STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
DUTY OF THE COURT TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET LAWS
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA,
MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the
Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by
Respondent Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads:4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their
aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
1
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this
land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned
to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However,
during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for
want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit
"E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently,
the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction
over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its
pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has
a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the
second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper
of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be
legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier
explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in
the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared
November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us.
This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an
error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of
the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and
not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of
discretion"10 in holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC
Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
"published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According
to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the
trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice
requirement of due process."11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
2
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid
that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to
explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced
them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official
Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous
places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded
to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the
notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in
the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However,
the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold
that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of
notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners
of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential,
then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.   Being in rem, such
17
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise,
persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as
an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of
realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the
3
applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" —
who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to
come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties
and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity
to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well
as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand.
The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of
the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.
Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to
dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear.
Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only
for application.19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by
private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is
DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, to wit:
DUTY OF THE COURT TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET LAWS
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
vs. Erlinda C. Pascual
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL- wit:
MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO,
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE Avelino Pascual
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Isoceles Pascual
Manila, respondents. Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
PARAS, J.: Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the (d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled blood of the deceased, to wit:
"Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C.
Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Olivia S. Pascual
Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court Hermes S. Pascual
and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: deceased and represented by the following:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children Dominga M. Pascual
of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Mamerta P. Fugoso
Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17). Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following: Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses; Silvestre M. Pascual

4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding,
Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the
Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect
that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late
husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were
are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and
Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation
of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the
court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo,
pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights
(Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby
resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and
Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526).
and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo,
p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the
Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine
laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural
children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such
children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be
strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is
applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this
Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to
the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989
of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate
estate of Don Andres Pascual.
6
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by
the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate
children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death.
The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of
the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented
are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this
matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may
be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a
legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article
982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would
allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of
his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of
Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article
992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may
not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants
shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of
illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p.
12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432;
[1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is
clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged
natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DUTY OF THE COURT TO CONSTRUE AND INTERPRET LAWS
G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and
Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
7
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether
or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August
14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a
violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his
possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22,
without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset
asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in
possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess
the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the
governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After
counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his
exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision,
he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get
a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could
pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit
that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information
was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The
accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the
lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also
affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment
"as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2,
1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no
oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the longer speaks with authority.
effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the
provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The CONSTRUCTION DEFINED
exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët G.R. No. L-19650             September 29, 1966

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
"of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of vs.
from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." appellant.

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
affirmed. Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
CASTRO, J.:
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to
performance of their official duties."6 estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its
advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station
application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must
where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
stand. It cannot be set aside.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted
Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by
on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in
the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the
the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him
next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight
expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of
with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then
this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent
8
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of
the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-
prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-
prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National
Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500
and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this
final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation
prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of
the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported
into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of
the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the
Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner
pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of
any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may
instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the
person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written
or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed
9
by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such
person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer
service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any
person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the
issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer
to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether
such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of
any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums
named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or
company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored
to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within
the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its
counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand,
stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest
was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an
opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion
217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally
banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of
the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was
conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory
relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered
declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the
parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules
marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether
the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the
proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in
seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available
to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights
thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court,
conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua
non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must
have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September
28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579;
Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's
stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief,
our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of
some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means,
and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its
products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the
Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof —
particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right
aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed.
To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails,
amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance
clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and
construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in
10
the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the
correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications
in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence
with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with
which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open
warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to
be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's
insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the
challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid.
There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on
the other, concerning a real — not a mere theoretical — question or issue. The contenders are
as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the
divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance
its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to
transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the
appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if
carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30,
1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can
rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the
fears of others" — which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there
was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated
into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz.,
251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a
given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for
declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the
assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions
can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not
feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into
the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at
hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is
anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet
been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or
contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues
susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the
propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the
asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead
(III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be
conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr.,
800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the
appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between
undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to
whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would
be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof,
it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a
fraud order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually
be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the
appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally
unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality
with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1,
Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) — which, in the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law — we can see in
the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our
intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand
down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a
declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound.
But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code
of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to
11
abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we
entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is
not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487,
where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county
prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that
if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief
action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In
pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin
vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-
mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise
deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second
issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate",
Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal
authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
—
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for
this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having
to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery"
extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and
third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs.
Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S.
vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962;
Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as
in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following
terms —
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly
or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal
schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in
which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus —
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have
to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with
the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from — to —, and win valuable
prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry
form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern
injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real
element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs.
Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only appear to
be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the
privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex
product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A
contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.1awphîl.nèt
12
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion,
would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be
encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing
entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived
by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d.,
99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for
the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in
return for the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the
contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris
Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing;
does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan,
Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with
under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is
equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on
the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here
invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive
justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon
Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme,
though not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which
that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the proposed contest —
wanting in consideration as we have found it to be — is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be
passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit
words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the
term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their
market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54
C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga.
App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open
to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed
within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we
think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied
upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance,
even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited
(E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129
Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P.
2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive
authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes
only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs.
People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash.,
297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P.,
389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker
vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-
594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory
provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the
terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in
others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically
eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford
vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of
the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.
disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable.
As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the
recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is
inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason
behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held —
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it
is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived,
directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M.,
258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have
heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in
the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails
for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association
with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known
principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied
upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the
term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort
to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail
fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for
13
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-8451        December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G.
Bautista and Troadio T. Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.
FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao seeking the reversal of a resolution by the Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C.
Consulta No. 14. The facts of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer
Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,
s corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr.
Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed of sale was
presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
14
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an
affidavit to the effect that 60 per cent of the members of their corporation were
Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of
donation of a parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the
members thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an affidavit,
both not in the same tenor as that made the Progress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two
cases were not similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five
incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to their articles of
incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the owner of properties
donated to it, whereas the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would
become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the document, the
matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in
accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter was
conducted by the Commissioner and after the petitioner corporation had filed its
memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the
provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60
per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question
that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the
opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159 of the corporation Law
relied upon by the vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein — that at least
60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens — be present, and, therefore, ordered
the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof
of compliance with such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was
instituted with this Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law as
well as the settled jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis
in favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is
qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and maintenance of places
of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside the resolution of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In its resolution of November 15, 1954, this
Court gave due course to this petition providing that the procedure prescribed for appeals
from the Public Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange Commissions (Rule 43),
be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to cititzens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER CONSTITUTION.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases other than the
development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered "qualified" to
acquire and hold agricultural lands in the Philippines? What is the effect of these
constitutional prohibition of the right of a religious corporation recognized by our
Corporation Law and registered as a corporation sole, to possess, acquire and register real
estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its
incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The
Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or
"ordinary" is not the owner of the of the properties that he may acquire but merely the
administrator thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church temporalities are owned by
15
the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or by the diocess as minor "moral persons" with the
ordinary or bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, petitioner
explained that as a religious society or organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions
— the clergy or religious members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures of the
Bureau of Census showed that there were 277,551 Catholics in Davao and aliens residing
therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting that all these foreigners are Catholics, petitioner
contends that Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics population
of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition, counsel for petitioner presented the
Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year,
Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was,
therefore, allowed that the constitutional requirement was fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not
the owner of the land purchased, yet he has control over the same, with full power to
administer, take possession of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands
and their improvements registered in the name of the corporation sole and can collect,
receive, demand or sue for all money or values of any kind that may be kind that may become
due or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into agreements with any
persons, concerns or entities in connection with said real properties, or in other words,
actually exercising all rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the
theory that properties registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in true for the
benefit of the Catholic population of a place, as of Davao in the case at bar should be
sustained because a conglomeration of persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que
trust or recipient of the benefits from the property allegedly administered in their behalf.
Neither can it be said that the mass of people referred to as such beneficiary exercise ant right
of ownership over the same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a trust. The
respondents instead tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary of ecclesiastical properties
are not members or faithful of the church but someone else, by quoting a portion a portion of
the ought of fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon his elevation to the episcopacy wherein he
promises to render to the Pontificial Father or his successors an account of his pastoral office
and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the constitutional provision
calling for 60 per cent of Filipino citizenship, the criterion of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A
corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy.
Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was designed to facilitate the exercise
of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which
was regarded as the property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at
a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens,
distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and sustain
the stand of petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
SEC. 154. — For the administration of the temporalities of any religious
denomination, society or church and the management of the estates and the properties
thereof, it shall be lawful for the bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such
religious denomination, society or church to become a corporation sole, unless
inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or discipline of his religious denomination,
society or church or forbidden by competent authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law
copied hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding
elder of any religious denomination, society or church must file with the Securities
and Exchange Commissioner articles of incorporation setting forth the following
facts:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged with the
administration of the temporalities and the management of the estates and properties
of his religious denomination, society, or church within its territorial jurisdiction,
describing it;
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
16
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
of the said articles of incorporation, which verified by affidavit or affirmation as
aforesaid and accompanied by the copy of the commission, certificate of election, or
letters of appointment of the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as
prescribed in the section immediately preceding such the bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder, as the case may be, shall become a corporation sole and all
temporalities, estates, and properties the religious denomination, society, or church
therefore administered or managed by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding
elder, shall be held in trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use, purpose, behalf,
and sole benefit of his religious denomination, society, or church, including hospitals,
schools, colleges, orphan, asylums, parsonages, and cemeteries thereof. For the filing
of such articles of incorporation, the Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall
collect twenty-five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 287); and.
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by
a religious order or society, or by the diocese, synod, or district organization of any
religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation
and shall be held in trust for the use, purpose behalf, and benefit of the religious
society, or order so incorporated or of the church of which the diocese, or district
organization is an organized and constituent part.
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of the corporation sole or
ordinary as administrator of the church properties, as follows:
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre la administracion de todos
los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su
jurisdiccion, salvs las prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios
derechos.
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y circunstancias,
procuraran los Ordinarios regular todo lo concerniente a la administracion de los
bienes eclesciasticos, dando las oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco
del derecho comun. (Title XXVIII, Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, Canon
1519).1
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as
corporation's sole are merely administrators of the church properties that come to their
possession, in which they hold in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true
that church properties could be administered by a natural persons, problems regarding
succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. Through this legal
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in office. It could
be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of
the church or religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same to his
successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the properties do not pass to the
administrators, who are the owners of church properties?.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise comment:
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic
See, the Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme administrator through the
Roman Curia; in matters regarding other church property, through the administrators
of the individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid down in
the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is the
owner of all the church property; but merely that he is the supreme
guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A Text and Commentary, p. 764).
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the
case of Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the properties
constituting the endowment of the ecclesiastical or collative chaplaincies is vested.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom the ownership of the
ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose,
confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano
believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is
more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter, and,
consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches, institutions and
canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated.
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring ownership of church
properties on the Pope although he appears to be the supreme administrator or guardian of his
flock, nor on the corporation sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly
mere administrators of said properties, ownership of these temporalities logically fall and
develop upon the church, diocese or congregation acquiring the same. Although this question
of ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been mentioned in several decisions
17
of the Court yet in no instance was the subject of citizenship of this religious society been
passed upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the
case of Agustines vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church by the Pope,
with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There is no question that the Roman Catholic
Church existing in the Philippines is a tributary and part of the international religious
organization, for the word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes the
authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty in drawing conclusions, We
have to analyze and take note of the nature of the government established in the Vatican City,
of which it was said:
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and jurisdiction
over clergy and laity alike as held by the pope who (since the Middle Ages) is elected
by the cardinals assembled in conclave, and holds office until his death or legitimate
abdication. . . While the pope is obviously independent of the laws made, and the
officials appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually exercises his
administrative authority according to the code of canon law and through the
congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In their respective
territories (called generally dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the
patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is
called ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to a person. . . (Collier's
Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman
Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the
Catholic congregation of the faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of
their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of
personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the
faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship
with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs from
that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive
their authorities and receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of
the Pope upon these branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a
sort of "radiation". We have to realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic
countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality that the word "catholic"
implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the interpretation of
their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent
from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of
their temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world
follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead to the
absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become
members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is
more so if We consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other
country of the world. The same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of
the corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines, which is not altered by the
change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is
lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is
considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial
being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman
Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are
governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We may draw on this matter
will have a far reaching influence, nor can We overlook the pages of history that arouse
indignation and criticisms against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that snowbailed
into a strong nationalistic sentiment manifested itself when the provisions on natural to be
embodied in the Philippine Constitution were framed, but all that has been said on this regard
referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations known as "Friar Estates"
which have already bee acquired by our government, and not to properties held by
corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the faithful
residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling probably precipitated and
influenced to a large extent the doctrine laid down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We
have to take this matter in the light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually obtaining,
irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Universal Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural
lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only persons or corporations
qualified to acquire hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines may acquire or be
assigned and hold private agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in the present
18
controversy hinges on the proposition or whether or not the petitioner in this case can acquire
agricultural lands of the public domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission, We find that the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a corporation sole)
in September, 1912, principally to administer its temporalities and manage its properties.
Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of incorporation were reconstructed in
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, this corporation sole
administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the island of Mindanao.
Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new corporations sole were created to
correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner
herein, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the
administrative for all the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved April 1, 1906, a
corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or
church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of such society or church.
By "temporalities" is meant estate and properties not used exclusively for religious
worship. The successor in office of such religious head or chief priest incorporated as
a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on ascension to office, and shall
be permitted to transact business as such on filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a copy of his commission, certificate of election or letter of appointment
duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record (Guevara's The
Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal;
property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may
receive bequests or gifts of such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell
real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the
order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the
application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise
in such manner and for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have
directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell
must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious
denomination, society or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided,
however, That in cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the religious
denomination, society or church concerned represented by such corporation sole
regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and
personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the
intervention of the Courts shall not be necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property,
like the power exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted although the power  to sell or
mortgage sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church
concerned represented by said corporation sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real
estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register said
real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of
registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner
herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its
name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is
absurd that while the corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the
erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are
expressly authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not register
said properties in their name. As professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his
search for the immortal and imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded history,
erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no doubt that he will continue to do so for
all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring the aid of Divine Providence'"
(Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41, September, 1956).
Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every
corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the
necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the
territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created,
independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the
bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers
of the Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious
corporations sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by
Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an
artificial being having the right of succession and the power, attributes, and properties
19
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In
outlining the general powers of a corporation. Public Act. No. 1459 provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise
deal with such real and personal property as the purpose for which the corporation
was formed may permit, and the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation
may reasonably and necessarily require, unless otherwise prescribed in this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a form of corporation
recognized by the same law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole
to purchase and hold real as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion of the
objects for which said corporation sole is created. Respondent Land Registration
Commissioner, however, maintained that since the Philippine Constitution is a later
enactment than public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of
Section 13 thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered repealed by the former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by
respondent Commissioner was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in
mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the naturalization
and conservation of our national resources was one of the dominating objectives of the
Convention and in drafting the present Article XII of the Constitution, the delegates were
goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an
instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign
control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a
source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence (See The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego,
a Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book Delegate
Aruego, explaining the reason behind the first consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been to be
rather shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to invest a considerable sum of their
capital for the development, exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of
the country. They had not as yet been so used to corporate as the peoples of the west.
This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the retardation of the
development of the natural resources, unless foreign capital would be encouraged to
come and help in that development. They knew that the naturalization of the natural
resources would certainly not encourage the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN
CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in the Convention that it was
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
better to have such a development retarded or even postpone together until such time
when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to undertake it rather than permit the
natural resources to be placed under the ownership or control of foreigners in order
that they might be immediately be developed, with the Filipinos of the future serving
not as owners but utmost as tenants or workers under foreign masters. By all means,
the delegates believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino
posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the Constitution intended said
provisions as barrier for foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire,
exploit and develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to
clear and enrich when they are already prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the
case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of
the "temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit of the members of
their respective religion composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No mention nor
allusion whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the liability of
the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands.
Although there were some discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the
inclusion of the provision allowing the Government to break big landed estates to put an end
to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of
Section 1 of Article XIII of the constitution does have bearing on the petitioner's case; even
so the clause requiring that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned
by Filipinos is subordinated to the petitioner's aforesaid right already existing at the time of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the Philippines. In the language
of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel (a delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in his concurring
opinion of the case of Gold Creek mining Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez,
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of
Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied
in the report submitted by the Committee on Naturalization and Preservation of Land
and Other Natural Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17,
1954. It was later inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article
XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes
undergone by the proviso from the time when it comes out of the committee until it
was finally adopted. When first submitted and as inserted to the first draft of the
Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in
respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the Constitution'. As finally adopted, the
20
proviso reads: 'subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution'. This
recognition is not mere graciousness but springs form the just character of the
government established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the
rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They
well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or
annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither
episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in the protection of property rights.
This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic traits discoverable upon even a
sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during the deliberation of this
case he submitted to the consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the
"vested right saving clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, but some
of the members of this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer, or were not
ready to take a definite stand on the particular point I am now to discuss deferring our ruling
on such debatable question for a better occasion, inasmuch as the determination thereof is not
absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem involved in this case. In his desire to face
the issues squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a disgression, to explain and develop
his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it better and
convenient to go over the cycle of reasons that are linked to one another and that step by step
lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other
things, that "all agricultural lands of the public domain and their disposition shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining
Corporation vs. Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition (in the clause already
quoted), is not mere graciousness but springs from the just character of the government
established. The farmers of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy
or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of
our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY
RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or
private lands by a corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
purchases of the Constitution and not to later transactions. This argument would imply that
even assuming that petitioner had at the time of the enactment of the Constitution the right to
purchase real property or right could not be exercised after the effectivity of our Constitution,
because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein petitioner, conferred in virtue
of the aforequoted provisions of the Corporation Law, could no longer be exercised in view
of the requisite therein prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation
had to be Filipino. It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary
corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one
persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for
the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only
the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by
said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful
residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no
nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship
of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the
specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art.
XIII), was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked
this particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already
indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this
requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We might say that a reading of
said Section 1 will show that it does not refer to any actual acquisition of land up to the  right,
qualification or power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of the
Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of religion of
their faithful the corporation sole may be in need of more temples where to pray, more
schools where the children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of their
religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more hallow or consecrated
grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually
existing at the time of the enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it be
logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by express provision of law, has
the power to hold and acquire real estate and personal property of its churches, charitable
benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth
and restrain its necessities just because the corporation sole is a non-stock corporation
composed of only one person who in his unity does not admit of any percentage, especially
when that person is not the owner but merely an administrator of the temporalities of the
21
corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to whoever may read and consider this portion
of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in disposing the case, for even
if We were to disregard such saving clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any
existing right, grant, etc., at the same time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution, yet We would have, under the evidence on record, sufficient grounds
to uphold petitioner's contention on this matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple,  2 G.R. No. L-6776,
promulgated May 21, 1955, wherein this question was considered from a different angle, this
Court through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice
to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of
foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to
ensure that corporation or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to
exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation sole but a
corporation aggregate, i.e., an unregistered organization operating through 3 trustees, all of
Chinese nationality, and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With
regard to petitioner, which likewise is a non-stock corporation, the case is different, because it
is a registered corporation sole, evidently of no nationality and registered mainly to
administer the temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of said
church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the record to inquire into the
composing membership to determine whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not,
we would find undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith
within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens. As indicated before,
petitioner has presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion
fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution. These facts are
not controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed. — After having developed our theory in the case and arrived
at the findings and conclusions already expressed in this decision. We now deem it proper to
analyze and delve into the basic foundation on which the dissenting opinion stands up. Being
aware of the transcendental and far-reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter might have,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
this case was thoroughly considered from all points of view, the Court sparing no effort to
solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a prompt dispatch of the
case: (1) the reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the celebrated Krivenko case by
excluding urban lots and properties from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" use
in this section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution; and (2) by driving Our reasons to a point
that might indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head the
corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great majority of the members of this Court were
not yet prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the
second way, it seems to be misleading because the nationality of the head of a diocese
constituted as a corporation sole has no material bearing on the functions of the latter, which
are limited to the administration of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed that
its author lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus throwing the main points in controversy
out of focus. Of course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the framers of our
Constitution had at heart to insure the conservation of the natural resources of Our
motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve them as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all these precautions adopted
by the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could have not been intended for or directed
against cases like the one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on the statement that once the
capacity of a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted there will be no
limit to the areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the "revival or
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past", cannot even
furnish the "penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place, the
right of Filipino citizens, including those of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations, to
acquire private lands is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We
certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right of Filipino citizens and corporations to
acquire public agricultural lands is already limited by law. In the second place, corporations
sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all. Corporations sole
are, under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in
the Philippines. In the third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only entitled
to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with real
properties when it is pursuant to or in consonance with the purposes for which the corporation
was formed, and when the transactions of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably
22
and necessarily require such dealing — section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law, Public Act
No. 1459 — and considering these provisions in conjunction with Section 159 of the same
law which provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real estate and
personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes", the above
mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely
dispelled. The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire
their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that
bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in
the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the
revitalization of religious landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that when the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention drafted and approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not
have in mind the corporation sole. We come to this finding because the Constitutional
Assembly, composed as it was by a great number of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any
other legislative body empowered to enact either the Constitution of the country or any public
statute, presumed to know the conditions existing as to particular subject matter when it
enacted a statute (Board of Commerce of Orange Country vs. Bain, 92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind of the
Legislature in enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A. 109; 277 P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the law on the
subjects upon which it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al.,
187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted with full
knowledge of the prior legislation on the subject and its construction by the courts.
(Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89 N. E. 899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject with which it was
dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E. 778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction. (People vs.
Lowell, 230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N.W.
211, 250 Mich. 436.).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution or statute
without reason, or that a result was intended inconsistent with the judgment of men of
common sense guided by reason" (Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.)
See City of Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other
authorities that can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single individual, the
head of any religious society or church operating within the zone, area or jurisdiction
covered by said corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the temporalities
which he merely administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any administrator has
absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to acquire real
property in the Philippines by purchase or other lawful means other than by
hereditary succession, who according to the Constitution must be a Filipino (sections
1 and 5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the corporation
sole to purchase and hold real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent or
educational purposes, and to receive bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, almost all of whom were Roman Catholics, could not have intended to
curtail the propagation of the Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities
of their church, knowing pretty well that with the growth of our population more
places of worship, more schools where our youth could be taught and trained; more
hallow grounds where to bury our dead would be needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations sole even
to receive bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could not, without any clear and
specific provision of the Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this
year, could no longer be registered in the name of the corporation sole to which it was
conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not receive our sanction on the pretext that
23
corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only
one person in the capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty per
centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
ART. 10. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the properties of a Filipino
can acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands without any limitation whatsoever, and
that is so because the properties thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the
administrator but to the Filipino whom he represents. But the dissenting Justice inquires: If
the Ordinary is only the administrator, for whom does he administer? And who can alter or
overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The corporations sole
by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of its
temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary
holds them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful to their respective locality
or diocese. Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say that the temporalities of every
corporation sole are held in trust for the use, purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious
society, or order so incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district
organization is an organized and constituent part (section 163 of the Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation sole,
let us see now what is the meaning and scope of the word "control". According to the
Merriam-Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of
the word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to
hold from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. — to overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not
necessary, to mortgage or sell real property held by the corporation sole where the rules,
regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned
presented by such corporation sole regulates the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and
mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the
corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or of selling real property. It
may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese cannot govern or overrule the acts of the
Ordinary, but all this does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
corporation sole without check or restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation sole
is incorporated under Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself to
the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain
grievances arising out of or with respect to the temporalities of the church which came into
the possession of the corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that the courts
cannot intervene as to the matters of doctrine or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the instance of the faithful for whom the
temporalities are being held in trust, to check undue exercise by the corporation sole of its
power as administrator to insure that they are used for the purpose or purposes for which the
corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by persons
claiming to be members of a church, who allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion
of the church property to uses foreign to the purposes of the church, since no
ecclesiastical question is involved and equity will protect from wrongful diversion of
the property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A. — n.s. —
1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the officers of
such corporations in respect to the performance of their official duties; but as in
respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of
TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of
trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30 L.R.A. — n.s.
— 665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, supra.).
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or
discipline unless civil rights become involved and which must be protected (Morris
St., Baptist Church vs. Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753, and others). (All cited in Vol.
II, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 960-964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above enumerated and of the
provisions of law relative to existing conditions as to management and operation of
corporations sole in the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates
thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined even for an instant that when
Article XIII of the Constitution was approved the framers thereof intended to prevent or
curtail from then on the acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation, of real properties
that they might need for the propagation of the faith and for there religious and Christian
activities such as the moral education of the youth, the care, attention and treatment of the
24
sick and the burial of the dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of
the respective corporations sole? The mere indulgence in said thought would impress upon
Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that is precisely the leit motiv that permeates
the whole fabric of the dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are confronted with in this appeal,
hinges around the necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of statutory
construction laid down by the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words
employed are to be taken in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms
are to be given their technical meaning. The imperfections of language as a vehicle
for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved by result to
extraneous aids for discovering the intent of the framers. Among the more important
of these are a consideration of the history of the times when the provision was
adopted and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional
convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the
legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted
to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities. . . . Consideration of the consequences
flowing from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an
important interpretative device. . . . The purposes of many of the broadly phrased
constitutional limitations were the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves
to definite and specific formulation. The courts have had to define those policies and
have often drawn on natural law and natural rights theories in doing so. The
interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of political
and social values. The extent to which these extraneous aids affect the judicial
construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence
cannot be ignored in describing the essentials of the process (Rottschaeffer on
Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be
inconsistent with the general objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of equity
or spirit of the statute the courts rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A
restricted interpretation is usually applied where the effect of literal interpretation
will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one court, the language must
be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'. (Vol. 3, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor
an obstruction to its progress and foreign relations (Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of
Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d.
745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged
from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand
for a great length of time, and it is progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should
not receive too narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the meaning given it
should be applied in such manner as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise
(U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the
language used and that construction which effectuates, rather than that which
destroys a plain intent or purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but
will be adopted (State ex rel. Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction
should be broad or liberal or equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that
intent, rather than technical (Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243
S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in
mind the corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of
said Article XIII when they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is,
herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be
deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation real properties for charitable,
benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name with the
Register of Deeds of Davao, an indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land Registration
Act for lands covered by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question above referred to as "the
vested right saving clause" contained in section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The
dissenting Justice hurls upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of the
decision the most pointed darts of his severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong
dissent should have been spared, because as clearly indicated before, some members of this
Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer or were not ready to take a definite
stand on that particular point, so that there being no majority opinion thereon there was no
need of any dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the writer deems it
necessary to say a few words of explanation.
25
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a capacity to acquire
(property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing property right that the Constitution
protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a
transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must
have attached to a thing; it must have become 'fixed and established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51
Phil. 498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the rule because among
the rights granted by section 159 of the Corporation Law was the right to receive bequests or
gifts of real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And this right to
receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in futuro), is not a mere potentiality
that could be impaired without any specific provision in the Constitution to that effect,
especially when the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of the religious
faith of the immense majority of the Filipino people and the curtailment of the activities of
their Church. That is why the writer gave us a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego
said in his book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the enlightening opinion of
Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in his
concurring opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil.
259. Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to pass upon said "vested right
saving clause" for the final determination of this case.
JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September 21,
1954, holding that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Philippine Constitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, properties or
assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed of sale in the absence
of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by
Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc.,
which is the subject of the present litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
LABRADOR, J., concurring:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The case at bar squarely present this important legal question: Has the bishop or ordinary of
the Roman Catholic Church who is not a Filipino citizen, as corporation sole, the right to
register land, belonging to the Church over which he presides, in view of the Krivenko
decision? Mr. Justice Felix sustains the affirmative view while Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
negative. As the undersigned understands it, the reason given for this last view is that the
constitutional provision prohibiting land ownership by foreigners also extends to control
because this lies within the scope and purpose of the prohibition.
To our way of thinking, the question at issue depends for its resolution upon another, namely,
who is the owner of the land or property of the Church sought to be registered? Under the
Canon Law the parish and the diocese have the right to acquire and own property.
SEC. 1. La Iglesia catolica y la Sede Apostolica, libre e independientemente de la
potestad civil, tiene derecho innato de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes
temporales para el logro de sus propios fines.
SEC. 2. Tambien las iglesias particulares y demas personas morales erigidas por la
autoridad eclesiastica en persona juridica, tienen derecho, a tenor de los sagrados
canones, de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes temporales. (Canon 1495) (Codigo
de Derecho Canonico por Miguelez-Alonzo-Cabreros, 4a ed., p. 562.).
The Canon Law further states that Church property belongs to the non-collegiate moral
person called the parish, or to the diocese.
In canon law the ownership of ecclesiastical goods belongs to each separate juridical
person in the Church (C. 1499). The property of St. John's Church does not belong to
the Pope, the bishop, the pastor, or even to the people of the parish. It belongs to the
non-collegiate moral person called the parish, which has been lawfully erected. It is
not like a stock company. The civil law does not recognize this canonical principle; it
insists on an act of civil incorporation or some other legal device. (Ready Answers in
Canon Law by Rev. P.J. Lydon, DD., 3rd ed., 1948, p. 576.).
Parish. 3. A portion or subdivision of a diocese committed to the spiritual jurisdiction
or care of a priest or minister, called rector or pastor. In the Protestant Episcopal
Church, it is a territorial division usually following civil bounds, as those of a town.
In the Roman Catholic Church, it is usually territorial, but whenever, as in some parts
of the United States there are different rites and languages, the boundaries and
jurisdiction are determined by right or language; as, a Ruthenian or Polish parish. "5.
The inhabitants or members of a parish, collectively.
26
Diocese. 3. Eccl. The circuit or extent of a bishop's jurisdiction; the district in which
a bishop has authority. (Webster's New International Dictionary).
We are aware of the fact that some writers believe that ownership of ecclesiastical properties
resides in the Roman Catholic Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, but the better opinion
seems to be that they do belong to the parishes and diocese as above indicated.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the
ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose,
confine ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano
believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is
more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter and,
consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches, institutions and
canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated. (3 Campos y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, P. 420, cited in
Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil., 881, 888-889.).
The property in question, therefore, appears to belong to the parish or the diocese of Davao.
But the Roman Catholics of Davao are not organized as a juridical person, either under the
Canon law or under the Civil Law. Neither is there any provision in either for their
organization as a juridical person. Registration of the property in the name of the Roman
Catholics of Davao is, therefore, impossible.
As under the Civil Law, however, the organization of parishes and dioceses as juridical
persons is not expressly provided for, the corporation law has set up the fiction known as the
"corporation sole."
It tolerates the corporation sole wherever and as long as the state law does not permit
the legal incorporation of the parish or diocese. The bishop officially is the legal
owner. (Ready Answers in Canon Law, supra, p. 577.) .
and authorizes it to purchase and hold real estate for the Church.
SEC. 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal
property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may
receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell
real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of
First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the
order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the court that notice of the application
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such
manner and for such time as said court or the judge thereof may have directed, and
that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be
granted. The application for leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly
verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, acting as corporation sole, and
may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, society, or church
represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases when the rules,
regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned
represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding,
selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and
discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary. (The
Corporation Law.)
And in accordance with the above section, temporalities of the Church or of parish or a
diocese are allowed to be registered in the name of the corporation sole for purposes of
administration and in trust for the real owners.
The mere fact that the Corporation Law authorizes the corporation sole to acquire and hold
real estate or other property does not make the latter the real owner thereof, as his tenure of
Church property is merely for the purposes of administration. As stated above, the bishop is
only the legal (technical) owner or trustee, the parish or diocese being the beneficial owner,
or cestui que trust.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the property in question belongs actually either to the
parish or to the dioceses of Davao, the next question that possess for solution is, In case of
said property, whose nationality must be considered for the purpose of determining the
applicability of the constitutional provision limiting ownership of land to Filipinos, that of the
bishop or chief priest who registers as corporation sole, or that of the constituents of the
parish or diocese who are the beneficial owners of the land? We believe that of a latter must
be considered, and not that of the priest clothed with the corporate fiction and denominated as
the corporation sole. The corporation sole is a mere contrivance to enable a church to acquire,
own and manage properties belonging to the church. It is only a means to an end. The
constitutional provision could not have been meant to apply to the means through which and
by which property may be owned or acquired, but to the ultimate owner of the property.
Hence, the citizenship of the priest forming the corporation sole should be no impediment if
the parish or diocese which owns the property is qualified to own and possess the property.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that a great majority of the constituents of the parish or
diocese of Davao are Roman Catholics. The affidavit demanded is therefore, a mere
formality.
27
The dissenting opinion sustains the proposition that control, not actual ownership, is the
factor that determines whether the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of lands
should or should not apply. We may assume the correctness of the proposition that the Holy
See exercises control cannot be real and actual but merely theoretical. In any case, the
constitutional prohibition is limited by its terms to ownership and ownership alone. And
should the corporation sole abuse its powers and authority in relation to the administration or
disposal of the property contrary to the wishes of the constituents of the parish or the diocese,
the act may always be questioned as ultra vires.
We agree, therefore, with the reversal of the order.
Montemayor and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix. The decision of the
Supreme Court in this case will be of far reaching results, for once the capacity of
corporations sole to acquire public and private agricultural lands is admitted, there will be no
limit to the areas they may hold until the Legislature implements section 3 of Article XIII of
the Constitution, empowering it to set a limit to the size of private agricultural land that may
be held; and even then it can only be done without prejudice to rights acquired prior to the
enactment of such law. In other words, even if a limitative law is adopted, it will not affect
the landholdings acquired before the law become effective, no matter how vast the estate
should be.
The Constitutional restrictions to the acquisition of agricultural land are well known:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant. (Article XII, Constitution of the Phil.).
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XII,
Constitution of the Phil.).
In requiring corporations or associations to have sixty per cent (60%) of their capital owned
by Filipino citizens, the constitution manifestly disregarded the corporate fiction, i.e., the
juridical personality of such corporations or associations. It went behind the corporate entity
and looked at the natural persons that composed it, and demanded that a clear majority in
interest (60%) should be Filipino. To me this was done to ensure that the control of its
properties (not merely the beneficial ownership thereof) remained in Filipino hands. (Aruego,
Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 2. pp. 604, 606.) .
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure
their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national
defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through
peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of
international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence. . . .
The convention permitted aliens to acquire an interest in the natural resources of the
country and in private agricultural lands as component elements of corporations or
associations. The maximum limit of interest that they could hold in a corporation or
association would be only forty per centum of the capital. Accordingly the control of
the corporation or association would remain in Filipino hands.
In its report the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other
natural resources recommended that the maximum limit of interest that aliens could
hold in a corporation or association should be only twenty-five per centum of the
capital. The purpose of the committee was to enable Filipino-controlled corporations
or associations, if necessary, to interest aliens to join their technical or managerial
staff by giving them a part interest in the same. The sub-committee of seven
embodied this recommendation in the first draft of the Constitution; but in the revised
article on General Provisions, it raised the amount to forty per centum. (emphasis
supplied.)
28
It was in recognition of this basic rule that we held in Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si
Temple, 51 Off. Gaz. p. 2866, that if the association had no capital, its controlling
membership must be composed of Filipinos. Because ownership divorced from control is not
true ownership.
From these premises it can be deduced that the preliminary question to be decide by the court
is the following: what and who exercises the power of control in the corporation sole known
as "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc."?.
Under section 155 of the Corporation Law, the bishop, or other religious head, as corporation
sole, is "charged with the administration of the temporalities of his church." It becomes then
pertinent to inquire: if he is only an administrator, for whom does he administer? And who
can alter or overrule his acts?
If his acts as administrator can not be overridden, or altered, except by himself, then
obviously the control of the corporation and its temporalities is in the bishop himself, and he
must be a Filipino citizen. If, on the other hand, the final say as to management, exploitation,
encumbrance or disposition of the temporalities resides in another individual or body of
individuals, then the control resides there. To possess constitutional capacity to acquire
agricultural land or other natural resources, that body making the final decision for the
corporation must have at least 60 per cent Filipino membership.
By this test, the body of members professing the Catholic faith in the diocese of Davao does
not constitute the controlling membership. For under the rules of the Roman Catholic Church
the faithful can not control the acts of the Ordinary; they cannot override his decision, just as
they do not elect or remove him. Only his hierarchical superiors can do that; the control is
from above, not from below. Hence, the fact that 90 per cent (or even 100 per cent) of the
faithful in the diocese should be composed of Filipino citizens is totally devoid of
significance from the standpoint of the constitutional restrictions in question (see Codex,
Canons 1518 and 1530, paragraph 1, No. 3).
Moreover, I do not think that the body of Catholic faithful in the Davao diocese can be taken,
for the purpose here under consideration, as the Church represented by the Ordinary of
Davao. That body does not constitute an entity or unit separate and apart from the rest of the
faithful throughout the world that compose the Roman Catholic Church that has always
claimed ecumenical (universal) character. There is nom Catholic Church of Davao district
and independent of the Catholic Church of Manila, Lipa or Rome. All those professing
Catholic faith are members of only one single church or religious group. Thus the Iglesia
Filipina Independiente is not part of the Catholic Church, precisely because of its
independence.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
If, the, the Catholic Church of Davao is part and parcel of the universal Catholic Church, it
can not be considered separate and apart from it in this case. And if considered with it,
obviously the condition of 60 per cent Filipino membership is not satisfied when all the
Catholic faithful in the world are taken into account.
The unity and singleness of the various diocese of the church appears expressly recognized in
section 163 of the Corporation Law, which provides that the corporation (sole) shall hold the
temporalities, not for the diocese; but for the benefit "of the church of which the diocese — is
an organized or constituent part."
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by
a religious order or society, or by the diocese synod, or district organization of any
religious denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation
and shall be held in trust for the use purpose, behalf, and benefit of the religious
society or order so incorporated or of the church of which the diocese, synod, or
district organization is an organized and constituent part.
So that, even from the standpoint of beneficial ownership, the dioceses of Davao can not be
viewed as a group legally isolated from the Catholic Church as a whole.
Nor does court control over the acts of the corporation sole constitute a guarantee of Filipino
control that would satisfy the purposes of the constitution, for the reason that under section
159 (last proviso) of the Corporation law, the court intervention is dispensed with where the
rules and discipline of the church already regulate the acquisition and disposition of real
estate and personal property.
Provided however, that in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the
religious denomination, society, or church concerned represented by such corporation
sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging real estate
and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the
intervention of the courts shall not be necessary. (emphasis supplied.)
It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between the lands to be devoted to purely
religious purposes and the lands held in ordinary ownership. But where in the Constitution is
such a distinction drawn? Under it, capacity to acquire agricultural land for the erection of a
church is capacity to acquire agricultural lands for any lawful purpose, whether it be for
convents or schools or seminaries or haciendas for their support or land to be held solely for
enjoyment of the revenue. Once the capacity to acquire is granted, the way is paved for the
29
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past. I cannot
conceive that the Constitution intended to revive them.
It is also argued that, before the Constitution was adopted, the corporations sole had, by
express statute, the right to acquire agricultural land; and that the Constitution was not
intended to destroy such "acquired property rights." If followed, the argument destroys the
constitutional restrictions. All aliens had a capacity to acquire agricultural land before the
Constitution came into effect, because no prohibition existed previously. Must their right to
acquire and hold agricultural land be conceded in spite of the Constitution?.
That the law should have expressly conferred capacity to acquire land upon corporations sole
was not due any special predilection for them; it was exclusively due to the principle that
corporation, as artificial entities, have no inherent rights, but only those granted by the
sovereign. Unless conferred, the corporate right would not exist.
Furthermore, a capacity to acquire in futuro, is not in itself a vested existing property right
that the Constitution protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired)
there must be a transition from the potential, or contingent, to the actual, and the proprietary
interest must have attached to a thing, it must have become "fixed or established "(Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). If mere potentialities cannot be impaired, then the law would become
unchangeable, for every variation in it will reduce some one's legal ability to do or not to do.
Already in Benguet Consolidated vs. Pineda,  3 52 Off. Gaz. 1961, we have ruled that no one
has a vested right in statutory privileges or exemptions. And in the concurring opinion in
Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (cited by Justice Felix), Mr. Justice
Laurel squarely declared that "contingency or expectation is neither property right." (cas. cit.,
p. 269.) Finally, the point is also made that the Ordinary, as religious corporation sole, has no
citizenship, and is not an alien. The answer is that under the Constitution of the Republic, it is
not enough that the acquirer of agricultural land be not an alien; he must be a Filipino or
controlled by Filipinos.
Wherefore, I am constrained to conclude:
(1) That the capacity of religious corporations sole to acquire agricultural land depends upon
60 per cent Filipino membership of the group or body exercising control of the
corporation;lawphi1.net
(2) That if control of any such corporation should be vested in a single person, then such
person must be a Filipino citizen;1awphi1.net
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

(3) That in the absence of evidence on these points, the order appealed from, denying (p. 75, Rollo). Fourteen days later, or on December 23, they mailed their petition for review
registration of the conveyance, should be affirmed. to the Court of Appeals (p. 5, Rollo).

Concepcion, J., concur. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1976 gave due course to that petition,
required the Torres spouses to answer it, set the case for hearing on February 11 and directed
the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon private respondents' filing of a bond in the sum
of one thousand pesos (Yu vs. Torres, CA-G.R. No. SP-04952
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
That resolution was assailed by the Torres spouses in the instant special civil action of
G.R. No. L-42626 December 8, 1982 certiorari which they filed in this Court on February 2, 1976. Their petition was given due
course. (In the meantime, the decision of the Court of First Instance was executed).
ANITA G. TORRES and LAZARO TORRES, petitioners,
vs. The Torres spouses contend that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction under Republic Act
NORA S. YU, JOSE B. YU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. No. 6031 to review the said decision of the Court of First Instance because the issue of
whether its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence is allegedly a purely legal
Isidro G. Arenas for petitioners. question which this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to resolve (pp. 7 and 11, Rollo).

Ignacio Castillo for respondents. Diametrically opposed to that contention is the position taken by the respondents Yu. They
contend that whether the factual findings in the decision of the Court of First Instance are
supported by substantial evidence is an issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals (pp. 95, 100-103, Rollo).
AQUINO, J.:
In resolving these conflicting views, it is necessary to examine the law-maker's efforts to
diminish the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over cases decided by the Court of First
This case is about the much discussed and vexed question as to the jurisdiction of the Court
Instance which are exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and thus relieve in some measure
of Appeals under section 45 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031, to
the congestion of cases in the appellate courts.
review the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by an
inferior court.
In the beginning, all cases decided by the Court of First Instance involving factual issues
were appealable to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right. Note that no distinction was
The municipal court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in its decision dated September 1, 1975 in an
made as to cases coming from inferior courts and cases originally filed in the Court of First
ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3509, ordered the Yu spouses to vacate the one-third portion
Instance. Before the Judiciary Law was amended, it provided:
on the southern side of Stall No. 1 of the Lingayen Central Market and to pay the spouses
Anita G. Torres and Lazaro Torres the sum of ninety pesos a month from February 19, 1975
until the possession of the stall is restored to the Torres spouses (p. 27, Rollo). SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings
not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it from
The Yu spouses appealed to the Court of First Instance which in a decision dated October 27,
Courts of First Instance. The decision of the Court of Appeals in such cases
1975 in Civil Case No. 15178 affirmed the municipal court's judgment (p. 40, Rollo). A copy
shall be final:
of that decision was received by the Yu spouses on October 28, 1975. Fifteen days later, they
filed a motion for reconsideration. They received the order denying it on December 9, 1975

30
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case
involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the
decision and under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require by
certiorari that the said case be certified to it for review and determination. as
if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
To avoid protracted litigations over cases coming from inferior courts, like ejectment cases,
which could pass through four courts, including this Court, the lawmaking body found it
expedient to abolish appeals to the Court of Appeals from judgments of the Court of First
Instance in cases decided by inferior courts and to allow the Court of Appeals to review the
said judgments by means of a petition for review under certain conditions.
Hence, it enacted Republic Act No. 5433, which took effect on September 9, 1968 and which
amended section 29 by providing that decisions of Courts of First Instance rendered after trial
on the merits in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment
of an inferior court, may be elevated to the Court of Appeals by the aggrieved party only
on petition for review and that the Court of Appeals may entertain that petition when it
shows prima facie that the Court of First Instance "has committed errors of fact or of fact and
law that would warrant reversal or modification of the judgment or decision sought to be
reviewed". For reference, section 29, as amended by Republic Act No. 5433, is quoted below:
SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals shall
have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings,
not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it,
except final judgments or decisions of Courts of First Instance rendered after
trial on the merits in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in
full the judgment or decision of a municipal or city court, in which cases the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals only
on petition for review, to which the Court of Appeals shall give due course
only when the petition shows prima facie that the court has committed errors
of fact or of fact and law that would warrant reversal or modification of the
judgment or decision sought to be reviewed. The decision of the Court of
Appeals shall be final:
Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case
involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the
decision and under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require by
certiorari that the said case be certified to it for review and determination, as
if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
31
On the other hand, section 45 of the Judiciary Law originally provided that "Courts of First
Instance shall have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in municipal and justice of the
peace courts, in their respective provinces". Note that no distinction was made between cases
exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction
of inferior courts and the Court of First Instance.
Republic Act No. 2613, which took effect on August 1, 1959 and which enlarged the
jurisdiction of inferior courts in criminal cases, amended sections 45 and 87 by providing that
the decisions of justices of the peace of provincial capitals and city judges in criminal cases
where the penalty does not exceed six years imprisonment or a fine of three thousand pesos,
or both, shall be appealable directly to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court as the case
may be. The proceedings in such cases shall be recorded.
In the meantime, Republic Acts Nos. 3345, 3820 and 3828 changed the designation of justice
of the peace and municipal judge into municipal judge and city judge, respectively. The term
"inferior court " is now used to refer to municipal and city courts (SC Resolution of
December 23, 1963) .
Republic Act No. 6031, which took effect on August 4, 1969, amended section 77 of the
Judiciary Law by providing that "all municipal and city courts shall keep records of their
proceedings in the same manner as courts of first instance" and "all judgments determining
the merits of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the municipal or
city judge, stating clearly the facts and the law on which they are based, signed by him, and
filed with the clerk of court". Thus, inferior courts became courts of record.
Republic Act No. 6031 also amended section 45 of the Judiciary Law by abolishing the trial
de novo court provided for in section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court (when inferior courts
were not court of records) and by requiring the Court of First instance in deciding cases
appealed from the inferior court to decide them on the basis of the record transmitted from the
inferior court to the Court of First Instance.
Republic Act No. 6031 further amended section 45 by adopting the innovation introduced by
Republic Act No. 5433 in section 29 of the Judiciary Law. That amendment or innovation is
that the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior
court shall be final.
But in contrast with Republic Act No. 5433, Republic Act No. 6031 (enacted less than a year
from the enactment of Republic Act No. 5433) provides that the decision of the Court of First
Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior court shall be final only when the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
factual findings in the said decision are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions
therein are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence.
Another amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 6031 into section 45 is that the decision
of the inferior court in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance and an inferior court shall be appealable directly to the Court of Appeals whose
decision shall be final, subject to review by this Court on legal questions as provided in Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. As amended, section 45 reads:
SEC. 45. Appellate jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal courts, in
their respective provinces, except over appeals from cases tried by municipal
judges of provincial capitals or city judges pursuant to the authority granted
under the last paragraph of Section 87 of this Act.
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided,
That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested: Provided, however, That if the case was tried in a city or
municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then on appeal the
case shall proceed by trial de novo.
In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance, the decision of the
latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts contained in said
decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the
conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence; in cases falling
under the concurrent jurisdictions of the municipal and city courts with the
courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to the court of
appeals whose decision shall be final: Provided, however, that the Supreme
Court in its discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon
petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and conditions
that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for
review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
It is at once evident that Republic Acts Nos. 5433 and 6031 overlap or are in pari
materia with respect to the finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases
exclusively cognizable by an inferior court such as judgment cases. Both laws abolished
appeal by record on appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First
32
Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court. Such cases are not, repeat, are
not appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Both Republic Acts Nos. 5433 and 6031, the former in section 29, dealing with the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and the latter in section 45, dealing with the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, intend that litigation should, if possible, be
terminated in the Court of First Instance.
However, both amendatory laws assume that the Court of First Instance is not infallible.
Therefore, in exceptional cases the rule on finality should not be enforced and the decision of
the Court of First Instance in the cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior court should be
reviewed by an appellate court.
Republic Act No. 5433 provides that the decision of the Court of First Instance in that kind of
cases may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for review when it is
apparent that the Court of First Instance committed errors of fact or of fact and law and that
there is some basis for possible reversal or modification of its decision notwithstanding the
fact that the Court of First Instance affirmed in toto the inferior court's decision.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6031, while allowing also the review of the decision of
the Court of First Instance in those same cases, does not unmistakably and explicitly indicate
the appellate court that should undertake the review and by what means the review should be
made. That deficiency or silence has generated controversy. Republic Act No. 6031 changed
the grounds for review spelled out in Republic Act No. 5433.
Republic Act No. 6031 provides that the grounds for review are that the factual findings in
the decision of the Court of First Instance in the said class of cases are not supported by
substantial evidence and that its conclusions are contrary to law and jurisprudence.
It is obvious that, as to the grounds for review, there is repugnancy between the two
amendatory laws. Republic Act No. 6031, as the later law, should prevail and should be
deemed to have superseded Republic Act No. 5433 on the matter of the review by the Court
of Appeals of decisions of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by
inferior courts.
But Republic Act No. 5433 should not be considered totally abrogated by the later law
because Republic Act No. 5433, in indicating that the mode of review is by petition for
review and that the Court of Appeals is the tribunal to undertake the review, supplies the
deficiencies of Republic Act No. 6031 on these matters.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The question of whether it is this Court or the Court of Appeals that should review the
decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts has
been debated for a long time in this Court. The pros and cons have been thoroughly threshed
out. One school of thought believes that the petition should always be filed in this Court. Of
course, that solution would aggravate the congestion of cases in this Court.
It is said that hard cases make bad law. The converse is true. A bad law (meaning a law that is
ambiguous and deficient) makes cases hard. Republic Act No. 6031 is such a law. The
lawmaking body did not indubitably clarify whether it was intended to repeal Republic Act
No. 5433 and where the petition for review should be filed.
We hold that if the only issue is whether the conclusions of the Court of First Instance are in
consonance with law and jurisprudence, then that issue is a purely legal question. It should be
ventilated in this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari, as expressly provided
in the last proviso of section 45, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031.
The petition for review in that case should be in the form prescribed in Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court for an appeal from the Court of Appeals, a form adopted by Republic Act No. 5440
which took effect on September 9, 1968.
But if the issue is whether "the findings of fact contained" in the decision of the Court of First
Instance "are supported by substantial evidence", which is not purely a legal issue, or if that
issue is raised together with the legal issue of whether the conclusions of the Court of First
Instance are in conformity with pertinent law and jurisprudence, then the petition for review
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
Those issues require an examination and evaluation of the evidence. As that function is the
prerogative of the Court of Appeals, the review in that case should be by means of a petition
for review.
Realizing the deficiencies in Republic Act No. 6031, the Court of Appeals adopted on August
12, 1971 the following resolution (67 O.G. 6715) which prescribes the filing of a petition for
review when the decision of the Court of First Instance in cases exclusively cognizable by an
inferior court is assailed for not being supported by substantial evidence and because its
conclusions are claimed to be contrary to law and jurisprudence:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6031 does not prescribe the procedure to be
followed by the Court of Appeals in the review of judgments of the Courts of
First Instance, in cases falling under the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
33
municipal and city courts, where the findings of facts of the Courts of First
instance are and for not being supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof and the conclusions are claimed to be clearly against the law and
jurisprudence;
WHEREAS, it is the sense of this Court that a uniform practice be followed
by all its divisions and members thereof in reviewing the abovementioned
decisions of Courts of First Instance;
NOW THEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED,
that the following practice be observed in elevating to this Court for review
decisions of Courts of First Instance in cases falling under the original
exclusive jurisdiction of municipal and city courts:
SECTION 1. That the aggrieved party shall file within the period for
appealing six (6) copies of a verified petition for the review of the decision of
the Court of First Instance. The petition shall contain a concise statement of
the matters involved and the grounds and arguments relied upon, specifically
pointing out why the decision in question is not supported by substantial
evidence and/or is clearly against the law and jurisprudence. The petition
shall be accompanied with a certified true copy of the decision or judgment
sought to be reviewed, together with copies of such material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition. As much as possible,
the petition shall be a sort of a brief of the aggrieved party.
SEC. 2. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals the docketing fee. If the Court finds that, from the
allegations of the petition, the same is not prima facie meritorious or is
intended manifestly for delay, the Court may outright dismiss the petition,
otherwise, the same shall be given due course, in which case, the petitioner
shall deposit the amount of eighty pesos (P80.00) for costs within three days
from notice of the resolution giving due course to the petition. Upon the
failure of the petitioner to deposit the amount for costs within the said period
of three (3) days, the petition shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. Immediately after the deposit for costs is made, the Court shall order
the respondents to answer the petition for review within ten (10) days, unless
the Court shall grant the respondents a longer period, and shall likewise order
the corresponding Clerk of the Court of First Instance to elevate the whole
record, including the oral (transcript of stenographic notes) and documentary
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
evidence, of the case to this Court within ten (10) days. The answer of the
respondents, which shall also be in six copies, shall be accompanied with true
copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein
together with other supporting papers. Likewise the answer shall take the
place of the respondents' brief.
SEC. 4. After the filing of the answer, the petitioner may reply thereto within
five (5) days from receipt of copy thereof, after which, the case shall be
deemed submitted for decision unless either party shall, within five (5) days
from the filing of petitioner's reply, ask that the petition be heard on oral
argument, which may or may not be granted at the discretion of the Court.
In the instant case, the Yu spouses in filing their petition for review in the Court of Appeals
simply followed the said resolution. It is a correct implementation of Republic Act No. 6031
which has been in force for more than eleven years now (See Buenbrazo vs. Marave L-41144,
December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 849 and Estrella vs. CA, 56284, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 581).
The Yu spouses assailed the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on
the ground that the factual findings therein are not supported by substantial evidence. The
Court of Appeals (per Gatmaitan, J.) acted within its jurisdiction and did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the petition for review of the Yu spouses.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., is on leave.
 
Separate Opinions
 
34
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J., concurring:
I concur in the result which upholds the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review the
adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan under the provisions of section
45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act 6031 which took effect on August 4,
1969.
In essence, the conflict of views that arose in the Court after the enactment of Republic Act
6031 is as to where the petition for review on certiorari of the final decision of the Court of
First Instance acting as an appellate court in appealed cases exclusively originating from the
municipal and city courts should be filed. ** One view is that all such petitions for review
should be filed with the Court of Appeals, subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of reviewing on certiorari cases involving pure questions of law. The other adheres to
the main opinion's orthodox view that if questions of fact are involved, the petition for review
should be filed with the Court of Appeals; and that if the petition for review involves pure
questions of law, then the petition should be filed with the Supreme Court. (Still a third view
would have all such petitions filed only with the Supreme Court, which would add to the
congestion of cases filed with this Court.)
I believe that the historical record sustains the first view and shows that Republic Act 6031
was enacted to lessen the number of appeals that a litigant could take in a case and to relieve
the Supreme Court of having to pass over appeals or petitions for review of cases originating
from the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. Hence, the Act provided
for only one appeal from cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts - to the Courts of First Instance expressly providing that the decision of the
Courts of First Instance shall be final, thus, cutting off any further appeal to a higher court.
The Act made a provision however, that for such finality of the decision of the Court of First
Instance, acting as an appellate court, to stand, the "findings of fact contained in the said
decision (must be supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are
not clearly against the law and jurisprudence." The proviso involves mixed questions of fact
and law, to wit: there must be substantial evidence to support the findings of fact and the
conclusions drawn therefrom "are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence;" and the
appellate court with proper jurisdiction over such mixed question of fact and law and with
whom all petitions for review should be uniformly filed is the Court of Appeals which is
supposed to have under the Judiciary Act fifteen (15) divisions composed of three (3)
members each and is, therefore, fully equipped to handle and dispose of all such petitions for
review. It should also be noted that the criterion provided by the Act is the substantial
evidence rule which does not involve a painstaking review of evidence submitted during the
trial in the municipal or city court but merely the determination of the existence in the record
of such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
findings and conclusion. Prescinding from the mixed questions of fact and law involved by
the Act's provision and assuming that the petition raises a pure question of law, there is
nothing objectionable in having the Court of Appeals pass upon and determine the same,
subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over such questions. The last
proviso of the third paragraph of the Act expressly recognizes such reserved and ultimate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving pure questions of law as vested in it by
the Constitution [Art. X, section 5 (2) (e)] and therefore provides that the Supreme Court, in
its discretion, may in such cases require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review
and determination.
In brief, although the statute's wording may have lacked the requisite precision (specially if it
is considered that section 29 of the Judiciary Act was left standing when it should be deemed
superseded by the provisions of the Act), the law as it stands now under Republic Act 6031
provides for finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance in appealed cases
originating from the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. The
correctness of such decisions may be, however, questioned under petitions for review filed
within the reglementary period with the Court of Appeals. Such petitions for review are not
appeals which are automatically given due course. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration
of the petition for review and a determination that the findings of fact in the Courts of First
Instance's decision are supported by substantial evidence and that the conclusions are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence, may deny the petition outright for lack of merit.
This generally puts an end to the case. Parties who persist in still filing a petition with the
Supreme Court to review on certiorari the Court of Appeals' determination get short shrift
with an outright dismissal of their petition and the consequent waste of time, effort and
money and only in rare cases where a substantial question of law is involved are such
petitions entertained by the Supreme Court.
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
With how exhaustive and analytical are the main opinion and the separate concurring opinion
of Justice Vasquez on the "vexing" question treated by them, it is hoped the following
observations win not be mere superfluities, much less devoid of any merit.
The provision of Section 29 of the Judiciary Act, before and on its amendment by Republic
Act No. 5433, clearly showed a legislative intent to place the greater burden in appeals from
the decisions of the Court of First Instance on the Court of Appeals. What is reserved to the
Supreme Court is the power to review decisions in any case when they involve only questions
of law. It is, therefore, hard to ascribe to the legislative body that in enacting Republic Act
No. 6031, it intended to eliminate altogether the Court of Appeals from the judicial process
involving a review of the aforementioned decisions and place the entire burden on the
35
Supreme Court, as would be the effect of the view that appeals from the decisions of the
Court of First Instance referred to in Republic Act No. 6031 should all go directly to the
Supreme Court by passing the Court of Appeals.
The rule has always been that if the questions raised are one of fact or both fact and law, the
appeal goes to the Court of Appeals. The first ground mentioned in Republic Act No. 6031 on
the substantiality of the evidence is, in my humble opinion, if not one involving solely a
question of fact, one involving both question of fact and law.
The mere fact that this ground is set apart from the other ground, to wit: that "the conclusions
are clearly against the law and jurisprudence" evinces an intention to distinguish one from the
other, insofar as the nature of the question as may be raised from either of the two grounds, is
concerned. The first ground has reference to the evidence which has to be assessed and
evaluated, which necessarily involves the determination of what the fact proven or not proven
is. The separate mention of this ground from the second, which explicitly involves question
of law or jurisprudence, implies a nature of the question arising from the first, different from
that expressly stated in the second ground which doubtlessly raises question of law.
The first ground of "substantiality of evidence" could perhaps be a question of law when the
evidence has been evaluated by the Court in such arbitrary or erroneous manner that the act
would constitute a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But
before making this conclusion, the factual basis has first to be laid. This means coming to
grip with a question of fact, and of necessity, making first a conclusion of fact after assessing
the evidence before making the legal conclusion as to the commission of grave abuse of
discretion by the lower court.
There is thus no evading the conclusion that when the appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance under Republic Act No. 6031 is based on the first ground - substantially of
the evidence - what is raised is a question of fact, or at least a mixed question of law and of
fact, which makes the appeal cognizable by the Court of Appeals, not directly or exclusively,
by the Supreme Court.
Justice Vasquez cited Section 22 of B.P. No. 129, which, to me, lends support to the view that
the Court of Appeals was never intended, under Republic Act No. 6031, to be stripped of
appellate jurisdiction over appeals taken from decisions of the Courts of First Instance on
cases appealed to them from the inferior courts as therefore exercised by it. Had that been the
intention, which would be a sudden and sharp departure from the appeal procedure then
existing and being observed, Republic Act No. 6031 should have, in all likelihood, not failed
to indicate such intent with clear and unequivocal terms.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
It may appear presumptuous for me to add to the exhaustive and scholarly dissertation made
by the ponente of the main opinion which truly deserves the gratitude of those who have
heretofore been vexed by question involved herein. I only desire to throw in my observations
on some of the points discussed in the hope of adding clarity to the same.
1. It is not very accurate to state that both R.A. 5433 and R.A. 6031 "abolished appeal by
record on appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior
court"; or that "such cases are not appealable to the Court of Appeals." (Decision, p. 7.) The
appeal by record on appeal abolished by R.A. 5433 is only from the decision of a court of
first instance in a case appealed to it from an inferior court which affirms in full the judgment
of the latter. Where the judgment of the court of first instance modified or reversed that of the
inferior court, the appeal to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal which needed a record
on appeal.
Neither R.A. 5433 nor R.A. 6031 abolished appeals from the decisions of the courts of first
instance in such cases to the Court of Appeals. The effect of said laws is not to do away with
such appeals, but merely to change the mode of taking the appeal. After R.A. 5433 was
enacted on from an inferior court may be taken in one of two ways, depending on the nature
of said decision in relation to that of the inferior court; namely, (1) by petition for review if
the decision affirms in full that of the inferior court; and (2) by record on appeal if it does not.
After R.A. 6031 was enacted to amend Section 45 of the Judiciary Law, R.A. 5433 was
virtually repealed. Insofar as appeals from the decisions of the court of first instance in cases
appealed to them from inferior courts are concerned, the two laws are irreconcilable and may
not be applied together. Appeal by record on appeal (authorized by R.A. 5433 in cases where
the court of first instance modified or reversed the decision of the inferior court) was totally
eliminated. Although R.A. 6031 did not provide expressly as to whether the decision of the
court of first instance in such cases may still be appealed, or if so, by what mode of appeal,
the implication is clear that despite the declaration that the decision of the court of first
instance shall be "final", an appeal may still be taken to determine whether the statutory
condition for such finality has been complied with it, to wit, that "the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the
conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence." It was in the face of the fact
that while an appeal is presumably allowed from such decisions of the court of first instance,
there is a void in the law as to how such appeal may be taken, the Court of Appeals issued its
Resolution dated August 12, 1971 (quoted in pp. 9-10 of the Decision). Said Resolution,
obviously due to the absence of any mode of appeal provided for in R.A. 6031, adopted the
mode prescribed in R.A. 5433, which is by petition for review if the appeal is to be taken to
36
the Court of Appeals. Quite understandably, the said Resolution could not have provided for
the mode or procedure if the appeal shall be taken to the Supreme Court.
2. My understanding of the problem as to whether the petition to review the decision of the
court of first instance in such cases should be filed in the Supreme Court or in the Court of
Appeals is that some Members of this Court are of the opinion that the determination of
whether the findings of facts contained in the decision of the court of first instance "are
supported by substantial evidence" is a pure question of law, and hence, the appeal in all such
cases should be lodged with the supreme Court.
The main opinion does not share this view. I join the same conclusion but not exactly on the
same grounds stated in the main opinion.
To my mind the question of where to appeal a decision of the court of first instance in a case
appealed to it from an inferior court should not be determined by finding out if the issue is
whether the findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence, or whether the
conclusions are not clearly against the law or jurisprudence, as the case may be. The main
opinion holds that in the first case, the appeal should be to the Court of Appeals, and in the
latter to the Supreme Court.
My own view is that the appeal should be to the Supreme Court in all cases wherein the
exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals is vested in the Supreme Court pursuant to the
Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary Law. The appeal to the Court of Appeals is only
proper in the cases not included in said category. This is the only way to distinguish between
and delineate the respective appellate jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court with respect to appeals from decisions of the courts of first instance. It is fallacious, if
not erroneous, to adopt any other test.
3. The condition provided for in R.A. 6031 as to when a further appeal from the decision of
the court of first instance in appealed cases may be entertained will be a thing of the past the
moment the Judiciary Reorganization Law B.P. 129) shag become operative. Section 22 of
this law provides:
SEC. 22. Appellate jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Courts shag exercise
jurisdiction over an cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs
as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable
by petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it
due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that own warrant a reviewed or
modification of the decision of judgment sought to be reviewed.
It will be noted that the above-quoted provision no longer predicates the finality of the
decision of the court of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) on the ground that the
findings of fact contained therein are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions
are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. Instead, it applies the qualification
prescribed in R.A. 5433 in determining whether the decision of the court of first instance may
be appealed by petition for review in cases where it affirmed in fun the judgment of the
inferior court, to wit, that the court of first instance committed errors of fact or of law that
would warrant a modification or reversal of the judgment sought to be reviewed. This change
is not only a matter of terminology. B.P. 129 in effect abandons the substantial evidence rule
in determining whether to give due course to the petition for review.
Under both tests, however, the question of where the petition to review the decision should be
filed is to be answered in the same manner. Neither provision was intended to deviate from
the rule that the Supreme Court may not be deprived for in the Constitution and other
applicable laws.
4. Coming to the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals
has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review filed in said court by the herein
petitioners to review the decision of the court of first instance in a case appealed to it from an
inferior court. In the main opinion, it has been stated that the issues raised in the said petition
for review "require an examination and evaluation of the evidence." On this assumption, there
can be no doubt that the appeal of petitioners by petition for review was properly lodged in
the Court of Appeals.
On this basis, I concur in the conclusion reached in the main opinion.
 
 
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J., concurring:
37
I concur in the result which upholds the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review the
adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan under the provisions of section
45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act 6031 which took effect on August 4,
1969.
In essence, the conflict of views that arose in the Court after the enactment of Republic Act
6031 is as to where the petition for review on certiorari of the final decision of the Court of
First Instance acting as an appellate court in appealed cases exclusively originating from the
municipal and city courts should be filed. ** One view is that all such petitions for review
should be filed with the Court of Appeals, subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of reviewing on certiorari cases involving pure questions of law. The other adheres to
the main opinion's orthodox view that if questions of fact are involved, the petition for review
should be filed with the Court of Appeals; and that if the petition for review involves pure
questions of law, then the petition should be filed with the Supreme Court. (Still a third view
would have all such petitions filed only with the Supreme Court, which would add to the
congestion of cases filed with this Court.)
I believe that the historical record sustains the first view and shows that Republic Act 6031
was enacted to lessen the number of appeals that a litigant could take in a case and to relieve
the Supreme Court of having to pass over appeals or petitions for review of cases originating
from the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. Hence, the Act provided
for only one appeal from cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts - to the Courts of First Instance expressly providing that the decision of the
Courts of First Instance shall be final, thus, cutting off any further appeal to a higher court.
The Act made a provision however, that for such finality of the decision of the Court of First
Instance, acting as an appellate court, to stand, the "findings of fact contained in the said
decision (must be supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof and the conclusions are
not clearly against the law and jurisprudence." The proviso involves mixed questions of fact
and law, to wit: there must be substantial evidence to support the findings of fact and the
conclusions drawn therefrom "are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence;" and the
appellate court with proper jurisdiction over such mixed question of fact and law and with
whom all petitions for review should be uniformly filed is the Court of Appeals which is
supposed to have under the Judiciary Act fifteen (15) divisions composed of three (3)
members each and is, therefore, fully equipped to handle and dispose of all such petitions for
review. It should also be noted that the criterion provided by the Act is the substantial
evidence rule which does not involve a painstaking review of evidence submitted during the
trial in the municipal or city court but merely the determination of the existence in the record
of such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
findings and conclusion. Prescinding from the mixed questions of fact and law involved by
the Act's provision and assuming that the petition raises a pure question of law, there is
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
nothing objectionable in having the Court of Appeals pass upon and determine the same,
subject to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over such questions. The last
proviso of the third paragraph of the Act expressly recognizes such reserved and ultimate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving pure questions of law as vested in it by
the Constitution [Art. X, section 5 (2) (e)] and therefore provides that the Supreme Court, in
its discretion, may in such cases require by certiorari that the case be certified to it for review
and determination.
In brief, although the statute's wording may have lacked the requisite precision (specially if it
is considered that section 29 of the Judiciary Act was left standing when it should be deemed
superseded by the provisions of the Act), the law as it stands now under Republic Act 6031
provides for finality of the decision of the Court of First Instance in appealed cases
originating from the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. The
correctness of such decisions may be, however, questioned under petitions for review filed
within the reglementary period with the Court of Appeals. Such petitions for review are not
appeals which are automatically given due course. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration
of the petition for review and a determination that the findings of fact in the Courts of First
Instance's decision are supported by substantial evidence and that the conclusions are not
clearly against the law and jurisprudence, may deny the petition outright for lack of merit.
This generally puts an end to the case. Parties who persist in still filing a petition with the
Supreme Court to review on certiorari the Court of Appeals' determination get short shrift
with an outright dismissal of their petition and the consequent waste of time, effort and
money and only in rare cases where a substantial question of law is involved are such
petitions entertained by the Supreme Court.
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
With how exhaustive and analytical are the main opinion and the separate concurring opinion
of Justice Vasquez on the "vexing" question treated by them, it is hoped the following
observations win not be mere superfluities, much less devoid of any merit.
The provision of Section 29 of the Judiciary Act, before and on its amendment by Republic
Act No. 5433, clearly showed a legislative intent to place the greater burden in appeals from
the decisions of the Court of First Instance on the Court of Appeals. What is reserved to the
Supreme Court is the power to review decisions in any case when they involve only questions
of law. It is, therefore, hard to ascribe to the legislative body that in enacting Republic Act
No. 6031, it intended to eliminate altogether the Court of Appeals from the judicial process
involving a review of the aforementioned decisions and place the entire burden on the
Supreme Court, as would be the effect of the view that appeals from the decisions of the
38
Court of First Instance referred to in Republic Act No. 6031 should all go directly to the
Supreme Court by passing the Court of Appeals.
The rule has always been that if the questions raised are one of fact or both fact and law, the
appeal goes to the Court of Appeals. The first ground mentioned in Republic Act No. 6031 on
the substantiality of the evidence is, in my humble opinion, if not one involving solely a
question of fact, one involving both question of fact and law.
The mere fact that this ground is set apart from the other ground, to wit: that "the conclusions
are clearly against the law and jurisprudence" evinces an intention to distinguish one from the
other, insofar as the nature of the question as may be raised from either of the two grounds, is
concerned. The first ground has reference to the evidence which has to be assessed and
evaluated, which necessarily involves the determination of what the fact proven or not proven
is. The separate mention of this ground from the second, which explicitly involves question
of law or jurisprudence, implies a nature of the question arising from the first, different from
that expressly stated in the second ground which doubtlessly raises question of law.
The first ground of "substantiality of evidence" could perhaps be a question of law when the
evidence has been evaluated by the Court in such arbitrary or erroneous manner that the act
would constitute a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But
before making this conclusion, the factual basis has first to be laid. This means coming to
grip with a question of fact, and of necessity, making first a conclusion of fact after assessing
the evidence before making the legal conclusion as to the commission of grave abuse of
discretion by the lower court.
There is thus no evading the conclusion that when the appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance under Republic Act No. 6031 is based on the first ground - substantially of
the evidence - what is raised is a question of fact, or at least a mixed question of law and of
fact, which makes the appeal cognizable by the Court of Appeals, not directly or exclusively,
by the Supreme Court.
Justice Vasquez cited Section 22 of B.P. No. 129, which, to me, lends support to the view that
the Court of Appeals was never intended, under Republic Act No. 6031, to be stripped of
appellate jurisdiction over appeals taken from decisions of the Courts of First Instance on
cases appealed to them from the inferior courts as therefore exercised by it. Had that been the
intention, which would be a sudden and sharp departure from the appeal procedure then
existing and being observed, Republic Act No. 6031 should have, in all likelihood, not failed
to indicate such intent with clear and unequivocal terms.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
It may appear presumptuous for me to add to the exhaustive and scholarly dissertation made
by the ponente of the main opinion which truly deserves the gratitude of those who have
heretofore been vexed by question involved herein. I only desire to throw in my observations
on some of the points discussed in the hope of adding clarity to the same.
1. It is not very accurate to state that both R.A. 5433 and R.A. 6031 "abolished appeal by
record on appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases exclusively cognizable by an inferior
court"; or that "such cases are not appealable to the Court of Appeals." (Decision, p. 7.) The
appeal by record on appeal abolished by R.A. 5433 is only from the decision of a court of
first instance in a case appealed to it from an inferior court which affirms in full the judgment
of the latter. Where the judgment of the court of first instance modified or reversed that of the
inferior court, the appeal to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal which needed a record
on appeal.
Neither R.A. 5433 nor R.A. 6031 abolished appeals from the decisions of the courts of first
instance in such cases to the Court of Appeals. The effect of said laws is not to do away with
such appeals, but merely to change the mode of taking the appeal. After R.A. 5433 was
enacted on from an inferior court may be taken in one of two ways, depending on the nature
of said decision in relation to that of the inferior court; namely, (1) by petition for review if
the decision affirms in full that of the inferior court; and (2) by record on appeal if it does not.
After R.A. 6031 was enacted to amend Section 45 of the Judiciary Law, R.A. 5433 was
virtually repealed. Insofar as appeals from the decisions of the court of first instance in cases
appealed to them from inferior courts are concerned, the two laws are irreconcilable and may
not be applied together. Appeal by record on appeal (authorized by R.A. 5433 in cases where
the court of first instance modified or reversed the decision of the inferior court) was totally
eliminated. Although R.A. 6031 did not provide expressly as to whether the decision of the
court of first instance in such cases may still be appealed, or if so, by what mode of appeal,
the implication is clear that despite the declaration that the decision of the court of first
instance shall be "final", an appeal may still be taken to determine whether the statutory
condition for such finality has been complied with it, to wit, that "the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis thereof, and the
conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence." It was in the face of the fact
that while an appeal is presumably allowed from such decisions of the court of first instance,
there is a void in the law as to how such appeal may be taken, the Court of Appeals issued its
Resolution dated August 12, 1971 (quoted in pp. 9-10 of the Decision). Said Resolution,
obviously due to the absence of any mode of appeal provided for in R.A. 6031, adopted the
mode prescribed in R.A. 5433, which is by petition for review if the appeal is to be taken to
39
the Court of Appeals. Quite understandably, the said Resolution could not have provided for
the mode or procedure if the appeal shall be taken to the Supreme Court.
2. My understanding of the problem as to whether the petition to review the decision of the
court of first instance in such cases should be filed in the Supreme Court or in the Court of
Appeals is that some Members of this Court are of the opinion that the determination of
whether the findings of facts contained in the decision of the court of first instance "are
supported by substantial evidence" is a pure question of law, and hence, the appeal in all such
cases should be lodged with the supreme Court.
The main opinion does not share this view. I join the same conclusion but not exactly on the
same grounds stated in the main opinion.
To my mind the question of where to appeal a decision of the court of first instance in a case
appealed to it from an inferior court should not be determined by finding out if the issue is
whether the findings of facts are supported by substantial evidence, or whether the
conclusions are not clearly against the law or jurisprudence, as the case may be. The main
opinion holds that in the first case, the appeal should be to the Court of Appeals, and in the
latter to the Supreme Court.
My own view is that the appeal should be to the Supreme Court in all cases wherein the
exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals is vested in the Supreme Court pursuant to the
Constitution and Section 17 of the Judiciary Law. The appeal to the Court of Appeals is only
proper in the cases not included in said category. This is the only way to distinguish between
and delineate the respective appellate jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court with respect to appeals from decisions of the courts of first instance. It is fallacious, if
not erroneous, to adopt any other test.
3. The condition provided for in R.A. 6031 as to when a further appeal from the decision of
the court of first instance in appealed cases may be entertained will be a thing of the past the
moment the Judiciary Reorganization Law B.P. 129) shag become operative. Section 22 of
this law provides:
SEC. 22. Appellate jurisdiction. — Regional Trial Courts shag exercise
jurisdiction over an cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs
as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable
by petition for review to the Intermediate Appellate Court which may give it
due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that own warrant a reviewed or
modification of the decision of judgment sought to be reviewed.
It will be noted that the above-quoted provision no longer predicates the finality of the
decision of the court of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) on the ground that the
findings of fact contained therein are supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions
are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. Instead, it applies the qualification
prescribed in R.A. 5433 in determining whether the decision of the court of first instance may
be appealed by petition for review in cases where it affirmed in fun the judgment of the
inferior court, to wit, that the court of first instance committed errors of fact or of law that
would warrant a modification or reversal of the judgment sought to be reviewed. This change
is not only a matter of terminology. B.P. 129 in effect abandons the substantial evidence rule
in determining whether to give due course to the petition for review.
Under both tests, however, the question of where the petition to review the decision should be
filed is to be answered in the same manner. Neither provision was intended to deviate from
the rule that the Supreme Court may not be deprived for in the Constitution and other
applicable laws.
4. Coming to the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals
has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition for review filed in said court by the herein
petitioners to review the decision of the court of first instance in a case appealed to it from an
inferior court. In the main opinion, it has been stated that the issues raised in the said petition
for review "require an examination and evaluation of the evidence." On this assumption, there
can be no doubt that the appeal of petitioners by petition for review was properly lodged in
the Court of Appeals.
On this basis, I concur in the conclusion reached in the main opinion.
Footnotes
* No problem is encountered regarding cases failing under the concurrent
jurisdictions of the municipal and city courts with the courts of first instance.
The Act provides for one appeal directly to the Court of Appeals whose
decision shall be final, regardless of whether the question raised is one of fact
40
or of law, subject, of course, to the reserved jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision on certiorari.
PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-43683             July 16, 1937
MACONDRAY AND CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
URBANO EUSTAQUIO, defendant-appellee.
Jose Agbulos for appellant.
Urbano Eustaquio in his own behalf.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff corporation from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissing its complaint, without costs.
The plaintiff brought the action against the defendant to obtain the possession of an
automobile mortgaged by the latter, and to recover the balance owing upon a note executed
by him, the interest thereon, attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and the costs. The
defendant was duly summoned, but he failed to appear or file his answer, wherefore he was
declared in default and the appealed judgment was rendered accordingly.
The plaintiff sold the defendant a De Soto car, Sedan, for the price of which, P595, he
executed in its favor the note of May 22, 1934. Under this note, the defendant undertook to
pay the car in twelve monthly installments, with 12 percent interest per annum, and likewise
agreed that, should he fail to pay any monthly installment together with interest, the
remaining installment would become due and payable, and the defendant shall pay 20 per
cent upon the principal owning as attorney's fees, expenses of collection which the plaintiff
might incur, and the costs. To guarantee the performance of his obligation under the note, the
defendant on the same date mortgaged the purchased car in favor of the plaintiff, and bound
himself under the same conditions stipulated in the note relative to the monthly installments,
interest, attorney's fees, expenses of collection, and costs. The mortgage deed was registered
on June 11, 1934, in the office of the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal. On the 22d of
the same month, the defendant paid P43.75 upon the first installment, and thereafter failed to
pay any of the remaining installments. In accordance with the terms of the mortgage, the
plaintiff called upon the sheriff to take possession of the car, but the defendant refused to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
yield possession thereof, whereupon, the plaintiff brought the replevin sought and thereby
succeeded in getting possession of the car. The car was sold at public auction to the plaintiff
for P250, the latter incurring legal expenses in the amount of P10.68, According to the
liquidation filed by the plaintiff, the defendant was still indebted in the amount of P342.20,
interest at 12 per cent from November 20, 1934, P110.25 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
I. The plaintiff's first assignment of error is addressed to the appealed judgment in so far as it
applied Act No. 4122 and dismissed the complaint, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant waived his rights under said law by not making any appearance, by having been
declared in default, by not interposing any special defense, and not asking for any positive
relief.
Under section 128 of our Civil Procedure, the judgment by default against a defendant who
has neither appeared nor filed his answer does not imply a waiver of right except that of being
heard and of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of
the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to
adduce his evidence in support of his allegation as an indispensable condition before final
judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the
defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or that latter is entitled to
the relief prayed for. (Chaffin vs. Mac Fadden, 41 Ark., 42; Johnson vs. Peirce, 12 Ark., 599;
Mayden vs. Johnson, 59 Ga., 105; Peo. vs. Rust, 292 Ill., 412; Madison County vs. Smith, 95
Ill., 328; Keen vs. Krempel, 166 Ill. A., 253.) For these reason, we hold that the defendant did
not waive the applicant by the court of Act No. 4122, and that the first assignment of error is
untenable.
II. The plaintiff contends in its second assignment of error that Act No. 4122 is invalid
because it takes property without due process of law, denies the equal protection of the laws,
and impairs the obligations of contract, thereby violating the provisions of section 3 of the
Act of the United States Congress of August 29, 1916, known as the Jones Law. This is not
the first time that the constitutionality of the said law has been impugned for like reasons.
In Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Reyes (64 Phil. 461), the validity of the said law was
already passed upon when it was questioned for the same reason here advanced. In resolving
the question in favor of the validity of the law, we then held: "2. Liberty of contract, class
legislation, and equal protection of the laws. — The question of the validity of an act is
solely one of constitutional power. Questions of expediency, of motive or of results are
irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not improper to inquire as to the occasion for the enactment of a
law. The legislative purpose thus disclosed can then serve as a fit background for constitution
inquiry.
41
Judge Moran in fact instances had the following to say relative to the reason for the
enactment of Act No. 4122:
"Act No. 4122 aims to correct a social and economic evil, the inordinate love
for luxury of those who, without sufficient means, purchase personal effects,
and the ruinous practice of some commercial houses of purchasing back the
goods sold for a nominal price besides keeping a part of the price already
paid and collecting the balance, with stipulated interest, costs, and attorney's
fees. For instance, a company sells a truck for P6,500. The purchaser makes a
down payment of P500, the balance to be paid in twenty-four equal
installments of P250 each. Pursuant to the practice before the enactment of
Act No. 4122, if the purchaser fails to pay the first two installments, the
company takes possession of the truck and has it sold at public auction at
which sale it purchases the truck for a nominal price, at most P500, without
prejudice to its right to collect the balance of P5,500, plus interest, costs. and
attorney's fees. As a consequence, the vendor does not only recover the
goods sold, used hardly two months perhaps with only slight wear and tear,
but also collects the entire stipulated purchase price, probably swelled up
fifty per cent including interest, costs, and attorney's fees. This practice is
worse than usurious in many instances. And although, of course, the
purchaser must suffer the consequences of his imprudence and lack of
foresight, the chastisement must not be to the extent of ruining him
completely and, on the other hand, enriching the vendor in a manner which
shocks the conscience. The object of the law is highly commendable. As to
whether or not the means employed to do away with the evil above
mentioned are arbitrary will be presently set out."
In a case which reached this court, Mr. Justice Goddard, interpreting Act No. 4122,
made the following observations:
"Undoubtedly the principal object of the above amendment was to remedy
the abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel
mortgages. This amendment prevents mortgagees from seizing the
mortgaged property, buying it at foreclosure sale for a low price and then
bringing suit against the mortgagor for a deficiency judgment. The almost
invariable result of this procedure was that the mortgagor found himself
minus the property and still owing practically the full amount of his original
indebtedness. Under this amendment the vendor of personal property, the
purchase price of which is payable in installments, has the right to cancel the
sale or foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Whichever right the vendor elects he need not return to the purchaser the
amount of the full installment already paid, "if there be an agreement to that
effect." Furthermore, if the vendor avails himself of the right from foreclose
the mortgage this amendment prohibits him from bringing an action against
the purchaser for the unpaid balance."
"In other words, under this amendment, in all proceedings for the foreclosure
of chattel mortgages, executed on chattels which have been sold on the
installment plan, the mortgagee is limited to the property included in the
mortgage" (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan [1935]. 61 Phil., 409.).
Public policy having thus had in view the objects just outlined, we should next
examine the law to determine if notwithstanding that policy, it violates any of the
constitutional principles dealing with the three general subjects here to be considered.
In an effort to enlighten us, our attention has been directed to certain authorities,
principally one coming from the state of Washington and another from the State of
Oregon. For reason which will soon appear we do not think that either decision is
controlling.
In 1897, an Act was passed in the State of Washington which provided "that in all
proceedings for the foreclosure of mortgages hereafter executed or on judgments
rendered upon the debt thereby secured the mortgagee or assignee shall be limited to
the property included in the mortgage." It was held by a divided court of three to two
that the statute since limiting the right to enforce a debt secured by mortgage to the
property mortgaged whether realty or chattles, was an undue restraint upon the liberty
of a citizen to contract with respect to his property right. But as is readily apparent,
the Washington law and the Philippine law are radically different in phraseology and
in effect. (Dennis vs. Moses [1898], 40 L. R. A., 302.)
In Oregon, in a decision of a later date, an Act abolishing deficiency judgment upon
the foreclosure of mortgages to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price of
real property was unanimously sustained by the Supreme Court of that State. The
importance of the subject matter in that jurisdiction was revealed by the fact that four
separate opinions were prepared by the justices participating, in one of which Mr.
Justice Johns, shortly thereafter to become a member of this court, concurred.
However, it is but fair state that one of the reasons prompting the court to uphold the
law was the financial depression which had prevailed in that State. While in the
Philippines the court take judicial notice of the stringency of finance that presses
42
upon the people we have no reason to believe that this was the reason which
motivated the enactment of Act 4122. (Wright vs. Wimberley [1919], 184 Pac., 740.)
While we are on the subject of the authority, we may state that we have examined all
of those obtainable, including some of recent date but have not been enlightened very
much because as just indicated, they concerned different state of facts and different
laws. We gain the most help from the case of Bronzon vs. Kinzie ([1843], 1 How.,
311), decided by the Supreme Court of the United State. It had under consideration a
law passed in the State of Illinois, which provide that the equitable estate of the
mortgagor should not be extinguished for twelve months after sale on decree, and
which prevented any sale of the mortgaged property unless two-thirds of the amount
at which the property had been valued by appraisers should be bid therefor. The
court, by Mr. Chief Justice Taney declared: "Mortgages made since the passage of
these laws must undoubtedly be governed by them; for every State has power to
describe the legal and equitable obligation of a contract to be made and executed
within it jurisdiction. It may exempt any property it thinks proper from sale for the
payment of a debt; and may imposed such conditions and restriction upon the creditor
as its judgment and policy may dictate. And all future contracts would be subject to
such provisions; and they would be obligatory upon the parties in the provisions; and
they would be obligatory upon the parties in the courts of the United States, as well
as in those of the state."
As we understand it, parties have no vested right in particular remedies or modes of
procedure, and the legislature may change existing remedies or modes of procedure
without impairing the obligation of contracts, provided an efficacious remedy for
enforcement. But changes in the remedies available for the enforcement of a
mortgage may not, even when public policy is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so
far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a
spirit of oppression. (Brotherhood of American Yeoman vs. Manz [1922], 206 Pac.,
403; Oshkosh Waterworks Co. vs. Oshkosh [1908], 187 U. S., 437; W. B. Worthen
Co. vs. Kavanaugh [1935], 79 U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions, 638.)
In the Philippines, the Chattel Mortgage Law did not expressly provide for a
deficiency judgment upon the foreclosure of a mortgage. Indeed, it required decisions
of this court to authorize such a procedure. (Bank of the Philippine Island vs.
Olutanga Lumber Co., [1924], 47 Phil., 20; Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs.
Tamaraw Plantation Co., supra.) But the practice became universal enactment
regarding procedure. To a certain extent the Legislature has now disauthorized this
practice, but has left a sufficient remedy remaining.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on the
installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact the fulfillment of the obligation.
(Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Milan, supra.) (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two
or more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have
failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the mortgage, if one
has been given on the property. The basis of the first option is the Civil Code. The
basis of the last two option is Act No. 4122, amendatory of the Civil Code. And the
proviso to the right to foreclose is, that if the vendor has chosen this remedy, he shall
have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance
owing by the same. In other words, as we see it, the Act does no more than qualify
the remedy.
Most constitutional issues are determined by the court's approach to them. The proper
approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of
the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the constitution.
All doubts should be resolved in its favor.
The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses
committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were
payable in installments. The public policy, obvious from the statute, was defined and
established by legislative authority. It is for the courts to perpetuate it.
We are of the opinion that the Legislative may change judicial methods and remedies
for the enforcement of contracts, as it has done by the enactment of Act No. 4122,
without unduly interfering with the obligation of the contract, without sanctioning
class legislation, and without a denial of the equal protection of the laws. We rule that
Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. As a consequence, the errors assigned by the
appellant are overruled, and the judgment affirmed, the costs of this instance to be
taxed against the losing party.
In his brief counsel for the plaintiff advances no new arguments which have not already been
considered in the Reyes case, and we see no reason for reaching a different conclusion now.
The law seeks to remedy an evil which the Legislature wished to suppress; this legislative
body has power to promulgate the law; the law does not completely deprive vendors on the
installment basis of a remedy, but requires them to elect among three alternative remedies;
the law, on the other hand, does not completely exonerate the purchasers, but only limits their
liabilities and, finally, there is no vested right when a procedural law is involved, wherefore
the Legislature could enact Act No. 4122 without violating the aforesaid organic law.
43
III. In its last assignment of error plaintiff contends that, even granting that Act No. 4122 is
valid, the court should have ordered the defendant to pay at least the stipulated interest,
attorney's fees, and the costs. This question involves the interpretation of the pertinent portion
of the law, reading: "However, if the vendor has chosen to foreclose the mortgage he shall
have no further action against the purchaser for the recovery of any unpaid balance owing by
the same, and any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void." This paragraph, as its
language shows, refers to the mortgage contract executed by the parties, whereby the
purchaser mortgages the chattel sold to him on the installment basis in order to guarantee the
payment of its price, and the words "any unpaid balance" should be interpreted as having
reference to the deficiency judgment to which the mortgagee may be entitled where, after the
mortgaged chattel is sold at public auction, the proceeds obtained therefrom are insufficient to
cover the full amount of the secured obligations which, in the case at bar as shown by the
note and by the mortgage deed, include interest on the principal, attorney's fees, expenses of
collection, and the costs. The fundamental rule which should govern the interpretation of laws
is to ascertain the intention and meaning of the Legislature and to give effect thereto. (Sec.
288, Code of Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U. S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil., 134;
De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phil., 73; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; People vs.
Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126.) Were it the intention of the Legislature to limit its meaning to the
unpaid balance of the principal, it would have so stated. We hold, therefore, that the
assignment of error is untenable.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance to
the plaintiff and appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-46825             October 18, 1939
ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judge-at-Large of First Instance assigned to the Province of
Bulacan, and IÑIGO S. DAZA, as Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO VILLAROMAN, DIEGO CUEVAS, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Office of the Solicitor General Ozaeta for petitioners.
Vicente Francisco for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
By this petition for prohibition, petitioners would have the Court of Appeals abstain
absolutely from taking cognizance of, hearing and deciding the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the respondents Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas against Judge Arsenio C.
Roldan and provincial fiscals Iñigo S. Daza and Roman de Jesus, the first two being
petitioners, bearing CA-G.R. No. 5295 of said Court of Appeals, and would further have,
during the pendency of this petition, a writ of preliminary injunction issued to the end that the
Court of Appeals abstain from executing or carrying out the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by it in the aforesaid certiorari proceedings.
On February 6, 1939 the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, Iñigo S. Daza, filed an information in
the justice of the peace court of San Rafael, Bulacan, against the respondents Pedro
Villaroman and Diego Cuevas, Pablo de la Cruz and one, John Doe, charging them with
having committed the crime of murder upon the person of Joaquin Venturina, on November
30, 1936, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, with treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price or reward. Villaroman and
Cuevas were arrested and at the preliminary investigation they pleaded not guilty. Both were
set a liberty under bail for P20,000 which each of them put up. As a result of the preliminary
investigation, the justice of the peace elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan and there docketed as criminal case No. 7652. In the said Court of First Instance the
same provincial fiscal reproduced the very allegations of the information filed by him in the
justice of the peace court.
Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Villaroman and Cuevas also pleaded not
guilty. The trial of the case went forward against the two accused and the prosecution
presented the greater part of all its evidence. While the prosecution was adducing its
evidence, Cuevas was taken ill and to be confined in the Manila Central Hospital. The
petitioner judge, who was hearing the case, denied various petitions for postponements filed
indiscriminately by the attorneys for the respondents-defendants. When the fiscal rested his
case, waiving the testimony of many government witnesses appearing in the list which he had
prepared and served upon the attorneys for the defense, the latter reiterated the petition for
postponement on the ground, principally, that the accused Cuevas was absent due to sickness.
44
The court denied the petition and compelled the attorney for Villaroman to present the
evidence in defense if this accused. The attorney felt bound to abide by the order and so
presented some witnesses for the defense. When he ran short of available witnesses, as the
others were not present, he again asked for the postponement of the trial to which the court
acceded; but before Villaroman left the courtroom, the prosecuting attorneys filed a written
motion asking for the cancellation of the bonds filed by the accused. The attorneys for the
latter sharply opposed this, but the court sustained the motion, cancelled the bonds and
ordered the arrest of the accused. As a result, Villaroman was rearrested as well as Cuevas
who was confined in the Bilibid Prison Hospital.
At this stage of the case, Pedro Villaroman and Diego Cuevas
instituted certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals against of the petitioners and fiscal
Roman de Jesus, CA-G.R. No. 5295, impugning in their petition the jurisdiction of the
petitioner judge to proceed with the criminal case for murder in the absence of Diego Cuevas,
and asking that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining the petitioner judge from
setting the continuation of the trial of the criminal case until further order. The Court of
Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for and ordered the petitioner judge
to abstain from going forward with the trial of said case until further order. The Solicitor-
General, on behalf of the then respondents, asked that certiorari proceedings be transferred to
the Supreme Court of Appeals to try and decide the same, and asked likewise for the setting
aside of the writ of preliminary injunction as well as to take cognizance of and decide
the certiorari proceedings. The resolution thus promulgated. Justice Enage dissenting and
Justices Paras, Montemayor and A. Reyes reserving their votes, are the ones which gave rise
to the remedy by prohibition now before us.
Passing upon the petition of the herein petitioners, this court granted the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for and ordered the Court of Appeals to abstain from carrying out and
executing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Villaroman and Cuevas under section 145-G
of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 3 of the Commonwealth Act No. 3,
reading:
SEC. 145-G. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals
shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.
The Spanish translation of said section is couched in the following language:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
ART. 145-G. Jurisdiction originaria del tribunal de Apelacion. — El Tribunal de
Apelacion tendra jurisdiction originaria para librar mandamientos perentorios de
inhibicion, de avocacion y de habeas corpus, interdictos prohibitorios y todos los
demas mandamientos y providencias auxiliares necesarios en el ejercicio de su
jurisdiccion en apelacion.
Comparing both texts, it will be noted that the Spanish translation is incorrect because the
English phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" was translated "necesarios en el ejercicio
de du jurisdiccion en apelacion." The Spanish translation of the phrase does not quite convey
the idea expressed in the English phrase. Commonwealth Act No. 3 was finally approved in
English by the First National Assembly, wherefore, the English text of the entire law should
govern (section 15 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).
Section 145-G is the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which confers on the Court of
Appeals original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari,
and habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs known and permitted by the law of
procedure; but the granted power or jurisdiction is subject to the condition that such writs
should be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. No other thing is meant by the phrase "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction" but the legal true.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the motions of the Solicitor-General, and now
assailed in this petition, rely principally upon its decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs.
Court of First Instance of Laguna (CA-G.R. No. 613, September 21, 1936), holding that the
phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" only refers to its approximate antecedent " and all
other auxiliary writs and process", and not to the writ of mandamus or to the writs of
prohibition, injunction, certiorari, and habeas corpus mentioned in the only sentence if said
section, in reliance upon the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be
understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. The rule of interpretation applied is in fact
the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or condition phrases found in a law (59
C.J., sec. 584, p. 985 but the rule is subject to the extension that where the intention of the
law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision, the same should be
made extensive to the whole. This exception is summarized in the same volume of the Corpus
Juris, at pages 985 and 986, as follows: "This rule is, however, merely an aid to construction
and will not be adhered to where the extension to a more remote antecedent is clearly
required by a consideration of the entire act. Slight indication of legislative intent so to extend
the relative term is sufficient. Where several words are followed by a clause as much
applicable to the first and other words as to the last, the clause should be read as applicable to
all." (Stevens vs. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 137 N.E., 859; Warner vs. King, 107 N.E., 837;
Grenough vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford, 92 N.E., 447; State vs. St. Louis, 73 S.W., 623;
45
Nebraska State Ry. Commission vs. Alfalfa Butter Co., 178 N.W., 766; Myer vs. Ada
Xounty, 293 P., 322; Porto Rico Ry., Light and Power Co. vs. Mor, 253 U.S., 345.)
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislator (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil., 126);
and when the language of a law is reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that
should be adopted which tends to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislator and to
promote the purpose for which it was enacted, and that interpretation should be rejected
which tends to defeat the purpose which the legislators has intended to attain by its enactment
(U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil., 85; U.S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil., 134). A close study of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 3 and those of the amending Act, No. 259, will
disclose that the purpose of the national Assembly was to confer upon the Court of Appeals
as appellate jurisdiction that is special and limited, unlike the original and appellate
jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court and upon the Courts of First Instance of the
Archipelago.lâwphi1.nêt
Commonwealth Act No. 3 reorganized the membership of the Supreme Court, created the
Court of Appeals and defined the original and appellate jurisdiction of both. Section 2
amended section 138 of the Revised Administrative Code relative to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Section 138 was subsequently modified by section 3 of Commonwealth Act
No. 259 which amended paragraphs (4) and (5). Section 138, as finally amended reads:
SEC. 138. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The Supreme Court shall have such
original jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines at the time of the approval of this Act, including cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm, on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court
may provide, final judgments of inferior courts may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, compost, assessment of toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which,
although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may
have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise
to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices or accesories, or whether they have been tried jointly
or separately;
(5) All civil cases in which the value in controversy exceeds fifty thousand
pesos, exclusive of interest and costs, or in which the title or possession of
real estate exceeding in value the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be
ascertained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent
evidence, is involved or brought in question. The Supreme Court shall
likewise have exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even
though the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, is fifty
thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is the same
as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided herein.
Section 145-F of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 3 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 3, also reads:
SEC. 145-F. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. — The Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all cases, actions, and proceedings, not enumerated
in section one hundred and thirty-eight of this Code, properly brought to it from
Courts of First Instance. The decision of the Court of Appeals in such cases shall be
final; Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its discretion may, in any case
involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and
under rules and conditions that it may prescribe by certiorari that the said case be
certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal.
It is inferred from a reading of sections 138 and 145-f that the Court of Appeals has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction only in all cases not enumerated in the first of said sections, brought to
it on appeal from Courts of First Instance. Section 145-F does not enumerate the cases
appealable exclusively to the Court of Appeals has not enumerate the case appealable
exclusively to the Court of Appeals, but bearing in mind the other legal provisions relative to
cases which may be appealed from Courts of First Instance, it will be seen that cases, whether
civil or criminal, appealable to the Court of Appeals are limited as to kind, amount and
nature. The Court of Appeals has no power of supervision, unlike the Supreme Court and the
46
Courts of First Instance. Under Commonwealth Act Nos. 3 and 259, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals are final only with respect to disputed and adjudicated facts; all questions of
law are appealable to the Supreme Court. Generally, in the special remedies by mandamus,
prohibition, injunction and certiorari and in habeas corpus proceedings, the questions raised
by the parties are legal in character. In the light of these legal provisions, it is evident that the
National Assembly, in conferring original jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to take
cognizance of petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus,
did so with the limitation that it should be exercised in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. It is
groundless to assume that the National Assembly meant to confer this jurisdiction without
any limitation if, ultimately, the decisions to be rendered by the Court of Appeals may again
be appealed to the Supreme Court because involving, in many cases, questions of law.
In the case of Mujer vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, supra, invoked as a precedent
upon which the questioned resolutions are based, is cited as authority the case of Hyatt vs.
Allen (54 Cal., 353, 357), and the case of Tyler vs. Houghton (25 Cal., 26), cited with
approval in the first, wherein the Supreme Court of the State of California, interpreting
section 4, Title VI, of the Constitution of the State, held that it had jurisdiction to pass upon
petitions for mandamus, prohibitions, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus. The
constitutional provision relied upon by the Supreme Court of California is couched in the
following language:
The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition
and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Comparing this constitutional provision with section 145-G of the Revised Administrative
Code, inserted by the amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 3, it will be seen
that both provisions differ substantially in their wordings, inasmuch as the first does not
contain the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" which is found in the record. The
language of both provisions not being identical, the ruling of the Supreme Court of California
in the case of Hyatt vs. Allen and Tyler v. Houghton does not constitute and cannot be
invoked as a precedent to bulwark the conclusion reached in the Mujer case as well as in the
Resolutions complained of.
Section 2, article VII, of the Constitution of the State of Louisian, provides"
S 2. Habeas Corpus — Power to issue writ — Supervisory powers of appellate
courts. — The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and each of the judges thereof
subject to review by the court of which he is a member, and each district judge
throughout the State including judges of the Civil and Criminal District Courts in the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Parish of Orleans, may issue writs of habeas corpus, in behalf of any person in actual
custody in cases within their respective jurisdictions; and may also in aid of their
respective jurisdictions, original, appellate, or supervisory, issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and all other needful writs,
orders and process, and where any of said writs are refused, the appellate courts shall
indicate the reasons therefor.
It will be noted that the closing portion of the constitutional provision is closely similar to
section 145-G of our law in providing "and may also in aid of their respective jurisdictions,
original, appellate, or supervisory, issue writs of mandamus, . . . ." Interpreting this
constitutional provision in connection with the original jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals
of Louisiana to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas
corpus, the Supreme Court of said State, in the cases of Riccobono vs. Kearney (114 So.,
707), resolved the question negatively, on the ground that the original jurisdiction of said
Court of Appeal to issue the said writs is confined to cases in which it is exercised in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. In said case the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution it appears that the Court of Appeal for the
Parish of Orleans has appellate jurisdiction only, with the exception of the right to issue the
writ of habeas corpus, and the right to issue in aid of its jurisdiction, which is appellate only,
save as here stated, writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and other needful orders and
process. Therefore, as the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans has appellate jurisdiction
only, save as above stated, the question is resolved into whether the rule that issued was in aid
of the appellate jurisdiction of that court, for the limited original jurisdiction which it
possesses is not here involved.
"In our opinion, the rule was not in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of that court. The fact that
true recorder refused to register the judgment could not affect in any manner the jurisdiction
of that court, which was appellate only, over the case in which the judgment was rendered.
The right, if it existed, to have the judgment registered in the mortgage office, is a right
distinct from the appeal, and not in separately connected with it. It is one which should have
been enforced independently of the appeal by proceedings begun in a court possessing
original jurisdiction, in this instance the civil district court for the parish of Orleans.
"The present case is unlike the cases of Dannenmann & Charlton vs. Charlton (113 La., 276;
36 So., 965); Cluseau vs. Wagner (126 La., 375; 52 So., 547); and Daly vs. Brook (133 La.,
752; 63 So., 318), cited by plaintiff, and relied on by the Court of Appeal in overruling the
plea to the jurisdiction. In the Dannenmann & Charlton case a moneyed judgment was
recovered in the trial court, and recorded in the mortgage records, while a suspensive appeal
was pending in this Court from the judgment rendered. In each of the remaining cases cited,
47
moneyed judgments were obtained in the trial court, and recorded in the mortgage records
prior to the taking of a suspensive appeal. In each of these cases the appellant proceeded by
rule in this court to force the appellee and the recorded in the mortgages to cancel the
inscriptions of the judgment. This court in each of those cases, held or considered that the
registry of the judgment was a partial execution of them, in violation of the right of
suspensive appeal, and maintained jurisdiction in order to preserve intact the suspensive
appeal in each case, and to prevent any interference wit it. The fact in the present case are
entirely different. Here there was no partial execution of the judgment, which was rendered
for the first time on appeal, and no interference with the appeal. Here the issue simply is
whether the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction, in a proceeding commenced before it, to force
the recorder of mortgages to register in the mortgage records a judgment rendered by it while
the appeal in the case is still pending. To this we answer no, and do so because the proceeding
is not in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the court.
For these reasons, the judgment under review is annulled and set aside, the exception
to the jurisdiction is sustained, and the rule issued by the Court of Appeal is
dismissed.
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana followed the same interpretation in the cases of Wall vs.
Tangipahoa School Board (119 So., 371); State ex rel. Truxillo vs. Gilbert (128 So., 204;
and State ex rel. Griffin vs. Morgan (130 So., 868).
In the State of Indiana, section 803, Chapter 87 of the Laws of 1915, section 1244, Burns'
1926, confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and on the Court of Appeals on the
State to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in aid of their appellate jurisdiction and
functions in the following language:
Writs of mandate and prohibition may issue in aid of the appellate Courts of this
State in aid of the appellate Courts of this State in aid of the appellate powers and
functions of said courts respectively.
The Supreme Court of the State of Indiana, interpreting its original jurisdiction to issue the
aforesaid writs in section 803, said the following in the case of State ex. rel. Hanrahan vs.
Chambers (181 N. E., 282.)"
In the case of Kesinger vs. Cox (141 N.E., 225), the Supreme Court of Indiana, interpreting
the same law, said:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court on September
26, 1923, which was 259 days after the decision is alleged to have been made and the
judgment to have been rendered in the election contest, and it does not allege that a
motion for a new trial had been ruled on which postponed the running of the time
allowed (180) days for taking an appeal, nor does it aver that an appeal already had
been perfected, ion aid of which this writ is asked.
And the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus only when
necessary for the exercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal, and has no authority
to require a bill of exceptions to be certified or the filing of a motion for a new trial to
be noted, unless such acts are to be done ion aid of an appeal which the law
authorizes to be taken. (Section 1224, Burns' Supp., 1921, Acts 1915, c. 87, p. 207;
Collins vs. Laybold, 182 Ind., 126, 129; 104 N.E. 971.)
In the following cases, the Federal Court of Appeals of Indiana adhered to the interpretation
laid down by the Supreme Court of the same State in the cited cases:
In the State ex. rel. Green vs. Jeffries (149 N.E., following:
A question having been raised as to the jurisdiction of this court over the subject-
matter, that question will be considered first. This court has jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus only in aid of its appellate powers and functions. (Section 1224, Burns'
1921 [Acts 1915, p. 207, c. 87]; State ex rel. vs. Cox, 193 Ind., 519; 141 N.E., 225.)
If the relatrix were in a position to appeal from the action of the Vigo circuit court,
should her appeal be to the Supreme Court or to this court? If to this court, we have
jurisdiction to entertain her petition filed herein. If that appeal should be to the
Supreme Court, we have no jurisdiction to act upon her petition for want of
jurisdiction. If it were an appeal instead of an original action, and, if we had no
jurisdiction, it would be our duty to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court.
In the case of Frankel vs. Woodrough (7 Fed. [2d], 796, 797), the same Federal Court said:
This character of action (an original writ) is somewhat unusual in Courts of
Appeals and it is proper that this court examine its jurisdiction to entertain it. The
purpose of the petition is to compel the determination of a criminal action against
petitioner which, he avers, the trial court will not hear although it is its duty to do
so. This jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is purely and they have no original
jurisdiction except such as is necessary to aid, protect or enforce their appellate
48
jurisdiction. (Whitney vs. Dick, 202 U.S., 132; 26 S. Ct., 584; 50 Law. ed., 963;
United States vs. Meyer, 235 U.S., 55; 35 S. Ct., 16; 59 Law. ed., 129.)
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the certiorari proceedings instituted by the respondents Villaroman and
Cuevas because the decision to be rendered in the criminal case against the latter, if appealed,
would have to be passed upon by the Supreme Court because of the death penalty which has
to be imposed in view of the allegations of the information and the evidence presented. In
opposition the respondents contend that the appeal which may be interposed should not be the
basis in the determination of the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the
petition for certiorari, because if no appeal is taken from the decision to be rendered, there
would be no way of determining if the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to act upon
the certiorari proceedings. Following the ruling in the case of Re Barber Asphalt Pav. Co.
(67 L.T.A., 761, 768, 769), cited in the memorandum of counsel for the respondents, we hold
that the basis of the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals should not be the appeal
which may be interposed in the criminal case against the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas,
but the right to appeal. Otherwise stated, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
try and decide the petition for certiorari instituted by Villaroman and Cuevas should be
determined by the existing right of appeal from the decision to be rendered in the criminal
case and not only by the contingency of whether or not such appeal will be taken.
Paragraph (4) of section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 259, reads:
(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or
lite imprisonment, and those involving other offenses which, although not so
punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by
the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense,
regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices, or
accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly or separately.
In accordance with this provision, appeals from decisions in criminal cases imposing the
penalties of death or reclusion perpetua and those taken from decisions in which, while lesser
penalties have been imposed, the facts constituting the less grave offenses, however, arose out
of the same occurrence as that giving rise to the more serious offense, correspond to the
Supreme Court and appellate jurisdiction shall be exercised by the latter. Where criminal case
has not yet been decided, the bases in determining what court has original jurisdiction over a
petition for certiorari founded upon questions arising from said criminal case, should be the
penalty fixed by law for the offense charged in the information. Applying this criterion to the
case at bar, it follows that the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to pass upon the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
petition for certiorari filed by the respondents Villaroman and Cuevas, not to issue the
auxiliary writ of preliminary injunction issued by it, because in both cases the jurisdiction
assumed by it was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, which it does not have for the
following reasons: First, because under paragraph (4) of section 138 of the Administrative
Code, as amended, the appeal to be taken from any judgment of conviction which may be
rendered in the criminal case would, in any avert, correspond to the Supreme Court; and,
secondly, because no decision having rendered in the criminal case, the penalty imposable
under the allegations of the information is the capital penalty, in which case the appellate
jurisdiction would likewise be exercised by the Supreme Court.
The respondent Villaroman and Cuevas asked in their answer that this court pass upon the
legality of the order issued by the petitioner judge in the aforesaid criminal case, cancelling
the bonds put up by said respondents and ordering their re-arrest. We hold that it is not in
order to pass upon said question in this petition for prohibition not being necessarily included
therein. For all the appears, the question was one of the grounds of the petition
for certiorari filed by the said respondents, a petition which has to be dismissed because it
was filed before an incompetent court.
The writ prayed for by the petitioners is granted; it is held that the Court of Appeals has no
original jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari filed before it by the respondents
Villaroman and Cuevas, not to issue the writ of preliminary injunction which it issued; the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals holding that it has power and jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the said petition for certiorari, as set aside; and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in this made permanent, with costs to the respondents Pedro Villaroman and
Diego Cuevas. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
49
G. R. No. L-41001 September 30, 1976
MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF THE
ELKS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, and TARLAC
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
No. L-41012 September 30, 1976
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, LODGE NO. 761,
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, INC., respondents.
CASTRO, C.J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTS
These two cases are petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated June 30, 1975 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51590-R entitled "Tarlac Development Corporation vs.
City of Manila, and Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.,"
affirming the trial court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the property subject of the
decision a quo is a "public park or plaza."
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which authorized the City
of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the
Luneta extension. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the City
of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five
hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the
approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not
exceed ninety-nine years."
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending
Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set
aside as a hotel site.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The total area reclaimed was a little over 25 hectares. The City of Manila applied for the
registration of the reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in
the name of the City of Manila. The title described the registered land as "un terreno conocido
con el nombre de Luneta Extension, situato en el distrito de la Ermita x x x." The registration
was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of said law (Land
Registration Act) as may be subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones
impuestas en la Ley No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de venta, celebrados y
otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No.
761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, fechados respectivamente, en 29 de Diciembre
de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909." 1
On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled
5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE, for short) on the basis of which TCT No.
2195 2 was issued to the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta
Extension, Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back of this title vas annotated
document 4608/T-1635, which in part reads as follows: "que la citada Ciusdad de Manila
tendra derecho a su opcion, de recomparar la expresada propiedad para fines publicos
solamete in cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13 le Julio le 1911, precio
de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que entonces tengan las mejoras."
For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the portion
sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761, PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No. 2196 3 was issued on
July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to the Elks
Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The Elks Club,
Inc.," was later changed by court oder to "Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks, Inc."
In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for
the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was
granted on February 15, 1963.
On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all
the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which
paid P1,700.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor the same realty to secure the
payment of the balance to be paid in quarterly installments.5 At the time of the sale,, there
was no annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On December 12, 1963
50
TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject land still described as "UNA PARCELA
DE TERRENO, que es parte de la Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."
In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
the reannotation of its right to repurchase; the court, after haering, issued an order, dated
November 19, 1964, directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in
toto the entry regarind the right of the City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty
years. From this order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968
affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of reannotation, but
reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its rights.
As a consequence of such reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila
and the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, containing three causes of action and praying -
a) On the first cause of action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have purchased the parcel
of land now in question with the buildings and improvements thereon from the defendant
BPOE for value and in good faith, and accordingly ordering the cancellation of Entry No.
4608/T-1635 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of the Plaintiff;
b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant City of Manila to pay the plaintiff
TDC damages in the sum of note less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);
c) On the third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to recover from the
defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in par. XVI of the complaint in accordance with Art.
1555 of the Civil Code, in the remote event that the final judgment in this case should be that
the parcel of land now in question is a public park; and
d) For costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 6
Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer dated May 19, 1971, admitted all the facts
alleged in the first cause of action except the allegation that TDC purchased said property "for
value and in good faith," but denied for lack of knowledge or information the allegations in
the second and third causes of action. As, special and affirmative defense, the City of Manila
claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it had actual notice of the City's right
to repurchase which was annotated at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and that,
assuming arguendo that TDC had no notice of the right to repurchase, it was, nevertheless,
under obligation to investigate inasmuch as its title recites that the property is a part of the
Luneta extension. 7
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer dated June 7, 1971, admitted having sold the
land together with the improvements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in good
faith, but denied for lack of knowledge as to their veracity the allegations under the second
cause of action. It furthermore admitted that TDC had paid the quarterly installments until
October l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed without justifiable cause to pay the
subsequent installments. It also asserted that it was a seller for value in good faith without
having misrepresented or concealed tacts relative to the title on the property. As
counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to recover the balance of the purchase
price plus interest and costs. 8
On June 15, 1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its refusal to make
further payments was fully justified.9
After due trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding the subject land
to be part of the "public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court
consequently declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in g faith and
for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to
recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had 'paid the latter. 'The dispositive
part of the decision reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel of land formerly
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos 2195 and 67488 in the name of
BPOE and now by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of
Tarlac Development Corporation is a public' park or plaza, and,
consequently, instant complaint is dimissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
In view of the reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation
to recover from defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI
of the complaint in accordance with Article 1555 of the Civil Code, the Court
makes no pronouncement on this point. 10
From said decision the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE, appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, avers that
the trial court committed the following errors, namely:
51
1. In holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial property of the City of
Manila; and
2. In holding that the Tarlac Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right
against the defendant BPOE. 11
The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the other hand, asserts that the trial court erred:
(1) In finding that the property in question is or was a public park and in consequently
nullifying the sale thereof by the City of Manila to BPOE;
(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602, and Government
vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112, to the case at bar; and
(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to ,recover damages from the
defendant City of Manila. 12
Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second assignment of error raised by BPOE,
maintained that it can recover and enforce its rigth against BPOE in the event that the land in
question is declared a public park or part thereof. 13
In its decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals concur ed in the findings
and conclusions of the lower court upon the ground that they are supported by he evidence
and are in accordance with law, and accordingly affirmed the lower court's judgment.
Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari.
G.R. No. L-41001
The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. L-41001, that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the very enabling
acts and/or statutes according to which the subject property was, and still is, patrimonial
property of the City of Manila and could therefore be sold and/or disposed of like any other
private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings when it simply made a general affirmance of the court a quo's findings and
conclusions without bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed by the BPOE
in its assigned errrors. 14
G.R. No. L-41012
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The Tarlac Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. L-41012, relies on the following grounds for the allowance of its petition:
1. that the Court of Appeals did not correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No.
1657, of the Philippine Commission; and
2. that the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings in that it did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower
court. 15
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
FIRST ISSUE
Upon the first issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the action, pursuant to
the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the
City of Manila and not a park or plaza.
Arguments of Petitioners
In G.R. No. L-41001, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be
some logic in the conclusion" of the Court of Appeals that "neither Act No. 1360 nor Act No.
1657 could have meant to supply the City of Manila the authority to sell the subject property
which is located at the south end not the north — of the reclaimed area." 16 It argues,
however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the City of Manila to undertake
the construction of the Luneta extension by reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and
declared that the reclaimed land shall be the "property of the City of Manila," the State
expressly granted the ownership thereof to the City of Manila which. consequently. could
enter into transactions involving it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No. 1909, there could he
no doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City was its patrimonial property;" that the
south end of the reclaimed area could not be for public use for. as argued by TDC a street,
park or promenade can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the Spanish Civil
Code only when it has already been so constructed or laid out, and the subject land, at the
time it was sold to the Elk's Club, was neither actually constructed as a street, park or
promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;" that even assuming that the subject
property was at the beginning property of public dominion, it was subsequently converted
into patrimonial property pursuant to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had never
been used, red or utilized since it was reclaimed in 1905 for purpose other than this of an
ordinary real estate for sale or lease; that the subject property had never been intended for
52
public use, is further shown by the fact that it was neither included as a part of the Luneta
Park under Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission nor considered a part of the
Luneta National Park (now Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of
President Ramon Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated October 4, 1967 of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos;" 19 that, such being the case, there is no reason why the
subject property should -not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial
property, pursuant to the ruling in Municipality vs. Roa 7 Phil. 20, inasmuch as the City of
Manila has considered it as its patrimonial property not only bringing it under the operation
of the Land Registration Act but also by disposing of it; 20 and that to consider now the
subject property as a public plaza or park would not only impair the obligations of the parties
to the contract of sale (rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property without
due process of law.21
G.R. No. L-410112
In L-41012, the petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the interpretation of Act
No. 1360, as amended by. Act No. 1657 of the Philippine Commission, 22 and avers that
inasmuch as Section 6 of Act No. 1360, as amended by Act 1657, provided that the
reclamation of the Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the City of Manila
which was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be expended in the construction of Luneta
Extension," the reclaimed area became "public land" belonging to the City of Manila that
spent for the reclamation, conformably to the holding in Cabangis,23 and consequently, said
land was subject to sale and other disposition; that the Insular Government itself considered
the reclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to disposition as evidenced by
the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360 declared that "the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property
of the City of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for public use for according to
Article 344 of the Civil Code, the character of property for public use can only attach to roads
and squares that have already been constructed or at least laid out as such, which conditions
did not obtain regarding the subject land, that Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized the City of
Manila to lease the northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel purposes; that Act No. 1657
furthermore authorized the City of Manila to sell the same; 24 that the express statutory
authority to lease or sell the northern part of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean
that the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the purpose of the statute was not
merely to confer authority to sell the northern portion but rather to limit the city's power of
disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent disposition of the northern portion for any purpose other
than for a hotel site that the northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be
considered as extension of the Luneta for they lie beyond the sides of the original Luneta
when extended in the direction of the sea, and that is the reason why the law authorized the
sale of the northern portion for hotel purposes, and, for the same reason, it is implied that the
southern portion could likewise be disposed of.26
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
TDC argues likewise that there are several items of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence
which may serve as aids in construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the
subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J" and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of
the National Planning Commission showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do not include the
subject property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which is the plan of the subject
property covered by TCT No. 67488 of BPOE, prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates
that said property is not a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copy of
Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U"
which is Proclamation Order No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not
include the subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4) Exhibit "W", which is the location plan
of the Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos. 234 and 273, further confirms that the
subject property is not a public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333
in the name of the United States of America covering the land now occupied by the America
covering the land now occupied by the American Embassy, the boundaries of which were
delineated by the Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is bounded on the northwest
by properties of the Army and Navy Club (Block No. 321) and the Elks Club (Block No.
321), and this circumstance shows that even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject
property as private property of the Elks Club. 27
TDC furthermore contends that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity
of the sale of the subject property that it executed on July 13, 1911 to the Manila Lodge No.
761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1) the City's petition for the reannotation of Entry
No. 4608/T-1635 was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when the property was
bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park as testified to by both Pedro
Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the surveyor, Manuel Añoneuvo, according to whom the
subject property was from all appearances private property as it was enclosed by fences; (3)
the property in question was cadastrally surveyed and registered as property of the Elks Club,
according to Manuel Anonuevo; (4) the property was never used as a public park, for, since
the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name of the Manila Lodge NO. 761,
the latter used it as private property, and as early as January 16, 1909 the City of Manila had
already executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of the Manila Lodge No. 761; and
(5) the City of Manila has not presented any evidence to show that the subject property has
ever been proclaimed or used as a public park. 28
TDC, moreover, contends that Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply to the subject land,
for Com. Act No. 141 took effect on December 1, 1936 and at that time the subject land was
no longer part of the part of the public domain. 29
TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good faith cannot be disregarded, for the
mere mention in the certificate of title that the lot it purchased was "part of the Luneta
53
extension" was not a sufficient warning that tile title to the City of Manila was invalid; and
that although the trial court, in its decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found the TDC -
to has been an innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded the petitioner's rights as
such purchaser that relied on Torrens certificate of title. 30
The Court, continues the petitioner TDC erred in not holding that the latter is entitled to
recover from the City of Manila damages in the amount of P100,000 caused by the City's
petition for- reannotation of its right to repurchase.
DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUE
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general
legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the
statute, 31 and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered.32 It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all the
provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.
Act No. 1360 which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as
amended by Act No. 1657 enacted on May 18, 1907, authorized the "construction of such
rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of an extension to
the Luneta" (Sec. 1 [a]), and the placing of the material dredged from the harbor of Manila
"inside the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta extension above referred to" (Sec. 1
[a]). It likewise provided that the plan of Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for
the extension and improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila" be adopted; that "the
reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the land included in said projected Luneta extension...
is hereby authorized and the land thereby reclaimed shall be the property of the City of
Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension authorized by this Act at the worth end of
said tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to
lease the same with the approval of the Governor General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-
nine years; that "should the Municipal Board ... deem it advisable it is hereby authorized to
advertise for sale to sell said tract of land ... ;" "that said tract shall be used for hotel purposes
as herein prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object whatever;" "that
should the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to
said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred, and shall not be devoted to any other
purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said tract a
first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred to the
grantee shall revert to the City of Manila, and said City of Manila shall thereupon become
entitled to immediate possession of said tract of land" (Sec. 5); that the construction of the
rock and timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the funds of the City of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said proposed Luneta extension shall be filled,
without cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay at the expense of
the Insular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to borrow
from the Insular Government ... the sum of three hundred thousand pesos, to be expended in
the construction of Luneta extension provided for by paragraph (a) of section one hereof"
(Sec.7).
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of
"public" nature, the same having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have
always been strictly construed against the grantee.33 One compelling reason given for the
strict interpretation of a public grant is that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of,
public money or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that
reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public. 34 This reason for strict
interpretation obtains relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City of Manila was to
pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary
for the making of the Luneta extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the
expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila, with material
dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude
maters which if included would defeat the policy of the legislation.
The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of
Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of private ownership. 35 What
kind of property of the City is the reclaimed land? Is it of public ownership (dominion) or of
private ownership?
We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for public use.
Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila as its patrimonial property, the
City could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need
of authorization to do so from the lawmaking body. Thus Article 348 of the Civil Code of
Spain provides that "ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further
limitations than those established by law." 36 The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of one's
property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as amended, however, provides by
necessary implication, that the City of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without
being authorized by the lawmaking body. Thus the statute provides that "the City of Manila
is hereby authorized to set aside a tract ... at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the
same ... should the municipal board ... deem it advisable, it is hereby authorized ...to sell said
tract of land ... " (Sec. 5). If the reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the
latter could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by the statute, and the
authorization to set aside ... lease ... or sell ... given by the statute would indeed be
54
superfluous. To so construe the statute s to render the term "authorize," which is repeatedly
used by the statute, superfluous would violate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that
effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute
should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous. 37 To
authorize means to empower, to give a right to act. 38 Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the
verb it authorize" with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or section,"
Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could
not lease or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed
area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its
patrimonial property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said
to be patrimonial property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and
the title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms
provided by the statute.
TDC however, contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in Act No. 1360 to
lease or sell was really to limit the City's power of disposition. To sustain such contention is
to beg the question. If the purpose of the law was to limit the City's power of disposition then
it is necessarily assumed that the City had already the power to dispose, for if such power did
not exist, how could it be limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gave the City the power to
dispose for it was hereby authorized by lease of sale. Hence, the City of Manila had no power
to dispose of the reclaimed land had such power not been granted by Act No. 1360, and the
purpose of the authorization was to empower the city to sell or lease the northern part and not,
as TDC claims, to limit only the power to dispose. Moreover, it is presumed that when the
lawmaking body enacted the statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and
legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance or with respect thereto. 39 If by
another previous law, the City of Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it
could do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, would it then not be a
superfluity for Act No. 1360 to authorize the City to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither
has petitioner TDC pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do so, nor have we
come across any. What we do know is that if the reclaimed land were patrimonial property,
there would be no need of giving special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said
authorization was given because the reclaimed land was not intended to be patrimonial
property of the City of Manila, and without the express authorization to dispose of the
northern portion, the City could not dispose of even that part.
Secondly, the reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila." 40 If the
reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or character as the
old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or
business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. 41 It is not disputed that the old
Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Ordinances of the City of Manila.42 Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public
park or plaza and for public use.
TDC, however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an extension of the
old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This
is a strained interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension," it has been held,
"signifies enlargement in any direction — in length, breadth, or circumstance." 43
Thirdly, the reclaimed area was formerly a part of the manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than
an inlet of the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays, roadsteads, coast
sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national domain open to public use. These are also
property of public ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the Civil
Code of Spain.
When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed, it does not lose its character of being property
for public use, according to Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis.44 The
predecessor of the claimants in this case was the owner of a big tract of land including the
lots in question. From 1896 said land began to wear away due to the action of the waters of
Manila Bay. In 1901 the lots in question became completely submerged in water in ordinary
tides. It remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of
the Vitas estuary and dumped the Sand and - silt from estuary on the low lands completely
Submerged in water thereby gradually forming the lots in question. Tomas Cabangis took
possession thereof as soon as they were reclaimed hence, the claimants, his successors in
interest, claimed that the lots belonged to them. The trial court found for the claimants and
the Government appealed. This Court held that when the lots became a part of the shore. As
they remained in that condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government, they
belonged to the public domain. for public use .4' Hence, a part of the shore, and for that
purpose a part of the bay, did not lose its character of being for public use after it was
reclaimed.
Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the
reclaimed area as a hotel sites. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to
be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule
of expresio unius est exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject
property. The application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the more
imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the public grant of the reclaimed area
to the City of Manila be, as above stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but
also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as happens in this case where the
city is author ized to lease or sell the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly
55
limited to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the
objectives of the corporation.
Fifthly, Article 344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in
provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares streets
fountains, and public waters the promenades, and public works of general service paid for by
such towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is
undoubtedly comprised in said article.
The petitioners, however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that the character
of property for public use may be so attached to a plaza, the latter must be actually
constructed or at least laid out as such, and since the subject property was not yet constructed
as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City, it could not be property
for public use. It should be noted, however, that properties of provinces and towns for public
use are governed by the same principles as properties of the same character belonging to the
public domain.46 In order to be property of public domain an intention to devote it to public
use is sufficient. 47 The, petitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in his
comments", on Article 344, that: ñé+.£ªwph!1
Las plazas, calles y paseos publicos correspondent sin duda aiguna aldominio
publico municipal ), porque se hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y
estan destinadas al uso de todos Laurent presenta tratando de las plazas, una
question relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de dominio publico los
lugares vacios libres, que se encuenttan en los Municipios rurales ... Laurent
opina contra Pioudhon que toda vez que estan al servicio de todos pesos
lugares, deben considerable publicos y de dominion publico. Realmente, pala
decidir el punto, bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los
citados lugares, y si este destino entraña un uso comun de todos, no hay duda
que son de dominio publico municipal si no patrimoniales.
It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be already constructed of- laid out as a plaza in
order that it be considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be intended to be such
In the case at bar, it has been shown that the intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the
City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a
grant for public use as a plaza.
We have demonstrated ad satietatem that the Luneta extension as intended to be property of
the City of Manila for public use. But, could not said property-later on be converted, as the
petitioners contend, to patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said,
in Ignacio vs. The Director of Lands, 49 the executive and possibly the legislation department
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
that has the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property, is no longer
required for public use, and until such declaration i made the property must continue to form
paint of the public domain. In the case at bar, there has been no such explicit or unequivocal
declaration It should be noted, furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are undoubted v not.
primarily called upon, and are not in a position, to determine whether any public land is still
needed for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters . 50
Having disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the main issue, we now
pass to the items of circumstantial evidence which TDC claims may serve as aids in
construing the legislative intent in the enactment of Act No. 1360, as amended. It is
noteworthy that all these items of alleged circumstantial evidence are acts far removed in time
from the date of the enactment of Act No.1360 such that they cannot be considered
contemporaneous with its enactment. Moreover, it is not farfetched that this mass of
circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the antecedent series of invalid acts,
to wit: the City's having obtained over the reclaimed area OCT No. 1909 on January 20,1911;
the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge No. 761; and the issuance
to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It cannot gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the
circumstantial evidence have been base on, or at least influenced, by those antecedent invalid
acts and Torrens titles S they can hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in
enacting Act No. 1360 and its amendatory act.
TDC claims that Exhs. "J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the subject property is
not a park.
Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and vicinity showing proposed development" dated May
14, 1949, were prepared by the National Urban Planning Commission of the Office of the
President. It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for development of the Luneta
should show that the subject property occupied by the ElksClub is a public park, for it was
made 38 years after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been issued to Elks. It
is to be assumed that the Office of the President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE.
That the subject property was not included as a part of the Luneta only indicated that the
National Urban Planning Commission that made the plan knew that the subject property was
occupied by Elks and that Elks had a Torrens title thereto. But this in no way proves that the
subject property was originally intended to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila or
that the sale to Elks or that the Torrens-title of the latter is valid.
Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for Tarlac
Development Company." It was made on November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz, private land
surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for TDC. 51 This plan cannot be expected to
show that the subject property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was made to show the
56
lot that "was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have also assumed the existence of a
valid title to the land in favor of Elks.
Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations No. 234 issued on November
15, 1955 and No. 273 issued on October 4, 1967, respectively. The purpose of the said
Proclamations was to reserve certain parcels of land situated in the District of Ermita, City of
Manila, for park site purposes. Assuming that the subject property is not within the
boundaries of the reservation, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the subject property was
not originally intended to be for public use or that it has ceased to be such. Conversely, had
the subject property been included in the reservation, it would mean, if it really were private
property, that the rights of the owners thereof would be extinguished, for the reservations was
"subject to private rights, if any there be." That the subject property was not included in the
reservation only indicates that the President knew of the existence of the Torrens titles
mentioned above. The failure of the Proclamations to include the subject property in the
reservation for park site could not change the character of the subject property as originally
for public use and to form part of the Luneta Park. What has been said here applies to
Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also refer to the area and location of the
reservation for the Luneta Park.
Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13, 1935, covering the lot where
now stands the American Embassy [Chancery]. It states that the property is "bounded ... on
the Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club (Block No.321) and Elks Club (Block
No. 321)." Inasmuch as the said bounderies delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act
No. 4269, the petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized and conceded the existence
of the Elks Club property as a primate property (the property in question) and not as a public
park or plaza. This argument is non sequitur plain and simple Said Original Certificate of
Title cannot be considered as an incontrovertible declaration that the Elks Club was in truth
and in fact the owner of such boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means
of acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and void.
TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the
sale it executed on July 13,'1911 conconveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No.
761, BPOE. This contention cannot be seriously defended in the light of the doctrine
repeatedly enunciated by this Court that the Government is never estopped by mistakes or
errors on the pan of its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation to
validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against Republic policy, and the sale of July
13, 1911 executed by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited
by law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila accepted the benefits
of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge No. 761 had performed its part of the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

agreement, for to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would
be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 52
The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. 53 It suffered from an incurable
defect that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila
Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now
the contract inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No.
761, an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no
contract at all.
The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who asserts a right arising from it,
not only against the first vendee, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its
suceessors, including the TDC which are not protected the doctrine of bona fide ii purchaser
without notice, being claimed by the TDC does not apply where there is a total absence of
title in the vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title where none
exists. 55
COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUE
We have shown in our discussion of the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully
in accordance with law. To follows that when such decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the affirmance was likewise in accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will
be served in further discussing the second issue.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack
of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby affirmed, at
petitioner's cost.
Makasiar, Munoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee, concurs in the result which is wholly consistent with the basic rulings and
jugdment of this Court in its decision of July 31, 1968.

The so-called sale of the subject property having been executed, the restoration or restitution
of what has been given is order 56
PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION
SECOND ISSUE
G.R. No. L-19190             November 29, 1922
The second ground alleged in support of the instant petitions for review on certiorari is that
the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision. TDC in L-41012, argues that the vs.
respondent Court did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the lower court VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.
and made a general affirmance, contrary to the requirements of the Constitution; that the
respondent Court made glaring and patent mistakes in recounting even the copied findings,
Recaredo Ma. Calvo for appellant.
palpably showing lack of deliberate consideration of the matters involved, as, for example,
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
when said court said that Act No. 1657 authorized the City of Manila to set aside a portion of
the reclaimed land "formed by the Luneta Extension of- to lease or sell the same for park
purposes;" and that respondent Court. further more, did not resolve or dispose of any of the
assigned errors contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act.. 57

The Manila Lodge No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the reasons warranting
review, that the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of Judicial
proceedings by simply making a general affirmance of the court a quo findings without
bothering to resolve several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned errors. 58
57
MALCOLM, J.:
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the
Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was essential
in view of the memorandum order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the
discretional power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and discount
negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to P10,000.
Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm of "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required consisting of six demand notes. The notes,
together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto
Concepcion contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion,
P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio
Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the administrator of the
company.
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank
and as member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by
the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for one year and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which
reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not,
directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank
nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who
shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts
took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.
Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. These
errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in oral
argument. Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and comprehensive
brief, answers the proposition of appellant one by one.
The question presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which follows:
58
I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that the documents of record do not prove that authority to make a loan was
given, but only show the concession of a credit. In this statement of fact, counsel is correct,
for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito" (credit) and not of a " prestamo" (loan).
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence
or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848],
13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the
receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to
repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y., 146,
167.) The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit
of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
II. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C.," by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a
"discount"?
Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a "loan," it does
not prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount."
In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank,
inquired of the Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to
discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11,
1916, was to the effect that said section referred to loans alone, and placed no restriction upon
discount transactions. It becomes material, therefore, to discover the distinction between a
"loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes under the first or the
latter denomination.
Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of
an actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of
loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in
advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is always
on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.
Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and
not discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm "Puno
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness,
because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was paid when the notes
fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.
The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not essentially
different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was declared that the
operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should we here lay down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan"
within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an
"indirect loan." In this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held
one-half of the capital of this partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition
against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two
masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always
suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or
failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a
member, falls within the prohibition.
Various provisions of the Civil serve to establish the familiar relationship called a conjugal
partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially noted.) A
loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an
indirect loan to such director.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown by
the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal
and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan P300,000 to a partnership of
no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.
In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the
Supreme Court of Maryland said:
59
What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer
should borrow of the bank, and "if any director," etc., "shall be convicted," etc., "of
directly or indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine and
imprisonment?" We say to protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the
bank, against the temptation to which the directors and officers might be exposed,
and the power which as such they must necessarily possess in the control and
management of the bank, and the legislature unwilling to rely upon the implied
understanding that in assuming this relation they would not acquire any interest
hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty, declared in express
terms that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank.
In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan Estate
decision, it was said:
We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to
himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a
violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when
these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the finding of the
information and the rendition of the judgment?
As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation
to section 35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any of
the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of these
sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal
prosecution.
This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to
such contention in the cases of United Stated vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs.
Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States
([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must
again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense, such
repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect
of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentenced offenders
charged with violations of the old law.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of
section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the
bank, and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates
any provisions of the law, but on a person violating any provisions of the same, and imposing
imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section 35 is without
penal sanction.lawph!l.net
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition
extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually.
(People vs. Concepcion, supra.)
VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National
Bank, in extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."
constitute a legal defense?
Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was because
he was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated that since
the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been paid, no loss
has been suffered by the Philippine National Bank.
Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the
defendant has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the inhibited
act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the crime. And, in
this instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts of the President of the Philippine National
Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even conceding that
such rulings have controlling effect.
Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:
It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, and advantage not common
to the other stockholders. The law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will
not listen to any proof of honest intent.
JUDGMENT
60
On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and the
errors assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court on the
same subject, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was committed
in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls
within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law.
Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-10520             February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.
Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of
the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for
the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal
Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M.
Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the
elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-
was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson,
Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run
for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano
Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez
and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of
petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada
and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A.
Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter
appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as
supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal
instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his
capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege
that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who
belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-
belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and
in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming
membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority
and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and
exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the
appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and
private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be
made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators
Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No.
4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of
petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their
election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three
(3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having
the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five
members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to
which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4
61
belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the
manner alleged.. hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable
Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents
Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or
exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending
this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A.
Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether
excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the
respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it
questions the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants
and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of
jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the
Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner
Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to
nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the
present action is not the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power
to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly
conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the
constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their
respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not
in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To
begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino
(77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it
does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to
perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the
Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter
is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very
enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be
exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been
validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of
a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not
the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon
whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to
determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either
an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224,
244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own
pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the
merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its
President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of
the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to
inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by
the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like
that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the
former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the
fundamental law.
62
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled
without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot
be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88
Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that
the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof
who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the
votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution,
sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The
weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in
Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number
essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the
number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the
Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate
three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2)
Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the
Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate
reorganizing its representation in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the
negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra),
the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator
Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to
be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of
the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or
advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called
upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded,
impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of
votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the
Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the
Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
xxx     xxx     xxx
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their
theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but
an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at
bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in
the judicial forum, but, to use petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of
public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February
21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the
floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take
up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the
course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator
Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista
Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy
open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we
can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course,
as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the
Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against
any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the
Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that
learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to
the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has
not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers,
but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the
provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the
Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said
nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator
Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the
Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the
issue before us is political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it
is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or
executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by
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statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The
courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of
these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of
as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is
necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of
public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional
provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by,
statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these
determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in
the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis
supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what
matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside
the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also
Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs,
Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the
Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a
political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was
considered carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are
political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of
the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided
contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally
settled.
x x x           x x x           x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is
that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or
that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L.
R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69
Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L.
R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether
it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts
have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question,
but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial
control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His
discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature,
but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But
every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to
the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as
through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the
limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle,
unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government
may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in
any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are
called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member
and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its
64
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question.
The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary.
Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a
given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a
way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis
supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the
Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis
supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines
consists of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the
Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the
session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada,
"the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members"
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329),
referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected
formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and
the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the
aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the
Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that
Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said
Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to
nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada
further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after
hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in
which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate
adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336,
338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only
seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada
should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator
who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new
issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by
its spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as
well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349,
350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole
morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the
Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of
Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When
session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to.
Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate
elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens
Party member in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias
stood up and said:.
65
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the
Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two
other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional
Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last
two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do
not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that
these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only
permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate
three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I
took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of
two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.)
Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de
Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal
Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda
aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who
belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and
void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by
said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as
members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must
necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs
and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral
Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after
the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf
of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when
Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were
chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias
and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law,
relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly,
Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their
co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid
and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished
gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant
had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the
Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our
Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the
end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada "is the
distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by
the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330).
Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the
second largest number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he
should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we
should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must
grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has
the right and not a mere privilege to nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes,
and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the
66
gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Tañada was
included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance
between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when
Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista
Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a
fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its
personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also
remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was
one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis
supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that,
therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the
actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of
the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public
opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that
Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good
thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this
Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to
grant Senator Tañada the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated
himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without
any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt
that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party,
represented by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said
House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the
mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and
that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939,
pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said
opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the
practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a
Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a
consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or
practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to
distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to
matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department,
contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a
doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its
further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy,
it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform"
application of the view therein adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by
the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the
natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more,
there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do
not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount
considerations of public policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies
upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the
Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method
prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be
considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents
have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory
insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered
directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute
respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when
they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a
member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to
the lawmaking body the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of
political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled
67
and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative
seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very
apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were
decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this
function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the
lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in
the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests,
following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February
22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members,
that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those
election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when
you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that
House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case
and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the
majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been
made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator
Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and
it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming
the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show
that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of
election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position
to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many
abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives,
said:.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate
court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that
these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the
electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to
believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed
himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the
qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there
was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department.
So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body
was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should
continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the
fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal
Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested
in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the
determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in
the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of
the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above,
Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that
the abolition of Party line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and
the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the
Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of
the same, would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for
seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the
lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the
Electoral Commission in the following words:.
68
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only
of the majority party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor
which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that
many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to
prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only
the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already
enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the
intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be
any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in
which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly
a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check
upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really
applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before
the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the
doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application
of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have
three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests
it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the
administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully
or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied
rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three
justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as
well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice
that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the
minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the
hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given
good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the
majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will
be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the
minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the
Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263;
emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs.
Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in
their majority-men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar
with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore
they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested
with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in
the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened
peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said
now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission
is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents,
however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention,
to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a
composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to
off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial
temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas
said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite
de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr.
CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la
minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a
dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa
forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la
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Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el
partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto
los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in
providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one
Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial
impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body.
To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the
largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the
National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of
representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act
with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number
of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may
be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In
fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the
nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-
agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely
thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a
preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
330; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a
balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority
become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial
functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as
judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the
Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators
like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the
Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to
favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from
the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as
judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will
offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the
three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants.
In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the
decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the
Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices
who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either
protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the
Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
x x x           x x x           x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral
Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be
done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to
it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no
partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral
Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative
of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging
to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the
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Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to
the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having
the largest, and the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the
Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating
them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal
representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the
Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of
the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the
Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized
(Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364,
370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or
interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and
that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over
the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is
not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute,
is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is
not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in
all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the
determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime
object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the
surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences
which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed
in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a
statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them
some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction
should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form,
may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such
construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the
construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where
it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence
of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be
determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a
statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter
of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely
with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as
directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as
directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the
purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with
substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the
thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation
of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the
legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act
or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the
exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the
statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol.
26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the
adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers
intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals,
holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the
selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to
play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is
mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it
is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359,
375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted
maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a
tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated
by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having
the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to
the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada
71
felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens
Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said
Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because,
otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens
Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three
members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority
party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The
equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the
decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in
lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political
considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is
precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their
nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their
character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the
Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above
referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus
established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the
wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran
politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the
fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In
connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that,
even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and
prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies,
the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the
party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of
the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when
"there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the
minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of
notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism
committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority
parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the
remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged
fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since
liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no
senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the
election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it
would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6
members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this
Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the
very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the
legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
x x x           x x x           x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral
protests filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority
party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by
candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority
party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a
cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme
Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members
of the majority party in the Tribunal.
x x x           x x x           x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear
that there were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although
"an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly
those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure
his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals"
are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The
procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was
adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a
statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive
its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such
effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his
72
rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is
vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner
Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate
Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his
was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions
of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation
that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of
Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta
assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the
case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties
specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate
may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to
nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that
neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party
other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly
make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator
Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal,
are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although
recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the
majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate,
as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal
matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the
case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are
hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral
Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4
thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix,
JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:.
In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be
an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein." As all the members of the National Assembly then
belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with
the constitutional requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes, the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision
involved. Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.
"Sir:.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the
office of His Excellency, the President, in which you request my opinion as `to the proper
interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution':.
73
`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three
of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the
party having the second largest number of votes therein.'.
"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the
Nacionalista Party, it is impossible to comply with the last part of the provision which
requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest number
of votes in the Assembly.'.
"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an
Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six
members to be chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes and three by the party having the second largest number of
votes.
"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was
provided that the Electoral Commission shall be composed of `three members elected by the
members of the party having the largest number of vote three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court ..
(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally adopted by the
Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the
National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number
of votes, an and three by the party having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The
Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).
"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the
intention of the framers of our Constitution was that there should invariably be six members
from the National Assembly. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any
partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. The primary object was to avoid
decision based chiefly if not exclusively on partisan considerations.
"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate
that the Assembly is entitled to six members in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a
minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members
cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may nominate three
others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members
from the National Assembly would be nullified.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could
not have been intended. We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members
during one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must
always have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be
fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or
more parties in the Assembly.
"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and
uniform interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another
thing at another time, even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a
different rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving
representation to the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights
of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any
member of the minority party is protested. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional
provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority in the Electoral
Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch,
however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a
check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the
three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the
changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the
convertion, as well as, the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional
Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six
chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other
party entitled to such nomination.".
Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was
formally organized, with six members of the National Assembly all belonging to the same
party and three Justices of the Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced
and duly adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral
Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that "Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each house, three
upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having
74
the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution.).
If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the
framers of which may be assumed to have been fully aware of the one-party composition of
the former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of
Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion,
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the
original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory
that at all times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not
two parties make up each house of Congress.
It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed
to nominate three Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, it is not
required that the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that the six
Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is
inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor necessary.
Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the
party having the second largest of votes, the latter may nominate less than three or none at all;
and the Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, would
frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal
and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the
Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would
naturally vote along purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the
Justices; otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the
Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives. Upon the other hand, he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some
such argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence, integrity and
uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and
thereby expected them, as does everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme
Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.
In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party,
the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to nominate two other
Members of the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional
mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Endencia, J., concurs.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.
I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.
The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were
elected by the Senate members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three
of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II,
Article VI of the Constitution.).
I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in
character and that this character is true not only of the provision that nine members shall
compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be
chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction.
"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be
given mandatory effect than is true of any other class of organic law. Indeed, such a
construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its
character is such as to require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the
very principles of our institutions, involving as they do concepts of constitutional supremacy,
are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution
intended that just such efficacy be given to it .." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).
The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not
belong to the Nacionalista Party, has refused to exercise the constitutional privilege afforded
him to nominate the two other members the Senate may not elect said two other members.
And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision
to safeguard the interests of the minority. This holding is subject to the following
fundamental objections. In the first Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the
75
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a
mandatory provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the power that the
constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the Electoral
Tribunal so in effect this right or prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the
minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority, contrary to the
constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the supposedly procedural
provision, the process of nomination lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to
and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the
ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders
nugatory the other more important mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by interpretation
inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone had the
power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to
exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral
Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not
justified by any rule of law or reason.
I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two
other members must be construed as a waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not
only with the constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above
principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision,
that which fixes membership at nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said
membership of nine may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal principle that
provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make
them both effective, if the reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal
principles. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.
While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a
constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate even as against the other
coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not
clearly appear that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly
recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been clearly
violative of the constitutional mandate.
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.
1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster,
11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563;
Compania Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central
Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599; McDaniel vs.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440.
Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo,
50 Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57
Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs.
Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49
Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off. Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1
Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs.
Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S.
Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock
vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S.
286.
2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each
of the Electoral Tribunals under the Constitution as amended.
3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer
of the Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85
Phil., 101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los
Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49
Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs.
Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51 Off. Gaz., 5607.
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From the very nature of
the American system of government with Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and
powers of each of the three branches of government, it has devolved on the judiciary to
determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the fundamental
law. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to
judge of the Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the obligations
imposed in the instrument, and in the order of time pointed out by it. When the, judiciary has
once spoken, if the acts of the other two departments are held to be unauthorized or despotic,
in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they cease to be operative or
binding.
x x x           x x x           x x x.
"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other
departments of government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the court are
not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. It is their duty in authorized proceedings
to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective
of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.
76
"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case
to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance
with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in
the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This
duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline
the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713,
713-715; emphasis supplied).
5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier
vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785;
Prohibition and Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler
vs. Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs. Melver, 72 N. C.
76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz,
43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.
6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate
that the Assembly is entitled to six in the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority
representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be
exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others,
otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the
National Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could
have been intended; We cannot say that the Commission should have nine members during
one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always
have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and
not variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more parties
in the Assembly.
`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and
uniform interpretation, so they shall not be taken to mean one thing at one time and another
thing at another time, even though the circumstance may have so changed as to make a
different rule seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving
representation to the minority party in the Electoral Commission was to safeguard the rights
of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any
member of the minority party is protected. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional
provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the majority of the Electoral
Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch,
however, as there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a
check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to be exercised by the
three Justices of the Supreme Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the
changes that it has undergone since it was first introduced until finally adopted by the
Convention, as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional
Convention in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme Court and six
chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other
party entitled to such nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.
6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been
taken up or discussed, until the events leading to the case at bar (in February 1956).
6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that
the Electoral Commission formed part of the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the
principle of contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to
refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.
7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the
following language:.
"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner
prescribed in the Constitution, the party that received the highest number of votes, meaning
the majority party which is the Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party
receiving the next highest number of votes therein, meaning the minority party, the party
receiving the next highest number of votes. But there was a great deal of opinion that it would
be better if this political organization, so far as the legislative department is concerned, could
be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to each
Electoral Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great
majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why
we have nine members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one
reason that I remember then and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was that it is
77
likely that the three members representing a party would naturally favor the protestants or
protestees, and so on. So it would be better that even on that hypothesis or on that supposition
it would be better, in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or three votes
against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court
decide the case because then it would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is
founded on the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are supposed to be beyond
influence, although that may not be true. But having reached the highest judicial position of
the land, these persons would likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate
Vol. III, p. 376.).
8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National
Assembly.
9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
10 Senator Lim said:.
"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party
having the second largest number of votes, precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain
equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a
senator belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I agree with Your Honor,
Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the Constitution is clear that the three
must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated
must belong to the party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor can see the
point. If we allow Your Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be
maintained, because partisan considerations enter when one is with the majority party, and
that no party should prevail, Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the
Constitution is precisely to obviate that to the extent that the only three can be nominated
from the party having the largest number of votes and three from the party having the second
largest number of votes." (Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis
supplied.).
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.
The statement of Senator Sabido was:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a
balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation.".
x x x           x x x           x x x.
".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is
that those participating in the electoral tribunal shall belong to the members of the party who
are before the electoral tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure
impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349, 352; emphasis supplied.).
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.
Senator Cea declared:.
".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major
parties in the Senate in the Electoral Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol.
III, p. 350; emphasis supplied.).
The words of Senator Paredes were:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate
court composed of nine members three of them belonging to the party having largest number
of votes, and three from, the party having the second largest number of votes so that these
members my represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the
electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to
believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to,
but, also, by the fact that constitutional provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed
to be mandatory, "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of
statutory construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:.
"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular
sections are mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional
provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions
which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional
provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or
78
to disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is
unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The analogous
rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and
are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.
"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law
that it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the
government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that
each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes."
(II Am. Jur. 686-687; emphasis supplied.).
12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.
13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking
for this Court, recalled that:.
"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by
reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral
Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party.
The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46),
thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission."(emphasis supplied.).
Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by
direct action or grant of authority in the Charter of our Republic should not receive judicial
sanction, when done by resolution of one House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter.
14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and
Primicias, or a total of six (6) members of the Tribunal.
[G.R. No. L-9669.  January 31, 1956.]
NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, Acting Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte,
Rizal, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRED RUIZ CASTRO, Executive Secretary, Office
of the President of the Philippines, HONORABLE WENCESLAO PASCUAL,
Provincial Governor of Rizal, and DOCTOR BRAULIO STO.
DOMINGO, Respondents.
 
DECISION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

MONTEMAYOR, J.: actually holding when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor was that of
Vice-Mayor, the one to which he had been duly elected; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he
The facts in this case are not disputed. Briefly stated, they are as follows. Engracio E. Santos
was not actually holding the office of Mayor but merely discharging the duties thereof and
is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and the Petitioner Nicanor
was merely acting as Mayor during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.
G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month of September, 1955 and for some
Elaborating, Respondents claim that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor merely discharges the
time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges
duties of the office but does not exercise the powers thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the
his tenure is provisional, lasting only during the temporary disability of the regular
Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability of the Mayor
incumbent. Petitioner counters with the argument that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does
such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. On September 8,
not only discharge the duties of the office of Mayor but also exercises the powers
1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of
thereof; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that while acting as Mayor, he actually holds the
Mayor.
office of Mayor for all legal purposes.
Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor as an automatic
It is clear that Petitioner’s stand is taken from the point of view of his acting as Mayor and
resignation from his office of Vice-Mayor under the provisions of section 27 of the Revised
not of his office of Vice-Mayor, while Respondents’ position is taken from the point of view
Election Code, as a consequence of which he no longer had authority to continue acting as
of Petitioner actually holding the office of Vice-Mayor though incidentally and temporarily
Mayor, the Office of the President of the Philippines on September 12, 1955 designated
discharging the duties of the office of Mayor.
Braulio Sto. Domingo acting Municipal Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal. On the
same date Salaysay was advised by Respondent Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual of We have given the case considerable study and thought because we find no precedents to aid
Rizal that in view of his (Salaysay’s) automatic cessation as Vice-Mayor due to his having and guide us. The parties have ably adduced pertinent and extensive citations and arguments
filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, and in view of the appointment of not only at the original hearing but also at the re-hearing. As to whether a Vice- Mayor acting
Sto. Domingo, as acting Vice-Mayor by the President of the Philippines, and because he as Mayor may be regarded as actually holding the office of Mayor, there are plausible
Pascual) had directed Sto. Domingo to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of arguments and good reasons for either side. We are inclined to agree with Petitioner that one
Mayor Santos, he (Salaysay) should turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo. On acting as Mayor not only discharges the duties of the office but also exercises the powers of
September 13, 1955, Salaysay was also advised by Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro to said office, and that in one sense and literally, he may legitimately be considered as actually
turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo immediately, otherwise he might be holding the office of Mayor. But there is also force and logic in the argument
prosecuted for violation of Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code for prolonging performance of Respondents that inasmuch as a Vice-Mayor takes over the duties of the Mayor only
of duties. temporarily and in an acting capacity, he may not be regarded as actually holding the office,
because the duly elected Mayor incumbent though actually under temporary disability such as
Salaysay refused to turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo and brought this action of
suspension, illness or absence (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code) could and should
Prohibition with preliminary injunction against Executive Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual
be considered as retaining his right to the office of Mayor and actually holding the
and Sto. Domingo, to declare invalid, illegal and unauthorized the designation of Sto.
same; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise there would be a situation where two officials at
Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor of San Juan del Monte as well as his designation by
the same time would be having a right to the same office and actually holding the same. In
Governor Pascual to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor
view of the possible uncertainty and doubt as to whether or not a Vice-Mayor by acting as
Santos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto order Respondents to desist and refrain from molesting,
Mayor can be regarded as actually holding said office of Mayor, we have to go back and
interfering or in any way preventing Petitioner from performing his duties as acting
resort to the legislative proceedings had, particularly the discussions and interpellations in
Municipal Mayor and prohibiting Sto. Domingo from performing or attempting to perform
both houses of Congress leading to the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code,
any of those powers and duties belonging to Petitioner. Acting upon a prayer contained in the
with a view to ascertaining the intention of that body. After all, in interpreting a law, the
petition, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
primary consideration is the ascertainment of the intent and the purpose of the legislature
Petitioner contends that his case does not come under section 27 of the Election Code for the promulgating the same.
reason that when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he was actually
“Statute law is the will of the legislature; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the object of all
holding said office. The Respondents, however, maintain that the office Petitioner was
judicial interpretation of it is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by
79
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
implication, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for determining whether the
particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it.” (Black, Handbook
on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, 2nd ed., p. 11.)
HISTORY OR BACKGROUND OF SECTION 27
REVISED ELECTION CODE
Before the enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, the law in force covering
the point or question in controversy was section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666. Its burden
was to allow an elective provincial, municipal, or city official such as Mayor, running for the
same office to continue in office until the expiration of his term. The legislative intention as
we see it was to favor re- election of the incumbent by allowing him to continue in his office
and use the prerogatives and influence thereof in his campaign for re- election and to avoid a
break in or interruption of his incumbency during his current term and provide for continuity
thereof with the next term of office if re-elected.
But section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 had reference only to provincial and municipal
officials duly elected to their offices and who were occupying the same by reason of said
election at the time that they filed their certificates of candidacy for the same position. It did
not include officials who hold or occupy elective provincial and municipal offices not by
election but by appointment. We quote section 2, Commonwealth Act No.
666:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his once from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
However, this was exactly the situation facing the Legislature in the year 1947 after the late
President Roxas had assumed office as President and before the elections coming up that
year. The last national elections for provincial and municipal officials were held in 1940,
those elected therein to serve up to December, 1943. Because of the war and the occupation
by the Japanese, no elections for provincial and municipal officials could be held in 1943.
Those elected in 1940 could not hold-over beyond 1943 after the expiration of their term of
office because according to the views of the Executive department as later confirmed by this
Court in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, through Commonwealth Act
No. 357, Congress had intended to suppress the doctrine or rule of hold- over. So, those
provincial and municipal officials elected in 1940 ceased in 1943 and their offices became
vacant, and this was the situation when after liberation, President Osmeña took over as Chief
Executive. He filled these vacant positions by appointment. When President Roxas was
elected in 1946 and assumed office in 1947 he replaced many of these Osmeña appointees
with his own men. Naturally, his Liberal Party followers wanted to extend to these appointees
the same privilege of office retention thereto given by section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
80
to local elective officials. It could not be done because section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666
had reference only to officials who had been elected. So, it was decided by President Roxas
and his party to amend said section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 by substituting the phrase
“which he is actually holding”, for the phrase “for which he has been lastly elected” found in
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666. The amendment is now found in section 27 of the
Revised Election Code which we quote below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 27.  Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official
running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
The purpose of the Legislature in making the amendment, in our opinion, was to give the
benefit or privilege of retaining office not only to those who have been elected thereto but
also to those who have been appointed; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarystated differently, to
extend the privilege and benefit to the regular incumbents having the right and title to the
office either by election or by appointment. There can be no doubt, in our opinion, about this
intention. We have carefully examined the proceedings in both Houses of the Legislature.
The minority Nacionalista members of Congress bitterly attacked this amendment, realizing
that it was partisan legislation intended to favor those officials appointed by President
Roxas; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut despite their opposition the amendment was passed.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
We repeat that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election
Code was to allow an official to continue occupying an elective provincial, municipal or city
office to which he had been appointed or elected, while campaigning for his election as long
as he runs for the same office. He may keep said office continuously without any break,
through the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office. By continuing in
office, the office holder was allowed and expected to use the prerogatives, authority and
influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the office he was
holding. Another intention of the Legislature as we have hitherto adverted to was to provide
for continuity of his incumbency so that there would be no interruption or break, which
would happen if he were required to resign because of his filing his certificate of candidacy.
Bearing this intention of the Legislature in this regard in mind, can it be said that a Vice-
Mayor like the Petitioner herein, merely acting as Mayor because of the temporary disability
of the regular incumbent, comes under the provision and exception of section 27 of the
Election Code? The answer must necessarily be in the negative. A Vice Mayor acts as Mayor
only in a temporary, provisional capacity. This tenure is indefinite, uncertain and precarious.
He may act for a few days, for a week or a month or even longer. But surely there, ordinarily,
is no assurance or expectation that he could continue acting as Mayor, long, indefinitely,
through the elections and up to the end of the term of the office because the temporary
disability of the regular, incumbent Mayor may end any time and he may resume his duties.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
VICE-MAYOR ACTING AS MAYOR, OUTSIDE
LEGAL CONTEMPLATION
The case of a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor could not have been within the contemplation and
the intent of the Legislature because as we have already stated, that lawmaking body or at
least the majority thereof intended to give the benefits and the privilege of section 27 to those
officials holding their offices by their own right and by a valid title either by election or by
appointment, permanently continuously and up to the end of the term of the office, not to an
official neither elected nor appointed to that office but merely acting provisionally in said
office because of the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. In drafting and enacting
section 27, how could the Legislature have possibly had in mind a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor, and include him in its scope, and accord him the benefits of retaining the office of
Mayor and utilizing its authority and influence in his election campaign, when his tenure in
the office of Mayor is so uncertain, indefinite and precarious that there may be no opportunity
or occasion for him to enjoy said benefits, and how could Congress have contemplated his
continuing in the office in which he is acting, when the very idea of continuity is necessarily
in conflict and incompatible with the uncertainty, precariousness and temporary character of
his tenure in the office of Mayor?
“ACTUALLY HOLDING OFFICE” EQUIVALENT
TO “INCUMBENT”
All these doubts about the meaning and application of the phrase “actually holding office”
could perhaps have been avoided had the intention of this Legislature been phrased
differently. It could perhaps have more happily used the term “incumbent” to refer to those
provincial and municipal officials who were holding office either by election or by
appointment, and so had a legal title and right thereto. As a matter of fact, this term
“incumbent” was actually used by Congressman Laurel in explaining the idea of the
committee that drafted this amendment to section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666, of which
committee he was the Chairman. The deliberations of the lower House as quoted by the very
counsel for Petitioner reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Mr. ROY.  What must be the reason, then, Mr. Chairman of the Committee for deleting the
words ‘has been lastly elected’?
“Mr. LAUREL.  The idea is to cover the present incumbents of the local offices.” (II
Congressional Record 1143.)
In this connection, a happier phraseology of another portion of section 27 could have been
used for purposes of precision. For instance, the first part of said section reads
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running
for an office”, and yet as we have already said, the Legislature intended said section to refer
81
to officials who were appointed by President Roxas to fill vacancies in provincial, municipal
and city elective offices. In other words, those officials were not really elected or elective
officials but they were officials occupying or holding local elective offices by appointment.
All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or
literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may interpret, nay, even disregard loose or
inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of a statute intended and
breathed into it by the law-making body.
MEANING OF PHRASE “RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE”
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 in providing that a local elective official running for an
office other than the one he is actually holding, is considered resigned from his office, must
necessarily refer to an office which said official can resign, or from which he could be
considered resigned, even against his will. For instance, an incumbent Mayor running for the
office of Provincial Governor must be considered as having resigned from his office of
Mayor. He must resign voluntarily or be compelled to resign. It has to be an office which is
subject to resignation by the one occupying it. Can we say this of a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor? Can he or could he resign from the office of Mayor or could he be made to resign
therefrom No. As long as he holds the office of Vice-Mayor to which he has a right and legal
title, he, cannot resign or be made to resign from the office of Mayor because the law itself
requires that as Vice- Mayor he must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the
regular or incumbent Mayor. If he cannot voluntarily resign the office of Mayor in which he
is acting temporarily, or could not be made to resign therefrom, then the provision of section
27 of the Code about resignation, to him, would be useless, futile and a dead letter. In
interpreting a law, we should always avoid a construction that would have this result, for it
would violate the fundamental rule that every legislative act should be interpreted in order to
give force and effect to every provision thereof because the Legislature is not presumed to
have done a useless act.
“A statute is a solemn enactment of the state acting through its legislature and it must be
assumed that this process achieve result. It cannot be presumed that the legislature would do a
futile thing.” (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 237.)
EXAMPLE
To emphasize and illustrate this inapplicability of section 27 to a Vice-Mayor acting as
Mayor, let us consider an example. A Vice-Mayor while acting as Mayor files his certificate
of candidacy for the office of Vice-Mayor. In other words, he wants to run for re-election.
The Provincial Governor, especially if belonging to a different political party wants to keep
him out of the office of Mayor, especially during the electoral campaign, and instead have his
party man, the councilor who obtained the highest number of votes in the last elections, act as
Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code). So, he hastens to the Municipal building
and enters the Mayor’s office where the Vice-Mayor has installed himself. Using the same
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
argument of herein Petitioner, he tells the Vice-Mayor that inasmuch as while acting as
Mayor, he was “actually holding” said office of Mayor, and because while thus holding it, he
filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor which is a different office, he must be
considered resigned from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he even asks
him to leave the Mayor’s room and office. The Vice-Mayor, a law abiding citizen acquiesces
and obeys, he reluctantly, leaves and abandons the office of the Mayor and repairs to his own
room as Vice-Mayor. But he has a happy inspiration and remembers the law (section 2195,
Revised Administrative Code); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe rushes back to the office of the
Mayor and tells the Governor and the authorities that he is still the Vice-Mayor because when
he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor, he was also actually holding said office,
and so did not lose it; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat as such Vice-Mayor, he can act and
must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the incumbent, because he cannot resign
and no one can make him resign from the office of Mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand he
defies the Governor to oust him from the office and room of the Mayor. The Governor is
helpless for the Vice-Mayor is right, that is, if we apply section 27 of the Election Code to
him. This possible, undesirable and anomalous situation is another reason why section 27
may not be applied to the case of a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.
In the above given example, the Governor might contend that when the Vice-Mayor filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor, he was actually holding only the office of Mayor and not
that of Vice-Mayor and so he lost his office of Vice-Mayor. But that contention of the
Governor is untenable. Even counsel for herein Petitioner in his memorandum admits that a
Vice-Mayor while acting as Mayor, also actually holds his office of Vice-Mayor. And it has
to be that way. A Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not cease to be Vice-Mayor. In fact, that
is his real, principal and basic office or function. Acting as Mayor is only an incident, an
accessory. Let him cease holding the office of Vice-Mayor even for an instant, and he
automatically also ceases acting as Mayor. Furthermore, a Vice-Mayor has administrative
duties to perform. He is an ex-officio member of the Municipal Council and he is in charge of
the barrio or district where the town offices are located (section 2204, Revised Administrative
Code). While acting as Mayor he may not say that he ceases to hold the office of Vice-
Mayor and so cannot look after the needs of the residents of his district and present them to
the town council.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE
The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Then he goes on leave of absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and
while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then
the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes,
acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the office of
82
Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate
of candidacy while acting as Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using
the same argument, the councilor who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns for his
election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct
offices, running for the same office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices,
and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and Councilor) are different from the
office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet
that would happen if the contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of “actually holding
office” is to prevail.
CONGRESS CONTEMPLATED ONLY ONE OFFICE
ACTUALLY HELD
Another argument against the contention that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds
the office of Mayor, occurs to us. For purposes of ready reference we again quote section 27
in its entirety:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 27.  Candidate holdings office. — Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official
running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
It will readily be noticed from the quoted section, especially the words underlined by us that
the Legislature contemplated only one office, not two or more. To us, this is significant as
well as important. As we have previously stated, there is no question that a Vice-Mayor
acting as Mayor still holds the office of Vice-Mayor. Petitioner himself admits this in his
written argument and even contends that there is nothing wrong or illegal in an official
holding two offices at the same time provided there is no incompatibility between them. If the
Legislature believed that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds the office of Mayor
and that he would thus be actually holding two offices, then it would have provided in section
27 for offices in the plural instead of employing the words office, his office, and the one
which it used in the singular. Besides this clear expression of legislative intent for only one
office being actually held and to be resigned from, to say that the Vice-Mayor when acting as
Mayor is actually holding two offices would create confusion and uncertainty because we
would not know which office he would be considered resigned from.
TWO OFFICIALS “ACTUALLY HOLDING” THE SAME
ELECTIVE OFFICE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

We have already said that a Mayor under temporary disability continues to be Mayor EXCEPTION TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
(Gamalinda vs. Yap * No. L-6121, May 30, 1953) and actually holds the office despite his
Section 26 of the Revised Election Code provides that every person holding an appointive
temporary disability to discharge the duties of the office; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe
office shall ipso facto cease in his office on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Then
receives full salary corresponding to his office, which payment may not be legal if he were
we have section 27 of the same Code as well as section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666
not actually holding the office, while the Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not receive said
which it amended, both providing that local elective officials running for office shall be
salary but is paid only a sum equivalent to it (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code).
considered resigned from their posts, except when they run for the same office they are
Now, if a Mayor under temporary disability actually holds the office of Mayor and the Vice-
occupying or holding. It is evident that the general rule is that all Government officials
Mayor acting as Mayor, according to his claim is also actually holding the office of Mayor,
running for office must resign. The authority or privilege to keep one’s office when running
then we would have the anomalous and embarrassing situation of two officials actually
for the same office is the exception. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that an
holding the very same local elective office. Considered from this view point, and to avoid the
exception or a proviso must be strictly construed specially when considered in an attempt to
anomaly, it is to us clear that the Vice-Mayor should not be regarded as holding the office of
ascertain the legislative intent.
Mayor but merely acting for the regular incumbent, a duty or right as an incident to his office
of Vice-Mayor and not as an independent right or absolute title to the office by reason of “Exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed;  chan
election or appointment. roblesvirtualawlibrarythey extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception. Where a
ACTING MAYOR AND ACTING AS MAYOR, DISTINGUISHED
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
Petitioner claims that he is the acting Mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely add to the latter by implication, and it is a general rule that an express exception excludes all
acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and profitable, at least in the present case, to make a others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of this rule, to inquire
distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor. When a vacancy whether, in the particular case, it accords with reason and justice cralaw .” (Francisco,
occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21(a) or the President Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., section 643, pp. 1092-1093; chan
under section 21(b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting Mayor. roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.)
In that case the person designated or appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds the
“As in all other cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative intent.
office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21 [f]) because when he was appointed
Where the proviso itself must be considered. In an attempt to determine the intent of the
there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor,
Legislature, it should be strictly construed. This is true because the legislative purpose set
there is no vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the
forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy and only those subjects
latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may
expressly exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute.
not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily, provisionally and
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 471-472.)
during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball
parlance, Petitioner is only a “pinch hitter”, — pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an Applying this rule, inasmuch as Petitioner herein claimed the right to retain his office under
emergency. As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular line up, he is not the the exception above referred to, said claim must have to be judged strictly, — whether or not
pitcher, does not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and his mere acting in the office of Mayor may be legally interpreted as actually holding the same
privileges of the regular pitcher. so as to come within the exception. As we have already observed, literally and generally
speaking, since he is discharging the duties and exercising the powers of the office of Mayor
Ordinarily, this apparently fine and subtle distinction would seem unimportant and
he might be regarded as actually holding the office; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut strictly
unnecessary. When a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor we usually call him Mayor or Acting Mayor
speaking and considering the purpose and intention of the Legislature behind section 27 of
and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut
the Revised Election Code, he may not and cannot legitimately be considered as actually
there are times and occasions like the present when it is necessary to make these distinction
holding the office of Mayor.
and use correct and precise language in order to determine whether or not under section 27 of
the Election Code a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor like the Petitioner herein comes within the RETENTION OF OFFICE
phrase “actually holding office” used in that section.

83
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
We have, heretofore discussed the case as regards the resignation of an office holder from his
office by reason of his running for an office different from it; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
our conclusion is that it must be an office that he can or may resign or be considered resigned
from; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the office of Mayor is not such an office from the
stand point of a Vice-Mayor. Let us now consider the case from the point of view of retaining
his office because he is running for the same office, namely — retention of his office. As we
have already said, the Legislature intended to allow an office holder and incumbent to retain
his office provided that he runs for the same. In other words, he is supposed to retain the
office before and throughout the elections and up to the expiration of the term of the office,
without interruption. Can a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor be allowed or expected to retain the
office of Mayor ? The incumbent Mayor running for the same office can and has a right to
keep and retain said office up to the end of his term. But a Vice-Mayor merely acting as
Mayor and running for said office of Mayor, may not and cannot be expected to keep the
office up to the end of the term, even assuming that by acting as Mayor he is actually holding
the office of Mayor, for the simple reason that his holding of the same is temporary,
provisional and precarious and may end any time when the incumbent Mayor returns to duty.
Naturally, his temporary holding of the office of Mayor cannot be the retention or right to
keep the office intended by the Legislature in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180. So that,
neither from the point of view of resignation from the office of Mayor nor the standpoint of
retention of said office, may a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, like herein Petitioner, come
within the provisions and meaning of section 27 of the Election Code, particularly the
exception in it.
SUPPOSED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICE-MAYOR
ACTING AS MAYOR
During the hearing and oral argument of this case, the suggestion was made, which
suggestion was also used as an argument during the deliberations among the members of this
Tribunal, that to include in section 27 particularly the phrase “actually holding office” one
who has been appointed as acting official such as Acting Mayor and at the same time exclude
a Vice-Mayor who acts as Mayor, would be discriminating against an official (Vice-Mayor)
who by statutory provision and sanction is required to act as Mayor, and give more
importance to one merely appointed to said office. We fail to see any discrimination for the
reason that an appointee to the office of Mayor fills a vacancy and serves until the end of the
term of the office, whereas a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor fills no vacancy because there is
none and he serves only temporarily until the disability of the incumbent, such as suspension,
absence, illness, etc. is removed. Now, if a vacancy is created in the office of Mayor by
removal, resignation, death or cessation of the incumbent, then the Vice-Mayor automatically
fills the vacancy, becomes Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code), and serves
until the end of the term (section 21[f], Revised Election Code). That is the time when he may
invoke section 27 because he would then be actually holding the office of Mayor.
84
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we believe and hold that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not “actually
hold the office” of Mayor within the meaning of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of candidacy for the office
of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is considered resigned from the office of Vice-Mayor
for the reason that is the only office that he “actually holds” within the contemplation of
section 27 of the Revised Election Code and the office he is running for (Mayor) is naturally
other than the one he is actually holding (Vice-Mayor); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that
having ceased to be a Vice- Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as Mayor.
A word of explanation. This decision should have been promulgated long before now. In
truth, this Tribunal was anxious and determined to decide this case before the last November
elections, at least before the newly elected local officials assumed office. However, after
long, careful deliberations the court was deadlocked, the vote standing five to five. The
rehearing ordered by us as decreed by law failed to break the deadlock. It was only when the
new addition to the membership of the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Endencia studied the case,
weighed the arguments and considered the authorities on either side, that the tie vote could be
broken. He voted for and signed the present opinion which now becomes the majority
opinion.
The question involved in the present case may in a way be regarded as moot. Just the same,
we doomed it advisable to proceed with its final determination, even elaborate on the
discussion of its different aspects, by reason of its importance and for the information and
guidance of local elective officials, and perchance so that the Legislature, apprised of the
judicial interpretation and meaning given to section 27 of the Revised Election Code, may be
in a better position to decide whether to continue and leave it as it stands on the statute books,
or amend or change it before the next general elections.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for prohibition is denied, with costs. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.
Padilla, Jugo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.
 
Separate Opinions
REYES, A., J., concurring:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The chief function of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker and,
that intention has been ascertained, to give effect thereto. By reference to legislative record
Mr. Justice Montemayor has, I think, arrived at the true legislative intent and has therefore
fashioned his opinion 50 as to give effect to that intent. I readily subscribe to that opinion as
the correct judicial solution to the present controversy.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I fully concur with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Concepcion, but would only add that
I fail to see how the majority can hold that the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, cannot be
considered resigned from the mayoralty, because “it has to be an office which is subject to
resignation by the one occupying it.” That conclusion would only be true if the law required
the candidate to resign voluntarily from his office. But the law does not require him to
resign; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit considers him resigned, treats him as if he had
resigned; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that is altogether a different thing. In order that an
official can be considered resigned all that is needed is that the office be one that he could
forfeit or loss. And the mayoralty is certainly an office that can be lost or forfeited
by Petitioner, even if he could not resign from it. The trouble, I suppose, is that the structure
of our language is such that (as semanticists have pointed out) it enables us not only to use
words about realities but also to use words about words.
And it is precisely because the law here involved decrees a forfeiture that restrictive
interpretation becomes imperative and doubts should be resolved against the Petitioner’s
forfeiting his office.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This case hinges on the interpretation of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised
Election Code), reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” (Italics supplied.)
The main issue is whether Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is “actually holding” the office of
municipal mayor of San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal.
ORDINARY AND LEGAL MEANING OF THE PHRASE
“ACTUALLY HOLDING”
“Actual” implies
“Real, in opposition to constructive or speculative, something ‘existing in act.’ State vs.
Wells, 31 Conn. 213; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryreal as opposed to nominal; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryAstor vs. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 4 Sup. Ct. 413, 28 L. Ed. 401.’
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 130.) (Italics supplied.)
“That which exists in fact, a reality.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p.
27.) (Italics supplied.)
According to Ballantine Law Dictionary (1948 ed., p. 28):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
85
“That which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. See Steen vs. Modern
Woodmen of America, 296, 111, 104, 17 A. L. R. 406, 412, 129 N. E. Rep. 546.” (Italics
supplied.)
Hence, “actually” means “in act or fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryin reality; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarytruly as, he was actually there.” (Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard
Dictionary, 1952 ed., p. 31.) In other words, actually “is opposed to seemingly, pretendedly,
or feignedly as actually engaged in farming means really, truly, in fact. (In re Strawbridge &
Mays, 39 Ala. 367)” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 130.)
Upon the other hand, to “hold” is “to possess; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto occupy; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryto be in possession and administration of; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryas
to hold office.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 897.) Consequently, to “actually hold” is to
possess in fact or in reality, that is to say, physically or materially.
A public office, however, “is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period either fixed by law or induring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” (Mechem, Public Officers, section 1.)
Being intangible, it is incapable of physical or material occupation. As a consequence, the
actually holding of an office is determined by its physical, external or tangible manifestations,
namely, the exercise of the powers and performance of the duties appurtenant thereto. For this
reason, it has been held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Actually holds office — within statute regulating tax commission’s salaries, means
discharge of duties after due appointment and qualification. (Acts 1923, p. 14, section 1;  chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryp 184, section 85.)” (Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 266) (Italics
supplied.)
“‘Actually holds office’ means the discharge of the duties thereof after due appointment and
qualification, as required by law, subject to removal at the will of the appointing power.
Touart vs. State ex rel. Callaghan, 173 Ala. 453, 56 So. 211; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryWilliams, Judge vs. Schwarz, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330, Ann. Cas.
1918D, 869; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNolen’s case, 118 Ala. 154, 24 So. 251.” (Brussel vs.
Brandon, 136 So. 577.) (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that, being the vice-mayor of San Juan del Monte,
Rizal, Petitioner Salaysay is, and has been, discharging the duties of mayor of said
municipality, since the suspension of its mayor, Engracio E. Santos. Consequently, the former
is “actually holding” the office of the mayor.
PETITIONER DISCHARGES ALL OF THE DUTIES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

HAS ALL THE POWERS OF THE MAYOR the office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21[f]) because when he was appointed
there was no regular incumbent to the office. However, when a Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor,
Although maintaining that Petitioner merely performs said duties, without the powers vested
there is no vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only that the
in said office, the Solicitor General has been unable to name a single power of the mayor
latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may
which may not be legally exercised by the vice-mayor, during the former’s suspension.
not be considered Acting Mayor. He is only acting as Mayor temporarily, provisionally and
That Petitioner possesses all the powers attached to the office of the mayor is conceded in the
during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent. He is not the incumbent. In baseball
very opinion of the majority. Indeed, in the case of Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (47 Off. Gaz.,
parlance, Petitioner is only a pinch hitter,’ pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an emergency.
2303, 2307), it was held that appointments “or other official acts made by the Undersecretary
As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular line up, he is not the pitcher, does
of Health when acting as Department Head, have the same efficacy and legal effect as the
not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and privileges of the
acts of the regular incumbent,” who was then absent. Inasmuch as Petitioner is clothed with
regular pitcher” (pp. 17-18).
all the duties and powers of the municipal mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, — and this by
operation of law (section 2196, Revised Administrative Code) — we cannot escape the To begin with, when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of municipal mayor, under
conclusion that he is “actually holding” said office. section 21 (b) of Republic Act No. 180, no appointment or designation is made by the
President, for the vice- mayor becomes the mayor. Upon the other hand, section 21(d) and (e)
PETITIONER IS THE “ACTING MAYOR”
of said Act provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In fact, while performing said duties and exercising said powers, Petitioner “acts as mayor”,
“When a local officer-elect dies before assumption of office, or fails to qualify for any reason,
or is the “acting mayor.” This is admitted (1) in the majority opinion, which states
the President may in his discretion either call a special election or fill the office by
that Petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of the mayor while “acting
appointment.
as mayor” (pp. 1, 2, 8 and 16); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) in the very letter of the
Provincial Governor of Rizal (Annex C), to Petitioner herein, advising him of the “In case a special election has been called and held and shall have resulted in a failure to
appointment of Respondent Sto. Domingo as Acting Municipal Vice-Mayor, which letter is elect, the President shall fill the office by appointment.”
addressed to said Petitioner as “Acting Municipal Mayor.” This is in conformity with our
The appointments made by the President under either paragraph may be temporary or
view, in Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (supra), to the effect that the Undersecretary of Health who,
permanent in nature. If permanent, the appointee is the mayor, not “acting mayor.” If
during the absence of the Secretary of Health, performs the duties of the latter — pursuant to
temporary, the appointee is an “acting mayor” who, said opinion impliedly admits, holds
section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code — is the “Acting Secretary” of Health, and
actually the office of mayor.
that his acts, as such, have “the same efficacy or legal effect” as those of the Secretary of
Health. Secondly, there is no legal distinction between the phrases “acting mayor” and “acting as
mayor.” The distinction in these expressions is imposed merely by the rules of grammar.
Now, then, “acting”, according to Ballentine Law Dictionary (p. 19) is “substituting, taking
When availed of as a gerund of the verb “to act,” for the purpose of indicating the capacity in
the place of another officer temporarily, as an acting Judge.” Since an acting mayor,
which an act has been performed, the word “acting” must be followed by the preposition
therefore, temporarily takes the place of the regularly elected mayor, who, prior thereto, was
“as,” which is improper when said word is used as a noun, to describe the status of an officer.
actually holding said office, it follows that the same is actually in the possession of, and,
Thus, the Undersecretary of Health, “acting as” Secretary of Health, during the absence of the
hence, “actually holding” the former, upon the aforementioned substitution.
latter, is “acting Secretary of Health.” (Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios, supra.) Similarly, the vice-
Said majority opinion states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary mayor “acting as mayor” during the suspension of the mayor, is the “acting mayor,” and, this
is confirmed by the aforementioned letter of the Provincial Governor of Rizal (Annex C) and
“Petitioner claims that he is the acting mayor. Respondents insist that Petitioner is merely
by the established practice — referred to in the aforesaid majority opinion — of addressing
acting as Mayor. It is pertinent and profitable, at least in the present case, to make a
the vice-mayor discharging the duties of the Mayor, either as “Mayor” or as “acting mayor.”
distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor. When a vacancy
occurs in the office of Mayor, the Provincial Governor under section 21 (a) or the President Thirdly, the word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office, simply connotes, in legal
under section 21 (b), (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting parlance, the temporary nature with which said office is held (Austria vs. Amante, 45 Off.
Mayor. In that case the person designated or appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds
86
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Gaz., 2829). What is more, it indicates that the “acting” officer is physically in possession of
the office, or actually holding it.
Fourthly, although a “pinch hitter” may not be the “regular pitcher,” when he pitches or bats,
is he not the “actual” pitcher or batter? When he “strikes out” a batter or connects a “hit”, or
commits an “error”, is the “strike out”, “hit”, or “error” not counted actually, as a real one?
Fifthly, the vice-mayor acting as mayor, during the suspension of the mayor, is in a better
position than a pinch-hitter, who, it is said, does not “receive all the benefits and privileges of
the regular pitcher.” Said acting mayor has all the powers and duties of the suspended mayor,
who, in turn, cannot discharge the functions of his office or even receive the emoluments
attached thereto, until exonerated or reinstated.
PETITIONER HAS ASSUMED THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
When a vice-mayor discharges the duties of a suspended mayor, the former “assumes” the
office of the latter. This was acknowledged, expressly, in Laxamana vs. Baltazar (48 Off.
Gaz., 3869), and by implication in said case of Eraña vs. Vergel de Dios (supra). Thus, in the
aforementioned communication of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, Petitioner was informed
that Respondent Sto. Domingo, who has been appointed Acting Vice-Mayor, was to “assume
the office of mayor during the suspension of Mayor Engracio E. Santos”. Considering that to
assume an office is to take possession thereof, it is obvious to us that a vice-mayor
performing the functions of the mayor who has been suspended, actually holds the office of
the latter.
PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
Again, said Provincial Governor and the Executive Secretary have directed and
advised Petitioner “to turn over the office of mayor” to Respondent Sto. Domingo, thus
implicitly, but, clearly, conceding that Petitioner herein is the actual holder of said office.
Otherwise, how could he turn it over, even if he wanted to, to said Respondent?
This is so patent that the majority opinion accepts the fact “that one acting as mayor not only
discharges the duties of the office, but, also exercises the powers of said office  cralaw so that
in one sense and literally, he may be legitimately considered as actually holding the office of
the mayor”, and that “when a vice-mayor acts as mayor we usually call him mayor or acting
mayor and deal with him as though he were the regular incumbent” (p. 18). These views, we
believe, must, however, be qualified. Petitioner is the “actual” holder of the mayor’s office,
not “in one sense and literally,” but in every sense, namely, literally and legally, in ordinary
parlance, as well as from the viewpoint of the law on Public Officers. Similarly,
although Petitioner is not the regular incumbent of the office of mayor, he is its actual and
87
legal incumbent, for he holds office — and, accordingly, he is its actual incumbent —
pursuant to law, which legalizes his status.
“ACTUAL HOLDING” AND “CONSTRUCTIVE HOLDING
DISTINGUISHED
The issues would, perhaps, be clearer if we considered at closer range, the nature of a public
office, the essence of which is the right, authority and duty, forming part of the sovereign
functions of the government, delegated by operation of law. Insofar as public officers are
concerned, two other elements are material, namely, (1) title to the office, and (2) authority to
exercise its powers and discharge its duties. The former is usually acquired either by
appointment or by popular election, although, in some instances, it may be secured by
legislative enactment. Thus, by statutory provision, a vice-mayor becomes ipso facto the
mayor upon the death, removal, resignation or permanent disqualification of the regularly
elected mayor (section 21[b], Republic Act No. 180). The latter, in general, exists when the
possessor of the former assumes office. At times, however, the regular incumbent cannot
exercise the functions of his office, as when he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) is ousted by
another, who enters upon the discharge of said functions; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor (2)
absent or becomes temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryor (3) is suspended from office by competent authority.
If, in the first case, the person who effected the ouster, and assumed the office in question,
has color of title, which is defective, and the people, unaware of the defect, submit to, or
invoke, his action, supposing him to be the officer he claims to be, he is legally considered a
de facto officer, the one ousted being regarded a de jure officer. It should be noted that the
status of a de facto officer requires the concurrence of the following conditions, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) there must be a de jure office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) there must be actual possession of the office; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) this must be coupled with color of title. — In such event, the de
facto officer is “actually holding” the office. The person vested with a valid title thereto, or
the de jure officer, is not in material possession of the office. Hence he is not “actually
holding” the same. Yet, he is deemed to hold the office, in the sense only that there is no
vacancy which may be filled by appointment or election, as the case may be. As a
consequence, the office is held by two individuals, in different
capacities:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the de facto officer actually holds the office, whereas
the de jure officer retains possession thereof by legal fiction. This distinction between the
actual and the constructive possession of a public office is vitally important in the case at bar.
If the office involved in the second and third cases is that of a municipal mayor, the law
(section 2195, Revised administrative Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLaxamana vs.
Baltazar, supra) requires the vice-mayor to discharge the duties of the mayor. In compliance
with such requirement, the vice- mayor assumes the office of mayor, wields its powers,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
performs its duties, and, as a consequence, actually holds said office. The regular incumbent
does not exercise said power or perform said duties, because he cannot do so, owing, in the
second case, to his absence or disability, and, in the third case, to the order of suspension,
which temporarily divests him of said powers and duties. The suspended officer is legally
deprived of the authority to exercise those powers and perform said duties. Should he do so,
in violation of the order of suspension, his acts would be null and void, for, in the eyes of the
law, the mayor is, not he, but the vice-mayor acting as mayor. In short, said order oust the
mayor, for the time being, from physical possession of the office, thus resulting in its
“temporary vacancy” (Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra), which is actually filled by the vice-
mayor acting as mayor, in compliance with section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The suspended mayor merely hold the legal title to the office, and, in this sense, only he is in
constructive possession thereof. His condition is comparable to the holder of the naked title to
a property, the usufruct of which is vested in another, who is in the material possession and
enjoyment of said property. The latter is physically occupied by the usufructuary, in the same
manner as Petitioner is “actually holding” the office of mayor, unlike the suspended mayor
who, though actually holding the title to the office, does not hold the office itself, except
constructively, or by legal fiction.
AS ACTING MAYOR, PETITIONER RECEIVES THE COMPENSATION FOR THE
OFFICE OF MAYOR
Pursuant to section 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code, “the mayor shall receive full
salary when absent from the municipality” on official business “or  cralaw when he is absent
from his office because of illness contracted through no fault of his own, provided the
absence in the latter case does not exceed thirty days during the year  cralaw; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand if during such authorized or justified absence the vice-
mayor  cralaw temporarily discharge the local duties of the mayor,” said vice-mayor “may
receive compensation in an amount to be fixed by the council  cralaw which shall not be in
excess of the salary of the mayor for the same period.” However, section 2192 provides that
“a municipal officer suspended from duty pending an investigation of charges against him
shall receive no pay during such suspension; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut upon subsequent
exoneration or reinstatement, the Department Head may order the payment of the whole or
part of the salary accruing during such suspension.” The vice-mayor, acting as mayor during
the suspension of the mayor, “shall receive compensation equivalent to the salary of the
mayor.” (Section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.)
In line with a practice established as early as 1916 — when the first Administrative Code was
adopted — and followed, then, by the Department of the Interior, now, by the Division of
Local Governments in the Office of the President, as well as by the Department of Finance
and the Office of the Auditor General (before, the Insular Auditor), said compensation of the
vice-mayor, acting as mayor, in lieu of the suspended mayor, is paid from the appropriation
for salary of the mayor. Should the suspended mayor be eventually exonerated or reinstated
88
with pay, as provided in section 2192, the municipal council approves a new appropriation
therefor, the original appropriation for salary of the mayor having been applied to the
payment of the emoluments of the acting mayor.
The distinction between the case of a mayor who is absent on official business or is sick,
without his fault, for not more than 1 month a year, and the mayor who is suspended, as
regards the right to compensation — for both the mayor and the vice-mayor acting in his
place — and the appropriation from which payment shall be made, constitutes another
tangible and significant evidence that, when the mayor is suspended, the vice-mayor, who
discharges the duties of the mayor, is regarded by law as the actual holder of the office of
mayor. This conclusion becomes even more imperative when we consider that, by explicit
legal provision, said vice-mayor may no longer receive his per diems as vice-mayor, for
attendance of the sessions of the council (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code.) Thus,
during his incumbency as “acting mayor”, by which name he comes to be known, he is more
a mayor than a vice-mayor.
In the case of Rodriguez vs. Tan (48 Off. Gaz., 3330), the Petitioner in an election protest, for
the office of Senator, who won said protest, was not allowed to recover the salary collected
by the defeated protestee during the period of his incumbency, despite the fact that the latter
had actually held office merely as a de facto officer. Surely, Petitioner herein, who had, not
only the right, but, also, the duty, to act as mayor, even if temporarily, has a better status than
a de facto officer and, like the latter, at least, must be considered legally as the actual holder
of the office of mayor.
THE SUSPENDED MAYOR DOES NOT “ACTUALLY” HOLD THE OFFICE OF
MAYOR
As already adverted to, when a mayor is suspended his office becomes temporarily vacant
(Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysection 2195, Revised
Administrative Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarySection 21[a], Republic Act No. 180). This
fact is absolutely inconsistent with the theory that he actually holds the office of mayor,
during the period of suspension.
Moreover, said mayor may be “reinstated” in office (section 2192, Revised Administrative
Code). This means necessarily that, during said suspension, the mayor does not actually hold
his office, for reinstatement is restoration to a possession formerly enjoyed, and thereafter
lost. Such loss of actual possession is total. The suspended mayor retains nothing but the
naked title - he is completely stripped of the beneficial enjoyment of the powers appurtenant
to the office. The forfeiture, though temporary, of the official attributes — save as to the
naked title — is such that the suspension ipso facto deprives the mayor even of the right to
compensation. (Section 2192, Revised Administrative Code). What is more, the emoluments
attached to his office become due, by operation of law (section 2187, do. do.), to the vice-
mayor acting as mayor.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
It is urged that the phrase “actually holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was
meant to refer only to “permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a
temporary character. We cannot accept this view, for the following reasons, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1.  The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any
elective local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the nature
of said possession, so long as, it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is
held temporarily or permanently.
2.  One of the purposes of Congress, it is claimed, in providing that the filing of the certificate
of candidacy shall not operate as a resignation, when a local elective officer runs for an office
he is actually holding, is that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“By continuing in office the office holder allowed and expected to use the prerogatives
authority and influence of his office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the
office he was holding.
It is obvious, however, that — as the one vested by law with the authority to exercise the
powers and discharge the duties of the mayor — Petitioner is the person who could carry out
said alleged intent of the law-maker. Upon the other hand, the suspended mayor could not be
so, even if he wanted to, for his suspension prevents him from availing himself, during the
election campaign, of the authority, influence and prerogatives of the office of mayor.
3.  Admittedly, if the acting mayor had been appointed by the President, the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor would not operate as a resignation from said
office. Said presidential appointee could have received, however, either a regular or
permanent appointment, or a designation or temporary appointment. We are unable to find
any valid and sufficient reason — and none has been offered in the majority opinion — why a
discrimination should be made in favor of the person so given, by the Executive, a temporary
appointment and against one, like Petitioner herein, chosen by the law itself, from which the
Chief Magistrate of the land derives his power to make said appointment.
4.  The last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No 666, the former election law,
reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
This provision was amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, which eliminated the
clause “other than the one for which he has been last elected”, and substituted, in lieu thereof,
the words “other than the one which he is actually holding”. Explaining the purpose of the
89
amendment, in reply to criticisms made by members of the Senate who belonged to the then
minority party, Senator Tirona, Chairman of the Committee sponsoring the measure on the
floor of the Senate and, in effect, majority spokesman in relation thereto, had the following to
say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Precisamente, por el hecho de que una gran mayoria de los gobernadores provinciales,
miembros de la Junta Provincial, alcaldes, vice alcaldes y concejales municipales, son de
nombramiento, queda justificada la disposicion del articulo 27, porque si se aplicara a esos
funcionarios la prohibicion de que no pueden ser candidatos a los cargos que ocupan a menos
que dimitan, se produciria un grave desbarajuste que podria perjudicar la administracion de
los asuntos provinciales y municipales. Por que? Porque el cambio de todos esos funcionarios
provinciales no se podria hacer facilmente, Daria lugar a muchos conflictos de grupos o
facciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarya una infinidad de cuestiones.” Congressional record of
the 1st Congress of the Republic, Vol. II, p. 108). (Italics supplied.)
It is apparent, from the foregoing, that the amendment merely sought to minimize the number
of vacancies resulting from the filing of certificate of candidacy by persons holding local
elective offices. The reason was both administrative and political. Administrative, because
too many vacancies, it was feared, would gravely disrupt the administration of local
governments. Political, because every vacancy would create the difficult problem of filing the
same precisely on the eve of elections. Indeed, each vacancy is more likely to lead to political
discontent than to political expediency, considering that, for every appointment to fill a
vacancy, there would generally be several disappointed and disillusioned candidates therefor,
who might, as a consequence work against the administration.
5.  The journals of Congress contain ample evidence of the fact that, when section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 666 was amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, the
members of both Houses knew that there existed a sizeable number of local officials holding
elective positions by virtue of presidential appointments, some of which were temporary in
nature. Yet, Congress approved the amendment with the understanding that it would apply
equally to the permanent and the temporary appointees of the executive branch. Obviously,
therefore, the phrase “actually holding”, in said section 27, does not refer solely to
“permanent” officers.
6.  Although the aforementioned amendment was bitterly criticized by the minority members
of Congress, by reason of its favorable effects upon said presidential appointees and upon the
political party then in power, nothing was said in the course of the deliberations of the
lawmaking body, to indicate, even if remotely, the intent to exclude, from the benefits of said
amendment, those who may be actually holding local elective offices by operation of law.
Said journals are absolutely silent on this point.
7.  It is argued for the Respondents that section 27 contemplates an office from which its
incumbent could resign, and that it could not apply, therefore, to the office of mayor,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
which Petitioner claims to hold actually, for, as vice-mayor acting as mayor during the
suspension of the mayor, said Petitioner cannot resign from the office of mayor. Let us
examine carefully said section 27, which, for convenience, we reproduce once more.
“An elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
It will be noted that the word “office” is twice used therein; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryfirstly, in the expression “running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding;” and, secondly in the clause “shall be considered resigned from
his office.” Obviously, the latter refers to an office from which it is possible to resign. Does
the former allude to an analogous situation? We do not think so, for the “office” first
mentioned is the one for which the candidate is running. Moreover, it specifically refers to an
office “other than the one which he is actually holding.” Even if the office actually held by
the candidate were one he could give up by resignation, he could not possibly do so as to the
“other” office, for which he seeks the popular mandate, because he does not hold that office
as yet.
Must the office he is “actually holding” be one from which he could resign, if he so desired?
One can resign from an office to which he had been duly elected or appointed. If such were
the office contemplated in section 27, the same would have used only the word “holding,”
without the qualification “actually,” it being clear — particularly to the members of
Congress, most of whom are lawyers — that an office may be held materially by one who has
not been elected or appointed thereto, such as the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, in
compliance with Article 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, in view of the suspension
of the mayor.
The situation visualized in section 27 would be more apparent had Petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of provincial governor. This being other than the offices
he is actually holding — those of vice-mayor and mayor — he would be deemed, by
operation of said section 27, resigned from “his” office, namely that of vice-mayor. Having
thus relinquished this office, we would, necessarily, have no more authority to act as mayor.
In other words, the office he is “actually holding” need not be necessarily his office, and this
is not unusual under the Law on Public Office. Otherwise, the word “actually” would be not
only unnecessary, but inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the law.
8.  It is next said that, in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, “Congress contemplated only
one office actually held.” This view is based upon the clause “an office other than the one
which is based upon the clause “an office other than the one which he is actually holding,” in
said provision, with emphasis on the phrase “the one”. It will be recalled that said clause is
only an amendment of the last paragraph of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
90
“Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” (Italics supplied.)
In other words, the word “one” was not inserted by Republic Act No. 180. It was part of said
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666, which referred to an elective local official “running
for an office other than the one for which he has been lastly elected.” Since, normally, a
person is elected to only one office, it was only natural for said section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 666 to use the word “one”. But, let us suppose that, during the effectivity of
Commonwealth Act No. 666, a law was passed permitting an individual to run for, and hold,
two offices, say, for instance, the positions of municipal mayor and member of the provincial
board, and that while holding both elective offices, the incumbent should, in a subsequent
election, file his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor only, would he not be entitled
to continue in office, as mayor and as member of the provincial board, despite the fact that he
is not running for the last office? Obviously, the word “one” was used in Commonwealth Act
No. 666 (section 2) merely because it assumed that the person concerned had been elected
only to one office. This did not mean, however, that one legally elected to, and holding, two
elective offices, was sought to be excluded from the benefits of said enactment.
Similarly, section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 assumes — in line with the ordinary course of
events — that one discharging the duties of a given office does not hold any other office,
without implying necessarily, that, otherwise, he would be denied the benefits of said
provision. As pointed out in the preceding pages, the purpose of said provision was to permit
an incumbent to remain in office if he did not seek to change the status quo, such as the case
of Petitioner herein.
EXAMPLES ANALYZED
Several examples have been given to illustrate the alleged validity of Respondents’ pretense.
Let us analyze said examples:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first is, substantially, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A vice-mayor, while acting
as mayor, filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor. Thereupon, the provincial
governor, alleging that said candidate is actually holding the office of mayor and that he is
not running for such office, asked him to vacate it. After giving up, reluctantly, the office of
mayor, the vice-mayor, asserts that he actually holds the office of vice-mayor; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat, since he is running for re-election therefor, he is not deemed
resigned as vice-mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, as vice- mayor, he is entitled to
act as mayor. Then, the assertion is made that “this possible, undesirable and anomalous
situation is another reason why section 27 may not be applied to the case of a vice-mayor,
acting as mayor.” But, why should this situation be undesirable or anomalous ? Is it not
merely a natural and logical consequence of the fact that section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code requires the vice-mayor, in the event therein contemplated, to hold, at
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
the same time, two offices, namely, the office of vice-mayor and that of mayor? Is the holder
of such offices not bound to discharge the duties of both? Is he, as a consequence, not
entitled, logically and by law, to all the privileges and prerogatives attached to said offices? Is
the right to run for election to an office actually held, without resigning therefrom, not one of
such privileges or prerogatives? Is it not only fair, just and reasonable that the increased
responsibilities of the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, be coupled with a corresponding increase
in his powers, exemptions and immunities?
The second example is couched in the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The regular incumbent Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.
Then he goes on leave of absence or falls sick and the Vice-Mayor acts in his place, and
while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Then
the Vice-Mayor also goes on leave or falls sick or is suspended, and because the regular
Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes,
acts as Mayor and while thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the office of
Mayor. The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the
herein Petitioner that he did not lose his office of Vice-Mayor because he filed his certificate
of candidacy while acting as Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor. Using
the same argument the councilor who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns for his
election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor. Thus we would
have this singular situation of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct
offices, running for the same office of Mayor, yet keeping their different respective offices,
and strangely enough two of those offices (Vice- Mayor and Councilor) are different from the
office of Mayor they are running for. Could that situation have been contemplated by the
Legislature in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code? We do not think so, and yet
that would happen if the contention of the Petitioner about the meaning of “actually holding
office” is to prevail.” (pp. 14-15.)
The example is most ingenious, but, to our mind, not in point. In order that the mayor, the
vice-mayor and the municipal councilor alluded to could run for mayor, without resigning
from their respective offices, pursuant to section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, it would be
necessary that each be “actually holding” the office of mayor. Inasmuch, however, as “actual
holding” is equivalent to material or physical possession, and “possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities, except in cases of co-possession”
(Article 538, Code of Civil Procedure) it follows that it would be necessary to determine
which one, among the officers involved in the example, is “actually holding” the office of
mayor, and that the person declared to be in physical possession of such office should be the
only one not deemed to have resigned in consequence of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for mayor. Although not indispensable for the determination of the case at bar, it
would seem that said privilege belongs solely to the officer in fact discharging the duties of
91
the office of mayor, at the time of the expiration of the statutory period for the filing of
certificate of candidacy. Indeed, until then, the other officers could withdraw the certificates
of candidacy already filed by them, and file other certificates of candidacy for the respective
offices actually held by them at such time, thus avoiding the implicit resignation which
otherwise may result from the application of said section 27.
EXCEPTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY
The rule of statutory construction to the effect that exceptions must be strictly construed, has
been invoked in favor of Respondents herein. It is claimed that, as a matter of general rule, a
local elective official who runs for an elective office is, pursuant to section 27 of Republic
Act No. 180, deemed to have resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat such rule does not apply, when he
runs for an office other than the one he is actually holding; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
that, this is the exception which should be construed strictly.
The argument is logical, but its major premise is predicated upon the assumption that said
section 27 establishes the general rule. We believe, otherwise. To our mind, the general rule
is that an elective official shall remain in office for the full term for which he was elected,
although he may have filed a certificate of candidacy. The exception is that he shall be
deemed to have resigned from his office, from the time of the filing of said certificate of
candidacy, if (1) he is a provincial, municipal or city official, and (2) the office for which he
runs is other than the one he is actually holding. If he runs for the office he is actually
holding, the general rule applies — he shall not be deemed to have resigned from his office.
In other words, the provision implying a resignation from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy in the exception, which should be construed strictly.
This interpretation is demanded, not merely by the fact that Republic Act No. 180 is a part of
our law on Public Officers, and should be construed jointly with the latter, but, also, by the
fundamental principles underlying the democratic system of government established in the
Philippines. Indeed, petition was chosen by the direct vote of the people, in whom
sovereignty resides. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 180 was passed not by the people
themselves, but by their representatives. The people elected Petitioner herein for a term
ending on December 31, 1955. In the absence of clear, positive and unequivocal provision of
law to the contrary, the member of Congress, as agents of the people, must be presumed to
have intended to respect said direct mandate of their principal.
In the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor, who runs for mayor, the intention of Congress to
oust him from both offices is far from being patent or incontestible. In fact, the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language used in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, in relation to
sections 2187, 2192 and 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, connotes that Petitioner is
actually holding the office of mayor, for which he ran at the last general elections, and that,
accordingly, he shall not be deemed to have resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
candidacy for said office. Indeed, it is admitted, in the majority opinion, that the letter of said
section 27 favors Petitioner herein - said opinion states that, literally, Petitioner is actually
holding the office of mayor. At any rate, the factors analyzed in the foregoing pages, the very
efforts exerted in said opinion to bolster up the stand therein taken and the conflicting views
among the members of this Court, who are almost equally divided on the issue under
consideration, eloquently demonstrate that the law upon which Respondents rely is, at least,
not free from ambiguities or doubts. Hence, the same should resolved in favor of Petitioner’s
continuance in office, for the full term for which he was elected.
THE ACTUAL HOLDER OF AN OFFICE HAS PRESUMPTIVELY A BETTER RIGHT
THERETO
Although a public office is not property, in the strict sense of the word, the right to a given
person to hold a particular office partakes of the nature of a property, in that he cannot be
deprived of such right without due process of law, (42 Am. 886-888; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryState vs. Wadhams, 67 N.W. 64, 64 Minn. 318, 324; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryChristy vs. Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 1375, 13 Okl. 585; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryHamilton vs. Brennan. 119 N.Y.S. 2d 83 [20 Gen. Digest p. 364]); chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary11 O.S. 1951 Su 572 — Laison vs. Bunch, 225 P. 2d. 486 (21 Gen.
Digest p. 348) — 1953; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryEmerson vs. Hughes, 90 A. 2d. 910, 117
Vt. 270 [19 Gen. Digest p. 287 — 1953; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryHanchey vs. State ex rel
Roberts 52 So 2d. 429 [15 Gen. Digest p. 369, 1952]).
A person actually holding an office, pursuant to law, is, therefore, in a condition analogous to
one in physical possession of a property, under claim of ownership. Pursuant to Article 541 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, such “possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or
prove it.” He who wishes to recover the property from its possessor as owner must prove,
therefore, a better title thereto. Similarly, the actual holder of an office, under color of title,
like Petitioner herein, must be respected and protected, in the enjoyment of said possession,
unless the party seeking to eject him therefrom shall establish satisfactorily that said title is
defective and that his (claimant’s) is the legitimate and stronger title. In other words, doubts
must be resolved in favor of the actual holder of the office.
At any rate, to our mind, the law is patently in favor of Petitioner herein. When he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, he was actually
discharging the duties and exercising the powers of said office. The public and the very
Government, as well as the law (section 2187, Revised Administrative Code), regarded him
as the acting mayor of said municipality. He received the emoluments appurtenant to the
office. He had all of the responsibilities attached thereto, including the civil and criminal
liabilities which would accrue to the regularly elected mayor, in case of nonfeasance,
misfeasance or malfeasance in office.
92
Upon the other hand, having been suspended as mayor of San Juan del Monte, Engracio
Santos was stripped of his functions as such, he could not, and did not, discharge the same.
He was not entitled to collect the compensation corresponding to said office, which
compensation was paid to herein Petitioner. In other words, the latter was literally and legally
in actual physical possession of the office of mayor.
Moreover, the language of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180 is too plain, simple and clear
to admit of construction. It is well settled that “where the intention of the legislature is so
apparent from the face of the statute there can be no question as to the meaning, there is no
room for construction.” (People ex rel. Wood vs. Sands, 102 Cal. 12, 36 Pac. 404.)
Again, in ordinary, as well as in legal, parlance, to hold actually an office is to have physical
or legal possession thereof, to occupy the office in fact or really, as distinguished from, or
opposed, to its presumptive or constructive possession. To declare, therefore, that Engracio
Santos — who does not, and cannot, perform the functions of mayor of San Juan del Monte
— not Petitioner herein — who actually, really, materially and in fact discharges the same —
is the persons “actually holding” said office, does not amount merely to a construction of the
meaning of “actually, holding”, but to giving thereto its opposite meaning, its exact antithesis.
With due respect to the learned view of our distinguished colleagues to the contrary, we do
not feel that judicial power may go that far, consistently with the principle of separation of
powers.
Wherefore, we are of the opinion that the petition should be granted and that the writ of
preliminary injunction, issued upon the institution of this case, should be made permanent.
G.R. No. L-26100             February 28, 1969
CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J.
BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and Feria, Feria, Lugtu and
La'O for petitioners.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged
contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year
period next preceding the approval of Republic Act 931; (2) said petition was not published;
and (3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under
Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened, Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite, were instituted by the Director of Lands in
the Court of First Instance of Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described
in Plan Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in
that case on November 13, 1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims. His prayer was that the land be
registered in his name upon the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in actual,
open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes thereon; and (2) his predecessors were
illiterate Igorots without personal notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not
able to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin,
Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. Ground: They are tree
farm lessees upon agreements executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65
square meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959, and for 14,771
square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied private petitioners' right
to intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962
in Yaranon vs. Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio] which declared
that such tree farm leases were null and void.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred that said declaratory
relief judgment did not bind them, for they were not parties to that action.
93
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of May 8, 1962, allowed
petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent Lutes.
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private petitioners' opposition to
his reopening petition. On October 25, 1962, private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners' opposition to the
reopening. A motion to reconsider was rejected by the court on November 5, 1963.
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a motion to dismiss the
petition to reopen. This motion was adopted as its own by the Reforestation Administration.
They maintained the position that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding
on those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24, 1964. On April 6,
1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's motion as well as the
April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private petitioners.
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral
court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963
dismissing private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction upon a P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30, 1965. The court held that
petitioners were not bound by the declaratory judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the
appellate court ruled that as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening
of the cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May 6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966, respondents moved to dismiss
the petition before us. On August 5, 1966, petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave
due course.
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20, 1953.
The title of the Act reads —
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT
HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF
THIS ACT.
Section 1 thereof provides —
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper
court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on
account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared
land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty
years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five
years 2 after the date on which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of
the judicial proceedings under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred
and fifty-nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, and the
competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the
Government through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the parties, said court
shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with, and that all
taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax
should have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall order
said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such parcels.  3
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a land registration case
where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of public land", a principle was hammered out that
although Section 34, Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any
kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ... nevertheless ... the
opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and
not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government." 5 The opposition, according to
the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part
of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that "it is incumbent upon the duly authorized
representatives of the Government to represent its interests as well as private claims
intrinsically dependent upon it."
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act. Normally and logically, lessees cannot there present issues of
94
ownership. The case at bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special
statute R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be declared"
or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of judicial proceedings. Such right,
however, is made to cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 6 The lessee's right
is thus impliedly recognized by R.A. 931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear
from the impact of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a petition
to reopen has already been leased by the government, that petition can no longer prosper.
This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966. The
reopening petition there filed was opposed by the Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of
public land holding revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the petition
in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the suit, had already been leased by
the government to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the lessees alone, but
through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale the heights of injustice or abet
violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the view that only the Director of Lands  7 can here
properly oppose the reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will
legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of government officials? Should the cadastral court
close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved by the lessees themselves, and which is
enough to bar the reopening petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation
should happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no question of ownership need be
inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest
in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here becomes the more patent
when we take stock of their averment that they have introduced improvements on the land
affected. It would seem to us that lessees insofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the
purview of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an action. For, they
are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties." 9 In the event herein private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate
lessees, then their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be proven that
the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of Republic Act 931 and place it beyond
the reach of a petition for reopening. 10
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by respondent Lutes herein, the
cadastral court should have ruled on the validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
the merits. Because there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue as
lessees to be threshed out in that court.
We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are lessees, have the
necessary personality to intervene in and oppose respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under R.A. 931, should
have been published in accordance with the Cadastral Act.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of this Court in De
Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same set of facts bearing upon the question.
We there held, after a discussion of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of
the petition for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia — was already
embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the
Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The petition,
therefore, need not be published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the November 13, 1922
decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case to show, amongst others, that the land here
involved was part of that case. Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this
point of fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the cadastral court below
over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral court have power to
reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the application of respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April
12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to
reopen on July 25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed, authorizes "the filing in the
proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have
been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks
of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
95
It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on constitutional grounds. No
charge has been made hero or in the courts below that the statute offends the constitutional
injunction that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-
entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional questions will not be
entertained by courts unless they are "specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed
in its title.
This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.
Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus not difficult to stray
away from the true path of construction, unless we constantly bear in mind the goal we seek.
The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine
legislative intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it
may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in
interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when
they subserve this purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By this, we do not "correct the act of
the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent. 17
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression
in the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the
legislative intent, 19 the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional
will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or
clue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in this jurisdiction. For the
reason that by specific constitutional precept, "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such
case, courts "are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order
to arrive at the legislative intention." 22
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation that confronts us. We
take another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN
THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF
TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY
VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT
PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not
merely composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very substance of the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2
law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress intended to give some effect to the title of
R.A. 931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of R.A. 931 aforesaid —
from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency between the title and the body — attended
Commonwealth Act 276, the present statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same
language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this circumstance. Had the
legislature meant to shake off any legal effects that the title of the statute might have, it had a
chance to do so in the reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility
the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more
thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states is the subject of constitutional
regulation." 24 The constitutional in jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be
expressed in the title of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill." 25 Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the title of a bill, which, while not an enacting
part, no doubt "is in some sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These
considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed without benefit of
congressional debate in the House from which it originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the
Senate. 28
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and positiveness. It recites that it
authorizes court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
That title is written "in capital letters" — by Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to
be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature
speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the phrase last quoted
from R.A. 931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted
from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title
and body. In line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of titles which; should
be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressed in the body. 30 At the very least, the
words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal
importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted."
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of construction we must
give to the statute does not need such reflection. We lean towards a liberal view. And this,
because of the principle long accepted that remedial legislation should receive the blessings
of liberal construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a
piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who,
96
before the Act, had no legal means of perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the
explanatory note thereof, which reads:
This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant who has any
interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land in cadastral
proceeding for failure of said person or claimant to present his claim within the time
prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels of land have
not had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing of cases affecting their
claims in the corresponding cadastral proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for
other reasons and circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276,
said persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of said Act
expired in 1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said persons or
claimants with meritorious claims or interests in parcels of land may seek justice and
protection. This bill proposes to give said persons or claimants their day in court.
Approval of this bill is earnestly requested.
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted
to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal
technicalities should not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation.
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931, claims of title that
may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land
"by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval
of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes
to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of
Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-
year period.lawphi1.nêt
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the cadastral
court's orders of August 5, 1963, November 5, 1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby
declared null and void and the cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners'
oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part..
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASES: WEEK 1 AND 2

97