SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) PUNO, J.:
FACTS:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-
year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the petitioner experienced a sharp descent from
power started on October 4, 2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. Numerous investigations commenced both
from the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
issued a pastoral letter asking the petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral
authority to govern.

Political tensions continued to heat up as key economic advisers and members of the cabinet defected. On
November 13, in a tumultuous session, the house of representatives finally transmitted the articles of
impeachment to the senate signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House
of Representatives. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner.
Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.

The political tension rose during the impeachment trial particularly during the December hearings when
Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of the Jose Velarde
account. The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the fateful day of January 16, by a vote of
11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
The non-opening of the second envelope led to the resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the
spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now referred to as the EDSA dos. Petitioner’s
fall from power became more apparent starting January 19 when key officials from the armed forces, the PNP
and his other cabinet members withdrew support.

At about 12:00 noon of January 20 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace while
leaving a press statement indicating his strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
the proclamation of the respondent as President and that he is leaving the Palace as he does not wish to
“prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.”

ISSUES:
Whether or not the case at bar is a political question and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
decide

RULING:
No. The case at bar is not a political question.
Accordingly, it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, the Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.

Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power
II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.

EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented
a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
DELEGATION OF POWER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI,
1987 CONSTITUTION UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO
G.R. NO. 17122,
FEBRUARY 27, 1922
JOHNS, J.:

FACTS:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose," the material provisions of which are enumerated. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation (Executive Order No. 53) fixing the price at which rice should be sold. August 8, 1919, Ang Tang
Ho charged with the sale of rice at an excessive price and was accordingly convicted.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but
says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise."
That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with
the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and
effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to
say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and
as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under
this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price
at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a
proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legislature under Act No. 2868 has delegated its power to the Governor-General

HELD:
Yes. The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law. The proclamation undertakes to fix one
price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine
Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and
their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a
delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to
communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
"an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the
price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation
should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any
cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define
the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime
was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice,
and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which
is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53." We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act
No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
G. R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
Emilio Gonzales III (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Enforcement Offices) / MOLEO)
vs. Office of the President
Political Law; Law on Public Officers

Facts:
In August 23, 2010, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hijacked a bus packed with tourists and
killed most pf its passengers in a 10-hour hostage drama. The brother of the hijacker said that his brother was
upset over a dismissal from the police force, without due process, no hearing, and no complaint. In the afte
math of the hostage taking, IIRC / Incident Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearing and executive sessions. However
petitioner refused to participate insisting that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional
body. Nevertheless, IIRC found that the Petitioner committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross
violation of their own rules by allowing Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration to languish for more than 9
months in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motion for reconsiderations for
administrative disciplinary cases within 5 days from submission. Inaction is gross, considering there is no
opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperated resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner
was dismissed from office through Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770. Petitioner seeks to declare Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 “Ombudsman Act” which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the
Office of the Ombudsman unconstitutional.

Issues:
1) whether or not the Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is constitutional
2) whether or not the administrative action of removal taken against Gonzales is valid

Held:
Constitutional. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is
implied from his poeer to appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or
Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is alrdy implied from the
President’s constitutional authority to appoint the afpresaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Invalid. The motion for reconsideration which remained prolonged for nine months cannot be simply taken as
evidence of petitioner’s undue interest in the case considering the lack of any evidence of personal grudge,
social ties, or business affiliation with any parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did.
The Office of the President’s pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside as the findings
of neglect of duty or misconduct in the office do not amount to betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President
while he may be vested the authority, he cannot order the removal of the petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman,
there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting a betrayal of public trust.
Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al
G.R. No. L-61388 –121 SCRA 472

FACTS:

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong,
NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was authorized by a
search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant
of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions
together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.

HELD: Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in
the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  was once again held as discretionary in the president. The
SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the
president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to
be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government
efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized
the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to
bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”
Teodosio Lansang, et al vs Brig-Gen Eduardo Garcia
G.R. No. L-33964 – 42 SCRA 448

FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of eight
people, the president Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Teodosio Lansang et al were invited by Brigadier General Eduardo Garcia of the Philippine Constabulary at
Camp Crame for interrogation and investigation. After the interrogation, Lansang et al were arrested without
warrant. Garcia invoked Proclamation No. 889. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the
writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of the writ is constitutional.

HELD: The long-standing doctrine held in Barcelon  and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case
where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the president. To be recalled, the case
of Barcelon and Montenegro provide that the judiciary may not inquire upon the factual basis of the
President’s suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the same is a political question – the
president, with all the intel he has, is in a better position to determine whether or not there exists a ground
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Thus, this is one instant when the Supreme Court becomes a trier of facts. Accordingly, hearings were
conducted to receive evidence on the question whether or not Proclamation No. 889 was issued with factual
basis, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the Supreme Court and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow
the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26, 1949)
TUASON, J.:
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Concerned in case L-3055 is Executive Order
No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. On the other hand, case No. L-3054 relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. Affected in case
No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection
with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. Petitioners rest
their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased
to have any force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect.

HELD: Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides: “In time of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy”.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period."
"Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond
question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full
knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal
the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be
unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain.

Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle the legislative
intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The
silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the
repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the
National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no
idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a
provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of
the delegation.

There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the
law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and
regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature. It is our considered opinion,
and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session
on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.
In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of
the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article
VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by
the limitations imposed by the organic law. Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
(G.R. NO. L-6266 FEBRUARY 2, 1953)
PARAS, C.J.

FACTS:
Petitioners herein seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the
first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside
the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. Such Executive Orders were issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known as the Emergency Powers Act. Petitioners’ primary contention rests
on the fact that the National Assembly intended such powers to exist only for a limited period.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are valid.

HELD: No. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national
policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which
involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in section 1." Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to
be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the
Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed
by the Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all
Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the principal
authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in palpable
repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period,
necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the
Congress or the President. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted
only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when
Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending
of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session Moreover, Section 26 of Article VI of
the 1935 constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by the
Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.

The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as
distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes
such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some
provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were and could not have been
contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it
cannot let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or
ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto
withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take
judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating
funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as
to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding
power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have powers with
regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.

Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in
force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the
Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary
to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to
hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and
legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would
necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.

Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency
powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we
have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy.
In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of
separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of
the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements
between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive departments.

Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of
democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for
obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national
emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself
cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom
and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution. Wherefore,
Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the respondents are ordered to
desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein.
DELEGATION OF POWERS; PROBATION
PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. NO. L-45685 NOVEMBER 16, 1937)
LAUREL, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners, the People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the
defendants, in a criminal case. Respondent Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the
trial court who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid
criminal case. The trial court rendered judgment, convicting Unjieng. Upon appeal, the court modified the
sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven
years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by Unjieng before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Unjieng states in his petition, inter
alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he
would observe good conduct in the future. However, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the
granting of probation to the Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition, elaborating on the
unconstitutionality of Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD: Yes. Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature
by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines).

The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by
delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. "One of the settled maxims in
constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the
authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative
has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust."

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that
local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the
municipalities exercising local self-government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation
is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to
prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the
superior in cases of necessity."

Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of
article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize
the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff
rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the
Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this
decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever
doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.

The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned. The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.

In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held
an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to
issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime.
The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to
be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative
boards. For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces.

They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of
legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule
which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative
bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale
revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the
statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is
sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking.

As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of
their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.

What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a
"roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the
Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation
Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the
Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary
of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It should be observed that in the
case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by
executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we
were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457,
MARCH 20, 1987

FACTS:

Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of the carabaos or carabao meat across the provincial
boundaries without government clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of
those animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright.
The petitioner claimed that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial cout as guaranteed by due process. The petitioner challenges the
constitutionality of the said order and the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power in relation to the disposal of the
confiscated properties

HELD: No. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall
“be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal ad the
Director of the Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.”

The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse and even corruption, One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named
can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion.
BOCEA vs. Teves
G.R. No. 181704
December 6, 2011
661 SCRA 589

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took
effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at
least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the
rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for
removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for
performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A.
No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to
impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is
without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular
group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group
of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. 

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment
without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or
employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the
constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected. 
CITIZENSHIP
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as
a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who
was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.

**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
POE – LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Grace Poe, in her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, declared that she is a natural- born citizen
of the Philippines and that her residence up to the day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as new born infant in Iloilo, and was legally
adopted by celebrities Ronald Allan Kelly Poe a.k.a. FPJ, and Jesus Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces in 1974.
She then immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at
the U.S., thereby Grace Poe became a NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN in 2001.

On 2004, however, she returned to the Philippines due to FPJ’s deteriorating medical condition, who then
died in February 2005. She decided to quit her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went
home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On 7 July 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship. On JULY 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition declaring
that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.

She was registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. She since then stopped using her American passport.
Petition were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground that she cannot be
considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her biological parents cannot
be proved Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she did not comply
the residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

ISSUE:
1. WON Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. YES
2. WON Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement. YES

RULING:

Grace Poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
requirement that only natural-born Filipino may run for Presidency. The Court ruled that there is a high
probability that her parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features (i.e. height, flat nasal bridge,
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face) which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact
that she was found as an infant in Iloilo, a municipal wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are
Filipinos. Said probability are admissible under Rule 128, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Evidence.

On the issue of FOUNDLING, the SC held that FOUNDLING as a class, natural-born citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, and such issue is moot because there is no dispute that
she is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. Foundlings are likewise citizens
under international law.

Pursuant to Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention “A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.. “(Grace Poe was found in ILOILO) As to
the matter on RESIDENCY, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency due to the fact she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain PERMANENTLY) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTEDI
(intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting from May 24, 2005,
upon returning the to the Philippines, she presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent
to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino
Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was GRANTED.
MAQUILING v COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649 : July 2, 2013

FACTS: This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has already
ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm
the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated
April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however,
that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the
question before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the
effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009
and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit
of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be presented as public documentsof a
foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."Mere reference to a foreign law in
a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a
person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls
for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy,
he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of
this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local
elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective public office, to
renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Codewhich disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local
position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign
passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the
Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the
person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to
the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship
when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn
duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".On the contrary, this
Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is
not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence
been properly appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at
least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc,
which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he
only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels
on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using
his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding
these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also
presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon
departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by the
facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel
records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23
March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the U.S.
passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S.
passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce
their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.

MERCADO v MANZANO
G.R. No.
135083
May 26, 1999
G.R. No.
135083
May 26, 1999
G.R. No.
135083
May 26, 1999
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

FACTS:
The petitioner, Eduardo Barrios Manzano, was born in the United States, San Francisco, California on
September 14, 1955 to a Filipino father and mother. He was granted a dual citizenship upon his birth due to
jus solis of US laws and jus sanguinis of the Philippine laws. By the age of six years old, he arrived in the
Philippines using an American passport and was later registered as an alien and upon reaching the age of
majority, he registered as a voter and exercised his right to vote three times clearly and officially
renounciating his American citizenship applicable to both laws. Consequently, he became a winning
candidate for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections however, prior to its
announcement, respondent filed a petition of disqualification against Manzano.

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo Barrios Manzano is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected while withholding the
fact that he may have a dual citizenship with the Philippines and the United States of America.

RULING: Eduardo Barrios Manzano is eligible for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998, elections.

HELD: Manzano only have Filipino as his citizenship as noting by the indisputable fact that he registered as a
voter upon reaching the age of majority and exercised his right to suffrage in 1992, 1995 and 1998 thereby
renunciating his US Citizenship under the American Law. Likewise, under the Philippine Law, he no longer has
U.S. Citizenship.