Republic of the Philippines On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
 
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating
the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous
and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by
your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,
cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner
by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "
for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and
of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that
complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without
"even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately
desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution  in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk
of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he
who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and
as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all
of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use
the title but refers to himself as "DATU  ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times
respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is
evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise
stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains
no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo  at p. 14; copies of the letter were also
furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, The Finance
Management and Budget Office and-the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES
(or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any
of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the
corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being
incorporated verbatim in said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id at p. 60.
9 id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
14 See  Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with
(1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not
exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after
due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA
491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68: SEE also Policarpio
v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
19 Art. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should
apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
 21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681,
entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular
courts;." SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned
by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960
the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that
he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
 drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing
of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information
flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's
or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado
de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed
of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May
25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer
is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors
of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
 This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. ( Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which
in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule
of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery."
(See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
 Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the
answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on
the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
   Separate Opinions
  NARVASA, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
  PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of
COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing
law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359)
 3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he  did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view,
this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's
credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and
not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result
because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations
and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin
American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. 8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —
Member
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have
if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding b. Dataprep, Philippines
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
to pass the bar examinations?
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an e. CBL Timber Corporation
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or Member of the Board of the Following:
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
 c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or
other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor
at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without
adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois
State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
x x x           x x x          x x x
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x           x x x          x x x
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
x x x           x x x          x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
 Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of
COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My
purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a
reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As
declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as
preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing
law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-
L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing
law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a
lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he  did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view,
this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's
credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it
were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on
matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by
some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in
the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or
regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and
not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he
was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests)
and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result
because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave
with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations
and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can
look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by
the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have
if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding
committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened
to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees
in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the
United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961
consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin h. Philippine Electric Corporation
American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated
companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support
in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of
legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt —
Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the
practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce,
industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts
as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has
reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
b. Dataprep, Philippines knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain,
teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can
these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not
d. Semirara Coal Corporation satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
e. CBL Timber Corporation Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
Member of the Board of the Following: The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or
other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be
carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor
at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or
e. Graphic Atelier rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without
adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois
f. Manila Electric Company State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily,
to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times
his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties
that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall
exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to
do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-
estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has
engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
x x x           x x x          x x x
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear
and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of
an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice,"
as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts.
Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x           x x x          x x x
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required
component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law
office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the
oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De
Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do
not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required
for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989
Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a
member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do
not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was
our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such
high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
 3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7. ANNULMENT. VISA.

4 14 SCRA 109. THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

Republic of the Philippines THE17F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
SUPREME COURT INC.  Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
Manila
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
EN BANC unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
 
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
vs. these services should be allowed supposedly
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
R E SO L U T I O N
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
REGALADO, J.: Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
profession other than those allowed by law."
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Annex A
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
SECRET MARRIAGE? aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
P560.00 for a valid marriage. this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like
birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in
the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce
is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a
man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself
to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation  employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice
of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned
to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and
such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and
pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in
the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having
a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek
advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our
laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the
law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of
the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and
who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is
not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are
the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them
are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice
of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an
agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the
person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he
is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception
where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales
 are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the
land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms,
with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved
and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There
is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to
the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING
OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication
and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the
unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification
of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course
of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and
counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
 1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is
in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have
laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.  16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.],
 pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage
or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and
only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now,
if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal
and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part48of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances   or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and50province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action,   after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor
General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
 
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left
side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10,
1991, Rollo, 328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1,
10; Rollo, 209, 218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar
Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416, 425-427.
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-
6; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano
M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free
Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty. Barbara Anne
C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504; Rhode Island
Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139, 144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al.,
42 SCRA 302 (1971).
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and
Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974) and Shayne, The
Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977, Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of
Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to
appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the government has
an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138, id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the purpose of
conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, who
is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities where members of
the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine Patent
Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer)
in trademark, service mark and trade name cases (Rule 23, Rules of Practice in
Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or
any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party to the case; (2) he
represents an organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present
written proof that he is properly authorized; or (3) he is duly-accredited members of
any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure
of the National Labor Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case falling
under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the studies of law
in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient qualification for
appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917). See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New York vs.
U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license promptly
secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free
for the poor. Everything confidential.".
 40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
41 Op. cit., 80. civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
43 * * * Missing * * * . Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24, 1930); During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a
A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941), 241 (Feb. 21, sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). . Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the
Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
45 Supra, Fn 2. evidence ex-parte  was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.
46 Id., 810, 825.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American Bar Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248. number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411
dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38. Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil. 968 might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
(1958).
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No. 902-A
and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to
the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the
respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly
appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of
Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said
title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18,
1989. Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is
a superior lien on the said registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of
Republic of the Philippines Gregorio Lantin.
SUPREME COURT
Manila Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
THIRD DIVISION judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.
 
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995 1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using,
apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty.
Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant, paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20,
vs. 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents. Committee on Bar Discipline.

RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with
unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal
who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the
IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance
and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership
dues of her employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and
obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time,
especially when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-
4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of
Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to 1 take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.  He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath
of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated
his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did
not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at
law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in
the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause
a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
 character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a
lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established
himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when
proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his
license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen , as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and
in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will
attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to
all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to
enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of
the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents
give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and
officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration
of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad
moral character the chances are that his character will remain
bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to
his great calling  — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a
Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission
to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears
that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding,  and the court may receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality,  and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his
guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a
requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make
up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished
to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
 Footnotes
1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of permission to take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of this Court dated 24 August
1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations," stated on page 2
thereof:
"The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following candidates
with dismissed charges or complaints, to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations:
 xxx xxx xxx This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
3349. Al C. Argosino
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
xxx xxx xxx Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved
(Emphasis supplied) and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then paroled.
2 G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at p. 13; In Re Parazo, 82 Phil.
230, 242 (1948), reiterated in Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, 481 (1992).
3 131 S.E. 661 (1926).
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however,
whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up
his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

4 131 S.E. at 663. In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
5 69 Idaho 297, 206 P2d 528 (1949).
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
6 314 Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943). admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
7 221 NY 81, 116 NE 782 (1917). before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
8 43 Mich 289, 5 NW 309 (1880). Philippines.

9 In Re Farmer, supra at 663. Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
10 15 Cal 2d 71, 98 P2d 489 (1940). disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
11 174 Cal 467, 163 P 657 (1917).

12 See  generally, Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. (En Banc), 223 SCRA 378, 409 (1993). We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
Manila observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
EN BANC are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege
to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust
and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007 professional privilege.4

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
RESOLUTION the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
CORONA, J.:
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of
the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
to foreigners.16
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1
 As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912 duly signed
by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.
2
 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C. No.
1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
3
 Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.
4
 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another 5
 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine 6
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of  Id.
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in 7
 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
8
 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority 9
for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires  Section 17, id.
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: 10
 Sections 18 and 19, id.

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; 11
 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re Atty.
Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.
(b) the payment of professional tax;
12
 Section 139, RA 7160.
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and 13
 Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory Continuing
update him of legal developments and Legal Education for Members of the IBP).
 14
 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L- PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302. vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
15
 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII. 16 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902). 17 Section 2,
RA 9225. Emphasis supplied. Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
18
 Section 5(4), id.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good
standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given
by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-
judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle
cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an
application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . .
that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known
as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance
with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that
prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
Republic of the Philippines United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law,
SUPREME COURT Republic Act No. 165.
Manila
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding
EN BANC tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before
the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do
G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959 so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue.
And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office
and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court ; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,  where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service
Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For
instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary
to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be
considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention
thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more
than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in
the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10
provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section
28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a
patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case
the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years
from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented
invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in
the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the
patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by
him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or
machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or
if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for
legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of
the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in
the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of
the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and
whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to
hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring
to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members
of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United
States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination
similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless
he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order
that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed
upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must
be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for
three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute,
are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before
the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his
office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of
gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall,
with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter,
or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of
Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its
rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We
reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and
competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which
showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law,
Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express
provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed
to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to
the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.
466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only
for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to
govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area
are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the
Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
Endencia, JJ., concur.
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.

Footnotes RESOLUTION

1
 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales
was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by
this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges
more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an
amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely,

Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the
value of the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143,

wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without
said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
in Civil Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the

Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil
Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a

contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty
percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the
Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was
already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial
Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds
of Iligan City;

Republic of the Philippines 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
SUPREME COURT documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Manila Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection
EN BANC with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
 
 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who
was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without
legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office
of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent
appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required
to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the
long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings
filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor
General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required
the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent
committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency
of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on
November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing
additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the
determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under
Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent
claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly
by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-
B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation
of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be
transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even
before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the
Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent
submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the
Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for
more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the
case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent
was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely
his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that
respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to
support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a
witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by
this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2)
of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to
the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex
"B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of
the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue
of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that
"[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer
to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended
or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these
underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any
provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship
with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it
cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the
nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other
hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the
matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in
relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a
disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because
the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable.
Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the
Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement.
The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do
transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs,
successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D
of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to
be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement
was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time
the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had
already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31,
1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the
request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved
in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice
to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at
the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the
sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing,
respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a
premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former
client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important
fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land
development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a
public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they
were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even
in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v.
Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to
be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the
land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado,
Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were made to appear as having signed the original
document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names.
However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and
duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never
did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy
(Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said  xerox
copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply,
pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the
addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of
the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was
signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his
solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed
by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and
Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for
libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17;
Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and
perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering
that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it
was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is
no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to
harass complainant.

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.Alfaro T. discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
Fortunado [signed]
Editha T. Fortunado [signed] The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed] and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the
CONFORME standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29,
1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature
of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed] lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4]. WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective
from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the SO ORDERED.
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid
by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and
are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the Cortes, JJ., concur.
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See
Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.
violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the
same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that
his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados.
The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent
when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23,
1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting
interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the
facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
 ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------x

ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating
student Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student
Council, drew the then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special
Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo
Bentain, head of the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.

As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time
in the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu
Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against
Atty. Dizon’s move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest.

Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the
office of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon,
despite the latter’s claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects’ lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after
what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were
allowed to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI
the following morning.

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.

Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with Chancellor
Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for violation of
P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenses.

Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and
Canon 8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission
THIRD DIVISION on Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:

A.C. No. 6968             August 9, 2006

1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated
Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes violation of the CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
Code of Professional Responsibility. AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005,
CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she "acted within her official duties as she safeguarded
the rights of the students in accordance with the school’s substitute parental authority" and "within the
bounds of the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest."
xxxx
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).

With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in "recklessly tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects
without warrant. Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Commissioner’s Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution, together
with the records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Justice.
As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Professional
Ethics in "refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon." SO ORDERED.
When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court Associate Justice
addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a WE CONCUR:
warrant; and1 (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1829. x x x, LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students "cannot be construed as a Chairperson
violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional," 2 they having "a right to
prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal."3 ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to Atty.
Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizon’s administrative PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
complaint against her must then be dismissed. Associate Justice
Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that
"[f]or the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, . . .
their attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was illegal." 4

In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers Footnotes
the NBI "to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines,
upon its own initiative and as public interest may require" 5 and to make arrests. The invocation does 1
 Posadas v. Ombudsman, 395 Phil. 601, 609-610 (2000).
not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI
Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be "in accordance with existing laws and rules."
2
 Id. at 617.
Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such
have the following powers: 3
 Ibid.

(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules.6 4
 Id. at 613.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) 5
 Republic Act 157, Section 1(a) and (b).
 6
 Id. at Section 5. ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.

MELO, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a
practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection
with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit,
which accompanied her letter-complaint, alleged that respondent:

. . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale with me as the Vendee-a-

Retro last January 21, 1987 in this City using Original Certificate of Land Title stolen
from the Office of the Register of Deeds herein in Iligan as a result of which I was
swindled in One hundred eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00) because the said land
sold to me by Pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time to another party, using
the owner's duplicate copy of the title. That during our pacto de retro sale, as I was
suspicious already of the appearance of the Original Certificate of Title, having many
annotations and old patches thereof, when I brought the matter to the attention of
Atty. Jose A. Grageda, notarizing the same, he simply answered me that the title was
all right and that he told me further not to worry as he is an attorney and besides he
knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro  whose business transactions especially notarial
matter has been and in fact always handled by him (Attorney Jose A. Grageda).

That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was confiscated by Iligan City
Register of Deeds, Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on the occasion when I applied for
registration of my Pacto de Retro. Findings showed that many other cased of stolen
original certificates of land titles have taken place in the said office but the said
Attorney as the Register of Deeds did not prosecute the thieves thereof.

I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-Retro together with her accomplices to

include said Attorney Jose A. Grageda, coursing it through the local Barangay
Captain last May 1987 yet, then forwarded to the City Fiscal through the Police
Station Commander in June 1987 but that and until the time of this Report was not
tried in Court yet but that the Information did not include said Atty. Jose A. Grageda,
hence this report.

(p. 2, Vol. I, Record.)

Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, 1989, pertinently alleging:

6. That they showed me a copy of the title which I examined and found out the title
was clear and there was no annotation or entry so I told them that as far as the title
was concern there was no encumbrances or annotation and can be the subject of
the Pacto de Retro;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila 7. That they insisted that I notarized the document so I proceeded to translate the
document in Cebu, Visayan dialect to make sure that the parties understood the deed
and they replied that they understood this and I asked then further if they have any
THIRD DIVISION more to add or delete; they answered that there was no more and they will sign the
same;
 
8. That I told them to sign the document above their typewritten name which they did
and witnessed by the other person with them who were present, so after their
A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994 signature in good faith based upon their documents I notarized the same.
 (p. 10, Vol. II, Record.)
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court  En Banc of April 12,
1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and
consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision.
Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an empty
routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled hearings for reception of evidence but complainant ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to
manifested that she cannot proceed to Manila and attend to her case due to financial constraints. SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
Upon the other hand, respondent could no longer be located, having moved without leaving any commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any
forwarding address. other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the
records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
duly circularized to all courts.
Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the complaint and the supporting affidavit, as well as
the counter-affidavit of respondent, found that "there is reason for disciplining the respondent" SO ORDERED.
premised upon the following observations:
Feliciano, J., Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the vendor-a-retro and the
complainant (vendee-a-retro) on the matter of the title when he was asked to notarize
the Deed of Sale a Retro. He admits that he rendered an opinion based on the title Bidin, J., is on leave.
that was presented to him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the Original
Certificate of Title which only the Register of Deeds has custody of and he should
have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should
have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate
of Title, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the
possession of unauthorized persons. Even if it were the photostat copy of said
Original Certificate of Title that was presented to him, the same did not bear any
certification by the Register of Deeds which could have alerted him of the irregularity.
The testimony that the Original was shown to him has not been controverted. The
Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original because it was testified that when
the Register of Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the original
certificate was confiscated by the Register of Deeds.

The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting more than a notary
public and goes beyond mere certification of the presence of the signatories, their
having signed, and having contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary
public has entered the realm of giving "legal advice" — thus "acting also as counsel
aside from notary public" to the parties to the contract.

Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the legal duty to advice him properly of
the irregularities and the dangers of holding the Original Certificate which should
have been in the custody of the Register of Deeds. Respondent had acted recklessly
at the least, in his advise of the vendee. He rendered an opinion that was
irresponsible that his client relied upon — which recklessness is censurable.

(pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol. Record.)

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts,
and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of
the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]).

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).

In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated
every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed