2021 Legal Method Study Manual Reading Materials

PART 2
READING MATERIALS
READING 1 265
Crossley v Rawlinson [1982] 1 WLR 369 265
READING 2 272
Crossbows Act 1987 272
READING 3 274
Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 (extracts) 274
READING 4 276
Human Rights Act 1998 (extracts) 276
READING 5 285
Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 728 285
READING 6 291
Guard Dogs Act 1975 c.50 291
READING 7 295
Guard Dogs Act 1975 (Commencement No 1) Order 1975 295
READING 8 297
Hobson v Gledhill [1978] 1 WLR 215 297
READING 9 303
Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985 303
READING 10 304
Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102 304
READING 11 309
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern)
Ltd [1953] 1 QB 401 309
264 Part 2 / Reading Materials
Part 2 / Reading Materials 265
READING 1
Crossley v Rawlinson [1982] 1 WLR 369
Crossley v Rawlinson
1979 C No 3014
Queen’s Bench Division
14 July 1981
[1982] 1 WLR 369
Mr Richard Tucker QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge
1981 July 13, 14

Negligence - Duty of care to whom? - Rescuer - AA patrolman running to put
out fire on lorry - Injury in fall before reaching lorry - Whether injury
foreseeable.
The defendant was driving his lorry along a dual carriageway, when, as a
result of his negligence, a tarpaulin covering the body of the lorry caught
fire. The defendant then stopped the lorry on the roadside. The plaintiff,
an AA patrolman, was on duty at an AA service centre about 100 yards from
where the lorry was stopped and saw the fire. He picked up a fire
extinguisher and ran out to assist in putting out the fire. While running
towards the lorry along a rough path by the side of the road, the plaintiff
caught his foot in a concealed hole and fell. He was injured but managed to
get up, reached the lorry and extinguished the fire.
In an action by the plaintiff for damages for personal injuries:
Held, dismissing the action, that although the fire was caused by
the defendant’s negligence, no reasonable man could reasonably have
foreseen that it would cause the plaintiff to suffer injury by running along
the path; that the plaintiff’s damage was caused by an accident which
neither party could reasonably have foreseen; and that, accordingly, the
defendant was not liable for the plaintiff’s injury and no damages were
recoverable
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, CA; Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC
837, HL(Sc); Hyett v Great Western Railway Company [1948] 1 KB 345, CA
and Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650, CA
distinguished.
Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625, CA applied.
The following cases are referred to in the judgment:
Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112.
Corothers v Slobodian (1975) 51 DLR (3d) 1.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, CA

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837; [1963] 2 WLR 779; [1963] 1 All ER
705, HL (Sc).
Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 345; [1947] 2 All ER 264, CA
Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625; [1981] 2 WLR 1038;
[1981] 2 All ER 408, CA
Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650; [1963] 3 WLR 374;
[1963] 2 All ER 860, CA
No additional cases were cited in argument.
ACTION
In his statement of claim dated July 18, 1979, the plaintiff, Peter Crossley,
alleged that on September 28, 1976, he was on duty as an AA patrolman at the
Gallows Corner Road AA Service Centre next to the A12 dual carriageway road
at Romford in Essex when a lorry owned and driven by the defendant, William
John Rawlinson, drove along the eastbound half of the dual carriageway and
stopped some 300 feet from the service station with the tarpaulin over the
body of the lorry ablaze. The road at the time was busy with traffic, and the
plaintiff, fearing an explosion, took a fire extinguisher from the service station
and ran along a trodden pathway in the adjacent grass verge to put out the fire.
The plaintiff was within about 100 feet of the blazing lorry when his foot went
into a hole or depression in the verge and he fell over. The plaintiff averred
that his fall and the injuries sustained were due to the defendant’s negligence.
The defendant’s defence served on November 29, 1979, denied that he
was guilty of any of the negligence alleged or that such negligence caused or
contributed to any injury, loss or damage which the plaintiff might establish.
It was further alleged that any injury which the plaintiff might have sustained
was caused by his own negligence in that he failed to take any care as to how
he moved towards the lorry and that he had voluntarily accepted the risk of
sustaining such injury.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
John Crowley for the plaintiff.
George Pulman for the defendant.
RICHARD TUCKER QC In this action the plaintiff sues the defendant for
damages in respect of personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on September
28, 1976, while he was on duty as an AA patrolman. The defendant is the
owner and was the driver of a lorry. At about 9.15 in the morning, as the
defendant was driving the lorry along the A12 road, which is a dual carriageway
at Romford in Essex, a tarpaulin covering the body of the lorry caught fire. The
defendant accordingly stopped his lorry, partly on the carriageway and partly
on the grass verge. The place where he stopped is about 300 feet from the
AA Service Centre at Gallows Corner where the plaintiff worked. The plaintiff
saw what happened. He grabbed a fire extinguisher and ran towards the lorry
intending to put out the fire. He ran along a trodden pathway on the grass
verge but unfortunately his foot went into a hole and fell and injured his back.
He managed to get to the lorry and thought he had succeeded in dealing with
the fire.
The scene is illustrated in a sketch plan forming part of the further and
better particulars of the statement of claim, and in six agreed photographs,
which were taken on the first anniversary of the accident and at about the
same time of day. It can be seen from the plan and from photographs 1 and
2, that there is a layby alongside the AA post. There was room on it for the
defendant to park his lorry there, but he had not got that far along the road
and did not do so. In photograph 1 the plaintiff is shown standing in about the
position where the lorry stopped. There is a verge and a rough path between
that position and the AA post, as can be seen. In photograph 2 the plaintiff is
shown standing at about the point where he fell, and that point can be seen
in close-up in photographs 3, 4 and 5. It was about 128 feet from the AA post.
The road itself is a busy one. It runs between London and Southend.
The plaintiff is now aged 36; he is married with three children; he has been
employed by the AA as a patrolman since 1974 and is still so employed. He
moved to Gallows Corner in July 1976, that is to say, two or three months prior
to the accident. He had previously been employed as a fitter and then as a
heavy goods vehicle driver.
The plaintiff described the path. There was no paved footpath alongside
the road but there was a rough path which had been made by people walking
to and from work, and by an occasional horse-rider. He said it was bumpy
and that there were a few pot-holes either side of the verge, otherwise it was
a normal footpath such as you find in the country. He had been on the path
himself many times. In particular he had gone along it to recapture horses
which had escaped from nearby riding stables. That was something which had
happened more than once before the accident. Although the plaintiff said that
the grass on the verge is normally six to eight inches high, he said the path
itself was a pretty well-worn track and that other emergencies had involved
him going along it. He had run along it before. There is no suggestion that he
had ever tripped or fallen. ‘I did not think it was going to be dangerous to run
along there. I would not expect to fall or trip.’ He agreed that he was one of
the best people to say, having used it regularly, although he later qualified
that to a great extent when he said. ‘I would not have run along that path for
a menial task. It was uneven and dangerous.’
I find that the plaintiff had used that path regularly; had run along it
occasionally and did not regard it as dangerous to do so. It was, in my judgment,
an ordinary country footpath with nothing about it which ought to lead anyone
to suspect that it would be dangerous to run along it if necessary.
The plaintiff told me how the accident happened. He saw the lorry from the
window of the AA post. He saw it stop about 100 yards away. The tarpaulin was
ablaze. Instinctively he grabbed a fire extinguisher and ran very fast towards
the lorry. It was in his mind that the fire might cause an injury; that the lorry
might explode or that smoke might go across the road and cause accidents.
He ran along the path, but as he got about one-third of the way towards the
lorry, his foot went down a pot-hole of some description. He said it felt like
stepping off a kerb which you did not realise was there. He fell down. He felt a
searing pain in his leg. He managed to get up and get to the lorry. He thought
the hole had, in fact, been made by a lorry, standing there overnight. He could
not see it at the time - it was covered by grass. He said his foot was just off the
pathway and he would not have known what was off the pathway.
I find that the hole was off the beaten track and was invisible. Although the
plaintiff realised that there might be small holes about, he had not appreciated
that there was a hole big enough to get his foot in. He made his way to the
lorry. He found that the body of the lorry had been partly tipped. There are
illustrations of a somewhat similar lorry. He found the blazing tarpaulin was
half in the body of the lorry and half between the body and the cab, that is to
say, close to the engine and the fuel tank. The plaintiff extinguished that fire
with the fire extinguisher, an extinguisher of a normal type, about 15 inches
long, weighing three lbs, and easily carried. In appearance it looks like a thin
and elongated soda siphon.
The plaintiff hobbled back to the AA post. His leg was painful. He went
straight to his general practitioner after work. It is not suggested that he did
not injure himself in the way he described, and I find that he did. I thought the
plaintiff was perfectly genuine in his description of his symptoms which I find
to be wholly attributable to the injury which he sustained in the accident. Had
there been any doubt about the circumstances of the accident the remaining
evidence called by the plaintiff would have dispelled it. A fireman who attended
the scene confirmed that the tarpaulin had caught fire and produced an extract
from the fire report, which gave as the supposed cause of the fire, ‘tarpaulin
inadvertently placed too close to the engine exhaust, overheated and ignited.’
The plaintiff also called his fellow AA patrolman who saw the fire and later
saw the plaintiff limping back to the post. The defendant called no evidence.
The issues are these: (1) was the fire due to the defendant’s negligence?
(2) If so, was that negligence causative of the plaintiff’s accident? As to the
first matter no explanation came from the defendant about the cause of the
fire, but there is no difficulty about finding that it was due to his negligence
because his counsel, Mr Pulman, has accepted that the defendant must be
found guilty of negligence, and I have no difficulty in finding that the fire was
caused by some negligence on the part of the defendant. As to the second
issue, Mr Pulman also conceded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
plaintiff would take a fire extinguisher and run along a path towards the fire.
He abandoned the allegation that the plaintiff had voluntarily accepted the risk
of injury, but Mr Pulman argued that that was not the end of the matter. He
submitted that the plaintiff had not at the time of his accident brought himself
within the protection afforded to a rescuer and that there was no breach of any
duty owed to him by the defendant. He further submitted that a tortfeasor was
not the guarantor of the safety of a victim. What was required, he submitted,
was reasonable foreseeability by a reasonable man and here there was none.
The plaintiff’s counsel, Mr Crowley, on the other hand cited a number of
the rescue cases and argued that the test was whether the rescuer exposed
himself to a real risk of injury and that the precise nature of the injury does not
have to be foreseen. He submitted that the defendant would be liable even if
injury resulted not from the danger itself but from the plaintiff attempting to
deal with the danger. He cited three English cases, a Scottish case, an Australian
case and a Canadian case. The English cases were Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1
KB 146; Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 345 and Videan v British
Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 was the case of the police constable
who was injured while stopping runaway horses. Greer LJ, in the course of his
judgment said, at p 156:
‘There can be no doubt in this case that the damage was the result of
the wrongful act in the sense of being one of the natural and probable
consequences of the wrongful act. It is not necessary to show that this
particular accident and this particular damage were probable; it is sufficient
if the accident is of a class that might well be anticipated as one of the
reasonable and probable results of the wrongful act.’
Roche LJ said, at p 166:
‘My answer is this: that the learned judge rightly arrived at an affirmative
conclusion, because the negligence of the defendants’ servant was the
cause, and not merely the occasion, both of the horses running away and
of the necessity arising for the very proper intervention of the plaintiff.’
In Hyett v Great Western Railway Co [1948] 1 KB 5, the plaintiff was injured
while removing drums of paraffin from a blazing wagon. Tucker LJ said, at p 348:
‘In the case of fire if a man is going to act at all, he must act swiftly, and,
applying the tests laid down in the two cases referred to, I have reached
the conclusion that the act of the plaintiff was not novus actus interveniens
breaking the chain of causation, but was the kind of act which the railway
company might reasonably have anticipated as likely to follow from their
act of negligence in leaving the leaking paraffin on this siding.’
In Videan v British Transport Commission [1963] 2 QB 650 a stationmaster
was killed while attempting to rescue his son from the path of an oncoming
trolley. Lord Denning MR, in the course of his judgment, said, at p 669:
‘Foreseeability is necessary, but not foreseeability of the particular
emergency that arose. Suffice it that he ought reasonably to foresee that,
if he did not take care, some emergency or other might arise, and that
someone or other might be impelled to expose himself to danger in order
to effect a rescue. Such is the case here.’
And in a later passage he said:
‘Whoever comes to the rescue, the law should see that he does not suffer
for it. It seems to me that, if a person by his fault creates a situation of
peril, he must answer for it to any person who attempts to rescue the
person who is in danger. He owes a duty to such a person above all others.
The rescuer may act instinctively out of humanity or deliberately out of
courage. But whichever it is, so long as it is not wanton interference, if the
rescuer is killed or injured in the attempt, he can recover damages from
the one whose fault has been the cause of it.’
That must be read subject to a later judgment of Lord Denning MR in Lamb

v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625, to which I shall refer in due
course. But referring back to the Videan case, in the judgment of Pearson LJ,
he said, at p 682:
‘It was foreseeable by Souness that if he drove his vehicle carelessly into
the station he might imperil the stationmaster, as the stationmaster might
well have some proper occasion for going on the track in the performance
of his duties, For this purpose it is not necessary that the particular accident
which happened should have been foreseeable. It is enough that it was
foreseeable that some situation requiring the stationmaster to go on the
line might arise, and if any such situation did arise, a careless approach
to the station by Souness with his vehicle would be dangerous to the
stationmaster.’
In all those cases the accident was caused by the original negligence itself.
In all of them the victim was actually engaged in a rescue operation at the
scene of the danger. The police constable was not injured because he fell over
a protruding flagstone while running to stop the horses. The stationmaster’s
death was not caused because he fell off the platform. Mr Crowley also cited
Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837 where again the accident was caused
directly by the negligence and not by something extraneous to it. In all four
cases, it seems to me, it was held that it ought to have been foreseen that
injury might result from the negligence and that people might attempt to
rescue those imperilled by the negligent act. It also seems to me that in all
those cases it was held that a reasonable man ought reasonably to have
foreseen that the accident which did befall the plaintiff, or the deceased, might
well have befallen him.
Mr Crowley went on to cite two Commonwealth cases which he agreed were
not binding, although of course they are of considerable persuasive authority.
Both concern rescuers who were injured and in the one case killed while at
or close to the scene of road accidents because they were struck by motor
vehicles other than those originally involved. Thus in the Australian case of
Chapman v Hearse (1961) 106 CLR 112, a doctor who was attending an injured
driver in the middle of the road, was run down and killed by another car. It was
held that his widow was entitled to recover against the driver responsible for
the original accident on the grounds that subsequent injury by passing traffic
to those rendering aid after a collision on the highway would be by no means
unlikely.
In the Canadian case of Corothers v Slobodian (1975) 51 DLR (3d) 1, the
plaintiff assisted at the scene of a road accident, then ran along the side
of the road to seek aid for the injured victims. She was struck by another
vehicle. It was held that she could recover against the driver responsible for the
original accident on the grounds that her action was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of his negligence.
Although those two cases appear at first sight to extend the scope to which
protection is afforded to a rescuer, in fact the basis of liability in my view
remains the same – the test is foreseeability. Before applying that test to the
facts of the present case I have very much in mind the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625, 636, to
which I have already referred, where Lord Denning MR said that the problem
of limiting the range of liability for negligence ‘ultimately ... is a question of
policy for the judges to decide’ and I particularly also have in mind the words
of Watkins LJ, where he said, at p 647:
‘A robust and sensible approach to this very important area of the study
of remoteness will more often than not produce, I think, an instinctive
feeling that the event or act being weighed in the balance is too remote
to sound in damages for the plaintiff. I do not pretend that in all cases the
answer will come easily to the inquirer. But that the question must be asked
and answered in all these cases I have no doubt. To return to the present
case, I have the instinctive feeling that squatters’ damage is too remote. I
could not possibly come to any other conclusion, although on the primary
facts I, too, would regard that damage or something like it as reasonably
foreseeable in these times.’
Thus if I were answering the question whether in the present case the
plaintiff’s damage is too remote, my instinctive feeling would be that it is. If I
were answering the question, as in my judgment I have to, whether it ought
reasonably to have been foreseen that the plaintiff would suffer this or any
other injury while, running along the path, I would say, and do say, that no
reasonable man could reasonably have foreseen it. I reach this conclusion with
reluctance because on any view the plaintiff acted with very great presence
of mind and with the best possible motives. I think it unfortunate that such
a man should not be awarded damages for an injury which was not his fault.
I dismiss the allegation that he brought it about by his own carelessness, but
it was an accident in the true sense of the word, which neither party could
reasonably have foreseen.
Accordingly I am obliged to hold that the defendant is not liable for that
injury and that no damages are recoverable. If I had awarded damages I would
have awarded the plaintiff £3,500 for pain and suffering and loss of amenities.
I accept that his complaints are genuine. I find that there is no real prospect of
his ever being put out of employment with the AA but there is a chance that
he may have to take work with them which is slightly less remunerative and I
would have added a further £250 for that. As I have indicated, it is with regret
that I have decided that he cannot recover those damages in this action and
there must be judgment for the defendant.
Representation
Solicitors: Amery-Parks & Co, Basingstoke; Greenwoods.
Action dismissed with costs.
READING 2
Crossbows Act 1987
Crossbows Act 1987

An Act to create offences relating to the sale and letting on hire of crossbows
to, and the purchase, hiring and possession of crossbows by, persons under
the age of eighteen and for connected purposes [15 May 1987]
1. Sale and letting on hire
A person who sells or lets on hire a crossbow or a part of a crossbow to a
person under the age of eighteen is guilty of an offence unless he believes him
to be eighteen years of age or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief.
2. Purchase and hiring
A person under the age of eighteen who buys or hires a crossbow or a part of
crossbow is guilty of an offence.
3. Possession
A person under the age of eighteen who has with him–
(a) a crossbow which is capable of discharging a missile, or
(b) parts of a crossbow which together (and without any other parts)
can be assembled to form a crossbow capable of discharging a
missile,
is guilty of an offence, unless he is under the supervision of a person who is
twenty-one years of age or older.
4. Powers of search and seizure etc
(1) If a constable suspects with reasonable cause that a person is committing
or has committed an offence under section 3, the constable may–
(a) search that person for a crossbow or part of a crossbow;
(b) search any vehicle, or anything in or on a vehicle, in or on which
the constable suspects with reasonable cause there is a crossbow,
or part of a crossbow, connected with the offence.
(2) A constable may detain a person or vehicle for the purpose of a search
under subsection (1).
(3) A constable may seize and retain for the purpose of proceedings for
an offence under this Act anything discovered by him in the course of
a search under subsection (1) which appears to him to be a crossbow
or part of a crossbow.
(4) For the purpose of exercising the powers conferred by this section a
constable may enter any land other than a dwelling-house.
5. Exception
This Act does not apply to crossbows with a draw weight of less than 1.4
kilograms.
6. Punishments
(1) A person guilty of an offence under section 1 shall be liable, on summary
conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a
fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under section 2 or 3 shall be liable, on
summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
(3) The court by which a person is convicted of an offence under this Act
may make such order as it thinks fit as to the forfeiture or disposal of
any crossbow or part of a crossbow in respect of which the offence
was committed.
7. Corresponding provision for Northern Ireland
An Order in Council under paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 1 to the Northern
Ireland Act 1974 (legislation for Northern Ireland in the interim period) which
contains a statement that it is made only for purposes corresponding to the
purposes of this Act–
(a) shall not be subject to paragraph 1(4) and (5) of that Schedule
(affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament), but
(b) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either
House of Parliament.
8. Short title, commencement and extent
(1) This Act may he cited as the Crossbows Act 1987.
(2) Sections 1 to 6 shall come into force at the end of the period of two
months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(3) Sections 1 to 6 shall not extend to Northern Ireland.
Notes
Initial Commencement
Specified date
Specified date: 15 July 1987: see s 8(2).
Amendment
This Act was amended by the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (implemented
1 October 2007). The Act increased the relevant age from 17 to 18 for the
purposes of ss 1-3.
READING 3
Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 (extracts)
On the Right of Citizens of the [European] Union and their Family

Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Member States
Article 1 Subject
This Directive lays down:
(a) the conditions governing the exercise of free movement and resi-
dence within the territory of the Member States by Union citizens
and their family members;
(b) the right of permanent residence in the territory of the Member
States for Union citizens and their family members;
(c) the limits placed on the rights set out in (a) and (b) on grounds of
public policy, public security and public health.
Article 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
1. ‘Union citizen’ means any person having the nationality of a Member State;
2. ‘family member’ means:
(a) the spouse;
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered
partnership ... equivalent to marriage;
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are depend-
ants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b);
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the
spouse or partner as defined in point (b);
3. ‘host Member State’ means the Member State to which a Union citizen
moves in order to exercise his/her right of free movement and residence.
Article 5 Right of entry

1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to
national border controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave
to enter their territory with a valid identity card or passport and shall grant
family members who are not nationals of a Member State leave to enter
their territory with a valid passport.
No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens…
Article 7 Right of residence for more than three months

1. All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of
another Member State for a period of longer than three months if they:
(a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or
(b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members
not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host
Member State during their period of residence and have comprehen-
sive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State; or
(c) are enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or fi-
nanced by the host Member State on the basis of its legislation or ad-
ministrative practice, for the principal purpose of following a course
of study, including vocational training; and have comprehensive sick-
ness insurance cover in the host Member State and assure the rele-
vant national authority, by means of a declaration or by such equiv-
alent means as they may choose, that they have sufficient resources
for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on
the social assistance system of the host Member State during their
period of residence; or
(d) are family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who sat-
isfies the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c)…
READING 4
Human Rights Act 1998 (extracts)
Human Rights Act 1998 (extracts)
CHAPTER 42
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Section
Introduction
2. Interpretation of Convention rights.
Legislation
3. Interpretation of legislation.
4. Declaration of incompatibility.
Public authorities
5. Acts of public authorities.
6. Proceedings.
Parliamentary procedure
19. Statements of compatibility.
SCHEDULES:
Schedule 1–The Articles.
Part I–The Convention.
Human Rights Act 1998
1998 CHAPTER 42
An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the
European Convention on Human Rights; to make provision with respect to
holders of certain judicial offices who become judges of the European Court
of Human Rights; and for connected purposes. [9th November 1998]
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:–
Introduction
2. Interpretation of Convention rights
(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in
connection with a Convention right must take into account any–
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the
European Court of Human Rights, . . .
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal,
it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.
...
Legislation
3. Interpretation of legislation
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible
with the Convention rights.
(2) This section–
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever
enacted;
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement
of any incompatible primary legislation; and
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement
of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any
possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of
the incompatibility.
4. Declaration of incompatibility
(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines
whether a provision of primary legislation is compatible with a
Convention right.
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a
Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.
...
Public authorities
6. Acts of public authorities
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible
with a Convention right.
...
(3) In this section ‘public authority’ includes–
(a) a court or tribunal, and
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising
functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament.
(4) ...
...
7. Proceedings
(1) A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to
act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may–
(a) bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the
appropriate court or tribunal, or
(b) rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal
proceedings,
but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act.
...
Parliamentary procedure
19. Statements of compatibility
(1) A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in either House of Parliament
must, before Second Reading of the Bill–
(a) make a statement to the effect that in his view the provisions of
the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights (‘a statement
of compatibility’); or
(b) make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make
a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes
the House to proceed with the Bill.
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner as
the Minister making it considers appropriate.
SCHEDULES
Section SCHEDULE 1
1(3)
THE ARTICLES
PART I
THE CONVENTION
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Article 2
Right to life
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be de-
prived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention
of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more
than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a
person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
Article 3
Prohibition of torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
Article 4
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour

1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’
shall not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention
imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention
or during conditional release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious
objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted
instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening

the life or well-being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
Article 5
Right to liberty and security

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accord-
ance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a
competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of
any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose
of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or
fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose
of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or
drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him.
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge
or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the
detention is not lawful.
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contra-
vention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right
to compensation.
Article 6
Right to a fair trial

1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any crimi-
nal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hear-
ing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribu-
nal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in
the interest of morals, public order or national security in a demo-
cratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following mini-
mum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and
in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under
the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
or speak the language used in court.
Article 7
No punishment without law

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under na-
tional or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person
for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed,
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations.
Article 8
Right to respect for private and family life

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-
tice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Article 10
Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall in-
clude freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas without interference by public authority and regard-
less of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial in-
tegrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Article 11
Freedom of assembly and association

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to free-
dom of association with others, including the right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of
the administration of the State.
Article 12
Right to marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found
a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
Article 14
Prohibition of discrimination
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Article 16
Restrictions on political activity of aliens

Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
Article 17
Prohibition of abuse of rights

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Article 18
Limitation on use of restrictions on rights

The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and
freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which
they have been prescribed.
READING 5
Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 728
Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson
[1995] 1 WLR 728
Queen’s Bench Division
QBD
Balcombe LJ and Schiemann J
1994 March 7
Road Traffic - Breath specimen for analysis - Consumption of alcohol - Alcohol
injected into body for medical reasons - Possibility of injected alcohol affecting
breathalyser reading - Whether consuming including injection of alcohol - Road
Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52), s 5(1)
The defendant was arrested for driving a motor vehicle after having
consumed alcohol in excess of the prescribed limit contrary to s 5(1) of the
Road Traffic Act 1988. At the police station he gave two breath specimens
containing 70 and 69 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath. The
magistrate found that, some two months earlier, a doctor who had been
treating the defendant for a spinal injury had administered to him by injection
three millilitres of a pain killer to act as a slow release reservoir giving relief
over many weeks. The pain killer included an aqueous solution of 1.5 per cent.
benzyl alcohol as a preservative which could have affected the breathalyser
reading. The defendant had been drinking wine during the evening of his
arrest but the evidence did not show that to be the cause of his being over
the limit. The magistrate held that for the purposes of s 5 of the Act of 1988
‘consuming’ was not intended to include injecting and that the defendant was
therefore not guilty.
On appeal by the prosecutor: -
Held, allowing the appeal, that although the primary meaning of ‘consuming’
was consuming by mouth, it was capable of a variety of meanings depending
on its context; and that, on the true construction of s 5(1) of the Road Traffic
Act 1988, bearing in mind the mischief at which it was aimed, ‘consuming’
was not restricted to drinking but included the introduction of alcohol into
the body by injection or other means.
The following cases are referred to in the judgments:
Brewer v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 WLR 267; [1969] 1 All
ER 513, DC.
Stephens v Cuckfield Rural District Council [1960] 2 QB 373; [1960] 3 WLR 248;
[1960] 2 All ER 716, CA.
Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd v Citibank NA [1992] Ch 53; [1991] 3 WLR 750;
[1991] 4 All ER 1.
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Blakey v Harrison [1915] 3 KB 258, DC.
Caldwell v Jones [1923] 2 KB 309, DC.
Collins v Lucking [1983] RTR 312, DC.
Cracknell v Willis [1988] AC 450; [1987] 3 WLR 1082; [1987] 3 All ER 801, HL(E).
Hull and Lady Meux, In re [1905] 1 KB 588, CA.
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593; [1992] 3 WLR 1032; [1993] 1 All ER 42, HL(E).
[Extracts from the] Case Stated by a stipendiary magistrate at Liverpool.
On 17 December 1991 an information was preferred by the Director of
Public Prosecutions against the defendant, David Edward Johnson, that he
drove a motor vehicle on a road after consuming so much alcohol that the
proportion of it in his breath exceeded the prescribed limit contrary to s 5(1)
(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The stipendiary magistrate heard the information on 22 February 1993 and
… found the following facts. On 15 November 1991 PC 8093A Derek Joseph
McCarthy and WPC Nicola Diana Mary McGuire stopped a black Astra GTE
motor car registration number E38 XMA. The driver of the vehicle was the
defendant. A breath test for analysis was administered by Sgt Worrell on a Lion
lntoximeter 3000, which provided readings of 70 and 69 micrograms of alcohol
in 100 millilitres of breath. … Following charge, the defendant replied: ‘I have
no idea why I was over the limit, but I think it might be something to do with
being on medication.’ The defendant gave evidence that he had been drinking
wine during the course of the evening … On 8 October 1991 the defendant was
admitted to Murryfield Hospital under the treatment of Dr JCD Wells. He was
injected with 5 millilitres of 1 per cent lignocaine and 3 millilitres of Kenalog.
… The object of the preparation was to form a ‘depot’ preparation capable of
giving slow release of pain relieving steroids over many weeks … Neither the
defendant nor Dr Wells was aware of the presence of benzyl alcohol or of its
possible effects at the time the injection occurred. The stipendiary magistrate
heard evidence from Dr Wells on behalf of the defence and Dr Ferner on
behalf of the prosecution. He accepted, as a fact, that there was a reasonable
possibility that the injection of Kenalog by Dr Wells affected the reading on
the machine when the defendant was subject to the breath test procedure. …
It was contended by the prosecutor that benzyl alcohol was alcohol within
the meaning of s 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It was further contended by
the prosecutor that, even if the stipendiary magistrate accepted Dr Wells’s
evidence, the defendant had consumed alcohol within the meaning of s 5 of
the Road Traffic Act 1988. The prosecutor relied upon the strict language of
s 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and s 15(2) of the Road Traffic Offenders
Act 1988. It was further contended that, because one of the objects of the road
traffic legislation was the promotion of road safety and the accepted perception
based on medical knowledge was that the presence of alcohol in the body
impaired driving, it was wrong to give a narrow definition to consumption.
The prosecutor also submitted that the dictionary definition of consumption
covered the instant case and that it was not justifiable to look at Parliament’s
purpose for the legislation in attempting to interpret consumption.
It was contended by the defendant that it was not proved he had driven a
motor vehicle on a road after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion
of it in his breath exceeded the prescribed limit, given that he could not be said
to have consumed the alcohol which had been injected into him, and that it
was a reasonable possibility that that was the cause of the reading being over
the prescribed limit. The defendant argued that on the facts of the particular
case he had not consumed alcohol and that it was proper to examine the
motives of Parliament in interpreting consumption. It was further contended
that benzyl alcohol was not alcohol within the meaning of s 5 of the Road
Traffic Act 1988.
The stipendiary magistrate was of the opinion that (1) benzyl alcohol was
alcohol within the meaning of s 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and (2) s 5 unlike
s 4 did not require consumption and in the circumstances of the particular case
the insertion of Kenalog did not amount to consumption within the meaning
and spirit of the Road Traffic Act 1988; accordingly, the defendant was found
not guilty.
The question for the opinion of the High Court was: in order to determine
whether a person charged with an offence contrary to s 5 of the Road Traffic
Act 1988, of consuming so much alcohol that the proportion revealed in
his breath exceeded the prescribed limit, was the court entitled to restrict
the meaning of ‘consuming’ to the act of drinking and to no other mode of
introduction or injection of alcohol?
Representation
Timothy Spencer for the prosecution.
Andrew Edis for the defendant.
SCHIEMANN J: This is an appeal by way of case stated from a stipendiary
magistrate in Liverpool, which raises a point of some general importance under
the legislation which makes it a crime to drive vehicles after having consumed
so much alcohol that one is over the limit prescribed by the Road Traffic Act
1988. The short point is whether, in order to make one guilty of the offence,
the alcohol which is within the body must have been drunk, or whether the
mode of entry of the alcohol into the body is irrelevant.
The point arises in the present case because the magistrate found that the
defendant had been injected by his doctor with a substance known as Kenalog.
This, according to the magistrate’s finding, is a suspension of 40 milligrams
per millilitre of crystalline triamcinolone acetonide as a pain relief component
in aqueous solution containing 1.5 per cent. benzyl alcohol, ie 15 milligrams
of alcohol per millilitre. The purpose of the benzyl alcohol was to act as a
preservative to ensure that the active components of the preparation are
sterile at the time of entry into the body. Neither the defendant nor his doctor
was aware of the presence of benzyl alcohol, or of its possible effects at the
time the injection occurred.
The magistrate heard evidence from doctors on each side:
I accepted, as a fact, that there was a reasonable possibility that the
injection of Kenalog by Dr Wells affected the reading on the machine when
the defendant was subject to the breath test procedure ... such a finding
was based upon the acceptance of the evidence of Dr Wells in this regard,
namely that benzyl alcohol was capable of remaining part of the depot
preparation for as long a period as that over which the pain relieving drug
would operate and that during this period the benzyl alcohol would be
released intermittently and unevenly direct to the air passages of the lungs.
I interpose to say that the injection had taken place rather more than a
month before the man was stopped. The case continues:
There was no evidence on which I could conclude that the consumption
of alcohol by drinking wine which defendant admitted was the cause of
his being over the limit. I accepted his evidence. Neither was there any
evidence on which I could draw any conclusions as to the extent of the
effect on the reading of the Kenalog, which I had found was a reasonable
possibility.
The magistrate found that benzyl alcohol was alcohol within the meaning
of s 5 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and nothing turns on that. Section 5 he says,
unlike s 4, requires consumption, and in the circumstances of the particular
case the insertion of Kenalog did not amount to consumption within the
meaning and spirit of the Act. Accordingly, the defendant was found not guilty.
The magistrate posed this question for the court:
The question for opinion by the High Court is: in order to determine
whether a person charged with an offence contrary to s 5 of the Road Traffic
Act 1988, of consuming so much alcohol that the proportion revealed in
his breath exceeded the prescribed limit, is the court entitled to restrict
the meaning of ‘consuming’ to the act of drinking and to no other mode
of introduction or injection of alcohol?
That is the way he phrases the question. Section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act
1988, the section to which he refers, provides:
If a person –
(a) drives ... a motor vehicle on a road ... after consuming so much alcohol
that the proportion of it in his breath ... exceeds the prescribed limit he is
guilty of an offence.
Particularly in the light of the finding in the case that the defendant did
not know of the presence in his body of alcohol emanating from his injection
over a month before, it is relevant to observe that in this branch of the law
neither the Act nor the common law provides that ignorance of the presence
of alcohol is a defence to a charge under s 5. It may well be good mitigation,
but the offence is an absolute one.
The defendant argued successfully in the court below that the word
‘consume’ in its most usual sense in the context of alcohol involves imbibing,
and possibly eating an alcohol-soaked confection, such as brandy butter, but
does not embrace taking alcohol in the form of sniffing it, having it injected
or in the form of a suppository. Thus the man who has been to a wine tasting
and has religiously sniffed but then spat out the contents of numerous glasses
would not be caught under s 5 because he has not consumed - if this argument
is right - any alcohol, whatever amount of alcohol may be in his breath.
I agree with Mr Edis that the usual use of the word ‘consume’ does not
embrace sniffing, still less absorbing by way of injection. However, in the
context of taking snuff, sniffing would be an action regarded as a method of
consumption. For my part, I think that the word ‘consume’ is capable of a
whole variety of meanings depending on the context in which it is used. It is
not unusual to speak of a house consumed by fire, and it would not be strange
to speak of a bottle of medical alcohol having been consumed by rubbing its
contents onto skin prior to administering an injection. As I say, one can talk
of consuming snuff by sniffing. It very much depends on the context. In the
present context it is clear that that section was enacted in the context of a
parliamentary endeavour to diminish the number of those who drive whilst
there is alcohol inside their bodies. I would accept that it is probable that
Parliament did not specifically consider the possible modes of entry of alcohol
into the body.
Mr Edis, who argued the case very well, was constrained to accept that it
is impossible to think of a reason why Parliament in this context should have
been interested in the mode of entry of alcohol into the body. This is, after all,
not sumptuary legislation designed to get rid of the pleasurable sensation of
drinking first class wine, but is legislation enacted to prevent harm on roads.
He submitted elegantly that, nevertheless, if the words used by Parliament
leave a hiatus, it is not the function of this court, particularly in a criminal
case, to fill that hiatus. I agree, but this submission presupposes that there is
a hiatus and that is precisely the question that we have to resolve. As I say,
what Parliament was clearly concerned with was the effect of having drivers
with alcohol inside them driving on the roads.
Accepting that injecting alcohol into the body is not a usual mode of
consumption of significant quantities of alcohol, and that the same may be
said of inhalation perhaps, it remains the case that it is possible, without
doing violence to the chameleon-like qualities of this word to construe it
widely enough to embrace ingestion in any form. Should the magistrate have
so construed it?
Mr Edis accepted that the law was accurately stated by Upjohn LJ delivering
the reserved judgment of the court in Stephens v Cuckfield Rural District Council
[1960] 2 QB 373, 383, when he said, with reference to a marginal note of an
Act then under consideration:
While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used
in the section, it is at least permissible to approach a consideration of its
general purpose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in
mind. (My emphasis.)
I am indebted for that quotation to Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd
ed (1992), p 513, where the author draws attention to it and to the fact that
this dictum was applied recently by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Tudor
Grange Holdings Ltd v Citibank NA [1992] Ch 53, 66.
So far as the sidenote which we find against the side of s 5 is concerned,
it reads as follows: ‘Driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with alcohol
concentration above prescribed limit.’ Approaching the section with the
sidenote in mind, I am of the view that the answer to the question posed by
the magistrate is in the negative. Nevertheless in the circumstances of the
present case, since the prosecution was only interested in establishing the
principle, and the defendant has ample mitigation I would not send the case
back to the magistrate.
BALCOMBE LJ: In my judgment the primary meaning of consuming alcohol in
the context of s 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is consumption of alcohol
by mouth, whether in the form of liquid or of food prepared with alcohol.
However, the dictionary meaning of the word ‘consume’ is wide enough to
include other methods of the ingestion of alcohol into the breath, blood or
urine of the person concerned. The sidenote to the section indicates the
mischief at which the section was aimed.
That the ingestion of alcohol by inhalation can and does happen is apparent
from the facts of Brewer v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 WLR
26, to which we were referred.
I therefore agree with Schiemann J’s answer to the question posed by the
case stated. I also agree that, in the circumstances of this case, nothing further
need be done.
Appeal dismissed. Question answered in negative. Legal aid taxation of
defendant’s costs.
Solicitors: Crown Prosecution Service, Liverpool (North); Lees Lloyd Whitley,
Liverpool
[Reported by DURAND MALET Esq Barrister]
READING 6
Guard Dogs Act 1975 c.50
Guard Dogs Act 1975 c. 50 1
1975 Chapter 50 2
An Act to regulate the keeping and use of guard dogs; and for purposes 3
connected therewith.
[1st August 1975] 4
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice 5
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
1.–(1) A person shall not use or permit the use of a guard dog at any 6 Control of
premises unless a person (‘the handler’) who is capable of controlling the dog guard dogs.
is present on the premises and the dog is under the control of the handler at
all times while it is being so used except while it is secured so that it is not at
liberty to go freely about the premises.
(2) The handler of a guard dog shall keep the dog under his control
at all times while it is being used as a guard dog at any premises except–
(a) while another handler has control over the dog; or
(b) while the dog is secured so that it is not at liberty to go freely
about the premises.
(3) A person shall not use or permit the use of a guard dog at any
premises unless a notice containing a warning that a guard dog is present is
clearly exhibited at each entrance to the premises.
2.–(1) A person shall not keep a dog at guard dog kennels unless he 7 Restriction on
holds a licence under section 3 of this Act in respect of the kennels. keeping guard dogs
without a licence.
(2) A person shall not use or permit the use at any premises of a
guard dog if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the dog (when
not being used as a guard dog) is normally kept at guard dog kennels in breach
of subsection (1) of this section.
Guard dog kennel 3.–(1) A local authority may on the application in the prescribed form
licences.
of, and on payment of the prescribed fee by, a person who runs or intends to
run guard dog kennels at premises within their area grant that person a licence
in respect of those kennels.
(2) A licence under this section shall be made subject to the
prescribed conditions (if any) and to such other conditions as the local authority
thinks fit.
(3) A licence under this section shall, subject to regulations, come
into force on a date specified in the licence as the commencement date and
shall expire at the end of the period of twelve months beginning with that date
unless it is cancelled by a court in pursuance of the following subsection.
(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act the
Protection of Animals Act 1911, the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912
the Pet Animals Act 1951, the Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963 or
the Breeding of Dogs Act 1973, the court by which he is convicted may cancel
any licence held by him under this Act.
(5) The court may suspend the operation of the cancellation
pending an appeal.
(6) For the purposes of this Act the Inner and Middle Temples shall
be deemed to be in the City of London.
Appeals. 4.–(1) The applicant or, as the case may be, the licence holder may
appeal to a magistrates’ court or, in Scotland, a sheriff court, against –
(a) the refusal of a local authority to grant a licence; or
(b) the conditions (other than the prescribed conditions) to which
the licence is subject; or
(c) the authority’s refusal to vary the conditions; or
(d) the revocation of a licence.
(2) On an appeal the court may, if it thinks fit, give directions to
the local authority with respect to the licence or the conditions, and it shall
be the duty of the local authority to comply with such directions.
Offences, penalties 5.–(1) A person who contravenes section 1 or 2 of this Act shall be
and civil liability.
guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
£5,000.
(2) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed as –
(a) conferring a right of action in any civil proceedings (other than
proceedings for the recovery of a fine or any prescribed fee) in
respect of any contravention of this Act or of any regulations
made under this Act or of any of the terms or conditions of a
licence granted under section 3 of this Act; or
(b) derogating from any right of action or other remedy (whether
civil or criminal) in proceedings instituted otherwise than by
virtue of this Act.
6.–(1) Regulations may be made – Regulations.
(a) enabling a local authority to revoke a licence and on the

application of the licence holder to vary the conditions (other
than the prescribed conditions) of the licence;
(b) requiring the payment of the prescribed fee to be made to a
local authority on inspection by the authority of premises in
respect of which an application for a licence has been made;
(c) providing for the continuance or transfer of the licence where
an appeal is made, and on the death of the licence holder.
(2) Any power to make regulations under this Act –
(a) may be exercised so as to make different provisions for different
cases or different classes of cases;
(b) includes power to make such incidental or supplemental
provision in the regulations as the Secretary of State considers
appropriate.
(3) Regulations under this Act shall be made by statutory
instrument which shall be subject to annulment by resolution of either House
of Parliament.
7. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires– Interpretation.
‘agricultural land’ has the same meaning as in the Dogs (Protection of

Livestock) Act 1953;
‘guard dog’ means a dog which is being used to protect–
(a) premises; or
(b) property kept on the premises; or
(c) a person guarding the premises or such property;
‘guard dog kennels’ means a place where a person in the course of
business keeps a dog which (notwithstanding that it is used for other
purposes) is used as a guard dog elsewhere, other than a dog which is
used as a guard dog only at premises belonging to its owner;
‘local authority’ means, in relation to England and Wales, a district
council, a London borough council and the Common Council of the
City of London and, in relation to Scotland, an islands council or a
district council;
‘premises’ means land other than agricultural land and land within the
curtilage of a dwelling-house, and buildings, including parts of build-
ings, other than dwelling-houses;
‘prescribed’ means prescribed by regulations;
‘regulations’ means regulations made by the Secretary of State.
8 Short title, com- 8.–(1) This Act may be cited as the Guard Dogs Act 1975.
mencement and
extent. (2) This Act shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of
State may by order made by statutory instrument appoint, and different days
may be so appointed for, or for different purposes of, different provisions.
(3) This Act does not extend to Northern Ireland.
READING 7
Guard Dogs Act 1975 (Commencement No 1) Order 1975
S T A T U T O R Y I N S T R U M E N T S
1975 No 1767 (C. 50) a
DOGS b
The Guard Dogs Act 1975 (Commencement No 1) Order 1975 c
Order 1975
Made - - - - 29th October 1975 d
In pursuance of section 8(2) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975(a), I hereby make e
the following Order:–
1. This Order may be cited as the Guard Dogs Act 1975 f

(Commencement No 1) Order 1975.
2.–(1) The Guard Dogs Act 1975, except the provisions specified in
paragraph (2) below, shall come into force on 1st February 1976.
(2) The provisions referred to in paragraph (1) above are–
(a) section 2 (restriction on keeping guard dogs without a licence);
(b) section 3 (guard dog kennel licences);
(c) section 4 (appeals);
(d) section 5 (offences, penalties and civil liability) so far as its
provisions relate to sections 2, 3, 4 and 6; and
(e) section 6 (regulations).
(This Note is not part of the Order.)

This Order brings into force on 1st February 1976 the provisions of the Guard
Dogs Act 1975, except those provisions which relate to the establishment of a
licensing scheme for guard dog kennels.
g
Home Office, Roy Jenkins
Whitehall. One of Her Majesty’s
29th October 1975. Principal Secretaries of State.
h EXPLANATORY NOTE
(a) 1975 c. 50.
READING 8
Hobson v Gledhill [1978] 1 WLR 215
[1978] 1 WLR 215
1977 Oct. 12 Lord Widgery CJ, Cantley

and Peter Pain JJ
Animal - Dog - Guard dog –Use of guard dogs on premises - Dogs not under
control of handler but chained - Whether handler required on premises while
dog properly secured - Guard Dogs Act 1975 (c. 50), s 1(1)
Section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975 provides:
‘A person shall not use or permit the use of a guard dog at any premises
unless a person (‘the handler’) who is capable of controlling the dog is
present on the premises and the dog is under the control of the handler
at all times while it is being so used except while it is secured so that it is
not at liberty to go freely about the premises.’
The defendant used three Alsatian guard dogs on his premises where they
were not under anyone’s control but were independently chained on chains
of 12, 12 and 13 feet long respectively so that they could not reach the gates
or go into every part of the premises. He was charged under section 1(1) of
the Guard Dogs Act 1975 with three offences of using a guard dog at premises
when no person who was capable of controlling the dog was present on the
premises and the dog was not under the control of the handler at all times
while it was being used, the dog not being secured so that it was not at liberty
to go freely about the premises. The justices found that the dogs were secured
within the meaning of the section and dismissed the informations on the
ground that, in those circumstances it was not necessary for the handler to
be on the premises.
On appeal by the prosecutor:–
Held, dismissing the appeal, (1) that section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act
1975 was ambiguous in that the phrase ‘except while it is secured so that
it is not at liberty to go freely about the premises’ could apply either to the
whole of the subsection so that a handler was required to be present at all
times and the dog to be secured when it was not under his immediate control
or the phrase could apply to the latter part of the subsection only, in which
case either a handler had to be present on the premises with the dog under
his control or the dog had to be properly secured; that since an ambiguity in
a penal statute was to be construed in favour of the subject, section 1(1) on
its true construction imposed the more restricted duty on a person using a
guard dog and accordingly, it was not necessary for the handler to be on the
premises at all times providing that the dog was properly secured.
(2) That whether a guard dog secured on a 12 foot length of chain was ‘not
at liberty to go freely about the premises’ depended on all the circumstances
of the case bearing in mind that the purpose of the chain was to enable a
person, whether on the premises lawfully or not, to remove himself from
the dog’s range and accordingly as the justices had held that the dogs were
secured within the meaning of section 1(1), the appeal would be dismissed.
Per Lord Widgery CJ There is a good deal to be said for the view that
it would be desirable to abolish for all time the conception of a dog alone on
the premises, even when it is tied up (post, p 219H).
No cases are referred to in the judgment.
The following case was cited in argument:
Cummings v Granger [1977] QB 397; [1976] 3 WLR 842; [1976] 1 All ER 104, CA
CASE STATED by Huddersfield justices.
On May 7, 1976, three informations were preferred by the prosecutor
James Hobson, against the defendant, Norman Gledhill, each alleging that on
March 27, 1976 at Huddersfield he used a guard dog at premises in George
Street, Milnsbridge, when no person who was capable of controlling the dog
was present on the premises and the dog was not under the control of the
handler at all times while it was being used, the dog not being secured so that
it was not at liberty to go freely about the premises, contrary to section 1(1)
of the Guard Dogs Act 1975.
The justices heard the informations on July 21, 1976, when the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty to each information and consented to the
informations being heard at the same time. They found the following facts.
On March 27, 1976, the defendant was the owner of premises consisting of a
yard and buildings situate at George Street, Milnsbridge, Huddersfield. On that
date he used three Alsatian dogs as guard dogs at the premises. The dogs were
secured by being fastened independently on chains 12 feet, 12 feet and 13
feet long respectively and were unable to reach the gates of the premises by
at least two feet. Two of the chains were securely anchored to the ground on
either side of the main gates which were locked. The third chain was secured
at a point set back from the main gates. The dogs were not able to go into
every part of the premises. At the time no person was present on the premises.
It was contended by the prosecutor that section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs
Act 1975 was ambiguous and could be interpreted in two different ways: one
interpretation required that a handler be present on premises where a guard
dog was being used, notwithstanding that the dog was secured so that it was
not at liberty to go freely about the premises; on the other interpretation, if
a guard dog was secured so that it was not at liberty to go freely about the
premises then it was not necessary that a handler be on the premises or that
the dog be under the control of the handler; that the ambiguity arose out of
the fact that the clause ‘except while it is so secured that it is not at liberty to
go freely about the premises’ might be construed as referring either to the
whole of the preceding words of subsection (1) or only to the latter part of
that subsection commencing with the words ‘and the dog is under the control
of the handler at all times while it is being so used’; that the first question
for the court to determine was the correct interpretation of section 1(1) with
reference to the above mentioned ambiguity; that if the court should decide
that the first interpretation was the correct interpretation, then the offences
were clearly made out since no handler was present on the premises; that
if the court should decide that the second interpretation was the correct
interpretation then the question for the court to determine was whether each
dog was secured so that it was not at liberty to go freely about the premises.
It was contended by the defendant that by section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs
Act 1975 a person was excepted from the provision stipulating that a handler
should be on the premises if the dog was so secured that it was not at liberty
to go freely about the premises and that each dog was so secured.
The justices were of the opinion that it was not necessary for a handler
to be on the premises when the dogs were so secured that they were not at
liberty to go freely about the premises, and that the dogs were secured in such
a manner that they could not go freely about the premises. They therefore
dismissed the informations.
The prosecutor appealed.
The questions for the opinion of the High Court were (i) whether by virtue
of section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975, where a guard dog was used
on premises it was necessary for a person capable of controlling the dog to
be present on the premises at all times whilst the dog was being so used
notwithstanding that the dog was secured so that it was not at liberty to go
freely about the premises; and (ii) whether a dog secured on a chain 12 feet
in length could be regarded as ‘not at liberty to go freely about the premises.’
Robert Taylor for the prosecutor.
Gordon Lakin for the defendant.
LORD WIDGERY CJ I will ask Peter Pain J to give the first judgment.
PETER PAIN J This is an appeal by way of case stated by the
Huddersfield justices in respect of informations which they heard on July 21,
1976. There were three charges, all of them similar in nature, and each alleged
that on March 27, 1976, at Huddersfield, the defendant did use a guard dog at
premises in Milnsbridge when no person who was capable of controlling the
dog was present on the premises and the dog was not under the control of
the handler at all times while it was being used, the dog not being secured so
that it was not at liberty to go freely about the premises, contrary to section
1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975. There were three charges because there
were three Alsatian dogs.
One only has to read each charge with the several negatives in it to see
how it can give rise to difficulties of construction. The court is told that the
true meaning of section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975 is a matter that has
been of some concern to the authorities who are responsible to enforce it, and
there has as yet been no decision upon it. The authorities are anxious for the
ambiguity which appears to arise on the section to be disposed of by this court.
Before I come to read the section I will deal with the short facts as found
by the justices. They found that on March 27, 1976 the defendant was the
owner of premises consisting of a yard and building situate at George Street,

Milnsbridge, Huddersfield. On that date the defendant used three Alsatian
dogs as guard dogs at the premises. The dogs were secured in the following
manner, that is they were fastened independently on chains 12 feet, 12 feet
and 13 feet long respectively, and were unable to reach the gates of the
premises by at least two feet. Two of the chains were securely anchored to the
ground on either side of the main gates which were locked. The third chain
was secured at a point set back from the main gates. They also found that the
dogs were not able to go into every part of the premises and at the time no
person was present on the premises. But they did not make any finding as to
the extent of the premises, though one supposes from the fact that there was
a yard and buildings that they must have been a good deal more extensive
than the chains by which the dogs were held.
Section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975 provides:
‘A person shall not use or permit the use of a guard dog at any premises
unless a person (‘the handler’) who is capable of controlling the dog is
present on the premises and the dog is under the control of the handler
at all times while it is being so used except while it is secured so that it is
not at liberty to go freely about the premises.’
The section clearly is ambiguous, and one asks oneself: does the
exception which applies while the dog is secured so that it is not at liberty
to go freely about the premises apply to the whole sentence, or does it
apply only to the latter part of the sentence, which would be the time when
the dog might be out of the control of the handler who is none the less on
the premises? Or, to put it another way does the section - and this is the
important point - require a person who uses a guard dog to have a handler
on the premises all the time the dog is there, and when the dog is not under
the immediate control of the handler to tie it up; or does it require the
person using the guard dog either to have a handler on the premises under
whose immediate control the dog is or to tie the dog up? If it be the latter,
then the handler can leave the premises, leaving the dog secured.
Realising this ambiguity, one comes to the rule that a penal statute, where
there is an ambiguity, should always be construed in favour of the citizen who
may find himself the subject of the penalty. That was the first point which was
put before us by Mr Taylor, and, applying that principle, it would seem clear
that the more restricted duty should be placed upon the citizen, that is to say,
that to use a guard dog he must either have a handler on the premises with the
dog under his control or he must have the dog secured. For myself, it seems
to me also that, if that be done, it does meet the mischief which Parliament
was seeking to provide against because, provided the dog is properly secured,
the person who may come on the premises, whether lawfully or not, is in a
position to remove himself from the ambit of the dog’s teeth.
One also does have the point that, although there is no finding on this,
one can probably take judicial notice of the fact that a number of fairly small
premises do protect themselves by the use of guard dogs. If a handler always
had to be on the premises with the guard dogs, the economic burden on a
person’s using those premises would be very heavy indeed.
One does ask oneself, as Lord Widgery CJ asked in the course of the
argument, would it satisfy section 1 if the handler just tied the dog up and
went away and left it indefinitely. On the construction which I favour there
would, I think, be no offence under section 1. But it has to be remembered
that there are several other sections in the Act providing for the licensing of
kennels used for guard dogs by the local authority, and it is to be assumed
that the local authority in imposing conditions and the like in respect of those
licences will take proper steps to see that dogs are properly treated and cared
for as they should be and are not abused.
Coming, therefore, to the questions propounded by the justices, the first
question they ask is:
‘Whether by virtue of section 1(1) of the Guard Dogs Act 1975 where
a guard dog is used on premises it is necessary for a person capable of
controlling the dog to be present at all times whilst the dog is being so
used notwithstanding that the dog is secured so that it is not at liberty to
go freely about the premises.’
The answer that I give to that is that it is not necessary. They ask a second
question: ‘whether a dog secured on a chain 12 feet in length can be regarded
as “not at liberty to go freely about the premises”’. This is a question which
I feel unable to answer at large. Whether it is able to go freely about the
premises must depend on the size of the premises. If the premises are a small
workshop the dog might, despite the chain, be able to go freely about the
premises; it would be quite wrong for this court to attempt to give any sort
of guidance as to the appropriate length of chain for a dog because it must
depend on all the circumstances, bearing in mind of course the purpose of the
chain, which is to enable the person, even though he may be a trespasser or
burglar, to remove himself from the dog’s range. That would always have to be
borne in mind in considering the length of chain provided. But, subject to that,
this must be a question of degree depending on the facts of the individual case.
The justices having in this case dismissed the informations, I would dismiss
the appeal.
CANTLEY J I agree. I must confess that my initial impression on reading
section 1(1) was that the exception applied only to the words, ‘the dog is under
the control of the handler at all times while it is being so used,’ and not to the
entire paragraph. But I am persuaded that the ambiguity to which Peter Pain
J has referred does exist and, accordingly, I agree that the section should be
construed in this way, it being a penal section.
LORD WIDGERY CJ I agree with all the propositions put forward so
clearly by Peter Pain J. One thing is clear to me, and that is that since the
passing of the Guard Dogs Act 1975 one can no longer have a guard dog
roaming at large on premises with no handler in control of it. That has gone
once and for all. I think there is a good deal to be said for the view that it
would be desirable to take the reform further and to abolish for all time the
conception of a dog alone on the premises, even when it is tied up. But for
the reasons which have been given, I am quite unable to say which of the
solutions canvassed was the intention of Parliament, and the right course in
those circumstances is to favour the citizen. I would do so, as have already
the other members of the court. If we are wrong, and if we have chosen a
solution which is contrary to the wishes of Parliament, it will not be very
difficult for Parliament to put that right in a suitable statute hereafter. The
appeal is therefore dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Prosecutor’s and defendant’s costs
out of central funds.

READING 9
Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985
Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985
1985 CHAPTER 26
An Act to prohibit the supply to persons under the age of eighteen of certain
substances which may cause intoxication if inhaled [13 June 1985]
Be it ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in the present
1. Offence of supplying intoxicating substance
(1) It is an offence for a person to supply or offer to supply a substance
other than a controlled drug–
(a) to a person under the age of eighteen whom he knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, to be under that age; or
(b) to a person–
(i) who is acting on behalf of a person under that age; and
(ii) whom he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be
acting,
if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the substance is,
or its fumes are, likely to be inhaled by the person under the age of
eighteen for the purpose of causing intoxication.
(2) In proceedings against any person for an offence under subsection
(1) above it is a defence for him to show that at the time he made
the supply or offer he was under the age of eighteen and was acting
otherwise than in the course or furtherance of a business.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six
months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale ... , or
to both.
(4) In this section ‘controlled drug’ has the same meaning as in the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1971.
2. Short title, commencement and extent
(1) This Act may be cited as the Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985.
(2) This Act shall come into force at the end of the period of two months
beginning with the day on which it is passed.
(3) This Act extends to Northern Ireland but not to Scotland.
[Note. This statute has been repealed but is retained for teaching purposes.]
READING 10
Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102
Corkery v Carpenter
[1951] 1 KB 102
1950 July 21.
Lord Goddard CJ, Hilbery and Byrne LJ.
Road Traffic - Drunk in charge of a bicycle - Whether bicycle a ‘carriage’ -
Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), s 12.
The word ‘carriage’ in s 12 of the Licensing Act, 1872, by which ‘every person
who … is drunk while in charge on any highway … of any carriage, horse, cattle,
or steam engine … may be apprehended, and shall be liable to a penalty …
or … to imprisonment …’, includes a bicycle, whether an ordinary passenger
bicycle or, semble, a tradesman’s bicycle or tricycle.
Taylor v Goodwin (1879) 4 QBD 228 applied.
Williams v Ellis (1880) 5 QBD 175 and Simpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon
Bridge Co [1903] 1 KB 405 distinguished.
CASE STATED by Devon Quarter Sessions.
The defendant, Shane John Corkery, was charged before justices with
being drunk in charge of a bicycle on a highway at Ilfracombe on January
18, 1950, contrary to s 12 of the Licensing Act, 1872; and with maliciously
causing damage to a police cell, contrary to s 14, sub-s 1, of the Criminal
Justice Administration Act, 1914. The justices found him guilty on both charges,
sentencing him to one month’s imprisonment on the first charge and three
months’ imprisonment on the second.
He appealed to quarter sessions, at the hearing before which the following
facts were proved or admitted: —At about 2.45pm on January 18, 1950, the
defendant was pushing his pedal bicycle along Broad Street, Ilfracombe. He
was drunk and creating a disturbance and incapable of having proper control
over his bicycle. A police constable then arrested him without warrant for
being drunk in charge of a bicycle on the highway. The defendant resisted
arrest. Two police constables took him to the police station, where he was
charged with being drunk in charge of a bicycle, forcibly searched, and lodged
in a cell. He wrenched the lavatory seat there from its hinges and smashed
nineteen panes of glass in the cell window, and did other damage in the cell,
continuing to bang and shout most of the night. On the following morning he
was charged also with maliciously causing damage, and the justices convicted
him on both charges.
It was contended for the defendant on his appeal to quarter sessions that
a bicycle was not a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of s 12 of the Licensing
Act, 1872; that his arrest without warrant and his confinement in the cell
were therefore unlawful; that he was entitled to break out of such unlawful
confinement; and that, as he had been brought before the justices solely by
virtue of the unlawful arrest, no information having been preferred against
him, he was never properly before them at all and the proceedings were a
nullity.
Quarter sessions were of the opinion that a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ within
the meaning of s 12 of the Licensing Act 1872; that the defendant was drunk in
charge of a bicycle; that his arrest without warrant was therefore lawful; that
he had maliciously caused damage amounting to £17 10s. 0d. to the cell; and
that the proceedings against him on both charges were regular. They therefore
confirmed the convictions and the sentences imposed on him by the justices.
DM Scott for the defendant. The word ‘bicycle’ does not appear in s 12 of
the Licensing Act, 1872. The only word at all applicable is ‘carriage’, which does
not include a bicycle. The point has never been decided by a court of record.
The editors of Stone’s Justices Manual express the opinion that a bicycle would
be deemed a carriage within this section, but the cases referred to are all
under other statutes and do not constitute authorities for the interpretation
of the Licensing Act. A cardinal principle of interpretation is that in statutes
concerning matters relating to the general public words are presumed to be
used in their popular meaning. The popular meaning of ‘carriage’ does not
include a bicycle, as the words of the song ‘Daisy Bell’ show:-
It won’t be a stylish marriage,
I can’t afford a carriage,
But you’ll look sweet upon the seat
Of a bicycle made for two.
Webster’s Dictionary of 1920 states that ‘carriage’ is obsolete or archaic
except in the case of wheeled vehicles or railway carriages. The main ‘toll’
cases are not really relevant, as the Acts with which they were concerned had
different purposes from the Licensing Act, and in any case opinions differed on
the question whether ‘carriage’ included a bicycle: Cannan v Abingdon [1990]
2 QB 66, Williams v Ellis [1880] 5 QBD 175, Simpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon
Bridge Co [1903] 1 KB 405, Smith v Kynnersley [1903] 1 KB 788 and Pollard v
Turner [1912] 3 KB 625.
Section 12 is a penal section providing for the arrest without warrant of an
offender, and that is sufficient to require the court to put a narrow construction
on it. The test is whether s 12 conveys to the mind of the reader that it was
Parliament’s intention to include a bicycle. Violence must not be done to
the language of the Act so as to bring within its terms articles which are not
expressly included. In Taylor v Goodwin [1879] 4 QBD 228 it was held that a
person riding a bicycle on a highway at such a pace as to be dangerous to the
passers by might be convicted of furiously driving a carriage under the Highway
Act, 1835, s 78; but as the Local Government Act of 1888 by s 85 declared
that bicycles were vehicles within the Highway Acts, it would appear that the
legislature lacked confidence in the correctness of that decision. Reg v Parker
[1895] 59 JP 793 is not an authority on the point as there was no argument on
whether a bicycle was a carriage within the meaning of s 35 of the Offences

Against the Person Act, 1861. The words of the enactments under review
in these two decisions differ from those in s 12 of the Licensing Act and are
wider. Section 12 states: ... ‘carriage, horse, cattle or steam engine …’ of which
the common denominator is a force, something the motive power of which
exists independently of muscular effort on the part of the person in charge.
It is significant that the dominant words relating to ‘carriage’ in s 12 are ‘ in
charge’, while, in the case of firearms, which are mentioned later in the section,
the offence is committed by the person ‘in possession’.
Wilmers, for the prosecutor, was not called upon to argue.
LORD GODDARD, CJ, stated the facts and continued: –The point, though it
seems trivial, is of some importance because a doubt has been expressed by
textbook writers whether a bicycle is a carriage within the meaning of that
word used in s 12, and Mr. Scott has called our attention to most of the cases
decided on the word ‘carriage’.
The first thing to do in construing an Act of this sort is to see what was the
purpose of the particular section. Obviously, it was passed for the protection of
the public and the preservation of public order. Section 12 says: ‘Every person
who in any highway or other public place, whether a building or not, is guilty
while drunk of riotous or disorderly behaviour, or who is drunk while in charge
on any highway or other public place of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam
engine, or who is drunk when in possession of any loaded fire-arms, may be
apprehended, and shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings, or
in the discretion of the court to imprisonment with or without hard labour for
any term not exceeding one month’.
In my opinion, and, I think, in the opinion of my brethren, it is clear that
the word ‘carriage’ is wide enough to include a bicycle for this purpose. It
does not follow that in every Act of Parliament a bicycle is a carriage. That
may depend on the particular words of the Act in question; and where the
question has most commonly arisen is with regard to toll-bridges, because
the proprietor of the toll-bridge has to show that the vehicle from which he
seeks a toll is covered by the words of the Act of Parliament which allows him
to impose a toll.
In this case the object of the Act is clear: it is the protection of the public
and the preservation of public order; and for this purpose, I think, a carriage
can include any sort of vehicle, certainly a vehicle which is capable of carrying a
person; and, it may be, a vehicle capable of carrying goods. In my opinion, this
case is decided, so far as this court is concerned, by Taylor v Goodwin 4 QBD 28.
That case, it is true, arose under the Highway Act, 1835, but for this purpose
there cannot be any distinction between a section in a highway statute passed
for the protection of the public and a section in a licensing statute passed for
the same purpose, both of them concerning the conduct of a person on the
highway and the preservation of public order.
The headnote to Taylor v Goodwin 4 QBD 228 reads: ‘A person riding a
bicycle on a highway at such a pace as to be dangerous to the passers by may
be convicted of furiously driving a ‘carriage’. Section 78 of the Highway Act,
1835, provides that: ‘if any person riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort
of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously so as to endanger the life or
limb of any passenger’, he shall be guilty of an offence. It is true that the words
there are ‘any sort of carriage’; but that does not carry the matter any further,
as a carriage is a carriage of some sort; a bicycle is a carriage and therefore
it comes within the word ‘carriage’. It is a carriage in my opinion because it
carries. The court, in giving judgment in that case, said ‘The expressions used
are as wide as possible. It may be that bicycles were unknown at the time when
the Act was passed, but the legislature clearly desired to prohibit the use of
any sort of carriage in a manner dangerous to the life or limb of any passenger’.
Applying that case, nothing can be more dangerous than a drunken man with
a bicycle on a highway: he is dangerous whether he is riding the bicycle or
pushing it, because even if he is pushing it he has not proper control over it,
and can be a danger to others and himself.
Is there anything in any of the other cases which obliges us to give a
construction other than that given by the court in Taylor v Goodwin? A well-
known case is Cannan v Abingdon (Earl) in which the question was whether
or not a bicycle could be subjected to a toll in going over the bridge belonging
to Lord Abingdon on the road between Oxford and Cheltenham. In that case
the relevant Act allowed a toll to be imposed on carriages other than those
which had been named in the section, the words of which were: ‘ For every
coach ... or other carriage whatsoever with four wheels the sum of fourpence,
and with less than four wheels the sum of twopence’. Bigham, J, said: ‘The
bicycle or tricycle is a thing which carries. It may carry a man, as a horse does,
or a carriage does; it may carry luggage or goods as we know that tradesmen’s
tricycles do. It is, therefore, in my opinion, a carriage, and, being a carriage,
it is made by the terms of the Act of Parliament liable to pay the toll’. It was
held that a bicycle was a carriage.
There are other cases in which a distinction is drawn because of the actual
words of the section. In Williams v Ellis the words of the Turnpike Act which
imposed the tolls were, first, ‘for every horse, mule, or other beast drawing
any coach, sociable, chariot, berlin, landau, vis-à-vis, phaeton, curricle’ etc; and
then, ‘for every carriage of whatever description, and for whatever purpose,
which shall be drawn or impelled, or set or kept in motion by steam or other
power or agency’, and the court held that a bicycle was not caught by those
particular words which had to be construed ejusdem generis with the carriages
previously specified. To the same effect was Simpson v Teignmouth and
Shaldon Bridge Co [1903] 1 KB 405, where an enumeration of various coaches
concluded: ‘for every other carriage hung on springs’. The court came to the
conclusion that a bicycle did not come within any of the words in that section.
In spite of Mr Scott’s argument, I am clearly of opinion that the words of
the Licensing Act are wide enough to embrace a bicycle under the expression
‘carriage’. Therefore, the doubt which has been expressed by textbook writers
on the subject need no longer exist, as this court has now construed the word
‘carriage’ in the Licensing Act, 1872, as including a bicycle, whether it be a
tradesman’s bicycle or tricycle or the ordinary passenger bicycle - ordinarily
called a push bicycle - as was the case here.
It follows that the defendant was lawfully arrested, and was accordingly
in lawful custody at the police station. There was no excuse whatever for
his breaking up the cell in the disgraceful manner in which he did, and he
was properly sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. The first point being
decided as it is, the second falls to the ground. This appeal is dismissed.
HILBERRY J. I agree.
BYRNE J. I agree
Appeal dismissed.
READING 11
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists

(Southern) Ltd [1953] 1 QB 401
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists A
(Southern) Ltd [1953] 1 QB 401
Court of Appeal B
Somervell, Birkett and Romer LJJ C
5 February 1953 D
Poisons–Sale of–Self-service system–Selection of articles by customer from E

shelves–Payment at cash desk in presence of qualified pharmacist–Legality–
Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933 (23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 25) s 18(1)(a)(iii).
Contract–Offer and acceptance–Sale of goods–Self-service–Time of sale.
The defendants’ branch shop, consisting of a single room was adapted to the F
‘self-service’ system. The room contained a chemist’s department, under the
control of a registered pharmacist, in which various drugs and proprietary
medicines included, or containing substances included, in Part I of the Poisons
List compiled under section 17(1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933 (but
not in Sch I to the Poisons Rules, 1949), were displayed on shelves in packages
or other containers, with the price marked on each. A customer, on entering
the shop, was provided with a wire basket, and having selected from the
shelves the articles which he wished to buy, he put them in the basket and
took them to the cashier’s desk at one or other of the two exits, where the
cashier stated the total price and received payment. That latter stage of every
transaction involving the sale of a drug was supervised by the pharmacist in
control of the department, who was authorised to prevent the removal of any
drug from the premises.
In an action brought by the plaintiffs alleging an infringement by the
defendants of section 18(1)(a)(iii) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933,
which requires the sale of poisons included in Part I of the Poisons List to be
effected by or under the supervision of a registered pharmacist: –
Held, that the self-service system did not amount to an offer by the
defendants to sell, but merely to an invitation to the customer to offer to buy;
that such an offer was accepted at the cashier’s desk under the supervision
of the registered pharmacist; and that there was therefore no infringement
of the section.
Decision of Lord Goddard CJ [1952] 2 QB 795; [1952] 2 TLR 340; [1952] 2
All ER 456 affirmed.
APPEAL from Lord Goddard CJ.
Special case stated by the parties under RSC, Ord 34, r 1.
The defendants carried on a business comprising the retail sale of drugs
at premises at Edgware, which were entered in the register of premises kept
pursuant to section 12 of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, and from which
they regularly sold drugs by retail. The premises comprised a single room, so
adapted that customers might serve themselves, and the business there was
described by a printed notice at the entrance as ‘Boots Self-Service.’ On entry
each customer passed a barrier where a wire basket was obtained. Beyond the
barrier the principal part of the room, which contained accommodation for 60
customers, contained shelves around the walls and on an island fixture in the
centre, on which articles were displayed. One part of the room was described
by a printed notice as the ‘Toilet Dept.,’ and another part as the ‘Chemists’
Dept.’ On the shelves in the chemists’ department drugs, including proprietary
medicines, were severally displayed in individual packages or containers with
a conspicuous indication of the retail price of each. The drugs and proprietary
medicines covered a wide range, and one section of the shelves in the chemists’
department was devoted exclusively to drugs which were included in, or
which contained substances included in, Part I of the Poisons List referred to
in section 17(1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933; no such drugs were
displayed on any shelves outside the section, to which a shutter was fitted so
that at any time all the articles in that section could be securely inclosed and
excluded from display. None of the drugs in that section came within Sch I to
the Poisons Rules, 1949 (SI 1949, No 539).
The staff employed by the defendants at the premises comprised a manager,
a registered pharmacist, three assistants and two cashiers, and during the time
when the premises were open for the sale of drugs the manager, the registered
pharmacist, and one or more of the assistants were present in the room. Each
customer selected from the shelves the article which he wished to buy and
placed it in the wire basket; in order to leave the premises the customer had
to pass by one of two exits, at each of which was a cash desk where a cashier
was stationed who scrutinized the articles selected by the customer, assessed
the value and accepted payment. The chemists’ department was under the
personal control of the registered pharmacist, who carried out all his duties at
the premises subject to the directions of a superintendent appointed by the
defendants in accordance with the provisions of section 9 of the Act.
The pharmacist was stationed near the poisons section, where his certificate
of registration was conspicuously displayed, and was in view of the cash desks.
In every case involving the sale of a drug the pharmacist supervised that part
of the transaction which took place at the cash desk and was authorised by
the defendants to prevent at that stage of the transaction, if he thought fit,
any customer from removing any drug from the premises. No steps were taken
by the defendants to inform the customers, before they selected any article
which they wished to purchase, of the pharmacist’s authorisation.
On April 13, 1951, at the defendants’ premises, two customers, following
the procedure outlined above, respectively purchased a bottle containing a
medicine known as compound syrup of hypophosphites, containing 0.01%
W/V strychnine, and a bottle containing medicine known as famel syrup,
containing 0.23% W/V codeine, both of which substances are poisons
included in Part I of the Poisons List, but, owing to the small percentages
of strychnine and codeine respectively, hypophosphites and famel syrup do
not come within Sch I to the Poisons Rules, 1949.
The question for the opinion of the court was whether the sales instanced
on April 13, 1951, were effected by or under the supervision of a registered
pharmacist, in accordance with the provisions of section 18(1)(a)(iii) of the
Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933.1
The Lord Chief Justice answered the question in the affirmative.
The Pharmaceutical Society appealed.
1
Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, s 18: ‘(1) … it shall not be lawful – (a) for a person to sell any poison included in
Part I of the Poisons List, unless – (i) he is an authorised seller of poisons; and (ii) the sale is effected on premises
duly registered under Part I of this Act; and (iii) the sale is effected by, or under the supervision of, a registered
pharmacist.’
G H V Lloyd-Jones QC and T Dewar for the Pharmaceutical Society. The real

question at issue in this appeal is whether under the self-service system of
trading devised by the defendants the sale in fact takes place at the point
where the customer removes from the shelves the article that he wishes to
buy, and puts it in the basket, or whether it takes place at the cash desk,
where the money is paid and the pharmacist is stationed. We contend that the
self-service system invites the customer to purchase, the price of each article
being fully displayed, and that the taking of an article by the customer is an
acceptance of the trader’s offer to sell. Even if it be the law that a customer
cannot demand goods merely because they are displayed in a shop window,
the position is different where goods are displayed inside a self-service shop. It
is submitted that the contract is made and the property passes at the moment
when the customer takes an article from the shelf and puts it in the receptacle.
[Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 3rd ed, p 26, and Timothy v Simpson
(1834) 6 C&P 499 referred to.] In Wiles v Maddison [1943] WN 40 a butcher
was charged with offences against the Rationing Order, 1939, and the Meat
(Maximum Retail Prices) Order, 1940, by offering meat for sale to registered
customers at a price exceeding the maximum, and in excess of the rationing
quantity. He was acquitted, although he had put aside the meat, with the price
affixed, because the customers had given no specific orders for the meat and
he had not intended to deliver it until the following day. In the words of Lord
Caldecote CJ, the facts were not such as ‘to justify or permit a finding that
there had been an offer.’
Tucker J, agreeing, said: ‘For myself, I think that the position might be
different if the course of conduct between the butcher and the customer in
this case had been different, that is to say, if the evidence had been that the
custom was for the butcher to put … in his shop certain quantities of meat
allocated to certain customers at certain prices and if the practice had been
for the customers to call on a particular day and take away the meat.’ In the
present case, by their deliberately devised self-service system the defendants
are making an offer to sell, and the customer, when he takes an article from the
shelf and puts it into the receptacle, is accepting the offer. By section 17(2) of
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the property in goods passes when it is intended
to pass, and here there is clearly an intention that the sale shall take place at
the spot where the customer takes the article from the shelf. The intention
of the legislature under the Act of 1933 was to interpose the possibility of
guidance or veto on the part of the pharmacist when a customer is selecting
poisons, and even though at the time of payment the pharmacist is present,
the sales in question, it is submitted, were not effected in accordance with
the provisions of section 18.
[Roberts v Littlewoods’s Mail Order Stores [1943] KB 269 also referred to.]
H G G Baker QC and G D Everington for the defendants were not called on
to argue.
SOMERVELL LJ. This is an appeal from a decision of the Lord Chief Justice on I
an agreed statement of facts, raising a question under section 18(1)(a)(iii) of the
Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. The plaintiffs are the Pharmaceutical Society,
incorporated by Royal charter. One of their duties is to take all reasonable steps
to enforce the provisions of the Act. The provision in question is contained in
section 18. [His Lordship read the section and stated the facts, and continued:]
It is not disputed that in a chemist’s shop where this self-service system does
not prevail a customer may go in and ask a young woman assistant, who will
not herself be a registered pharmacist, for one of these articles on the list,
and the transaction may be completed and the article paid for, although the
registered pharmacist, who will no doubt be on the premises, will not know
anything himself of the transaction, unless the assistant serving the customer,
or the customer, requires to put a question to him. It is right that I should
emphasize, as did the Lord Chief Justice, that these are not dangerous drugs.
They are substances which contain very small proportions of poison, and I
imagine that many of them are the type of drug which has a warning as to
what doses are to be taken. They are drugs which can be obtained, under the
law, without a doctor’s prescription.
The point taken by the plaintiffs is this: it is said that the purchase is
complete if and when a customer going round the shelves takes an article
and puts it in the receptacle which he or she is carrying, and that therefore, if
that is right, when the customer comes to the pay desk, having completed the
tour of the premises, the registered pharmacist, if so minded, has no power
to say: ‘This drug ought not to be sold to this customer.’ Whether and in what
circumstances he would have that power we need not inquire, but one can,
of course, see that there is a difference if supervision can only be exercised at
a time when the contract is completed.
I agree with the Lord Chief Justice in everything that he said, but I will put
the matter shortly in my own words. Whether the view contended for by the
plaintiffs is a right view depends on what are the legal implications of this
layout - the invitation to the customer. Is a contract to be regarded as being
completed when the article is put into the receptacle, or is this to be regarded
as a more organised way of doing what is done already in many types of shops
- and a bookseller is perhaps the best example - namely, enabling customers
to have free access to what is in the shop, to look at the different articles, and
then, ultimately, having got the ones which they wish to buy, to come up to the
assistant saying ‘I want this’? The assistant in 999 times out 1,000 says ‘That is
all right,’ and the money passes and the transaction is completed. I agree with
what the Lord Chief Justice has said, and with the reasons which he has given
for his conclusion, that in the case of an ordinary shop, although goods are
displayed and it is intended that customers should go and choose what they
want, the contract is not completed until, the customer having indicated the
articles which he needs, the shopkeeper, or someone on his behalf, accepts
that offer. Then the contract is completed. I can see no reason at all, that being
clearly the normal position, for drawing any different implication as a result
of this layout.
The Lord Chief Justice, I think, expressed one of the most formidable
difficulties in the way of the plaintiffs’ contention when he pointed out that,
if the plaintiffs are right, once an article has been placed in the receptacle the
customer himself is bound and would have no right, without paying for the
first article, to substitute an article which he saw later of a similar kind which
he perhaps preferred. I can see no reason for implying from this self-service
arrangement any implication other than that which the Lord Chief Justice
found in it, namely, that it is a convenient method of enabling customers to
see what there is and choose, and possibly put back and substitute, articles
which they wish to have, and then to go up to the cashier and offer to buy
what they have so far chosen. On that conclusion the case fails, because it is
admitted that there was supervision in the sense required by the Act and at
the appropriate moment of time. For these reasons, in my opinion, the appeal
should be dismissed.
BIRKETT LJ. I am of the same opinion. The facts are clearly stated in the
agreed statement of facts, and the argument on them has been very clearly
stated by Mr Lloyd-Jones. I think the clearest of all was the judgment of the Lord
Chief Justice, with which I agree. In view of an observation which I made during
the argument, I should like to add that under section 25 of the Pharmacy and
Poisons Act, 1933, it is the duty of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain,
by means of inspection or otherwise, ‘to take all reasonable steps to enforce
the provisions of Part I of this Act’ - that really deals with the status of the
registered pharmacist - ‘and to secure compliance by registered pharmacists
and authorised sellers of poisons with the provisions of Part II of this Act’.
This action has been brought by the Pharmaceutical Society in pursuance of
that duty which is laid upon them by statute, and the short point of the case
is, at what point of time did the sale in this particular shop at Edgware take
place? My Lord has explained the system which had been introduced into that
shop in March of 1951. The two women customers in this case each took a
particular package containing poison from one particular shelf, put it into her
basket, came to the exit and there paid. It is said, on the one hand, that when
the customer takes the package from the poison section and puts it into her
basket the sale there and then takes place. On the other hand, it is said the
sale does not take place until that customer, who has placed that package in
the basket, comes to the exit.
The Lord Chief Justice dealt with the matter in this way, and I would like to
adopt his words: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that the transaction is in no way
different from the normal transaction in a shop in which there is no self-service
scheme. I am quite satisfied it would be wrong to say that the shopkeeper is
making an offer to sell every article in the shop to any person who might come
in and that that person can insist on buying any article by saying “I accept your
offer’’.’
Then he went on to deal with the illustration of the bookshop, and

continued: ‘Therefore, in my opinion, the mere fact that a customer picks
up a bottle of medicine from the shelves in this case does not amount to an
acceptance of an offer to sell. It is an offer by the customer to buy and there
is no sale effected until the buyer’s offer to buy is accepted by the acceptance
of the price. The offer, the acceptance of the price, and therefore the sale take
place under the supervision of the pharmacist. That is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the section, for by using the words ‘the sale is effected by, or
under the supervision of, a registered pharmacist’ the Act envisages that the
sale may be effected by someone not a pharmacist. I think, too, that the sale
is effected under his supervision if he is in a position to say “You must not have
that: that contains poison,” so that in any case, even if I were wrong in the view
that I have taken on the question as to when the sale was completed, and it
was completed when the customer took the article from the shelf, it would
still be effected under the supervision of the pharmacist within the meaning
of section 18.’
I agree with that, and I agree that this appeal ought to be dismissed.
ROMER LJ. I also agree. The Lord Chief Justice observed that, on the footing
of the plaintiff society’s contention, if a person picked up an article, once
having picked it up, he would never be able to put it back and say that he had
changed his mind. The shopkeeper would say: ‘No, the property has passed
and you will have to pay’. If that were the position in this and similar shops,
and that position was known to the general public, I should imagine that the
popularity of those shops would wane a good deal. In fact, I am satisfied that
that is not the position, and that the articles, even though they are priced and
put in shops like this, do not represent an offer by the shopkeeper which can
be accepted merely by the picking up of the article in question. I quite agree
with the reasons on which the Lord Chief Justice arrived at that conclusion
and which Birkett LJ has just referred to, and to those observations I can add
nothing of my own. I agree that the appeal fails.
Representation: A C Castle; Masons J
Appeal dismissed.
Leave to appeal to House of Lords refused.
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales

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PART 2

Crossley v Rawlinson [1982] 1 WLR 369

Queen’s Bench Division

[1982] 1 WLR 369

Mr Richard Tucker QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge

1981 July 13, 14

Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, CA

That must be read subject to a later judgment of Lord Denning MR in Lamb

Crossbows Act 1987

Crossbows Act 1987

Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 (extracts)

On the Right of Citizens of the [European] Union and their Family

Article 5 Right of entry

Article 7 Right of residence for more than three months

Human Rights Act 1998 (extracts)

Human Rights Act 1998 (extracts)

Human Rights Act 1998

Prohibition of slavery and forced labour

(c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening

Right to liberty and security

Right to a fair trial

No punishment without law

Right to respect for private and family life

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

Freedom of assembly and association

Restrictions on political activity of aliens

Prohibition of abuse of rights

Limitation on use of restrictions on rights

Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 728

Director of Public Prosecutions v Johnson

[1995] 1 WLR 728

Queen’s Bench Division

Balcombe LJ and Schiemann J

Guard Dogs Act 1975 c.50

Guard Dogs Act 1975 c. 50 1

[1st August 1975] 4

6.–(1) Regulations may be made – Regulations.

(a) enabling a local authority to revoke a licence and on the

‘agricultural land’ has the same meaning as in the Dogs (Protection of

Guard Dogs Act 1975 (Commencement No 1) Order 1975

1975 No 1767 (C. 50) a

The Guard Dogs Act 1975 (Commencement No 1) Order 1975 c

Made - - - - 29th October 1975 d

1. This Order may be cited as the Guard Dogs Act 1975 f

(This Note is not part of the Order.)

Hobson v Gledhill [1978] 1 WLR 215

[1978] 1 WLR 215

1977 Oct. 12 Lord Widgery CJ, Cantley

owner of premises consisting of a yard and building situate at George Street,

Prosecutor’s and defendant’s costs

out of central funds.

Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985

Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985

Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102

whether a bicycle was a carriage within the meaning of s 35 of the Offences

Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists

Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists A

(Southern) Ltd [1953] 1 QB 401

Somervell, Birkett and Romer LJJ C

Poisons–Sale of–Self-service system–Selection of articles by customer from E

G H V Lloyd-Jones QC and T Dewar for the Pharmaceutical Society. The real

Then he went on to deal with the illustration of the bookshop, and

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