (1766),
2,534 (1774), 3,178 (1787), 9,008 (1796) and 8,757 (1805). Phila-
delphia: 1,779 (1785), 2,025 (1791) and 4,113 (1805). Note that for
Liverpool these numbers represented the total directory, whereas for
Philadelphia these represent all traders, plus all women that were
not traders. The figures are of course snapshots in time, but 100
per cent sampling means that they are as accurate as the sources
allow. At the very least, they give the minimum number of people
involved in each sector and an indication of split by gender.
APPENDIX B
CATEGORIES OF TRADER INCLUDED IN EACH

TRADING SECTOR
This appendix contains a list of all sub categories included in each

trading sector. The sector in which a trader was included was taken
to be the first or only occupation listed in the directory entries. The
categories were the same for Philadelphia and Liverpool and for men
and women.
Broker
Any commodity broker, broker for the flats, commission broker,

exchange broker, household broker, insurance broker, mercantile bro-
ker, ship broker, stock broker.
Dealer
Any commodity dealer, corn seller, dry salter, flourman or flourseller,

glassman, lime seller, meal man, meal seller, milkman/woman, pork
seller, ship dealer, trader, tripe seller, victualler.
Factor
Any commodity factor, commission factor.
Grocer
All grocers and greengrocers except wholesale grocers.

260 appendix b
Itinerant Dealer
Huckster (not huckster shop), itinerant dealer, mug man, newsman

or carrier, pedlar, ragman, tinker, travelling stationer.
Merchant
Any commodity merchant, commission merchant.
Specialist Shopkeeper
Draper, haberdasher, hosier, mercer.
Shopkeeper
Any store or shopkeeper including bookseller, chandler, cheesemon-

ger, corn chandler, druggist, fishmonger, flour shop, fruiterer, hard-
wareman, huckster shop, ironmonger, music seller, paper seller,
printseller, ship chandler, slopseller, stationer, tobacconist, toyman,
wine seller.
Wholesalers, Warehouse-Keepers and Auctioneers
Appraiser, auctioneer, clothier, repositories, vaults, vendue cryer or

holder, warehousemen, warehouses and wholesalers of any commodity.
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Africa (trade with), 21, 26, 28, 226–230 Liverpool, 129–130, 214–215,
Alexandria, 233, 236 232–233
Auctioneers (role, status and place in Philadelphia, 130–132
hierarchy), 47–48, 85–87, 198, Charleston, 19, 34, 39 (trade with), 20,
200–202 (numbers of ), 84, 86 42, 201, 229, 235, 236 (houses),
William Summers, 229
Baltic (trade with), 20, 78 Chester (GB), 223
Baltimore, 233, 249 (trade with), 151, China (trade with), 21, 193
236 Coffee Houses, Taverns and Inns
Bankruptcy, 28, 37, 48, 56, 76, 86, 92, (as a place to network), 131–135,
99, 102, 113, 115, 144, 176, 137
179–181, 207, 211, 238, 239, 246 Consumer Revolution, 183–210, 209,
Banking, 37, 42–43, 67, 78, 131, 245
159–164 Courts (Chancery and/or local), 113,
Banks 176, 194–195, 216, 239
Bank of North America, 43, Credit, 119, 142–145, 173, 213–214,
131–132, 157, 160–164, 238, 246 246–247
Caldwell, Charles and Co., 27 Crises, 8, 21, 144–145, 153, 247
Heywood’s, 43, 154, 161–164 Short term, 62–63
Leyland and Bullin’s, 43, 161–164 Local and Regional, 145–150
Neal, James, Fordyce and Brown, Trans-Atlantic, 150–159, 181
37, 144
Failures, 27, 37, 144 Dealers (role, status and place within
Barbados (trade with), 227 hierarchy), 51–52, 91–93, 200,
Bills of Exchange, 25, 46, 82, 102, 205–206 (numbers of ), 92
112, 118, 123, 143, 153–159, 162, Debtors’ Gaol, 4, 113, 141, 144, 175,
173, 181, 224 177, 179–180, 182, 194, 206,
Birmingham (GB), 52 (trade with), 15, 217, 239
192, 202–203, 209, 235–236 Distribution of Goods, 41–61, 74–105,
Boston (Colonies/states), 22, 114, 121, 183–210
233 Across the Ocean, 187–195
Bristol (GB), 19, 22, 25, 34, 39, 114, Breaking Bulk, 196–203
130 Retail Sales, 203–208
Brokers (role, status and place within Diversity, 12, 46, 51, 52, 242–243
hierarchy), 45–46, 81–83, 197, Dominica, 200
200–201 (numbers of ) 82 Drapers (role, status and place within
Business culture (mentalité), 7, 18, hierarchy), 48–49, 87–88, 204–205
61–66, 120, 132, 144, 174, (numbers of ), 88–89
175–176, 213, 241, 250
East Indies (trade with), 41
Cadiz (trade with), 193, 235–236 Edinburgh (trade with), 235–236
Canada (trade with), 11 Europe, 78 (trade with), 20, 26
Capital, 62–63, 104, 119, 142–145, Exchange (the), 128–131
244, 247 (see also under women) Liverpool, 129–130
Chambers of Commerce, 102, 134 Philadelphia, 130–131
280 index of subjects
Factors (role, status and place within Leeds (trade with), 193
hierarchy), 43–45, 79–81, 202–203 Lisbon (trade with), 193, 236
(numbers of ), 80 Livorno (Leghorn, Italy), 126, 233
Failure, 173–182 (see also insolvency London, 39, 61, 121 (trade with), 82,
and bankruptcy) 156, 235–237 (houses), Barclays,
Feme Covert, 63, 71–72 181; Peter Clement, 238; Joseph
Feme Sole, 72, 216 Hadfield, 236; Herries and Co.,
France, (trade with), 10, 139, 189, 246 122–123, 126–127; Daniel
Mildred, 155–156; Neale and Co.,
Gibraltar (trade with), 236 124, 157; Thomas Plummer, 158;
Glasgow, 34, 130 (trade with), 235 Thomas Powell, 152, 248; Mr.
Grenada, 200 Rucher, 158; Stephen Wilson,
Grocers (role, status and place within 235
hierarchy), 50–51, 89–91,
197–198, 201, 205 (numbers of ), Madeira (trade with), 234–236
90 Manchester (GB), 66 (trade with), 15,
152, 192–193, 201, 209, 235–237
Haberdasher (role, status and place Manufactures (stage and development
within hierarchy), 49–50, 87–88, of )
204–205 (numbers of ), 88 American, 10, 170, 246
Halifax (Nova Scotia), 19 (trade with), British, 25, 26, 170–171, 185–186,
153, 235–236 202, 246
Hamburgh (trade with), 236 Markets (role, status and place within
Havana (trade with), 193 hierarchy), 57–58, 100–101, 208
Hosier (role, status and place within Mediterranean, 20–21
hierarchy), 49–50, 87–89, Mercers (role, status and place within
204–205 hierarchy), 48–49, 87 (numbers of ),
88
Illegal trade and traders (including Merchants (role, status and place
smuggling), 58–60, 68, 101, 229, within hierarchy), 41–43, 74–79,
233 (role, status and place within 190–203 (numbers of ), 75, 77
hierarchy), 58–61, 101–103,
194–195, 214 (scale of ), 68, 103 Netherlands (trade with), 127
Industrial Revolution, 5, 210 Networks, 109, 243–245
Insolvency, 113, 115, 144, 175–178 People, 47, 62–64, 79, 98, 104–105,
Insurance, 42–43 109–141, 212–239
Investment, 118, 143, 163, 164–173 Credit, 105, 142–182
‘safe’, 167–169 Goods, 105, 183–210
‘risky’, 169–173 New Calabar, 19
‘female’ (see under women) New England (trade with), 151
Ireland (trade with), 15, 25, 126, 139, New York, 34, 114, 233 (trade with),
199, 206, 221, 227, 228 20, 151, 204, 206, 235–236
Itinerant dealers, 206 (role, status and Non Importation, 21, 27
place within hierarchy), 54–56, North Carolina (trade with), 191
98–100, 207–208 (numbers of ), 99
Obligation, 212, 217, 220–221,
Jamaica (trade with), 27, 189, 199, 223–224, 234, 240, 249
227, 235 (houses), Case and Old Calabar (trade with), 227
Southworth, 147; Lindo[w], Mr., 17;
Samuel Rainford, 110, 137 Paisley (Scotland) (trade with), 235
Population
Kingston ( Jamaica), 19, 110, 137, 233 Liverpool, 28–29
(trade with), 34, 39, 42 Philadelphia, 29
index of subjects 281
Port Trading Community, 4–7, 23–24,

Economy, 6 35–40, 63–66 (entry into), 62–63
Cities, 23, 33–34 (size of ), 67–70
Portland (US), 233 Trieste, 233
Portugal (trade with), 234 Trust, 65, 111–113, 139–141, 145,
155, 159, 174–175, 220, 230, 249
Reputation, 45, 62, 122, 125, 127,
152, 155, 158–159, 212–213, 217, Vendue holders (see auctioneers)
221, 224–226, 230, 234, 237–238, Victuallers (role, status and place within
240, 244, 249 hierarchy), 52–53, 93–95 (numbers
Risk, 12, 37, 43, 64, 77, 112, 150, of ), 94
157, 169, 172, 180, 182, 191, 193, Virginia (trade with), 191
211–240, 249
Rochdale (GB) (trade with), 193 War
of American Independence, 5, 8–11,
Sheffield (GB) (trade with), 193, 202, 27, 66, 76, 113, 127, 144, 152,
203, 209 157, 186, 214, 226, 229, 234, 243,
Shipping, 25, 114–118, 187–192, 246–248
247–248 (agents), 15, 117, 188–193, Napoleonic, 28, 144, 195
202, 230–238 Seven Years’, 27, 133
Ship ownership (Liverpool), 171–173 Warehouse keepers (role, status and
(Philadelphia), 171–173 place in hierarchy), 46–47, 83–85,
Shopkeepers (role, status and place 198, 201–202, 204, (numbers of ),
within hierarchy), 52–54, 95–98, 84
196–197, 204–207 (numbers of ), 95, West Indies, 39 (trade with), 11, 15,
97 21, 42, 60, 151, 155, 169–170, 199,
Slave Trade, 15–16, 25, 42, 78, 176, 228, 243, 246, 250 (merchants), 166
187, 189, 193, 199, 227, 240 Wholesalers (role, status and place in
Smuggling (see illegal trade) hierarchy), 47, 83, 197–198 (numbers
Staffordshire (trade with), 204, 209, of ), 82
236 Wilmington (Delaware), 147, 148
Stamp Act, 22, 27, 66, 122 Women
Sugar Act (Act of Trade), 22 Banking, 159–164
Capital (access to), 71, 164–167, 221
Tenerife (trade with), 193 Credit and Bills of Exchange,
Town Council 145–159, 218–223
Liverpool, 31, 128, 134, 138, 232 Cultural attitudes towards, 72–73,
Philadelphia, 31, 128, 134, 138 104–105, 220, 222–223, 243
Townshend Act, 22, 27 Failure (bankruptcy and insolvency),
Trade 173–182
Between Liverpool and Philadelphia, Finance and Investment, 164–173
25–28, 187–210, 245–249 Shipowners, 171–173
Between Great Britain and the Traders (numbers), 68–69, 73–74
thirteen colonies/early states, (see each sector for the numbers
20–21, 27–28, 41, 245–249 of women and their role within it)
(others – see under individual places) (vignettes of women traders),
Trader (definition of ), 4–7, 242 218–223, 239–240
INDEX OF NAMES
N.B. This list contains Philadelphia and Liverpool related people only. This does not represent
all traders listed in the trade directories, only those mentioned in the text.
Abraham, John (Philadelphia), 201 Bradford, William (Philadelphia), 129

Agard, Stephen (Philadelphia), 163 Brandon, Mary (Philadelphia), 178,
Alder, William (Liverpool), 235 182
Allen, William (Philadelphia), 170 Brancker, John (Liverpool), 163
Alweeks, Rebecca (Liverpool), 162–163 Breveil, Francis (Philadelphia?), 17
Ashbridge, Ann and Sarah Brown, John and Samuel (Liverpool),
(Philadelphia), 220 190
Astair, James (Liverpool), 4, 17–18, 23, Brown, Martha (Liverpool), 162
241 Brown, Mary (Philadelphia), 136
Atkis, Richard (Liverpool), 199 Bullin, Richard (Liverpool), 16, 79
(see also under banks)
Baker, Samuel (Philadelphia), 48, 86 Bullock, Ruth (Liverpool), 194
Barber, William (Liverpool), 193 Bury, Joseph (Liverpool), 206
Barlow, Jacob (Liverpool), 205 Butler, Margaret (Philadelphia), 197
Barrett, Edward (Liverpool), 139
Baynard, John (Philadelphia), 198 Caldwell, Charles and Co. (Liverpool),
Baynton, Wharton, Morgan and Co. 27 (see also under banks)
(Philadelphia), 27 Canby, Thomas (Philadelphia), 170
Bazing, John (Philadelphia), 178 Carey, Mathew (Philadelphia), 208
Beale, Js. (Philadelphia), 149 Carmalt, Susannah (Philadelphia), 206
Beckwith, John (Liverpool), 199 Case, Thomas and Clayton (Liverpool),
Bell, David (Liverpool), 205 77, 79
Bell, William (Philadelphia), 120 Case and Southworth (Liverpool and
Bennet, Thomas (Liverpool), 167 Kingston), 147, 199, 205
Benson, John (Liverpool), 173 Catherall, Hannah (Philadelphia), 168
Benson, Robert (Liverpool), 15, 136, Cato, William (Liverpool), 166
231 Cay, David (Philadelphia), 125,
Bent, Ellis and Robert (Liverpool), 234–238
193, 201 Cazneau and Marlin (Liverpool), 193
Bergier, Mr. (Philadelphia?), 17 Chaffers, Edward (Liverpool), 137
Bispham, John (Liverpool), 234 Charnock, Edward (Liverpool), 18
Black, Alexander (Liverpool), 4, 17–18, Clark, Daniel (Philadelphia), 102, 124,
24, 146, 241–242 137, 139, 146, 151, 155–157, 172,
Black, Patrick (Liverpool), 169 194, 196
Blackley, Mary (Liverpool), 93 Clarke, T. (Liverpool), 205
Blanchard, John (Philadelphia), 205 Clemens, James (Liverpool), 200
Blight, Peter (Philadelphia), 120 Clifton, Anna Maria (Philadelphia),
Blundell, Jonathon (Liverpool), 60, 169 162
Boissier, John (Philadelphia?), 17 Clifford, Thomas (Philadelphia), 170
Boswell, William (Philadelphia), 92 Clow, Andrew (and Co.) (Philadelphia),
Boudinot, Elias (Philadelphia), 163 4, 15, 18, 23, 110, 124–125, 128,
Bowen, Mrs. (Philadelphia), 91 137, 159, 163, 180, 191, 201, 222,
Bowie, Jane (Philadelphia), 147, 221 231, 234–242
284 index of names
Coates, Mary (Philadelphia), 87, Earle (Liverpool), 126

218–219, 249 Ralph, 169
Margarett, 219, 239 Thomas, 125, 193, 201
Samuel, 218 William, 125, 193, 201
Coats, William (Philadelphia), 116 Eddowes, Ralph (Philadelphia), 78, 125,
Collier, Ann (Liverpool), 200 127, 136–137, 157, 181, 223–226,
Cook, Charles (Liverpool), 177 231, 234, 240, 242
Cope, Thomas P. (Philadelphia), 147, Emelia (Philadelphia), 198
154, 193, 196, 200, 220–222
Core, Ann (Liverpool), 171 Farmer, Eliza (Philadelphia), 127, 137,
Corries, Gladstone and Bradshaw 141
(Liverpool), 41 Fazakerly, James (Liverpool), 171
Coxe, Tench (Philadelphia), 130, 166 Fishers (Philadelphia), 42–43, 137,
Crammond, Philip (Philadelphia), 219 147–148, 160, 163, 168, 172,
Crispin, Esther and Sarah 191–193, 196, 198, 200–201,
(Philadelphia), 220 205–207, 218–222, 224
Crompton, Peter (Liverpool), 167 Jabez Maud, 128
Crooke, George (Philadelphia), 92 Joshua, 190, 197
Cropper, James (Liverpool), 231–232 Miers, 168, 190, 192, 203
Cropper, Benson and Co. (Liverpool), Samuel, 190, 192, 203
193 Thomas, 190, 203
Crutchley, Sarah (Liverpool), 52 Fleetwood, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 167,
Cunningham and Nesbit (Philadelphia), 221, 239
148 Mary, 221, 239
Cunningham and Parker (Philadelphia), Forbes, Mr./William, 85, 148
197 Fryer, Jane (Liverpool), 147
Fuller, Benjamin (Philadelphia), 139
Davenport, William (Liverpool), 155,
175 Garnett, Jane (Liverpool), 220
Davis, George (Philadelphia), 175 Garrigues, Samuel (Philadelphia), 47,
Davison, Ann (Liverpool), 221 204
De[s]grove, Robert and C. Gatley, Edward (Liverpool?), 206
(Philadelphia), 85, 201, 204 Gilbert and Hunt (Philadelphia), 150
Denison, William (Liverpool), 228 Girard, Stephen (Philadelphia), 139
Dicas, Mary (Philadelphia), 147, 149 Gore, John (Liverpool), 146
Dingue, Daniel (Philadelphia), 148 Green, George (Liverpool), 191, 201
Dobson, George (Philadelphia), 125 and Sons, 191
Dobson, John (Liverpool), 229 Green and Wainwright, 191
Dougherty, Mary (Liverpool), 163 Griscom, Rachel (Philadelphia), 220
Doz, Andrew (Philadelphia), 147–148,
196–197 Haliday and Bamber (Liverpool), 190
Drinker, Henry (Philadelphia), 70 Haliday and Dunbar (Liverpool), 124,
Drinkwater, George (Liverpool), 146, 152, 155–156, 180
200–201 Hall, Jean (Philadelphia), 212
Dubre, Hannah (Philadelphia), 118 Hallsall, James (Liverpool), 200
Dunbar, George (Liverpool), 200 Hamer, Ralph (Liverpool), 86
Duffey, Patrick (Liverpool), 168 Hankey, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 91
Duncan, David (Philadelphia), 79 Hankey, Robert (Liverpool), 91
Duncan, Margaret (Philadelphia), 79, Hardie, Robert (Philadelphia), 171
159, 171 Harlan, Joshua (Philadelphia), 197
Duncan, William (Philadelphia), 171 Harvey, Edward (Philadelphia), 85
Duncan, William (Liverpool), Hassall, Christopher (Liverpool), 137
231–232 Hallsall, James (Liverpool), 200
index of names 285
Harrison, Elizabeth (Philadelphia), 220 Landell, Mary (Philadelphia), 220

Hemmings, Benjamin (Philadelphia), Latham and Reid (Philadelphia), 149,
91 197
Henderson and Sellar (Liverpool), 200 Latimer, George (Philadelphia), 120
Heywood (Liverpool), 42, 137, 160 Lawrence, Elizabeth (Philadelphia), 163
(see also under banks) Lawrence, John (Philadelphia), 82, 118,
Arthur, 37, 43, 138, 171 168
Benjamin, 228 Lawrence, Thomas (Philadelphia), 87,
Hird, Miss (Liverpool), 171 198
Hobson and Bolton (Liverpool), 116 Leadbetter, Ann (Liverpool), 52
Hodgson, Samuel (Philadelphia area), Leay, Nonne and Co. (Liverpool), 85
99, 208, 211 Ledlie, Maria (Philadelphia), 159
Hodgson, Thomas (Liverpool), 169 Lesher, George (Philadelphia), 121
Holland, Hannah (Philadelphia), 162, Leuffer, Thomas (Philadelphia?), 17
163 Leyland, Thomas (Liverpool), 15–16,
Benjamin, 162 18, 23, 43, 78, 126, 144, 147, 154,
Holland, Samuel (Liverpool), 138, 170 159, 221, 230 (see also under banks)
Hollingsworth, Levi (Philadelphia), 80, Lickbarrow, Thomas (Liverpool), 169
85, 191, 199 Lister, John (Liverpool), 146
Holme, Peter (Liverpool), 156, 169 Lloyd, Sarah (Philadelphia), 206
Houghton, Thomas (Liverpool), 86 Loughead, James (Philadelphia), 117,
Howell, Joseph (Philadelphia), 82, 118, 198
168 Lowe, James (Liverpool), 99
Hughes, William (Liverpool), 231
Hughes and Duncan, 192 Maddocks, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 95
Humble, Michael (Liverpool), 139 Mann, Luke, Captain (Liverpool), 227
Hunter, Elizabeth and Deborah Martin, Ann (Liverpool), 89
(Liverpool), 171 McAuslane, Patrick (Liverpool), 60
Hurry and Jones (Liverpool), 193 McCord, William (Philadelphia), 207
Hutton, Ann and Jannet (Liverpool), McEwen, Andrew (Liverpool), 86
89 McIver, Iver (Liverpool), 193
Meade, George (Philadelphia), 120,
Ingram, Francis (Liverpool), 228 132
Mease, John (Philadelphia), 201
Jacobs, Hannah (Philadelphia), 221 Mease and Miller, 190
Jacobs, Israel (Philadelphia), 221 Middleton, Thomas (Liverpool), 175
James, Abel (Philadelphia), 170 Miercken, Peter (Philadelphia), 60, 170
Johnston, Ann (Liverpool), 147 Mifflin, Jonathon (Philadelphia), 150
Jones, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 177 Mifflin and Massey, 147–150,
Jones, Hugh (Liverpool), 200 197–198, 202, 214
Jones, Rebecca (Philadelphia), 134, Sarah, 168
136, 194, 219, 239 Milnes, Robert, Bridget and Eliza
Jones, Sarah (Liverpool), 93 (Liverpool), 167
Jones, Thomas (Liverpool), 102 Milnor, John (Philadelphia), 197
Jordan, Elizabeth (Philadelphia), 147 Mills, Mary Cameto (Philadelphia), 39
Mills and Co. (Liverpool), 201
Kennion, Peter (Liverpool), 200 M’Lean, Duncan (Liverpool), 202, 206
Kennon, Captain (Liverpool and Molyneaux, Amy (Liverpool), 220
Philadelphia), 194 Montgomery, [n/g] (Philadelphia), 120
Kenyon, James (Liverpool), 172 Moore, Eleanor (Liverpool), 159
Knox and Henderson (Philadelphia), Morgan, Thomas (Liverpool), 204
201 Morris, Cadwallader (Philadelphia),
Kreps, Margaret (Philadelphia), 220 207
286 index of names
Morris, Robert (Philadelphia), 24, 28, William IV, 15, 28, 77, 117, 125,
158 128, 136, 157, 190–191, 200,
Morris, Samuel (Philadelphia), 60, 170 224–225, 229–234, 240–241, 249
Moulder (Philadelphia), William V, 234
Joseph, 148 Rawlinson and Chorley (Liverpool),
Margaret, 4, 16, 18, 23, 37, 148, 117
205, 221, 239, 241–242 Redman, Martha (Philadelphia), 220
Munay, William (Philadelphia), 148 Reynolds, Hannah (married William
Rathbone IV) (Liverpool), 230
Needham, Mrs. (Liverpool), 171 Rhea, Mary (Philadelphia), 162
Nevins, Pim (Liverpool), 136, 182 Richards, Samuel (Philadelphia?),
197
Onslow, Mr. (Liverpool), 102 Riche, Thomas (Philadelphia), 102
Orton, P. (Liverpool), 102 Rigby, Hannah (Liverpool), 206–207
Arthur and Pryce, 49, 85 Rigby, Sarah (Liverpool), 216
Roberts, John (Liverpool), 173
Packer, Sarah (Liverpool), 159 Roberts, Mrs (Liverpool), 199
Parke, Thomas (Liverpool), 228 Robinson, John (Liverpool), 202
Parker, George (Liverpool), 48 Robson, John (Liverpool), 206
Paschall, Elizabeth (Philadelphia), 87, Roscoe, William (Liverpool), 16,
134, 140, 218, 249 78–79, 125, 127, 136, 138–139,
Patten, John (Philadelphia), 198 167, 181, 224, 226
Penrose, Mary (Philadelphia), 149 Ruston, Thomas (Philadelphia), 166
Perhouse, John (Philadelphia), Rutson, Thomas (Liverpool), 163
109–110, 211–212 Ryan, Thomas (Philadelphia), 86
Phillips, Crammond and Co.
(Philadelphia), 17 Sadler, Thomas (Liverpool), 211
Postlethwaite, John (Liverpool) 173 Sandford, Hannah (Liverpool), 175
Pollard, William (Philadelphia), 77, 79, Savill [Saviel], Samuel (Philadelphia),
156, 180 92
Powditch, George (Liverpool), 102 Sharpe, Mrs. B. (Liverpool), 118
Powell, Ann (Philadelphia), 196, 207, Shaw, David (Liverpool), 168, 200
219 Scott, James (Liverpool), 120
Pratt, Alice (Liverpool), 205 Scott, Mary (Liverpool), 177
Pratt, Isabell (Liverpool), 82 Shute, W. (Philadelphia), 101
Prescott, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 177 Sitgreaves (Philadelphia)
Preston, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 168 John, 201
Preston, Robert (Liverpool), 203 William, 152–153, 175, 180,
Price, Ann (Liverpool), 49 196–198, 213–214
Pritchard, P. (Liverpool), 204 William and John, 77, 168, 183,
Pryor, Thomas W. (Philadelphia), 203, 248
197 Slater, Gill (Liverpool), 200
Smith, Frances (Liverpool), 162
Rainford, Samuel (Liverpool and Sparling, John (Liverpool), 169
Kingston, Jamaica), 110, 137 and Bolden, 59, 137
Rathbone (Liverpool) Speers, William (Liverpool), 228
Rathbone and Benson/Rathbone, Spence, Jacob (Liverpool), 168
Benson and Co., 15, 159, Stag, William (Liverpool), 168
191–193, 200–201, 203, 231–232, Standford, Mary (Liverpool), 204
234–238 Steele, Rebecca (Philadelphia), 87
Rathbone, Hughes and Duncan, Steele, William and James
192–193 (Philadelphia), 175
William III, 191 Stewart, Robert (Philadelphia), 120
index of names 287
Stoward, Mathew (Liverpool), 195 Wallace, William and Co. (Liverpool),

Sutton, Catharine (Liverpool), 171 191
Sutton and McCauley (Philadelphia), Waltman, William (Philadelphia), 205
150, 197 Warbrick, Anne (Liverpool), 79
Swift, J. (Philadelphia), 207 Warbrick and Holt (Liverpool), 191
Warder, Jeremiah (Philadelphia), 190
Tarleton, John (Liverpool), 17, 64, 200 Warder and Sons, 190
and Backhouse, 147 Warder, Parker and Co., 190, 201
Tatham, Richard (Liverpool), 163 Warrington, George (Liverpool), 171
Taylor, Jane (Philadelphia), 201 Waterhouse and Sill (Liverpool), 200
Taylor, Rebecca (Philadelphia), 118 Watson, Mary (Liverpool), 147, 171
Templeton, Oliver (Liverpool), 146, Weiss, Henry (Liverpool), 167
214, 216 Margaret, 167
Thomas, John (Philadelphia), 222 West, Elizabeth (Philadelphia), 221
Thompson, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 146 Wetherherd, Mary (Liverpool), 83
Thompson, Samuel (Liverpool), 163 Whartonby, Elizabeth (Philadelphia),
Trotter, Nathan (Philadelphia), 87 134
Trotter, Peter (Liverpool?), 99 White, Thomas (Philadelphia), 149
Tuohy (Liverpool), Whitehead, Lydia (Philadelphia), 136
David, 16, 28, 102, 137–140, 154, Wigmore, Hannah (Philadelphia),
168, 199, 221–222, 226–230, 240, 129
242 Wikoff, Peter (Philadelphia), 201
Anne and Mary, 4, 16, 23, 93, 137, Wikoff, Isaac (Philadelphia), 207
147, 200, 230, 241 Willis, Seth (Philadelphia), 17
Turner, Joseph (Philadelphia), 170 Willock, William (Liverpool), 173
Wilson, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 93
Usher, Abraham (Philadelphia), 196 Wilson, John (Liverpool), 212
Usher, Robert (Philadelphia), 203 Winstanley, William (Liverpool), 178
Usher, Mary (Liverpool), 169 Wolfe, Thomas (Liverpool), 85,
204–205
Valentine and Byrom, 60 Wood, Ellen (Liverpool), 208
Voss, Elizabeth (Liverpool), 205 Woolmer, John (Liverpool), 181
Worthington, Lawrence (Liverpool),
Wakefield, Thomas (Liverpool), 199 177
Walker, Simon (Philadelphia), 125 Wrigglesworth, Mr. (Liverpool and
Walker, Joseph (Liverpool), 206 Philadelphia), 125
THE ATLANTIC WORLD
ISSN 1570–0542
1. Postma, J. & V. Enthoven (eds.). Riches from Atlantic Commerce. Dutch

Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817. 2003.
ISBN 90 04 12562 0
2. Curto, J.C. Enslaving Spirits. The Portuguese-Brazilian Alcohol Trade at
Luanda and its Hinterland, c. 1550-1830. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13175 2
3. Jacobs, J. New Netherland. A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century
America. 2004. ISBN 90 04 12906 5
4. Goodfriend, J.D. (ed.). Revisiting New Netherland. Perspectives on Early
Dutch America. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14507 9
5. Macinnes, A.I. & A.H. Williamson (eds.). Shaping the Stuart World, 1603-
1714. The Atlantic Connection. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14711 X
6. Haggerty, S. The British-Atlantic Trading Community, 1760-1810. Men,
Women, and the Distribution of Goods. 2006. ISBN 90 04 15018 8

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THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC TRADING COMMUNITY

Wim Klooster (Clark University)

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal

printed in the netherlands

PROFILE AND STRUCTURE

Introduction Men and Women of the British-Atlantic

Chapter Four People, Trust and Information .................... 109

Appendix A The Trade Directories and the Database ...... 253

ACP Andrew Clow Papers

JUH Journal of Urban History

1.1 Map of Liverpool, 1796 .................................................. 30

3.1 Total Traders: 1766–1805 .............................................. 70

3.1 Share of the Trading Communities by Gender:

PROFILE AND STRUCTURE

MEN AND WOMEN OF THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC

The theme of the Atlantic as a category of historical analysis is now

This means that the history of trade and trading communities is

Men and Women of the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic Trading Community

The tradition of considering elite (male) merchants as the “dynamic

occupational group embracing both wealthy traders and many petty

Yet we know that women could occasionally work as merchants,

Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American Culture at Williamsburg

out by historians have little meaning. In the fervour of pre War of

It is ironic therefore that whilst economic interpretations of the

able to beneﬁt directly. However, eﬀorts were soon made to resolve

Part two considers the interaction of the trading community at

TRADERS AND THE BRITISH-ATLANTIC ECONOMY

merely for money?

In 1786, Andrew Clow, merchant of Philadelphia, was in Liverpool.

including setting up a banking house with William Roscoe, ironi-

of slops (second-hand clothing) to the merchant Thomas Leyland in

Charnock was similarly unsuccessful. A timber merchant also of

The Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic Economy

Of course Philadelphia and Liverpool did not exist in a vacuum.

There was obviously an imbalance in trade between the two

the revolution; by ﬁnding a common language of dissent, “Thirteen

same time encouraging commercialisation of agriculture of their hinter-

and itinerants such as Alexander Black. Traders of all levels were

Two Port Cities: Liverpool and Philadelphia

The amount of trade and the number of ships increased between

were involved in the coastal trade. They were important in sending

in 1795 in Grenada and St. Vincent also made many Liverpudlian

well as from the hinterland of Lancashire and Cheshire. There was

There were of course diﬀerences between the two ports. Philadelphia

diﬀer widely from being a mere shipping point to a fully developed

WHAT IS A TRADING COMMUNITY?

Trader, One Engaged in merchandize or commerce

In both 1755 and 1780, a trader was described as “One engaged

of people. The use of this deﬁnition, as a trader as one engaged in

to pay his debts or experiencing bankruptcy could aﬀect his credi-

Sometimes totally new terms came into being. Contemporary dic-

The Roles and Relationships of Traders

These high set-up costs meant that merchants often worked in

Certainly forecasting demand of a distantly-produced commodity such

The factor as agent was often indistinguishable from a merchant in

Despite particular reference to a London-based crisis, this attitude