Joseph Nye, Soft Power

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive LLC
Soft Power
Author(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), pp. 153-171
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SOFT POWER
byJosephS. Nye,Jr.
The Cold War is over and Americans are try-

ing to understand their place in a world with-
out a defining Soviet threat. Polls report that
nearly half the public believes the country is in
decline, and that those who believe in decline
tend to favor protectionism and to counsel
withdrawal from what they consider overex-
tended international commitments.
In a world of growing interdependence, such
advice is counterproductive and could bring on
the decline it is supposed to avert; for if the
most powerful country fails to lead, the conse-
quences for international stability could be di-
sastrous. Throughout history, anxiety about
decline and shifting balances of power has been
accompanied by tension and miscalculation.
Now that Soviet power is declining and Japa-
nese power rising, misleading theories of
American decline and inappropriate analogies
between the United States and Great Britain in
the late nineteenth century have diverted our
attention from the real issue-how

away issue-how power

is changing in world politics.
FOREIGN
The United POLICY
States is certainly less powerful
at the endhas of the twentieth 23 century
cent than it was
product each
in 1945. Evenaveraged
conservative per estimates show yearthat
since the mid-1970s. The CIA, using numbers
the U.S. share of global product has declined
that reflect the purchasing power of different
from more than a third of the total after World
currencies, reports that the American share of
War II to a little more than a fifth in the 1980s.
world product increased slightly from 25 per
That change, however, reflects the artificial
cent in 1975 to 26 per cent in 1988.
effect of World War II: Unlike the other great
These studies suggest that the effect of
powers, the United States was strengthened y
World War II lasted about a quarter century
the war. But that artificial preponderance was
and that most of the decline worked its way
bound to erode as other countries regained
through the system by the mid-1970s. In fact,
their economic health. The important fact is
the of American commitments
theadjustment
that big U.S. economy's share of the global
occurred with then President Richard Nixon's
product has been relatively constant for the
withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of the
past decade and a half. The Council on Com-
convertibility of the dollar into gold.
petitiveness finds that the U.S. share of world
The dictionary tells us that power means an
ability S.toNYE,
JOSEPH
do things and control others,Interna-
JR., is director of theCenterfor
to get
others
tional to doat what
Affairs Harvard they otherwise
University. Thiswould not.
articledraws
his 1990
Because
from the book, Bound to Lead:others
to control The Changing
is often
ability
Nature of American Power (New York:BasicBooks).
associated with the possession of certain re-
sources, politicians and 153. diplomats commonly
define power as the possession of population,
territory, natural resources, economic
military forces, and political stability. For ex-
ample, in the agrarian economies of eight-
eenth-century Europe, population was a criti-

cal power resource since it provided a base for
taxes and recruitment of infantry.
Traditionally the test of a great power was

its strength in war. Today, however, the defi-

nition of power is losing its emphasis on mili-
Nye
tary force and conquest that marked earlier
eras.
WhatThecan factors
we sayof about
technology,
changes in the distri-
education, and
economic
bution are becoming
growthresources
of power in themore
coming de-
signifi-
cant in Political
cades? international leaders
power, while
often the term
usegeography,
population,
multipolarity andtorawimply materials
the return aretobecoming
a balance
somewhat
among less important.
a number of states with roughly equal
If so,resources
power are we entering
analogous a Japanese the nine-
to that ofperiod in
world century.
teenth politics? ButJapan thishasis not likely to
certainly done far
be the
better with
situation its turn
at the of the
strategy as century,
a tradingfor in terms
state since
1945
of powerthan it did with
resources, its potential
all the strategy to
military challengers
create thea Greater
United East StatesAsian
are deficient in some
Co-Prosperity
Sphere The
respect. in the Soviet Union
1930s. On lags
the economically,
other hand,
Japan's security ainless-developed
China remains relation to its large Eu-
military
country,
China and
rope lacks political
neighbors, unity,theandSoviet is deficient
JapanUnion, and
the
bothsafety of its power
in military and in
sea routes depend
global heavily on
ideological
U.S. If economic
appeal.protection. While
reforms they may Soviet
reverse diminish,de-
these
cline, problems will not vanish
if Japan develops with thenuclear
a full-fledged end of
the
andCold War. Onemilitary
conventional should capability,
not leap tooor if Eu-
quickly
to thebecomes
conclusion that all trends favor economicthere
rope dramatically more unified,
may beora return
power countries like Japan.
to classical in the
twenty-first century.154. But barring such
changes, the United States is likely to retain a
broader range of power resources-military,
economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological
-than other countries, and the Soviet Union
may lose its superpower status.

TheGreatPowerShift
The coming century may see continued

American preeminence, but the sources of

power in world politics are likely to undergo
FOREIGN POLICY
major changes that will create new difficulties
tivesallwill
for countries in achieving
be diminished. To their goals. Proof
understand what
of
is power lies not in resources but in the ability
happening to the United States today, the
to
distinction the behavior ofover
change between states.
otherThus, the
countries
power
critical
and power question for the United
over outcomes must beStates
clear. not
is Al-
whetherthe will start
it United nexthas
the still
States century as the
though leverage over
with the largest of re-
particularcountries, it has
superpower farlesssupply
leverage over
sources,
the but to what extent it will be able to
system as a whole. It is less well-placed to
attain itsthe
control ends environment and alone other
unilaterally, but it is notget
political in
countries
this situation.to do All
what it wants. Some trends in
major states will have to
world
confront suggest that
the changing
politics it will
nature be more
of power diffi-
in world
cult in the future for any great power to control
politics.
theSuch
political environment.
changes, Theare
of course, for the
not entirely
problem
United
new. For States will be
example, theless
rapidthegrowth challenge
rising of private
of another
actors majoracross
operating than a general
power international diffu-
borders,
sion of power. Whereas or
whether large corporationsnineteenth-century
political groups,
Britain faced new challengers, the 1970s. Even
was widely recognized in the early twenty-first
century United States will face new challenges.
Henry Kissinger, with his deeply rooted belief
in As world politics becomes more conceded
classical balance-of-power politics, complex,
the
in apower of all major
1975 speech that states to gain their aobjec-
we are entering new
era. Old international155. patterns are crumbling.
... The world has become interdependent in
economics, in communications, in human aspi-
rations.
By the late 1970s, however, the American
political mood had shifted. Iran's seizure of the

U.S. embassy in Tehran and the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan seemed to reaffirm the role
of military force and the primacy of the tradi-

tional security agenda. Ronald Reagan's presi-

dency accentuated these trends in the early Nye
1980s. The U.S. defense budget increased in
real terms
other actorsforare
five
becoming years, arms control
straightincreasingly impor-
was downgraded,
tant. Although they andlack military
public power, to
opposition trans-
nu-
clear forces
national and deterrence
corporations have enormous economic
grew. Conventional
military force
resources. Thirty was today eachalbeit
used successfully,
corporations have
annual
against sales greater than
the extremely weakthe states
gross national
of Grenada
and Libya.
products 90 countries.
The shifting
(GNPs)of agenda of Inworld
the 1980s,
poli-
the
tics annual
discredited the of
profits 1970s' and Royal
IBMconcern withDutch/
inter-
Shell Group and
dependence wererestored
each larger the than the central
traditional em-
phasis on military
government budgets of Colombia,
power. Kenya, or
But interdependence
continued to grow,
Yugoslavia. Multinational
and the world are
of the 1980s
corporations
sometimes
was not themoresamerelevant
as that oftothe 1950s. a coun-
achieving
Thegoals
try's than are other states.
appropriateresponse to the The
changesannual
oc-
overseas
curring inproduction
world politicsby such is not to aban-
todaycorporations ex-
don the traditional
ceedsthe total value of international
concern for thetrade. In a
military
balance
regionalof power,a but
context, of theitsMiddle
to accept
portrait East
limitations
conflict that did not
and to supplement include
it with the superpowers
insights about inter-
would be woefully
dependence. In the inadequate,
traditional view,but sostates
would a
are
the that didactors
only significant
description not intellworld
of transnational
politics and
oil companies,
only a few large states really matter. andButterrorist
today
organizations. The issue 156.is not whether state or
nonstate actors are more important-states
usually are. The point is that in modern times,
more complex coalitions affect outcomes.
With changing actors in world politics come
changing goals. In the traditional view, states

give priority to military security to ensure their
survival. Today, however, states must consider
new dimensions of security. National security

has become more complicated as threats shift

from the military (that is, threats against terri-
FOREIGN POLICY
torial integrity) to the economic and ecological.
For
instruments
example,such Canadians today are notorgani-
as communications, afraid
that U.S.and
zational soldiers will burn
institutional Toronto
skills, for a sec-
and manipula-
ond
tion time (as in 1813); rather
of interdependence they fear
have become that
impor-
Toronto will be to
tant. Contrary into a flourishes,
some rhetorical
programmed backwater
by a Texas computer. doesThenotforms
mean of vulnerabil-
interdependence harmony.
ity have it increased,
often means and trade-offsbalanced mu-
Rather, unevenly among poli-
cies
tualare designed toJust dealaswith
thedifferent vulnera-
less enamored of
dependence.
bilities. The United States, for
two lovers may manipulate theinstance, other, the less
might
enhance
vulnerable its of two states
energy security naval
may byusesending
subtle threats
forces to the Persian as but itofcould accom-
to their relationship Gulf; a source power. Fur-
ther, the
plish same goal byisenlarging
interdependence its strategic
often balanced differ-
petroleum reserve, by
ently in different sucha as
imposing
spheres gasoline tax
security,
to encourage
trade, conservation
and finance. at home,
Thus, creating andand
resist-
by
improving
ing linkages in institutions
between issues
cooperation when a likestatethe is
International
either less orEnergy more Agency.
vulnerable than another
While military
becomes the art offorce remains the ultimate
the power game. Political
form of power
leaders in a self-helpinstitutions
use international system, theto usedis-
of
force has or become more costly for modern
courage promote such linkages; they greatshop
powers than it was in earlier centuries.
for the forum that defines the scope of an issue Other
in the manner best suiting 157. their interests.
As the instruments of power change, so do
strategies. Traditionalists consider the goal of
security and the instrument of military force to
be linked by a strategy of balancing power.
States wishing to preserve their independence
from military intimidation follow a balancing
strategy to limit the relative power of other
states. Today, however, economic and ecologi-

cal issues involve large elements of mutual ad-

vantage that can be achieved only through co- Nye
operation. These issues are often critical to the
reelection
shipping, and of political
airlines leaders.
each have A somewhat
French presi-dif-
dent
ferenttoday would notof
distributions interfere
power.with power of
TheGermany's
increased
states varies economic
as well, as does the
growth because German
significance of
nonstateisactors
growth in to
critical Frenchspheres.
different economicFor exam-
growth.
The French
ple, the decision
politics to forego an
of international debt cannot be
independent
economic
understoodpolicy withoutandconsidering
remain in the power of
the European
system in the early 1980s is one ex-
private banks.
monetary
of such interdependence.
If military
ample power could be transferred freely
Traditionalist
into the realms ofaccounts
economicsofand world
the environ-
politics
often
ment,speak of an international
the different systemnot
structures would thatmat-
re-
sults from
ter; and thetheoverall
balancing determined
strategies
hierarchy of states.by
Although bipolarity
military strength andaccurately
would multipolaritypredict out-
are use-
ful
comes in world
terms, different
todaypolitics. Butspheres worldis
militaryofpower
have and
more costly
politics different
less transferable
distributions than in
of power-
today
that
earlier different
is,times. the hierarchiesthat
Thus,power charac-
structures. Military
terize different
power, issues
particularly are more
nuclear, remains
diverse. The
largely
bipolar
games of in its distribution.
world But in trade,
politics encompass where
different
the European
players at different
Communitytablesacts
withasdifferent
a unit, power
piles
is Ocean transfer winnings
chips. They can resources,
ofmultipolar. money, space,
among
tables, but often only 158.at a considerable dis-
count. The military game and the overall
structure of the balance of power dominate
when the survival of states is clearly at stake,
but in much of modern world politics, physical
survival is not the most pressing issue.
ConvertingPower
The fragmentation of world politics into

many different spheres has made power re-

sources less fungible, that is, less transferable
FOREIGN POLICY
from sphere to sphere. Money is fungible, in
that it can beMeasily converted from
ilitarization one cur-
considerable. mightthen reduce
rency to
rather another.
han increase Power has alwaystobeen less
Japan'sability achieve
its ends. than money, but it is even less so
fungible
than in earlier
Because In the
today power is aperiods. y defini-
relationship,beighteenth
tion
century, a monarch
it implies with a full
some context. treasury could
Diminished un-
purchase
gibility means thattospecifying
infantry conquer newthe context
provinces,is
which, in turn,
increasingly
could enrich the treasury.
mportant n estimating
This
he actual
that canthe
was essentially derivedoffrom
be strategy Frederick IIre- of
power power
Prussia, for example, when in
than ever, one musthe seized
1740 the
Austria's Power of orSilesia.
what? Yet at the same
question,province
Today,
time, worldthe
however,
because use of force for
directhas
politics only partly
economicandthe
changed gain istraditional too costly and
generally geopolitical dan-
genda
is for modern
still relevant,
gerous some powers. Even
greatfungibility short of
of military
aggression, the translation of economic
remains.The into
power protective oleof military
is apower
military
force resourcesinmay be very costly.
relevantasset bargaining mong
For instance, there is no economic
states.The dependence f conservative obstacle to
oil-pro-
Japan's states a
on the major
developing nuclear or
United States for conven-
their
ducing
tional force, but the political
for example, imitedcost
heirboth at home n
security, leverage
and in the reaction of other countries would be
the United States during the 1973 oil crisis.
The United Statesis 159.
still the ultimateguaran-
tor of the military security of Europe and
Japan, and that role is a sourceof bargaining
power n negotiationswith itsallies.In general,
the allies' need for protection strengthens
American nfluence,andmaycontinue o do so
even with a reducedSovietthreat.Duringthe
Cold War, the United States often worried
about the frailty of its allies and tended to

sacrifice omeeconomic nterests n itseffortto

containthe perceivedSoviet menace. Despite
Nye
the waningof that threat,if the United States
worries ess thanits
New forms alliesdo, it mayand
of communications be able to
trans-
demandmoreof
portation have had them. a revolutionary effect on
To evaluate
economic power in aApost-Cold
interdependence. century ago,Warit
world,
took twoit is
weeks to cross
necessary o recognize nstruments
the Atlantic; in 1927,
and
Charles Lindbergh did it in 33necessary
balance-of-powertrategies or a
hours; today,
successful
the Concorde flies But
policy. new
across three andin
in elements a the
half
modernworld
hours. Modernare telecommunications
diffusingpoweraway from
are instan-
all the great
taneous, satellites Thus,
and powers. any successful
and fiber-optic cables
have ledmust
strategy to a tenfold othin
increase
incorporate continuity and
overseas tele-
phone calls in the last decade. The declining
change.
The of
costs great powers of today
transportation andarecommunication
less able to use
have revolutionized
their traditional power marketsand
resources
global acceler-
to achieve
ated the
their purposes than of
development in transnational
the past. Oncorpora-
many
tions that
issues, actorseconomic
transfer
private and small activity across
states have be-
come more
borders. World
powerful. hasleast
trade At grownfivemore
trends have
rapidly
contributed to this diffusion
than world product, becoming of morepower: eco-
important
nomic
in all major transnational
economies. Trade
interdependence, has more than
actors,
doubled its in
nationalism weak
role in the U.S.the
states, spread of
economy tech-
over the
past twoand
nology, changing
decades. political
Changes issues. markets
in financial
are even more dramatic. 160. International mone-
tary flows are some 25 times the world's aver-
age daily trade in goods. The rapid expansion
of Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets (that
is, currencies held outside their home country)
has eroded the ability of national authorities to

control their capital markets. In 1975, foreign
exchange markets handled some $10-15 billion
daily; by 1986, they handled $200 billion.

Governments can intervene in such markets;

but if they do so with a heavy hand, they will
FOREIGNPOLICY
incur enormous costs in their own economic
States. In
growth risk words,
andother unintended effects. For
transnational in-
invest-
stance, efforts
ments have by theanU.S.
changed American in the
interest.
government
1960s
The to slow thecase
American is notofunique.
export capital For U.S.-
by years,
based
Francemultinational firmsautomobiles to those
restricted Japanese 3 per
firms
cent ofto the
keep and borrow
French marketdollars outside the
and restricted in-
United
vestmentStates. The result
by Japanese was the inrapid bur-
France.
companies
of Eurocurrency
When Japanese marketsoutside U.S.
geoning automakers began to establish
controls.
plants in other European countries that could
In addition to way states
the Frenchthegovernment
export to France,constraining
droppedtheir
pursue national interests,
its restrictions. transnational
Transnational invest-
actors
ments affect
changed the away such interests
long-standing are initially
French policy.
defined. Transnational investment creates
The diffusion of power to private transnational new
interests
actors and and coalitions in of
the resulting complication world
na-
politics. For example,
tional interests is likelyHonda of America
to continue evenis
turning into an American car maker. It
steadily it
though is not recognized in many compari-
plans tothe
sons of export 50,000 cars annually to Japan in
power resources of major states.
the early 1990s. American officials are now
pressing Europeans to open their market to
More automobiles
Japanese than produced
one must
ever,
in the United
ask the
question, 161.for what?
Power
Modernization, urbanization, and increased

communication in developing countries have
also diffused power from government to pri-
vate actors. Military power is more difficult to
apply today than in the past because a social
awakening has stirred nationalism in otherwise

poor or weak states. This increased social mo-

bilization makes military intervention and ex-
Nye
ternal rule more costly. The nineteenth-cen-
Third
tury greatWorld
powers carved
states can out and ruled
deploy in the colonial
1990s
with a handful of troops. In 1953,
more costly thanthein
make
empires regional intervention
United
the States
1950s. was able at
In addition, to least
restore the Shah
a dozen of
Third
Iran tostates
World his throne through a minor
have developed covert ac-
arms-
significant
tion. It industries.
is hard to imagine, however,
Meanwhile, how arms
manyre-
export many
would have been to needed to restore
their pur-the
cipients have sought
troops diversify
Shah ininthe
chases order mobilized
to gain
socially and nationalistic
over the major
leverage
Iran of 1979. TheWhen
or sole United States
arms areand the Soviet
from
supplier. supplied
Union
outside,found the costs
the supplier of maintaining
often troops in
has leveragethrough
Vietnam
technical and Afghanistan
assistance, and replace-
unsupportable. In
spare parts,
each Thethe
case, cause was less an increase in the
ments. growth of indigenous arms indus-
of a weaker
tries removes
power state than the costliness for
that leverage.
outsiders of ruling
In addition, more countries
actively are acquiring
antagonistic popu-
lations.
sophisticated weapons capabilities. Today
Another trend inhavethe the
diffusion of power is
about 20 countries capability to make
the of modern
spreadweapons, which has
chemical by the year 2000 an
andtechnology,
enhanced
estimated the 15 capabilities
Third World of countries
backwardwill states.
be
While the superpowers have keptmissiles.
a large lead in
Five
producing their own ballistic
military
states hadtechnology,
the bomb when the forces that many
the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty was 162. signed in 1968; India,
Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa have since
developed some nuclear capability. Within the
next decade Argentina, Brazil, and several
others might also develop military nuclear ca-
pability. However, a small nuclear capability

will not make these states contenders for global
power; in fact, it may increase the risks they
face if their neighbors follow suit or if the

weapons fall into the hands of rebel or terrorist

groups. OnPOLICY
FOREIGN the other hand, nuclear capability
would add to these states' regional power and
issuesare
increase thetransnational
potential costsecause heyhave
of regional do-
inter-
mesticrootsand cross nternational
vention by larger powers. Technology also orders.
in-
As
creases the powerccident
the nuclear t Chernobyl
of private groups. For n the
in-
USSR
stance, emonstrated, vena domesticssue
handheld antiaircraft ike
missiles helped
guerrillas inofAfghanistan
the nuclearreactors and new anplastic
suddenlyex-
become ransnational.
plosives are effective tools for terrorists.
The abilityorce
Although sometimes
maypowers
of great laya role,
with impressive
traditional nstruments
traditional power f power
resources rerarely
to control uf-
their en-
ficient o deal
vironments is with henewdilemmasf
also diminished world
by the changing
nature of New
politics. in world
issuespower resources, uch as the
politics. Increasingly,
today do notommunication
the issues oreffective
capacity ndfor
pit one state against
developing
another; instead, theymultilateral
ndusing are issues innstitutions,
which all
mayprove
states try tomorerelevant.
control nonstateMoreover, oopera-
transnational
tion will
actors. The oftenbe to manyrom
solutionsneeded small,
current weak
issues of
states hat arenot
transnational fully capable
interdependence will frequire
managing
col-
theirown domestic
lective action or ecological
rug,health,cooperation.
and international
problems.
These include orecological heUnitedStates
example,changes an-
(acid rain and
notuseitstraditional
global warming), health ower esources
epidemics o force
such as
AIDS, tradehe
o curtail
Peru illicit production
in drugs, f cocainef
and terrorism. Sucha
weakPeruvianovernment annot ontrol ri-
163.
vategangsof drugdealers.And if the U.S.
governmentannot ontrol he American e-
mand,a transnationalarketor cocainewill
survive.Although he traditional owerre-
sourcesof economicassistance nd military

force anassistncopingwith errorism,rolif-

eration, or drugs, the ability of any great
power to control its environmentand to
not as

achievewhat t wants s oftennotas greatas

traditionalardpower ndicators ouldsug-
Nye
gest.
Thechanging ature finternational olitics
custom-tailoring products can be incorporated
hasalsomade ntangibleorms of powermore
into modern manufacturing plants. Japan has
important. Nationalcohesion,universalistic
been particularly adept at such flexible manu-
culture,andinternational nstitutionsretak-
facturing processes; the United States and Eu-
ingonadditional
rope and the owers
ignificance.
need to do more, Soviet passing
Union
fromthe capital-rich o the information-
and China lag seriously behind.
rich.
Timely response to information is not only
Informations
in becoming moreandmore
but also in critical
important manufacturing
plentiful,
services utthe
such flexibility
as finance, o actfirston new
insurance, and trans-
informationIn the Information
s rare.markets becomes
were defined
portation. past, by
limitsespecially
power,
the before it
of transportation andspreads. Thus a
communication
for timely
capacity buyers
between andresponse
sellers. Today, informa-
to new however,
tionnew criticalof
is a means power resource. With the rise
the communication convey im-
of an information-based
mediate market raw
information oneconomy, mate-
trends to
rials have become less important and organiza-
buyers and sellers worldwide. Satellites and
tional skills and flexibility more important.
fiber-optic cables instantaneously and contin-
Product cycles are shortening
link and technology
little
uously people watching green screens
is moving toward
in London, New York, and flexible
highly production
Tokyo. That China
systems,
and in which
the Soviet Unionthedo craft-era tradition of
not significantly par-
ticipate in these transnational
164. credit markets
seriously limits their access to intangible
aspects of power. In the 1980s, other govern-
ments such as Britain and Japan had to follow
the United States in the deregulation of money
markets and financial operations in order to
preserve their positions in these important
markets.
Intangible changes in knowledge also affect

military power. Traditionally, governments

have
FOREIGNinvested in human espionage. But now
POLICY
major powers like the United States and the
Soviet Union
possibility that
employ continuous
the weaker side might
photographic
collapse
and
underelectronic
pressuresurveillance from space,
limits the leverage of the seem-
provid-
ing quick
ingly access to
stronger a varietyThe
partner. of economic,
power of the
polit-
debtor
ical, andhas long been
military information.
known: If Other coun-a
a man owes
bank such
tries, as France,
$10,000, the bank arehas power over
beginning to make
him.
low-resolution
But if he owes $100satellite information
million, commer-
he has power over
the bank.
cially If Mexico
available, but the or United
some Caribbean
States leads in
states
became too weak
high-resolution to deal with internal poverty
information.
orAnother
domesticintangible the United
problems, aspect States would
of power arises
face interdependence.
from a new foreign policy The overt
agenda distribution
involving
of influxes
economic
larger of migrants,
resources drugs, orthe
poorly describes contra-
bal-
band.of Similarly,
ance power between the failure of developing
interdependent states.
countries
On the onetohand,
prevent thedestruction
influence of of the
theirostensi-
forests
willstronger
bly affect the
state be limited
may climate;
global bythose
yet states'
the greater
very weakness
organization andwill
concentration
diminish other of itscountries'
smaller
power to influence
counterpart. This difference
them. The helps to account
current U.S.
for
neglect of weak
Canada's Third success
surprising in bargaining
World countries may
with
reducetheits
United
abilityStates.
to affect the other
On their hand,
policies on if a
the
relationship is beneficial
new transnational issues.toThebothUnited
parties, the
States
will have to devote more 165. attention to the para-
doxical power that grows out of political and
economic chaos and weakness in poor coun-
tries.
TheChangingFaceof Power
These trends suggest a second, more attrac-

tive way of exercising power than traditional
means. A state may achieve the outcomes it

prefers in world politics because other states

want to follow it or have agreed to a situation
Nye
that produces such effects. In this sense, it is
just astoimportant
tends to setwith
be associated the agenda
intangibleandpower
struc-
ture the situations
resources in world
such as culture, politicsandas toinsti-
get
ideology,
others to change in particularcases.
tutions.
This second aspect
Soft of ispower-which
just as important occursas
co-optive power
whencommand
hard one country gets other countries
If a state can maketo want
its
power.
what it wants-might
legitimate inbethe called of others, or it
power seem eyes co-optive
soft encounter
will power in contrast with the
less resistance hard
to its or com-
wishes. If
mand
its culture
power andofideology
orderingare others to do what
attractive, othersit
wants.
will more willingly follow. If it can establish
Parents of teenagers
internationalnorms have long
consistent known
with that if
its society,
it
theyis have have
shapedtotheir
less likely to change.
child's If itpref-
beliefs and can
their powerthat
erences, institutions
support willmake other states
be greater wish
and more
to channelthan
enduring if they
or limit their
rely only oninactive
activities wayscon-the
trol. Similarly,
dominant politicalitleaders
state prefers, may beand the
philoso-
spared
have long
phizersexercise
costly understood
of coercive the power.
or hard power of at-
tractive ideas power
In general, or the ability
is becoming to setless
the transfer-
political
agenda
able, and
less determine
coercive, andthelessframeworkof debate
tangible. Modern
in a way
trends andthat shapes
changes others' preferences.
in political The
issues are having
ability to affect what other countries want
significant effects on the nature of power and
the resources that produce 166. it. Co-optive power
-getting others to want what you want-and
soft power resources-cultural attraction, ide-
ology, and international institutions-are not
new. In the early postwar period, the Soviet
Union profited greatly from such soft re-
sources as communist ideology, the myth of
inevitability, and transnational communist in-
stitutions. Various trends today are making

co-optive behavior and soft power resources

relatively more
FOREIGN important.
POLICY
Given the changes in world politics, the use
of
States
power is becoming
to reduce lessdeficit,
its budget but at
coercive, least
threat-
amongtotherefuse
ening majortostates. The current instru-
buy American Treasury
ments of power
bonds would rangetofrom
be likely financialnotes
diplomatic mar-
disrupt
and economic
through
kets to produce threats to military
enormous coercion.
costs for Japan
In earlier
as well as periods, the costs of such
for the United States. Because the coercion
were
use ofrelatively
force has low.become
Force wasmore acceptable and
less
costly,
economies were less Earlyin-in
threatening forms ofinterdependent.
power have grown
this century, the United States sent marines
creasingly attractive.
and customs agentsis to the collect debts
of a in some
Co-optive power ability country to
Caribbean situation but
structure acountries; so under
that current condi-
tions, the direct use of American troops against
develop preferences or define their interests in
small countries
consistentlike its own.carries
Nicaragua
with This greater
ways
costs. power
tends to arise from such resources as cultural
and of interdependence
Manipulationattraction as well asunder
rules cur-
and
ideological
rent conditions is also more costly. Economic
institutions of international regimes. The
interdependence carries benefits in
United States has usually
more co-optive power than
both directions; and threats to disrupt a rela-
other countries. Institutions governing the in-
tionship, if carried out, can be very expensive.
ternational economy, such as the International
For example, Japan might want the United
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 167. tend to embody liberal,
free-market principles that coincide in large
measure with American society and ideology.
Multinational corporations are another
source of co-optive power. British author
Susan Strange argued in her 1988 book States

andMarkets hat U.S. power in the world econ-
omy has increased as a result of transnational
production:

Washington may have lost some of its au-

thority over the U.S.-based transnationals, Nye
but their managers still carry U.S. pass-
can be in
embodied
ports,
ture, products and
sub-poenaed in U.S.
communica-
courts,
and in war or national emergency would
tions, has widespread appeal. Young Japanese
obey Washington first. Meanwhile, the
who have never been to the United States wear
government has gained new authority over a
with the names of American col-
many foreign corporations inside the
greatjackets
sports
United
leges. States. AHof
Nicaraguan television are acutelyAmeri-
them broadcast aware
canthat the U.S.
shows even market is the biggest prize.
while the government fought
American-backed guerrillas. Similarly, Soviet
This power
wear arises in partand
from theAmerican
seek fact that
teenagers blue jeans
34 per cent of the largest multinational
recordings, and Chinese students usedcorpora-
a sym-
tions are headquartered in the United States
bol modeled on the Statue of Liberty during
(compared to 18 per cent in Japan)
the 1989 uprisings. the and in part
Chinese
Despite gov-
from the importance of the American market in
ernment's protests against U.S. interference,
any global
Chinese corporate
citizens werestrategy.
as interested as ever in
American culture is another relatively inex-
American democracy and culture.
pensive and useful soft power resource. Ob-
viously, certain aspects of American culture are
unattractive to other people, and there is
Whereas nineteenth-century Brit-
always danger of bias in evaluating cultural
ain offaced new
sources challengers, the
power. But American popular cul-
twenty-first century United States
168.
will face new challenges.
Of course, there is an element of triviality

and fad in popular behavior, but it is also true
that a country that stands astride popular chan-

nels of communication has more opportunities
to get its messages across and to affect the
preferences of others. According to past studies
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization, the United States
has been exporting about seven times as many
television shows as the next largest exporter
(Britain) and has had the only global network
for film distribution. Although American films
account for only 6-7 per cent of all films made,
they occupy about 50 per cent of world screen-
time. In 1981, the United States was responsi-
ble for 80 per cent of worldwide transmission
and processing of data. The American lan-
guage has become the linguafrancaof the global
economy.
Although Japanese consumer products and
cuisine have recently become more fashion-
able, they seem less associated with an implicit
appeal to a broader set of values than American
domination of popular communication. The
success of Japan's manufacturing sector pro-
vides it with an important source of soft power,
but Japan is somewhat limited by the inward
orientation of its culture. While Japan has been
169.


FOREIGNPOLICY
extraordinarily successful in accepting foreign

technology, it has been far more reluctant to
accept foreigners. Japan's relationswith China,
for example, have been hampered by cultural
insensitivities. Many Japanese are concerned
about their lack of internationalization and
their failure to project a broader message.
While Americans can also be parochial and
inward-oriented, the openness of the American
culture to various ethnicities and the American
values of democracy and human rights exert
international influence. West European coun-
tries also derive soft power from their demo-
cratic institutions, but America's relative open-
ness to immigrants compared to Japan and
Europe is an additional source of strength. As
European scholar Ralf Dahrendorf has ob-
served, it is relevantthat millions of people all
over the world would wish to live in the United
States and that indeed people are prepared to
risk their lives in order to get there. Maintain-
ing this appeal is important.
In June 1989, after President George Bush
the government killing
student protesters in China, ordinary Chinese
seemed more supportive of the United States
than ever before. Subsequently, by sending a
delegation of too high a level to Beijing to seek
reconciliation, Bush squandered some of those
soft-power resources. When ideals are an im-
portant source of power, the classic distinction
between realpolitik and liberalism becomes
The who the
Americans are rightly concerned about the
future shape of a War world, but it is
a mistake to portray the problem as American
decline rather than diffusion of power. Even
so, concern about decline might be good for the
United States if it cut through complacency
and prodded Americans to deal with some of
their serious domestic problems. However,
pollsters find that excessive anxiety about de-
cline turns American opinion toward nationa-
listic and protectionist policies that could con-
strain the U.S. ability to cope with issues
created by growing international interdepen-
dence. There is no virtue in either overstate-
ment or understatement of American strength.
170.


Nye
The former leads to failure to adapt, the latter

to inappropriate responses such as treating
Japan as the new enemy in place of the Soviet
Union.
As the world's wealthiest country, the
United States should be able to pay for both its
internationalcommitments and its domestic in-
vestments. America is rich but through its po-
litical process acts poor. In real terms, GNP is
more than twice what it was in 1960, but
Americans today spend much less of their GNP
on international leadership. The prevailing
view is we can't afford it, despite the fact that
U.S. taxes represent a smaller percentage of
gross domestic product than those of other ad-
vanced industrial countries. This suggests a
problem of domestic political leadership rather
than long-term economic decline.
As has happened many times before, the mix
of resources that shapes international power is
changing. But that does not mean that the
world must expect the cycle of hegemonic con-
flict with its attendant world wars to repeat
itself. The United States retains more tradi-
tional hard power resources than any other
country. It also has the soft ideological and
institutional resources to preserve its lead in the
new domains of transnational interdepen-
dence. In this sense, the situation is quite dif-
ferent from that of Britain at the century's
beginning. Loose historical analogies and
falsely deterministic political theories are
worse than merely academic; they may distract
Americans from the true issues confronting
them. The problem for U.S. power after the
Cold War will be less the new challengers for
hegemony than the new challenges of trans-
national interdependence.
171.


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Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive LLC

This content downloaded from 131.155.123.27 on Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:56:34 AM

The Cold War is over and Americans are try-

away issue-how power

eenth-century Europe, population was a criti-

its strength in war. Today, however, the defi-

may lose its superpower status.

American preeminence, but the sources of

political mood had shifted. Iran's seizure of the

tional security agenda. Ronald Reagan's presi-

changing goals. In the traditional view, states

has become more complicated as threats shift

cal issues involve large elements of mutual ad-

many different spheres has made power re-

sacrifice omeeconomic nterests n itseffortto

has eroded the ability of national authorities to

Governments can intervene in such markets;

Modernization, urbanization, and increased

poor or weak states. This increased social mo-

pability. However, a small nuclear capability

weapons fall into the hands of rebel or terrorist

sourcesof economicassistance nd military

force anassistncopingwith errorism,rolif-

achievewhat t wants s oftennotas greatas

military power. Traditionally, governments

These trends suggest a second, more attrac-

prefers in world politics because other states

co-optive behavior and soft power resources

Susan Strange argued in her 1988 book States

Washington may have lost some of its au-

Of course, there is an element of triviality

that a country that stands astride popular chan-

This content downloaded from 131.155.123.27 on Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:56:34 AM

extraordinarily successful in accepting foreign

This content downloaded from 131.155.123.27 on Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:56:34 AM

The former leads to failure to adapt, the latter

This content downloaded from 131.155.123.27 on Wed, 26 Nov 2014 10:56:34 AM

You might also like