Calme vs.

CA
G.R. No. 116688 (August 30, 1996)
Kapunan, J.
Rule 110, Section 15 (c)
Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law.
“Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such
voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.”
This is the applicable provision in the case at bar.
Petition for review is denied.

FACTS:
• Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other persons were
accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by throwing him overboard
the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned
and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was
sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City.

• Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the

offense charged, he asserts that, although the alleged crime
took place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid
down in par. (a) of Sec. 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court is the applicable provision in determining the proper
venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) thereof since the
exact location where the alleged crime occurred was known.

• Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor

because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's
captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off
Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes)
received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard."

ISSUE: Whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner.

HELD: Yes. The present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in
the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . . ."

Sec. 15(c) of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that:

Bau. Page 1
 AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, JANUARY 11, 2018.

TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union
produced two children: CCC and DDD. In May of 2007, BBB started working in
Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of
2008.
AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. There
were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC,
and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started
having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly
has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and
BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their
kids.
The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA
mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. Accordingly, an
Information was filed against BBB for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused filed on behalf of BBB an Omnibus Motion
to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest.
The RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby
dismissed the case. The RTC ruled that since BBB’s acts complained of had occurred
in Singapore, said Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having
transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may be filed
within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad.

HELD:
YES.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly
pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the
psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an
indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or
emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates
that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; x x x Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.
We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental
and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution
under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
  

Hernan v Sandiganbayan digest

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 TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR in Baguio City. By

virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer.

As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from customers and clients for
the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections
she received were deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.

On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by Hernan was

conducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and
November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively,
did not bear a stamp receipt by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then
informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but
not for the P11,300.00.

Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds with the amount of
P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty. Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her
conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside
its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s decision but
modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying
petitioner’s MR became final and executory.

On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of
Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and
directed the execution of the judgment of conviction.

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of
Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on
January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further reception of evidence.
 HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES.

The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime of malversation of
public funds.

The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them. This article establishes a
presumption that when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses.

As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s
defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and
handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea
as to where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.

For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another, when
questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same
readily available, she also could not satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the
crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that she did not have them in her
possession when demand therefor was made, and that she could not satisfactorily
explain her failure to do so. Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody
else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held
liable for malversation.

SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify
the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the
accused.

The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of the first requisite
that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already
cripples the Motion to Reopen the Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the
August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact, was already
recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013.

Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of Rules of
Court)

1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;

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IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951,
IN RELATION TO HERNAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2018)

Petitioners: ROLANDO ELBANBUENA Y MARFIL

Respondents: -

Ponente: Jardeleza (En Banc)

Topic: Criminal Law

SUMMARY: The SC applied R.A. 10951 retroactively, being favorable to the accused, and provided
guidelines for its application.

DOCTRINE: I. Scope.

These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking (1) the modification, based on
the amendments introduced by RA No. 10951, of penalties imposed by final judgments; and, (2) the
immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account of full service of the penalty/penalties, as
modified.

II. Who may file.

The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative, may file
the petition.

III. Where to file.

The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the
locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case shall be raffled and referred to the branch
to which it is assigned within three (3) days from the filing of the petition.

IV. Pleadings.

(A) Pleadings allowed. - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition and the comment
from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other dilatory motions for postponement, shall be
allowed. The petition must contain a certified true copy of the Decision sought to be modified and,
where applicable, the mittimus and/or a certification from the Bureau of Corrections as to the length of
the sentence already served by petitioner-convict.

(B) Verification.- The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-convict himself.

V. Comment by the OSG.

Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.

VI. Effect of failure to file comment.

Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu proprio, or
upon motion of the petitioner-convict, shall render judgment as may be warranted.

VII. Judgment of the court.

To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later than ten
(10) calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The judgment shall set forth the
following:
 a. The penalty/penalties imposable in accordance with RA No. 10951;

b. Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in confinement (and whether
time allowance for good conduct should be allowed); and

c. Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to complete service of

his sentence/s, as modified in accordance with RA No. 10951.

The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the filing before the
Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court where there is showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.

The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory capacity insofar as
they are not inconsistent therewith

FACTS: Elbanbuena worked as a Disbursing Officer of Alingilan National High School in Alingilan, Bacolod. He
was charged with four counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of a public document under
Articles 217 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). After trial, Elbanbuena was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in the Information. Elbanbuena was sentenced:

1) To suffer imprisonment in Criminal Cases Nos. 95- 17264, 95-17265, 95-17266, from prision mayor
maximum or ten (10) years one (1) day to twelve (12) years to reclusion temporal maximum or seventeen (17) years
four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; in three (3) counts;

2) To suffer imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 95- 17263 of prision mayor medium or eight years one (1)
day to ten (10) years to reclusion temporal minimum or twelve (12) years one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months

Since Elbanbuena did not appeal the ruling, it became final and executory on August 10, 2000. On
January 9, 2003, Elbanbuena started serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.

On August 29, 2017, RA No. 10951 was promulgated. It amended Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, and reduced the penalties for certain crimes. Pertinently, Section 40 of RA No. 10951
provides:

Sec. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1060, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – xxx

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved
in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000).

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(P1,200,000).

On December 5, 2017, this Court issued its ruling in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan. There, the Court held:

The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or
 law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the
Court may sit en banc and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of
the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en banc. To the Court,
the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 x x x which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable
to the crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance. x x x

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt
but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

Hence, this petition which seeks, among others, the modification, in conformity with RA No. 10951, of the
Decision dated July 5, 2000 rendered by Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City and, pursuant
thereto, Elbanbuena's immediate release from confinement.

ISSUES:

 WoN Elbanbuena’s petition should be granted

o YES. As held by this Court in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, the passage of RA No. 10951 is an
exceptional circumstance which warrants not only the re-opening of an already terminated case,
but also the recall of an Entry of Judgment for purposes of modifying the penalty to be served.
Thus, in Hernan, this Court re-opened the case for the sole purpose of re-computing the proper
sentence to be imposed in accordance with RA No. 10951. In contrast, Elbanbuena here seeks
not only a modification of his sentence in accordance with RA No. 10951; he also seeks
immediate release from confinement on account of his alleged full service of the re-computed
sentence. The determination of whether he is entitled to immediate release, however, would
necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time Elbanbuena has actually
been in confinement and whether time allowance for good conduct should be allowed. Such an
exercise would, at the first instance, be better undertaken by a trial court, which is relatively more
equipped to make findings of both fact and law.
o However, and especially in view of the anticipated influx of similar petitions, the Court, in the
interest of justice and efficiency, resolves to issue the following guidelines (see doctrine)

NOTES: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 5, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-17263, 95-
17264, 95-17265, and 95-17266 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City for the
determination of: (1) the proper penalty/penalties in accordance with RA No. 10951; and (2) whether petitioner
ROLANDO ELBANBUENA y MARFIL is entitled to immediate release on account of full service of his
sentences, as modified.
G.R. No. 240347

IN RE: CORRECTION/ ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO.

10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

SAMUEL SAGANIB y LUTONG, Petitioner

RESOLUTION

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Release,1 praying for the immediate release of Samuel Saganib y Lutong
(petitioner) pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 109512 and this Court's ruling
in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan.3

The Facts

Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code for pretending to be a lawyer, a certain "Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling" that will help
private complainants to facilitate the release of their friend from jail for ₱l00,000.00 as attorneys
fees. Despite receipt of the said amount, however, the prisoner was never released and worse, he
died injail.4 The dispositive portion of the Decision5 dated January 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R, reads:

WHEREFORE, [petitioner] is hereby FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, for the
crime of Estafa, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from FIVE (5)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum, at the
National Bilibid Prisons (NBP), Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, and to indemnify private complainant
Ruben Iglesias the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as Actual Damages,
with legal interest from January 2007, until the amount is fully paid; Moral Damages of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) each to private complainants Nenita Catabay, and Ruben Iglesias;
and Exemplary Damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) each to the said private
complainants, plus costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.6

The RTC Decision became final and executory on February 12, 2012 per the said court's Entry of
Judgment7 dated February 20, 2012.

Per his Prison Record,8 petitioner already has two (2) years, seven (7) months, and six (6) days time
served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018.

Meanwhile, R.A. No. 10951 was promulgated on August 29, 2017, which provides under Article 315,
paragraph 3 that estafa, involving an amount of over ₱40,000.00 but not exceeding ₱l,200,000.00
shall be punishable by arresto mayor in the maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period.

Applying, thus, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and invoking our ruling in Hernan, allowing for the
re-opening of an already terminated case and the recall of an Entry of Judgment for purposes of
modifying/reducing the penalty to be served, petitioner comes before this Court averring that he is
entitled to have his sentence modified in accordance with R.A. No. 10951 and be released
immediately from confinement in view of the aforesaid circumstances.

The Issue

Is petitioner entitled to the relief prayed for?

Ruling of the Court

While the petitioner correctly invoked R.A. No. 10951 for the modification of his sentence, in the
recent case of In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty pursuant to R.A. No. 10951 in Relation to
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan - Rolando Elbanbuena y Marfil,9 this Court, however, ruled that the
determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release would necessarily involve
ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct time
allowance should actually be allowed, and thus should be better undertaken by the trial court, which
is relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact and law. In the said case, the Court also
had the occasion to issue Guidelines considering the anticipated influx of similar petitions, in the
interest of justice and efficiency, which states:

I. Scope.

These guidelines shall govern the procedure for actions seeking (1) the modification, based on the
amendments introduced by R[.]A[.] No. 10951, of penalties imposed by final judgments; and, (2) the
immediate release of the petitioner-convict on account of full service of the penalty/penalties, as
modified.

II Who may file.

The Public Attorney's Office, the concerned inmate, or his/her counsel/representative, may file the
petition.

III Where to file.

The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the
locality where the petitioner-convict is confined. The case shall be raffled and referred to the branch
1awp++i1

to which it is assigned within three (3) days from the filing of the petition.

IV Pleadings.

(A) Pleadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the petition and the
comment from the OSG. No motions for extension of time, or other dilatory motions for
postponement shall be allowed. The petition must contain a certified true copy of the
Decision sought to be modified and, where applicable, the mittimus and/or a certification
from the Bureau of Corrections as to the length of the sentence already served by petitioner-
convict.

(B) Verification. - The petition must be in writing and verified by the petitioner-convict himself.

V. Comment by the OSG.

Within ten (10) days from notice, the OSG shall file its comment to the petition.
VI. Effect of failure to file comment.

Should the OSG fail to file the comment within the period provided, the court, motu propio, or upon
motion of the petitioner-convict, shall render judgment as may be warranted.

VII. Judgment of the court.

To avoid any prolonged imprisonment, the court shall promulgate judgment no later than ten (10)
calendar days after the lapse of the period to file comment. The judgment shall set forth

a. The penalty/penalties imposable m accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951;

b. Where proper, the length of time the petitioner-convict has been in confinement (and whether time
allowance for good conduct should be allowed); and

c. Whether the petitioner-convict is entitled to immediate release due to complete service of his
sentence/s, as modified in accordance with R[.]A[.] No. 10951.

The judgment of the court shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to the filing before the
Supreme Court of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court where there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

VIII. Applicability of the regular rules.

The Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided in a suppletory capacity insofar
as they are not inconsistent therewith.10

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 28, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 27487-R is hereby REMANDED to the
said court for the determination of: (1) the proper penalty in accordance with Republic Act No.
10951; and (2).whether petitioner Samuel Saganib y Lutong is entitled to immediate release on
account of full service of his sentence, as modified.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
the First and Second Level Courts, as well as to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's
Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
Brodeth v. People, G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017

FACTS:
On August 16, 2001, there were two charges against the petitioners
involving dishonored checks for reason “Drawn against insufficient funds.” On
August 31 and September 5 in 1999, the accused drew and issued two (2) checks
from Metrobank to Vill Integrated Transport Corporation (VITC), represented by
Abraham Villegas, in the amount of P140,000.00 and P123,600.00 respectively.
Despite receipt of notice of such dishonors, said accused failed to pay VITC the
amount of the check or make arrangements for full payment of the same within
five banking days after receiving said notice.
The petitioners argued they had arranged with a certain Cristina Villegas that
the checks will be paid in cash but they have no receipts to prove their claims. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the offense charged on July 2, 2008, and on the 29 th, the petitioners
timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings. Petitioner’s appeal was however denied by the
appellate court. It emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charges is the
issuance of a bouncing check regardless of the purpose why it was issued; and that
the fact that the checks were drawn by a corporation cannot exculpate petitions
from the charge against them. Further, the CA maintained that the MeTC Manila
had jurisdiction to try the case because the complaint affidavit categorically stated
that the checks were issued in Manila.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila had jurisdiction over
the case
HELD:
NO. Petitioners argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction because Villegas'
allegation that the subject checks were issued in Manila was unsubstantiated. They
explain that the lower courts should not have relied on this allegation for being
hearsay considering that Villegas had no firsthand knowledge about the transaction
between Vill Integrated and L&S Resources.
The petitioners are correct. A careful review of the rulings of the lower
courts would show that the only piece of evidence they considered connecting the
alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is
the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In this affidavit, the allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila was mentioned only once even though the
circumstances behind the issuance of the checks were referred to a couple of times.
Moreover, the phrase "in Manila" only appeared in the ninth paragraph of Villegas'
affidavit where the elements of the offense were already being summarized.
Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject
checks were really issued. Villegas could not have testified or alleged in his
affidavit that the checks were issued in Manila because he was not privy to the
contractual negotiations with L&S Resources nor was he present when petitioners
issued the checks. Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were
issued as a guarantee for the payments. As admitted by Vill Integrated's liason
officer, their company collects payments from its clients in their respective offices.
Considering that L&S Resources' principal place of business is in Makati City, it
would be out of the ordinary course of business operations for petitioners to go all
the way to Manila just to issue the checks.
Morillo v. People29 is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22
should be filed and tried: “It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases
are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of
the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction
to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the
same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed.”
From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed and tried either at the place where the check was issued,
drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the present case, however, evidence on record is
missing at any of these material places. Again, the only factual link to the
territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the allegation that the subject checks were
issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of
the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged.
Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to
jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and
could not be made equivalent to proof. All said, since the prosecution failed to
prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was any evidence shown
that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has no
factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and dismissed the instant
cases.
 January 23, 2019
G.R. No. 233174
RUEL FRANCIS M. CABRAL, Petitioner,
vs.
CHRIS S. BRACAMONTE, Respondent.

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
On 2009, respondent Bracamonte and petitioner Cabral executed an MOA for the purchase of
shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver International
Corporation (AV/VER). Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a postdated
check to Cabral in the amount of (more than 12 Million pesos) ₱ 12,677,950.15. However, the drawee
bank in Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. When Bracamonte failed to
settle the obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against respondent in Parañaque City.
The RTC of Parañaque City issued an Information.

Bracamonte moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in
Parañaque City, because the postdated ·check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Thus,
the prosecution failed to show how the supposed elements of the crime charged were committed in
Parañaque City.

Cabral maintained that the averments in the complaint and Information are controlling to determine
jurisdiction. Since the negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a warehouse in Parañaque City
where Cabral was convinced to sell his shares in the two corporations, then the R TC of Parañaque
City properly had jurisdiction.

Ruling of RTC: The RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it has jurisdiction over the case
because Bracamonte employed fraudulent acts against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the
issuance of the postdated check. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, jurisdiction of said courts is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.

Ruling of CA. The CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against Bracamonte.
Applying the elements of estafa, it is clear that deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless
check was issued and delivered, while damage was inflicted at the same place where the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank. Thus, jurisdiction solely lies in Makati City where all the elements of
the crime occurred. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Cabral filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred when it held that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction to try
the criminal case against Bracamonte as venue was improperly laid thus dismissing the information.

RULING: The Petition is denied.

It has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the

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case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code. In this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made
punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check.

It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his complaint affidavit, that the
crime of estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there that he was convinced to sell
the subject shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate the assertion. Equally guilty of the
same failure to substantiate is the trial court which relied merely on Cabral's complaint affidavit in
connecting the alleged offense within its territorial jurisdiction.

Case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made
punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. Thus, while Cabral is not
wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may be prosecuted
at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of evidence on
record point only to one place: Makati City.

Time and again, the Court has ruled that "in criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the
elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a
mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally
liable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 27, 2017 and Resolution
dated July 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146746 are AFFIRMED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 11-
0664 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

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1. ISIP VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before
Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City. Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was
indicted before the same court for seven counts of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. The
spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts
of Estafa. the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Joses
ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to
substantially prove its allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila,
particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of
Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the money
with which the complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted the
defenses claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The Court of
Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the venue was properly laid and
that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the
transactions transpired at complainants ancestral home in Cavite City, and
that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within its territorial
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense imputed to petitioner
and for which he was convicted.

RULING:

Yes. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is
a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court
has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person

0 0
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[16]

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced
that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant
had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-
84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved
leave of absence[17] from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown
that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for
it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The
age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.[18]

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent

evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not
persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen there.
Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he
can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in
the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to
have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number
of times they received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact
that the checks issued by petitioners late wife in all the transactions with
complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati
likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered
into in Cavite City.

0 0
 CASANAS v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 223833 December 11, 2017

Criminal Procedure: Court jurisdiction may be raised as an issue at any time in the proceedings;
A court has no jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed outside its limited territorial jurisdiction

FACTS:

1. In this petition for review on certiorari, is assailing both the Decision dated July 28, 2015 and the Resolution
dated January 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Decision dated May 15, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 269 (RTC-Valenzuela) finding petitioner Joshua Casanas y
Cabantac, a.k.a. Joshua Geronimo y Lopez (Casanas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972".

2. An Information was filed before the RTC-Valenzuela charging Casanas of the crime of Carnapping, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about August 12, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away with him one (1) Racal motorcycle with plate
number 7539IJ without the consent of its owner CHRISTOPHER CALDERON y DORIGON, to the
damage and prejudice of the said complainant.

3. The RTC-Valenzuela found Casanas guilty beyond reasonable, holding that the prosecution had
established all the elements of the crime charged, considering that:

(a) Calderon allowed petitioner to drive the subject motorcycle, which was then attached to a sidecar;
(b) Casanas did not return the subject motorcycle within the agreed period; and
(c) Casanas continued to use the same for his personal use, thereby exhibiting his intent to gain.

In this regard, the RTC-Valenzuela ruled that while Casanas's possession of the subject motorcycle was
lawful in the beginning, such possession became unlawful when he failed to return the same to Calderon in
accordance with their agreement.

4. The CA affirmed the RTC-Valenzuela ruling in toto. Aside from upholding the RTC-Valenzuela's findings,
the CA likewise pointed out that initially, Casanas borrowed a tricycle from Calderon; but when he was
apprehended, only the subject motorcycle without the sidecar was recovered from him. The CA ruled that
such removal of the sidecar from the subject motorcycle bolsters the conclusion that Casanas indeed
intended to appropriate for himself the subject motorcycle.

5. Casanas moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE(s):

(a) W/N the RTC of Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case; and [NO]
(b) W/N the CA correctly upheld Casanas' conviction for the crime of Carnapping [NO]

HOLDING/RATIO:

1. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court [RTC-Valenzuela] cannot exercise jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory [Marilao, Bulacan]. As such, when
it becomes apparent that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Casanas primarily argues that the RTC-Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the case, as the alleged
carnapping happened in Marilao, Bulacan, and not in Valenzuela City, where he was arrested, charged, and
tried.

2. Citing Heirs of Fernando v. De Belen, the Court averred that "the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned
at any stage of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may
dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any
of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So that, whenever
it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable,
as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside."

The RTC-Valenzuela ruling convicting Casanas of the crime charged, as well as the CA ruling upholding the
same, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that "where there is want of jurisdiction over a
subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and
under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law
and, hence, it can never become executory.

It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res
judicata.

3. The SC grants the petition of Casanas, and the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
SET ASIDE. The Criminal Case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to its re-filing in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the case.
NAVAJA v. DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 182926

June 22, 2015

FACTS:

Private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, filed a complaint
against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she
falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00,
instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for
it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.

Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the ground that none of the essential
elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue.

MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for arraignment.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration, but the MCTC denied it.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the MCTC.

The RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.9The
contention of the petitioner is untenable. The improper venue was already resolved squarely by the
Regional State Prosecutor when he held that “there are sufficient evidences indicating that the
falsification took place in Jagna”.

Reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Lavaro who narrated that after she issued
the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said
receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement “describes an apparent
scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. Ms. Lavaro also corroborated the affidavit of
another witness, which states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna when the questioned receipt was issued.

Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.

CA dismissed Navaja's appeal.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol has jurisdiction over the criminal case

RULING

The petition lacks merit. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (a)
Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. Also,
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states: Place of
commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

The Court said that both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is
actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or
not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was
intended.17chanrobleslaw

The Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.
 002 VIRGINIA DIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND
(CONSOLACION)
08 JUNE 2016 | Leonen, J. | The Internet and Cybercrime-Relevant Cases
PETITIONER: VIRGINIA DIO
RESPONDENTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TIMOTHY DESMOND
SUMMARY:
Desmond filed a libel complaint against Dio arising from purported libelous
statement contained in an e-mail and sent by Virginia Dio to officials of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority.
Dio raised the defense that the Informations are defective for failure to allege
"where the libelous article was printed and first published" or "where the offended
party actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense" and as such
cannot be cured by mere amendment even before arraignment.
The Supreme Court denied Dio’s petition. The Court reasoned that it is not
apparent on the face of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the
authority to file them. The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity
to amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan
after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the
case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file
the information.
Briefly the Supreme Court declined to preempt the decision on the issue of the
“public” character of the emails which is best left for now to the decision of trial
court stating that “The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in
abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence; otherwise, this
Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined,
not real.”
DOCTRINE:
Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named in the
Informations—who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority where
Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found—is sufficiently "public," as required by
Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law,
is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial. Passionate and
emphatic grievance, channeled through proper public authorities, partakes of a
degree of protected freedom of expression. Certainly, if we remain faithful to the
dictum that public office is a public trust some leeway should be given to the public
to express disgust.
FACTS:
1. This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Regional Trial Court Order that quashed the Informations charging petitioner
Virginia Dio (Dio) with libel because these Informations failed to allege
publication.
2. On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. Two
(2) separate Informations. The 1st Information reads:
That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with malicious intent to
besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman
and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the
offended party and to other persons namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John
Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which read as follows:
'NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD
SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP YOUR NONSENSE THREAT
BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE
PAY YOUR EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN (sic)
SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED
IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING
EXCEPT A PERSON WHO IS TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE
PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU
ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE WORK
(sic). AT THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL
YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from US$500,000.00 to
US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more shares that you
should. Please look into this deeply.
IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL
PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE SHOULD
STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF
ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.'
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act
causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person
of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
3. The 2nd Information states:
That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with malicious intent to
besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman
and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the [sic]
Atty. Winston Ginez and Fatima Paglicawan, to the offended party, Timothy
Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon. Felicito Payumo, SBMA
Chariman [sic], Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule which read as
follows:
'Dear Winston and Fatima:
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS OF THIS DATE THE COMPANY HAD
INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A
 BALANCE SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR ACCOUNTANT JULIET
REFLECT AND (sic) ASSETS OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS OVERVALUED AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM
DESMOND AND FAMILY HAD ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE
THAN 70% OF THE RECORDED PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF
THE ASSETS CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN
THE USA, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED
THE COMPANY FROM DATE OF INCORPORATION TO PRESENT FOR
AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL
GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic] ETC.
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act
causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt against the person
of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
4. Dio filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege
publication and lack of jurisdiction which was denied by the trial court.
5. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the Informations did not
substantially constitute the offense charged. It found that the Informations did
not contain any allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond
had been accessed. However, it found that the trial court erred in quashing
the Informations without giving the prosecution a chance to amend them
pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
6. Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases." Considering that
libel is limited as to the venue of the case, failure to allege "where the libelous
article was printed and first published" or "where the offended party actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense" is a jurisdictional defect.
She argues that jurisdictional defects in an Information are not curable by
amendment, even before arraignment.
7. Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong,
Bataan had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
offenses charged. The complaint filed before the prosecutor did not allege that
the emails were printed and first published in Morong Bataan, or that
Desmond resided in Morong, Bataan at the time of the offense. In the absence
of these allegations, the prosecutor did not have the authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation or to file the information.
8. Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not
present in the case. She asserts that emailing does not constitute publication
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. As there was no allegation in
the Informations that the emails were received, accessed, and read by third
persons other than Desmond, there could be no publication. Further, emails
are not covered under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the
time the allegedly libelous emails were sent, there was no law punishing this
act.
9. Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private communication to the
officers of the corporation, who were in the position to act on her grievances.
The emails were sent in good faith, with justifiable ends, and in the
performance of a legal duty.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER AN INFORMATION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH VENUE IS A DEFECT
THAT CAN BE CURED BY AMENDMENT BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013 is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 10,
2013 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. Dio’s arguments cannot prosper, for an information to be quashed based on the
prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on
the face of the information. The Informations here do not allege that the venue of
the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of
the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them. The
proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the
Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong, Bataan after the
Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the case due to
lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the
information.
2. Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner claims this is bolstered by the
enactment of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime
Law, which widened the scope of libel to include libel committed through email,
among others. Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons
named in the Informations—who appear to be officials of Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found—is sufficiently "public,"
as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-
Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial.
Passionate and emphatic grievance, channeled through proper public authorities,
partakes of a degree of protected freedom of expression. Certainly, if we remain
faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust some leeway should be given
to the public to express disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be
grounded in abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence;
otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations
only imagined, not real.
Liang vs. People
GR 125865, 28 January 2000

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank. Sometime in
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City with two counts of
grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
MeTC Judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in
the country. The MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the case based from
the said protocol.
The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its
motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC
of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this court via
a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
ISSUE: Whether immunity invoked by DFA for ADB employees based on the Agreement is
cognizable in our courts.

HELD: The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
act was done in “official capacity.” The prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
The petition is therefore denied.
Labels: Political Law
ARIGO vs. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510
735 SCRA 102, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
EN BANC
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts:

In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine
habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law.
The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the
SC.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy. As
petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between US and
PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian violated
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside
from damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits
for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding
incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.

Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA

No. The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this case.

First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners’ claim, the US
government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
have control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment
against these officials would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity – in correlation with
the principle of States as sovereign equals “par in parem non habet non imperium” – bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the Tubbataha
Reefs

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under the customary laws
of navigation.

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and
caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS.
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US considers
itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans”, which is codified in
UNCLOS.

As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US’ refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep
seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary
international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)

Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines
as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear
“international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##

Other Issues

Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed Separately

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper considering that it is the VFA which
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no
way damages which resulted from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.

In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or non-application
of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan.

Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is
Not Proper

The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government. The VFA being a valid and
binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions. A petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.