University of St. Andrews, Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)

University of St.
Andrews
Scots Philosophical Association
Divine Freedom and Creation

Author(s): Laura L. Garcia
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 42, No. 167 (Apr., 1992), pp. 191-213
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
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The Philosophical QFarterly Vol. 42 JNo. 167
ISSN 0031-8094 $200
DIVINE FREEDOM AND CREATION
BY LAURA L. GARCIA
The claim that God acts freely in choosing to create us, or in c

create at all, holds a central place in theologies which
Anselmian understanding of God as the greatest concei
Divine freedom assumes this importance for at least three r
there is Thomas Aquinas' observation that freedom is a perf
as humans are said to be more perfect than the lower
possessing the power of free choice, so God, who is the m
agent, must be said to have free choice in an even grea
Aquinas makes it clear in his discussion of this topic that th
of freedom involves not only being master of one's own ac
for one's own sake, which might be construed in a determ
but also a sort of election which is unnecessitated - the abil
freely among genuinely open alternatives.2
A second powerful impetus behind the doctrine of divine
that it aids us in resolving the problem of evil. If ours is the o
world God could have created, then the natural evils which
cannot be seen as merely accepted by God on account of gr
be gained thereby. Rather, each earthquake, hurricane and
results from the ordinary workings of natural laws must
necessary elements of the universe, as events God could no
without. Further, theologians often appeal to human free
explanation for the existence of moral evil, arguing that
creatures who respond to God and to one anotherfreely ou
disvalue resulting from their wrong choices. But those w
necessitarian view of divine action often accept a simi
ministic view of human action, and this raises the problem
to a deeper level. Necessitarians must see each instance
suffering caused by human beings as absolutely inev
essential part of the world. Evil cannot be explained as a co
' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk I, Ch. 88.

2 I understand 'divine freedom' here in a libertarian sense, so that Go
free only if they are neither causally nor logically necessitated by any state
192 LAURA L. GARCIA
free human choices if there are no gen

rather, God must be seen as the determ
mankind. The doctrine of divine freed
that this world could have been other tha
(for purposes often obscure to us) an
means of it, but his ends in no way requir
can create a world free from evil altoge
Finally, divine freedom seems import
motives in creation, for God is traditio
gracious love and kindness towards his
necessity, whether of an internal or
freedom is to see the universe in all
emanation from God's nature, so that G
us and our fellow creatures. On this sce
creator seems inappropriate, but this r
theistic attitudes and beliefs. Consider the
I consider Thy heavens, the work of Th
stars, which Thou hast ordained;/ Wha
thought of him?/ And the son ofman, th
Thou hast made him a little lower than
glory and majesty!' (Psalm 8: 4-6). Rob
utterances seem quite incongruous wit
because if he had not he would have
possible state of affairs.'4 Rather, it se
amazed and grateful that God has no
exalted such unworthy creatures as our
In spite of these substantial consideration
divine freedom, it has met with oppositio
years, especially from rationalistic or id
the sort found in neo-Platonism, Spino
I consider in this paper, however, are tw
freedom from within the traditionalis
conception of God is taken seriously an
emphatically asserted. Both thinkers b
claim that God exists necessarily an
omnipotent, perfectly good and outside
reject outright or seriously compromise
3 In this paragraph I have assumed two things:

creatures will act prior to creating them, and (b
events in the world apart from those brought abo
4 Robert Adams, 'Must God Create the Bes
Concept of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
DIVINE FREEDOM AND CREATION 193
to consider here the question of whether someone w

conception of God shared by these thinkers must a
abandonment of the doctrine of divine freedom.
Recently, Paul Helm has challenged the traditional understanding
of divine freedom by reviving the Leibnizian view that a perfectly good
and rational agent must create the most optimific possible world. Since,
according to Helm, God exists necessarily and has goodness and
rationality essentially, and since Helm holds that humans are not free in
the libertarian sense, it follows from his view that the universe that does
exist is the only universe that could exist. One could qualify this if one
holds that God has created free creatures who could choose differently
than they do choose, but even on such a view, the universe will be
necessary in every feature which is up to God, including the number of
free creatures (if any), the natural laws under which they operate, his
responses to their choices, etc. On such a view, God would have less
freedom than creatures have. The second challenge to God's freedom is
found in some recent articles by William Alston on divine action, where
Alston tries to fashion a functionalist account of human agency into an
appropriate model for divine agency. Unlike Helm, Alston has no
intention of compromising God's freedom within his account, but I
believe the model he proposes must ultimately have that effect if it is to
be at all useful to him in illuminating God's activity. Following the
discussion of these two challenges to divine freedom, I will briefly sketch
an alternative account of God's creative act which I think avoids the
difficulties of Helm's and Alston's theories while still responding to the
concerns they express. The account I propose is based on Aquinas'
analogy between God's creative act and human creativity.
I. HELM'S DENIAL OF DIVINE FREEDOM
It is agreed by virtually every theologian that God's free

limitations, though most argue that these restrictions should
as imposed upon God from outside his own nature. Exam
limitations are that God is not free to do what is impossible
that he is not free to do evil, though perhaps the second
be construed as an instance of the first. Theologians are
agreement with respect to some of the things that d
includes. As Paul Helm puts it, 'Because [God] is a necessar
free from intellectual and moral decay and weakness, and
the omnipotent creator of all he cannot be dominated o
anything that he creates.'5 But disagreements arise over
5 Paul Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp. 171-2.
194 LAURA L. GARCIA
has the freedom to choose among

universe, or whether he has the fre
not creating.
Helm suggests three distinct arguments for the conclusion that the
universe we inhabit is the only possible world which God could have
created. The first is based on God's immutability and timelessness:
The picture frequently sketched (for example by Leibniz), that

among all possible worlds God has chosen to actualize one
particular possible world, supposes that God 'stands back'
from the array of possibilities to confer on one of them the
dignity of actuality. And such a picture implies that while God
chose A he might instead have chosen not-A. The 'internal
sources' of God's action incline but do not necessitate, but then
this seems to suppose there could have been other reasons
inclining other ways. But could there? Could there have been a
situation in which God chooses neither A nor not-A, but is
contemplating them both along with all other possibilities?
Such a 'situation' could only have been a time, and yet by
supposition God is eternal and hence necessarily has no time in
which to contemplate a range of possibilities before deciding
which, if any, to actualize.6
Thus, if God first contemplates the different possibilities which he

might create and then chooses one of these, his act of will must
temporally succeed his act of knowledge, which entails that God is
subject to change and hence to time. This conclusion is unacceptable to
those who, like Helm and myself, believe that God exists timelessly.
Oddly enough, Helm seems to answer this objection himself in the
very next sentence, so it is hard to believe that he places much store in it.
Helm says at the end of the paragraph just quoted, 'Consideration of
possibilities is logically prior to actualizing one of them, but both
contemplation and actualization are one eternal act of the divine
nature, if God is timelessly eternal.'7 So Helm tentatively accepts the
Leibnizian picture he sketches, as long as we understand the knowledge
of God and the willing of God to be merely conceptually distinct and not
temporally sequenced. This solution seems to me essentially correct,
and various versions of it have enabled thinkers like Aquinas and John
Duns Scotus to accept both divine freedom and divine immutability.
6 Ibid., pp. 178-9.

7 Ibid., p. 179.
We can distinguish various aspects of the divine inte

bear logical connections to one another withou
distinctions into a temporal sequence. Duns Scotus
aspects within the life of God 'instants of nature' t
from temporal instants.8 The 'instant' in which G
universe is posterior to, in the sense of dependent upo
the instant at which God knows all the possible wo
but these are merely relations of dependency withi
act. Thus it does not follow from the fact that God's choice of this
universe depends upon his knowledge of possible universes he mig
create, that his choice constitutes a change. Rather, God might ha
eternally willed that this universe exist, even though that choice
eternally informed by his knowledge of all the possible worlds he co
actualize.
Helm next proposes an argument against divine freedom based on
the claim that if God's choice of the world is an eternal act of a necessary
being, then it must itself be logically necessary. His argument is this:
For example, if we suppose with some (Anselm, for instance),

that God's existence is itself logically necessary, and if this
logically necessary being eternally wills that A, then it looks as
ifA is itself logically necessary since there is no possible world in
which God does not exist, and no possible world in which God
chooses some alternative to A.9
This argument requires an additional premise, namely, that whatever

is eternally willed by God is necessarily willed by God, but this premis
is far from an obvious truth. In fact, Aquinas argues forjust the opposite
claim in the course of his treatment of a related issue. In his discussion of
whether or not creation constitutes a change in God in the Summa Contra
Gentiles (Bk I, Ch. 82), Aquinas considers the argument that the shift
from contemplating different possibilities to electing one of them
involves having a certain kind of potency and then undergoing a change
when this potency is actualized. Such a result would compromise
Aquinas' conception of God in a double way, since God for Aquinas is
both fully actual and essentially immutable. He confronts the objection
8 See Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, ed. Allan Wolter (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1962),
p. 66, where Duns Scotus distinguishes between the view that non-existence pre-
cedes existence by a 'priority of duration' and his own view, that non-existence precedes
existence merely by a 'priority of nature.' Duns Scotus attributes his view to Avicenna in
Metaphysics, Bk VI.
9 Eternal God, p. 177.
196 LAURA L. GARCIA
by means of an interesting distincti

'possible'. In one sense, something is
certain power or agent, as heating a
knocking out Mike Tyson is possible
'possible' bears the meaning of'poten
exists first in potency and then in ac
all if the power involved is never act
sense only relative to a power which
actualization always involves a chang
In Aquinas' second sense, 'possib
tingent, what is neither necessar
something can be 'possible' relative to
long as that power is notforced to on
in which Aquinas claims that differe
holds that God's will is never in pot
nothing can be 'possible' for God in the
first potentially willed by God and
other worlds than ours are possible i
could have eternally been aimed at a
no created universe at all. Note that
claim about God's power- that he is a
is a claim about his will - that he could have chosen other alternatives.
Thus Aquinas argues that an act of will can be eternal without being
necessary or determined, since even an eternal act of will might have
had a different object. This means that Helm cannot move from the fact
that God eternally wills A to the conclusion that A is logically necessary,
so the second argument he proposes is unsound.
However, Helm's case against divine freedom rests less on the two
arguments just discussed than on his claims about what is necessary to
rational choice. Helm argues that a perfectly rational and good agent
will choose what he takes to be the best option open to him, all things
considered. To choose less than the best would be either irrational or
wicked or both. Furthermore, unless there is a best option presented to
an agent, the choice made must result from a kind of arbitrariness, a
mere whim or fancy. So God chooses the best of all possible worlds in his
act of creating, and it is impossible for him to choose otherwise, given
that he is essentially both rational and perfectly good. Helm's argument
here really involves two different premises:
(1) If God's willing a certain universe is rational, then that

universe must be the optimific alternative.
(2) There is an optimific universe, a best of all possible worlds.
If one accepts that the divine will is essentially

necessarily God wills some universe (even if that univer
but God), then (1) entails (2), since rational cho
choosing the optimific universe, which entails that t
universe. Helm seems to rely on this entailmen
arguments aim at supporting (1), and he offers
argument for (2). It should be noted, however, that
would entail the falsehood of (1). I believe that b
false, and will address them in order in what follows
Constraints on rational choice
Helm's defence of (1), that rationality requires an op

is somewhat obscure and scattered throughout the t
heart of it to be found in this passage:
Certainly having a reason of a certain sort

particular view of explanation, explain an actio
a reason for doing the action implies the possib
reason for not doing it (in precisely similar ci
then the reason is what the action is due to, but t
not render it intelligible.'0
Helm argues here that if a choice is to be fully e

intelligible, then the reason for that choice mus
reason. Helm's suggestion that there cannot be even
having a reason for a different choice is far too strong,
amended to the weaker claim that any reasons suppo
must be merely primafacie reasons that are overruled
the choice actually made. Helm believes that if
among equally optimific alternatives, his choice wi
'reasonless will'," 'pure whimsy',12 or 'divine caprice
The underlying assumption here is that if one's rea
are to make the action intelligible, or fully explain
must point to the act's being optimific. 'Optimific' is
Helm, but presumably it has reference to the degr
realizes one's goals or objectives, perhaps together w
moral good or value produced by the act. Assuming
0 Ibid., p. 174.
"Ibid., p. 178.
12 Ibid., p. 180.
3 Ibid.
198 LAURA L. GARCIA
such an optimific choice for God

essentially rational agent necessar
osophers would deny even this claim
not always choose the optimific alte
shows that we are subject to ignora
will. Richard Swinburne claims that
action if he acknowledges overriding re
refraining from doing it [where refr
some other action], if hejudges that do
refraining from doing it'.'5 Thus if
truth of (2), that there is a best poss
plausible, at least given the notion
proposes - the action one has overri
does not argue for (2) directly. Inst
accept (1), that rationality requires a
must be examined more closely.
Helm's acceptance of (1) seems t
principle of sufficient reason applied
principle this way in his correspond
happens without a reason why it sho
In applying this principle to intentio
not only the relatively uncontrovers
must be done for a reason, but also t
action must be done for an overridin
be fully explained or 'intelligible'. T
action, there are reasons why that ve
any of the other alternatives open to
version of his principle this way: 'For a
to act, when he has not also a suffi
manner.'17 But this principle seem
where the options open to one are e
reasons not simply to refrain from
are four exits from a room, equal
convenient with respect to your pres
out around the wiring just above yo
you have no sufficient reason to lea
14 However, some have challenged this claim
so-called 'satisficing consequentialism' (vs. 'op
Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London:
15 The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarend
16 The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed.
University Press, 1956), Leibniz's Second Pape
17 Ibid., Leibniz's Fifth Paper, p. 60.
more reason to leave through this door than throu

reason to leave is a compelling one, namely, that you
and this can explain your departure perfectly well, e
action of racing through the door you did - you were f
true that the reasons offered do not fully determin
specific act, and if full explanation requires suc
account, there will be no full explanation of why you e
door you did. But this is not surprising, since some p
make the absence of a complete explanation the dist
separating free actions from other behaviour.18 Re
concept of agent causation is in part the attempt t
choice in a way that allows for reasons which do no
seems that this is the sort of concept which fits best w
In fact, it seems even more unlikely in the divine case
explanation of God's actions could exist, since, unli
God is not moved by any forces or impulses externa
and will. Thomas Aquinas holds that everything Go
sake of his goodness. Clearly, some sorts of conceptu
will be such that God cannot will them, then, beca
willed for the sake of his goodness.19 But there is no re
worlds different from our own in large and small ways
or embody God's goodness as well as ours does. F
already possesses his goodness completely, no creat
necessary means to the end which God wills, so ther
reason for God to create at all, much less to cre
creatures he does. Does this openness in the divine w
creative act is arbitrary? Not at all, since God does
creating, namely, his goodness, and this is a reason for
universe which he creates, even though he may ha
reason to create another universe. Helm believes that in order for God's
will to be moved to create a given universe, there must be a 'further
factor' in addition to his goodness which will steer his will in that
particular direction.20 But this is to assume the sort of determinism with
respect to action which is the very point at issue. It is to assume with
Leibniz that agents can only be moved to act and are never in any sense
18 For example, Richard Swinburne says in The Coherence of Theism: 'An action, I
suggest, is a free action if and only if the agent's choosing to do that action, that is having
the intention to produce the result of that action, has no full explanation - of any kind,
whether of the kind described by scientific explanation or of the kind described by personal
explanation' (p. 143).
19 See my article 'A Response to the Modal Problem of Evil', Faith and Philosophy, 1
(1984), pp. 378-88.
200 LAURA L. GARCIA
self-movers, an assumption we
abandon.21 Thus I reject Helm's cla
choices open to him, his free choice i
matter of caprice. I would grant tha
though in this instance I would pref
Is there a best possible world?
So far we have dealt only with He

rational choices must be optimific on
for accepting it as a general princip
claim that there is an optimific cho
creating? If (2) is correct, then (1) w
as we have already seen. Various atte
determine whether or not the concep
coherent one, and the answer to thi
least some understanding of what is
possible worlds. Bruce Reichenbach
senses of 'best' in this context. First,
creatures found in the world, so tha
containing either the best kinds of
variety of creatures. Along these
possibility of a vacuum in space on t
would contain as much matter as is p
no empty space in the universe.22 Bu
there is no upper limit to the perfec
each level of finite knowledge or go
always a higher level. Similarly, there
richness or variety present in a give
variety of possible life forms. So a 'best
seem to be a coherent concept.
A second understanding of'best' wou
in the universe, where this might be
benefit or good in the world. But he
any limit on how much happiness or
any world with a total value of V, t
total value greater than V. Reichenb
21 In the Theodicy, Leibniz actually compare

part only where it finds the greatest ease or th
compressed in a glass-receiver will break the gl
2 Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Leibniz's Se
It seems to be the case that when we speak of best a

the created world, we find that there is not a fin
that there could be a best possible being or stat
Rather, we are faced with an infinite series of c
degrees of their actualization, or optimific states
which for any given being or state of affairs there
a better. The entire series thus asymptotically ap
as a finite, created world, cannot reach, the infin
of God.23
Thus the notion of a 'best of all possible worlds' seems incoherent on

either interpretation. Reichenbach's argument here parallels a point
made by Alvin Plantinga in the course of discussing Gaunilo's perfect-
island objection to Anselm's ontological argument. Plantinga argues
that 'the idea of a greatest possible island is an inconsistent or
incoherent idea; it's not possible that there be such a thing.' His reason
is that 'the qualities that make for greatness in islands - number of palm
trees, amount and quantity of coconuts, for example - most of these
qualities have no intrinsic maximum'.24 Plantinga's point here, I believe,
can be generalized to the case of any finite object, including any created
universe. Since the created universe by definition contains finite
creatures with finite attributes, there cannot be a created universe
which exhibits great-making qualities to the highest possible degree.
Only God has such properties. So I believe Reichenbach's rejection of
the notion of a 'best possible world' in his two senses is well founded.
However, there are at least two further senses of the term 'best' which
Reichenbach does not consider in his essay. Philip Quinn suggests a
definition of 'best' in terms of the moral goodness found in a given
universe. He introduces the notion of a 'morally unsurpassable world',
meaning a world which has at least as much moral value as any other
possible world, however moral value is defined, and accepts the
possibility that there is more than one world which falls in this category.
Quinn then argues that a perfectly good moral agent would be obliged
to create one of the morally unsurpassable worlds, since such an agent
must be interested in maximizing the total moral value in the universe.
Quinn says, 'If he actualizes one than which there is a morally better,
he does not do the best he can, morally speaking, and so it is possible
that there is an agent morally better than he is, namely, an omnipotent
23 Bruce Reichenbach, 'Must God Create the Best Possible World?', International
Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1979), p. 208.
24 God, Freedom and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 91.
202 LAURA L. GARCIA
moral agent who actualizes one of

Quinn restricts the field of possi
'actualizable' for God; that is, he is c
goodness in a given world, excluding
does not bring about his own goodn
Quinn makes two assumptions here
he finds it very likely that the
unsurpassable possible world. But i
world would contain. If moral value i
choices of free agents, then it se
Reichenbach's and Plantinga's will sho
the amount of moral value in a crea
correct moral choices, there coul
Similarly, if moral value is defined in
possessing certain virtues, then it is
upper limit to the number of virtuous
virtue in any given creature.
A second assumption Quinn makes
obliged to create the world with the
assuming for the moment that th
possible that even a perfectly goo
purposes in creating besides maximi
that in the case of a tie between
considerations of beauty or simplici
that these other considerations c
considerations that Quinn emphasizes
good agent who is also perfectly wis
world less full of creaturely moral v
purpose of Quinn's article is to refut
God might choose a world with less
might have created, in order to be
creatures.26 But it seems to me that
sense, and that God has no overridin
moral value in preference to other v
the prospect of a God who cared little
and only for turning us into moral h
25 Philip L. Quinn, 'God, Moral Perfectio

Sontag and M. Darrol Bryant, (eds) God: The C
Rose of Sharon Press, 1982), p. 213.
26 In 'Must God Create the Best?' Adams say
normally praise him for his moral rectitude an
God for his existence as for an undeserved pe
Let us consider one more attempt to define the term

in the sense of the best relative to the ends or purposes o
so that the 'best possible world' will be the one that is
God's purposes, whatever they may be. In this sen
might accept that if there is a world which is best fo
including his purpose in acting graciously towards hi
this is the world that God must create. This notion of'best' is related to
Swinburne's concept of having an overriding reason to act in a certain
way. I believe it is also the notion that Helm has in mind, since he sees
God's creative act to be determined by the purposes of God, which are
largely unknown to us, not by some obvious features of the particular
universe itself, such as its having the best creatures or the greatest
amount of moral value. Helm says that in choosing to create a given
world A, 'God has a reason for willing A in preference to any
alternative',27 but 'no further explanation of what takes place is
possible than that it seemed good to the eternal God that these things
should be so'.28 Helm believes that the existence of this particular
universe is not entailed by anything about God's character; rather, it is
simply the universe which God has the most reason to create. I believe
that the notion of a best possible universe in this sense is at least a
coherent one. And perhaps there is a universe which uniquely fits the
purposes God has in mind, so that it is preferable from the divine point
ofview to any other, but this is far from obvious. The hesitation to affirm
that there is such a world is in part due to the fact that we have so little
to go on in determining what God's purposes are. Further, on Aquinas'
picture of things, God's purposes cannot constrain him to create
anything at all, much less to create any particular universe, since the
only purposes he has necessarily are already fulfilled by his own
existing. It is true that, according to Aquinas, God cannot will the
absence of a good 'which causes the nature of the good to be entirely
lost. But there is no such good apart from God.'29 Finally, since God's
goodness is infinite it can be participated in in an infinite number of
ways, so God's purpose in ordering things to his goodness or creating
things which participate in his goodness can be fulfilled by an infinite
number of distinct possible worlds.
Even if Aquinas' picture of God's purposes is rejected, it still seems
difficult, if not impossible, to show that those purposes must be so
narrow as to restrict God's creative activity to one logically possible
world. I believe this is the reason that Helm does not try to defend (2)

28 Ibid., p. 181.
29 Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk I, Ch. 81.
204 LAURA L. GARCIA
itself, but spends his energies instead i

this fourth understanding of best as 'b
very plausible unless we already know
must fully explain his creative act, th
universe which fulfils those purposes.
to accept Helm's requirement that e
such a complete explanation.
Before leaving Helm's treatment of
one unfortunate consequence of acc
correct, it would follow that the actua
part of the actual world strongly actua
world, since it is necessarily the on
created by the necessarily existing
necessary and his eternal act of will i
determinist like Helm, there is only on
Helm because he accepts divine d
compatibilism) with respect to human
that humans have libertarian freedom and that God has neither
foreknowledge offuture contingent propositions nor middle knowled
of counterfactuals of freedom could accept here the existence of
restricted set of possible worlds, with only the divinely determined
component fully fixed. God's response to each of our choices would b
completely necessitated by his nature, but the universe would not b
necessary in all of its details, since some of these would depend on ou
genuinely free choices. Obviously someone like Helm would find thi
view repugnant, since he cites the Westminster Confession of Faith, III.I,
approvingly as follows: 'God from all eternity did, by the most wise a
holy council of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain what-
soever comes to pass.'30 Helm tries to blunt this result by observing that
worlds other than ours would still be epistemically possible (that is, they
are possible for all we know) and conceptually possible (that is, we fin
no internal inconsistency in the description of them). But the fa
remains that, as Helm puts it, 'these possibilities are only abstract. The
do not represent real possibilities and never did. The thought that the
did was the product of our ignorance.'31 In the end, Helm must simp
accept the counter-intuitive result that many things which appear to
to be eminently contingent, including on his view wicked huma
actions, are in fact metaphysically necessary. Further, even if human

31 Ibid., p. 189. Helm says that God's choice of this universe cannot be deduced fro
any set of logical truths, but of course many other necessary truths share this property
e.g., that red is a colour or that the number 7 is not purple.
and other creatures such as angels have liberta

necessitarian view of divine action entails that God c
evil from occurring, since he cannot but create this un
universe some creatures do make evil choices. Helm does not seem to
appreciate fully how deeply ingrained is our intuition that some things
are not necessary, or how important this is for theology. He complains
of one of Aquinas' arguments for divine freedom that it merely assumes
that there is contingency in the universe.32 But surely this assumption is
about as unassuming as they come; one would need a very strong reason
for rejecting it, and as far as I can see, Helm fails to provide such a
reason.
II. ALSTON'S FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT
The model ofdivine agency proposed by William Alston i

by him to compromise God's freedom in any way; in fact
on the freedom of God in creating the universe. But it
Alston's functionalist model of agency is to shed any li
divine action, it must incorporate elements that signific
God's freedom of choice.33 Alston is convinced that we need to find
concepts within religious language that have a univocal sense when
applied to creatures and to God, so he seeks to determine 'how much of
the way we think of human action can be carried over to our thought of
divine action'.3 The way Alston proposes to understand human action
is by means of the functionalist theory of mind, which attempts to
predict (or explain) human behaviour by linking up the input into the
human psyche (especially perceptual input) with the behavioural
output (including linguistic behaviour). On most views of intentional
action, whether functionalist or not, an action is done intentionally
only if it results in the right way from the appropriate psychological
states of the agent. These states are of two kinds: goal-setting states, or
pro- and con-attitudes, and cognitive guidance states, or beliefs.
Functionalism defines both types of psychological states according to
the role they play in a system which connects the input and the output
for a given agent. For humans, the input is their perceptual conditions
and the output is their behaviour.
32 Ibid., p. 177.
33 For a thorough discussion of Alston's theory, see his essays: 'Divine and Human
Action', in Thomas V. Morris (ed.) Divine and Human Action (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1988), pp. 257-80, and 'Functionalism and Theological Language', American
Philosophical Quarterly, 22 (1985), pp. 221-30.
34 'Divine and Human Action', pp. 259-60.
206 LAURA L. GARCIA
Functionalism provides an advan

accounts in that it allows us to consid
different from ourselves (for exa
psychological states that play the sam
and attitudes play for us. This enable
token identity between mental eve
example, a given belief is identical w
the embarrassing consequence that no
state can share that belief. This im
Alston to suggest that even God's
understood on a functionalist mod
univocal connection between divine action and human action. In the
human case, a pro-attitude towards a certain goal G, together with the
belief that some course of action A is the best way to obtain G, often
results in doing A. But it might be that G is impossible to obtain or that
doing A is incompatible with other goals we have, so that in the
situation just described, A does not always occur. To account for this
Alston calls on the notion of a tendency to do A: 'The rough idea is that a
tendency to do A is a state that, in the absence of sufficient interference
or blockage, will issue in doing A.'35 This definition allows for th
possibility that a given tendency will be overridden by a stronge
tendency or an incompatible tendency. Of course, this model of action
is still completely deterministic, since functionalism sees our beliefs an
attitudes as completely necessitated by causes ultimately outside us,
and then as combining to issue in actions in a causally deterministic
way, with the strongest tendency prevailing. Given traditional claims
about the perfect freedom of God, functionalism does not seem a very
promising model for capturing divine activity.
Alston recognizes that the determinism implicit in functionalism
poses an obstacle to applying that theory to God's actions. He asks, 'Are
we really prepared to think of God's behavior as issuing automatically
from the interplay of motivational factors? Wouldn't that make God
into a mechanism, a system the output of which is determined by the
interplay of its parts, rather than a supremely free agent?'36 But Alston
tries to amend the functionalist account to avoid these problems by
introducing the notion of agent causation. On Alston's view, an agent's
free volition can intervene between her attitudes or motivational
structure and behaviour, so that even her strongest tendency is not
necessarily realized in action.37 With the introduction of agen
35 Ibid., p. 268.
36 Ibid.
37 As I understand it, Alston does not interpret volitions as pro-attitudes. Presumably,
causality, one might think that Alston has mov

from functionalism, especially since he admits that
that can be given a functionalist interpretation'.38
his revised functionalism can be applied to our und
agency. Alston summarizes revised functionalism
(3) If S has a pro-attitude towards G, the

tendency to do whatever S takes to be a way o
(4) If S has a tendency to do A, then if this
successfully opposed by a stronger tendency or b
S will do A, if the external world co-operates in
Objections to thefunctionalist account
Alston believes these conditionals can be applied to

to human activity alike, providing the univocal lin
the two cases, but serious problems arise here. In t
actions do not have 'input' in the sense in which hu
does not learn or acquire knowledge and he is n
situation when he acts. Further, as Alston poin
biological urges, cravings or other external forces
and his knowledge and power are unlimited - h
natural laws as humans are. Thus, God's 'situation'
dramatically.
Alston suggests that the input for the divine psyc
conceived of as all the truths there are, but this will n
the situation God is in 'prior' to his decision to cre
comprised of facts regarding God's own nature, oth
and perhaps certain contingent counterfactual
about what agents would freely do in various circ
they are placed.4 Omitted from this original situa
contingent truths, since these depend causally upon
thus cannot serve as input into God's creative act.
with Aquinas and other theists in the classical trad
atemporal and that his willing should be unders
on his view, volitions are directly within the agent's control in a w

the time) are not.
38 'Divine and Human Action', p. 272.
39 Ibid., p. 271. Alston points out that the last qualification in
the divine case.
40 This is my own view, in any case, though Alston does not commit himself on the
question of whether or not there are true counterfactuals of freedom.
208 LAURA L. GARCIA
Thus, it cannot have as input the conting

Furthermore, even if God exists temp
time, not every contingent fact can b
input to a given act, since some will be
Since the input for God's cognitive st
include the contingent facts dependent
more freedom with respect to his act
divine actions differ significantly in this
action in the functionalist model. For G
output radically under-determined
functionalists hope to find lawlike con
inputs and resulting outputs.
One might reply that the original
'prior' (in some sense) to creating the u
and goals, and that these can prov
probabilities with regard to what God
the traditional claim that in this o
overriding reason to choose to crea
a particular universe. That is, even
create this world, he can realize his
another world or by creating no world
(3) above, if God's purposes can be r
infinite number of different possib
tendency to create an infinite number
tendency to create no world. And accor
such that they will issue in action unles
or by an act of will. But this presents us
pulled in an infinite number of directi
he does not create but simply finds him
Much depends on the way in whic
understood. There seem to be three pos
of tendency that is operative in cases
tendency might be understood as a
inclination or attraction which literally
Tendencies in this sense would be state
a direct way) to the bringing about of
interpretation of tendencies might
statements which describe how often a certain characteristic occurs
within a particular group, for example, that women have a tendency
live longer than men. Finally, tendencies might be understood
expressing certain counterfactual truths, of the form: ifS did not w
G, S would do A.
I think it is clear that Alston must interpret tend

way, as causal forces, rather than in either of the
because conditionals (3) and (4) above describe ten
different degrees of strength, as capable of being
tendencies, as succeeding, as being blocked or inter
on. Statistical tendencies, on the other hand, thoug
construed as having varying strengths in some sen
oppose one another or be blocked or interfered
counterfactual statements do not admit of degrees o
they oppose one another or be blocked or interfered wi
cannot figure in the functionalist theory as summar
(3) and (4).41 Although these counterfactuals might
example, that if he had found ten righteous persons
not have destroyed it), by themselves they do not pr
functionalism that Alston desires. If God has such counterfactual
'tendencies' to realize each of the various possible means to his goals
this is merely for him to have some reason to realize each of those means
Such reasons need not issue in action at all, even if they are not block
by 'stronger tendencies' (better reasons?) to do something else. This
clearest in cases where there are several incompatible means to one
God's goals.
If the tendencies do not causally move God to act in some way, but
instead God acts only by a direct exercise of agent causality, then
conditional (4) in Alston's description of functionalism does not apply
to God after all. Conditional (4) will be false in the divine case because
tendencies will not compete in strength and will not themselves
produce or issue in an action (unless 'blocked' by God's will). Rather,
on this view, God's will produces the action, and the 'tendencies' play
no role in the action's production, but only come in to help provide a
rational explanation of it. I am sympathetic to such a view, but it does
not seem to correspond to functionalism as Alston describes it and as
I understand it. Conditionals (3) and (4) contain the core of the
functionalism that Alston wants to apply to both God and humans. If
the tendencies in (3) are read in a counterfactual way and the claims of
(4) are false in the divine case, then we seem to have lost any significant
connection to functionalism.
Presumably, then, Alston must construe tendencies as some kind of
causal force or impetus which points a person towards a certain action.
Whenever an agent has a pro-attitude towards a goal, she auto-
matically has a tendency towards whatever means she sees as a way of
4 Some of these counterfactuals may be true because of the existence of tendencies of
the first sort (causal forces), but they need not be based in tendencies of that kind.
210 LAURA L. GARCIA
attaining that goal. There seem to be

could generate tendencies of this sort. A
attitude consists in being attracted b
particular direction. The will's being
results in its also having a tenden
whatever the agent takes to be a mea
tendencies of this kind can be block
Alston's revised functionalism, by a
they automatically produce an action
this model comes immediately to m
really produced by the tendencies th
since the tendencies automatically
impeded in some way. Whatever pro
acting will automatically produce
strength, and normally the strongest
Even when the agent intervenes by a
does not causally produce the actio
tendencies from producing the action
win out and produce the action. Thi
appeals to weights and physical forc
Further, Alston's introduction of ag
active role for the agent in producin
makes her passive in the extreme, s
volitions play a role, her actions are p
the strongest unblocked tendency. Th
to the role of a bomb specialist, call
bomb's exploding by defusing it, bu
that the bomb does. If she blocks it,
to block it, the bomb is doing the ex
does not causally contribute to the ex
part of the background conditions fo
helps produce the explosion.) Such a p
unattractive even for the theory of
unattractive as a model for divine
viewed as subject to various tendenc
actions unless blocked in some way b
that 'the things [God] directly bring
causality' rather than 'event causality
are states of His own psyche'.42 But
functionalism does view God's action
psyche, namely tendencies, rather th
42 'Divine and Human Action', p. 269.
Given Alston's hesitation to adopt the implications

model of tendencies, we might consider a second wa
the link between pro-attitudes and tendencies, in w
understood as moving herself towards the various m
contribute to the realization of her goals. On this p
recognizes that something is good (has a pro-attitud
then seeks (or points herself towards) whatever she
to that goal. Since we have already seen that the ten
be understood as a type of causal force, this seeking mu
of pushing herself towards the means to her ends. W
the passivity inherent in the attraction view, it raise
problem of its own. Since some tendencies will b
actions which are incompatible with each other, this
the agent as striving to bring about incompatible a
operating irrationally. If David has some tenden
towards digging a hole deeper and some tendency to
he must be directing himself towards both of these acti
time, which seems deeply irrational. One can be
mutually incompatible alternatives without being ir
cannot actively seek what one knows are mutua
alternatives if one is to remain rational. Therefore,
Alston's functionalist model must be seen either
passive or as irrational, both of which are repugnant
conception of God.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
We have already seen that Aquinas' account of human ac

more cognitively oriented than is the functionalist ac
believe it is an improvement over that view. Instead of be
pro-attitudes, seen as evaluative or affective states of the
generate tendencies, Aquinas begins from reasons to act, w
not generate causal tendencies even when they involve v
states of affairs as good or desirable. For Aquinas, the en
necessarily wills (namely, his own goodness) gives him n
reason to bring about any contingent means to that end,
no tendencies of Alston's sort towards realizing one of the
should not be viewed as having a tendency towards each o
that would realize his goals, and then as either allowing th
these tendencies to win out or as blocking the strongest ones
will so that the most forceful remaining tendency wi
action. It is true that, within the set of things willed by
~212~ ~LAURA L. GARCIA
willed as a means towards realizing others and some are willed as
necessary conditions of others, but these cases do not translate easily
into tendency-language. In the case of necessary conditions, God
cannot but will what are necessary conditions to other things he wills,
since he cannot will the ends without willing their essential conditions.
Further, when God wills something as a non-essential means to a
particular end, as in Alston's examples of sending Ezekiel to renew the
faith of Israel or sending the Holy Spirit to guide the Church into the
correct Trinitarian doctrine, it seems unlikely that there is such a thing
as the best means to his ends. God has no need to minimize the amount
of effort or expense and he is not subject to time constraints, natural
laws, etc. It may be that a given means is optimal with respect to its cost
to other goals or purposes of his, but even here it is not clear that he is
required to realize that means. Finally, even if God is required to realize
the best means to his ends in this sense, this does not seem to be a matter
of a tendency towards that action winning out over tendencies towards
less optimal actions. At most, God might be said to have a counter-
factual tendency towards the other actions, since, given that he has a
certain goal, perhaps he would choose those means were it not for other
purposes of his. But given all of his goals and purposes and his
omniscience, surely God would have no actual tendency or inclination
towards the less optimal means. While Aquinas sees God's goals as
rendering certain subsidiary actions 'fitting' or 'useful' or even
'necessary', these considerations do not prevent God's willing of a
particular order of things from being a free elective choice. I believe it is
only a view like Aquinas', which takes agent causation seriously as the
ultimate explanation of what God does, which will enable Alston to
hold on to what he rightly takes to be a central theistic doctrine:
namely, that 'God's activity is the activity of a free agent in the most
unqualified sense'.43
I believe Aquinas' understanding of God's creative act represents an
equally significant advance over that of Helm. Whereas Helm has
accused Aquinas of grounding the act of creation in God's 'reasonless
will', in the end it is Helm who cannot provide any reason for the
creation of this universe other than that it seemed good to God to do so,
while Aquinas suggests at least a partial explanation of what God does
in terms of what is fitting, useful or conditionally necessary. In Aquinas'
account, we find the metaphor of an artist, freely choosing the forms
and materials that suitably realize his design. Surely this artistic
metaphor, which has guided theological commentary on creation for
43 Ibid.
centuries, is a far more congenial image of God's activit

Leibnizian metaphor of a divine calculator or t
metaphor of a divine automaton.4
Georgetown University
" I wish to thank Terry Christlieb, Wayne Davis, Jorge Gar

and the philosophy departments at the University of St Tho
University for invaluable comments and criticisms on this paper.

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Divine Freedom and Creation

University of St. Andrews, Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association

DIVINE FREEDOM AND CREATION

The claim that God acts freely in choosing to create us, or in c

' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk I, Ch. 88.

free human choices if there are no gen

3 In this paragraph I have assumed two things:

to consider here the question of whether someone w

I. HELM'S DENIAL OF DIVINE FREEDOM

It is agreed by virtually every theologian that God's free

has the freedom to choose among

The picture frequently sketched (for example by Leibniz), that

Thus, if God first contemplates the different possibilities which he

6 Ibid., pp. 178-9.

We can distinguish various aspects of the divine inte

For example, if we suppose with some (Anselm, for instance),

This argument requires an additional premise, namely, that whatever

by means of an interesting distincti

(1) If God's willing a certain universe is rational, then that

If one accepts that the divine will is essentially

Constraints on rational choice

Helm's defence of (1), that rationality requires an op

Certainly having a reason of a certain sort

Helm argues here that if a choice is to be fully e

such an optimific choice for God

more reason to leave through this door than throu

Is there a best possible world?

So far we have dealt only with He

21 In the Theodicy, Leibniz actually compare

It seems to be the case that when we speak of best a

Thus the notion of a 'best of all possible worlds' seems incoherent on

moral agent who actualizes one of

25 Philip L. Quinn, 'God, Moral Perfectio

Let us consider one more attempt to define the term

27 Eternal God, p. 178.

itself, but spends his energies instead i

30 Eternal God, p. 155.

and other creatures such as angels have liberta

II. ALSTON'S FUNCTIONALIST ACCOUNT

The model ofdivine agency proposed by William Alston i

Functionalism provides an advan

causality, one might think that Alston has mov

(3) If S has a pro-attitude towards G, the

Objections to thefunctionalist account

Alston believes these conditionals can be applied to

on his view, volitions are directly within the agent's control in a w

Thus, it cannot have as input the conting

I think it is clear that Alston must interpret tend

attaining that goal. There seem to be

Given Alston's hesitation to adopt the implications

III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL

We have already seen that Aquinas' account of human ac

centuries, is a far more congenial image of God's activit

" I wish to thank Terry Christlieb, Wayne Davis, Jorge Gar

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