Maersk Line vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

94761, May 17, 1993

DOCTRINE

While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by

law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not
vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such
common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver
at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should
at least be made within reasonable time.

GENERALLY, NOT OBLIGATED BY LAW TO CARRY AND TO

DELIVER MERCHANDISE PROMPTLY; EXCEPTION

The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for

delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is
not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When
a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law
implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination
within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement
as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an
express contract to transport and deliver property within a
specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable
for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. 

FACTS:

  Maersk Line is engaged in the transportation of goods by sea, doing

business in the Philippines through its general agent Compania General de
Tabacos de Filipinas.
 respondent Efren Castillo, on the other hand, is the proprietor of Ethegal
Laboratories, a firm engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical
products.
 November 12, 1976, private respondent ordered from Eli Lilly, Inc. of
Puerto Rico through its (Eli Lilly, Inc.’s) agent in the Philippines, Elanco
Products, 600,000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his
pharmaceutical products.
 Through a Memorandum of Shipment (Exh. `B’; AC GR CV No. 10340,
Folder of Exhibits, pp. 5-6), the shipper Eli Lilly, Inc. of Puerto Rico
advised private respondent as consignee that the 600,000 empty gelatin
capsules in six (6) drums of 100,000 capsules each, were already shipped
on board MV "Anders Maerskline" under Voyage No. 7703 for shipment to
the Philippines via Oakland, California. In said Memorandum, shipper
Eli Lilly, Inc. specified the date of arrival to be April 3, 1977.
 For unknown reasons, said cargo of capsules were mishipped and
diverted to Richmond, Virginia, USA and then transported back to
Oakland, California. The goods finally arrived in the Philippines on
June 10, 1977 or after two (2) months from the date specified in
 the memorandum. As a consequence, private respondent as
consignee refused to take delivery of the goods on account of its
failure to arrive on time.
 rivate respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the
delivery of the goods, filed an action before the court a quo for rescission
of contract with damages against petitioner and Eli Lilly, Inc. as
defendants
 Denying that it committed breach of contract, petitioner alleged in its
answer that the subject shipment was transported in accordance with the
provisions of the covering bill of lading and that its liability under the law
on transportation of goods attaches only in case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods as provided for in Article 1734 of the Civil Code
 Defendant Eli Lilly, Inc. alleged that the delay in the arrival of the subject
merchandise was due solely to the gross negligence of petitioner Maersk
Line.
  private respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint against Eli
Lilly, Inc. on the ground that the evidence on record shows that
the delay in the delivery of the shipment was attributable solely
to petitioner.
 trial court dismissed the complaint against Eli Lilly, Inc. Correspondingly,
the latter withdrew its cross-claim against petitioner in a joint motion
dated December 3, 1979.
 court a quo rendered judgment dated January 8, 1982 in favor of
respondent Castillo that there was a breach in the performance of
their obligation by the defendant Maersk Line consisting of their
negligence to ship the 6 drums of empty Gelatin Capsules which
under their own memorandum shipment would arrive in the
Philippines on April 3, 1977 which under Art. 1170 of the New
Civil Code, they stood liable for damages.
 CA rendered its decision ordering defendant-appellant Maersk Line to pay
plaintiff-appellee

ISSUE

Whether or not the carrier is liable for the delay in the delivery of the
shipment.

RULING;

 SALUDO RULING: The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for

delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an
insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier
undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be
delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any
agreement as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an
express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time,
it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from
what cause it may have arisen.
 In the case before us, we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods
spanning a period of two (2) months and seven (7) days falls way
beyond the realm of reasonableness. 
 Described as gelatin capsules for use in pharmaceutical products, subject
shipment was delivered to, and left in, the possession and custody of
petitioner-carrier for transport to Manila via Oakland, California. But
through petitioner’s negligence was mishipped to Richmond, Virginia.
Petitioner’s insistence that it cannot be held liable for the delay finds no
merit.

Federal Express vs. Antonio, GR No. 199455, June 27, 2018

DOCTRINE:
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

"Extraordinary diligence is that extreme measure of care and

caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use
for securing and preserving their own property or rights."  Consistent
with the mandate of extraordinary diligence, the Civil Code stipulates that in
case of loss or damage to goods, common carriers are presumed to be
negligent or at fault, except in the following instances:

FACTS:

 Eliza was the owner of Unit 22-A (the Unit) in Allegro Condominium,
located at 62 West 62nd St., New York, United States.7 In November
2003, monthly common charges on the Unit became due. These
charges were for the period of July 2003 to November 2003, and
were for a total amount of US$9,742.81
 On December 15, 2003, Luwalhati and Eliza were in the Philippines. As
the monthly common charges on the Unit had become due, they decided
to send several Citibank checks to Veronica Z. Sison (Sison), who was
based in New York
 Upon learning that the checks were sent on December 15, 2003, Sison
contacted FedEx on February 9, 2004 to inquire about the non-delivery.
She was informed that the package was delivered to her neighbor but
there was no signed receipt.
 n March 14, 2004, Luwalhati and Eliza, through their counsel, sent a
demand letter to FedEx for payment of damages due to the non-delivery
of the package, but FedEx refused to heed their demand.
 FedEx claimed that Luwalhati and Eliza "ha[d] no cause of action against
it because [they] failed to comply with a condition precedent, that of filing
a written notice of claim within the 45 calendar days from the acceptance
of the shipment.
 It added that it was absolved of liability as Luwalhati and Eliza shipped
prohibited items and misdeclared these items as "documents."
 Regional Trial Court ruled for Luwalhati and Eliza, awarding them moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.17
 Regional Trial Court found that Luwalhati failed to accurately declare the
contents of the package as "checks."18 However, it ruled that a check is
not legal tender or a "negotiable instrument equivalent to cash,"
as prohibited by the Air Waybill.
 It explained that common carriers are presumed to be at fault
whenever goods are lost

ISSUE
Whether petitioner common carrier is liable for the lost/damage sustained by
respondents

RULING

 YES!
ivil Code mandates common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in
caring for the goods they are transporting:
The Civil Code mandates common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence
in caring for the goods they are transporting:

Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
"Extraordinary diligence is that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use
for securing and preserving their own property or
rights."45 Consistent with the mandate of extraordinary diligence,
the Civil Code stipulates that in case of loss or damage to goods,
common carriers are presumed to be negligent or at fault,46 except
in the following instances:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act or competent public authority.47
In all other cases, common carriers must prove that they exercised
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties, if they
are to be absolved of liability.48
The responsibility of common carriers to exercise extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
their possession until they are delivered "to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them."49 Thus, part of the
extraordinary responsibility of common carriers is the duty to ensure that
shipments are received by none but "the person who has a right to receive
them."50 Common carriers must ascertain the identity of the recipient. Failing
to deliver shipment to the designated recipient amounts to a failure to deliver.
The shipment shall then be considered lost, and liability for this loss ensues.

 Petitioner is unable to prove that it exercised extraordinary

diligence in ensuring delivery of the package to its designated
consignee. It claims to have made a delivery but it even admits that it
was not to the designated consignee. It asserts instead that it was
authorized to release the package without the signature of the designated
recipient and that the neighbor of the consignee, one identified only as
"LGAA 385507," received it.51 This fails to impress.

Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Company of N.A., GR No. L-18965, Oct. 30,
1964

DOCTRINE;

FACTS:

  in October, 1952, Macleod and Company of the Philippines (SHIPPER)

contracted by telephone the services of the Compañia Maritima
(CARRIER), a shipping corporation, for the shipment of 2,645 bales of
hemp from the former's Sasa private pier at Davao City to Manila and for
their subsequent transhipment to Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. on board
the S.S. Steel Navigator.
 this oral contract was later on confirmed by a formal and written booking
issued by Macleod's branch office in Sasa and handcarried to Compañia
Maritima's branch office in Davao
-The 2 lighters were manned each by a patron and an assistant patron.
 The patrons of both barges issued the corresponding carrier's receipts
and that issued by the patron of Barge No. 1025
 Received in behalf of S.S. Bowline Knot in good order and condition from
MACLEOD AND COMPANY OF PHILIPPINES, Sasa Davao, for transhipment
at Manila onto S.S. Steel Navigator.
 Early hours of October 30: LCT No. 1025 sank, resulting in the damage or
loss of 1,162 bales of hemp loaded therein
 Macleod promptly notified the carrier's main office in Manila and its
branch in Davao advising it of its liability
 The damaged hemp was brought to Odell Plantation in Madaum, Davao,
for cleaning, washing, reconditioning, and redrying. 
 Macleod filed a claim for the loss it suffered with the insurance company
and was paid P64,018.55
 October 28, 1953.: failing to recover from the carrier P60,421.02 (amount
supported by receipts), the insurance company instituted the present
action 
 W/N there was a contract of carriage bet. CM (carrier) and Macleod
(shipper)

RULING;

 YES
 receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie at the
foundation of the contract to carry and deliver, and if actually no
goods are received there can be no such contract
 -The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for
the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to,
or receipt by, the carrier or an authorized agent. ... and delivery
to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel,
where it is the custom to deliver in that way
 Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and
nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can be said with
certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established
