Kulenovic Sasa (2013), Temperanter - IV - 3-4, Kosovo's Changed Attitude Throughout Negotiations With Belgrade

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International Quarterly Journal

Revue Trimestrielle Internationale
Rivista Internazionale Trimestrale
ISSN 2037-2965
Editor in Chief
Directeur de la Publication
Direttore Responsabile
Lorenzo Dugulin
Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013
RACISM, XENOPHOBIA and INTOLERANCE

RACISME, XÉNOPHOBIE et INTOLÉRANCE
RAZZISMO, XENOFOBIA e INTOLLERANZA
tempĥranter
International Quarterly Journal
Revue Trimestrielle Internationale
Rivista Internazionale Trimestrale
ISSN 2037-2965
http://temperanter.cirsi.net
Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013
ISBN 978-88-98746-01-9
Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance

Racisme, Xénophobie et Intolérance
Razzismo, Xenofobia e Intolleranza
Dichiarazione di Roma (23 settembre 2013).........................................7

Cécile Kyenge Kashetu (Ministra per l’Integrazione)
Kosovo’s Change of Attitude throughout Negotiations

with Belgrade ....................................................................................11
Saša Kulenoviđ (Johns Hopkins University)
Le moi de l’auteur: de l’autobiographie à l’autofiction.......................79

Darouèche Hilali Bacar (Université Lumière Lyon 2)
Authors - Auteurs - Autori .................................................................87
Summaries - Résumés - Sommari.......................................................89
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Kosovo’s Change of Attitude throughout Negotiations
with Belgrade
Saša Kulenoviđ
Johns Hopkins University
1. Introduction
Ten years have passed since the launch of the first direct dialogue
between Serbia and Kosovo. Although the two sides have always
remained adamant when it comes to their position on the status of
Kosovo, the changing political conditions have shaped their attitude
throughout the years.
When the Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions for Self-Government
(PISG) were created in 2001, they enjoyed only limited powers. The
authority over Kosovo was administered by the Special
Representative, the head of the United Nations Interim
Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Retrospectively, even
though Kosovo Albanian leaders were already calling for
independence, it was difficult to predict that the province would
become independent in a foreseeable future. And yet, as the transfer
of responsibilities progressed, the Provisional Institutions became
more confident and more vocal. In order to address the pressures for
a definition of Kosovo’s final status, UNMIK decided that before talks
on a status settlement for Kosovo could begin, progress would need
to be made in eight UN-endorsed standards. As a roadmap was set,
direct dialogue on technical issues between Pristina and Belgrade
started in Vienna on 14 October 2003.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the dialogue between Belgrade
and Pristina taking into account Pristina’s perspective. In doing so, it
is my intention to unveil the variables that most influenced Pristina’s
behavior during the dialogue and show how and why Pristina’s
attitude changed throughout ten years of negotiations. Indeed, over
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12 Saša Kulenoviđ
the last ten years, the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia passed
through different stages. The talks launched in Vienna in 2003 were
short-lived as the seemingly positive environment for dialogue was
overturned when unrest broke out in Kosovo in March 2004. During
the subsequent status talks there was no room for compromise
between the sides and Kosovo declared unilaterally independence in
2008. As a consequence, the dialogue ended and then resumed again
in 2011 with the EU facilitated talks.
In order to analyze these events, I organized the thesis into three
main chapters which in sequence analyze how Pristina behaved
before the declaration of independence, after the declaration of
independence and during the resumption of direct negotiations in
2011.
By comparing these three stages, we can see that the EU-
facilitated talks represented a turning point in terms of Pristina’s
willingness to cooperate. Indeed, the uncompromising attitude of
Kosovo’s negotiating team during the status talks had been replaced
by a more constructive approach within the framework of the
ongoing EU facilitated dialogue. However, it must be stressed that
Pristina’s willingness to compromise was far from being
unconditional and several unilateral action were still pursued.
While the thesis covers the entire dialogue, the change in attitude
witnessed during the EU facilitated talks is certainly the most
interesting turn and for this reason is particularly emphasised in the
text. Therefore, it is pivotal to determine what caused Kosovo’s
readiness to resume negotiations and engage more seriously in
dialogue.
In trying to understand what changed during the last stage of
negotiations, it will be necessary to uncover the forces that have
most influenced Pristina’s behavior ever since the establishment of
its first government in 2001.
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Kosovo’s Change of Attitude Throughout Negotiations with Belgrade 13
2. From War to Independence

The war in Kosovo came officially to an end with the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, passed on 10 June 1999.
The resolution envisaged the establishment of the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), an international
civil presence headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General. Under the resolution, the responsibilities of this mission
included “the establishment of provisional institutions for self-
government, the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the
provisional institutions and the facilitation to determine Kosovo’s
future status”1. While the principles embedded in the text ostensibly
called for a final settlement based on autonomy, it was clear that
such a solution would have never been acceptable to Kosovo
Albanians, whose calls for independence dated back to the start of
the Yugoslav wars.
When UNMIK arrived in Kosovo, the security situation was
extremely volatile. Despite the utmost authority over the territory
and people of Kosovo conferred to the Special Representative, the
poorly staffed mission could not confront the unrestrained ethnically
motivated violence.
The violence, which ranged from harassment and intimidation to
abductions and murders, was mainly directed against Kosovo Serbs,
in reprisal for the disenfranchisement suffered during Milosevic’s
rule. The failure to protect minority communities prompted a sense
of impunity among the perpetrators and weakened the confidence of
the victims in the international presence [King, Mason, 2006, 84]. In a
situation where the lack of institutions was encouraging many to fill
the power vacuum, the creation of a reliable international
administration became urgent.
The first step to building up a framework of self-governing
institutions in Kosovo was the creation of the Kosovo Transitional
Council, aimed at enhancing cooperation between UNMIK and the
local leaders. Subsequently, in order to lay the foundations for the
future administrative apparatus, an Interim Administrative Council
and the Joint Interim Administrative Structure were established as
well2. At that point, UNMIK was ready to launch its “contract” on self-
1
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.
2
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 3 March 2000.
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14 Saša Kulenoviđ
government which envisaged a plan to build the necessary legislative,

executive and judiciary structures required for self-administration3.
Thus, as foreseen by the contract, the drafting for a legal framework
for Kosovo began. Kosovo Albanian leaders, who planned to secure as
many powers as possible, participated intensively in the drafting
process [King, Mason, 2006, 117]. In this case, despite the escalation
of politically motivated violence among Albanian political parties in
the wake of the first municipal elections, the Albanian political
leaders behaved cooperatively. Indeed, their willingness to take
actively part in the drafting process was prompted by the awareness
that a Constitutional framework was a fundamental step towards
statehood, a common political aim.
Eventually, in May 2001, the UN Constitutional Framework was
finally promulgated and the Provisional Institutions of Self-
government were established. Nonetheless, the initial powers of the
PISG were limited. The responsibilities were divided between UNMIK
and the newly established institutions, and the demarcation of
powers became soon a problematic issue. During the campaign for
the first Assembly elections, the three main Kosovo Albanian parties
put independence at the top of their political agenda. Moreover, the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) extended its campaign on
criticizing the Constitutional framework because of the few powers
reserved for the provisional institutions [King, Mason, 2006, 120].
After the elections, there were many instances of the Assembly trying
to go beyond its responsibilities and the Special Representative was
forced to intervene several times to invalid the resolutions adopted.
In the meantime, on the international level, the events that
followed the 11 September 2001 brought about a revision of the
United States foreign policy. The Balkans were put off the
international agenda and a decline of the U.S. presence in Kosovo
ensued [Kim, Woehrel, 2008, 24]. Many Kosovo Albanians also
believed that the international community was in favour of
reintegrating Kosovo within Serbia, thus hampering Kosovo’s
aspirations for statehood [BBC News, 2001]. Indeed, after the fall of
Milosevic in 2000, Serbia was going through a phase of change. It was
clear that nobody wanted to destabilize the democratization of the
country. Thus, unrelenting calls for independence became a way to
3
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 18 September 2000.
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reaffirm Pristina’s position in front of the international actors on the

ground and the authorities in Belgrade.
While the sharing of powers with the authorities in Pristina was
becoming a thorny question, UNMIK worked on improving its
relations with the authorities in Belgrade. The signing of a common
document on the 5 November 2001 defined the future form of their
cooperation. As a result, direct talks intensified and cooperation
improved especially with regards to the fate of the missing persons.
Furthermore, the document foresaw the establishment of the main
platform for dialogue, the High-ranking Working Group, composed of
two bodies on judicial cooperation and police cooperation. This
working group was tasked to bringing together UNMIK, Belgrade and
Pristina to discuss minority issues 4 . However, Kosovo Albanian
leaders were outraged by the document, as they perceived an
increase in Belgrade’s leverage in Kosovo’s affairs [King, Mason, 2006,
123].
In the following period, unilateral and provocative actions
became more frequent and defiant. On 15 May 2003, the Assembly
endorsed a controversial resolution on the liberation war of the
people of Kosovo for freedom and independence. In response, the
Special Representative issued a declaration stating that the text of
the resolution was “divisive and contrary to the spirit of resolution
1244” 5. On 24 April 2002, Kosovo leaders agreed to endorse a plan
for the creation of a “special body” designated to draft a law on
elections, even though election matters were among the reserved
competences for the Special Representative.
Moreover, on 23 May 2002, the Assembly debated a resolution
which demanded protection of Kosovo’s territorial integrity, an issue
beyond its authority and highly provocative. Soon after the vote the
Special Representative Steiner declared it null and invalid. Despite
the condemnations, Kosovo’s leaders acted as the resolution had
been a successful achievement for the Assembly [King, Mason, 2006,
162] Moreover, several of the New Year messages of leading Kosovo
Albanian politicians called for independence in 20036. Thus, as time
4
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 15 January 2001.
5
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 26 June 2003.
6
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16 Saša Kulenoviđ
went by, the several rifts around the divisions of powers increased
the enmity between the government and the Special Representative.
The constant pressure on UNMIK made it clear that it was time to
determine a timetable and a framework that could define the way
towards a status settlement.
The Special Representative Steiner, in order to address such
pressures, endorsed the Standards before Status policy (2002). The
main objective of the policy was to reassure the Kosovo Albanians
that a status decision would not be put off forever but it was equally
a way to find a reason to delay further such a decision [Ker-Lindsay,
2009, 18]. According to this policy, progress would have been needed
in eight key areas before the talks about a final status settlement
could begin. More importantly, one of the eight points required
normalization of the dialogue with Belgrade. In order to address the
persistent attempts of the provisional institutions to encroach on the
powers of the Special Representative, a Transfer Council was also
established, with the task of overseeing, monitoring and coordinating
the transfer of responsibilities 7 . As happend in the case of the
Constitutional Framework, the new Standards before Status policy,
along with the establishment of the Transfer Council, was viewed by
the Albanian leaders as a step towards independence. Nonetheless, a
drawback for Kosovo’s aspirations was represented by the
assassination of the Serb Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on 12 March
2003. Indeed, the event decreased UNMIK’s willingness to proceed
further with the transfer process. Considering the critical moment
that Serbia was dealing with, UNMIK was worried that expanding
Kosovo government’s powers would supply nationalist figures in
Serbia with favourable political arguments [King, Mason, 2006, 168].
Despite the uneasy situation, Steiner was determined to start
direct talks. However, an additional obstacle was caused by the
rivalry between the leaders of the two biggest Kosovo Albanians
parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Democratic
Party of Kosovo (PDK). The leader of LDK Ibrahim Rugova, who lost a
lot of credibility by talking to Belgrade during the 1999 war, refused
to engage in dialogue again unless he was accompanied by the PDK
leaders, who had no intension to pander Rugova’s requirements
[King, Mason, 2006, 169].
7
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The internal political stalemate was eventually overcome during

the EU summit in Thessaloniki, where the positive feedbacks about
Kosovo’s European future persuaded the leaders to cooperate and
engage jointly in direct talks with Belgrade.
3. The Dialogue begins

The prospect of a European future was determinant in creating a
more cooperative atmosphere among the Kosovo Albanian political
leaders. Thus, although initially loath to engage in direct dialogue
with Belgrade, the Provisional Institutions started attending the High-
ranking Working Group in an observer capacity8.
Subsequently, even though the calls for independence were still
very vocal, in early 2003, some form of direct contacts began
between the Provisional Institutions and Belgrade as the parties
showed their willingness to start discussing practical issues.
The head of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Kosovo agreed to discuss further cooperation on the transport of
passengers and goods. Regular working contacts, with regard to the
return of internally displaced persons, were held between the
Provisional Institutions and the Serbian refugee council. Furthermore,
a meeting of the Working Group on Cultural Issues took place in May.
During the occasion, progress was made on reaching an agreement
on preservation of cultural heritage and the return of related
documentation9.
In addressing these issues, the “standards before status” policy
remained the guiding instrument during this phase of UNMIK
activities.
On 28 February 2003, a breakthrough occurred when the leaders
of the two Kosovo Albanian coalition parties along with the Kosovo
Assembly signed a declaration encouraging the Provisional
Institutions to join UNMIK in direct dialogue on practical issues.
In the follow-up, on 2 March, the Special Representative initiated
the process by inviting a ministerial delegation from Belgrade with a
view to talk on a proposed agenda. However, after initial support,
8
9
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18 Saša Kulenoviđ
opposing concerns delayed the beginning of direct talks. Leading

Kosovo Albanian politicians backed away from the initiative, citing a
number of preconditions, including the need for further transfer of
powers and the approval of a Joint Platform by the Kosovo Assembly.
Similarly, the Belgrade authorities, although in favour of direct talks,
requested the inclusion of additional agenda items and expressed
unwillingness to participate, owing to disagreement with the transfer
of additional responsibilities to the Kosovo’s Institutions10.
While both sides were ready to start direct talks, they equally
desired to enter the dialogue in the strongest position possible in
order to enjoy a greater leverage over the final decisions. Indeed, the
parties maintained diametrically opposed positions with regard to
the final status. On the one hand, Belgrade continued to seek co-
governance with UNMIK11. On the other hand, the Kosovo Albanian
leadership continued to call for an accelerated path towards Kosovo’s
independence. In particular, the two main Kosovo’s political parties
had to be adamant as to the question of status as the risk of
appearing lenient on independence in front of the domestic
constituencies would have represented a political suicide for both
parties.
Despite the opposing views with regard to the status of Kosovo,
the leaders in Pristina and Belgrade finally agreed to start talks on
practical issues. The first direct dialogue was launched on 14 October
2003 in Vienna. Following a meeting to which the President of
Kosovo and the Prime Minister of Serbia took part, four working
groups of experts were established on energy, missing persons,
returns and transport and communication12.
The positive outcome from the first direct meeting prompted
UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions to increase their efforts. On 5
November 2003, a review mechanism was unveiled to review and
assess the implementation of the benchmarks defined in the
“standards before status” policy. The initiative, which was ostensibly
conceived by the Bush Administration, was aimed at giving impetus
to the new approach [Kim, Woehrel, 2008, 24]. It was made clear that
the start of the status process would depend on the results of the
10
Ibidem.
11
Ibidem.
12
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 15 October 2003.
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review. The establishment of the mechanism was important as it

reassured Kosovo Albanian leaders that conditions had been created
to deal with the resolution of the Kosovo’s status at some point in the
future. The Special Representative Steiner confirmed that now there
was a work-oriented situation in Kosovo. Now that the Provisional
Institutions were incentivized to behave more cooperatively, the
dialogue with Belgrade looked more appealing.
In order to address the standards more effectively, the
“Standards for Kosovo” document was endorsed. Such a document
defined in detailed terms the standards that Kosovo had to reach.”
Moreover, five working groups were convened to prepare a
timetable and specify the policies for the implementation of the eight
benchmarks13. At this point, Kosovo’s authorities could feel even
more empowered, since the transfer of non reserved responsibilities
to the provisional institutions, as envisaged in chapter 5 of the
Constitutional Framework, was largely completed. The concurrence
of these developments led many to believe that a more favourable
environment had been created for dialogue.
However, despite significant progress, the dialogue process was
severely damaged by the violence erupted in Kosovo in March 2004.
The violence was the result of an organized, widespread and targeted
campaign against the minority groups, notably against Kosovo Serbs.
The attacks were also extended against UNMIK personnel and
facilities. The inability to prevent the violence and protect the
minorities exposed KFOR and UNMIK as powerless. Moreover, the
ambivalent and controversial response by the authorities in Pristina
worsened the inter-ethnic relations and the confidence of the
minorities in the Provisional Institutions14.
13
14
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 30 April 2004.
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20 Saša Kulenoviđ
4. Towards the Status Talks

In the aftermath of this setback, even Belgrade realized that
bigger decisions were needed. The Serbian government issued a
declaration proposing a plan for Kosovo’s settlement. It was argued
that Kosovo Serbs should be granted a high level of political and
territorial autonomy within a highly autonomous Kosovo province.
The Belgrade’s idea with respect to the status settlement was thus
summarized in two phrases, namely, “more than autonomy less than
independence” and “autonomy within autonomy”15. Pristina, on the
contrary, was still firm on independence.
It must be pointed out that violence, coupled with the
international forces’ inability to prevent the riots, transformed the
debate over the status [Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 20]. The “standards before
status” policy was replaced with a watered down “standards with
status” policy which emphasized Kosovo’s most urgent needs. Thus,
while the implementation of the benchmarks remained a priority, the
status process had to be address, at least for the sake of security. The
fear of violence and attacks against minorities and international
actors on the ground was growing. The lack of safety and the
complicated relations with the Provisional Institutions were causing
UNMIK to rethink its strategy in Kosovo. After five years of
international administration UNMIK was viewed by many as a post-
colonial power and was depicted as an obstacle to independence by
Kosovo’s politicians.
As the costs of preserving the status quo were high, it became
clear that “the mission was reorienting towards getting out” [King,
Mason, 2006, 215]. In this context, an undeniable and disturbing fact
was that “violence advanced the independence agenda as nothing
else in the previous five years” [King, Mason, 2006, 191]. On the
other hand, following the widespread condemnation, the Provisional
Institutions tried to repair the damage and regain confidence among
the international community. In order to address minority concerns,
the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan was launched on 31
March 2004.
According to the Plan, the Provisional Institutions would
undertake six priority actions in response to the March violence,
15
Plan for the political solution to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija,
Belgrade, Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2004.
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relating to freedom of movement and to sustainable returns and

rights of communities. Despite progress on four of the six priority
actions, the authorities failed to deal with two of them. First, the PISG
failed to investigate and sanction the authorities and political leaders
who inflamed the violence through public statements or who did not
exercise duly their authority. Secondly, the Provisional Institutions fell
short of publicly condemning reports by print and broadcast media
which triggered the violence in the first place16.
In the attempt to restore inter-ethnic confidence, on 14 July
Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian leaders signed a joint declaration
in which they committed themselves to the reconstruction of the
houses damaged during the March violence. Anyhow, Belgrade
expressed its unwillingness to resume talks referring to the March
violence and other issues, such as security guarantees, direct
involvement in decentralization and resolution of the electricity issue,
as primary impediments17. Conversely, the Prime Minister of Kosovo,
Bajram Rexhepi, voiced his willingness to resume direct talks and
wrote to the International Committee of the Red Cross on 5 August,
calling for the resumption of the Working Group on missing persons.
Even though the climate was not conducive to dialogue, any hope
for a quick resumption was crushed because of the forthcoming
Serbian presidential elections and the Assembly elections in Kosovo.
As a consequence of the prolonged stalemate, there had not been
any meeting of the working groups since the March violence.
In the following months, a technical assessment provided by the
new Special Representative, Soren Jessen-Petersen, showed that
some progress had been achieved in specific areas but that the
overall level of implementations had been limited and uneven18.
More specifically, the lack of progress was evident in areas such as
reconciliation efforts, returns, security conditions and freedom of
movement for the Kosovo minorities.
Following the events in March 2004, as envisaged in the review
mechanism, the Secretary General requested Kai Eide to conduct a
“comprehensive review of the policies and practices of all actors in
Kosovo.” In the meantime, the elections held in October 2004 in
16
17
Ibidem.
18
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 14 February 2005.
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22 Saša Kulenoviđ
Kosovo led to the installation of the new coalition Government,

headed by the new Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj. The
appointment of Ramush Haradinaj, considered to be a war criminal
by Serbian authorities, hardened further more Serbia’s position as
Belgrade refused the resumption of dialogue objecting to the
appointment of the new Kosovo’s Prime Minister19.
However, when Haradinaj resigned voluntarily in order to
surrender to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a
more favourable environment for dialogue was created.
At the beginning of 2005, encouraging signs of rapprochement
were shown with the signing by representatives of the Serbian
Orthodox Church and the Provisional Institutions of a new
memorandum of understanding on the reconstruction of Serbian
Orthodox religious sites damaged during the riots of March 200420.
Another token of goodwill was represented by Serbian President
Boris Tadic’s invitation to meet with President Ibrahim Rugova of
Kosovo. Sensing a positive change in mood by Belgrade, the Special
Representative started working to arrange such a meeting. As a result
of the conciliatory efforts, direct dialogue resumed during this period.
The Working Group on Missing Persons met in Belgrade on 16 March
2005. In addition, the Government of Serbia accepted the proposal of
the Special Representative to restart the working groups on energy,
transport and telecommunications21.
However, the hopes for a more constructive and lasting dialogue
were about to be reversed again. In 2005 Annan announced his
intention to appoint a special envoy to conduct a full review of the
progress made towards the implementation of the standards and
decided to return to Kai Eide. In his appointment statement the
Secretary General specified that the report would not just assess the
formal conditions for launching the future status process, it would
also take into account the political realities on the ground22. Thus, Kai
Eide submitted his assessment and recommendation to the Secretary
General on 7 October 2005. The report outlined a comprehensive and
integrated strategy that would pave the way for a process to
determine a status settlement for Kosovo. Although according to the
19
Ibidem.
20
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 23 May 2005.
21
Ibidem.
22
Ibidem.
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report the fulfilment of the standards had been uneven, Eide

recognized that since there “would never be a good moment to
address the Kosovo’s future status, the time had come to start the
status process” [Eide, 2005]. Eide also suggested that setting artificial
deadlines would be counterproductive and urged the EU to step in as
the main international actor in Kosovo. In addition, making a
farsighted judgement, Eide warned that there was the risk that the
parties might focus only on status-related issues and not on the
implementation of the standards [Eide, 2005].
Following the submission of the comprehensive review, on 21
October 2005 the Security Council decided to launch a political
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status as foreseen in
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). On 2 November, the Contact
Group issued a set of guiding principles aimed at directing the talks.
Some of the 10 guiding points were clearly in agreement with Kosovo
Albanians’ aspirations. While it was stressed that a negotiated
solution would be a priority, it was equally argued that the status
process would not only depend on the level of engagement of the
parties but also on the conditions on the ground23. On 5 November,
the Contact Group sent the guiding principles to the President
Rugova and the overall document was welcomed by Kosovo Albanian
political and institutional leaders24. Such a favourable development
for Kosovo resulted in a big incentive to get involved in the
forthcoming status talks. Thus, while Belgrade was worried by the
guiding principles, Kosovo Albanian leaders were already preparing
for the forthcoming talks.
In September 2005, President Ibrahim Rugova established a
negotiating team. At a plenary meeting on 17 November, the Kosovo
Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution reconfirming the
political will of the people of Kosovo for an independent and
sovereign state of Kosovo. The resolution provided also a mandate to
the delegation of Kosovo for the future status process. A similar
resolution was adopted by the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro
23
Guiding Principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the Status of
Kosovo, 2 November 2005 (available at: www.unosek.org/docref/
Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20Guiding%20principles%
20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf).
24
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24 Saša Kulenoviđ
in Belgrade on 21 November25. In the meantime, on 10 November,

the Security Council endorsed the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as
the Secretary-General Special Envoy for the future status process.
Since September 2005 progress on practical issues had been
limited and, with the approaching future status process, the parties
became increasingly reluctant to engage constructively in direct
dialogue. Indeed, both sides started considering all issues to be part
of the future status process.
From 21 to 27 November 2005 the appointed Special Envoy
Ahtisaari held initial consultations in the region. As planned, he
visited both Kosovo and Serbia to gauge the starting positions of the
sides26.
In Pristina, Ibrahim Rugova made it very clear that Kosovo
Albanians “won’t back down from their demands for full
independence” and presented Martti Ahtisaari with a document
outlining Pristina’s position. Their unmistakable and ultimate goal
was independence [Associated Press, 2005].
After his meeting in Pristina, Ahtisaari flew to Belgrade to visit the
Serbian leadership. Apparently, during his meetings with Kostunica
and Tadic, Ahtisaari told them that, as far as he was concerned, the
status process would lead to independence for Kosovo [Ker-Lindsay,
2009, 28]. Thus, although Serbia offered far-reaching autonomy, such
a solution was not on the agenda for the Special Envoy. At this point,
a compromised solution was already put in jeopardy. Some days
later, Serbian President Boris Tadic, sensing that the outcome would
not depend on the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia only, warned
that “major powers might impose a solution if the two sides failed to
agree” [Reuters, 2005].
25
Ibidem.
26
Ibidem.
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5. A Dialogue shaped from Above

As remarked by the Serbian President, the decisive game would have
been played at a different level. The guiding points issued by the five
members of the Contact Group were clearly oriented towards
independence for Kosovo. However, in the lead-up to direct talks a
confrontation began at a higher level between Russia and the other
members of the Contact Group which would strongly condition the
unfolding of the status talks. In this regard, it is necessary to
acknowledge the existence of a deepening cleavage between Russia
and the NATO members of the Group. The Kosovo war represented a
setback in the Russia-NATO relations as it debunks the myth of a new
era of cooperation between the two. Russia realized that more than
five years of partnership “did not prevent the Alliance from risking
everything for the sake of a military adventure in the Balkans”
[Antonenko, 1999-2000, 131]. Furthermore, while in 1999 Russia was
too weak to play a determinant role in influencing a decision on
Kosovo, now the status talks represented a way to reassert Russia’s
regional authority and its international status. More generally, since
the talks over Kosovo occurred against a background of growing
tensions between Russia and the West, Russia could be adamant on a
relatively less important issue [Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 114].
Thus, while the set of guidelines issued by the Contact Group were
aimed at independence, Russia started distancing itself from the rest
of the members [Antonenko, 1999-2000, 48]. After a meeting in
Belgrade, Sergey Lavrov stated that Moscow supported Belgrade’s
call for “less than independence and more than autonomy” and that
a solution must come from a compromised approach and cannot be
imposed [Reuters, 2005]. On the other side, in 2005, the Bush
Administration launched a new phase with regard to its Balkan policy,
determined by the need to “finish the work” [Kim, Woehrel, 2008,
24]. Having more impelling international problems on the agenda,
one of the US priorities was to extricate themselves from the Balkans.
During the 108th Congress, several resolutions in support of Kosovo’s
independence were introduced. It was also specified that a full US
endorsement for independence would be assessed against the
implementation of the benchmarks [Kim, Woehrel, 2008, 27].
Similarily, during a visit to Pristina, John Sawers, the political director
of the Foreign Office, confirmed, later on, that “the more the leaders
of Kosovo can reach out to the other communities and show that
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26 Saša Kulenoviđ
Kosovo is a mature democracy, the more fully an independence can

be delivered” [Reuters, 2006a]. Thus, while during the “standards
before status” policy a direct link was made between the
implementation of benchmarks and the start of the status process,
the new message sent to Pristina was that a satisfactory
implementation of benchmarks would lead directly to independence.
The fact that the United States supported Kosovo’s independence
was clarified by other statements from US officials. While addressing
the Senate Committee for Foreign affairs, the Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Nicholas Burns, recognized that any decision on
Kosovo “should respect the basic fact that in Kosovo today 90
percent of the people are ethnic Albanians who were treated cruelly,
even viciously, by the government of Slobodan Milosevic” [Burns,
2005]. During the OSCE ministerial meeting, organized with the hope
to adopt a common statement on Kosovo among the member
countries, a confrontation arose due to the opposing views on the
mentioning of the Helsinki Final Act in the statement. Draskovic, the
Serbian Foreign Minister, advocated that the Helsinki Final Act, which
says that borders cannot be changed by force, must be included in
any statement on Kosovo. He complained that some unspecified
countries, among which allegedly the US, had viewed the mention of
the Helsinki Final Act as a “barrier to the promotion of Kosovo
independence” [Xinhuanet, 2005].
Before starting the first round of direct talks, the Special Envoy asked
the Contact Group to inform Serbia that “the unconstitutional
abolition of Kosovo’s authority in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events
led to a situation in which the return of Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is
not a viable option” [Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 30]. Even though some
members of the Contact Group tried to take a more balanced
position on the forthcoming talks, the rift between Russia and the
rest of the members was becoming clear-cut.
Such statements from international actors affected the willingness of
the parties to compromise. Therefore, before the direct talks could
begin the two parties had already crystallized their positions. Pristina
did not have any incentive to compromise. Its only priority was the
implementation of the standards as this was directly related to a US
full endorsement. Under such circumstances, the announcement of
the Prime Minister Kosumi that he was unwilling to negotiate on the
question of status did not come as a great surprise.
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The start of the status talks was further postponed as the President
of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, died on 21 January. On 10 February,
Fatmir Sejdiu was elected as the new President by the Assembly.
After the governing coalition parties reached an agreement regarding
changes in the leadership of the Provisional Institutions, the
incumbent Prime Minister, Bajram Kosumi resigned from office and
Agim Ceku was nominated as his successor. The newly appointed
Prime Minister reiterated Kosovo’s expectations that the province
would become totally independent from Serbia very soon27.
Moreover, Agim Ceku decided to accelerate further the
implementation pace as he recognized the direct link between the
Provisional Institutions’ ability to improve performance on the
standards and a positive outcome with respect to the Kosovo status
settlement28.
However, according to the European Union’s yearly Report, none of
the standards had been fully met. In particular, serious concerns
were raised regarding rule of law, freedom of movement, sustainable
returns and rights of communities and property rights29.
27
28
Ibidem.
29
Kosovo 2005 progress report, Brussels, European Commission, November
2005.
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28 Saša Kulenoviđ
6. The Status Talks

In February everything was ready for the status talks as the two
negotiating team had been established. Having already decided the
outcome of the status settlement, the main priority for the Special
Envoy became the condition of Serbs in Kosovo. Indeed, as direct
talks eventually began in Vienna on 20 February 2006,
decentralization appeared to be the first item on the agenda. Thus,
the first meetings revolved around the issue of devolving power to
the 100,000 remaining Serbs in Kosovo.
In order to emphasize again the paramountcy of the standards,
western diplomats pinpointed that independence hinged on
Albanians offering Kosovo’s minorities a viable future.
Even the Special Representative Soren Jessen-Petersen defined
what the pattern of the dialogue would be. While stressing the right
of the Kosovo Albanians to expect that their aspirations would be
met the Special Representative reiterated that a crucial point would
be the majority’s commitment on addressing minority issues
[Reuters, 2007a].
It was clear that the talks were not about the status of Kosovo,
but about the status of Kosovo Serbs. In March, the UK sent a strong
and unequivocal message that dispelled any remaining doubts, i.e.
that independence for Kosovo was "almost inevitable” [BBC News,
2006].
It is useful to recall that during this period Serbian position was
worsened by its failure to extradite the war criminals and by the
referendum on full independence of Montenegro scheduled on 21
May.
Thus, four rounds of direct talks between the parties on the
decentralization of Kosovo’s governmental and administrative
functions were held in Vienna between February and May, although
without any tangible result. Indeed, the respective positions seemed
again irreconcilable: while Belgrade favoured the creation of a Serb
entity with special rights, the Unity Team advocated that the same
decentralization should be applied equally to all municipalities
regardless of the ethnic balance [Reuters, 2006b].
Thus, despite convergence on some matters, after nearly four
months of negotiations the two sides were still at loggerheads. Since
every question was regarded in the broader context of the status
talks, no major breakthrough was achievable. The only successful
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rounds were those related to the protection of religious and cultural

monuments as the sides managed to reach an agreement. As far as
the economic and financial issues were concerned, the talks were
once again unsuccessful. In this regard, discussions revolved around
the division of state property and debt. While Belgrade claimed
control over several enterprises since it was paying their debts, many
of these firms had been privatized by the United Nations. Moreover,
a compromised agreement became even more unfeasible as Kosovo
Albanians demanded war reparations from Serbia [Reuters, 2006c].
Considering the deep divergences revealed by the dialogue,
Ahtisaari was considering the fact that the talks could be concluded
by the end of the year [AFP, 2006a]. Conversely, Russia insisted that
artificial deadlines would be detrimental to the dialogue and refused
that fear of violence could be used as a rationale for hurried decision
[Reuters, 2006d]. At this point the Serbian government was not
hiding its deep dissatisfaction as to the management of the entire
process. To make things even worse, during a meeting with
Kostunica, Condoleezza Rice told reporters that independence was
out of question [AFP, 2006b].
While the position of Russia was hardening and the controversy
around the overall talks mounting, Ahtisaari started preparing the
first high level discussion.
In the meantime, on 30 June the Contact Group met in Brussels
to discuss the tensions in northern Kosovo. In fact, the division of the
province along ethnic lines was becoming irreparably clear-cut. In the
wake of inter-ethnic attacks, on 5 June a demonstration was held in
protest by approximately 800 Kosovo Serbs in Zveçan municipality.
The Municipal Assembly declared that the security situation required
“extraordinary” measures and announced that it would cease
relations with the Provisional Institutions. Likewise, it was decided to
undertake preparations for self-protection and suspend cooperation
with the Kosovo Police Service in the area. In the following days the
other Serb Municipalities in the north followed suit 30 . As a
consequence, the influence of the Serbian Government became
stronger in the north of Kosovo, owing to its control of wages and
employment in parallel structures. Pristina instead feared that such
developments could pave the way for a future partition.
30
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30 Saša Kulenoviđ
On 24 July, Martti Ahtisaari brought the representatives of

Belgrade and Pristina together in Vienna for the first high-level
meeting. The President and the Prime Minister of Serbia and the
President and the Prime Minister of Kosovo headed their respective
delegations. During the meeting the parties were provided with an
opportunity to present their proposals on Kosovo’s future status. As
expected, both reiterated their divergent positions, substantial
autonomy and independence, respectively.
During the summer, three additional rounds of direct talks on the
decentralization of the governmental and administrative functions of
Kosovo were held in Vienna. Cultural heritage and religious sites were
discussed by the parties on 23 May and 18 July while economic issues
were taken again on 31 May, and community rights on 8 August31.
While the Provisional Institutions showed a greater willingness to
take responsibility for minority concerns in the attempt to enhance
Pristina’s credibility for the rest of the talks, the disagreement on the
decentralization proved to be an insurmountable hurdle. Another
effort towards implementing the standards more effectively was the
adoption in August of the European Partnership Action Plan which
replaced the 2004 Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, the basic
reference document on standards implementation hitherto. The
standards goals contained in the previous document were all
incorporated into the Action Plan, but the actions previously agreed
were updated to reflect current challenges and to address the
European partnership priorities32.
On 3 August 2006, because of to the high tension on the ground,
the Contact Group issued a new set of ten statements urging the
parties to defuse tensions.
At this stage, the dialogue was apparently exhausted. The newly
appointed Special Representative Ruecker reiterated that the
outcome would be independence [B92, 2006a]. Ahtisaari, who was
about to start preparing the status proposal, remarked that the final
settlement would take into account Milosevic’s policy in Kosovo and
that “every nation carries a burden for which it has to pay” [B92,
2006b]. The Contact Group met in New York on 20 September and,
due to the lack of progress between the parties, finally authorised
31
Ibidem.
32
Ibidem.
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Ahtisaari to prepare its comprehensive proposal for a status

settlement. Although Ahtisaari hoped to submit his proposal by the
end of the year, the announcement that the Serbian Parliament
agreed the text of a new Constitution, following Montenegro’s vote
to split from Serbia, altered the planned timetable. Moreover, this
meant that new elections and a new government would be required.
While Serbia was passing its new constitution, the Unity team,
during a televised debate, declared that an action plan had been
prepared to declare independence in the event that the Security
Council blocked a resolution on Kosovo’s settlement [Ker-Lindsay,
2009, 47]. The international community made an effort to curb Unity
Team’s willingness to act unilaterally but the internal pressure was
becoming unsustainable. On 28 November, more than 3000
protesters gathered in Pristina to protest about the delay of the
status decision. During the protests, the frustration for the
postponement of the status settlement led to attacks against the UN
headquarters. At this stage, the leaders in Pristina believed that
Kosovo would become independent in the near future. While
awaiting for the submission of the comprehensive proposal, the Unity
team focused its work on three priorities: participation in the
negotiations with the Belgrade negotiating team, continued outreach
activities to all Kosovo’s communities to explain the settlement
proposal and continuation of the diplomatic campaign aimed at
garnering international support for Kosovo’s independence33. On the
other hand, Serb officials argued that new rounds of talks would be
needed once Ahtisaari had submitted his document. In response, the
Unity team rejected any kind of further talks and announced that
thenceforth it would speak only with Ahtisaari and the Contact
Group, thus bypassing Belgrade [B92, 2007a].
After the elections in Serbia, Ahtisaari presented his proposal to
the Contact Group. It was decided to present the two sides with the
document only two weeks later in order to give time to the Contact
Group to analyse the new document. Eventually, on 2 February, the
Special Envoy submitted the proposal to the parties, specifying that
another meeting would be held in order to allow the parties to
propose amendments to the plan. By that time, the submitted plan
did not have any reference to the final status. Kosovo Albanians
33
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32 Saša Kulenoviđ
welcomed the proposal while the authorities in Belgrade strongly

rejected a plan clearly directed towards independence [B92, 2007a].
Furthermore, Russia stressed that any attempt to adopt a Security
Council resolution on the Ahtisaari’s proposal would be “futile and
counterproductive” [Associated Press, 2007].
In the meantime, the pressure on the ground was mounting. On
10 February 2007, supporters of the Self-Determination movement
organized a rally demanding immediate independence and
attempted to storm the government building. As a consequence of
the clashes with the police, two protesters died. Thus, besides the
support for independence that Pristina was getting from the
international community, the Unity Team came under strong
pressure internally. Albanians were becoming more vocal and the
turmoil caused fears of violent reactions if a status decision was
further postponed.
On 10 March Ahtisaari convened the parties in Vienna for what
was considered as the last meeting. As expected, the parties did not
reach any last minute agreement. Five days later, the comprehensive
proposal was sent to the UN Security Council. On 26 March 2007, the
final status proposal was sent to the President of the Security Council
along with a report in which Ahtisarri presented his recommendation
for supervised independence. Two particularly important parts of the
Ahtisaari’s report regarded decentralization and the envisaged role of
the International Civilian Representative. With respect to
decentralization the Special Envoy argued that municipalities in
which the Serb community was the majority must have their own
extended municipal competences in the selection of police Station
Commanders and in cultural affairs [Ahtisaari, 2007]. On the other
hand, the report envisaged the establishment of an International
Civilian Representative (ICR) tasked with supervising the
implementation of the status settlement. In this regard, the ICR
would be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the
settlement with the power to take any corrective measure to remedy
any action undertaken by the Kosovo authorities contrary to the
settlement [Ahtisaari, 2007]. Nonetheless, many countries within the
Security Council expressed their reservations about the endorsement
of the document and the possibility of a fact-finding mission in
Kosovo was weighted.
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On 5 April, the Assembly of Kosovo met in an extraordinary

session and approved a declaration in support of the Special Envoy’s
future status report and settlement proposal.
A week later, the Unity Team members signed a “declaration” in
which they agreed to remain united during the 120-days transition
period envisaged in the settlement proposal34.
Pristina, while reassuring that a unilateral move would be still
recognized by a number of important countries, was working on
improving its credentials for statehood. Indeed, Kosovo Albanian
leaders were already preparing themselves for the Independence Day
by working on several blueprints aimed at implementing various
policies after the declaration. This work revolved around establishing
a Kosovo Police Force, a new constitution, a flag and a network of
embassies [Reuters, 2007b].
On 3 April, the first official debate on the status proposal was
launched within the Security Council. Although the event was closed,
it emerged that strong differences were present among the members
and that a fact-finding mission, scheduled on 24 April, had been
approved. Hence, as decided, the fifteen ambassadors travelled to
Belgrade and Pristina where they were presented with the respective
views and proposals. Subsequently the team visited the divided town
of Kosovska Mitrovica.
After the fact-finding mission, the Security Council met for a
public debate on the report issued by the ambassadors. As different
positions persisted within the Security Council, the Russian
Ambassador to the UN Churkin suggested that talks must continue.
Indeed, it was evident to everybody that the Council failed to reach a
solution.
During the G8 summit in Germany, somewhat surprisingly, the
French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that a new round of talks
might be needed and that a resolution should be postponed for six
months. The reason behind such a proposal was that it would have
given time to the EU countries to reach a more concerted approach
[Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 121].
However, four days later, on 10 June, during his visit to Albania,
President Bush announced his commitment to statehood for Kosovo.
Pristina was delighted with the statement as this was the ultimate
34
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34 Saša Kulenoviđ
confirmation needed [Balkan Insight, 2007a]. As the deal seemed

sealed for Kosovo Albanians, the implementation of the standards,
under the lead of the Agency for European Integration, remained
Pristina’s main concern35.
In June, the attempts of the Security Council to reach a resolution
resumed. During the 20 June Security Council meeting, a new version
of the resolution circulated, proposing a new round of talks to be
held within 120 days. According to this version, if an agreement was
not reached within the given period the Ahtisaari Plan would be
automatically adopted. Russia rejected immediately the new version
objecting to the introduction of time frames. The impasse was
neither overcome during the much awaited meeting between Bush
and Putin as Kosovo was not on the agenda.
In the end, however, the stalemate was resolved when
Washington took a step backward and allowed for further talks. The
decision of the United States to extend the talks was taken in order
to show that “every attempt to reach a settlement had been made
and that Moscow was preventing a resolution for its own reasons
[Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 77].
This time it was agreed that the new talks would be held within
the Contact Group. It was agreed that a Troika of diplomats from the
United States, Russia and the European Union would mediate the
dialogue. Thus, after the nomination of the three mediators, the UN
officially launched the new round of talks on 1 August.
The Prime Minister Ceku, exasperated, called on Kosovo
Assembly to prepare a resolution paving the way for a declaration of
independence on 28 November, the Albanian Flag Day [Ker-Lindsay,
2009, 81]. Nonetheless, such an initiative was quelled by the EU and
the US.
According to Ceku, the continuation of the talks was simply aimed
at providing undecided countries time to change their mind with
regard to Kosovo’s independence. Moreover, Ceku warned that the
postponment of independence was aggravating the sense of
frustration among Kosovo Albanians [Setimes, 2007]. More
dangerously Surroi, the Assembly President, remarked that the
“people of Kosovo have a right to put pressure on their institutions”
[Reuters, 2007]. Thus, while the risk of violence was sometimes
35
Ibidem.
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directed against the Kosovo’s institutions, such a threat was often

used as a bargaining chip by the Unity Team to call for quick and
resolute actions.
Following the launch of the Troika-led negotiations, the Unity
Team presented to the Assembly of Kosovo seven principles for its
participation in those negotiations.
The objective of the Troika talks was to encourage the sides to
propose alternative solutions and to explore all options. In this
regard, the idea of partition was put on the table but Pristina was
stongly opposed. In the meantime, Kurt Volker, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, stressed that if an agreement
was not reached by 10 December, the US would be ready to
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence [B92, 2007c].
Nothwistanding the different stances, the Troika dialogue provided
the sides with the opportunity to present several proposals.
On 18 September, the Serbian Team proposed a solution based
on the Hong Kong status within China. On the other hand the Unity
Team presented a draft treaty of friendship to be signed by Serbia
and an independent Kosovo. While the two sides were encouraged to
come up with new solutions, Tadic stated that a compromised
solution would be possible only if the US and other countries stopped
supporting Kosovo’s independence so openly [B92, 2007d]. On the
other hand, Condoleeza Rice argued that the current talks would not
change the outcome and Lavrov accused the US of “deliberately
hindering a deal by removing all incentives for Pristina to
compromise” [Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 86].
As the dialogue was progressing sluggishly, Ceku announced that
Pristina was ready to announce independence after 10 December
even without UN authorization [Ker-Lindsay, 2009, 88]. However,
despite the ongoing talks, both political parties and the population in
Kosovo became increasingly focused on the elections scheduled for
the 17 November36.
In the following Troika meeting, Ischinger, the EU mediator,
proposed an accord based on the 1972 agreement normalizing
relations between East and West Germany. However, Serbia rejected
the proposal, arguing that it was similar to the agreement put forth
by Pristina [Balkan Insight, 2007b]. On 5 November, Ishinger came up
36
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36 Saša Kulenoviđ
with another proposal. He prompted the sides to consider a status-

neutral 14-points document as a basis for some sort of agreement,
but the proposal was unacceptable for both Belgrade and Pristina,
even though for diferent reasons.
In the meantime, the new Prime Minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaci
was elected. During the election campaign, Thaci had already
reassuerd a crowd of supporters that Kosovo would become an
internationally recognized country. Then, after the election, Thachi,
as Ceku had already done, suggested independence after the 10
December. Once again, the EU stepped in to rein such initiatives
[B92, 2007d].
During the fifth round of discussions, Belgrade presented a
comparative assessment of several autonomy models along with a
proposal for autonomy with independence in the longer term. On the
other hand, Pristina urged for immediate independence.
On 26 November, the sides met for the final round of direct
discussions under the aegis of the Troika. Neither party reneged on
its position and the talks ended with another stalemate. The
European Union, afraid that Pristina could go ahead with an
immediate unilateral move, called for patience.
On 7 December, the Troika submitted its report to the Secretary
General. While acknowledging that new ideas and solutions had been
explored during the four months talks, they reconfirmed the parties’
inability to reach a compromised agreement37.
On 10 December protestors took again to the streets of Pristina
demanding a declaration of independence. While the situation on the
ground was boiling, this time, Kosovo’s authorities agreed to wait for
the green light from their allies.
Since the talks were exhausted, the Security Council met on 19
December to discuss the Troika’s report. During the closed meeting
both Sejdiu and Kostunica were allowed to address the Council. The
countries willing to endorse Kosovo’s independence argued that the
resolution 1244 provided a sufficient legal basis on which to settle
Kosovo’s status. However, five countries within the European Union
were not ready to support Kosovo’s breakaway. Despite the lack of
37
Report of the European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika
on Kosovo, United Nations Security Council, 10 December 2007.
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unity, the EU members agreed to create a 1800 strong-mission in

Kosovo in order to implement the Ahtissari Plan.
Following up the Troika talks, the authorities in Pristina started a
series of consultations with their partners [Daily Telegraph, 2007].
The EU diplomats admitted that a coordination process had started
among NATO, the EU and the Kosovo authorities in order to define
the steps towards a declaration of independence in the following
months [Reuters, 2007d].
The atmosphere in Kosovo was electric. On 9 February 2008, the
Prime Minister Thaci said that one hundred countries were already
prepared to recognize Kosovo. On the other hand, Serbia was laying
the foundations for some form of partition as the Ministry for Kosovo
and Metohija opened an office in Kosovska Mitrovica. On 9 January,
Fatmir Sejdiu was re-elected as President of Kosovo. On the same
day, the Assembly voted into office a new coalition government
formed by the PDK and the LDK, led by Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi.
On 17 February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo held a session
during which it adopted a declaration of independence, declaring
Kosovo an independent and sovereign State38.
6.1. Remarks
The politicians in Pristina have called for independence ever since
the establishment of the Provisional Institutions for Self-Government.
While the PISG constantly questioned the powers reserved to the
Special Representative, they were always eager to cooperate
whenever a policy was aimed at extending their responsibilities. Even
though dialogue with Belgrade was a thorny and painful issue, the
prospect of a European future persuaded the two biggest Kosovo
Albanian parties to cooperate and engage jointly in direct talks.
Hence, despite the many challenges, favourable conditions had been
created for dialogue. Nevertheless, the violence of March 2004 and
the decision to hold status talks reduced drastically the leeway for
reaching compromised solutions.
Throughout the entire status process the Unity Team never gave
its calls for independence up. Such a steadfast attitude was possible
38
Kosovo Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008 (www.assembly-
kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635).
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38 Saša Kulenoviđ
because the leadership in Pristina did not have any pressure to back
away from its position. In the lead-up to the Ahtisaari talks, it was
already clear what the outcome of the process would be. The
awareness that the United States along with most of the EU countries
supported independence as the only viable solution was a priceless
guarantee for Pristina. Moreover, as the talks unfolded, it became
equally clear that even a unilateral move would be sufficient to gain
broad international recognition. Pristina was thus empowered
enough to reject any solution that did not entail independence. The
only thing that Pristina had to worry about was the implementation
of standards. Indeed, this was the best way to enhance Kosovo’s
credibility as a responsible political unit since improvements in the
implementation would have provided Pristina’s international
supporters with an additional reason to endorse independence.
However, in order to fully comprehend Pristina’s attitude during
the talks, domestic pressures should be taken into account. While the
international support allowed Pristina to maintain its position on
status, the internal pressure prompted Pristina to accelerate the
process. As the Unity Team was sure that independence was already
guaranteed, its only objective was to wrap up the deal as soon as
possible. The domestic pressure, expressed mainly through violent
demonstrations, persuaded the leaders in Pristina and the
international actors that reaching a status settlement would be the
best solution to assuage the violence. Furthermore, the fears of
violence were exploited by the Unity Team to demand a rapid
solution.
Thus, the lack of incentives to compromise along with the
relentless domestic pressures shaped the attitude of the Kosovo’s
negotiating team during the status talks.
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7. After Independence
Following the declaration of independence Kosovo Albanian
leaders worked on asserting their authority over the whole territory
and, in doing so, they sought to assume the remaining powers
reserved to UNMIK. Their main objective, as stated in the declaration,
became the implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal as
envisaged by Martti Ahtisaari39. In this regard, the support provided
by the European Union proved to be determinant. The day after the
declaration, Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, announced the decision
to deploy a rule of law mission within the framework provided by
resolution 1244. Moreover, on 28 February, upon Kosovo’s request, a
group of states formed the International Steering Group (ISG) with
the purpose of supporting the full implementation of the Ahtisaari’s
Proposal. In turn, the ISG appointed the International Civilian
Representative, Pieter Feith, whose main task was to oversee the
implementation of the status settlement during the period of
supervised independence [Ahtisaari, 2007].
On 7 April 2008, Pristina adopted a new constitution which did
not make any reference neither to UNMIK’s role nor to the resolution
1244. Thus, as Kosovo recognized EULEX as the only legitimate
international mission on the ground, UNMIK’s ability to pursue its
functions was seriously challenged.
On the other hand, Kosovo Serbs refused to cooperate with
EULEX and, thanks to Belgrade’s support, expanded their boycott of
the institutions of Kosovo to include UNMIK Customs, the Kosovo
Police Service, the judicial system, the municipal administration and
UNMIK railways40.
In the following months, further steps were taken to integrate
Kosovo in the international system as Pristina applied for
membership within the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. Moreover, the Assembly passed new legislations without
mentioning the powers of the Special Representative and resolution
124441.
39
Ibidem.
40
41
Ibidem.
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40 Saša Kulenoviđ
However, while Kosovo was trying to act as an independent and

sovereign state, independence came with some heavy handicaps.
Indeed, “the initial wave of recognitions diminished to a trickle, and it
became clear that Kosovo’s integration into regional and
international structures would be a long uphill struggle” [Lehne,
2012, 4].
Serbia, determined to defend its territorial integrity, decided to
resort to the legal tools available and announced its plan to request
an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s
secession. Thus, on 8 October 2008, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution submitted by Serbia requesting advisory opinion by the
International Court of Justice on the question: “is the unilateral
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?" 42.
Serbia hoped that a favourable response would justify its position
and increase the support of the international community.
During the period following the declaration, the lack of dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina affected the decisions on
communities and returns-related issues 43 . Acknowledging the
changed background, UNMIK decided to start a reconfiguration
process of its activities. As a consequence, the mission started
reducing gradually its personnel on the ground and handing over full
operational responsibilities in the area of rule of law to EULEX.
Despite such changes, the Special Representative, hoping to end the
hiatus, tried to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table. He
presented a document envisaging six provisions with a view to
address some of the most urgent questions. The six major questions
were related to the Kosovo police, custom duties, justice,
transportation and infrastructure, boundaries and Serbian patrimony.
The government of Serbia, willing to resume dialogue, held a
series of discussions with the Special Representative and accepted
the results of the discussions and the arrangements set in the report.
On the other hand, the authorities in Pristina expressively rejected
the results of the agreement of the report and favoured a quick
deployment of EULEX instead. Even though the Special
Representative reassured the parties that the implementation of the
42
General Assembly resolution 63/3, October 2008.
43
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 24 November 2008.
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arrangements would be carried out with continuous consultations,

Pristina reconfirmed its rejection of the whole six-point declaration
[B92, 2008].
Towards the fall of 2008, new laws were passed once again
without any reference to the powers of the Special Representative.
At this stage, according to Pristina, UNMIK mission was over and the
resolution 1244 was irrelevant44.
By the end of the year, the perception that the state-builiding
process was yielding notable results was widespread among Kosovo’s
authorities. The sense of empowerment encouraged Kosovo’s
authorities to take decisions autonomously on many issues. For
instance, Pristina advocated that they had to be notified directly by
Belgrade before Serbian officials’ visits to Kosovo. This policy led the
authorities to block several Serbian officials trying to visit Kosovo.
As time went by, the lack of dialogue resulted in a dramatic
decline in the number of voluntary minority returns. Some form of
collaboration on the issue was thus needed. Belgrade decided to
initiate a survey on internally displaced persons from Kosovo to
determine the number of those interested in returning to Kosovo and
to transfer the collected data to the authorities in Pristina45. On the
political level instead, after one year of independence, the sides
remained far apart. Kosovo declared that it would be ready to engage
in discussions with Belgrade only if the talks were held on the basis of
equality. Similarly, Belgrade stated that it would resume direct
negotiations only without prejudice to Kosovo’s status46. Clearly, such
divergent preconditions prevented the resumption of dialogue.
In the meantime, the situation in the north was still a source of
instability. Direct contacts between the municipalities in the north
and the central institution were non existent. It was only thanks to
UNMIK that some links were provided between the communities in
the north and Pristina.
During the post-declaration period, the principal venue where
Pristina and Belgrade continued to interact directly was the Council
of Europe-led Reconstruction Implementation Commission, tasked
with the reconstruction of 34 religious sites damaged during the
44
45
Ibidem.
46
Ibidem.
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42 Saša Kulenoviđ
March 2004 violence. As a result of the dialogue, the Commission

managed to overcome a year-long stalemate over the tendering
procedures for reconstructions projects47. Moreover, cooperation on
missing persons’ issues through the existing Working Group,
continued as well.
While maintaining a defiant attitude, the leaders in Pristina
became increasingly frustrated with the obstacles encountered. One
of the biggest source of frustration was represented by Pristina’s
inability to attend the CEFTA meetings without the presence of
UNMIK, which in turn continued to facilitate Kosovo’s participation in
international and regional fora. Kosovo’s authorities insisted that it
was their prerogative to represent Kosovo independently without the
presence of UNMIK or “Kosovo/1244” name plates. Thus, Kosovo’s
willingness to act for themselves exacerbated further the rift with
UNMIK48.
To make things worse, in the spring of 2009, Kosovo authorities
issued a series of public statements requesting UNMIK to conclude its
mission, arguing again, that resolution 1244 was not longer
applicable. Calls for the closure of UNMIK were particularly frequent
from representatives of the Self-Determination movement49.
In June 2009, Pristina took a significant step towards statehood
when Kosovo became a member of the five World Bank Group
institutions [World Bank, 2009].
On16 June, the Kosovo authorities announced that municipal
elections would be held on 15 November. Even though OSCE had
been in charge of previous elections, now, according to the new
constitution, Kosovo’s authorities assumed the Central Electoral
Commission50. The refusal of Kosovo Serbs in the north to recognize
or accept the forthcoming elections made it difficult for the
Commission to organize them. The Assembly of the Association of
Serbian Municipalities unanimously approved on 28 June the Saint
Vitus day Charter, which called on all political parties in Serbia to
oppose the participation of Kosovo Serbs in these elections51. In July,
the Government of Serbia officially declared that conditions for the
47
48
49
Ibidem.
50
51
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participation of Kosovo Serbs in the elections did not exist and that
the elections were not in line with resolution 1244 (1999) [B92,
2009a]. On the contrary, on 16 August, local by-elections organized
by the Serbian authorities took place in two Kosovo Serb-majority
areas.
In the meantime, the relations between Kosovo Serbs and EULEX
improved. Kosovo Serbs had accepted the deployment of the mission
in the north on condition that EULEX would respect resolution 1244
and operate within the status-neutral framework. Thus, in May 2009,
EULEX started the practice of copying commercial invoices and
stamping documents at Customs Gates 1 and 31 in the north of
Kosovo, sharing the data with the Kosovo Customs Service and the
Serbian Customs Administration 52 . As a result of the improved
conditions, EULEX announced in mid-August a possible agreement on
police cooperation between the mission and the Serbian Ministry of
the Interior. The news was met with resistance by the Kosovo
authorities, who maintained that signing such agreements was their
exclusive responsibility. In a deplorable development, on 26 August
some 60 Vetëvendosje self-determination activists vandalized 26
EULEX vehicles in broad daylight in Pristina to protest against the
signing of the protocol by EULEX53.
While Kosovo’s interministerial working group on
decentralization started establishing preparatory teams for the
establishment of new Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities, actions
from the central institutions very often worsened the daily lives of
Kosovo Serbs.
Kosovo Serbs communities were often affected by the electricity
disconnection policies of the Kosovo Energy Corporation. Likewise,
Serbs faced problems related to the issuance of Kosovo identification
cards by the Kosovo authorities, which did not recognize birth
certificates issued by the Serbian authorities prior to June 1999.
It is important to stress that, ever since the request for an
advisory opinion was issued by Serbia, the decisions taken by Pristina
52
Report of the Secretary General and High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union to the Secretary
General of the UN on the activities of the EULEX, 10 June 2009.
53
Report of the Secretary General and High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union to the Secretary
General of the UN on the activities of the EULEX, 30 September 2009.
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44 Saša Kulenoviđ
and Belgrade were very often influenced by concerns over how the
International Court of Justice would formulate its opinion.
From 1 to 11 December, the International Court of Justice held
public hearings on the question of the “Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by
the PISG. Delegations from Belgrade and Pristina addressed the Court
on 1 December [B92, 2009b].
On 15 November, the Kosovo authorities organized mayoral and
municipal assembly elections, during which, PDK and LDK renewed
their commitment to continue the government coalition.
In November the Special Representative met with the Serbian
President Boris Tadiđ and several times with other senior Serbian
officials, who continued to be fully engaged. On the other hand,
although small improvements were visible in UNMIK’s relations with
the Kosovo authorities, agreements seemed far-fetched in such areas
as justice, customs and cultural heritage. During November, tensions
arose with respect to the supply of electricity in the north. The
continued disconnections of the northern municipalities from the
Kosovo Energy Corporation network urged Electric Power Industry of
Serbia to step in and replace the Kosovo provider. Operational
consultations between Kosovo Energy Corporation and Electric Power
Industry of Serbia followed, in an attempt to find a longer-term
solution 54 . Moreover, another development on the ground was
worrying Kosovo Serbs: KFOR was making preparations for a gradual
withdrawal of static security from cultural heritage sites. It was
agreed that the responsibility for the guarding would be handed over
to the Kosovo Police.
During January 2010, a series of incidents occurred with respect
to Serb officials visiting Kosovo. On 13 January, Minister Bogdanoviđ,
was escorted out of Kosovo by the Kosovo Police [Kosovo
Compromise, 2010]. The Kosovo authorities argued that Bogdanoviđ
visited Kosovo with the intention to hold political meetings without a
prior announcement or permission from the Kosovo authorities.
While Kosovo’s action was in keeping with the procedure discussed
with Belgrade and the European Union, such an action remained
controversial. Bogdanoviđ stated that he had informed EULEX and
that, as a resident of Kosovo, he had a right to free movement
54
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irrespective of his ministerial office55. Regardless of the righteousness

of the decision, a negative message was sent to Kosovo Serbs.
Subsequently, on 26 January, the Kosovo Police escorted the Deputy
Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Branislav Ristiđ and four members
of his entourage out of Kosovo, arguing that his visit was not
coordinated with the Kosovo authorities56.
Despite the difficult background, the Special Representative tried
again to foster a more cooperative attitude. In his meetings with
senior Kosovo officials, discussions were held on the functioning of
the courts and full customs controls in northern Kosovo. During his
visit to northern Kosovo both communities explicitly indicated their
interest in cooperating with UNMIK. As a follow-up to these
meetings, UNMIK announced the establishment of task forces
comprising all stakeholders to address practical issues confronted by
communities on the ground. One task force began working on
practical aspects of returns with a view of providing adequate
housing, infrastructures and services. Task forces were also planned
on education and health57.
UNMIK also brokered an agreement on payments for electricity
between the Kosovo Energy Corporation and the entities of the
Serbian Orthodox Church. As a consequence, the power supply was
restored to almost all monastic communities south of the Ibar River58.
In spite of such positive developments, the hopes for a phase of
inter-ethnic rapprochement vanished when Kosovo authorities
announced their intention to implement a “strategy for northern
Kosovo.” The strategy aimed at increasing the presence north of the
Ibar River and integrate Kosovo Serbs into the Pristina-based
structures and institutions. As Kosovo leaders argued, the rationale
behind the implementation of the strategy was the need to
guarantee the “protection of the territorial integrity of Kosovo”
[Balkan Insight, 2010]. Conversely, Kosovo Serb representatives
warned that attempts to implement forcibly the “strategy for
northern Kosovo” would provoke violent reactions [Osservatorio
Balcani e Caucaso, 2010].
55
56
Ibidem.
57
Ibidem.
58
Ibidem.
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46 Saša Kulenoviđ
On 31 March 2010, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi announced

changes in the composition of the Cabinet and appointed a PDK
minister to the newly established Kosovo Ministry of European
Integration59.
On 2 June, Kosovo representatives and the Special Representative
attended the European Union-sponsored High-Level Meeting on the
Western Balkans in Sarajevo, where a Serbian delegation was also
present. After the meeting, the European Union presidency issued a
final statement reiterating its commitment to the European
perspective of the Western Balkan countries60. The Secretary-General
wrote on 24 June, to the High Representative of the European Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, stressing that, following the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the United
Nations stand ready to cooperate closely with the European Union61.
As a result, the High Representative indicated that the European
Union was ready to offer its assistance to both Belgrade and Pristina
in order to back their European future [Reuters, 2010].
While the recent developments laid the foundation for further
talks, Pristina continued to take actions aimed at asserting its
authority in Kosovo.
While UNMIK was facilitating communication between non-
recognizing states and the Kosovo Ministry of Justice, the latter
began dealing directly with mutual legal assistance requests and
responses. As expected, Serbia, as well as other non-recognizing
countries, did not accept the practice. The Serbia Ministry of Justice
returned the requests and responses to EULEX, while the Kosovo
Ministry of Justice ceased acting on requests from the Serbian
Ministry of Justice62.
On 22 April, the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority disconnected 26 telecommunications base stations
belonging to service providers unauthorized by the Kosovo
authorities. The action led to widespread disruption in the
communication infrastructure in minority areas and hindered the
functioning of several Serbian media outlets. On 2 July, the Kosovo
59
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 29 July 2010.
60
EU to reaffirm its commitment to Western Balkans at Sarajevo meeting,
EU Press Releases, 1 June 2010.
61
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 29 July 2010.
62
Ibidem.
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authorities inaugurated a civil service centre in Bosniak Mahala, a

multiethnic area in northern Mitrovica. The inauguration was viewed
by the Kosovo Serb community as another attempt to establish
Kosovo institutions in the north63. During the first two years of
independence, Pristina’s attitude had been swinging between
provocative actions and timid forms of rapprochement.
However, a paramount turning point, expected to influence the
behaviour of the parties as well as their future relation, came that
summer. On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice delivered
its advisory opinion on the question “Is the unilateral declaration of
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self Government of
Kosovo in accordance with international law.” The Court concluded
that “the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable
rule of international law” [International Court of Justice, 2010].
The verdict came as a shock to Kosovo Serbs. On 22 July, the
Serbian Government Coordinator for the Mitrovica District,
addressing a crowd of Kosovo Serbs in northern Mitrovica, declared
that the fight for Kosovo would continue”64.
On 27 July, Serbia forwarded a letter to the Secretary-General
specifying its position concerning the advisory opinion. Claiming that
the Court applied a narrow approach as to the scope of the question,
Serbia argued that the findings in this opinion neither endorsed
Pristina’s claim that the province of Kosovo is a state, nor the view
that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is a unique case.
Moreover, Serbia pointed out that the Court clearly affirmed that the
status of Kosovo had not yet been resolved and that “a political
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status had not run its
course” 65.
In the wake of the ICJ advisory opinion, on 9 September 2010, the
General Assembly adopted resolution 64/298 which was jointly
sponsored by Serbia and the 27 member States of the European
Union. The resolution acknowledged the content of the advisory
opinion and welcomed the European Union readiness to facilitate
dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade66.
63
Ibidem.
64
65
Letter dated 27 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
66
General Assembly resolution 64/298, 13 October 2010.
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48 Saša Kulenoviđ
As far as Kosovo was concerned, the advisory opinion was

welcomed as a victory and as the needed confirmation of their policy.
In the wake of the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice, Kosovo authorities strongly resisted the UNMIK facilitation
role in regional and international conferences, perceiving it as a
limitation on Kosovo’s sovereignty.
The rift continued also with respect to the question of the Serbian
officials visiting Kosovo.
In August, the Kosovo authorities announced that any Serbian
government representative entering Kosovo in an official capacity
would “be arrested and expelled if caught by the police” [B92, 2010].
Pristina blamed the Serbian officials for failing to act in accordance
with the rules set out by the Kosovo authorities. This announcement
came following a visit by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Interior to Graēanica monastery on 15 August, during which he
responded to questions from the media regarding the handover of
the protection of the monastery to the Kosovo police67.
In addition, efforts to exercise authority in the north worsened
inter-ethnic confidence as attempts to deploy the Kosovo Police
Special Units (ROSU) in Serb-majority municipalities continued68.
The announcement by the Kosovo authorities on 25 August 2010
of plans to allocate 5 million euros for northern Kosovo was rejected
by Kosovo Serb municipal leaders, who emphasized that the northern
municipalities received their financial support from Belgrade69.
On the other hand, as a gesture of goodwill, Pristina adopted a
policy decision to continue allowing the citizens of Serbia to enter
Kosovo only with their national ID card.
On 19 July, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ordered a partial retrial of
the case of Ramush Haradinaj, the leader of the Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo and former Kosovo Prime Minister 70 . On 2
November, the minority government led by the PDK lost a vote of no-
confidence in the Kosovo Assembly. As a result, the Assembly was
67
68
Ibidem.
69
Ibidem.
70
ICTY, Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj Appeal Judgement, Press Release The
Hague, 21 July 2010.
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dissolved and new elections were announced71. The elections, the

first organized by the Kosovo authorities since Kosovo declared
independence, were held on the 12 December.
A European Parliament delegation which monitored the elections
issued a statement noting that “some serious shortcomings
underscored insufficient political will”72. On 12 January, the European
Network of Election Monitoring Organizations announced that “a
high number of irregularities during the Kosovo Assembly elections
had severely affected the trust in the democratic process in
Kosovo”73.
Moreover, a wave of frustration among politicians in Kosovo was
caused by the release of the report of Council of Europe Special
Rapporteur Dick Marty entitled “Inhuman treatment of people and
illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” [Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights, 2010]. The Kosovo authorities expressed
their willingness to cooperate and welcomed the creation of an
EULEX Task Force to conduct the investigation.
As 2010 was coming to an end, the Special Representative hold
regular meetings with the Serbian leadership, to the purpose of
preparing for dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. While the
collapse of the governing coalition in Kosovo delayed the start of the
dialogue, the appointed European Union representatives held several
preparatory meetings with both sides 74 . Pristina expressed its
willingness to start talks rapidly, but the need for partial reruns of the
elections delayed further the formation of a new government.
During the election period, continued misrepresentation of
UNMIK activities in northern Kosovo were reported by some Pristina-
based media. UNMIK was depicted as the main obstacle to Pristina’s
ability to exercise its authority in the north and to implement its
“strategy for the north” 75.
In early November, the problem of illegal construction, perceived
as a provocation by local Serbs, resurfaced.
71
72
Election Observation Delegation to the General Election in Kosovo (12
December 2010-9 January 2011), Report by Doris Pack, European
Parliament, 27 January 2011.
73
74
75
Ibidem.
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50 Saša Kulenoviđ
From early January 2011, the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade

began issuing new vehicle plates. While the Belgrade authorities
began distributing the new plates to owners of Serbian-registered
vehicles in Kosovo, the Kosovo police began confiscating the Serbian
plates for Kosovo. As political representatives in northern Kosovo
threatened retaliatory actions, the European Union stepped in and
brokered a temporary arrangement to minimize the disruption76. The
willingness of the parties to pander to the European Union requests
indicated that time was ripe for direct dialogue.
After the conclusion of the electoral process, a political
polarization emerged in Kosovo. The discussions over the formation
of a new government revealed strong divisions among the major
political parties. As a result, a period of political turmoil ensued. On 1
March 2011, the political crisis worsened when opposition members
of the Assembly challenged the legality of the presidential election
process and a court ruling found that the election procedure had
violated the Constitution.
In the end, the crisis was overcome when the PDK and the LDK
reached an agreement on the electoral system reform and appointed
a consensual candidate for President, Atifete Jahjaga77.
7.1. Remarks
After the declaration of independence expectations were high in
Pristina. The Kosovo authorities hoped that the path towards
statehood would be smooth and international recognition
widespread. In the process of state-building, the support provided by
EULEX proved to be significant and the following sense of
empowerment led the Kosovo authorities to undertake unilateral and
assertive actions. Under the aegis of the EULEX, Kosovo’s main aim
became the implementation of the comprehensive settlement as
conceived by the Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. In this regard, the
promulgation of a new Constitution provided Kosovo leaders with the
required legal framework to pursue their new policies.
76
Ibidem.
77
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The willingness to act for themselves was particularly visible in

the dismissive attitude towards UNMIK, whose mission, according to
the central authorities, was not relevant anymore.
Pristina’s efforts to assert authority over the whole territory were
also detrimental to the lives of minority communities. The
disconnection by the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority of telecommunications base stations belonging to
unlicensed service providers caused disruption in the communication
in minority areas. In addition, other actions, such as the sustained
attempts to implement a strategy for the north, were perceived as
highly provocative by Kosovo Serbs.
The declaration of independence determined also the end of
direct dialogue. Pristina stated that it would be ready to engage in
dialogue with Belgrade only if the talks were held on the basis of
equality. Therefore, dialogue continued only on relatively
unimportant questions, namely within the Reconstruction
Implementation Commission and the Working Group on missing
persons.
It is unquestionable that, except for northern Kosovo, Pristina
managed to improve the administration over its territory. Indeed, the
responsibilities reserved to the Kosovo authorities increased. The
Kosovo Police gradually took on more and more responsibilities and
Pristina assumed the Central Electoral Commission. New laws were
passed without reference to the role of UNMIK and many actions
were pursued without any coordination with the international actors
on the ground. On the international level, particularly important was
the World Bank Group membership. Moreover, the advisory opinion
of the ICJ, according to which, the unilateral declaration of
independence was in accordance with international law,
strengthened further more Kosovo’s position.
However, while Kosovo was trying to act like a fully fledged
independent state, the declaration of independence did not
officialise Kosovo’s entry in the international community. The wave of
international recognition slowed down after the first two months.
The fact that independence was supervised and deeply connected to
the international presence represented another hindrance to full
statehood. Furthermore, Pristina did not enjoy the monopoly of
power over its territory and EULEX was free to take decisions
sometimes contrary to Pristina’s wishes. In addition, the ICR, while
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52 Saša Kulenoviđ
tasked with supervising the implementation of the settlement, had

the powers to take corrective measures and annul laws and decisions
adopted by the Kosovo authorities.
The willingness to participate in the international fora without
UNMIK’s facilitation turned out to be unfeasible. Particularly
frustrating was the inability to attend CEFTA meetings alone. The
inability to implement successfully its strategy for the north and
integrate the Kosovo Serbs in the central institutions aggravated
further more Pristina’s dissatisfaction.
It was clear that Pristina alone would not be able to resolve all
these issues. While the uncompromising attitude did not prevent
Pristina from declaring independence, unilateral attempts to act as
an utterly independent state were not sufficient to get rid of all the
obstacles in the way. Hence, Pristina’s authorities realized that if
Kosovo wanted to obtain a broader international recognition the
dialogue with Belgrade was of paramount importance and that many
problems could be solved only with Belgrade’s support. In such a
context, the breakthrough was provided by the European Union’s
willingness to facilitate new talks.
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8. EU facilitated Dialogue
Despite the political crisis in Kosovo, the EU-brokered dialogue
between Pristina and Belgrade started in March 2011. Robert Cooper,
Counsellor of the European External Action Service, was appointed as
facilitator. As he explained, the aim of the dialogue was to promote
cooperation and to remove obstacles that affected people’s daily
lives in the region. Likewise, the dialogue was aimed at achieving
progress on the path to EU78. The new phase of the dialogue was
presented as status-neutral since the EU did not intend to take on
political questions. However, the borderline between technical and
political issues proved to be often blurry. The need to mediate talks
without prejudice to status was the result of the diverging positions
of EU member states with respect to Kosovo’s independence, their
approach to the issue of the Serb municipalities in the north, and
their regard for Serbia’s European future. In this regard, the lack of
unity among the EU members over the topics foreseen in the
dialogue created a favourable environment for fostering
compromised and balanced solutions.
The first round of talks was held in Brussels on 8 and 9 March.
The Belgrade delegation was led by the Political Director of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Borislav Stefanoviđ, while the Pristina
delegation by Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri. The first meeting
served primarily as a confidence-building exercise and, according to
the facilitator, the meeting took place in a constructive and cordial
atmosphere79. Both sides agreed that people must have access to a
civil registry and cadastral data in order to be provided with verifiable
information in those areas. Other issues discussed included regional
trade and freedom of movement of goods, which had a substantial
impact on the economic development of the small individual regional
markets. The parties identified a modus operandi that would allow a
pragmatic approach to the holding of CEFTA meetings under the
forthcoming 2011 chairmanship. Exchanges of views on
telecommunications and electricity were also held, and civil aviation
was briefly discussed80.
78
EU facilitated dialogue: a positive start in Brussels, 8-9 March 2011, Press
Statement, Brussels, 9 March 2011.
79
Ibidem.
80
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54 Saša Kulenoviđ
The second meeting, built on the positive start of the dialogue,

was held on 28 March in a good working atmosphere. As a follow-up
to the first meeting, civil registry and cadastral records were
discussed81. The discussions identified a way forward on the issue of
availability of information contained in civil registry books. It was
agreed that the practical work of completing civil registry information
would be carried forward by a joint working group, chaired by EULEX.
The parties discussed cadastral information as well and committed
themselves to the elaboration of an outline for an agreement aimed
at producing more accurate cadastral records82.
In the wake of discussions held by technical working groups, the
third meeting took place on 15 April 2011 and revolved around
freedom of movement. The parties discussed related topics such as
identity cards, passports, car insurance, driving licences and licence
plates. Furthermore, issues related to civil registry,
83
telecommunications and electricity were also brought up .
In spite of the positive atmosphere during the dialogue, repeated
efforts by the Kosovo Minister of Interior to deploy Kosovo police
special units in Kosovo Serb-majority northern municipalities, without
consultations with the local communities, increased tensions. Many
in the northern communities perceived the attempts as not being
dictated by rule of law considerations.
As to the relations with UNMIK, after the start of the EU
facilitated dialogue, the new Kosovo’s government took a more
pragmatic attitude towards the UNMIK facilitating role in regional
and international initiatives84.
Having overcome a series of political crises, and following the
start of direct talks, the Kosovo authorities increased their efforts to
establish a close engagement with the European Union and increased
their visibility at the international level. In this regard, since her
inauguration on 7 April, the President Atifete Jahjaga focused her
activities on participating in multilateral forums.
As a result of the positive start of the dialogue, the frequency of
preparatory meetings, technical working groups and bilateral and
81
EU facilitated dialogue: working group on civil registry set up, Press
Statement, Brussels 28 March 2011.
82
83
Ibidem.
84
Ibidem.
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trilateral contacts between the European Union and the two parties
to the dialogue increased significantly.
The fourth round of meetings was held in Brussels on 17 and 18
May. The discussions focused once again on civil registry, cadastre
records, freedom of movement, telecommunications and energy
issues. The meeting was productive as the parties moved closer to
agreements on a number of issues. Moreover, in preparation of
future meetings, additional questions were brought up, such as
missing persons, religious and cultural heritage and recognition of
university and schools diplomas85. Soon after the fourth meeting, the
war criminal Ratko Mladic was arrested in Serbia and subsequently
extradited to The Hague. Serbia was understandably trying to come
to terms with its past and get closer to the EU.
During the period, some Serbian government officials, including
the Principal Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Daèiæ, suggested that
“territorial adjustments” might be brought to the table in order to
reach a final settlement for Kosovo86. The suggestion resulted in
condemnation from Pristina and Washington. Moreover, Kosovo Serb
political groups also opposed the idea of territorial adjustments,
regardless of whether they lived north or south of the Ibar River. In
contrast, the head of the opposition Self-Determination movement
pledged to work towards the union of Kosovo with Albania87.
The fifth meeting, held on 2 July, brought the first actual results
to the dialogue. Indeed, agreements were reached in three areas
pivotal for the improvement of ordinary people’s lives, with regards
to civil registry, freedom of movement and university diplomas. On
civil registry, it was agreed that a joint committee, chaired by EULEX,
would continue identifying gaps in missing pre-1999 civil registry
books. According to the agreement, EULEX would also certify copies
of all original civil registry books with the purpose of establishing a
comprehensive civil registry in Kosovo and would serve as a provider
of civil registration information upon request.
Secondly, the agreement on freedom of movement enabled
people to cross the administrative boundary line using their identity
cards or driving licences. The parties acknowledged the need to
85
EU facilitated dialogue: a productive meeting in Brussels, Press Statement;
17, 18 May 2011.
86
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 12 August 2011.
87
Ibidem.
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56 Saša Kulenoviđ
implement the agreement as soon as possible and additional

provisions were included with a view to allow cross-boundary travel
by car.
Thirdly, the parties agreed in principle on the mutual acceptance
of university and school diplomas. They decided to appoint a
mutually agreed international body tasked with the certification of
diplomas and to discuss the details at the next dialogue meeting88.
The parties’ willingness to move forward the dialogue was
signaled by their calls to put the agreements into practice as soon as
operationally feasible. In this regard, tripartite joint working groups,
chaired by the European Union were created to ensure an efficient
implementation mechanism. It was also expected that the
agreements reached at the fifth meeting would pave the way for the
opening of more complicated questions. However, it is important to
stress that the agreements reached “had been modeled by the EU in
a way which did not prejudice the parties as state parties, and
required no ratification from their sides” [Hamilton, 2012, 13].
Therefore, the implementation of the agreements depended solely
on the political will of the contracting parties.
After the fifth round of the dialogue, the President of Kosovo
Atifete Jahjaga, during the third regional summit held in Ohrid,
confirmed Kosovo’s aspirations to accelerate the Euro-Atlantic
integration [Setimes, 2011]. Moreover, the Prime Minister Thaci went
to Brussels to discuss the European Union perspective for Kosovo.
Indeed, the improvements in the dialogue were perceived as directly
linked to the Kosovo’s advancement on the European path.
In another positive development, the Pristina-Belgrade Working
Group on Missing Persons, chaired by the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), held its first meeting after a hiatus of nearly one
year, largely due to internal political events in Kosovo89.
While the first concrete results were reached, leaders of Kosovo
Serb parties generally expressed frustration over the perceived
exclusion from the process. In particular, northern Kosovo Serb
leaders continued to raise concerns with regard to the
implementation of the Pristina’s strategy for the north. Indeed, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to expand its operations into
88
Ibidem.
89
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Serb-majority northern municipalities and the Regional Operational

Support Units (ROSU) commenced daily patrols in multi-ethnic areas
of northern Kosovo. However, this rift was only the prelude to a more
unsettling setback90.
The meeting scheduled for 20 July was cancelled when, following
discussions with both parties, the European Union facilitator
concluded that no agreement would be reached on issues prepared
for that round91, which included the Kosovo Customs stamps.
Following the cancellation of the session, the government of
Kosovo issued a decision on customs reciprocity measures against
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, banning the import of goods with
Serbian Customs stamps while levying a tax on goods imported from
Bosnia and Herzegovina [Reuters, 2011].
Indeed, since 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina had levied a tax of 10
per cent while Serbia had refused to admit goods originating in
Kosovo, since it had not recognized the Kosovo Customs stamps.
According to the Italian ambassador to Kosovo Mr. Giffoni, the event
was the anticipation of a crisis. He argued that both Pristina and
Belgrade were prepared to take alternative actions if the EU-
facilitated dialogue had failed [Hamilton, 2012, 7]. Such an attitude
signaled a latent mistrust of the parties in the dialogue. It was clear
to both that, regardless the agreements achieved, the dialogue was
actually very fragile. On 25 July, the Kosovo authorities unilaterally
decided to deploy Kosovo Police Regional Operations Support Units
to the two authorized border crossings in northern Kosovo, gate 1
and 31, with the aim of enforcing the embargo throughout Kosovo92.
This attempt was not coordinated with the international presences or
the communities on the ground. Indeed, the frustration provoked by
the unwillingness of KFOR and EULEX to establish Pristina’s control
over the north “led the Kosovo authorities to take matters into their
own hands” [Lehne, 2012, 5]. When KFOR intervened to facilitate the
withdrawal of the Units from northern Kosovo a gunfight erupted
resulting in the death of a ROSU officer near Zubin Potok on 26 July.
The Albanian nationalist party Vetevendosje expressed its
disappointment that Kosovo forces retreated without enforcing
90
Ibidem.
91
EU facilitated dialogue: next round of talks postponed, Press Statement.
92
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58 Saša Kulenoviđ
reciprocity measures [Hamilton, 2012, 7]. The dissatisfaction was due

to the evident inabilty of Pristina to assert control over the borders in
the north. Moreover, the violence at the border showed to the world
that Kosovo was still a place where a policeman or a civilian can be
killed and that a de facto division along ethnic lines was strong in
Kosovo [Hamilton, 2012, 7].
In reaction to the actions of Pristina, local Kosovo Serbs, who
continued to reject the authority of the Kosovo institutions, erected
roadblocks along the routes leading to the two gates, effectively
blocking the ROSU movements. They promised to maintain them
until gates 1 and 31 were returned to the status quo ante 25 July.
Moreover, on 27 July, during a Serb demonstration gathered at the
crossing point, some individuals set fire to the customs facilities at
gate 193.
In response, KFOR temporarily closed the two gates and declared
them “military restricted areas” [Tanjug, 2011]. In order to lessen
tensions, on 5 August, the KFOR Commander brokered an 11-point
“common understanding” between Belgrade and Pristina. The
understanding involved KFOR remaining in control of the gates until
the resumption of the dialogue, with a deadline of 15 September.
Vehicles weighing over 3.5 tons carrying medical supplies or
humanitarian goods were allowed to pass through the gates and the
same principle was applied for goods directed to sites of the Serbian
Orthodox Church94.
On 2 September, the European Union-facilitated dialogue
resumed. During the meeting, Serbia agreed to recognize the Kosovo
Customs stamps. In this regard, Serbia agreed to allow free
movement of goods as long as goods from Kosovo were stamped
with “Kosovo Customs” instead of “Republic of Kosovo Customs.” As
a result of the agreement, trade flows resumed during the month of
September, except through gates 1 and 31 in northern Kosovo.
Accordingly, on 8 September, at a CEFTA meeting, representatives
from Belgrade and Pristina informed the Special Joint Committee that
the issue had been resolved in the dialogue and that trade would
soon return to normal95.
93
Ibidem.
94
Ibidem.
95
Ibidem.
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On 16 September, in accordance with an operational plan

prepared by Pristina and coordinated with EULEX and KFOR, EULEX
assumed control of both gates and ensured the presence of one
Kosovo customs officer, in an observer capacity, and two Kosovo
border police officers at each96.
On the other hand, President Tadic denied Belgrade’s acceptance
of the presence of Kosovo border guards and customs officials. It was
thus clear that “for a correct implementation of the customs
agreements it was necessary to find an agreement on the
management of crossing points” [Hamilton, 2012, 15].
Besides the customs agreement, on 2 September meeting, an
agreement was also reached on the issue of cadastre records. In this
regard, the parties agreed to establish a fully reliable cadastre in
Kosovo, in order to protect the rights of people with legitimate claims
to property. According to the agreement, a tripartite implementation
group chaired by the European Union would monitor the
implementation, involving also cadastre experts from the two parties
in the process97.
Despite the achievements of the last round of talks, the Kosovo
Serbs in the north reinforced their roadblocks at gates 1 and 31 and
erected additional roadblocks along other routes in order to protest
the deployment of Kosovo customs officers at the gates [Associated
Press, 2011]. These events contributed to a significant deterioration
in the security situation in northern Kosovo, widening the gap
between the communities in the north and the institutions in
Pristina.
Given the resurgent tensions and the reluctance of the Serb
delegation to re-engage immediately in dialogue, the facilitator
Robert Cooper informed the parties that the round of talks foreseen
for the 28 September would not take place98.
During fall 2011, in order to clarify their utter opposition to
Pristina’s meddling in the north, the municipal authorities in northern
Kosovo called for a public referendum on the question: “Do you
96
Report of the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy to the Secretary-General on the activities of the EULEX, 31
October 2011.
97
98
EU facilitated dialogue: Serb delegation not ready to continue the talks
today, Press Statement, Brussels, 28 September 2011.
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60 Saša Kulenoviđ
accept the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?” and announced

that it would take place on 14 and 15 February99. While the Serbian
Government publicly opposed the holding of such a referendum, the
symbolic message was unequivocal.
The continued tension in northern Kosovo influenced the political
discourse and significantly impacted the dialogue between Pristina
and Belgrade. Similarly, the standstill affected the discussions on the
European perspective of the region. On 9 December, the Council of
the European Union postponed its decision on Serbia’s European
Union candidate status until March 2012, with some specific
reference to the tension in northern Kosovo100. As a matter of fact,
while the European Commission approved Serbia’s EU candidacy, it
was the European Council that objected to it. This signaled the
ambiguous position of the European Union.
However, while the European Commission was in favour of
granting Serbia the EU candidacy, in its Enlargement Strategy 2011-
2012, the Commission officially requested that Kosovo adopt a
comprehensive agenda for the north [European Commission, 2011].
As a consequence, Pristina officials, in an attempt to reduce
tensions, adopted a more conciliatory rhetoric towards the north.
The Prime Minister Thaçi, addressing northern Kosovo Serbs,
expressed his willingness “to assist them more than Belgrade does”
[Independent Journalism, 2011].
Following several bilateral contacts, the European Union
facilitated dialogue resumed at the end of November, ending the
three-month hiatus. The seventh round of the dialogue was held in
Brussels on 21 and 22 November. The two parties agreed that the
European University Association would be the institution tasked with
certifying diplomas issued by universities of each party in connection
with further education and public employment. Discussions were also
held on regional cooperation. Referring to the EU’s overall strategy
for the region, the parties agreed to return to the issue at their next
meeting with the purpose of reaching an agreement101. The parties
reviewed also the implementation process and welcomed progress
99
100
Ibidem.
101
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made within the technical working groups so far102. Moreover, as a

response to related tensions on the ground, the issue of operational
management of crossing points was briefly discussed.
However, during the eight rounds, held from 30 November to 2
December, the parties focused almost exclusively on the European
Union concept of the integrated management of crossing points. As a
result, also because the parties were aware of the need to harmonise
their legislation with the EU acquis, an agreement was reached103.
The parties committed to gradually set up joint, integrated
management posts at all common crossing points, as soon as
practically possible, in line with European best practices. EULEX
would be present in line with its mandate and a technical protocol
would be signed to establish a tripartite group tasked with
overseeing the implementation. Essentially, the agreement called for
the union of the Kosovo and Serbia’s border points, leaving thus one
border point between the two territories, a border strategy that did
not necessarily create a national border [Hamilton, 2012, 17].
Moreover, it was agreed that no national symbols or flags would be
allowed at the crossing points. Given that, according to the official EU
document, Pristina and Belgrade reached an agreement on
integrated management for crossing points (IBM), it was not clear
whether the “B” of IBM stood for border or boundary. In any case,
despite the point of contention over the meaning of the “B”, the
establishment of joint border points indicated that Kosovo lost part
of its authority to control the movements with Serbia. Thus, from
Kosovo’s perspective this represented a step backwards [Hamilton,
2012, 18].
Besides the new agreements reached, the last two meetings of
2011 witnessed the implementation of earlier agreements. At the
beginning of December, the first original civil registry book from the
municipality of Lipjan was copied and certified by EULEX in an
operational follow-up to the agreement reached in early July, and
was subsequently handed over from Belgrade to Pristina, through
EULEX. With regard to cadastre records, the agreement reached in
September was followed up by meetings between the parties on
102
EU facilitated dialogue: Positive resumption in Brussels, Press Statement,
21-22 November 2011.
103
EU facilitated dialogue; Agreement on IBM, Press Statement, Brussels 2
December 2011.
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62 Saša Kulenoviđ
more detailed, operational matters required for its

104
implementation .
On 26 December, implementation began also for the 2 July
agreement on freedom of movement, which, since then, had been
elaborated by working groups and reviewed in the previous eighth
rounds of dialogue. Under these arrangements, residents of Kosovo
and Serbia were provided with an entry/exit document issued to
them at the crossing points, enabling them to travel in and through
their respective areas of control. Moreover, it was decided that cars
with Serbian (“SRB”) number plates issued to residents of Serbia
proper and cars with “KS” vehicle licence plates being reissued in
Kosovo to those requesting them would be able to travel freely. For
people travelling in vehicles with the current “RKS” licence plates of
the Kosovo authorities in circulation since the beginning of 2011,
temporary vehicle licence plates valid for Serbia proper were made
available by the Serbian authorities upon entry at the crossing points.
Following the agreement on the acceptance of university diplomas,
the parties agreed that the European University Association will
verify and certify diplomas issued by universities of each party. In
turn, the Association decided that the certification would be carried
out by a committee of European academic experts105.
As the end of the year was approaching, the implementation of
new agreements and the breakthrough on the integrated
management of crossing points encouraged the sides to further
dialogue on other thorny issues.
During the period, statements from the leaders in Belgrade,
stressed the need for a comprehensive, lasting settlement on Kosovo,
ruling out the possibility of its division along ethnic lines106.
In the meantime, Kosovo police and Customs officers continued
to be transported by air to gates 1 and 31 by EULEX, as the northern
Kosovo Serbs continued to deny EULEX full freedom of movement.
Moreover, public opinion about EULEX in the north was negatively
affected by confusion about the implementation of the dialogue
104
105
Ibidem.
106
Ibidem.
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agreements on freedom of movement and on the future integrated

management of the crossing points107.
On 14 and 15 February, the northern Kosovo Serb municipalities
conducted their public “referendum” on the question “Do you accept
the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?” The organizers claimed a
turnout of 75.29 per cent, and that some 99.74 per cent of
participants responded negatively to the question posed108. A number
of incidents added to problems on the ground. Among the more
worrying developments was the series of apparent tit-for-tat arrests
carried out by the Kosovo and the Serbian police109.
Despite the tensions on the ground dialogue continued. At the
ninth session of the European Union-mediated dialogue, from 22 to
24 February, the parties reached an agreement on Kosovo’s regional
representation and cooperation. The agreement provided for Kosovo
to participate in regional organizations with the nameplate of
“Kosovo*”, not to be referred to as a “Republic” anymore. The
footnote linked to the asterisk read: “this designation is without
prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with Security Council
resolution 1244 (1999) and the International Court of Justice Opinion
on the Kosovo declaration of independence.” With such a
denomination Kosovo was allowed to participate on its own account,
speak for itself at regional meetings and sign new agreements. With
regard to existing agreements signed by UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo,
the parties decided to let UNMIK determine whether to attend
related meetings. Taking into account the elements of the
agreement, UNMIK concluded that it was not necessary to attend
certain meetings110.
At the ninth dialogue session, the parties concluded also the
technical protocol on integrated management of crossing points
reached on 2 December 2011. The protocol enabled the relevant
committees to prepare practical issues, such as location of the
crossing points, the precise presence of authorities, their budget and
107
Report of the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy to the Secretary-General on the activities of the
EULEX, 31 January 2012.
108
109
Ibidem.
110
Ibidem.
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64 Saša Kulenoviđ
funding sources, the use of uniforms and badges and the exchange of
information111.
While the agreement on regional representation was a move
towards the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia,
the road ahead was still riddled with challenges and uncertainties,
since the deal did not tackle the key bones of contention between
the two countries, namely northern Kosovo and Pristina’s status.
Indeed, as Belgrade and Pristina held contrasting perspectives on
these issues, the overall situation was still unstable [Lepore, 2012, 7].
Moreover, “particularly significant was the way the deal was finally
struck. Indeed, without major incentives from the EU, both sides
would have doubtlessly stuck to their positions” [Lehne, 2012, 3]. In
this regard, EU facilitation was not facilitation at all but rather
“heavy-duty mediation, including setting the agenda, elaborating
solutions, and using massive carrots and sticks to bring the parties on
board” [Lehne, 2012, 8]. However, while playing a decisive role in
encouraging dialogue, it was equally important for the EU to maintain
its balanced approach which reflected the divergent positions on
Kosovo’s status among its member states.
Hence, following the successful conclusion of discussions on
important issues in the dialogue, both Belgrade and Pristina
advanced their European plans. At the beginning of March, the
European Union member states voted to grant candidacy status to
Serbia, which had been pending since its application in 2009. On 27
March, the European Commissioner for Enlargement formally
launched a feasibility study for a Stabilization and Association
Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo 112 . These
marked a paramount political development, as concrete progress in
the European Union-facilitated dialogue was made.
Despite the advancement on the European path, the agreement
on Kosovo’s representation caused internal divisions in Kosovo. The
public opinion was irritated that the country would not be referred to
as a Republic in regional fora and felt to had been used by Serbia as a
tool to get EU candidate status. Kosovo’s Self-Determination
Movement accused the government of having removed the word
“Republic” in exchange for a footnote that compromises and
111
Ibidem.
112
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damages Pristina’s independent status [The New York Times, 2012].

In fact,“by consenting to a rather peculiar nameplate, Pristina for its
part acknowledged that it was not quite yet a normal state” [Lehne,
2012, 3].
Moreover, as the agreement did not stipulate the precise way of
using the footnote, different interpretations led to problems with
Kosovo’s participation in a number of regional meetings. Belgrade
advocated that the footnote had to be on the name plates
immediately under “Kosovo”, while Pristina insisted that the footnote
did not belong on the name plate. Depending on the absence or the
presence of the footnote, either Pristina or Belgrade responded by
boycotting the meetings. Hence, exclusive interpretations hampered
Pristina’s or Belgrade’s ability to participate in the same regional
forums, also signalling the inherent shortcomings in the
implementation mechanisms113.
In the meantime, implementation of previous agreements
continued. With regard to the agreement struck on mutual
acceptance of university diplomas, the European Union charged a
third party foundation, SPARK, with undertaking verification of
university diplomas on the ground. It was agreed that upon
verification that the diplomas had been properly issued, SPARK would
forward them to the European University Association for
certification114. As part of implementing agreement on Civil Registry
Books, a factory building in Niš (Serbia) had been identified as the
place where civil registry files for Kosovo would be scanned, printed,
and certified. Both sides agreed to commence with an initial small-
scale pilot phase from 17 April for the municipality of Lipjan/Lipljan,
eventually leading to the main phase115.
Casting a shadow over these developments, tension resurged in
part because of preparations for the Serbian elections due on 6 May
and accompanying controversies about voting in Kosovo. In this
regard, while accepting the holding of presidential elections, the
Kosovo authorities warned that they would use all available means to
prevent local elections [Balkan Insight, 2012]. In order to avoid a
counterproductive confrontation, the Special Representative agreed
113
Ibidem.
114
115
Ibidem.
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66 Saša Kulenoviđ
with the Government of Serbia not to organize local elections in

Kosovo in May, but to reconsider the issue at a future date.
Moreover, UNMIK started working with international partners to
identify a voting mechanism acceptable to all stakeholders116.
The holding of parliamentary and presidential elections along
with the process of government formation in Serbia led to a hiatus in
dialogue. On 6 and 20 May, the voting for the parliamentary and the
two round Serbian presidential elections proceeded peacefully.
However, despite the agreement between Serbia and UNMIK, the
local authorities in two Serb municipalities in the north organized
local elections and Pristina failed to prevent them [Setimes, 2012a].
Tomislav Nikoliđ, who won the presidential elections, confirmed
Serbia’s commitment to honour all agreements reached in the
European Union-facilitated dialogue with Pristina.
Besides these developments, on 23 May, the Kosovo institutions
unveiled a plan to establish a new administrative office in northern
Mitrovica. The initiative, supported by some international
representatives in Kosovo, was rejected by Kosovo Serb political
leaders in the north [Setimes, 2012b]. The administrative office,
whose goal was the provision of services to all communities, became
operative on 6 July.
On 14 June 2012, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs
outlined a road map for visa liberalization to the Kosovo authorities.
Another important step for the Kosovo authorities was represented
by the preparations for what they had described as the end to
supervised independence. This envisaged the closure of the
International Civilian Office, created to oversee the implementation
of the provisions of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal
[Setimes, 2012c].
During summer 2012, implementation of previously reached
agreements produced mixed results. Positive developments regarded
certification of diplomas and civil registry books. On 27 June, the
European University Association certified the first pack of diplomas
issued by Kosovo institutions of higher education. With respect to the
civil registry, a pilot project on copying, verifying and certifying civil
registry books commenced on 10 May. In addition, a total of 111
books covering most records for the territory of Lipljan were certified
116
Ibidem.
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and handed over by EULEX to the Civil Registry Agency in Kosovo by

mid-June117.
However, less satisfying results were achieved in other areas.
With regard to cadastre records Pristina had still to adopt the
legislation required for the implementation of the agreement. Little
progress had been made in the implementation of the agreement on
the management of crossing points as well. Indeed, Belgrade had yet
to sign the technical protocol for the implementation of the
dialogue’s conclusions. On the freedom of movement, the
implementation of the provisions covering vehicle licence plates
proved to be controversial, and a decision of the Kosovo authorities
to ban, as from July, the use of Serbian licence plates issued for
Kosovo triggered new protests in northern Kosovo.
After the elections, in Belgrade, a new Government was formed
on 27 July while the Secretary-General visited the region on 23 and
24 July. While officials on both sides expressed their willingness to go
back to the negotiating table, the newly elected Serb President
Nikolic pointed out that the UN should play a more active role in the
talks [B92, 2012a]. In the meantime, the European Union had
continued consultations with both parties on the resumption of the
dialogue. Consultations between Serbia and the European Union on
the interpretation of the footnote corresponding to the asterisk in
“Kosovo*” helped to clarify the ambiguity caused by differing
interpretations. In this regard, the EU mediator Robert Cooper stated
that the parties had never agreed that the footnote must be written
on the nameplate [Tanjug, 2012]. Accordingly, the Government of
Serbia issued an instruction in which it specified the conditions under
which its delegations would attend regional meetings in accordance
with the agreement118. It was decided that in regional meetings the
footnote should be contained in the accompanying documents but
not on the nameplate [B92, 2012b].
As far as the civil registry books were concerned, the pilot project
in Niš continued while the pilot project in Lipljan was completed. A
full-scale project was envisaged to begin soon. Furthermore, the
Kosovo authorities eventually began working on the legislation
117
Ibidem.
118
Ibidem.
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68 Saša Kulenoviđ
required to establish a technical agency for the implementation of

the agreement on the cadastre records.
A significant breakthrough occurred on 25 September, when
Belgrade signed the technical protocol for the implementation of the
agreement on joint management of crossing points. The tripartite
implementation group, as envisaged in the protocol, was convened
on 10 and 11 October and began discussions on the implementation
of the agreement119.
On 4 September, the President of Kosovo sent an invitation letter
to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, in which she welcomed the presence of EULEX
and renewed the commitment of Kosovo to fully supporting the
EULEX mandate. On 7 September, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the
invitation letter and its acceptance by the High Representative with a
two-thirds majority, providing an additional legal basis for EULEX to
carry out its executive and monitoring, mentoring and advising
functions.
On 10 September, the Kosovo authorities declared the end of the
“supervised independence” of Kosovo and affirmed the Constitution
of Kosovo as the “sole” legal framework. The decision also foresaw
the closure of the International Civilian Office. On the same day, the
Assembly of Kosovo adopted a package of legislative and
constitutional amendments which removed from the Constitution
provisions concerning international supervision. This represented a
determinant step forward for Kosovo120.
In the follow-up to the positive developments, attempts to
establish communications with the population in northern Kosovo
increased. Hence, the Mitrovica North administrative office
intensified its activities to include civil registration services, business
and non-governmental organization registration services, cadastre
records and construction permits that are issued by Mitrovica
municipality in the south. In response, at a joint session held on 14
September in Zveēan, assemblies of the Belgrade-supported northern
municipal structures declared that the northern municipalities and
119
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 8 November 2012.
120
Ibidem.
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their residents would not recognize the independence of Kosovo in

any form121.
At the same time, the local Kosovo Serb population and the
Belgrade authorities reacted negatively to the refusal by Pristina to
accede to visits to Kosovo by the Director of the Office for Kosovo
and Metohija of the Government of Serbia122.
On 19 October, a new phase began in the European Union-
mediated dialogue, with the convening of the first high-level meeting
in Brussels between Prime Ministers Ivica Daēiđ and Hashim Thaçi,
under the auspices of Catherine Ashton. “The meeting elevated the
process from a primarily technical level to a political one, offering
new prospects for resolving various long-standing issues in the
relationship between Belgrade and Pristina.” The meeting of 19
October was followed by discussions held on 7 November and 4
December123.
During the 7 November meeting, progress was made with respect
to the modalities for the implementation of earlier agreements, in
particular the agreement on the integrated management of crossing
points. The parties also agreed to a joint feasibility study for a new
highway linking Pristina and Niš, Serbia. On 29 November, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia acquitted
Ramush Haradinaj, the former Prime Minister of Kosovo and KLA
regional commander, following his retrial on charges of war crimes
related to the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo. In spite of Serb
dissatisfaction for the acquittal, the dialogue moved forward.
During the 4 December meeting, agreements were reached on
the dates, locations and other practical arrangements for the
implementation of the agreement on the integrated management of
crossing points as envisaged in the technical protocol. The parties
also agreed to appoint liaison officers, who would be based in the
respective European Union delegation offices in Belgrade and
Pristina. Discussions were also opened on the transparency of the
financial support received by the Kosovo Serb communities from
Belgrade and the parties also agreed to intensify cooperation on
missing persons and to continue the work on energy and
121
Ibidem.
122
Ibidem.
123
Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIK, 4 February 2013.
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70 Saša Kulenoviđ
telecommunications. During the meeting, Thaci confirmed that he

had already established a multiethnic Special Police Unit within the
Kosovo Police tasked with the protection of Religious and cultural
heritage124.
The high-level engagement between Belgrade and Pristina
resulted in the start of the implementation of the agreement at four
of the six crossing points, including at gates 1 and 31, in northern
Kosovo, by the mutually agreed deadline of 31 December 2012.
As usual, the developments in the high-level dialogue were
accompanied by a number of incidents and some tensions on the
ground. Roadblocks were temporarily re-established in protest
against some of the terms of the agreement. The protestors and local
Kosovo Serb political leaders demanded assurances from the
Government of Serbia that the new procedures at the crossing points
would not affect their ability to use Serbian vehicle registration plates
and identification documents and that commercial goods destined
for northern Kosovo would not be subject to taxes and customs fees.
Moreover, they requested assurances that the implementation of the
integrated management of crossing points would not lead to the
creation of an international border with Serbia.
Following their meeting with the Serbian President and Prime
Minister in Belgrade on 6 December, the Kosovo Serb political
representatives announced that they had received such assurances
and that they would suspend the protests [Kosovo Compromise,
2012].
On 10 December, the implementation of the agreement
commenced at gate 1 in the north and at gate 3. EULEX was present
in the capacity of its mandate, but the gates were manned by
members of the relevant Serbia and Kosovo customs and police
authorities.
Issues concerning the collection of taxes and customs fees were
taken up by the technical working group in Brussels and a temporary
arrangement was agreed, which specified that all goods bound for
northern Kosovo would be exempt from customs fees and taxes, with
the exception of excise goods in excess of 3.5 tons.
124
Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton after the
third meeting in the framework of the EU facilitated dialogue, EU Press, 4
December 2012.
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On 13 January 2013, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted a

platform outlining basic principles for political talks with the interim
institutions of self-government in Kosovo.
The resolution, among other things, expressed support for the
European Union-led dialogue, with a view to achieving
comprehensive and mutually acceptable solutions. The day after, in
Pristina, the Kosovo authorities issued a public statement, outlining
Pristina’s positions on the key issues of the European Union-
facilitated dialogue.
Eventually, in 2013 the status of Kosovo Serbs in the north was
tackled. After several meetings, on 19 April 2013, the sides signed an
agreement that was considered historic. The agreement endorsed
the integration of the Kosovo Serb municipalities within Kosovo but
with an extensive devolution of northern Kosovo. According to the
15-point agreement, the four Serb municipalities will merge into a
single Association and will enjoy full powers in the areas of economic
development, education, healthcare and town planning. The
composition of the Kosovo Police in the new Association will reflect
the multiethnic feature of the area and a division of the Appellate
Court will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica with mostly Serb
judges. Moreover, Serbia received assurances from the NATO that a
future Kosovo Army will be prevented from entering northern
Kosovo. It was also agreed that neither side will block the other side’s
progress in their respective EU path [Setimes, 2013]. While the
agreement reached is groundbreaking there is still uncertainty over
the implementation process and the acceptance of the deal by
Kosovo Serbs.
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72 Saša Kulenoviđ
9. Conclusion
By looking at the last ten years of dialogue, it seems that Kosovo’s
attitude towards Belgrade has mostly changed according to the
degree of powers in Pristina’s hands and the degree of international
support for its cause. While the transfer of powers increased
Kosovo’s confidence, the incentives from the international
community proved to be by far the strongest force in determining
Kosovo’s attitude. The calls for independence had been vocal ever
since the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in 2001, but support for Pristina’s cause at that time was
not strong.
Nonetheless, when the international community reoriented its
Kosovo’s strategy towards getting out and an increasing number of
countries started endorsing independence as the sole viable solution,
Kosovo’s position became steadfast. As a consequence, during the
status talks, Pristina did not have any incentive to compromise or
further its dialogue with Belgrade. The awareness that the United
States and most of the EU countries were ready to endorse a
unilateral move persuaded Pristina to reject any solution that did not
entail independence. In addition, the pressure to conclude
negotiations was strong inside Kosovo as the frustration of Kosovo
Albanians for the continuous postponement of a status settlement
brought about violent demonstrations.
In the end, the failure of the status talks to mediate a
compromised solution between the parties led to Kosovo’s decision
to declare unilaterally independence in 2008.
As Pristina was moving closer to the unilateral declaration of
independence, the political leadership expected a broad international
recognition and a facilitated path towards complete statehood.
However, the declaration did not officialise Kosovo’s entry in the
international community.
The wave of international recognition decreased quickly leaving
Kosovo in a state of limbo. Since many countries objected to Kosovo’s
recognition, the access to most international organizations became
precluded. Moreover, independence was still supervised and deeply
connected to the international presence and aid.
On the other hand, the same international presence, notably
EULEX, proved to be pivotal in improving Kosovo’s state apparatus.
Thus, even though Kosovo had not achieved full statehood,
tempĥranter
Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013
improvements had been made in the building of an independent

state. Furthermore, an important boost in confidence came with the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, according to
which, the unilateral declaration was not contrary to international
law.
As Pristina aimed at garnering international recognition and
entering international organizations, dialogue with Belgrade proved
to be a step that Pristina needed to take. Indeed, many problems
could not be solved without Belgrade’s involvement and support.
Pristina returned to the negotiating table with a less hostile
attitude for two reasons. On the one hand, in order to achieve some
of its goals, Kosovo had to win Belgrade’s cooperation in a number of
critical areas. In that sense, a more compromising stance was
required. On the other hand, since it was clear that independence
was irreversible, Pristina knew that its bargaining power in a
potential dialogue with Belgrade had increased. Indeed, even if
Kosovo risked to lose something during the talks, independence was
already a sealed deal.
During the new round of talks, the EU proved to be essential in its
mediating role as it provided Kosovo with the right incentives to
engage. In offering its support, the EU clarified that its aim was
mainly to remove obstacles that affected people’s daily lives in the
region and to achieve progress on the path to EU. Moreover the
dialogue was without prejudice to status as requested by Belgrade.
Throughout the dialogue, the balanced approach adopted by the
EU was the result of the existing divergent positions on Kosovo
among the EU member states. Indeed, the necessity to find a position
acceptable to all member states led to a mediating approach which
favoured balanced and compromised solutions between Kosovo and
Serbia. Thus, only agreements acceptable to both Pristina and
Belgrade would have been acceptable to all the member states. In
order to achieve such agreements, the carrot and stick method was
paramount in manoeuvring the two parties’ behaviour.
Despite the setbacks and interruptions that put in jeopardy the
entire process several times, Kosovo showed its commitment to
further discussions. In this sense, the European Union membership
stands as the main incentive. Although provocative actions from the
Kosovo authorities persisted on the ground, their degree of
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Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013
74 Saša Kulenoviđ
willingness to pander to EU and Belgrade’s requests increased. Under

such conditions, breakthrough agreements were reached.
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90 Summaries - Résumés - Sommari
Kosovo’s Change of Attitude throughout Negotiations with

Belgrade
Saša Kulenoviđ (Johns Hopkins University)
The aim of this paper is to analyze the dialogue between Belgrade

and Pristina taking into account Pristina’s perspective. In doing so,
the author tries to unveil the variables that most influenced Pristina’s
behaviour during the dialogue and show how and why Pristina’s
attitude changed throughout ten years of negotiations.
In order to analyze all the different stages of the dialogue, the paper
is structured into three main parts which in sequence analyze how
Pristina behaved before the declaration of Independence, after the
declaration of Independence and during the EU-facilitated talks.
Key words: international relations, European Union, Balkans,
Kosovo, Serbia, negotiation
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Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013

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tempĥranter

International Quarterly Journal

Vol. IV - N. 3/4 - 2013

RACISM, XENOPHOBIA and INTOLERANCE

Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance

Dichiarazione di Roma (23 settembre 2013).........................................7

Kosovo’s Change of Attitude throughout Negotiations

Le moi de l’auteur: de l’autobiographie à l’autofiction.......................79

Authors - Auteurs - Autori .................................................................87

Summaries - Résumés - Sommari.......................................................89

2. From War to Independence

government which envisaged a plan to build the necessary legislative,

reaffirm Pristina’s position in front of the international actors on the

The internal political stalemate was eventually overcome during

3. The Dialogue begins

opposing concerns delayed the beginning of direct talks. Leading

review. The establishment of the mechanism was important as it

4. Towards the Status Talks

relating to freedom of movement and to sustainable returns and

Kosovo led to the installation of the new coalition Government,

report the fulfilment of the standards had been uneven, Eide

in Belgrade on 21 November25. In the meantime, on 10 November,

5. A Dialogue shaped from Above

Kosovo is a mature democracy, the more fully an independence can

6. The Status Talks

rounds were those related to the protection of religious and cultural

On 24 July, Martti Ahtisaari brought the representatives of

Ahtisaari to prepare its comprehensive proposal for a status

welcomed the proposal while the authorities in Belgrade strongly

On 5 April, the Assembly of Kosovo met in an extraordinary

confirmation needed [Balkan Insight, 2007a]. As the deal seemed

directed against the Kosovo’s institutions, such a threat was often

with another proposal. He prompted the sides to consider a status-

unity, the EU members agreed to create a 1800 strong-mission in

However, while Kosovo was trying to act as an independent and

arrangements would be carried out with continuous consultations,

March 2004 violence. As a result of the dialogue, the Commission

irrespective of his ministerial office55. Regardless of the righteousness

On 31 March 2010, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi announced

authorities inaugurated a civil service centre in Bosniak Mahala, a

As far as Kosovo was concerned, the advisory opinion was

dissolved and new elections were announced71. The elections, the

From early January 2011, the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade

The willingness to act for themselves was particularly visible in

tasked with supervising the implementation of the settlement, had

The second meeting, built on the positive start of the dialogue,

implement the agreement as soon as possible and additional

Serb-majority northern municipalities and the Regional Operational

reciprocity measures [Hamilton, 2012, 7]. The dissatisfaction was due

On 16 September, in accordance with an operational plan

accept the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo?” and announced

made within the technical working groups so far102. Moreover, as a

more detailed, operational matters required for its

agreements on freedom of movement and on the future integrated

damages Pristina’s independent status [The New York Times, 2012].

with the Government of Serbia not to organize local elections in

and handed over by EULEX to the Civil Registry Agency in Kosovo by

required to establish a technical agency for the implementation of

their residents would not recognize the independence of Kosovo in

telecommunications. During the meeting, Thaci confirmed that he

On 13 January 2013, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted a

improvements had been made in the building of an independent