A.M. No.

MTJ-95-1070 February 12, 1997

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

RELATED ARTICLE: ARTICLE 8

Facts:
 Complainant, Maria Apiag, claims that respondent married her on August 11, 1947 and had two
children named as, Teresita Cantero born on June 19, 1947, and Licerio Cantero born on
October 9, 1953.
 The complainant alleged that the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo Cantero, left them without
support after the respondent’s disappearance for unknown reasons.
 The complainant penned a letter addressed to the respondent through her lawyer, Redentor
Guyala, demanding for maintenance and support for the three of them and be instituted and
named as the respondent’s heirs, however no action or response was received from the
respondent. Subsequently, the complainant learned that the respondent had another family
with Nievas Ygay and had five children with her.
 Complainant charged the respondent with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed
bigamy and falsification of public documents.
 The Respondent denied the validity of his marriage with the complainant explaining that such
alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of their, without his consent freely given.
 That respondent did not file any annulment or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged
marriage because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was
void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be
inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money
consideration as reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and
the complainant have already signed a compromised agreement.
 Compromise agreement is executed and entered between the respondent and Teresita Sacurom
representing her mother, Maria Apiag, and brother Glicerio Cantero.
 The respondent died on September 27, 1996, while this case was still being deliberated upon by
this Court.

Issues:
1. Whether the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag is void?
2. Whether the charge of Grave Misconduct is applicable to the respondent assuming that when
he committed the offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary?

Ruling:
 On the issue of void marriage, the court cited the case of Odayat vs. Amante where it ruled that,
"Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the
New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages."
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs . . . a judicial declaration of
such fact" 20 before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will
also be void."21 This was expressly provided under Article 4022 of the Family Code. However,
the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before
 the promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence,
the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.

 In Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first
instance, the present Chief justice defines misconduct as referring "to a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by the public officer."

 That is to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of in re Horilleno, a
decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that for serious misconduct to be shown,
there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules.

 Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition,
it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as
affects his character as a private individual. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties . . . ."

The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no
direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his
official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct
in office.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Related to Article 17 par. 1

Facts:
 The plaintiff and defendant, both of legal age, got married on February 24, 1948, before a
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares.
 The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register. Defendants, Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, the Escaño spouses were
advised by Father Reynes to recelebrate the marriage to validate what he believed was an
invalid marriage due to lack of authority from Archbishop or the parish priest who celebrated
the marriage, but the recelebration did not take place.
 Pasto Tenchaves returned to his job in manila and Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental and there filed a petition to annul her marriage. However, she did not sign the
petition and did not appear before the court resulting to its dismissal.
 On June 24, 1950, without informing her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport, indicating that
she was single with the purpose to study. The application was approved, and she left for the
United State.
 On 22 August 1950, she filed for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, and was granted decree of
divorce, "final and absolute."
 In 1954, Vicenta married an American, and she subsequently acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
 Tenchaves, however, initiated proceedings against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño. The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of Vicenta. The plaintiff
appealed the courts’ decision in dismissing the complaint and for not holding defendants liable
for damages.

Issue:
Whether the marriage entered by the plaintiff and defendant was dissolved by the divorce granted by a
foreign country?

Ruling:
No, the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and
undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. At the time the divorce decree
was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at
the time, expressly provided: Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
In this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).