PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

Atty. Stephen L. Yu | A.Y. 2021 - 2022 | M2 & M3

DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW

1 Cayetano vs. Monsod (G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991)

DOCTRINES: The practice of law is any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. It is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill

FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April
25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess
the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the
World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic
consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial Davide
Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.
2. What constitutes practice of law?

RULING/S:
1. Yes. Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

The Commission, on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
 they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than
in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work
involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in
this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the
full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation.

DISPOSITIVE: The petition is DISMISSED.

2 Oscar B. Pimentel, et al. vs. Legal Education Board (G.R. Nos. 230642 and 242954, September 10, 2019)

DOCTRINES:
● Legal education or the study of law is NOT the practice of law, the former being merely preparatory to the
latter.
● The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
● The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study
of law.

FACTS:
Congress passed into law RA No. 7662 which created the LEB, an executive agency which was made
separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for
budgetary purposes and administrative support. Among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order
No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission" under Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those
seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test,
known as the PhiLSAT. The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications
and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018,
no applicant to law school was allowed admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642:

● Argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the Court's power to regulate and supervise the
legal profession
- They contend that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including the power to
prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of law
- Thus, Congress cannot create an administrative office, like the LEB, that exercises the Court's power
over the practice of law
● Also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under Section 7(c) and 7(e) to prescribe the
qualifications and compensation of faculty members and Section 7(h) on the LEB's power to adopt a
system of continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the
practice of law.
● They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954:

● Maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal profession which includes the admission to the
 practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers.
- According to them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission
to and supervision of the practice of law
- They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law extends to admission to
legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal
profession
- They profess that they are not against the conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the
LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do so allegedly belongs to the Court
● Contend that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the law school's exercise of
freedom to choose who to admit

Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not
include regulation of legal education. In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument
that the PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the
State's power to regulate education.

ISSUE/S: WON the Court has primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. NO.

RULING:
A. Jurisdiction Over Legal Education

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has NO primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education.
Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their
argument. The supervision and regulation of legal education is an Executive function.

1. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by the
political departments

2. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system.

It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself to
demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political
branches.

3. The Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and NOT the study of law.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it took away from
the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and
beyond doubt, the power to promulgate such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more
independent judiciary."

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the
Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, to hold
in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary
disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a judicial function
because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present,
affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles."

Legal education or the study of law is NOT the practice of law, the former being merely preparatory to the
latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
 guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions.

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys.

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the
study of law.

4. The Court exercises JUDICIAL power only.

The Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic
postulate being the separation of powers.

The regulation and supervision of legal education CANNOT be justified as an exercise of the Court's "residual"
power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal branches and which the remaining
branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is
primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the
judiciary.

[TL;DR: The LEB has primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education, not the SC]

B. Other Issues [just in case]

WON the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional. YES.

This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning
the practice of law and admissions thereto.

WON the adoption of a system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant
to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional. YES.
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" unduly gives the LEB the power to supervise the
legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems
necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar
which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law.

WON the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional. YES.

The Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power concerning admissions to the
practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission under Section 7 (e)
of R.A. No. 7662. Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7 (e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to
initiate and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law admission. Thus,
the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that measures the academic potential of the examinee
to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of legal education is improved, is not per se
unconstitutional.
HOWEVER, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary, restrictive, and
qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help
and guide law schools in gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively
and absolutely exclude applicants who failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a course in legal education,
thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools. These provisions of the PhiLSAT are
unconstitutional for being manifestly violative of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the
autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its law program.

When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom,
becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable clauses in the
PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither
emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for itself
who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of
academic discretion comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or
gravely abused.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is
UPHELD.

The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7 (c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set the standards of
accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7 (e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to prescribe the minimum
requirements for admission to legal education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching
upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;
2. Section 3 (a) (2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7 (2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education to
increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society;
3. Section 7 (g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7 (h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11 (h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the Legal Education
Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires :
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law
schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating students applying
for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to
any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student
in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has
passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law
schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students
who were conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their
academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty
members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may
teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2 (d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31 (2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal
apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach,
particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24 (c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
 c. Section 59 (d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

SO ORDERED.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR

3 Bar Matter No. 1153 dated March 29, 2010 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in
the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)

DOCTRINE: Proposed amendment to Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar)

Sec 5: Additional Requirement for Other Applicants

● All applicants for admission before being admitted to examination shall satisfactorily show that they
have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine
government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been
granted
● No applicant shall be admitted unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a
law school or university duly recognized by the government:
○ Civil Law
○ Commercial Law
○ Remedial Law
○ Criminal Law
○ Public and Private International Law
○ Political Law
○ Labor and Social Legislation
○ Medical Jurisprudence
○ Taxation
○ Legal Ethics
● A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to examination upon
submission of certification showing:
○ Completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree
○ Recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority
○ Completion of all the 4th year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law
school duly recognized by the Philippine Government

Sec 6: Pre-Law
● An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper
government agency that before commencing the study of law, he or she completed a 4-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences
● A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained Bachelor of Laws degree in a foreign law school must
present proof of having completed a separate bachelor’s degree course
● The Clerk of Court through the Office of the Bar Confidant must circularize the resolution among all
law schools in the country

4 Bar Matter No. 1222 dated February 4, 2004 (Re: 2003 Bar Examinations)

DOCTRINES: 'Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, the honesty and integrity of the profession.' In another case, it likewise intoned: 'We
cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He
can do thisby faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients.' (Reyes v.
Javier , A.C. No. 5574, February 2, 2002, 375 SCRA 538), It goes without saying that a lawyer who violates
this precept of the profession by committing a gross misconduct which dishonors and diminishes the 'public's
respect for the legal profession, should be disciplined.

FACTS:

After the day of the 2003 Bar Examinations, the Bar Examinations Committee Chairman was told of a rumored
leakage in the examination in Mercantile Law. Justice Vitug reported the matter to the Chief Justice,
recommending that the bar examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted.

September 23, 2003: Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug, and resolved to nullify the
examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another examination on October 4, 2003 at 8:00 pm at the De La
Salle University.

However, because numerous petitions, protests, and motions for reconsideration were filed against the
retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of such examination.

September 29, 2003: The Court designated 3 retired Associate Justices of SC to compose the Investigating
Committee and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before December 5, 2003 (refer to full text).

October 7, 2003: On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to
allocate the fifteen (15) percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination
subjects.

Bar Chair Associate Justice Vitug testified that on the day after the Bar examination in mercantile law, his
secretary, Rose Kawada, informed him that one of the law clerks told her that a friend of hers named Ma.
Cecilia Delgado-Carbajosa, a bar examinee, confided to her that something was wrong with the examination in
mercantile law. On the eve of the examination, she received a copy of the test questions in that subject. She
did not pay attention to the test questions because no answers were provided, and she was hard pressed to
finish her review of that subject. She agreed to meet Justice Vitug with the secretary and law clerk.

Atty. Marcial Balgos, examiner in commercial law, admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer
except to type in it. It is his secretary, Cheryl Palma, who opened and closed his computer for him. He was
surprised to discover, when reports of the bar leakage broke out, that his computer was in fact interconnected
with the computers of his nine (9) assistant attorneys.

Atienza, the office manager and year law student who is an expert in installing and operating computers,
admitted to Attorney Balgos that he participated in the bar operations or 'bar ops' of the Beta Sigma Lambda
law fraternity of which he is a member, but he clarified that his participation consisted only of bringing food to
the MLQU bar examinees.

Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman, also a member of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity,
FEU chapter. De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos'
computer and faxed a copy to a fraternity brother. Attorney Balgos was convinced that De Guzman was the
source of the leakage of his test questions in mercantile law.

ISSUE/S:

RULING: "The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the
examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C.Vitug, as chairman of
the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee.

The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos' computer without the latter's knowledge and
consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos' legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman,
who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee.

Atty De Guzman’s crimes and offenses:

"Attorney Danilo De Guzman's act of downloading Attorney Balgos' test questions in mercantile law from the
latter's computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of
intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his
intellect and legal knowledge.

"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos' right to privacy of
communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure —
 rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987
Constitution).

"He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that '[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect
for law and legal processes.'

De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is
violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Bar, which provide:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

Canon 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of
promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity.
His actuations impaired public respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the
final measure of a law graduate's academic preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.

"However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the
leakage of Atty. Balgos' proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination.

"On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos' computer could
have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test
questions which he prepared.

Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his
home, (instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and
assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos' negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions
for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the proximate cause of the 'bar leakage;' it was, in fact, the
root cause.

*For details of the investigation, testimony of the witnesses, findings refer to the full text.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to
—
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
(2) REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as an
Examiner in Mercantile Law;
(3) Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman,
Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and
Allan Guiapal with a view to determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar
examination leakage and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of
the Supreme Court's CALR database.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of the records of Danilo De Guzman in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated by the Office of the Court Administrator to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

5 Bar Matter No. 712 dated March 19, 1997 (Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take Lawyer’s Oath)

DOCTRINES: DOCTRINES: LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION
TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
 administration of justice.

ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER’S OATH; The lawyer’s oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer’s oath.

FACTS: Al Argosino passed the bar examinations of 1993. The Court, however, deferred his oath-taking due to
his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case arose from the
death of a neophyte (Raul Camaligan) during fraternity initiation rites. Argosino and seven (7) other accused
initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges but later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. The trial court granted Al
Argosino's application for probation. After a year, Argosino was discharged from probation.

Argosino filed before the SC a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation. The Court then issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to
the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance, Argosino submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members of religious orders . He
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of the hazing victim.
The SC required the father of the victim to comment on Argosino's prayer but the latter submitted the matter to
the sound discretion of the Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a bar-passer who was convicted of a crime may be allowed to take his lawyer‘s oath
after release?

Rule 138, ROC, Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

RULING: The Court allowed Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the
legal profession with the admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that
he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer‘s oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the
lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned.

DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer’s oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

6 In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling (Bar Matter No. 1154, June 8,
2004)

DOCTRINES:
● Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
 precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the practice of law.

● The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against
the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the
good moral character of the applicant.

FACTS:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Melendrez alleges that Meling
did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three pending criminal cases
before the MTCC, Cotabato City, namely: two Grave Oral Defamation, and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his
wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated.
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll
of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s
membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him constitute dishonesty;
2. WON Meling can use the appellation “Attorney.”

RULING: The Supreme Court fully concurred with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.

1. Yes. As provided in the OBC’s Report and Recommendation:

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable
by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or
accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling
did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him answerable under Rule
7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
 2. No. Meling’s use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot
go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of
the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar.
The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City,
used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract
entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that: persons who pass the Sharia Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks
to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.

7 In Re: Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law (Bar Matter No. 1678, December 17, 2007)

DOCTRINES:

General rule: The loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

Exception: Filipino citizenship is subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.

FACTS: Petitioner Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in 1960 and practiced law until 1998 when he
migrated to Canada for medical purposes. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of
Canada’s free medical aid program and he became a Canadian citizen in 2004.

In 2006, pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE/S: WON petitioner Dacanay may resume his practice of law after reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?

RULING: YES. The Constitution (Section 14, Article XII) provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. In addition, Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court provides that:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
 satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
a. the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
b. the payment of professional tax;
c. the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
d. the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines.

DISPOSITIVE:WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant,
after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

8 In Re: Petition to Re-acquire Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines (Bar Matter No. 2112, July 24,
2012)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest that it
is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer
of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose
in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege

FACTS:
● Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be
granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
● Petitioner alleged that he:
1. became a member of the IBP on March 21, 1966
2. lost his privilege to practice law and became a US citizen on August 28, 1981
3. reacquired his PH citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, DC, USA on September 15, 2006.
4. intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
 ● The SC in this case cited the case in Bar Matter No. 1678 where Benjamin Dacanay (Dacanay) filed a
petition where he requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of RA No.
9225. Dacanay:
1. was admitted to the PH Bar in March 1960
2. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention and eventually became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
3. reacquired his PH citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225 on July 14, 2006 before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
4. returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

ISSUE/S:

WON to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

RULING:

● The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.
R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

● Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in
relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

● In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and Certification dated
December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo- Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

● The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that
the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that
he shall retake the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate
fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition
of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.