1.

Case Digest: Tolentino and Mojica vs. Comelec

G.R. No.   148334.   January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.
RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were
conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular
election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results.
Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the
remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.

Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the
13th elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not  Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the
validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine
Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue
raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required
under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself
provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.     The law charges the voters with knowledge
of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of
such special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to
Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election
Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other
accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec. 

Case 2.

Case Digest: GR No. 183591

2/4/2015
11 Comments
 
Province of North Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga,
petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon,
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping &
Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr. and respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-Sectoral
Movement for Peace and Development and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is
scheduled to be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05,
2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

  GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare
unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public
consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD
and to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the
MOA-AD and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the
MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being
unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

 
            The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and
the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities;
and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada
declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed
office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and
MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the
parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of MOA-
AD in its final form was born.

 MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-
AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO
Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of
compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and
governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro
homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the
land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to
ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite
not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the
signing of another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction
over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial
waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial
waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all
natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision on the
internal waters. 

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP.
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall
have participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations
for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall
be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before
the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

 On the Procedural Issue

 
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of
judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on
issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that
there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically
create legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was denied.  

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse
of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their
authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes,
the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not
necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective
does not negate ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato,
Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province
of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs
which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for
the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score
alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And
lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim
Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they stand to
be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been
suspended and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates
that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, that  it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public
interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review;
and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it
does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for
damages or injunctive relief.  

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render
the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to
the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.

 On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards —
the effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the
contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted
in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such,
respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by
which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and
amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he
cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s
order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.  

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that
would clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies.  The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral
domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed
to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since
they allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and
compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to the effect.

3rd issue:  With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be
all accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:

 On matters of the Constitution.

      Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in
crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international law,
association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a middle ground between integration and independence.
The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the international definition of
association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated
state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the
principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. 

 On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the
Constitution can grant to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition;
and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-
AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD
clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
 

 On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those
areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the
respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary
to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region." Clearly, assuming that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul
the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion
to the ARMM and not to the BJE.
 

 On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested
to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution
and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment
of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for
instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear
that only the President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former
provision must be amended consequently.  Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of
the law that promotes national unity and development. Because clearly, associative
arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of
unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

 On matters of domestic statutes.

 
o   Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro
people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.

o   Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a
clear departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference
of the MOA-AD.

 On matters of international law. 

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit
of man and the external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing
states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block in
the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination.  International law, as a general rule,
subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated
within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to
internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the
right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise
used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own
police and security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for
the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

 On the basis of the suspensive clause.

 
o   It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from
the President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the
country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from
this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel
to advance peace talks even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The
legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such
power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President
cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather implied from her powers
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.  

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not,
of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented
from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may
submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation
of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s
power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

o   The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is not
a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence,
the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which changes
would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the
limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee
that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD. 

 
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding
on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself,
already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a
document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to
guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their
solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.

 case 3.

ATO V. DAVID (G.R. NO. 159402; FEBRUARY 23, 2011)

CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS

FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being
used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion
by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to
pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included
the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of
P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in
the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until
fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10,
more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing
the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.

ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil.
Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court,
reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an
agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an
enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of
public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government
not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative
of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We
uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478,
Nov. 2, 1991. DENIED.
Case 4.

DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec. 17, Article XII
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by
the local governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David and
Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

Case 5.
 
 
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN                    G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of  mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the
offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d)  "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a  combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.  Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the  Revised  Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy  (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information
itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.