IN RE: VICENTE SOTTO "The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of

court may be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority; such

Facts: power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any
special or express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain
This is a proceeding for contempt of court against respondent Vicente courts or tribunals to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by
Sotto, who was required by the Court to show cause why he should not statute, but such statutory authorization is unnecessary, so far as the
be punished for contempt of court for having issued a written statement courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds nothing
[in connection with the decision of the Court in the case of In re: Angel to their power, although so far as concerns the inferior courts statutory
Parazo (case didn’t say what the Parazo case was about) published in authority may be necessary to empower them to act."
the Manila Times]. The statement read: (copy paste ko nalang ah di ko
lam pano isummarize baka itanong ni sir haha) In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from
American Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
"As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted
by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local "The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending
daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior,
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal,
mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to
believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication,
of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the
sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
constituted a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary
loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or degrade
of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the part of the law of the land."
Philippine Judiciary.”
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
Upon his request, he was granted 10 days more (aside from the five or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
originally given to him) to file his answer good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten
the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
Although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
given him, his answer was still admitted influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.

The court then could have rendered a judgment for contempt after
considering his answer, because he did not deny the authenticity of his
statement but in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to
defend himself or justify the libelous statement, the case was still set for
hearing or oral argument (which was postponed because he did not
appear at the first date)
In his answer, the respondent did not deny having published the article
but he contends that under Sec. 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon the SC the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, “the Court has no power to impose
correctional penalties upon citizens, and that the SC can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to be
promulgated by Congress with approval of the President”
He also alleges in his answer that in the exercise of the freedom of
speech, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost
good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the
honorable members of the tribunal, who in his opinion, erroneously
decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked nor intended to attack
the honesty or integrity of any one”
Issue:
Is Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt? – Yes
Ruling:
Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to a statement
that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the
law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of
the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in
that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final
disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial
notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both
houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any
particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the
respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying
said Act. But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of
Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices
of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice,
for in his above-quoted statement he says:

That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of
superior jurisdiction independently of any special expression of statute,
is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of
last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction
since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of
that country. The doctrine or principle as expounded in American
Jurisprudence is as follows:
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this
effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce
in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme
Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy."cralaw virtua1aw library

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say,
Page 1 of 52
that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and [A.C. No. 1162. August 29, 1975.]
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity Clerk of Court, Respondent.
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and [A.C. No. 1163. August 29, 1975.]
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he Examinee, Respondent.
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts [A.C. No. 1164. August 29, 1975.]
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.  IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN,
ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. MANUEL MONTECILLO,
Respondent’s assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR.,
press with the utmost good faith and without intention of offending any Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, Respondents.
of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal," if true
may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; SYNOPSIS
but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this
proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Disbarment proceedings were filed against the Bar Confidant, Victorio
Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for Lanuevo and a 1971 bar candidate, Ramon Galang, and disciplinary
contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case action against five bar examiners for acts and omissions committed in
through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.  the 1971 bar examinations.

It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the Based on a confidential letter from a bar flunked, The Supreme Court
press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of checked the records of the 1971 bar examinations. As a result thereof,
liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty the grades in five subjects of an examinee (Ramon Galang) were found
in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press to be charged, which, however, were the properly initialed and
and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the authenticated by each of the examiner concerned. Upon investigation,
independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said the Bar Confidant admitted in his sworn statement having brought back
in U. S. v. Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The the five examination notebooks to the examiners for re-evaluation. In
administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate turn, the five examiners admitted, in their individual sworn statements,
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the having re-evaluated and re-checked the notebooks involved (all of which
other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and had failing marks) upon the representation made to each of them
should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, separately and individually by the Bar Confidant that examiners were
from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its authorized to do so and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously (examiner concerned) particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a passing. On the other hand, Ramon Galang denied any knowledge of the
clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business actuation’s of the Bar Confidant.
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of The Supreme Court, holding that the Office of the Bar Confidant has
justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to absolutely nothing to do with the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the
punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after
disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside the notebooks are submitted by the examiners and, that, therefore, the
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be deception made by the Bar Confidant was in violation of the trust and
insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an confidence reposed in him, disbarred the Bar Confidant and ordered his
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
With respect to respondent Ramon Galang, the Supreme Court likewise
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under
disbarred him because of the highly irregular manner of his passing the
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to bar which was effected through an authorized re-evaluation of his
the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of examination notebooks, and on the ground that he fraudulently
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
concealed and withheld his pending criminal case for slight physical
injuries in all his seven applications to take the bar examinations which
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto indicates his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the above- quoted demeanor.
publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of
fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, Respondent Bar Examiners were reminded to exercise the greatest or
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.  utmost care and vigilance in the performance of their duties as such.

The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same

period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred SYLLABUS
from practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this
Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him
during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of 1. COURT PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES; BAR CONFIDANT;
Court. FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES. — The Bar Confidant is simply the
custodian of bar examination notebooks for and in behalf of the court;
hence, any suggestion or request by him for re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing
mark before or after the notebooks are submitted by the examiner, is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy. His
Page 2 of 52
position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates. His one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest —
functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar Examinations are absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the
defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to. greatest or utmost care and vigilance in the performance of their duties
relative thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION IN CONNECTION WITH BAR
EXAMINATIONS. — After the connected notebooks are submitted to 10. ATTORNEYS; REVOCATION OF LICENSE. — Well-settled is
the Bar Confidant by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the the rule that concealment by an attorney in his application to take the
individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter Bar Examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicated
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a for, a crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law.
comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the 11. ANTI-GRAFT LAW; DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER
Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing SECTION 8, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019. Section 8 of Republic Act
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business No. 3019 authorized the dismissal on removal of a public officer once it
evaluating the answer of the examinees and cannot assume the functions is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion
of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiner concerned. He is to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
not the over-all Examiner and cannot presume to know better than the income and the income from legitimately acquired property . . ."
Examiner.

3. SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN ADMITTING BAR D E C I S I O N

CANDIDATES. — The judicial function of the Supreme Court is
admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and MAKASIAR, J.:
principles; (2) concrete facts whether past or present, affecting
determine individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles. Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for
disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for
4. ID.; ID.; BAR EXAMINATION COMMITTEE. — In the exercise of disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel
the judicial function in admitting bar candidates, the Court acts through C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty.
a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and
acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
in the eight (8) bar subject with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a
sort of liaison officer between the Court and Bar Chairman, on the one In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answers to the 1971
Bar Confidant is at the same time a deputy clerk of the court. Bar Examinations questions, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the
1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35%
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTS OF COMMITTEE MUST BE IN and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The
ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED RULES OF COURT. — starting fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one
Every act of Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
subject to the final approval of the Court. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo.
He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
6. BAR EXAMINATIONS; REQUEST FOR RE-EVALUATION. — grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the alterations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results.
same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act Note that this was without any formal motion or requests from the
thereon. Once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the bar examiners
the bar confidant the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. reason why they may not do so now when proper request and motion
therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might
7. ID.; ADMISSION; REQUIREMENT; GOOD MORAL not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for
CHARACTER. — Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court their grades were not asked to be reconsidered ‘unofficially’? Why the
of 1964, among others, provides that "every applicant for admission as a discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en
member of the Bar must . . . of good moral character . . . and must banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I,
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude rec.).
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to
1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicants was required to Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects
moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile
duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however,
ascertain or determine applicant’s moral character. Furthermore, as to were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
of one’s personal record, whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1967, 1966,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
compelling. 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971
bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75%
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — An applicant’s intentional by virtue of a Court resolution making 74% as the passing mark for the
withholding or concealment from the Supreme Court of his pending case 1971 bar examinations.
of slight physical injuries of his application to take the bar examination
of 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, by virtue of which he Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
was allowed unconditionally to take the examinations seven times and to requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
take his oath in 1972, is a ground for disbarment. examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
9. ID.; EXAMINERS REQUIRED TO EXERCISE UTMOST CARE.
— Examiner’s participation in the admission of members to the Bar is
Page 3 of 52
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant Respondent Galang, in all his applications to take the bar examinations,
admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re- do.
evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the
same was done and his reasons for doing the same. The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and
was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and
admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant
Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
borderline of passing. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5,1973, offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman In their individual sworn statements and answers, which they offered as
E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on respondents-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they
March 5, 1971 to require him "to show cause within ten (10) days from re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys"
(Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Law, affirmed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
"2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.) while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,1973 (Adm. Case No. that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on segments and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinarily high
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his grade;
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-
104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and "3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought
compliance came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110, back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
rec.). because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and
if I could reconsider this grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent passing mark;
Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or rechecked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law "4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, who was that I was just manifesting cooperation indoing so, I re-evaluated the
asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. "5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remained as a is number ‘95’;
respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re- "6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers
checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1622 turned out to be were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of
owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and
and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law No. 8 with 8% to 10%" (underscoring supplied).
resulting in the change of the grade from 47% to 50%. This notebook
bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations
by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with the following additional
latter’s father were summoned to testify in the investigation. statements:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation x x x

upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee
as Investigating Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias
Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon
University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on
Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted
with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-
21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember
having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries. Because
of this denial, a summons was issued to Eufrosino F. de Vera, who
narrated the circumstances surrounding the case and identified
respondent Galang as the very same person charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in that case (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
"3. . . . . However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer possible to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos.
1, 2 and 10 remained at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
"4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 95 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
"5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of

Page 4 of 52
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;
"b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent
and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that
time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court and
specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might he
identified as a bar examiner;
x x x I be identified as an examiner. . . .;
"3. At the time I reviewed the examinee’s notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did not know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that
I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to
the present;
"4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I
was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my
authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his
identity revealed, the Bar Confidant’s assurance was apparently regular
and so appeared to be in the regular course of official business which
thus convinced me because there was no express prohibition in the rules
and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was
my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as
much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest

"5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o’clock
"e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to reconsider and authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the representation were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
one who made the original correction of the same" (Adm. Case No. Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; Emphasis supplied). Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, about the same hour that he used to see me:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in library
his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
"On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner’s
code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on "7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error
The bar confidant had with him an examinee’s notebook bearing code in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
number 661, and, after the usual amenities, he requested me if it was considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred because I corrected
possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84%
subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as
law. unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the
other subjects; I presumed that, as Bar Confidant, he was in the position
"I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to review or re-examine the to know and that there was nothing irregular in
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control
and authority as long as the particular examinee’s name had not been "8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
identified or that the code number decoded and the examinee’s name examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 661. Still, the
in the case presented hearing code number 661 had not been identified examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was
or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that
particularly low grade to said examinee. he had passed the other subjects. . . .

"Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant’s representations
to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the
grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answers, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with
the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades and as he had
assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, . . . I therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No.
1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy of the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; Emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and repleaded "1. . . .
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
addition alleged that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x Mandaluyong, Rizal.
"9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners’
Committee, which according to my diary was on February 8, 1972, the
committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee’s first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
"10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. I had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had
I any kind of contact with him before or after the review and even up to
the present" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my then residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Page 5 of 52
 suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or
"3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) was legitimate.
paper in Criminal Law saving that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in x x x
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make
the general passing average.
"c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
"4. That seeing the justification, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
mark and revised also the mark in the general list. and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo’s representation that it was only in that particular subject that
"5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee the said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; Emphasis supplied). said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him,
but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent’s honest appraisal, to be
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9%" (Adm.
now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; Emphasis
supplied). Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 17, 1972:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit
dated April 14, 1972, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library x x x

x x x
"That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners’ Committee
after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed the one Bar
"2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
1912, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me
in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to "That I informed the Bar Examiners’ Committee that I would be willing
me an examinee’s notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he
used the word ‘we’) had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to "That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate’s
review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
previously given. He explained that the examinee concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade "That I reviewed the who]e paper and after re-evaluating the answers of
that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the "That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes
Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention in the grade sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; Italics supplied).
to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
entirely within my discretion.
x x x
"3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo’s authority as Bar
Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request was
in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded to re-read and re- "2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I
evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject. candidate concerned, which I did.

. . ." (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; Emphasis supplied). "3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo pertained to bar examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee"
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; Emphasis supplied).

x x x In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing x x x

the total grade of the examinee concerned in Remedial Law from
63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be
that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the
"As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed
Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to
omission, that — scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-
evaluation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
"a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not examiners shortly earlier to the effect that.
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
Page 6 of 52
. . . in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino
given to clarity of language and soundness of reasoning (par. 4), street and almost adjacent to the southeastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School (photograph of the number ‘954’, the contrivance
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is
re-evaluation and/or re-checking. identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number ‘954’ as
Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
"It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the
release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with "With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket,
them would copy their answers and have them checked by their which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to ‘954’. This
professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such digits of the ticket number was ‘27’, a number that is so significant to
motions or requests which we are readying for submission to the me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
Honorable Court. with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code
numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
"Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they charge of the examinations as bar confidant up to 1971, I either started
have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released with the number ‘27’ (or ‘227’) or end with said number. (1968 Master
is final and irrevocable. List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure ‘27’ at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a-Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh.
"It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that 6-Lanuevo and the figure ‘227’ at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure ‘227’ at
for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; Italics supplied). the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List
as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure ‘227’ at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo Lanuevo).
avers:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
"That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
concerned in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific
concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
the examiners’ decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;
meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing (b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army by way of
general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on
grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the February 27, 1957.
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one "Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
surnamed ‘de la Cruz’ or ‘Ty-de la Cruz’. resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the
"Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would office code number ‘954’. As the number was still fresh in my mind, it
stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
because he did it in all good faith. notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the
apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good
". . ." (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; Emphasis supplied). faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum
(Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation,
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum
amplification of, his answer, stating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

x x x "3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference

to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer
"1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned back to the respective examiners, namely:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were "(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law (the notebooks of this
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential examinee hear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner’s
that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) which was circulated to all the Code No. 951 with the original grade of 47% increased to 50% after re-
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
re-evaluation was in order;
"(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of
"2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the
notebooks in question:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law
"Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this
February, 1972, on my way hack to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh.
I thought of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object the Examiner’s Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased
and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was ‘954’ Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Pardo (Exh. ----- Pardo).
Page 7 of 52
"4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re- "7. This Honorable Tribunal’s Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make
evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant
and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners
concerned; were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded
as such in the consideration of this case.
"5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to
review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I ". . ." (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the
increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may I
not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
fact that Lanuevo’s story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of leading to the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the answers of
April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
answers on the first notebook" as he "was going over those notebooks, authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who
of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of
‘954."cralaw virtua1aw library December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
others; representations that as Bar Confidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate
"1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former Bar Confidant obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as in another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook
required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for for re-evaluation and change of grade (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
taking the bar examinations. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 34, rec.).

x x x Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo

brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet
in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who
"4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his
reconsider ‘failure’ cases; after the official release thereof; why should it grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examinee
now reconsider a ‘passing’ case, especially in a situation where the will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, respondent Lanuevo’s word and under the belief that was really the
met only once in the ordinary course of official business? practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he
was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper
"It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly and reconsidered the examinee’s grade in said subject to 75% from 64%.
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled? The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner’s Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon
"5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court’s E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo’s actuations which are stated in (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the
Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf. Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in
seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee
"But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions
arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent’s examination papers Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent’s grades Rizal, with an examinee’s notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent
was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter Manalo had previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly
year’s examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent’s to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they"
papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo had reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that Bar done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low
Confidant Lanuevo’s actuations resulted in herein Respondent’s benefit grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the
an evidence per se of Respondent’s having caused actuations of Bar general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Confidant Lanuevo to be done in former’s behalf? To assume this could Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that
be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo
bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
facts as unworthy of credence, or consideration. respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
x x x
Page 8 of 52
"4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarity of language and soundness of
reasoning."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo
that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo’s)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as
Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee’s answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase
of the examinee’s grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature
the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The
said notebook examiner’s code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, examinee Galang
could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
in the latter’s house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law
and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner’s Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.),
informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political
Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would
be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee
will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent
that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that
this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby
told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of
10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the changes made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang’s general
average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks
in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet
in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then
helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public
International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only
a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from
64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The II
examinee’s Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, Respondent.
71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
A
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular
re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one EXAMINEE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, alias
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
reviewing the examinee’s notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own
but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period
(Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang’s
general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three
more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee
Galangs notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the
last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization
from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile
Law to re-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8,
1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1161, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent
Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed
all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made
during the meeting within hearing of the other members, who were all
closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his
willingness to re-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate’s notebook
with Examiner’s Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration
or decision (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
70-11; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the
information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and
passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-
evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.). Respondent Montecillo
likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of
an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner’s
Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp 34-
35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to
the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo,
this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first
meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. Respondent Lanuevo had
with him on that occasion an examinee’s notebook bearing Examiner’s
Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examinee who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent
Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examinee concerned, resulting in
an increase of grade from 57% to 66%. Said notebook has number 1622
as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs.
1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30,
rec.).
Page 9 of 52
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in
the increase of Galang’s average from 66.25% to the passing grade BAI
74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less,
that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution Labor Laws and Social
of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year’s
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
Galang thereafter took his lawyer’s oath. It is likewise beyond dispute
that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such evaluation made.
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees. 2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 11 points

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that or 33 weighted points.
respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on
the borderline of passing, respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum (Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases evaluation made.
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.)
distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He 3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10pts.
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the
same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to or 30 weighted points.
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as Bar Confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he 4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners’ decision . . ." 22 weighted points.
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 74.5% (75%) =
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to 11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never
as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises 81% 81% = no re
the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any
such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive evaluation made.
to the norms of delicacy.
———————————
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz,
Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other. Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents- already narrated, Galang’s original average of 66.25% was increased to
examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross- 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and
examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-
Lanuevo took undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in evaluated for each of the latter two — Political Law and Public
him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as Bar International Law for-Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
Confidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and
characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re- nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar. notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a
respondent Lanuevo’s well-studied and well-calculated moves in comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, before the average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiner
was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on better than the Examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done
the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as
Exercises, a minor subject, with a grade of 81%. The averages and well as the image of the Court.
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized
reevaluation are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Respondent Lanuevo’s claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang
without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in
BAI him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the face of
the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang’s papers for re-
1. Political Law and Public evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees
with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73 9% of which he was
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
or 30 weighted points respondent Lanuevo’s claim of absolute good faith in referring back the
Page 10 of 52
papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p. 35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
against the original weighted average of 66.25%, of Galang, there can Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original
hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as
(90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change
to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present
injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the dela Cruz bearing Examiner Code Number 951 and Office Code
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162,
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No.
same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and evidence.
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile
Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz was to give his actuations in the case of In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
away. Even the reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V,
concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in p. 16, rec.). Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of
four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown. an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V,
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number pp. 16-17, rec.).
given to Galang’s notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his supplemental sworn statement (Exh. 3-Lanuevo, Adm. Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.) filed during the investigation with this Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
period of more than five (5) months after he filed his answer on March particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
19, 1973 (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought. Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of
B any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ’ Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
NOTEBOOK IN MERCANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF respondent Lanuevo to him.
47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG’S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8,
LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE- 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%. subject the examinee failed should reevaluate or recheck the notebook
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72,
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the rec.).
Examiners concerned.
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:chanrob1es virtual
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases 1aw library
were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its
first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer Labor Laws 73%
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to
the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty Taxation 69%
dela Cruz (Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the data of these two cases were contained in a sheet of Mercantile Law 68%
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every Ernesto Quitaleg’s grades and averages before and after the re-
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:chanrob1es
28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the data of the two examinees and virtual 1aw library
record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented
by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently B A
in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the
release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet weighted points
or record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 14, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-
13, 20-22, 2931, rec.). Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that Civil Law 75% 75% ="
there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record Taxation 69% 69% ="
(Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook’s examiner
Page 11 of 52
Mercantile Law 68% 68% ="
III
Criminal Law 78% 78% ="

Remedial Law 85% 85% =" Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, Respondent.
Legal Ethics 83% 83% ="
A
——————————

Average (weighted) — 73.15% — 74.5% The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, consequence of the un-authorized reevaluation of his answers in five (5)
rec.) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal
Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
Political Law 70% individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers’ Petition for
Taxation 72% Admission to the Bar — 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin,
removed are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 1969 ed., p. 13).

BA In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar

Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in
the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a
Labor Laws 75% 75% =" sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the
Civil Law 89% 89% =" Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise
Taxation 72% 72% =" of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar
must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the
Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
weighted points designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation be strictly adhered to.

Remedial Law 88% 88% =" The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
Legal Ethics 79% 79% =" established, was initiated by respondent Lanuevo without any authority
from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
———————————————— the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
Weighted Averages — 74.95% — 75.4% admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.). examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee’s answers merit re-evaluation or re-
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the correction or whether the Examiner’s appraisal of such answers is
answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance
the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo. proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate’s admission to the Bar
were in accordance with the rules.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in
Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be B
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because
even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates
Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile a member of the Bar must be . . . of good moral character . . . and must
Law as subsequently reevaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%. produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to
having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred. moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is
duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is ascertain or determine applicant’s moral character. Furthermore, as to
believed that they should be required to show cause and the what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
corresponding investigation conducted. determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court
Page 12 of 52
of one’s personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations
more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending
provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the to deceive the court" (165 NYS, 102, 104; Italics supplied).
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or
pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of Carpel’s admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form
used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in Furthermore, respondent’s persistent denial of his involvement in any
1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant’s criminal criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigator of
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation of the victim in that case (he finally admitted it when he was confronted
to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant’s criminal records criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant’s attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore
moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant’s unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant’s acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or omission.
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney’s certificate and the
of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in
not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or Re Felipe del Rosario:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending "The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one
case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971. clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the Bar (citing American
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty cases)" [52 Phil. 399-401].
of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971, he committed perjury Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to the grounds, among others, of (a) misrepresentations of, or false
take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant’s educational
take his oath. attainment [Tapel v. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking
off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law 478]; (black of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314];
is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People v.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Romualdez — re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399 and People v. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
" [1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime
this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so of falsification of public documents.
serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited)." [2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law IV
examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of
the judge would have been forthcoming" (State ex rel. Board of Law RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710)."cralaw virtua1aw Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian (Later Associate Justice
library of the Court of Appeals, now deceased) Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo,
Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
The license of respondent Podell was revoked and annulled, and he was Jr., Respondents.
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and
his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710). All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-
evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph misrepresentation of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
" [1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
discretion of the Appellate Division.’ In the exercise of the discretion, owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any
the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed
state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one
Page 13 of 52
the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrection in if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get
good faith and without any consideration whatsoever. passing mark;

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of
admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under
the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the
Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred
the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners
should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete Fades and/or the average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstanced.
This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations
could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed
and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really
deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo
in connection with the reevaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg’s answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it
would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember
the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a
passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one
causing his failure. . . ." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3
and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; Emphasis
ours). And respondent Pablo: ". . . he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in all other subjects except this subject
and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the
mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
examinations so I believe I asked him ‘Is this being done?’ and he said
‘Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees
who are failing in just one subject’ so I readily acceded to his request
and said ‘Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate’ and he left it
with me and what I did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient
as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong,
what I did was to be more lenient and if the answer was correct although
it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68
and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial
the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
"4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated
the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; . . ." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
"5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, . . ." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
"(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo’s representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he
did not deserve, in herein respondent’s honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of 75%. . . ." (allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.;
Emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
". . . I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in Remedial law, if I recall correctly. . . ." (allegation 7, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by
respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said reevaluations (Galangs memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re- At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they
actuations in connection with the reevaluation of the answers of Galang
gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extentin five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:chanrob1es virtual 1aw Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
library examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar
is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest —
Montecillo — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the
greatest or utmost care and vigilance in the performance of their duties
"Q And by reason of that information you made the reevaluation of the relative thereto.
paper?
V
"A Yeas, your Honor.

"Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
absence of such information? November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support
"A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" thereto . . . was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent’s
(Vol. V; p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner’s) alleged friend — a
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as
Answer dated March 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said
1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.). examinations" (p. 9, Lanuevo’s memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

Pamatian — It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and
integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
"3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo’s insinuations.
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for reevaluation Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense." His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation
Page 14 of 52
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971
charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly,
Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time
have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being he received the $2000 was not even presented by respondent during the
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of investigation. And according to respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In
not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to
re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
respective subjects. promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
see and did see Civil Law Examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable
his help in connection with the 1971 Bar examinations. Examiner under the foregoing circumstances.
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7,
(Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23,
rec.). Even though such information was divulged by respondent 1972 — date of inscription). On February 23, 1973, the second mortgage
Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains anin favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who and was subsequently cancelled on March 20, 1975, Entry No. 30143.
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.).
faith in the Supreme Court. Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance
of respondent’s house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the
VI monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that
since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with
The investigation failed in unearth direct evidence that the illegal his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed,
Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration. however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS
real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets
A and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a

There are, however, acquisitions made by respondent Lanuevo 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the
February, 1972, which may he out of proportion to his salary as Bar fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however,
that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the was P19,000 00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement,
BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00,
or less. for the amount of P84,114 00. The deed of sale was dated March including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date,
however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2) mortgages The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971
covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties,
amount of P67,291.20 (First —mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination
date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galangs
1972; Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent
instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from
to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to
20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114,00. Respondent During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971
while the remaining P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho’s Confidential Letter and in
form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of fact, after respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.] statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter of resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of
respondent’s 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
January 17, 1972.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the cash
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 claimed at the investigation that he used a part thereof as a down
statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.),
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in which he bought on April 5, 1972.
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.). under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from
his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place,
Page 15 of 52
"a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official obliquely across the City Court building.
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense. 2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
x x x veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does
not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
"(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, educational benefits and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross 3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the
of licenses or permits or other concessions."cralaw virtua1aw library guerilla movement in Samar.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or while working with the Philippine Veterans Board (Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerillas, to which
legitimately acquired property. . . ." (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Galang’s father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerilla
Act 3019). outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with
other guerilla organization in other parts of the country.
It should he stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo’s
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in
or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
part of the records of this Court. Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans
Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor
B (Vol. VII, p. 519 rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
D. Lanuevo before the latter became the Bar Confidant. Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I. Bill of December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942
entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, respondent Lanuevo served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
successively held the positions of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims 38th Division US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with 31 December 1945, date of demobilization" (Affidavit of Jose Banal
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang’s dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of
the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
Vol. IV, rec.). corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ above delineated.
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162,
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86- RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED
87, rec.). [Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. ATTORNEYS, AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG,
of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma
Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. and Aquino, JJ., concur.
IV, rec.).
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the
Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits Antonio, J., is on official leave.
and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office.
He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board
every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he has gone to the GSIS and City Court In re: Lanuevo A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 Posted on June 20,
of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the 2018 FACTS:
Page 16 of 52
 CASTRO, J.:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling
fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar Pedro A. Amparo of Guindulman, Bohol filed a petition to take the 1974
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results Bar examinations. This petition was granted.
were released that year and that there are grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects that underwent alterations to raise the grades In the afternoon of December 1, 1974 he was at his assigned seat no. 17,
prior to the release of results. The Court checked the records of the 1971 room 401, fourth floor, Manuel L. Quezon University Building on R.
Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Hidalgo, Manila. The Bar examination that afternoon was in Criminal
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law.
Law, and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office
code no. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent some changes which, however, While the examination was in progress, the headwatcher in room 401,
were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner Lilian Mendigorin, reported that examinee Amparo was found reading,
concerned. Each of the five examiners in his individual sworn statement at approximately 3:15 o'clock, a piece of paper containing notes in
admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved Criminal Law. He at first refused to surrender the paper, but later gave it
pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant to Mendigorin when she threatened to report the matter to the
Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee authorities. A verbal report was relayed to the Bar Chairman who
concerned failed only in his particular and/or was on the borderline of forthwith gave instructions that no investigation be then made in order to
passing. forestall any commotion that might disturb the other candidates. Amparo
was permitted to continue answering the questions. Headwatcher
Mendigorin thereafter submitted a special report on the incident.
The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of Ramon E. Galang alias Roman Galang, was unauthorized, and
On the following day, Clerk of Court Romeo Mendoza filed a formal
therefore he did noy obtain a passing average in the 1971 Bar
report. Acting thereon, the Court en banc, on December 3, 1974,
Examinations.
unanimously resolved "to disqualify Pedro Amparo from taking the Bar
examinations still to be given, namely, in the subjects of Remedial Law
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of and Labor and Social Legislation, on Sunday, December 8, 1974,
Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation or without prejudice to allowing him to take the Bar examinations after this
re-checking. The five examiners having re-evaluated or re-checked the year."
notebook to him by the Bar Confidant.
In a letter dated December 5, 1974, Amparo requested that "before final
As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon action is or becomes effective" he "be given a chance to explain" his
Galang was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries committed side. On December 5, 1974 the Court reconsidered its prior resolution
on certain de Vera, of the same University. Confronted with this and allowed Amparo to take the Bar examinations on the coming
information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember Sunday, December 8, 1974, without prejudice to further action by the
having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that Court after a formal and more detailed investigation of the incident.
case.
As ordered, the Clerk of Court conducted an investigation on December
It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the 9, 1974 at which the respondent Amparo (a) appeared in his own behalf,
results of the 1971 Bar Examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few (b) cross-examined the witnesses against him.(c) presented himself as
properties, including that of a house in V+BF Homes, which was never his own witness, and (d) presented as his witnesses three Bar candidates
declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s who in the afternoon of December 1 were seated near him in the
statement of assets and liabilities were not taken up during the examination room.
investigation but were examined as parts of the records of the court.
At the investigation, headwatcher Mendigorin identified Amparo as the
Bar examinee whom she saw reading a piece of paper inside the
ISSUES: examination room in the course of the examination in Criminal Law.
The piece of paper, later marked as exhibit C, contains handwritten
1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into notes, on both sides, on the durations of penalties and a formula of
re-evaluating Galang’s exam notebook. computing them, particularly reclusion temporal. Mendigorin testified
that she approached Amparo and asked for the piece of paper; that he
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and refused and put the paper in his pocket; that when she approached him a
withholding from the court his pending case. second time, he fished the paper from his pocket and gave it to her; that
when, at the end of the examination period, Amparo submitted his
RULING: examination notebook, he told her that he really had intended to cheat.
On cross-examination, she elaborated that Amparo gave the piece of
paper only when she told him that she would bring the matter up to
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the higher authority.
examiners to individually re-examine the grades of Galang to help him
pass even without the authority of the Court. Vernon B. Vasquez, a watcher under headwatcher Mendigorin,
corroborated the latter's testimony. He declared that from a distance of
2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and five meters, he saw Amparo reading a piece of paper on his lap; that he
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical wanted to approach him but his headwatcher was already ahead of him;
injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in and that Amparo thereupon placed the paper in his pocket, but when
1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared Mendigorin threatened to report the matter, Amparo yielded exhibit C
under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. That the with a smile.
concealment of an attorney of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, in his application to take the In his testimony, Amparo admitted having in his possession, in the
course of the examination, the piece of paper, exhibit C, explaining that
G.R. No. 000 July 18, 1975 because he was perspiring, he took his handkerchief from his pocket,
and out also came the piece of paper which fell to the floor; that the
IN RE: PEDRO A. AMPARO (1974 Bar Candidate), petitioner, notes were not in his handwriting as they were given by a friend, and
that it was by accident that he picked up the paper to find out what it
was, as he had forgotten about it, but had no intention to use it; that
while he was reading it, the headwatcher saw him and demanded it from
RESOLUTION him, but he refused because he thought that he might need it for "future
reference," but when the headwatcher insisted as otherwise she would
report the matter to her supervisor, Amparo surrendered the paper. On
Page 17 of 52
cross-examination, he declared that exhibit C had been in his pocket a Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of
long time before December 1; that he had not changed his pants for three said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and
weeks; that when the first bell rang for the examination in Criminal Law, documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of
he was required to put "all his things" out of the room; that he forgot candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September, 1926,
about the paper inside his pocket; that when he took out his handkerchief which were then kept in the archives of the said court, confabulating
to wipe his perspiration, the paper fell to the floor, and he wondered with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with
what it was and then recalled upon reading it that it had been given by a him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
friend; and that as he was reading it, "that diligent headwatcher came Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said
and asked for that paper." He further admitted that he knew it is contrary archives of the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to
to the rules to bring notes and books inside the examination room. wit: the compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by
the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of
Bar candidates Jovencio Fajilan, Norman M. Balagtas and Apolinario O. the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay,
Calix, Sr., who were seated near Amparo in room 401, were presented conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally,
by the respondent as his witnesses, but all of them professed lack of and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the
knowledge about the incident as they were engrossed in answering the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in
examination questions. Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis
Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the
It is clear that Amparo, in the course of the examination in Criminal grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and
Law, had possession of the piece of paper containing notes on the Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and
durations of penalties and that he knew that it is contrary to the rules to prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three
bring notes and books inside the examination room. It thus results that (73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused Estela
he knowingly violated Section 10, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of
pertinently provides that "Persons taking the examination shall not bring those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements
papers, books or notes into the examination rooms." and declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of
Amparo's impression that the notes had no "material use" to him is falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and official
correct, in the sense that they bore no reference to any question asked in documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general
the examination in Criminal Law; even so he committed an overt act average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the
indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading the notes, His refusal to latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the
surrender the paper containing the notes when first demanded; his great prejudice of the public.
eventual surrender of it only after he was informed that he would be
reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal Law and the Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
examination then in Criminal Law — all these override and rebut his
explanation that he merely read the notes to find out what they were as Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of
he had forgotten about them. evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which consumed
considerable of the court's time.
We find the respondent Amparo guilty of (1) bringing notes into the
examination room and (2) attempted cheating. According to the official UNDISPUTED FACTS
report of the Bar Confidant, approved by the Court, Amparo did not pass
the 1974 Bar examinations. There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not
disputed either by the prosecution or by the defense:
ACCORDINGLY, it is the sense of the Court that Pedro A. Amparo
should be as he is hereby disqualified from taking the Bar examinations The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation
for the year 1975. of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands as his secretary on November 1, 1921, and continued as such
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, until September 15, 1928.
Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to
Teehankee, J., is on leave. the bar examinations held in 1926.

The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed
to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932 of the examination committee for admission to the bar.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto
vs. Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for admission to
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants- the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente
appellants. Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination
committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas,
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney
appellant Romualdez. Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law;
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay. Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P.
Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of
falsification of public and official documents, committed, according to
the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in
the discharge of public functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a
committee of correctors was appointed, composed of the following
attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil Service, and
Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in
Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio
Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law;
Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of
Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of
Audits and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in
Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and the accused
Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the
Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as
correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of
Page 18 of 52
Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were
of illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in known."
Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert
with the approval of the chairman of the examination committee. Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to
the grades given by the corresponding correctors to compositions
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that said alterations
the preparation of the questions in their respective subjects and of a were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused
memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence (pages 723, 726, s. n.).
showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The work of
reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her
designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note own behalf, said that the chairman of the examining committee, gave her
or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil to understand that she "was authorized to correct any composition in any
Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she had never
correctors in grading the examination papers. corrected any composition after the name of the corresponding candidate
was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day of
the subject assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
on the composition, but in a separate note book, which were later
checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the same subject, Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the
composition. The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused
Estela Romualdez may be summarized in two following propositions:
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the examination
examination for the year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the
1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the fifth of said accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects
month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared in which she was not a corrector and which had already been graded by
the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. the other correctors, and much less the power to alter or change the
The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C- grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd — that granting
2, which was prepared after the publication of the result of the that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the
examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner
Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the
80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of compositions and on the condition that the revision and the changes of
the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy- grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the
three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial compositions belonged, were known.
Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said
compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains
given to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as
theretofore given to the composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, so that he
investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules,
filing of the information in this case. and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by
himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez were the powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the
compositions.
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence
tending to show the identity of the person who altered the grades As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the
appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, evidence adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the
the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused Estela Romualdez made
her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.): the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the
parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination
sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said committee when she was given said authority.
composition are also in my regular handwriting."
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades that the evidence for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance
with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to 75%
she was the person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
the words and figures alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that
the burden of establishing the authority under which said changes and Theory of the Defense
alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for
the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues
her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the examination that the power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his
committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or
correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice that
already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section
by them. 2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number
of years prior to 1926, and that when said court designated Justice
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without
considered the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and
supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the powers of the former he conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most
said (page 721, s. n.): in line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the procedure
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the
understand that in order to do justice to the compositions, she could powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman
review the compositions already graded by the other correctors; was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done in order to do
Page 19 of 52
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which
have known to whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said
the time of making the alteration of the grades appearing on the first compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not put
pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused, her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said,
in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing the
containing the names and the identification numbers of the candidates original grade on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no
were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of
examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names the examination committee "has not gone into such minor details" (page
of the candidates on said list, they had to work continuously from 8 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the
o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and
the publication of the result of the examinations. immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on
that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory
authority with respect to the other five compositions forming part of
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked
witness for the defense, the court finds that the accused Estela by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to the
Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the examination committee, grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the
and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were general average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the
considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects accused answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there are
assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With these answers and others
n.), both of them with equal powers and authority so that neither could appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory
consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the
however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new
the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revision of the compositions was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.)
revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors provided she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of
the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice to the 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject
compositions and that the same were mad before the names of the already graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the
candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same correctors; in other words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the
with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said work done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to
nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of
accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.
committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in
compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the examination committee,
changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the compositions of the candidates who filed motions for reconsideration
the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the
she made no report to the chairman of the examination committee of any examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he
error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to
during the progress of the work of grading the papers that they were each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the
being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might candidate in the revision, together with such other data which would
be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice Romualdez explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.
told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind
come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his
order to do justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her secretary to understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that the
attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of the bar
committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.), examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such
and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his
(page 780, s. n.). designation was made so that he should conduct the examinations in
accordance with law and the rules.
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez
as chairman of the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the
Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary power of supervision that grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she
in its exercise she should act independently, not only of the correctors acted in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by the chairman
and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination of the examination committee, is there any ground in support of her
committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the
committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom
examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of they belonged?
supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did
she exercise that power when she made the changes in the compositions Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the
in question? prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not
worthy of credit because of the contradictions and inconsistencies
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain
made the alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.
compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only person who could give
an account of and explain the circumstances under which said alterations It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the
were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in
was not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of the said Jeronimo
those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during the cross- Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor
examination to state the circumstances under which she came across and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of
those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed
said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each
circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the
compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823, s. upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and
n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit
under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions C-1 the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades
Page 20 of 52
in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.), compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear that said
leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.). alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that said
Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been
composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit
corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said alterations
at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the space had been made, and in order that the grades so altered should agree with
corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil
Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit Law and Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in place thereof
C-6. were written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The
accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was the author of
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the such alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the
general average of each candidate, who was theretofore known by his facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not only
identification number only, was prepared, the envelopes containing the the grades originally written by the correctors on the compositions
names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the columns
were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit C-1,
candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said
preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions
Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in
written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages the manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them
859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as
committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in
admission to the bar and not only for those candidates with a general the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making such erasures
average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a general and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her
average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic increase was identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to
ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this recommendation whom said composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and
was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said the names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1,
automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.),
the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary and
prepare another list containing only the names of the candidates who had supervisor of the examinations.
originally obtained a general average of 75% without having obtained
less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by
the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that
Mabunay is included with an average of 75%. one Luis Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the
telephone a few days before the publication of the results of the
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the
the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other
the grades directly from the compositions; while one of the helpers read evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show
them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its
computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable
by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who
Exhibit C-7. took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by
him, according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C- the adding machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was
2, were kept in the office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the
when the investigation of the irregularities in the examinations of 1926 examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75%
was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the
investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis list of successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927
Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase of these
Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree, grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2),
because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades
candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the theretofore given by the correctors.
same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of
candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that
Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted she had no motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay,
between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which testified that she did not know him and that the first time she saw him
is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view of her
73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis
Luis Mabunay in the examinations of 1926, which were united to his Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the
personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred upon
written by the respective correctors on the compositions of said Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions already
candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her
been altered, and further, that the grades that appeared on said knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.),
compositions before the alterations were identical with those that her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her
appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due
said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in only and solely to a happy coincidence.
the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General
Average, respectively, were written after erasing with rubber what was Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the
there originally written. It may also be noted, upon an examination of evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the
the alterations appearing on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust
and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors, Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the
authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when
is difficult to make out said original grades, leaving, however, intact, the correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused
initials of the correctors. Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of
the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may,
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing
altered the grades written by the correctors on the first pages of the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest
Page 21 of 52
passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified
that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca
Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for
sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect
was not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons
mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding
check or postal money order, as she had done when referring other
deposits in the bank.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez
changed the general average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay
in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J.
Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and
27, containing the opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.

Conclusion VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same
powers exercised by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the
allegations of the information are sufficiently supported by the evidence VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that
and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis
beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the court erred in
accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the
which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered information.
sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the
time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar
300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six examination committee of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme
years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised
law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the
view of the nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis
Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez
examination, to suffer, under the provisions of article 301 as amended by intended to conceal her identity when she revised and regraded
section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
of four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the exercising her powers as supervisor of the correctors in said bar
costs. examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order
to regrade them.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the
following assignments of error: XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading
said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.
of the crime of "falsification of public and official documents" and in
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment without due process of law, XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense
contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled "An of falsification with which she is charged, the lower court erred in
Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to
Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands". In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for
the appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the Philippine
Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2
of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice
testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar Romualdez, was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of affirming the
granted her. decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of
acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela the usual course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the
Romualdez a fair and impartial trial. deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:

The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court The court having under consideration again the case of People vs.
committed the following errors: Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating being all the members
of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the United
Justice Romualdez with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division
examination committee of the year 1926, to confer upon the accused in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment
Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in
connection with said examination. the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265
— the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in
Romualdez as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and
committee of 1926, really and truly conferred upon the accused Estela Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his
Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination. dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine
Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not
exercise the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case
examination committee of 1926, within the limits fixed by said until the further order of the court.
chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions
be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case
corresponding candidates were known. against him be considered separately and he be absolved from the
complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed his motion
on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no
severance had been asked for in the lower court, and for the further
Page 22 of 52
reason that there was a prospect that the membership of the court would 3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
soon be increased. proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.

The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to 4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
the death or retirement of three justices only six of the former members
remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela 5. By altering true dates.
Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing
before the court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
2, 1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging which changes its meaning.
that because of the inability of the court to reach a determination from
the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela 7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
Romualdez, she had been denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in
was denied. such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed
an additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply. 8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
in a protocol, registry or official book.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez
maintain that even if the lower court's findings of fact be justified by the The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made
evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal offense, the alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the
recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades
committed." They contend that the appointment of the committee of of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their
attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had made the
papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements
defendant Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she
information, of the grades in question did not constitute a crime. altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.

The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense,
completely refutes this contention. He testified that the bar examining
committee was composed of two groups of attorneys: Those that were
appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to
grade the papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the
way in which the examination was conducted and that it approved
thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eight
thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys
only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare the questions or the court
itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly
untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in
the grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions,
which served the other group of attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as
a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the "correctors" was
just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and the
intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and
valid.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E.,
725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for
August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts Senate
prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for
admission to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar
examiners. The Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted,
would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the
Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law would be
unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial
department decides that the marking of the written examinations may be
performed by competent persons not members of the board but acting
under the direction of such members, that pertains directly to the
ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute
of the judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also
stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in
marking the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.

It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant
Estela Romualdez altered were not public or official documents. That
contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys, the
examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function.
It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the
papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination
were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the
circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such
papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil.,
399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers
as "falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54
Phil., 41, where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his
examination papers was affirmed.)
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez
maintains that the trial court erred in not finding that she was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the examination
papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full
credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez,
chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926, concerning
the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez
ever gave the accused the authority which she claims to have received;
and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he gave her the
alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms
thereof.

In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his
members each year make all the necessary arrangements for the bar secretary, Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson,
examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice Romualdez for who were themselves "correctors" as supervisors of the other
that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any
attorneys to prepare the questions and another group to grade the papers. grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other
If any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the paper,
with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez. without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record
thereof or any report to him or to anybody else.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and
301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the
technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be committed in the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He
following eight ways: himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his
secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric. with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any warrant
of law give or attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. grade or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to

Page 23 of 52
anybody. The mere statement of such a claim shows that it is unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a persistent effort
preposterous. to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.

No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They
Romualdez was regarded by him as a supervisor of equal rank with are for the most part embraced in the assignments of error of his
Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was regarded as a coaccused which we have already considered. These remain only his
supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity. fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment
of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M.
granted to the accused Estela Romualdez. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of
said attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
a positive statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on
a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand that if a case The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the
should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent testimony of these three attorneys on the ground that it was not the best
an injustice, so long as she did not know the name of the candidate to evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the members of the
whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and
pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember. Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see
fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the
Samson from revising the revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did examination papers in question deserved the increased grades which the
not initial the changes made by her, and he was supposed to be a defendant Estela Romualdez gave them. The attorneys that prepared the
supervisor of equal rank. questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best
qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with
Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to have received, the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no merit in this
nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in assignment of error.
question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the
papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is insinuating that the motive of the accused Estela Romualdez in
unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2
the effect that the accused acted within the authority granted her in was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-
changing the grades in question was a mere expression of opinion. It was accused Luis Mabunay.
clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused
she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the Estela Romualdez committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in
necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with the the information, the court erred in concluding that the accused Luis
"correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt Mabunay participated in its commission.
to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to
revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of
out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had error together.
been altered by her.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez that Estela Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers of her
also alleges that she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised his grades in
trial of her case that the alterations had been made by her, and concludes two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own
therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the words, a passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as
statement of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be
not admit that the alterations were made by her until after the admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show that she
prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of raised the grades of any other candidate.
testimony and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting
experts that the alterations were in the handwriting of the accused. The The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous
evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's examinations, and that he failed in the examination in question,
office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining
specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The committee recommended that not only those having the required general
fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations under the average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received
circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an
the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was
in good faith. disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to
prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had obtained a
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included
said: in the new list submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that
he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in
competent evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed, question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average
unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction of evidence sufficient required for admission to the bar.
to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence
of such criminal intent. The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew
P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis
that the trial court erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for
trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment of error, which is what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the
utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such first list was disapproved.
contention. If the learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the
attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in arguing their objections. In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice
Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the Moreland speaking for the court said:
stenographic record of the evidence. The record shows a most
Page 24 of 52
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State.
If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed
if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it
may assist him.
Rosario did not know anything about the making of the alterations. The
trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the
purpose of taking disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm,
speaking for the court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe
that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations
culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the
sole beneficiary.

In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following rule:
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to charged with the falsification of a public document. The evidence
support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name of an attorney had
he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that
existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and that he wrote his name in the register under the direction of an employee
he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on
produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But this appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The
is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest that trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense committed required
proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution. the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact,
as the court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her appellant."
by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not
satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and
was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase acted in common accord in the commission of the crime. As the
of goods, but she could not name the person that brought the money to Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by
her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the
show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by
failure to produce evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
evidence is explained away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.
evidence would not support the party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
486.) accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148: concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof
testimony, is open to inference against a party accused, with the same of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to
limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of the burden of show the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the
proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or
the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law words of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp.
to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference 795, 796.)
from nonproduction. This seeming paradox, which has been already
sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a few For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court
courts to deny that any inference may be drawn. are fully justified by the evidence.

The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position
the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were in committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of
made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had rejected article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, and
those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the
were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and
money after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public office.
was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to
present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent,
pesos from the bank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. or from six years and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the
Ocampo (22 Phil., 42): Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight
has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and years and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant
rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day of
and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, prision mayor.
if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against
him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion. The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an
accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the
del Rosario failed for the third time in the bar examination of 1926. He Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of
then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an alleged arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a
mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
to the bar. It was subsequently found that alterations had been made in The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.
his examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for
the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was
responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela
Page 25 of 52
Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal Code, as indicated, made in the trial court and here confirmed by other judges
amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum who have minutely examined the record, must be taken as conclusively
degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision established.
correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the medium
degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one The legal features of the case offer no particular difficulties. Articles 300
days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of and 301 of the old Penal Code were violated. Examination papers
Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years, six months, and leading to admission to the bar constitute a part of judicial proceedings
twenty- one days of prision correccional. and are in the nature of public documents. These documents were altered
and their meaning changed to permit a candidate in the bar examinations
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all illegally to be admitted at the bar.
other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
A number of cases growing out of the bar scandal of 1926 have reached
Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur. this court and have resulted in convictions. Basically there is no
difference in fact and in law between the principles governing those
cases and the principles governing the case before us. If the accused in
Separate Opinions those cases merited punishment, the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are equally guilty.
AVANCEÑA, C.J., concurring:
STREET, J., dissenting:
I agree with the majority opinion. My vote regarding the defendant,
Estela Romualdez, is based on the ground that she did not act under It is the opinion of the undersigned that the acts imputed to Estela
authority alleged to have been given her by Justice Norberto Romualdez. Romualdez do not constitute the crime of falsification of a public
She made the alteration after the candidates' names were already known. document, and with respect to Luis Mabunay there is no proof
She did not act in the interests of justice, inasmuch as among the connecting him in any way whatever with the acts of Romualdez. As a
compositions of 1,056 candidates she examined those of her coaccused preliminary to the demonstration of these conclusions it appears
Luis Mabunay only, and she failed to show or to allege that before desirable to give few words of explanation to show how the situation
examining his compositions she had reasons for believing that arose with which the court is here confronted.
Mabunay's case was meritorious.
Under the American occupation, prior to the year 1921, high school
MALCOLM, J., concurring: graduates were eligible to take the course in law in any accredited law in
the Philippine Islands. In that year, however, the court decided to require
I concur with the comprehensive opinion of the majority in its principal two years of college work as a prerequisite to matriculation in a law
features, but more especially am I in accord with the views expressed by school, thereby materially raising the standard of education of lawyers.
the Chief Justice. My position will bear a word of explanation. But inorder not to affect adversely the rights of those who were already
qualifying under the prior rule, the requirement for two years of college
The charge is that of falsification of a public document by the accused work was made effective beginning with the examinations in 1927. It
Estela Romualdez, secretary to Justice Romualdez, acting in conspiracy resulted that 1926 was the last year in which examinations could be
with Luis Mabunay, a candidate in the 1926 bar examinations, by taken under the old rule, and there were nearly 1,100 candidates who
altering the grades of the candidate so that it was feloniously made to presented themselves for examination in that year.
appear that he had passed the bar examinations. The finding was of guilt
in a decision by the trial judge, concerned almost entirely with questions It has been the usage of this court to place the bar examinations for each
of fact. Speaking to these questions, since this case should be considered year in the hands of a member of the court designated by the Chief
exactly in the same manner as any other case, these findings are entitled Justice; and it is made the duty of this member to appoint the examiners
to our most respectful consideration. Not desiring to enlarge upon the and to superintend the giving of the examinations. In the year 1926
findings, it is only necessary to observe that the changes made in the Justice Norberto Romualdez was named to conduct the examinations,
papers of the candidate Mabunay have been admitted by the accused and he appointed the requisite number of members of the bar to prepare
Estela Romualdez to have been made by her in her ordinary the questions in the several subjects of examination. In view of the great
handwriting. Added to this we have the testimony of Justice Romualdez number of papers to be read in that year, it was quite evident that able
as follows: "As supervisor, I believe that there were occasions when I lawyers could not be expected to read so many papers, as the work, as
made her understand that in order to do justice to the candidates, she could be foreseen, would undoubtedly have taken up months of their
could revise papers already graded by the other correctors, provided that time. Justice Romualdez, therefore, upon the suggestion of our clerk,
the new revision was made before the name of the candidate concerned decided to adopt the plan followed in the Bureau of Civil Service, which
was known." In this connection it has been demonstrated beyond civil by is, to appoint readers (referred to in the record as "correctors") to read
a series of damaging and fatal circumstances that during the three-day and grade the examination papers in conformity with the written guides
interval between the making of the first report of the bar examinations prepared by the examiners. These readers (as we shall call them) were
and the second report when the names of the candidates were known, the qualified lawyers chosen from the Government service, chiefly from the
accused Estela Romualdez made changes in the grades of Luis Mabunay personnel of the Supreme Court and of the Bureau of Justice.
in express contravention of the authority alleged to have been given her
by Justice Romualdez and in bad faith. Not alone were the erasures on The reading of the papers occupied a period of about six months, and the
the papers made in a manner difficult to be deciphered, leaving below report presented by the examiners was not finally passed upon by the
the erasures the initials of the readers; not alone did the accused fail to court until March 5, 1927. The questions in the examination in Civil
place her own initials over the changes; not alone was there no attempt Law were prepared by Francisco Ortigas, and the questions in Remedial
to show why the grades were increased to give exactly a general average Law were prepared by Judge J. C. Abreu. The two readers primarily
of 75 per cent, but there are two other circumstances entirely chosen to read and grade the papers in Civil Law were Jeronimo Samson
inconsistent with innocence. The first is that two of the readers, namely, and Amado del Rosario, and the readers in Remedial Law were Alfonso
Jeronimo Samson, the deputy clerk of court, and Estela Romualdez were Felix and Marciano Guevara.
supposed to have identical authority, yet Samson never understood that
he had any right to change grades without the knowledge of the readers As Justice Romualdez had general charge of the examinations, his niece,
in the particular subject; when Samson acted as a substitute reader, Estela Romualdez, who was also his secretary and who had been
changes were made with the knowledge and consent of the other reader admitted to the bar in 1925, was selected as one of the readers. In
and Samson placed his initials under the new grades. The second addition to her duties as mere reader, Justice Romualdez confided to her
question is how Estela Romualdez could remember having made the custody of the examination papers and other apparatus of
erasures in the grades in two papers out of eight thousand to the examination, which were kept under key in his office when not in issue.
advantage of one candidate out of more than one thousand, but could not Samson was at this time a deputy clerk of this court, and because of his
recall any other similar incident and could not offer any explanation of official position he and Miss Romualdez were charged with the
why the grades of the one candidate merited an increase. I am, therefore, supervision of the clerical work connected with the examinations.
constrained to conclude that the findings of fact, along the line above
Page 26 of 52
In the conduct of the bar examinations it is important that the examiner The case for the prosecution supposes that the changes above referred to
or reader of papers should have no knowledge of the personality of the were made by Miss Romualdez in bad faith and that she was corrupted
author of any composition when the same is read and graded, and a by Luis Mabunay to make the changes in his papers for the purpose of
device had been adopted in the clerk's office which was supposed to securing his successful completion of the examinations when in fact he
accomplish this end. This was that the name of the candidate was not had failed. In this connection proof was submitted showing that on
permitted to appear on the composition. Instead, there was assigned in March 7, 1927, Luis Mabunay withdrew from his savings account in the
the clerk's office a number to each candidate, and this number was Philippine Trust Co. the sum of P600, and that on March 7, 1927, Miss
written on the outside of small envelope affixed to the composition when Romualdez deposited a sum of money to her credit in the Bank of the
it was turned in by the candidate. Sealed within the same envelope was a Philippine Islands, among the items of which deposit was the sum of
small slip of paper containing the corresponding name of the candidate. P400.
A record of the names and numbers was also kept in the clerk's office.
Every step in the reading, grading, and collating of the examination It appears that there are two persons bearing the name of Luis Mabunay
papers was therefore supposedly taken before the names of the different in the City of Manila. The individual who was candidate in the bar
candidates were known. examinations of 1926, and who is one of the two accused in this case,
was, at the time with which we are here concerned, assistant chief of the
When the work of the various readers in this case had been collated in administrative division of the Executive Bureau. The other Luis
the latter part of February, but before the names of the various Mabunay was, at the same time, a clerk in the law office of Vicente
candidates had yet been written in the list showing the results, the Romualdez, who is a brother of Miguel Romualdez, father of the
committee of the bar examiners was called together. Upon assembling accused Estela Romualdez. In the early stages of this prosecution
the committee found that the percentage of candidates passing was confusion existed concerning these two individuals. So much so that the
exceedingly low, being around ten per centum of the total number of fiscal, when this proceeding was begun, was under the impression that
candidates. This result was no doubt partly due to the hasty way in the Luis Mabunay who was joined as codefendant in this case was the
which a great number of immature candidates had rushed in the hope of Luis Mabunay who was employed in the office of Vicente Romualdez.
being admitted to the bar before the standards of the examination were On the other hand Estela Romualdez says that prior to his appearance in
raised, and in part also doubtless to the fact that the readers had applied court, she had never seen her codefendant Luis Mabunay and had never
the straight-edge pretty firmly in judging the grades. The committee of known that there was such a person in existence. This point of the
the bar examiners therefore thought it proper to suggest to the court the confusion over these two individuals has a bearing on the case against
propriety of admitting all the candidates who had made as much as 70 Luis Mabunay, but is not otherwise important.
per centum, and a recommendation to this effect was submitted to the
court. With this suggestion the court did not agree, and a new list had to An incident connected with the examinations now under consideration is
be made up, showing as passing the names only of those who had made found in certain corrections made by our then deputy clerk, Jeronimo
the requisite average of 75 per centum in all subjects without falling Samson, in the grades given by a reader named Remo who was relieved
below 60 per centum in any. from duty as a reader. Samson has the complete confidence of the court,
and nobody has called in question the good faith of his work throughout.
Among the candidates in these examinations was the accused Luis Well, after Remo was relieved, Samson took the papers in hand that
Mabunay, to whom, at the examinations, was assigned number 898. In Remo had already graded and in a number of cases changed his grades
the list submitted by the bar examiners recommending that all be in precisely the same way in which Miss Romualdez changed the two
admitted who had made a general average of 70, Luis Mabunay papers of Luis Mabunay. In some of these corrections Samson did not
appeared as receiving 72.8 per centum; and when the court decided that append his own initials, and although in one of the corrections made by
the passing grade could not be lowered, the result was naturally fatal to Miss Romualdez the obliteration of the original grade was more
him as a candidate. But in the list later submitted to the court containing complete than in the case of the grades obliterated by Samson, the
only the names of those who had made an average of 75 the same Luis manner of correction was substantially the same.
Mabunay appeared as having received the requisite per cent. Upon the
showing his name was therefore passed as a successful candidate. The dominating question in the case against Miss Romualdez is, in our
opinion, whether Justice Romualdez gave her authority to revise the
The explanation is that, in the interval between the submission of the grades in the two papers marked "898". If that authority was in fact
first recommendation of the bar examiners and the submission of the given, no case of falsification is made out against this accused; for,
later list, the grades corresponding to Luis Mabunay were raised by Miss although she may have abused the authority and increased the grades in
Romualdez in an amount sufficient to give him a general average of 75 question for a corrupt purpose, her delinquency would have the character
per centum. In this connection it appears that in the subject of Civil Law of an abuse of authority only. That this authority was given we do not
Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario had assigned to Luis entertain the slightest doubt, and the reason for crediting Justice
Mabunay 63 per centum as the value of his composition in that subject, Romualdez' statement on this point rests not only upon his character but
and this number was written on the composition cover and accredited by upon the circumstances under which that statement was made in court.
the initials of the two examiners. This credit was raised by Miss Of course a person will sometimes testify falsely or distort the truth for
Romualdez to 73. Likewise in Remedial Law the readers Alfonso Felix the purpose of assisting another; but experience shows that the most
and Marciano Guevara had given 58 as the value of the paper. This powerful motive which operates upon people as witnesses is the motive
credit was changed by Miss Romualdez to 64. In effecting these changes of self-protection. When the testimony of Justice Romualdez was
Miss Romualdez in each case obliterated the original grades by the use delivered in court, the full extent of the irregularities attendant upon the
of pen and ink, and wrote thereunder in her own hand "73" and "64" in examination of 1926 were generally known; and the slightest
words and figures. She did not sign her name to this alteration but left consideration of self-interest would have indicated to Justice Romualdez
intact the initials of the original graders. No attempt was made by her to that he would do himself a service by not testifying as a witness.
imitate the script used by the graders, and the making of these changes However, in the face of all these considerations, Justice Romualdez, in
was admitted by her. the interest of truth, did not hesitate to go into court and state that he in
fact gave his niece authority to revise the grades. and what necessity can
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness in the case, stated that he there be for us to debate the question of the truthfulness of Justice
authorized Miss Romualdez, upon finding any error made by the Romualdez when the fiscal who prosecuted this case more than once
readers, to correct it, provided that this should be done before the names stated in open court that he had never doubted the veracity of the witness
of the candidates should be known. Miss Romualdez testified that the in this case?
changes effected by her in the papers of her coaccused were made under
this authority. Furthermore, at the trial of the case, she offered to prove Upon this point we quote textually from the transcript of the proceedings
by three able lawyers of the Manila bar that the grades actually assigned in the lower court:
by her to the papers referred to were fully merited by the answers given.
The trial court refused to admit this testimony, and there is nothing FISCAL GUEVARA. We have never doubted the veracity of the
before us to show whether the changes made were in conformity with witness.
the merit of the papers or not.
xxx xxx xxx

Page 27 of 52
FISCAL GUEVARA. On the other hand, as we have already stated, we grade. Does the court mean to suggest by this decision that the assigning
do not doubt the veracity of the witness in this case. of an untrue grade in bad faith by any reader authorized to grade
examination papers constitutes a falsification of a public document?
But it is said that the authority granted by Justice Romualdez Legal literature does not furnish the slightest hint that would afford a
contemplated a revision of the grades in good faith and was coupled basis for such a ruling. But this would be no more untenable than the
with the condition that the revision to be effected by her should be conclusion reached by the court in this case that the alteration of a grade
accomplished before the names of the candidates should be known. But in bad faith by a person authorized to revise constitutes falsification of
the fact that the authority may have been coupled with this condition the document. A person charged with the duty of grading or revising
could not alter the character of the authority. She was made judge of the examination papers exercises a power involving judgment and
conditions under which the revision should be entered upon, as well as discretion. Such duty is evidently of a quasi-judicial nature; and a
judge of the extent of the revision, and the violation of her by Justice violation of such duty constitutes an abuse of authority rather than the
Romualdez' directions on these points could not have the effect of falsification of a public document. And if the law in its present state, as
obliterating the authority. However gross may have been her thus interpreted, should appear to be inadequate, the Legislature might
delinquency the offense could be nothing more than an abuse of safely be relied upon to extend to bar examiners and readers the
authority. provisions already applicable to examiners under the Civil Service Law.
This court is not called upon to legislate, and it should not distort the
In the course of these proceedings the evidence has been thoroughly severe provisions relating to falsification for the purpose of covering
combed by the prosecution to discover indications that Miss Romualdez delinquencies not fairly included therein.
acted in bad faith. Thus it is said that bad faith is shown in circumstances
such as these: That she did not affix her initials to her corrections; that With respect to the connection of Luis Mabunay with this case, we do
she used black ink to obliterate the grade that had been altered, and that not hesitate emphatically to say that, in our opinion, there is no item of
she confessed her inability to recall the exact considerations which led proof connecting this accused with the irregularity imputed to Miss
her to increase the grades allowed by the original reader. All these Romualdez. It is true that Luis Mabunay was the person whose interests
considerations, and others equally trivial, as it seems to us, come with were primarily served by Miss Romualdez in raising the grades above
very poor grace from a court that had refused to permit the accused to mentioned; and if there were independent proof connecting him with the
prove by the testimony of experts that the examination papers whose offense, the fact that his interests were so served would supply the
grades were altered by her were in fact entitled at least to the grades explanation of the acts committed. But in the absence of adequate proof,
which she affixed to them, if not more. What circumstance could this circumstance supplies no basis upon which to convict him. The only
possibly show more effectually the good faith of Miss Romualdez in fact supposedly pointing to him as the guilty suborner of Estela
increasing the grades than the fact, if it be a fact, that the papers merited Romualdez is that he drew out six hundred pesos from a savings account
the higher grades given by her to the candidate. But the merit of the on March 2, 1927; but there is no proof that any of this money ever
grades must remain, by the action of the court in this case, like the reached Miss Romualdez or that he was ever in communication with her
location of the grave of Moses, forever unknown; and this long drawn- in any way.
out litigation will shed no light upon what seems to the undersigned to
be the most vital question with which the court should have concerned The fact that Luis Mabunay did not testify as a witness in his own behalf
itself, namely, whether the grades assigned by Miss Romualdez to two cannot be used as an affirmative admission, and the logical propriety of
of the papers of Luis Mabunay were right or wrong. One of the reasons his assumed guilt is no substitute for proof. It is true that some authority
suggested for sustaining the objection against the proffered testimony of can be cited for the proposition, always guardedly advanced, that where
experts to show the propriety of the grades given is that the court itself there is some evidence, showing an incriminatory fact, and the accused
could judge of the true value of the papers without the assistance of is in a position to dissipate the inference drawn from that evidence, his
expert testimony, but no attempt had been made by the prosecution or by failure to do so may be used as an admission of the injurious inference.
the court to demonstrate from the papers themselves that the grades But the application of that rule presupposes the existence of some
assigned to them by Miss Romualdez were unmerited. Why should the incriminatory evidence; and in this case, to the mind of the undersigned,
court concern itself so meticulously with the circumstances indicative of there is no proof, even weak, connecting this accused with the offense
possible bad faith when the grades raised are before us, affording the charged.
best evidence of their character.
To present in a few words the legal basis of this dissent, we are unable to
In United States vs. Michelena (4 Phil., 492), it was held by this court agree with the court in extending the concept of falsification to cover an
that a person who makes a false statement in a certificate of merit in an abuse of authority on the part of a reviser of examination papers, a
application for an examination by the Civil Service Board cannot be person who is clothed with a discretion in appraising the work revised.
convicted of the falsification of a public document, but of an offense The circumstance that the cases against Felipe del Rosario and Jose
punishable by arresto mayor under article 311 of the Penal Code. This Bautista should be cited as authority in the opinion of the court merely
decision was repeated in United States vs. Dumandan (8 Phil., 61). shows that there is no legal warrant in past jurisprudence for the decision
These decisions apparently attracted the attention of our lawmakers as now made; for the acts of falsification in those cases were not done by
indicating that the penalties affixed by the Spanish Code to certain an examiner, reader, or reviser, but by the individual who was
offenses against the Civil Service were too light; and on August 26, prosecuted or by some unauthorized individual acting at his instance.
1907, the Philippine Commission adopted a law now incorporated in Moreover, the falsifications there accomplished were effected after the
section 2674 of the Administrative Code. One of the provisions of this examinations had been concluded and the documents falsified had been
section punishes any person who shall falsely rate, grade, estimate, or committed to the archives of the court.
report upon the examination or standing of any person examined by the
Bureau of Civil Service. But that provision is limited to Civil Service In the infancy of jurisprudence a sentiment had its birth in the mind of
examinations, and cannot be applied to bar examinations. Therefore, some jurist-poet which is still thought fit to be inscribed over the Temple
when confronted with the irregularity, or supposed irregularity, of Justice: Fiat Justitia Ruat Coelum. The decision of the court in this
presented in this case, the fiscal's office was unable to proceed with the case is a reminder that junctures sometimes occur in human affairs when
prosecution under section 2674 of the Administrative Code, and was even courts of last resort are constrained to ignore the suggestion
compelled to fall back upon article 300 of the Penal Code which deals expressed in this motto. Fortunately such occasions are rare; and we are
with the falsification of public documents. unable to see any necessity in the present case requiring a departure
from accepted doctrines.
The suggestion contained in the opinion of the court to the effect that
Justice Romualdez had no authority to authorize Miss Romualdez to For the reasons stated we dissent from the decision in this case.
revise grades is in our opinion wholly untenable. He had as much
authority to authorize her to revise grades as he had to authorize her to Villa-real and Villamor, JJ., concur.
read and grade papers in the first place, there being no difference
whatever in point of principle between the two acts. Now, the alteration
of a grade by one authorized to revise is on exactly the same footing in R E S O L U T I O N
law, under No. 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code, as the giving of a false
grade, under No. 4 of the same article, by one who is authorized to October 5, 1932
Page 28 of 52
VICKERS, J.: In support of his eleventh proposition, the attorney for the appellant
points out that the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
The attorney for the appellant Estela Romualdez submits in support of office is not included in article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which
his motion for reconsideration the following propositions: corresponds to article 300 of the Penal Code. He overlooks the fact,
however, that the penalty of prision mayor under the Revised Penal
First Proposition Code, as well as under the Penal Code, carries with it certain accessory
penalties.
The court has erred in finding defendant guilty of falsification of public
and official documents in view of the authority to revise the examination The penalty provided in article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by
papers extended by Mr. Justice Romualdez. section 1 of Act No. 2712, for a public officer or employee or notary,
who by taking advantage of his official position shall be guilty of the
Second Proposition falsification of a document, is prision mayor and a fine in a sum not less
than 250 and more than 12,500 pesetas, and in addition thereto perpetual
The court has erred in finding with respect to Mr. Justice Romualdez disqualification from any public office.
that "he himself had no such authority as is alleged to have been given
his secretary," in view of the inconsistency of such finding with its other Article 61 of the Penal Code provides that the penalties of prision
findings. mayor, prision correccional, and arresto mayor shall carry with them
suspension of the right to hold public office and the right of suffrage
Third Proposition during the term of the sentence.

The court has erred in not extending any consideration to the question as Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision
to the true merit of the examination papers of Luis Mabunay Exhibits B- mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and
1 and B-2. that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which
the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
Fourth Proposition unless the same shall have seen expressly remitted in the pardon.

The court has erred in finding as a fact that "the accused Estela
Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her until
after the prosecuting attorney had presented 350 pages of testimony and
announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the
alterations were in the handwriting of the accused."
Fifth Proposition
According to article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetual or the
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in
any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.
Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification.

The court has erred in finding as a fact that the defendant "when she In other words article 42 of the Revised Penal Code perpetually
made the changes already knew that the papers belonged to her co- disqualifies the offender from the right of suffrage, and article 32
accused, Luis Mabunay." provides that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification; whereas under article
Sixth Proposition 300 of the Penal Code the offender is perpetually disqualified from
holding public office, but under article 61 his right of suffrage is only
The court has erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy between suspended during the term of the sentence. Under both the Penal Code
defendants, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay. and the Revised Penal Code the offender is perpetually disqualified from
holding public office. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code are,
Seventh Proposition therefore, not favorable to the appellant.

The court has erred in ignoring the statutory provisions of section 16 of For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the appellant Estela Romualdez
the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing the manner of conducting bar is denied.
examinations.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and
Eighth Proposition Butte, JJ., concur.

The court has erred in failing to recognize the right of defendant at least
to the benefit of a reasonable doubt and by its judgment it has apparently STREET, J., dissenting:
nullified the principle that a person accused of crime is presumed
innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. I adhere to my views expressed in my dissenting opinion in the main
case.
Ninth Proposition
Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., dissent.
The court has erred in failing to extend to the defendant her
constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.
RESOLUTION
Tenth Proposition
October 5, 1932
During the period from the time this cause was submitted on appeal to
this Honorable Court, defendant has suffered punishment neither VICKERS, J.:
ordained, recognized nor authorized by any law on our statute books.
On September 22, 1932, the attorney for the appellant Estela Romualdez
Eleventh Proposition filed a motion for a new trial on the following grounds:

The court has erred in imposing upon the defendant a sentence of (a) That the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, has just discovered
punishment above and beyond such as is authorized under our Revised new evidence material to the defense in this case, which could not have
Penal Code. been discovered and produced at the trial below with reasonable
diligence;
The first ten propositions raise the questions which were discussed in the
arguments and duly considered in the decision of this case. No reason (b) That the judgment of this court is contrary to law.
has been adduced that would justify us in changing our decision.
Page 29 of 52
Affidavits of Godofredo Reyes and of appellant's attorney are attached refer to the decision in question. The attorney for the appellant appears
to the motion. The evidence which the appellant wishes to present is the to make no distinction between the failure of the defendant to testify and
testimony of Godofredo Reyes, who was a member of the bar explain a certain fact and the failure of the defendant to present any
examination committee in 1926. other witness in explanation of that fact.

After considering the motion and the affidavits presented in support After having elected not to testify in his own behalf or to present any
thereof, we find that it is without merit. In the first place the evidence other witness to explain for what purpose he withdrew the money in
which it is proposed to present is not newly discovered evidence within question from the Philippine Trust Company, the appellant Mabunay,
the technical meaning of that phrase, and in the second place this now that he has been convicted by the lower court and his conviction has
evidence, if admitted, would not affect the result of this case. been affirmed by this court, prays that he be granted a new trial in order
that he may testify himself and present other witnesses to testify as to
In the case of United States vs. Luzon (4 Phil., 343) and United States that fact. The appellant is clearly not entitled to a new trial for such
vs. Quijano (11 Phil., 368), it was held that a motion for a new trial, reason.
based upon newly discovered evidence, will not be granted unless the
following conditions exist: (1) The evidence must have been discovered For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the appellant, Luis Mabunay is
since the trial; (2) it must be such that with the use of reasonable hereby denied.
diligence on part of the defendant it could not have been secured at the
former trial; (3) it must be material, and not merely collateral, or Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and
cumulative, or corroborative, or impeaching; (4) it must be such as ought Butte, JJ., concur.
to produce a different result on the merits of another trial; and (5) it must Street, Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., dissent.
go to the merits and not rest on a merely technical defense.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant's motion for a new trial is PEOPLE v. ROMUALDEZ and MABUNAY (September 10, 1932)
denied. G.R. No. 31012
Ponente: Vickers, J.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Action: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
Butte, JJ., concur. Keywords (Topic): crimes against public interest, falsification of
public documents

STREET, J., concurring: SHORT STORY: Estela Romualdez altered the grades of Luis Mabunay
in two of his bar examination booklets in order for him to pass the Bar
While not questioning the propriety of the resolution I adhere to the Exam. Court found Romualdez guilty as principal of the crime of
views expressed in the dissenting opinion in the main case. falsification on public and official documents under Art. 300 of the
Penal Code (now Art. 171 of the RPC), while Mabunay was found guilty
Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. as conspirator and co-principal under Art. 301 of the Penal Code (now
Art. 172 of the RPC).

RESOLUTION FACTS:
• Estela Romualdez was the secretary of Supreme Court Justice
October 5, 1932 Norberto Romualdez (then the head of the Bar Examination Committee),
and by reason of said duty, had under her care the compositions and
VICKERS, J.: documents for the bar examinations of August and September 1926.
Luis Mabunay was one of the takers of the said bar exams.
The appellant Luis Mabunay asks for the reconsideration of the decision • During this time there were two separate committees for the bar
of this court of September 10, 1932 for the following reasons: exam: the Committee of Bar Examiners, which was in charge of
preparing the test questions, and the Committee of Correctors, which
(1) The court relied on mere suspicion and conjecture in convicting was in charge of reviewing and grading the test booklets.
Mabunay. • Romualdez, together with Mabunay, went through the archives
of the Supreme Court, took the compositions of Mabunay, and erased his
(2) From the fact that the accused Mabunay did not testify at the trial of grade of 58% in Remedial Law and 63% in Civil Law, and replaced
this case, nothing against his innocence should be inferred. them with 64% and 73%, respectively. The resulting general average of
Mabunay became 75% (originally 72.8%), thus enabling him to pass the
The motion for reconsideration raises only questions which have been bar exam. (Passing grade was 75%).
carefully considered and decided, and it is unnecessary to restate our • A review of Mabunay’s booklets led to the discovery of the
findings and conclusions. alterations. Romualdez admitted that she was the one who changed the
grades, arguing that she had the authority to revise the compositions
The attorney for the appellant calls attention to the Spanish text of already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades
section 59 of General Orders No. 58 reading as follows: already given, in her capacity as secretary of the head of the Bar Exam
Committee, as one of the correctors, and also as supervisor of the other
En todas las causas criminales las pruebas admitidas deberan ser correctors. In addition, she claimed that she corrected said composition
concluyentes para demostrar el hecho que se trata de probar. Al without knowing the identity of its owner, and that she had never met
querellante correspondera proponer y practicar las pruebas que Luis Mabunay prior to the first day of the trial of this case.
demuestren la culpabilidad, y debera ser presentada la prueba mas • Trial court found Romualdez guilty as principal of the crime of
concluyente de que sea susceptible la causa. falsification on public and official documents, while Mabunay was
found guilty as an accomplice.
This does not seem to us an exact translation of the original of this
section in English, which should prevail. It is as follows: ISSUES:
• WON Estela Romualdez is guilty of falsification of public
In all criminal prosecutions the evidence admitted must be relevant to documents. YES.
the fact at issue, the burden of proof of guilt shall be upon the • WON the examination papers were public and official
prosecution, and the best evidence must be produced of which the case is documents. (Stated differently, WON the act of altering the grades in the
susceptible. examination papers constituted a crime). YES.
• WON Romualdez was authorized to make the alterations. NO.
With respect to the second ground of the motion for reconsideration, • WON Luis Mabunay was liable of the same crime as an
based upon paragraph 3 of section 15 of General Orders No. 58 which accomplice. NO. He is liable as a conspirator/ co-principal.
provides that the neglect or refusal of a defendant to be a witness shall
not in any manner prejudice or be used against him, it is sufficient to RULES:
Page 30 of 52
• Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5000 pesos shall be imposed on any public officer, employee, or RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
notary who, taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts: Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge
o x x x (6) Making any alteraction or intercalation in a genuine Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro
document which changes its meaning x x x Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana
• Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos.
falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against
and maximum periods and a fine of note more than 5000 pesos shall be Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as
imposed upon: the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for
o (1) Any private individual who shall commit any of the reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
official document x x x places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded.
  For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and
• The phrase “falsification of a document” has a technical prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the
meaning and according to Art. 300 (of the Penal Code) may be litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of
committed in the following ways : the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional
o (2) By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25,
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate Rollo)
o (3) By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan
o (6) By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San
document which changes its meaning. Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries,
respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and
ANALYSIS 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
• YES. The acts of Romualdez are covered by paragraphs 2, 3,
and 6 (see Rule). She made the alterations in such a way as to make it Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior
appear that the correctors had participated therein, because she blotted law students of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of
out the grades of the correctors and wrote the new grades opposite their the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed
(the correctors’) initials. She in that way attributed to the correctors’ their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner
statements other than those in fact made by them. Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed
• YES. The examination of candidates for admission to the bar is the appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order
a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained that the papers dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
submitted by the candidates for the exam were not public and official the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors
documents, or that the alleged alteration was not a crime. in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent
• NO. The Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee was Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law and it
was inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
attempt to give Romualdez the unlimited authority which she claimed to prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated
have received, thereby allowing her to alter the grades as she pleases, August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain
without recording or reporting the same. Even if she was given such violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were
authority, she would no longer be allowed to make the alterations issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
because she already knew that the booklets belonged to Mabunay. She Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary
gave no explanation as to why she raised the grades of Mabunay other restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for
than that it was a “happy coincidence”. and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases
• NO. He is liable as a co-principal and conspirator. Mabunay Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and
had already failed in two previous bar exams, making this his third 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal
failure. Evidence shows that Mabunay withdrew Php600 from his bank Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled
account and that a few days later, Romualdez deposited Php510 in her or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.
own bank account. Both failed to present any explanation for or proof
of the purpose for withdrawing or depositing the said amounts. The Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
alterations were made AFTER Mabunay had failed (the third time), and states: têñ.£îhqwâ£
he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from Romualdez that
he had failed. Therefore, Romualdez and Mabunay acted in common SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of
accord with the crime. the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
CONCLUSION/DISPOSITIVE: attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
Decision of trial court MODIFIED. Penalty of Romualdez increased to by a duly authorized member of the bar.
eight years and one day of prision mayor. Luis Mabunay is liable as a
conspirator and co-principal; penalty increased to three years, six Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is
months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional. authorized to appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the
inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983 Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant
V. LUCILA, petitioners, to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who
vs. is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules
QUILATAN, respondents. of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners. SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
The Solicitor General for respondents. under the direction and control of the fiscal.
Page 31 of 52
 agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a
xxx xxx xxx Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness
in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said
the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A
right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a criminal
provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs.
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a
"party", in a criminal case.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is
subject to the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more
no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence
approval of the fiscal. over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon.
Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal,
clearly provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may
litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law
student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge,
the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged dated August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as
for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set
our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing aside.
Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid
the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can
do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of
the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation
of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the
private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
Separate Opinions
case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a
non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in
a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be
allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and
control of the trial fiscal. AQUINO, J., dissenting:

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar.
petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive They have no business appearing in court.
the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal
interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is
same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is "a party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
not a lawyer. agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a
Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of
1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party- Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A
litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a criminal
respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs.
intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a
Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on "party", in a criminal case.
November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence
over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal
Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal,
while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge,

dated August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as
private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases. Orders set
Separate Opinions aside.

De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. Separate Opinions
They have no business appearing in court.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar.
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is They have no business appearing in court.
"a party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
Page 32 of 52
 has since then conducted himself well in his relations with the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: community as well as in the performance of his duties as such official,
attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior from the
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial
"a party" who may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an Development Officer of the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas Bar
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Association, and the Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus of San
Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar
in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss
Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and
Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his taking his oath as
complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a criminal a lawyer this Court resolved to defer action on such petition until
action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. petitioner has given satisfactory proof to this Court as to the action
Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who was born
"party", in a criminal case. out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima Barba."1 Thereafter
came this resolution of February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro having
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more offered proof as to the action subsequently pursued by him with
specific provisions in respect of criminal cases, should take precedence reference to the child who was born out of his relations with
over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. complainant Purisima Barba, in compliance with the resolution of
Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent Hector S.
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, Pedro to take the lawyer's oath."2 Unfortunately, before he could do so
while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended party may in accordance with the above resolution, there was a letter from the
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as
a lawyer, premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the bar did not
dated August 16, 1979, disallowing the appearances of petitioners as represent her true feelings.
private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice previous resolution of February 26, 1969, which would have allowed
Herrera. him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to comment.
This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the
allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court
A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974 then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the matter to its
Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report
PURISIMA BARBA, complainant, was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful
vs. evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant and the
HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent. respondent, the conclusion is warranted that complainant "had all along
thought that the document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of
RESOLUTION their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of withdrawal of
her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine Bar."3 The
parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the
FERNANDO, J.:p complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent respondent
from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has maintained all this
Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, while. It remains her deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral
having obtained an average of 81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his character, as proven by his failure to marry her "after having carnal
efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be deferred knowledge of her." As she pointed out in her last pleading dated July 5,
because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by Purisima 1972: "The respondent was twenty seven years old when he committed
Barba, reiterates his plea for admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that the acts complained of and he was very much qualified to marry the
he had amorous relations with the complainant resulting in the birth of a complainant herein, but he did not comply with his promise to march her
child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter chosen another to the altar. Instead he married another
woman for his bride. After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering woman."4
that his conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole shown to be
blameworthy, this Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He
youthful indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of had committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high
prominence in the municipality where he resides, did intercede on his moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven false
behalf. Accordingly the long-sought privilege of membership in the bar to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side.
will not be denied him any longer, but with this caveat. He must comply On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956
with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock with examinations. He was a successful bar candidate but because of this
complainant Purisima Barba. lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's
oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to
15, 1969: "In the matter of the petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment,
oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed the while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated
bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of himself. Retribution has been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It
81.16%, he was not permitted to take his oath as a member of the is understandable that the bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot
Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint against him easily be erased, but that should not prove decisive. Even the most
filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain period.5 Moreover, as the
Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime in transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver
July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd designs succeeded in referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of life closely
gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three different associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire,"6 this Court
occasions accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of which a child feels that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer
was born on April 23, 1954, a matter which when investigated resulted would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite
in a report that the complaint was well-grounded, petitioner being moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in
prevented thus from taking his oath; the present petition alleging further offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone.7
that petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school
teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while
to the present, he has been employed as community development worker his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if
with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) that he he expects to be a member of the bar in good standing, that he complies
Page 33 of 52
with the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of oath in view of the complainants withdrawal of her complaint."6 The
the child born out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with reply of complainant was received on September 21, 1970. It was stated
complainant Purisima Barba. therein: "In reply thereto, I amhereby informing your good office that I
am objecting to said lawyer's oathtaking of Mr. Benito P. Tubaces on
WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous grounds of immorality on one hand and deceit on the either.
resolution of February 26, 1969, is set aside and in accordance Accordingly, I thereby request that my letter dated August 26, 1970 to
therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's your Office be withdrawn and considered without force and effect.
oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution. Evidently, I am reviving my complaint against Mr. Benito P. Tubaces on
grounds of immorality because of his refusal, upon my request, to put in
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. writing the fulfillment of his promise to marry me not later than
December 21, 1971."7 This Court, however, on September 28, 1970,
A.M. No. 510 September 30, 1971 considering the petition of respondent Tubaces praying that he be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath in view of the withdrawal of the
EVANGELINE ARGAÑOZA, complainant, complaint filed against him and the comment therein, denied the
vs. petition, respondent being further required tofile an answer on the
BENITO P. TUBACES, respondent. charges lodged against him ten days from notice. There was a motion for
the reconsideration of the above action taken by this Court filed by
RESOLUTION respondent on October 21, 1970, wherein he justified his failure to file
an answer thus: "The petitioner, in view of the retraction or withdrawal
of complainant, felt it needless to file his answer to her complaint as
required by the resolution of this Court as there is no more to answer for
FERNANDO, J.:p the complaint was withdrawn and instead file this motion for
reconsideration which filing is delayed because of the honest and
Complainant Evangeline Argañoza sent a telegram to this Court on April innocent belief that the letter of withdrawal or retraction is already
7, 1970 requesting that "the oath-taking of Atty. Benito P. Tubaces be sufficient and will serve as petition of the undersigned to take the oath of
held in abeyance." It was therein further stated that the reason relied attorney."8 The prayer in such motion for reconsideration was a
upon was immorality and that a letter would follow. Subsequently, four reiteration of his plea that he be allowed to take the oath of an attorney.
days later, a letter duly subscribed and sworn by the complainant was The above motion for reconsideration was referred to complainant for
receivedby this Court. It was therein alleged: "In 1966, I agreed to live comment in a resolution of October 26, 1970. The comment came on
with Benito who was then a sophomore student in Cebu and we had a November 16, 1970, complainant "retracting or withdrawing [her]
child. Per his request, I left with our kid in July 1967 so he can muster complaint against Mr. Tubaces on the reasons stated in [her] letter of
the usual financial support from his parents. As agreed I sacrificed withdrawal and [interposing] no objection to his oath-taking in the
almost two years of painful seclusionalthough, I received constant earliest time possible, as prayed for in his motion."9
communication from him as he likewise did from me. We saw each
other again in 1968 when he came to Manila for his review and Both complainant and respondent were required by resolution of this
participation in the bar examinations. In November of the same year, Court of November 18, 1970 it on appear personally before it on
however, he returned to his home province, leaving me and the kid December 16, 1970. Both complainant and respondent duly appeared
behind giving flimsy excuse the uncertainty of his passing in the and informed the Court thatthey had settled their differences and were
exam."1 The next paragraph of such letter was worded thus: "He did intending to get married. Five dayslater, on December 21, 1970, in a
flunk in the first exam and having decidedto take the next, he further pleading filed with this Court by respondent,there was an allegation of
requested me to stop communicating with him untilthe examination was such marriage having taken place on December 18, 1970 with City
over. I wrote him several letters immediately after especially when I Judge Oscar A. Inocentes of Quezon City having performed the
delivered our second baby but I constantly faced a blank wall. This ceremony, a photostat copy of the marriage contract accompanying such
never put me off, though. Instead, my eagerness to hear from him kept manifestation. To satisfy itself, this Court resolved, on January, 5, 1971,
on mounting until that eventful day came — the release of the results torequire that both complainant and respondent appear before it on
ofthe bar examinations. He made the grade this time and I was no more Monday, February 22, 1971. At such a date, the parties appeared before
glad than my folks. We sent him two congratulatory messages and again this Court withthe additional information that they intended to get
we were disappointed to hear no word from him."2 This Court was married in a religious ceremony, such a marriage to take place on March
likewise informed therein that they met accidentally, on which occasion 1, 1971 in the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church with Rev. Fr.
she tried to convince him that they should live together but instead of Emilio Castro officiating. A photostat copy of the marriage contract was
agreeing, his proposal was just to get the two children to live with him submitted by complainant and respondent in an urgent joint motion
and for them to separate for good.3 She would plead then that "he be praying that the respondent be allowed to take the oath of attorney, filed
barred from membership in the Philippine Bar." with this Court on March 3, 1971. Included in such motion is a photostat
copy of the marriage contract resulting from the religious ceremony.
This Court, on April 16, 1970, resolved: "... (a) to note the contents of
the telegram of Evangeline Argañoza requesting that the oath-taking of This Court takes due cognizance that respondent Benito P. Tubaces
Benito P. Tubaces be withheld on the ground of immorality; (b) to appears to have mended his ways and that a satisfactorily long period
require that a copyof the letter of Evangeline Argañoza be sent to Benito had elapsed from the time the results of the 1969 bar examinations were
P. Tubaces and (c) require respondent Tubaces to answer said letter- announced on March 5, 1970. Under the circumstances, it is of the
complaint, within 10 daysfrom notice hereof."4 Instead of answering, opinion that his plea to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath may be
respondent Benito P. Tubaces waited until August 26, 1970 when he favorably acted on. Respondent is admonished to be duly mindful of the
filed a petition alleging that complainantwas retracting or withdrawing standard of rectitude to which a memberof the bar is expected to live up
her complaint and that therefore he should be allowed to take the to. The delay in his being duly admitted to the practice of his profession,
lawyer's oath. Enclosed in such petition is a letter signedby Evangeline a matter traceable solely to his far-from-exemplary conduct, ought to
Argañoza where, after referring to the complaint filed by her against admonish him to observe with fidelity itscanons of behavior. He must by
respondent, there was this declaration of retraction or withdrawal. Thus: this time be fully cognizant that a failure to do so would be sufficient
"Without pressure nor influence exerted upon me, I voluntarily, cause for the appropriate disciplinary action.
irrevocably, and unconditionally retract or withdraw the said complaint
on theground that we have applied and was granted a marriage license WHEREFORE, the urgent joint motion of March 3, 1971, praying that
having agreed to get married on December of this year. The marriage respondent Tubaces be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, is granted.
license was issued on the 21st day of August, 1970 by the Quezon City
Civil Registrar."5 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Then came the resolution of this Court of August 31, 1970 to the
following effect: "Complainant is required to comment, within 10 days B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
from notice hereof,on the petition of the respondent with the latter's
affidavit attached thereto,praying that he be allowed to take the lawyer's
Page 34 of 52
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH- to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
petitioner. property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer
of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
RESOLUTION justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino
along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of
university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to
the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the
bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to
cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each
candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny
must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established
himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every
for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may
En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair
office. to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test
are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow standards are allowed to remain in it.
him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice
of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his Re Rouss:7
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that
his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to
June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar. examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely
a test of fitness.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
which we regard as having persuasive effect: assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of
good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
In Re Farmer: 3 they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have
xxx xxx xxx not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition the administration of justice.
precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in
North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, learning:
through association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or . . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A.
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
if it is wrong. . . . practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
xxx xxx xxx public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his
Page 35 of 52
community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Smith or a Ruffin.9 Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in Raul Camaligan.
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry
is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ.,
proceedings for disbarment: concur.

Re Stepsay: 10 Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984
his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment
proceeding. CARMEN E. BACARRO, complainant,
vs.
Re Wells: 11 RUBEN M. PINATACAN, respondent.

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to

the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral GUERRERO, J.:
character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E.
the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, Bacarro charging Ruben M. Pinatacan a 1975 successful Bar candidate,
and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper character required
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, of a member of the Bar.
and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish
his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment. In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent
fell in love and became engaged while they were studying at the Liceo
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she became pregnant as
would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. fulfilled his promise to marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave
There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into birth to a baby girl; that because of respondent's betrayal, complainant,
the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress
qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law become a member of the Bar. 1
and in our legal system as we know it.12
Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities admitted that complainant had been his sweetheart for several years
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of complainant's child. He
The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in
severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the January of 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co- returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971,
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in
well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental,
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand, as
the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied that he ever promised marriage
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of to complainant and that he ever cohabited with her. 2
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial
moral character. Investigator for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request prompted by
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has financial difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of present her evidence before the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City. 4
whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City Fiscal on
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be her evidence, both oral and documentary. 5
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take
the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of following facts: After about a year of courtship, she and respondent
office. became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while they were students at the
Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of
and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for about a
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make the necessary
sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back in
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get
Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment married because of his parents' objections. When complainant told
of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the respondent that she was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion.
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless Complainant refused and they had a quarrel Thereafter, she did not see
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at or hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named
large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971. Complainant had
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a
for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law. relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with
her to see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by the child. However, respondent did not make good his promise of
appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the support so complainant went to see him again, and once more
Page 36 of 52
respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness
until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of required by his chosen vocation.
Annie Sarabillo. 6
In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan 18
Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the against successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that
birth certificate of her child, numerous letters written by respondent therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for
covering the period from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971 professing admission to the Bar"for violating the honor of two women. Tan had
his everlasting love for complaint with assurances of his sincerity and sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired
loyalty, a letter dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.
complaint Identified as the sister of respondent, and pictures of the child
Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan. 7 As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed
to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the
In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, 8 respondent argued Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to
that based on the evidence adduced by complainant and even assuming him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her
her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an
taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, abortion When complainant refused, he deserted her. Complainant had
agreed with respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out of
"the intimacy between the parties in this case is neither so corrupt or so wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him,
immoral as to warrant the respondent's permanent exclusion from the respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to
Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed keep. On top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to
to take the lawyer's oath. 9 deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by
complaint.
On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating
among others that he is to recognize and give support or financial These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's
assistance to complaint 's child Maria Rochie although he cannot make character and are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that
assurance that he could give such support or financial assistance he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-
immediately since he is without a source of income. 10 deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and
retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally
Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie
complainant submitted a sworn statement expressing her adamant stand Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial
that respondent "is unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a word of support to the said child, 19 We hold that he has realized the
honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on several occasion in wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new
the past he had made the same promise to support our child ..., he did not leaf. Likewise, We reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro 20
even give something to the child to buy a candy during our several that "in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man
meetings ... when I tried to see him every now and then for the alone."
fulfillment of his promise." Moreover, according to complainant,
respondent's insistence that the child be aborted proves his "utter In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished
disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are
or unsuitable for the legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal
notmotivated by revenge, for she was aware that whatever fortunes obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an heir, but
that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was of WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to
the opinion that "respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to take the lawyer's oath.
the legal profession." 11
SO ORDERED.
By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as
proof of his sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a Fernando, C.J., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Plana, Escolin,
public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the
original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court Teehankee, J., took no part.
within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On October 19, 1979,
respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
Resolution. 13
Oath-taking should be deferred until 1985.
From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there
clearly appears no question that the complainant and respondent had ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
been sweethearts for several years, that during the said period they have
been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child Maria Rochie I vote that action be deferred until 1985.
Bacarro Pinatacan is the result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent,
however, maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other do
not justify his disqualification from the practice of law. I vote to deny respondent's admission to the Bar.

One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is

that the applicant must be of good moral character. 14 This requirement G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of
the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-
known to be honest and to possess good moral character. 15 "As a man 27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to
as a model citizen" 16 He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only vs.
for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. 17 Thus,
becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of
becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which RESOLUTION
has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the qualifications,
ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that
Page 37 of 52
CASTRO, J.: August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he
attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal.
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and
as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." 16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
petition with a prayer that thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal,
of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our
faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila
the noblest profession. Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a
pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs.
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30,
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows: 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to
expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant,
praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his the appeal.
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost
the case. Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between
this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
xxx xxx xxx Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by
this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
with impunity.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila
xxx xxx xxx Surety & Fidelity Co.

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised
become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case,
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied) which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case
was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to
Atty. Almacen's statement that appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the
Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to
commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for
is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment." leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of
time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was ordered expunged from the records.
counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered
judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a is unprofessional.
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on
Page 38 of 52
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to
withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered
his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No
word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court
could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no
pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's
September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive
or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to
pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar
for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in
the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in
an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his
reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed
waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and
in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his
sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation
"in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him
the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written
explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened,
offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly
repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St.
Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall
be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's
eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the
beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the
speck from thy brother's eyes." What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were
applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name",
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are
xxx xxx xxx committed in thy name."
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what
he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under
oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming
of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH
and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER
THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that
in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness
to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in
the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT?
One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was
the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court
that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in
the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in
good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of
reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU?
Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it
is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it
is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly
and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the
ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We
were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and
sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his
God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our
President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a
court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to
curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found
in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more
symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ...
We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members
of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
Page 39 of 52
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self- We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate
and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of
Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the recites:
grain of his grievances.
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and the Supreme Court;
ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-
impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
certiorari. departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of
supervision.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for
every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a
burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court
Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal
has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to
562, 566: exercise its supervisory power.

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941,
same petition different reasons may read different justices to the same Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for
result ... . reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant
must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in
time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in
Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be
their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon
is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The
undesirable. reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection,
May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may
Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the file his reply or opposition.
petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower
Bengzon: court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he
"decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and
provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus
have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of outbursts.
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion. circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts'
of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
merely ordered "dismissed".

Page 40 of 52
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that
the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism
concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official
actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and
the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them,
criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions before the
chancery of public opinion."
who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a
rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be
rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State
v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack
on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to
the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath
to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger
lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously
assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the
strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as
citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and
duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal
profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to
the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe
and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers."
15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical ... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
expected to serve. officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is 652)
that
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the —
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) . The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect
traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed,
detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all
bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what
expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of
integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in
or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom
he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality
monstrous to be so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
entertained. ... . statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of parallel precedents.
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court
become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216) application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a
judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed
Page 41 of 52
the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the
direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is 5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the
otherwise. state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats
of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended
OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed for a period of two years. The Court said:
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on
appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of
belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the
general public. courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are
not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be
affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published a held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office
to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court: 6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six
months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such
the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, said:
15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance: We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the
profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration
an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author." by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as
every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers
character than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation
better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration encouraged, and the person making them
of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220. case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise
the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their
attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose
attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the
the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice;
libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began: and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases
involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law 7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
allows and the case warrants.
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally
such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme residing here.
Court of Illinois declared:
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is
proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and ... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct,
the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to
bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public his client.
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to
the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, the Court.
Page 42 of 52
 assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the
published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his
habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned
that: by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication
subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an
measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
of the profession. ... these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
is of prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No applicable thereto.
right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to
private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and
free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to
honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When,
or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult
the court. for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
"criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial
and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a
attorneys. cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the
Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in judicial office under such conditions."
which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph: That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney
it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a
vigilant that the widow got no undue justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court."
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y.
a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common
active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that,
formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should
not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it. discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law
are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows: principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner,
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him
and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at
in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
Page 43 of 52
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held
that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v.
State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408;
People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270,
Atl. 481.
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the
statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged
with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client ... .

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far 2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ... Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has
suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in
he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
had paralyzed him for two years. members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the
unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory
general conduct of a case. of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred. But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is
loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of
from the bar. Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert justice ... .
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of
justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say,
Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and
duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above- in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this
disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
condemnable practices. upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
enlightenment. disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
although conceding that guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which
he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said
right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety
and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this
is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution.
Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty
of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
Page 44 of 52
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court in them is destroyed.
with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its
previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of that his statements and actuations now under consideration were made
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He
the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed: could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the
motion for reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be
arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and
repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented
to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the
blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of
this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to the office of an attorney.
respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect
due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
— and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is
called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice
of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 membership in the Bar. Thus —
which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is
of them involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated.
pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state
would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal.
This is of no moment. This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a
representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, much so that —
has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view
in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, ... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer
came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it
Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him
Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and
Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,
asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the
view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen
effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to
has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon: an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding,
constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts.
A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public
confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be
shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of
justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending,
as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now
proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and
actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely
potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no
statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer,
however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this
Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court
and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar
of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by
this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with
verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices"
Page 45 of 52
and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue fraternity.
the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication
in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court.
offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved
hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
disciplinary sanctions upon him. exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting
as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of
and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor
the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible and judge is absolutely inexistent.
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but
to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that
and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked
disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed
passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and
example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever
gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable. Court be zealously maintained.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from
criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the
Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the
Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function
as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism
is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and
infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our
authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the
members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if
not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but
also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest
is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of
a complainant or a prosecutor.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable
gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser
sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not
perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice
to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology
therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension
should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same
should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because,
even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we
have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law,
there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree
and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will
then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how
short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law
until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the
Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved

parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted
court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.
30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof —
as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties,
nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
In Re: Almacen
Rule 11.03 Duty to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts
FACTS
This is about Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's “Petition to surrender
Lawyer's certificate of title” filed in protest against what he asserts is “a
great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court”.
Almacen indicts the Court as a tribunal “peopled by men who are
calloused to pleas of justice, who ignore without reasons as their own
Page 46 of 52
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution against him... in open and public hearing”. Court then resolved to require
with impunity”. Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request. He then reasoned
that since the Court is the “complainant, prosecutor and Judge” he
Almacen continues, his client, who was deeply aggrieved by the Court's preferred to be heard and answer questions in an open and public
“unjust judgments”, has become “one of the sacrificial victims before hearing so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also
the altar of hypocrisy”. He also ridiculed the members of the Court asked to file a written explanation “in the event the Court has no time to
saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the hear him in person”. Court allowed him and he was also heard in oral
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb”. He vows to argument.
argue the cause of his client “in the people's forum” so that “people may
know of the silent injustices committed by this Court”, and that In Atty. Almacen's written answer, he offered no apology. He repeated
“whatever mistakes, wrongs, and injustices that were committed must his lamentations embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
never be repeated”.
ISSUE
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of his petition thus,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him by columnist Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined
Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of Manila Chronicle. In connection,
Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had “accused the high tribunal of HELD
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself”.
Yes.
(You can start here if di ka ganahan mag taas taas pa)
Before going into detail, Court first justified the importance of minute
It all started because of the civil case Yaptinchay v. Calero in which resolutions. Court held that most petitions by this Court are utterly
Atty. Almacen was the counsel for Calero where the trial court, after due frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. The rest do exhibit
hearing, rendered judgment against his client. Atty. Almacen received a a 1st impression cogency but fail to withstand critical scrutiny and the
copy of the decision and 20 days later, he moved for reconsideration. He Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify on As it is, if they were to accept every case or write a full opinion for
the time and place of hearing. Said motion was denied for “lack of proof every petition they reject, Court will be unable to carry out effectively
of service”. To prove that he did serve the adverse party a copy of his the burden placed upon by the Constitution to decide “only those cases
first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a 2nd motion for which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card but importance beyond particular facts and parties involved”. It should be
the motion was however withdrawn by the trial Court. Trial Court remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
elevated the case to CA. Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the
CA however on the authority of the SC's decision in Manila Surety and facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’
Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal: opinion. (sec.4, Rule 46 of Rules of Court)

“Court resolved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the motion for Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review it was found that Court of
reconsideration does not contain notice of time and place of hearing Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in
thereof, and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper which did not interrupt the light of the law and applicable decisions of the Court tracing the
the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was procedural lines etched by the Court in a number of decisions.
perfected out of time”.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941,
Atty. Almacen moved again to reconsider the resolution urging that the Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for
Manila Surety nd Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu reconsideration to stay the running of period of appeal, movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon adverse party but to also notify of
Construction & Co. is not decisive. At the same time, he filed a pleading the time and place of hearing which admittedly did not. This rule was
entitled “Latest decision of the Supreme Court in support for Motion for articulated in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction
Reconsideration” citing Republic of PH v. Gregorio Venturanza. Again, & Co. :
CA denied his motion.
“Rule 15, Section 4 & 5 which provides that such notice shall state the
Atty. Almaen then appealed to Court by certiorari and was again denied time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all parties concerned
through a minute resolution but shortly thereafter, he again filed a at least 3 days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a 2nd no motion shall be acted upon by Court without proof of such notice.”
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time but was ordered
expunged from the records. It was at this juncture Atty. Almacen vented If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate Court to review lower
his disappointment by filing his “Petition to Surrender Lawyer's court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence
Certificate of Title” pleading filled from beginning to end with insolent, caused the forfeiture of remedy of appeal, which is not a matter of right.
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks against the To shift away himself from his carelessness he looked for a “whipping
Court as well as for its individual members that is seen as boy” and took the liberty of vilifying Court and inflicted exacerbating
unprofessional. rancor on members thereof. It thus appears there is no justification for
his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless, Court decided by resolution to withhold action for his
petition until he has actually surrendered his certificate. Court waited for On Almacen's attack on the high Court, they acknowledged that it is
him but no word came from him. He was reminded to turn over his natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each tim he loses what
certificate so that the Court can act on his petition however he he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are
manifested “he has no pending petition in connection with Calero v. given wide latitude to differ with, and voice disapproval of, not only on
Yaptinchay for case is now final and executory” and that the Court's Court's rulings but also in manner which they are handed down.
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act, and However, as a citizen and officer of the Court, every lawyer is expected
that since his offer was not accepted, he “chose to pursue the negative not to only exercise his right, but also to consider his duty to expose
act”. shortcomings and indiscretions of Courts and judges. It is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill
In exercise of the Court's inherent power to discipline a member of the over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
Bar for gross misconduct, the Court resolved to require Atty. Almacen to fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of Courts and
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. judges on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty to respect to Courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
Atty. Almacen denying the charges against him asked for permission “to lawyer to disciplinary action.
give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
Page 47 of 52
Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. He vows solemnly to conduct
himself “with all good fidelity.. to the Court” and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him “to observe and maintain respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers”. The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him
to “maintain toward the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
temporary incumbent of judicial office but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance”.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline
and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves
unworthy of continued membership in the Bar.
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now
proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and
actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to Courts is The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer
essential to orderly administration of justice. Hence, in assertion of their and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and
client's rights, lawyers, even those gifted with superior intellect, are the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
enjoined to rein up their tempers. bounds of legitimate criticism. It is not a whit less than a classic example
of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from
because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all criticism. Like any other
times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481) Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should
not be, above criticism.
In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state
of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting
Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
period of two years. (In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725)
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism
In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the informed by perspective and infused by philosophy.
several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,"
"criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would
and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
attorneys. futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen
will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room
unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for under the circumstances.
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general, claiming that
the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting
general conduct of a case. repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the to decree that the same should be indefinite. The merit of this choice is
loss of a case, prepared Over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall] last.
moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
from the bar.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente
More... Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law
until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the
denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and (A/N: Hello, please note wala jud expressly gi state ang Rule pero ako
constituting an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and rang gi assume nga mao ni ang rule nga mu-apply)
a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court found
counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974
made disclosed.

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court vs.
With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of blindly adhering to its HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p

The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. Undoubtedly, this
is well within Court's authority to do. By constitutional mandate, ours is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to
the practice of law.
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina
Imperial, filed this present petition for disbarment against respondent
Honesto de Vera, a practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who was
retained by them as their counsel in civil case 2478 of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala".
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and
malpractice: 1) for having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify
Page 48 of 52
them of the decision in civil case 2478 resulting in the deprivation of the complainants could have proven that lot 1880 actually existed, to
their right to appeal from the adverse judgment rendered against them; wit: a sketch of lot 1880 prepared by the vendee, Semenchuk, himself
and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of interest in (Exh. L-Adm. Case); technical description of lot 1880 taken from
petitioners' cause resulting to their damage and prejudice. complainants' certificate of title (Exh. M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of lot
1880 in relation to the adjoining lots prepared by surveyor Miguel N.
Respondent attorney, in his answer to these charges, asserted that he Romero (Exh. N-Adm Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued by surveyor
notified his clients of the decision in question and that he defended Romero for the preparation of the sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case)
complainants' case to the best of his ability as demanded by the — all of which documents were turned over by Jose Alcala to
circumstances and that he never showed indifference, lack of interest or respondent before the trial of case 2478.
disloyalty to their cause.
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is no merit to this
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for particular charge.
investigation, report and recommendation, substantially found the
following: The records of case 2478 show that upon agreement of the parties and
their attorneys, the trial court appointed a commissioner to relocate lot
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of two parcels of 1880 and after conducting such relocation, the commissioner reported to
land (lots Nos. 1880 and 1883 covered by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 the Court that the lot existed, but that the same was in the possession of
respectively) filed by the vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against the vendors, other persons. Inasmuch as the existence of lot 1880 had already been
spouses Alcala, on the ground that lot 1880 "could not be located or did verified by the commissioner, it was therefore unnecessary for
not exist", and for the recovery of damages and attorney's fees. respondent attorney to introduce in evidence Exhibits "L", "M", "N", and
"O", the purpose of which was merely to prove the existence of said lot.
Respondent attorney, whose legal services were engaged by If the complaint for rescission prospered it was because of complainant
complainants, filed an answer denying the material allegations of the Alcala's failure to comply with his obligation of transferring the material
above-mentioned complaint and setting up a counterclaim for the or physical possession of lot 1880 to the vendee and for no other reason;
balance of the purchase price of the lots sold, the expenses of notarials, hence, complainants had nobody to blame but themselves. The fact that
internal revenue, registration, etc. plus damages and attorney's fees. the plaintiff, Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees,
and costs shows that respondent attorney exerted his utmost to resist
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered judgment rescinding the plaintiff's complaint.
contract of sale, on the ground that the vendee Semenchuk was not able
to take material possession of lot 1880 it being in the possession of a 2. Gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure
certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers who have been occupying the to inform his clients of the decision in case 2478: —
land for a number of years. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads: The matter in dispute with respect to this specific charge is whether or
not respondent notified his clients, the complainants herein, about the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: decision in case 2478. Respondent claims that he did inform his clients
of the decision; complainants insist the contrary.
(a) Declaring the deed of sale (Exhibit A) rescinded;
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on
(b) Directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants the possession of hand to prove that respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the
lot No. 1883. decision in case 2478.

(c) Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the sum of As stated in the Solicitor General's report, the reaction of complainant
P1,000.00 after deducting the amount of P250.00 which is the Jose Alcala when the writ of execution in said civil case was served
consideration in the deed of sale of Lot No. 185; and upon him and his wife by a sheriff was such that it betrayed a total
unawareness of the adverse decision. The evidence shows that when he
(d) Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 11, rollo) was told about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala immediately inquired from
the trial Court the reason for the writ of execution and it was only then
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the that he was informed that a decision had been rendered, that his lawyer
decision but he failed to inform his clients of the judgment against them. received a copy thereof since April 19, 1963, and because no appeal was
On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to complainants' house to serve a writ taken the judgment became final and executory. Alcala then sought the
of execution issued in said case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose Alcala help of his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila and the latter wrote
immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case to respondent inquiring as to what steps were taken, if any, to prosecute
2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, an appeal from the decision in question but respondent chose not to
informed Alcala that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy answer the letter. Thereafter, Alcala instituted an action for damages and
of the decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, filed the instant complaint for disbarment.
and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the
trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:

On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for Again, we do not think petitioner Alcala would have felt so aggrieved
damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them and embittered by the loss of his right to appeal the decision in Civil
of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they lost their right to Case No. 2478 so as to take all these legal steps against respondent, with
appeal from said decision. The trial court that heard case 2723 found for all the attendant trouble and expense in doing so, if it is not true, as he
a fact that respondent did not inform his clients of the decision rendered alleged, that the latter indeed did not notify him of said decision. We
in case 2478; however, it denied damages for lack of proof that the believe and so submit, therefore, that respondent really failed to inform
spouses Alcala suffered any damage as a result of respondent's failure to petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, and this was also the
notify them of the aforesaid decision. The judgment in case 2723 was finding made by the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in
appealed to the Court of Appeals1 by respondent herein but the same Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed by petitioners against respondent,
was affirmed by said appellate court. and by the Court of Appeals in the appeal taken by respondent from said
decision. (pp. 38-39, rollo)
Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this
complaint for disbarment against their former counsel. Is respondent's failure to notify his clients of the decision sufficient
cause for his disbarment? Complainants answer the question in the
1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest" of respondent in the affirmative, while on the other hand, respondent prays that he be
handling of complainants' defense in civil case 2478. exonerated because, according to him, granting arguendo that he failed
to inform the complainants about the decision, the truth is that said
The basis of this particular charge is the alleged failure of Atty. de Vera decision was fair and just and no damage was caused to complainants by
to present at the trial of case 2478 certain documents which according to reason thereof.
Page 49 of 52
 matters of professional employment" (7 C.J.S. 979). The relationship of
On this point, We agree with the following appraisal of the evidence by lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
the Solicitor General: the client's being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in
the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being
In this connection, it is indeed true that although both the Court of First defended. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
Instance of Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed by unimpaired (Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case No. 595, July 30, 1971).
petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera (pp. 30-34, Exh. "D", id.), As it happened in this case, because of respondent's failure to notify
and the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R (the appeal taken petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, the latter were
by respondent from the decision of the trial court in C.C. No. 2723), entirely caught by surprise, resulting in shock and mental and emotional
found that respondent actually did not inform petitioners of the decision disturbance to them, when the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home
in Civil Case No. 2478, still both courts also held that petitioners did not with a writ of execution of a judgment that they never knew had been
sustain any damages as a result of said decision, for which reason the rendered in the case, since their lawyer, the respondent, had totally failed
trial court dismissed petitioners' action for damages against respondent, to inform them about the same. ... (pp. 23-24, Report, pp. 45-46, rollo;
which dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We quote the emphasis supplied).
finding of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in Civil
Case No. 2723 in this regard: We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the
correctness of the decision in case 2478 is no ground for exonerating
The second issue that has to be passed upon by the Court is neither the respondent of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his
plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On this issue, the Court finds that the liability. While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent
plaintiffs cannot recover damages from defendant Atty. Honesto de to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of negligence,
Vera. No evidence has been presented that they sustained damages of inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to
the decision. Neither it has been shown that the decision is not supported give timely notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for
by the facts and the law applicable to the case. Consequently, the respondent, his negligence did not result in any material or pecuniary
plaintiffs are not entitled to damages because of the failure of Atty. damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not
Honesto de Vera to inform them of the decision. disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's
career as the extreme penalty of disbarment. As stated in the very early
"An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a case of In Re Macdougall:
reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of
the business he undertakes to do. Fallible like any other human being, he The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is
is answerable to every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
Moreover, a party seeking damages resulting from a judgment adverse to honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
him which became final by reason of the alleged fault or negligence of confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the exercise of
his lawyer must prove his loss due to the injustice of the decision. He disbarment, and the power should be exercised with that caution which
cannot base his action on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition the serious consequences of the action involves.
of the injustice of the decision. (Tuzon vs. Donato, 58 O.G. 6480)."
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study.
(Exh. "D", id.; pp. 33-34) It is a lifetime profession. By years of patience, zeal, and ability, the
attorney may have acquired a fixed means of support for himself and
Significantly, petitioners did not appeal from the above decision, which family of great pecuniary value, and the deprivation of which would
is an implied acceptance by them of the correctness of the findings result in irreparable injury. (3 Phil. 70, 77-78)
therein. Instead, it was respondent Atty. De Vera who appealed said
decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R), and the latter In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Court, although agreeing with the finding of the trial court that Court:
respondent really did not inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case
No. 2478 (Exh. "T"), affirmed, however, the lower court's finding that On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an
petitioners were not entitled to the damages claimed by them by reason individual and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its
of respondent's failure to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously
2478. ... While the rule of res judicata in civil or criminal cases is not, taken from him. On the other, it is extremely that the respectability of
strictly speaking, applicable in disbarment proceedings, which is neither the bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should
a civil or a criminal proceeding intended to punish a lawyer or afford be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some
redress to private grievances but is a proceeding sui generis intended to discretion, ought to reside in the Court. This discretion, ought to be
safeguard the administration of justice by removing from the legal exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised.
profession a person who has proved himself unfit to exercise such trust (Ex parte Burr. 9 Wheat 529; Martin, Legal & Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed.
(p. 207, Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics; Re Keenan, 86 ALR 679; De p. 213.)
Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, April 12, 1961; In re
Montague & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), still we consider the findings Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or
of the trial court as well as of the Court of Appeals in the damage, suit suspension under the circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot
filed by petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera based on the same escape a rebuke from Us as we hereby rebuke and censure him,
grounds now invoked in this disbarment case relevant and highly considering that his failure to notify his clients of the decision in
persuasive in this case, especially as petitioners themselves have, as question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest
already observed, accepted and admitted the correctness of said findings. expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional
And we may add that we ourselves agree with respondent that Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.
petitioners had not been prejudiced or damaged in any way by the
decision in Civil Case No. 2478, but that said decision appears in fact to WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and
be more favorable to them than could have been the case if the trial court recommendation of the Solicitor General, and the fact that this appears
had applied the law strictly against them in said case, ... (pp. 17-19, to be the first misconduct of respondent in the exercise of his legal
Report. pp. 39-41, rollo; emphasis supplied). profession, We hereby hold said respondent GUILTY only of simple
negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants,
The Solicitor General's Report continues and says: and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him. Let this decision be noted
in respondent's record — as a member of the Bar — in this Court.
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or
pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify SO ORDERED.
them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. It is no less true, however,
that in failing to inform his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000
civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
Page 50 of 52
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial
LLAMAS, Respondent. Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
DECISION violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

MENDOZA, J.: On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty.
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present."
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a comment-memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least 3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available) respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Annex A .......-
"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in
Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B .......-
"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C .......-
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer
in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme
Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge
of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139- Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual practice law.
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a 4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the delinquent in his dues.
Roll of Attorneys."
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Calauan, Laguna.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
tax. which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an
furnishing some of these courts). IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
Llamas, as shown by: exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA ) and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay
the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the contrary.
Court of Appeals).
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration
259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated
Page 51 of 52
April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of
Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
ordering respondents suspension for three months. deceitful conduct.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A",
"B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
Rizal 259060 for at least three years." FAITH TO THE COURT.

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991." by any artifice.

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per
his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness
to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8
we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
all courts in the land.

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the SO ORDERED.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the concur.
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number
in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law
practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least
for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was
his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which
those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged
in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is
exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No.
7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall

pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a
Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory
heirs of deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the

practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty
level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby

misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Page 52 of 52