State Immunity

Arigo v. Swift 2014 En Banc

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded.

Philippine Textile Research Institute v. CA 2019

PTRI, et al. are not immune from suit. Being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a
governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from suit.

PTRI entered into a Contract of Works with B.A. Ramirez. PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving
liability arising from a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit finds
application. Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when
the State enters into a contract. However, distinction must still be made between one which is executed
in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

Delegation of Powers

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. DOLE 2018 En Banc Leonen, J

Our governmental structure rests on the principle of separation of powers. In reality, however, the
powers are not as strictly confined or delineated to each branch. The growing complexity of modern life,
the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws require the delegation of powers traditionally belonging to the legislative to
administrative agencies.

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III 2019 En Banc Leonen, J

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that

1) the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and

2) that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law.

The Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the contribution rate and the minimum and
maximum amounts for the monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security
Commission's power to fix them, as clearly laid out in the law.

Eminent Domain

LBP v. Manzano 2018 Leonen, J

The Special Agrarian Court must ensure that the amount determined at the end of the proceedings is
equivalent to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking, and not based on a strict
adherence to a particular set or series of rules imposed by agricultural reform laws or administrative
orders. While Section 17 requires due consideration of the formula prescribed by DAR, the
determination of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the proper court.
Just Compensation. — The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be
curtailed or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule. (LBP v. Manzano 2018 Leonen, J)

a) According to De Knecht v. CA, owner refers to all those who have lawful interest in the property
to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee, and a vendee in possession under an
executory contract.
b) The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss.
c) The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time of the taking until just compensation
is actually paid to him. To be just, the compensation must not only be the correct amount to be
paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land is taken from the
owner. (Apo Fruits v. LBP 2010 En Banc)

Export Processing Zone Authority v. Estate of Jimenez 2011

The Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is
immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately
suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the
owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in
order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the
taking occurred.

NTC v. Bermuda Development 2019

A case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation,
which has occupied the land belonging to the former without prior acquisition of title thereto by
negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper.

The proper recourse is for the ejectment court:

a) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery of
just compensation and consequential damages; or
b) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation
or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages
assessed therein; or
c) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just
compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67, if the ejectment court has
jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.

Due Process

Acosta v. Ochoa 2019 En Banc Leonen, J

There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a firearm a
property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the government's
terms for its use. The grant of license, however, is without prejudice to the inviolability of the home.

With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the State, there could not have been a
deprivation of petitioners' right to due process in requiring a license for the possession of firearms.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution is clear that only life, liberty, or property is protected by the due
process clause. True property rights arise from legitimate claims of entitlement defined by existing rules
or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as law.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to possess a firearm was considered a property right,
it is doctrine that property rights are always subject to the State's police power.
Presidential Immunity

De Lima v. Duterte 2019 En Banc

The concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does not
distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity
hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions prevents us from making any distinctions.

Separate concurring of Leonen, J

Presidential immunity from suit only extends to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. A proceeding
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, as in this case, does not determine any such liability.

However, the proper respondent in a habeas data case for pronouncements made by the President in
his official capacity is the Executive Secretary, following the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Aquino III. This is in
accord with the doctrine that the president should not be impleaded in any suit during his or her
incumbency, as recently reiterated in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III.

Privileges of Legislators

Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen 2018

The questioned statements in this case were admittedly made in response to queries from the media
during gaps in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of privileged
speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary
nonaccountability to insulate his statements, uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity," from
judicial review.

Structure of Government

Legislative

Sema v. Comelec

The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a
Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional
legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory.

Aquino III v. Comelec 2010 En Banc

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. While a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.

Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district.
Aldaba v. Comelec 2010 En Banc Resolution

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not a political one.

Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI on the population requirement, the creation by
RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former 1st District, leaves the
town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the
requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory."

Intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose
population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election" after the attainment.

Bagabuyo v. Comelec

Legislative apportionment is defined as the determination of the number of representatives which a

State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.

Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the LGC expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of an LGU. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

A legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of an LGU where the
apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province,
city, municipality or barangay under the LGC should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

Equality of representation.

The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein. The Constitution does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation.