JULIUS BREYNN O.

DELEÑA

JD1-B

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

REACTION PAPER:

A promise is a declaration of one’s intention to do or refrain from doing

something, while breach of promise is the failure to do what one promises, where
the person has promised it in order to induce an action in another and if one
promise to marry another but fails to do so it has breached or broken his promise
to marry. In this reaction paper the topic will besiege more on Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides that “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damage” this in particular is on the topic of
breach of promise to marry. According to the Supreme Court the general rules is
that a breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong which means that
there will never be a tort within the constitutional rights of any person with
regards to breaching one’s promise to marry but there are always an exemption
to the rule, a breach of promise to marry will pursue with the presence of the
following; 1. When there is a seduction or a man employs deceit, enticement and
employs superior power; 2. When the promise to marriage is the proximate cause
of why a woman would have sex with a man and no intention to fulfill the
promise; and lastly 3. Extensive preparation and one of the parties walk out
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized.

The Supreme Court has ruled a lot of cases with regards to breach of promise to
marry as their decisions vary from one case to another. In the case of Tanjanco
V. Court of Appeals, Apolonio Tanjuanco who is the petitioner was the
defendant of the case filed by Araceli Santos as previously ruled by the Court of
Appeals that he is liable to pay the support and damages to the complainant
considering the facts that Tanjanco courted Santos both of being an adult age;
that the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection
including his promise of marriage, the complainant consented him for his pleas
to carnal knowledge in which the defendant succeeded on having carnal access
regularly until December 1959 that resulted the complainant to conceived a
child, the defendant refuse to marry the complainant despite her claim that he
had promise to marry her that led to demand for damages. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance stating that the Court of Appeals seems to have
overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission’s memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced considering that the
complainant is in adult age, furthermore the promise to marry of the defendant
did not involved any seduction instead they maintained their intimate sexual
relationship for more than a year. The case was also true on Natividad V. Tunac
where in Elsa Natividad was the complainant against defendant Ronald Tunac
for the compliant for damages for the breach of promise to marry; that both
parties were lovers and entered into carnal knowledge with the promise of the
defendant of marriage, as a result of their intimate relationship the complainant
got pregnant, as when the time of delivery of the baby it come out to be premature
and eventually died. From that time on the defendant turned cold and
consequently told the complainant that he could no longer fulfill his promise to
marry her, the complainant then filed a complaint for damages because the
wedding had already been set and the Regional Trial Court Branch 81 had
rendered its judgement that the defendant should pay moral and exemplary
damages but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the latter,
hence the petition, but ultimately the Supreme Court denied the petition of the
complainant declaring the case for lack of merit stating that our laws do not
provide for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise
to marry another and that their relationship turned sour afterwards, or
immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our
laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.

While on the other hand a different sightings and knowledges can be found in
some cases ruled by the Supreme Court with regards to breach of promise to
marry but this time moral damages can be or cannot be sought. In the case of
Hermosisima V. Court of Appeals facts revealed that on October 4, 1954 by
Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima,
as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner Francisco
Hermosisima admitted the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry complainant.
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950, Soledad then
a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger than her used to go
around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no promise of
marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one
evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse
in his cabin on board MV Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was pregnant,
whereupon he promised to marry her. However, subsequently, or on July 24,
1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez the prevailed issue on this case
whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry, the Supreme Court ruled that because of the defendant-
appellant’s seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him
yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control. In the present
case, the court is unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten years younger but also because the Court
of First Instance found that complainant surrendered herself to the petitioner
because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Similar case can be perceived in the case of Galang V. Court of Appeals, that
the facts were as follows; Plaintiff Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were
engaged, but Rodrigo’s parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. They
lived as husband and wife in the house of one Adolfo Dagawan until Rodrigo left
and never returned. The evidence on other pertinent facts is however conflicting.
Plaintiff tried to prove that she and Rodrigo were engaged despite the opposition
of the latter’s mother and that the father of Rodrigo agreed to give dowry and
defray the expenses of the marriage. The father even took them to the house of
Dagawan for them to stay as husband and wife. However when Rodrigo was not
able to secure a marriage license for lack of a residence certificate, he went back
to his hometown to get such certificate but never returned, on the other hand,
the defendants sough to establish that he and plaintiff were engaged but his
parents were opposed to the marriage. Rodrigo was agreeable to marry the
plaintiff after his graduation but the latter was impatient and wanted the
marriage to take place sooner. Because of continued relationships with the
plaintiff, Rodrigo’s parents told him to leave the parental home. He later told this
to plaintiff. The plaintiff convinced him to go to Dagawan’s house where she
followed and stayed thereafter. Because of his continued refusal to marry the
plaintiff, the latter’s relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary
soldiers intimidated him. He was allowed to go home and was then placed under
the custody of a town mayor by his parents. He refused to acknowledge the
marriage application, which was provided by Dagawan for him to sign, when he
did not appear before a notary public, the plaintiff filed an action against Rodrigo
and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages for breach of promise on the
part of Rodrigo to marry her. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff, which on appeal, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the prevailed
issue in this case was whether or not plaintiff may recover damages for breach
of promise to marry. The Supreme Court ruled the case by stating that it is urged
by the plaintiff that said Court had erred in not awarding moral damages to her.
She insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible
under our laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to plaintiff’s
pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals. Moral damages for breach of
promise to marry are not collectible.

Although breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong it is not always

be the case if a scenario already involves the following elements; 1. When there
is a seduction or a man employs deceit, enticement and employs superior power;
2. When the promise to marriage is the proximate cause of why a woman would
have sex with a man and no intention to fulfill the promise; and lastly 3.
Extensive preparation and one of the parties walk out when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized. Just like in the case of Pe V. Pe where the facts of the
case were as follows; The Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe, who is 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant, Alfonso Pe, on the other
hand, is a married man. Because of the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family.
Defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other
and conducted clandestine love affairs. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to
their house and even from seeing Lolita. Nevertheless, defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Plaintiffs
then brought an action to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and
corrective damages. They based their action on Article 21 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.” Defendant set up as a defense that the
facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action. The
Supreme Court ruled that yes. The defendant committed an injury to Lolita’s
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
contemplated in Article 20 of the Civil Code. The wrong caused by defendant is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. The defendant took
advantage of the trust of the plaintiffs and even used the praying of rosary as a
reason to get close with Lolita. The defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection thru
an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced Lolita to the extent of making her fall
in love with him. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her.

A similar case was also true on Gashem Shookat Baksh V. Court of Appeals
were facts was stated as follows; Private respondent is a 22 year old Filipino
citizen residing in Dagupan City. Petitioner is an Iranian medical exchange
student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Petitioner
allegedly courted and proposed to marry her. Thereafter, private respondent
began living with him. She allegedly was a virgin before such arrangement. A
week before the filing of private respondent’s complaint, petitioner’s attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her. As a
result, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked not to live with her anymore. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less
than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as
may be just and equitable. Petitioner denied the claims of private respondent.
Accordingly, he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the
private respondent nor he forced her to live with him. The lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private respondent.
The Supreme Court held that the existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, where a man’s promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Petitioner’s
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to
fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed,
he loved her and would want her to be his life’s partner. His was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy
a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of
morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts
in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

Another case that was ruled concerning a proper of breach of promise to marry
but in a different action is the Wassmer V. Velez as the following facts were
digested; Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married and set
the date on September 4, 1954. Preparations were made including the following:
obtaining a marriage license;; printing and distribution of invitations to relatives,
friends, and acquaintances;; purchasing the bride-to-be’s trousseau;; preparing
the dresses of those who are part of the entourage;; and buying a matrimonial
bed and its accessories, among others. Bridal showers were given and gifts were
also received. On September 2 or two days before the wedding, Velez went to his
home city in Mindanao and left a note for Wassmer postponing the wedding
saying that his mother opposes it. The next day, September 3, he sent her a
telegram saying that nothing has changed and assuring her of his return soon.
Thereafter, Velez was never heard from again. Wassmer sued Velez for damages
and won the suit by default. Almost two months later, Velez filed a petition for
relief from orders, judgment, and proceedings and motion for new trial and
reconsideration. Velez lost in his petition so he elevated the same to the Supreme
Court. He argues that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an
action for breach of promise to marry. The Supreme Court ruled that although
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, it must not be
overlooked, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless. Article 21 provides that “any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” In this
case, to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21. Therefore, Velez should be held liable.

In this reaction paper through stating facts of the Supreme Court rulings it has
proven from time to time and from every case to case that a mere breach of
promise to marry is really not an actionable wrong particularly if a case was just
a simple promise that lead parties to be in a relationship but it also proven that
a case on breach of promise to marry can prosper if other elements thus far
present in such as seduction, deceit, enticement, proximate cause to be indulge
in sexual intercourse and even in the event that a marriage is about to be
solemnized, it all boils down that women should be treated with respect, dignity
and decency that a women should be free from violence and threats to her
personal safety and security.
List of cases citation:

Tajanco V. Court of Appeals

Natividad V. Tunac

Hermosisima V. Court of Appeals

Galang V. Court of Appeals

Pe V. Pe

Gashem Shookat Baksh V. Court of Appeals

Wassmer V. Velez