G.R. No.

132319
May 12, 2000
People of the Philippines vs Fernando Madarang
FACTS:
 On or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante,
province of Pangasinan, Fernando Madarang(accused), stab his wife Lilia
with a bladed weapon which caused her instantaneous death.
 The accused is charged with parricide and upon arraignment the trial court
entered a not guilty plea for him since he refused to enter a plea
 On May 5, 1994, Fernando was observed behaving in an abnormal manner
inside the provincial jail. He was called to stand by the court but he refused to
answer any of the questions. The court then issued an Order directing the
transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for
psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial.
 The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was
suffering from a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. He was detained
at the hospital and was administered medication for his illness.
 On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused
was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he
was already found fit to face the charges against him
 At the resumption of the hearing, the accused claimed insanity at the time he
committed the offense.
 His mother in law, Avelina and his daughter Lilifer testified that on September
3, 1993 at 5:00pm, he and his wife had a squabble and in the heat of the fight
he stabbed Lilia.
 The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing
incident nor the whereabouts of his wife. He claimed that he did not know
whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being
confined at the NCMH for treatment.
 Dr. Tibayan, medical doctor at NCMH declared that on the first and second
psychiatric evaluation of the accused he was suffering from insanity classified
as Schizophrenia. He further explained that Fernando, may be incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing and may become
destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were
violent. However, he may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to
distinguish right from wrong.
 The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the
presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was able to prove insanity and is exempted from
criminal liability
HELD:
No, Fernando was not able to prove insanity as an exempting circumstance.
For insanity to be exempting it is required that there must be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will.
Establishing the insanity of an accused also requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused. The testimony
must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense
with which he is charged.
In the case at bar, the evidence of the defense was insufficient to prove insanity.
Fernando’s claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident
amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that
Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the Fernando holding a bolo
after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the
appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's
seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium
of his alleged insanity. Also the never seen quarreling of the accused and his victim
does not prove his unstable mental condition.
 G.R. No. L-18793
October 11, 1968
The People of the Philippines vs Getulio Pantoja
FACTS:
 On June 28, 1957 at Barrio Malinao Quezon, Getulio Pantoja, a Philippine
Army Sergeant uninvitedly went inside the house of Estelita Erotes. He asked
Hernandez, who is seated beside Estelita to allow him to sit beside her, but
Hernandez refused the request. Pantoja said nothing, showed no sign of
anger and immediately left and went to his camp about half a kilometer
distant, put on his fatigue uniform, got a rifle went back to the house and
stationed himself on the stairway.
 At about 2:00 A.M, Hernandez together with his group left the house of
Estelita. Pantoja followed them. At a distance of about five meters, Pantoja
suddenly shouted "Ano yan? Ano yan?" Turning their heads back they saw
Pantoja raise the garand rifle and aim at them. Pantoja fired two shots in rapid
succession. The first shot hit Angel Marasigan who instantly fell on his back.
The second shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez who fell down. The accused
walked nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan
and four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez.
 The lower court found Pantoja guilty of double murder and sentenced him to
the penalty of death.
 Upon appeal, Pantoja contends that the lower court erred in rejecting his
defense of insanity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lower court erred in rejecting his defense of insanity
HELD:
No, his contention lacks merit.
The legal presumption of sanity is reinforced by the evidence showing that
when he committed the crimes, appellant was calm and collected, and did not
show any sign of anger. The fact that he fired four more shots at the prostrate
body of Hernandez, who had refused his request to be allowed to sit beside
Estelita, shows that revenge was in his heart.
Moreover, the report of Dr. Cesar Catindig of the V. Luna General Hospital
where appellant was confined for one month by order of the trial court does
not show that appellant was insane. It merely shows that he was suffering
from psychoneurotic depressive reaction and psychoneurotic dissociative
reaction.
 G.R. No. 182941
July 3, 2009
Robert Sierra vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
 In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB
in the second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The
petitioner, a 15-year-old minor arrived holding a knife and told his
sister, AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them.
 The petitioner had sexual intercourse with BBB and AAA and
afterwards warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
 AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her
teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who
both accompanied AAA to the barangay office.
 Physical examination of AAA revealed a laceration on her hymen
consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the
complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with
rape.
 The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses
of denial and alibi. He claimed that AAA only invented her story
because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The
parties’ mother (CCC) supported the petitioner’s story who also stated
that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the
petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.
 The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped
her and confirmed the petitioner’s claim that AAA bore her brother a
grudge.
 On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape and
the CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the petitioner is exempted from criminal liability as
provisioned by RA 9344
II. Whether or not the defense has the burden of evidence in proving the
petitioners age to exempt him under RA 9344.

HELD:
I. Yes, under RA 9344 the petitioner is exempted from criminal liability
 The minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders under
RA 9344 were fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below 18
years old (who acted without discernment). In providing exemption, the law
presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to
distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary
ones for which they cannot be held accountable.

In the case at bar, the accused is not more than 15 years old when he
committed the crime of rape. Therefore, he is not criminally liable as
mandated by law.

II. Yes, the defense has the burden of showing by evidence that the
petitioner is less than 15 years old when he committed the rape charged.
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, the burden of proof
in a criminal case, falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove
all the essential ingredients of the crime. However, the burden of evidence
shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown or to
prove by evidence that the accused did not commit the crime charged or
cannot otherwise be held liable therefor.
In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done
everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now
shifted to the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that
the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability
because of his age when he committed the crime.
 G.R. No. 216671
October 03, 2016
Jerwin Dorado vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
 Dorado, a 16-year-old minor together with Julius Ramos (Ramos),
Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were
charged with the crime of frustrated murder for alleged shooting of
Ronald Bonion, the victim.
 On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned
and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
 The prosecution presented the victims testimonies that on April 15,
2004 at 11:00 in the evening, while Ronald was talking to his friends
(Ronalds Group), Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends
(Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at Ronald's
group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit
Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious and Dorado's
group ran away.
 The defense presented witnesses who collectively narrated that on
April 15, 2004, between 8:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, Dorado was at home watching television with his siblings
and his mother. Suddenly, the barangay tanods arrived and blamed
him for the shooting of Ronald.
 The RTC found Dorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of frustrated murder. Nevertheless, minority was not appreciated as
a mitigating circumstance in favor or Dorado. However, he was not
entitled to suspension of sentence because he was above 21 years
old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt.
 The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and denies the motion
for reconsideration of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is exempted from criminal liability under the
provisions of RA 9344

HELD:
Yes, he is exempted as mandated by law.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt
from criminal liability:
1. Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime; and,
2. Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who
acted without discernment.

The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in
each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and even during the trial.

In the case at bar, the court finds that the prosecution did not make an
effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen-year-old minor, acted with
discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. Considering that
there was no determination of discernment, the Court cannot rule with
certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible. In the absence of such
determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without
discernment.
 G.R. No. 150647
September 29, 2004
Roweno Pomoy vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS:
 On or about January 4, 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, Roweno Pomoy, a PNP member armed with his .45 service pistol,
shot Tomas Balboa, victim inflicting wounds on the vital parts of his body,
which directly caused victim’s death.

Version of the Prosecution

 On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, Balboa was arrested for
alleged connection with a robbery. He was detained at camp Jalandoni. Past
2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant directed the victim to
come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At
that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which
was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster,
with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
 When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the
shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing
Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital.

Version of the Defense

 According to the petitioner, as he was holding the doorknob with his right the
door of the investigation room, the victim, who was two meters away from
him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he
held the handle of his gun with his left hand; he and Balboa grappled for the
gun, after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right
side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when
the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or
wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left
his house, and it was locked when it fired; after the gun fired, they were
separated from each other and Balboa fell.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the shooting of the victim was the result of an accident.
II. Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

HELD:
I. Yes, the shooting of the victim was a result of accident.

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was
at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury
was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there
was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.

In the case at bar, it is clear that all these elements were present base on
the facts. It was in the lawful performance of Pomoy’s duty as a law
enforcer to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly
tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was
duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to
be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity,
including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary

precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm
to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun
locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times,
especially within the premises of his working area.

II. No, the petitioner was not able to prove self-defense.

Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident,

in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense
necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend
oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant
case did not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to
overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against
any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and
accidental result of both parties’ attempts to possess the firearm.
 G.R. No. 105002
July 17, 1997
People of the Philippines vs. Diarangan Dansal
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution

 On March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon, Matungao, Lanao del Norte, appellant,

armed with a Garand rifle like his four other companions, fired the fatal shots
which caused the death of Abubakar Alamat, also known as Abubakar
Pangalamatan.
 Panda Antalo testified that at 3:00 in the afternoon, he and Timal Mosa saw
Abubakar Alamat, the victim, conversing with five persons, one of whom was
appellant and the others he did not recognized. When they were five meters
away from the group, he heard gunshots. He turned his head and noticed that
smoke was coming out of appellants rifle and empty shells were falling
therefrom. The Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were pointed at
the victim who was lying on the ground face upwards. Seven shots were fired.
 Timal Mosa corroborated Antalos account. He also saw the victim, with the
appellant and four others talking. He heard gunshots, when he turned he
notice that smoke was coming out of appellant’s gun and that empty shells
were dropping from it. Appellants rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen
on the ground. He heard seven gunshots. Appellants companions also carried
Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not fired because he did
not notice smoke from their barrels. After firing at the victim, appellant
together with his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis coffee plantation.

Version of the Defense

 Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March 1,
1990, he went to Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister Saramina
Dansal. At his sister’s house, Mimbalawang Dorado, together with his sons
Macod, Talente and Talentes son Usop, seized appellant and brought him to
their house for reasons undisclosed to him.
 The next day, March 2, 1990 at 7:00 a.m., they all left Tagolo-an for Matungao
and arrived there at 11:00 a.m. He was given a Garand rifle that was not
serviceable. They proceeded to the victim’s house and asked the victim to
 come out, as soon as he appeared they fired their guns. Appellant said that
the Dorados killed the victim to avenge the killing of one of Mimbalawags sons
named Ali by a certain Salonga, the victims paternal cousin.
 After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns at appellant
and told him to run away. As he was also related to the victim, appellant
wanted to shoot the Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled
with the Dorados. He went home and afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an
that the Dorados killed his cousin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant can invoke exempting circumstance of
compulsion under an irresistible force.

HELD:
No, he cannot invoke the exempting circumstance of compulsion under an
irresistible force.
A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force under article 12 paragraph 5 of the RPC, must prove his
defense by clear and convincing evidence. He must show that the irresistible
force reduced him to a mere instrument that he acted not only without will but
also against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave
the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury is insufficient.
In the present case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his
testimony, he did not mention that the Dorados physically or morally
threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any attempt to resist. He
simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not follow
them. No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled
to join the Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to
prove that the Dorados made a real and imminent threat on his life or limb
sufficient to overcome his free will.
 G.R. NO. 186420
August 25, 2009
People of the Philippines vs. Samuel Anod
FACTS:
 On or about 10:30 in the evening, of May 16, 1997, at Purok 1,
Barangay Borbonan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Samuel Anod and Lionel
Lumbayan stab and hack Erlando Costan(victim) with a bolo, inflicting
multiple stab wounds which caused the victims death.

Version of the Prosecution

 Before midnight of May 16, 1997, the victim, was stabbed and hacked
to death in his house where his body was later found by Miguel Platil.
 On May 17, 1997, appellant and Lumbayan surrendered to Andromeda
Perater, Barangay Chairperson of Borbonan, before whom they
admitted the killing of Costan.
 On May 18, 1997, appellant and Lumbayan were brought to the police
station. The Barangay Chairperson testified before the RTC that
appellant narrated and admitted to her that he and Lumbayan killed
Costan.
Version of the Defense

 Appellant averred that at around 7 p.m. of May 16, 1997, he and

Lumbayan were having a drink together with Angges. After an hour, he
asked his companions to go home. Lumbayan told appellant that they
would spend the night at Costan's house.
 Upon reaching Costan's house, Lumbayan called for the victim. Costan
opened the door for them and immediately thereafter, Lumbayan poked
a knife at Costan and ordered appellant to tie the victim while the latter
was lying down. He then ordered appellant to stab Costan. Out of fear
of being stabbed by Lumbayan who, at the time, was poking a knife at
appellant's breast, appellant stabbed Costan once at the back.
Thereafter, appellant and Lumbayan went to the house of Lumbayan's
aunt. They surrendered to the Barangay Chairperson allegedly upon
the prodding of appellant.
  On the other hand, Lumbayan denied all the charges, claiming that he
and the appellant slept early on the night of the incident at his aunt's
house.

 The RTC found the appellant and Lumbayan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the
findings of the RTC with modification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is exempted from criminal liability for his criminal
act was under threat and with uncontrollable fear.

HELD:
No, the apellant is not exempted from criminal liability.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such
person does not act with freedom. However, we held that for such a defense
to prosper, the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent
and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.
In this case, based on the evidence on record, appellant had the chance to
escape Lumbayan's threat or engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was
also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's allegation of fear or duress
is untenable. Therefore, under the circumstances, appellant's alleged fear,
arising from the threat of Lumbayan, would not suffice to exempt him from
incurring criminal liability.