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National Strategy For The Arctic Region
National Strategy For The Arctic Region
STRATEGY FOR
THE ARCTIC
REGION
OCTOBER 2022
Pillar 2—Climate Change and Environmental Protection: Build Resilience and Advance
Adaptation, while Mitigating Emissions....................................................................................... 10
Pillar 4—International Cooperation and Governance: Sustain Arctic Institutions and Uphold
International Law .......................................................................................................................... 13
1
National Security Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25, “Arctic Region Policy,”
January 2009.
world. Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever before, while contributing
to rising global sea levels, coastal erosion, more frequent and severe wildfires, and damaged
ecosystems. These consequences threaten the livelihoods of Arctic residents and the traditional
lifestyles of Alaska Native communities. Changing fish and wildlife migration patterns,
combined with the high cost of non-subsistence foods, have exacerbated food insecurity and
made cultural traditions more difficult to carry on. Coastal erosion, permafrost thaw, and
flooding in Alaska are damaging infrastructure and will force some communities to relocate or
invest heavily in infrastructure resilience.
A more accessible Arctic could also create new economic opportunities. Low population
densities over a vast geography, high cost of doing business, and lack of financial resources have
contributed to long-standing challenges, including limited infrastructure and a reliance on the oil
and gas and commercial fishing sectors. These constraints have, in turn, kept cost of living high
and stifled opportunities to develop other industries. Diminishing sea ice is gradually opening
new shipping routes and could spur economic development. The Arctic’s significant deposits of
in-demand minerals essential to key technology supply chains have piqued the interest of
governments and businesses across the world. As ice in the Arctic Ocean diminishes and as fish
migration patterns shift, commercial fisheries may move into new areas. These changes could
generate economic benefits for Arctic residents if appropriately managed, in consultation with
those populations. New opportunities will also bring additional challenges, from the potential for
new illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and greater environmental degradation to risks
to maritime navigation, a greater likelihood of accidents, and changes to traditional lifestyles.
The Arctic’s growing strategic importance has intensified competition to shape its future as
countries pursue new economic interests and prepare for increased activity. Russia has invested
significantly in its military presence in the Arctic over the last decade. It is modernizing its
military bases and airfields; deploying new coastal and air defense missile systems and upgraded
submarines; and increasing military exercises and training operations with a new combatant-
command-equivalent for the Arctic. Russia is also developing new economic infrastructure in its
Arctic territories to develop hydrocarbons, minerals, and fisheries and is attempting to constrain
freedom of navigation through its excessive maritime claims along the Northern Sea Route.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has raised geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, as it has globally, creating
new risks of unintended conflict and hindering cooperation. The war has focused Russian
military attention on Ukraine, and sanctions levied against Russia following its invasion could
complicate Russia’s Arctic economic development and military modernization efforts. Russia’s
war in Ukraine redoubled NATO’s unity and resolve and spurred efforts to expand NATO
resourcing. It has also enhanced unity with our Arctic partners, as evidenced by Finland and
Sweden’s prospective NATO accession.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks to increase its influence in the Arctic through an
expanded slate of economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities. It has also emphasized
its intention to play a larger role in shaping regional governance. Over the last decade, the PRC
has doubled its investments, with a focus on critical mineral extraction; expanded its scientific
activities; and used these scientific engagements to conduct dual-use research with intelligence
or military applications in the Arctic. The PRC has expanded its icebreaker fleet and sent naval
vessels into the Arctic for the first time. Other non-Arctic countries have also increased their
presence, investments, and activities in the Arctic.
knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge into federal processes and by supporting Tribal
self-determination and opportunity.
• Deepen Relationships with Allies and Partners: The Arctic is home to some of the
United States’ closest allies and partners. Our North American neighbor and Ally,
Canada and our European Allies and partners, the Kingdom of Denmark (including
Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are essential counterparts in realizing
our shared vision for the Arctic. We will continue to deepen our cooperation and improve
interoperability and information-sharing. We will also expand Arctic cooperation with
other countries that uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards in the region.
• Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments: Many of the investments prioritized in this
strategy will require long lead times. We will be proactive, anticipating changes coming
to the Arctic over the next several decades and making new investments now to be
prepared. Among other investments, we will procure additional icebreakers, enhance
communications and maritime transportation infrastructure, support communities to build
climate resilience, and invest in scientific research.
• Cultivate Cross-Sectoral Coalitions and Innovative Ideas: The challenges and
opportunities in the Arctic cannot be solved by national governments alone. The United
States will strengthen and build on coalitions of private sector; academia; civil society;
and state, local, and Tribal actors to encourage and harness innovative ideas to tackle
these challenges. We will capitalize on institutions, such as the Ted Stevens Center for
Arctic Security Studies, to build strong networks of domestic and international leaders to
advance expertise and cooperation in the Arctic. We will also work with stakeholders
across the Arctic to facilitate economic, environmental, and cultural linkages.
• Commit to a Whole-of-Government, Evidence-Based Approach: The Arctic region
extends beyond the responsibility of any single region or government agency. U.S.
Federal departments and agencies will work together, through coordinating bodies like
the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the National Security Council, to provide
the resources, support, and expertise required to implement this strategy. We will deploy
evidence-based decision-making and carry out our work in close partnership with the
State of Alaska; Alaska Native Tribes, corporations, and other organizations; and local
communities, as well as with the U.S. Congress.
human-made incidents. We will improve our understanding of the Arctic environment and
develop whole-of-government capabilities to support expanding activity in the U.S. Arctic
region. We will deepen cooperation with Arctic Allies and partners in support of these objectives
and to manage risks of further militarization or unintended conflict, including those resulting
from geopolitical tensions with Russia. These improvements will contribute to both national
security and safety and livelihoods in the State of Alaska.
Strategic Objective 1.1: Improve Our Understanding of the Arctic Operating Environment
A deeper understanding of the Arctic operating environment is needed to inform real-time
decision-making and respond to changing conditions. We will invest in modernized domain
awareness to detect and track potential airborne and maritime threats and improve sensing and
observational capabilities, including for sea ice, ship traffic, and weather. For example, we will
collaborate with Canada on North American Aerospace Defense Command modernization. We
will support expanded observations, modeling, and analytic capabilities to enhance our ability to
use gathered data to predict the changing operational environment. We will also improve
communications and positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities by developing
communications and data networks capable of operating in the northern latitudes. We will work
to improve Arctic observing, mapping, and charting; weather, water, and sea ice forecasting;
subseasonal and seasonal prediction; emergency preparedness posture; and satellite coverage to
enable efficient commerce and to ensure maritime and air safety.
Strategic Objective 1.3: Maximize Unity of Effort with Allies and Partners
We will maximize our cooperation with Arctic Allies and partners to enhance our shared security
and deter aggression in the Arctic, especially from Russia. We will coordinate closely with our
allies and partners to deepen our understanding of Arctic security challenges, improve our
collective deterrent and ability to respond to contingencies, and jointly develop and lead shared
approaches to address security challenges together, including through expanded information
sharing in the region. To improve operational familiarity with the Arctic region, including cold
weather operations and interoperability, we will increase our focus on combined exercises and
training. We will undertake calibrated and coordinated activities with NATO Allies and Arctic
partners with the aim of both defending NATO’s security interests in the region while also
reducing risks and preventing unintended escalation, especially during this period of heightened
tension with Russia. We will also continue to partner with the State of Alaska and Alaska Native
and rural communities on activities such as combined exercises and training on cold weather
operations and interoperability.
Strategic Objective 2.2: Pursue International Initiatives to Mitigate Emissions in the Arctic
The United States will work to reduce localized emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and black
carbon, through both existing and new bilateral and multilateral initiatives as appropriate to
complement our global mitigation efforts. Mitigation should also include protection of habitats
that store carbon, such as forests, tundra, and coastal marshes.
Strategic Objective 2.3: Expand Research to Better Understand Climate Change and
Inform Policy Decisions
It is essential to better understand the ways the Arctic environment is rapidly changing, to
anticipate future changes, and to understand the Arctic’s impact on climate change globally and
extreme events regionally. The United States will advance our monitoring and predictive
capacity with better data collection and integration, new observational tools and data, and
2
“Environmentally threatened” communities are defined by the Denali Commission’s Village Infrastructure
Protection program as communities experiencing significant impacts to infrastructure from erosion, flooding, and/or
permafrost degradation.
improved regional and global climate models. We will also support research on marine
ecosystems, wildlife, and fisheries; the design and construction of Arctic infrastructure; and
health crises afflicting Arctic populations. To support science-based decisions, we will also
explore research to improve our understanding of issues such as the potential emissions and
health threats resulting from permafrost thaw. International scientific partnerships and
co-production of knowledge with Alaska Native communities will have a multiplier effect on
this research. Coordinated research on the environmental and societal impacts of climate change
in the Arctic and the Arctic’s role in global climate dynamics should be guided by the
Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee’s (IARPC) and the U.S. Arctic Research
Commission’s (USARC) research plans.3
Strategic Objective 2.4: Conserve and Protect Arctic Ecosystems, including through
Indigenous Co-Production and Co-Management
The United States must continue to pursue multilateral initiatives and research to conserve and
protect Arctic biodiversity, ecosystems, habitats, and wildlife, expanding on concepts like the
Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area.4 Conservation in the Arctic is consistent with the
America the Beautiful Initiative5, which sets out our national goal of conserving 30 percent of
America’s lands and waters by 2030, as well as our international commitments to conservation
and climate. We will work to preserve essential habitats, halt biodiversity loss, and manage
natural resources using an ecosystems-based approach. We will accelerate work to clean up
contaminated lands in Alaska. We will also explore nature-based solutions to reduce flood and
erosion risk, increase ecosystem resilience, store carbon, and deliver co-benefits such as habitat
protection. To carry out this work, we will support co-production of knowledge to develop, as
appropriate, co-managed conservation initiatives. We will ensure we have the capabilities
required to prepare for, prevent, and respond to oil spills and other environmental disasters in the
Arctic and to reduce harmful pollutants and improve waste and water management.
3
IARPC, “Arctic Research Plan 2022–2026,” December 2021; USARC, “Report on the Goals and Objectives for
Arctic Research 2019-2020,” May 2019.
4
Executive Order 13754, “Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience,” December 9, 2016.
5
“Report: Conserving and Restoring America the Beautiful,” May 2021.
transition, and build the resilience of U.S. supply chains. We will carry out this work without
compromising sensitive Arctic ecosystems and in partnership with Indigenous and local
communities. We recognize that the Alaskan economy, like the economies of several other areas
in the Arctic, still depends heavily on revenue from hydrocarbon development. We will work
with the State of Alaska to support efforts to diversify its economy; create a just energy
transition, including for impacted workers; and ensure energy security and affordability during
this transition. We will make inclusive economic growth a priority and work to improve
livelihoods in Alaska, including for Alaska Native communities.
Strategic Objective 3.2: Improve Access to Services and Protect Subsistence Lifestyles and
Cultural Traditions
In pursuing sustainable development that is equitable and aligned with Alaska Native
communities’ needs, we will protect subsistence lifestyles and improve access to reliable and
affordable services, including healthcare, education, energy, housing, water and sanitation, and
public safety. We will renew efforts to provide climate-resilient water and sanitation
infrastructure for the 31 Alaska Native communities still without dependable in-home running
water. We will also work to improve access to affordable energy by developing renewable
energy generation, storage, transmission, and distribution. We will explore opportunities to
expand Indigenous cooperative and co-management agreements and to fight the epidemic of
missing and murdered Indigenous peoples. Indigenous Knowledge will inform decisions about
Alaska’s fish and wildlife resources and help navigate the threats posed to Alaska’s subsistence
lifestyles.
Strategic Objective 3.4: Work with Allies and Partners to Increase Responsible Arctic
Investment, including in Critical Minerals
In the broader Arctic region, we will work with our allies and partners—including through the
potential use of relevant U.S. Government mechanisms and development programs, such as the
Export-Import Bank, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and U.S. Trade and
Development Agency—to expand private sector-led investment and pursue sustainable economic
development in the Arctic, including in critical minerals. We will explore methods to enable
enhanced U.S. government support for strategic investments and to incentivize private sector
investment in the Arctic. We will strengthen capacity across the Arctic region to screen
prospective investments based on national security, environmental sustainability, and supply
chain resilience concerns. Across our development efforts, we will continue to employ the best
practices that distinguish the United States and our partners from our competitors: transparency
and accountability; high environmental, labor, community engagement, and sustainability
standards; equity and ethics; and local partnerships supported by sound, sustainable financing.
agreements pertaining to the Arctic region, such as the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High
Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO Fisheries Agreement).
As the Arctic becomes more accessible and as strategic competition intensifies, we will maintain
our leadership role in the Arctic. We will sustain the existing multilateral fora and legal
frameworks dedicated to solving shared challenges in the region, recognizing that Arctic
countries have the primary responsibility for addressing these challenges. While emphasizing
existing frameworks, we will remain open to developing new bilateral and multilateral
partnerships as needed to advance scientific cooperation and other U.S. interests in the Arctic.
Strategic Objective 4.1: Sustain the Arctic Council and Other Arctic Institutions and
Agreements
The United States will seek to maintain the Arctic Council as the principal multilateral forum for
the Arctic by working through the Council whenever possible, in line with broader U.S. policy
on Russia, and making funding for U.S.-led Arctic Council activities more consistent. We will
also work to advance implementation and enforcement of existing international agreements,
including the CAO Fisheries Agreement, the International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code,
and the Agreement on Enhancing International Science Cooperation in the Arctic. For other
Arctic institutions, such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Forum of Arctic Research
Operators, we will expand U.S. engagement and leadership, pursue new partnerships and
arrangements that advance shared interests, and prepare for increased and evolving activity in the
region, including to manage increased maritime activity, promote sustainable economic
development, and advance conservation and scientific research. We will bring whole-of-
government tools to bear to support this work, including by expanding our diplomatic presence
across the Arctic with additional personnel and posts.
As noted above, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has rendered government-to-
government cooperation with Russia in the Arctic virtually impossible at present. Over the
coming decade, the United States recognizes that it may be possible for some cooperation to
resume under certain conditions. In the meantime, we will work with our allies and partners and
other governments that uphold the rule of law to sustain the effectiveness of the Arctic Council
and other Arctic institutions and to hold all members accountable for their responsibility to
uphold international law, rules, and standards globally.
Strategic Objective 4.2: Protect Freedom of Navigation and Continental Shelf Limits
The United States will protect navigation and overflight rights and freedoms across the Arctic
and will delineate the outer limits of the U.S. continental shelf in accordance with international
law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We will
also continue to support joining UNCLOS and to vigorously defend U.S. interests, which are
best served by widespread adherence to the international rule of law.
opportunities. This strategy lays out the U.S. approach for doing so. By working together with a
range of partners, including Arctic Allies and partners, the State of Alaska, Alaska Native
communities, local governments, businesses, and universities, we will undertake a whole-of-
government endeavor to realize an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
cooperative.