Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PGPM 42-Management of PPP
PGPM 42-Management of PPP
PGPM 42-Management of PPP
ON
“MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC PRIVATE
PARTERNIPSHIP”
(PGPM – 42)
SUBMITTED TO:
By
SUMIT KUMAR
Reg. no: - 216-09-31-12668-2184
INDEX
1 Introduction 3–6
6 Conclusion 21
7 Bibliography/ Readings 22
1. Introduction:
The growth of a country is depend open the infrastructure facility of the country. If a
country has no proper road network, no proper Railway network how a country can grow.
To grow interest of the private company to establish a factory, Government should prepare
a good transport facility for his staff & worker and also smooth transportation of raw
material and finish goods. Further to that the arrangements of sufficient electricity also
require very much to attract the entrepreneur. In order to ensure progress of the nation
But in India, Every year during budget our major amount of fund evoke by the military
department and also our major foreign Money goes to collect the oil (Petrol, Diesel, etc.). So
after that Government has no such fund for development of infrastructure of our
country.Also our country has large road & railway network. So for the country like ours, the
involvement of Private Company to build the infrastructure is very much needed. In the joint
venture project, private company also earn a good amount of money by investing a good
amount of money & as well as Government also gets an infrastructure without any
investment. Common people are also happy, as they are the main party who gets the
benefit of the infrastructure by spendingof some money. This system i.e. joint venture with
the private company with the government is called as Public Private Partnership or PPPor 3P
or P3.
/ government owned entity on one side and a private sector entity on the other, for the
provision of public assets and/or public services, through investments being made and/or
management being undertaken by the private sector entity, for specified period of time,
where there is well defined allocation of risk between the private sector and the public
entity and the private entity receives performance linked payments that conform (or are
Arrangement with private sector entity: The asset and/or service under the contractual
arrangement will be provided by the Private Sector entity to the users. An entity that has a
Sector entity.
Public asset or service for public benefit: The facilities/ services being provided are
‘Public Services’ are those services that the State is obligated to provide to itscitizens or
where the State has traditionally provided the services to its citizens.
‘Public Asset’ is that asset the use of which is inextricably linked to the delivery of Public
Service, or, those assets that utilize or integrate sovereign assets to deliver Public Services.
Investments being made by and/or management undertaken by the private sector entity:
The arrangement could provide for financial investment and/or non-financial investment by
the private sector; the intent of the arrangement is to harness the private sector efficiency
perpetuity. After a pre-determined time period, the arrangement with the private sector
Performance linked payments: The central focus is on performance and not merely
The above definition puts forth only the essential conditions for an arrangement to be
designated as a Public Private Partnerships (PPP). In addition to these, some ofthe desirable
Allocation of risks in an optimal manner to the party best suited to manage the risks.
Private sector entity receives cash flows for their investments in and/or management of the
PPP either through a performance linked fee payment structure from the government
entity and/or through user charges from the consumers of the service provided.
Generally a long term arrangement between the parties but can be shorter term dependent
Incentive and penalty based structures in the arrangement so as to ensure that the private
Outcomes of the PPP are normally pre-defined as output parameters rather than technical
identified. Such a structure is expected to leave room for innovation and technology
The models where ownership of the underlying asset remains with the public entity during
the contract period and project is transferred back to the public entity after thetermination
contract are the preferred forms of Public Private Partnership models. The final decision on
Some of the commonly adopted forms of PPPs include management contracts, build
Build-own-operate (BOO) model is normally not the supported form of Public Private
Partnership in view of the finite resources of the Government and complexities in imposing
the event of early termination. Government of India does not recognise service contracts,
PPP.
2. Different Public Private Participation Schemes:
Build Operate Transfer (BOT): BOT and similar arrangements are a kind of specialized
concession in which a private firm or consortium finances and develops a new infrastructure
Under BOTs, the private partner provides the capital required to Build the new facility,
Operate & Maintain (O&M) for the contract period and then return the facility to
Importantly, the private operator now owns the assets for a period set by contract—
sufficient to allow the developer time to recover investment costs through user charges.
BOTs generally require complicated financing packages to achieve the large financing
amounts and long repayment periods required. At the end of the contract, the public sector
assumes ownership but can opt to assume operating responsibility, contract the operation
responsibility to the developer, or award a new contract to a new partner. The main
Design Build (DB): Where Private sector designs and constructs at a fixed price and transfers
the facility.
Build Transfer Operate (BTO): Where Private sector designs and builds the facility. The
transfer to the public owner takes place at the conclusion of construction. Concessionaire is
from facility users. Under this Project, the Developer owns the assets of the facility and may
choose to assign its operation and maintenance to a facility operator. The Transfer of the
facility to the Government, Government Agency or the Local Authority is not envisaged in
this structure; however, the Government may terminate its obligations after specified time
period.
Design-Build Operate (DBO): Where the ownership is involved in private hands and a single
contract is let out for design construction and operation of the infrastructure project.
approach, the responsibilities for designing, building, financing, and operating &
maintaining, are bundled together and transferred to private sector partners. DBFO
Build- Operate- Transfer (BOT): Annuity/Shadow User Charge: In this BOT Arrangement,
private partner does not collect any charges from the users. His return on total investment
is paid to him by public authority through annual payments (annuity) for which he bids.
Other option is that the private developer gets paid based on the usage of the created
facility.
administration, delegates to a private sector entity to design and build infrastructure and
to operate and maintain these facilities for a certain period. During this period the private
party has the responsibility to raise the finance for the project and is entitled to retain all
revenues generated by the project and is the owner of the regarded facility. The facility
will be then transferred to the public administration at the end of the concession
agreement without any remuneration of the private entity involved. Some or even all of
the following different parties could be involved in any Public Private Partnership model
project:
infrastructure project and decides if the Public Private Partnership model project
circumstances are main factors for this decision. The government provides
1. grant to the sponsor the "concession", that is the right to build, own and
2. grant a long term lease of or sell the site to the sponsor, and
obtaining the necessary approvals, authorizations and consents for the construction and
operation of the project. It may also be required to provide comfort that the agency
acquiring services from the facility will be in a position to honor its financial obligations.
The government agency is normally the primary party. It will initiate the project, conduct
the tendering process and evaluation of tenderers, and will grant the sponsor the
one or more.
sponsors. It will take construction and completion risks, that is, the risk of
completing the project on time, within budget and to specifications. These can
be sizeable risks and the lenders will wish to see a construction company with a
balance sheet of sufficient size and strength with access to capital that gives real
long term contract with the sponsor for the operation and maintenance of the
facility. Again the operator may also inject equity into the project.
Lending banks: Most Public Private Partnership model project are funded to a big
extent by commercial debt. The bank will be expected to finance the project on
“non-recourse” basis meaning that it has recourse to the special purpose entity
Other lenders: The special purpose entity might have other lenders such as
infrastructure project have sufficient powers to enter into the relevant contracts
and perform their obligations under those contracts. Two examples where
powers must be carefully reviewed are life insurance companies and trustees of
superannuation funds.
Parties to the project contracts: Because the special purpose entity has only
adequate supply contracts in place for the supply of raw materials and other
A Public Private Partnership model project is typically used to develop a discrete asset
rather than a whole network and is generally entirely new or Greenfield in nature
operator generally obtains its revenues through a fee charged to the utility/ government
rather than tariffs charged to consumers. A number of projects are called concessions,
such as toll road projects, which are new build and have a number of similarities to Public
maintenance, including the collection of toll revenues. With a form of highway P3 called a
concessionaire invests its own funds (known as equity) and borrows additional funds to pay
for the construction of a highway project. The concessionaire maintains and operates the
project for a specified period and expects to be repaid for its investment in the project over
the period of the concession. P3s allow public agencies to access private equity capital to
finance projects. P3s can accelerate the delivery of projects by helping public agencies raise
the upfront capital necessary to construct a major infrastructure project all at once, rather
than in stages. In some cases, private capital can mean the difference between developing a
project and having no project at all. Project Financing Project financing is a specific type of
financing used in P3s, through which an expected future revenue stream generated from
users of a project or committed by a public agency is the primary means for repaying the
upfront investment needed to fund it. Project financing is also known as nonrecourse
financing, because the project’s lenders have no recourse or only limited recourse on the
shareholders of the concessionaire in case the project runs into difficulties and the
concessionaire is unable to repay them. Private firms often use project financing for large,
high-risk projects because it can help to insulate them from financial risks associated with
the project; however, the transaction costs related to implementing project finance
structures are high, making the use of this type of financing inappropriate for smaller scale
projects. The capital generated from private finance must be paid back with commitments
of a long-term revenue stream to repay lenders and private investors, who typically demand
a higher rate of return than investors in tax-exempt municipal bonds. Financial Structure of
P3s Figure 1 depicts a common financing structure for P3 concession projects. Although a
Concessionaire (SPV) Equity Investors Public Sponsor Availability Payment or Subsidy Shared
Revenue Bonds, loans Repayments Equity Investments Dividends Funds to build, maintain,
keep a fraction until the end of the PPP contract without the possibility of transferring.
The objective of this is to create long-term incentives. This is expensive for the initial
sponsor for two reasons: first, because the cost of capital for the sponsor is high; and
second, because by tying up resources for a long time, they cannot be deployed to other
uses. As the sponsor specializes in the early, building part of the project, this limits its
possibilities for future business. This means that projects must be very profitable to
Even though the SPV remains active over the whole life of the project, until the assets
revert to the government, there is a clear demarcation between financing during the
construction phase and financing in the operational phase (Figure 2). During construction,
sponsor equity (perhaps along with bridge loans and subordinated or mezzanine debt) is
combined with bank loans and, sometimes, government grants in money or kind. In the
case of projects that derive their revenues from user fees, the initial contribution to
investment is sometimes supplemented with subsidies from the government if the project
As completion of the construction stage approaches, bondholders enter the picture and
substitute for bank lending. Bond finance is associated with two additional entities: rating
agencies and credit insurance companies. When the PPP project becomes operational, but
only then, the sponsor’s equity may be bought out by a facilities operator, or even third-
party passive investors, usually pension or mutual funds. Bondholders, of course, have
The life cycle of PPP finance and the change in financing source is determined by the
Construction is subject to substantial uncertainty and major design changes, and costs
depend crucially on the diligence of the sponsor and the building contractor. Thus, there is
ample scope for moral hazard in this stage. Banks perform a monitoring role that is well
suited to mitigate moral hazard, by exercising tight control over changes to the project’s
contract and the behavior of the SPV and its contractors. To control behavior, banks
disburse funds only gradually as project stages are completed. After completion and
ramp-up of the project, risk falls abruptly and is limited only to events that may affect the
cash flows from the project. This is suitable for bond finance because bondholders only
care about events that significantly affect the security of the cash flows underpinning
repayment, but are not directly involved in management or control of the PPP. This is
appropriate for institutional and other passive investors, who by mandate can only invest
small amounts of their funds in the initial stages of a PPP because of their high risk.
The project is intended to provide a service to users, but the fundamental contracting
parties are the SPV and the procuring authority, which enforces the PPP contract and
represents users of the project. Because contracts give at least some discretion to the
procuring authority, cash flows and even the continuation of the concession may depend on
its decisions. Thus, ambiguous service standards and defective conflict resolution
mechanisms increase risk. In addition, user fees will be at risk if the political authority is
tempted to buy support or votes by lowering service fees, either directly or by postponing
the SPV’s revenues are derived from payments by the procuring authority, these payments
depend on the ability (or desire) of the government to fulfill its obligations. It follows that
the governance structure of the procuring authority, its degree of independence and the
financial condition of the government affect the level of risk perceived by debt holders.
Consider next the relationship of the SPV with construction and O&M contractors. Many
PPP projects involve complex engineering. In complex projects, unexpected events are more
likely and it becomes harder to replace the building contractor. In these cases, the
experience and reputation of the contractor become an issue. Moreover, the financial
strength of the contractor is relevant because this determines its ability to credibly bear
cost overruns without having to renegotiate the contract. Similarly, while the operational
phase is less complex, revenue flows depend on whether the contracted service and quality
standards are fulfilled, which depends on the O&M contractor. Again, the experience and,
secondarily, the financial strength of the contractor concern debt holders. Debt holders also
care about the type of risk-sharing agreements negotiated between the SPV and the
contractors. Cost-plus contracts, which shift cost shocks to the SPV, are riskier than fixed-
Finally, debt holders care about the incentives of the sponsor, who provides around 30 per
cent of the funding in the typical PPP project. This large chunk of equity has the lowest
priority in the cash-flow cascade, and is theoretically committed for the length of the PPP
contract to provide incentives to minimize the life-cycle costs of the project. Providers of
funds worry about the financial strength and experience of sponsors, particularly during the
construction and the ramp-up phase of complex transportation projects. They value
previous successful experience in the industry and technical prowess, and look for evidence
that the sponsor is committed to the project, both financially and in terms of time and
reputation.
public and private sector with a purpose to develop public assets or for provision of public
services. It is an elaborate arrangement between a state body and a privately owned entity
which serves to promote private capital investment in public projects, especially those
connected with infrastructure development. The agreement also includes sharing of assets
and skills between state and privately owned bodies to be able to achieve the best possible
outcome. The private entity receives performance linked payments based on a specific set
of criteria.
A basic feature of any PPP scheme is that the project under consideration is usually a high
priority one and is well-planned by the government. Another essential aspect is that both
the sides assume some amount of risk and mutual value for the project. Some of the
infrastructure projects usually covered under PPP model include building of highways, ports,
In India, the PPP model was introduced by UPA Government at the Centre for developing
some of the major facilities including airports and metros. The model worked well in some
cases but in some others, there arose a number of issues which could not be addressed
properly. Considering the infrastructural growth needed to drive the economy further, the
newly formed NDA Government has also come up with a number of proposals in the current
Union Budget in which PPP model would be implemented to help achieve better and faster
results.
Finance Minister laid stress that with more than 900 infrastructure projects are underway in
the country, PPP model holds great potential for us but we must work to remove the
To this end, he announced the setting up of an exclusive institution called 3P India with a
budget allocation of Rest 500 crore which would be responsible for resolving any disputes
There are several areas in which the government is looking forward to implement this
model including high-end metro projects, rural and urban development projects. The main
issues faced with proper implementation of this model is that infrastructure projects are
usually long-term ones and a number of factors including cost of materials, policies and
even economic conditions can change while the project is underway. If the initiative to set
successful, it can attract big investments from private sector and lead to fast-paced
development of infrastructure.
6. Conclusion:
This PPP are a very useful tools / system for the developing country like India. Government
should give some relaxation to modify the rules and the regulation to the private sector as
more company may take interest on this and this leads our company from developing