CALCULATION AND CHARISMA: The Leadership Style of Ho Chi Minh

Author(s): CHESTER A. BAIN

Source: The Virginia Quarterly Review , SUMMER 1973, Vol. 49, No. 3 (SUMMER 1973),
pp. 346-356
Published by: University of Virginia

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26435425

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA
The Leadership Style of Ho Chi Minh
BY CHESTER A. BAIN

course of history and to influence it even after his

IF a death,
manthenisonetoof thebemostjudged by ofhisthis capacity to direct the
significant leaders
century must be the enigmatic Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh.
His unswerving dedication to the dream of an independent
and united Vietnam under Communist rule inspired the
North Vietnamese and many of those in the South to almost
unbelievable sacrifices. He was able to repel the French, to
pit the two giant nations of Russia and China against each
other in competition to assist him, and to impose humiliat
ing frustrations upon the United States.
While he lived, Ho Chi Minh called unceasingly on his
people to struggle for "reunification" even if "the war
may drag on for 5,10, or 20 years" and "Hanoi, Haiphong,
and a number of cities may be destroyed." Shortly before
his death, Ho prepared a "will" in which he commanded
his followers to fight on until "final victory" regardless
of "sacrifices in terms of property and human lives." Fol
lowing Ho's death, his name and his will dominated appeals
of the Communist leaders for their people to continue the
war, despite their horrendous losses.
What were the qualities which made this little man so
significant a force? By almost any standards, Ho Chi Minh
was a unique personality. His leadership style was quite
different from that of any other major Communist leader.
Foremost, Ho was an idealist who worked with singular
devotion to achieve his ideal. But he was an activist rather
than a theorist. He led by providing a personal, practical
example. He had a phenomenal organizational ability for
himself and for others. An effective persuader and a prolific

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA 347

though not original writer, he could identify wit

and communicate with them at their level, using
sense of humor to get ideas across by making peo
With his abundant optimism, courage, energy, a
confidence, he could inspire others to struggle on i
of adversity. He had a strong, positive self-image a
conviction of the righteousness of his mission, wh
sued with a zeal at once messianic and unpreten
ability to isolate himself emotionally enabled him
his ambitions single-mindedly, using any mea
sidered necessary. Steadfast in the pursuit of long
jectives, he could balance off opposing forces
compromises in immediate situations. Finally,
master teacher who patiently involved his studen
lowers and made careful plans and preparations to
clear-cut objectives, convinced that he was teachin
worth learning.
Few modern leaders, however, have cultivated a
mystery as assiduously as did Ho Chi Minh. In
with reporters he often parried questions about his p
such comments as: "My past has no importance.
future interests me." Or, "I am an old man and lik
on to my little secrets. Wait until I am dead
whether he had spent a long time in prison, he re
a smile, "In prison, time is always long." When
true name, he replied, "Revolutionaries have man
one in the morning, another in the afternoon,
another in the evening." Another time he stated,
two things I can never remember: all my aliases a
places I was in prison." Ho once defined the th
duties of a revolutionary as "first secrecy, second
secrecy, third absolute secrecy."
The solid facts on Ho's life are relatively limi
Hanoi government press published three biogra
there is little evidence that Ho co-operated in thei
tion. There are also publications by Ho's associat
Ho himself, including his own four-volume

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348 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

Works." These together with accounts by newsmen and

others who met or worked with Ho at various times provided
sources for Jean Lacouture's book-length biography pub
lished in English in 1968. But there are still periods in Ho's
life for which his activities appear only in sketchy outline.
While Ho enjoyed appearing to be a simple man, he was
in many respects the most cosmopolitan of the world's major
Communist leaders. Lenin's early experiences were mainly
European; Stalin's were Russian; and Mao's were Chinese.
Ho had received a good education in Vietnamese and Chi
nese studies in Vietnam before he traveled as a ship's steward
to ports in Asia, Africa, Europe, the United States, and
South America. During this period and during his residence
in England, France, and the Soviet Union (where he re
ceived formal revolutionary training in Moscow), he taught
himself to speak and read in at least seven languages as
well as in several Chinese and Indo-Chinese dialects. Before
his rise to power in Vietnam in 1945, Ho worked as an agent
of the Communist Third International in Europe, China,
and Southeast Asia as well as in Vietnam.
But Ho preferred to minimize his learning, travel, and
experience, and to pose to his people as a familiar village
elder, speaking to them in the language of the peasant. To
foreigners, his conduct and speech could be disarmingly
humble, yet those who interviewed him often realized later
that they had given more information than they had received.
Characteristically, Ho appeared to take himself lightly,
and he maneuvered any discussion from himself to others.
In all circumstances, he seemed to maintain a sense of humor
and an ability to see himself with a detached viewpoint. With
his sense of fun, he appeared to be enjoying himself under
the most trying conditions.
While seemingly light-hearted, Ho was a remarkably
organized man with iron will, strong inner drive, and rigid
self-discipline. He lived by tight schedules and in a kindly
way taught his followers to do the same. When studying a
new language, he learned exactly ten words each day—no

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA 349

more, no less. When he carried bricks to help buil

while working in Thailand, he carried the same num
each load, marking each load with a letter so that fiv
a word. When he had completed four words, he mo
other tasks. When translating, he allotted a fixed
of pages to each day and always finished before goi
Clearly, Ho was unlikely to take any importa
without careful planning. Within this context, ho
exuded the touches of human warmth that fed the "Uncle
Ho" legend. A code of conduct for his troops he issued in
unadorned folksy language, concluding it with a poem the
soldiers could memorize to retain the message. He also
sometimes taught history and other subjects in poetry form.
Some of his actions seemed genuinely spontaneous. In the
midst of one large meeting he disrupted the formal pro
ceedings to pull flowers from the stage decorations to present
to a woman in the front row and then he told the audience
about her. In a national assembly debate on a new constitu
tion, he suddenly arose and told the debaters that he con
sidered "Clause A incomprehensible, clause B inexplicable
and clause C a bit naïve." When this brought an outburst of
laughter, Ho concluded, ". . . in that case I have won my
point. One has only to achieve such an atmosphere and half
one's problems are solved."
Thus, while Ho was always organized, he was a self
proclaimed opponent of formality and protocol; the latter
he defined as the number two enemy after the United States.
Although Ho appeared informal and flexible, he had a rep
utation for strict punctuality. His former students report
that he never missed classes and was never late. He taught
informally, drawing out his students in a gentle Socratic
manner, yet he somehow finished on schedule. In his early
days as president, a joke was current in Hanoi of asking
when making an appointment, "Which time, Ho Chi Minh's
or Viet Minh's?" for Viet Minh time was flexible.
When working in a guerrilla camp in the mountains, Ho
was usually the first one up at 5:00 A.M. After awakening

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350 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

the others, he took a half hour of exercise. As president he

followed a similar schedule and was often first at the office.
Combined with this total organization was a monk-like
simplicity in food, attire, and lodgings. His needs were al
ways few. Ho knew good food, but he usually ate very
humble fare. During the resistance days, even when he was
sick he refused to eat dishes not available to all his followers.
As president, he never completely abandoned these austere
habits, and he often ate with his subordinates in the restau
rant for office workers. However, some reporters noted that
he occasionally dined on expensive delicacies. Certainly, he
was famed for chain-smoking American cigarettes, even
while his country was fighting Americans.
In attire, Ho was artfully plain, dressing simply, but
according to the situation. As a revolutionary, he dressed
as a Buddhist monk, journalist, businessman, or beggar,
according to the disguise he needed. In the mountains with
the guerrillas, he often wore the clothing of the villagers or
tribesmen of the area, but more commonly he wore khaki
pants or shorts and shirt. When working in China in 1925
27, he wore an unadorned Sun Yat-sen type of uniform
and he reverted to this as president. His rubber-tire-soled
sandals became almost a national trademark. When he
moved into Hanoi in 1945, his followers had to have a khaki
suit made for him at the last minute so that he would look
presentable. He seems to have continued to wear the same
suit year after year.
Whether in Paris, Moscow, Canton, Hanoi, or the jungle,
Ho's living quarters were Spartan. The man seemed im
mune to the need for creature comforts. During the war
years, for example, he could ignore the insects and snakes
that shared his cave or hut in bad weather.
In his writing, Ho was no pedantic scholar, but an activist
who freely adapted ideas and facts from others. His most
constant companion was his portable typewriter on which he
poured out letters and directives, articles, speeches, and
translations of Chinese and Russian Communist literature.

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA 351

He showed small concern for theory, and he co

little to Marxist-Leninist ideology. As early as 192
he was a participant at the French Socialist Co
Tours, Ho could exclaim, "I don't understand a thi
strategy, tactics, and all the big words you use." H
were always directed to action and results rathe
ideology. He reduced Communist theory to simple
practice which he taught in plain language, loaded
and examples. Frequently, he held up to gentl
cadres who gave formal lectures using big words o
concepts.
"Propaganda work should be concrete and realistic," Ho
told the cadre at one training course. "Propaganda and
training activities for each group should be flexible to fit the
situation. . . . Our work should be easy to follow, and our
talk the same. Therefore, propaganda work should be real
istic. We must not propagandize for the sake of propaganda
and train for the sake of training." Similar guidance may
be found in training manuals in Mao's China, but Ho pro
vided a living example of what he taught.
Propaganda, Ho believed, was the vital element in any
revolution. First, last, and always a revolutionary, Ho prob
ably never said or did anything without consideration for its
propaganda effect on both his immediate audience and the
world. He manipulated everyone about him, but he never
claimed to have exceptional ability or power. He never used
his mastery of propaganda or control of the DRV's propa
ganda machinery to deify himself after the model of the
personality cults of Stalin or Mao Tse-tung. Yet Ho's name
and his "uncle" image became powerful energizers for
achievement among both young and old in North Vietnam.
Ho's approach to speaking, writing, and leading was
always disarmingly artless, direct, and practical. Most of his
writings were quite pedestrian. He emerged as a practical
activist who concentrated on the possible—one step at a time.
He asked people to go only where he was willing to lead.
He seemed ready to leave the job of theorizing to his sub

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352 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

ordinates, and he let them take full credit for their accom
plishments. Like all good master teachers, Ho enjoyed
having his students feel that they were thinking for them
selves and acting on their own initiative.
Ho's relationship with his top lieutenants appears to have
been that of a kindly "elder brother" in the traditional Viet
namese family sense. His subordinates were sometimes at
odds with each other over strategy or tactics and occasionally
disagreed with Ho. But Ho's ego did not require the removal
of dissenting lieutenants. Consequently, the same group of
leaders that emerged with him from the jungles in 1945 has
remained at the top with only minor shuffles. Ho's strength
seems to have been in his ability to balance these factional
forces.
Ho's concern for unity was strong and was vividly stressed
in his "Last Will and Testament," published following his
death on September 3, 1969.

Unity is an extremely precious tradition of our party and

people. All comrades, from the Central Committee down
to the cell, must preserve the union and unity of mind in
the party as the apple of their eye.

As a long-time Comintern agent and as leader of a small

nation dependent upon both Soviet and Chinese aid, Ho was
deeply distressed by the growing disunity among Communist
nations. He expressed this concern in his "Will."

About the World Communist Movement, having dedicated

my whole life to the cause of revolution, the more I am
proud to see the growth of the international communist
and workers movement, the more I am grieved at the dis
sensions that are dividing the fraternal parties.

Ho sought to mediate between Peking and Moscow, much

as he mediated disputes within his own party. He also tried
to thread a safe path between the courses taken by the two
giants, while maintaining some independence of action for
Vietnam.

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA 353

While manipulating his subordinates, Ho mai

many top colleagues with high prestige, yet none
authority to succeed him. As long as Ho lived, no
lieutenants could aspire to anything like the pr
enjoyed and none has emerged subsequently.
"Uncle" or "grandfather" to his countrymen and
brother" to his lieutenants, Ho was a "loner" th
his life. He never displayed the ordinary man's
family or for close friends. He worked closely wi
men over the years, but he was not known to hav
close friendly attachments. Ho's party was his fam
zealous monk, Ho dedicated himself to his party's
He displayed little interest in female companio
may once have had a wife or concubine and a dau
Hong Kong and may also have had an "assign
during his stay in Moscow from 1934 to 1938.
ported relationships, however, remain unproven.
While Ho portrayed an image of benevolence,
fastly pursued his goals regardless of cost in suff
loss of life. He demanded discipline from his foll
countrymen, and could take harsh and ruthless
against those he viewed as enemies of his goals
Moscow-trained Comintern agent by 1925, Ho
rejected traditional Vietnamese faith and moralit
of the Western-derived dogma, "morality," strat
tactics of Communism. His new faith included
trust and hatred of bourgeois nationalists who re
Comintern path. He learned to mask his rôle of c
militant revolutionary with the image of kindly t
"uncle." Following Leninist morality, he was rea
deceit, betrayal, terror, or individual and mass ex
to achieve his ends while beclouding his own rôle a
ing the means by the goal of universal Communis
Ho's strategy for operating his Viet Minh Front
the National Liberation Front in the South was ba
Lenin's two-stage revolutionary concept. This r
ception of the people by clever propaganda, for f

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354 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

are interested in Communism as such. While Ho's doctrine

branded nationalism as a bourgeois evil, he freely used na
tionalist appeals to draw wide support for his fronts. To each
class—bourgeois, peasant, worker—he promised whatever
they most wanted, without reference to Communist goals.
When Ho emerged from the mountains to proclaim his
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, he repeatedly
denied that he was Communist or that his government would
introduce Communism, although he early was identified
positively as Nguyen Ai Quoc, Comintern agent and
founder of the Indochinese Communist Party. Later he
denied that DRV troops were in South Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, long after their presence had become ir
refutable common knowledge.
While he used nationalist appeals to win support, Ho
terrorized or eliminated non-Communist nationalists who
might oppose him. Early in his career, French police had
considered Ho incorruptible, but in 1925 he collaborated
with the Sûreté for money when it suited his purposes. His
sale to the French secret police in China of Phan Boi Chau,
leading Vietnamese nationalist and a friend of Ho's father,
seems well documented. Ho justified the action because it
secured money for revolutionary work and stirred up po
litical awareness in Vietnam and because Phan Boi Chau
was too old for effective leadership.
At this same period, Ho also betrayed to the French police
many Vietnamese nationalist youths whom he had failed
to subvert to Communism in his classes at the Kuomintang
Whampao Academy in Canton between 1925 and 1927. It
is well known too that the Viet Minh guerrilla teams trained
by Ho Chi Minh launched a widespread campaign of terror
and murder in 1945-46 to eliminate nationalist opponents.
Among those killed was Ta Thu Thau, Saigon Trotskyite
leader. When reminded of this murder during his visit to
Paris in 1946, Ho said with emotion, "He was a great
patriot and we mourn him." But then Ho added in a steady

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 CALCULATION AND CHARISMA 355

voice, "All those who do not follow the line I have

will be broken."
There is no evidence that Ho tried to mitigate th
executions or the much larger bloodshed of the p
after the Geneva agreements. The 1954-56 pur
North which Ho launched under the name of land reform
and population classification movements killed 100,000 or
more (some estimations go as high as 500,000). This purge
of potential opponents was carried out under Party Secre
tary-General Truong Chinh with the help of Chinese ad
visors under the slogan, "It is better to kill ten innocent
people than to let one enemy escape." When this purge got
out of control and thousands of Party members fell victim
and insurrections erupted, Ho took over direct party leader
ship from Truong Chinh and confessed to the country that
the Party had erred. But Truong Chinh retained his seat
on the Political Bureau and soon was restored to his former
prestige.
While Ho sought to project a Gandhi-like image of pre
ferring nonviolence, he organized Vietnam's first guerrilla
training camp and personally taught Vo Nguyen Giap who
later became the Viet Minh's chief general and DRV De
fense Minister. For this course, Ho prepared the first Viet
namese guerrilla warfare training manuals. Later, during
the long war with the French, Ho maintained daily contact
with Giap, who has given Ho credit for his military guid
ance. Ho was responsible for the Viet Minh emphasis on
combining political propaganda with armed operations
among the peasants and operating in villages behind the
enemy lines after the model of Mao Tse-tung. Ho's resolu
tion to maintain a protracted war until final victory, regard
less of cost, was crucial to the eventual success in 1954.
During the war against the French, Ho worked unceas
ingly to maintain the fighting morale of his troops, always
setting a high example of courage, austerity, and selfless
devotion to duty under hazardous and arduous conditions.

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356 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

He is specifically mentioned as presiding over the party

meetings that made decisions on major military operations,
including the battle of Dien Bien Phu.
It is unlikely that Ho would have failed to take similar
interest in his party's warfare in South Vietnam. Ho's
propaganda statements always emphasized his goal of
"peaceful reunification" with the South, but captured docu
ments show his interest in warmaking. The orders to the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops to violate the New
Year's truce in early 1968 were issued in Ho's name, and
such a decision could hardly have been made without his
sanction. When President Johnson stopped bombing in the
North with the understanding that the fighting would be
scaled down, Ho ordered his forces to step up the fighting,
"especially in the South," as a "sacred duty." The response
to this "sacred appeal" broadcast by the Viet Cong and
Hanoi radio stations indicated plainly that it was viewed as
a military order.
The attributes of effective leadership are mysterious and
hard to define. A course of action successful with one man
may fail completely with another of different personality.
Scholars have difficulty agreeing on what does or does not
constitute charisma. Certainly Ho, whether by nature or by
design, developed a unique leadership mystique that some
might call charisma. He combined mystery with apparent
openness, rustic simplicity with worldly sophistication,
Gandhi-like kindliness with massive purges, apparent spon
taneity with rigid self-disciplined organization, short-range
flexibility with meticulous adherence to long-range goals,
apparent shyness with clever manipulation of all around
him. Which was the true man and which the calculatingly
contrived is perhaps impossible to determine.
The propaganda image of the wise and kindly "uncle"
may have been Ho's preferred rôle. In it he was most effec
tive in pursuing his Communist goals. And it was with this
image that his successors in Hanoi inspired the North Viet
namese to continue their armed struggle against the South.

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