Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE   G.R. No. 184053
PHILIPPINES,  
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
   
  CORONA, C.J.,
  Chairperson,
  LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
  DEL CASTILLO, and
  VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
   
  Promulgated:
VIRGINIA BABY P.  
MONTANER,  
Accused-Appellant. August 31, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
 
This is an appeal of the Decision[1] dated February 12, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Virginia Baby P. Montaner, which affirmed the Decision[2] dated April 8, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, in Criminal
Case No. 0748-SPL. The RTC found appellant Virginia Baby P. Montaner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
 
In an Information[3] dated April 21, 1998, appellant was charged as follows:
 
That on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Virginia
(Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said accused by means of
false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are fully funded draw, make
and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis the following Prudential Bank Checks
Nos.:
 
1.                  0002284 P5,000.00
2.                  0002285 P5,000.00
3.                  0002286 P5,000.00
4.                  0002287 P5,000.00
5.                  0002288 P5,000.00
6.                  0002289 P5,000.00
7.                  0002290 P5,000.00
8.                  0002291 P5,000.00
9.                  0002292 P5,000.00
10.              0002293 P5,000.00
 
all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and all
aforesaid checks are postdated June 17, 1996 in exchange for cash knowing fully
well that she has no funds in the drawee bank and when the said checks were
presented for payment the same were dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED and despite demand accused failed and refused to pay the
value thereof to the damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the
aforementioned total amount of P50,000.00.
 
 
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge leveled against her during her
arraignment on June 10, 1998.[4] Thereafter, trial ensued.
 
 
The parties evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:
 
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17, 1996, accused Virginia
Baby P. Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo
Solis in his house at Caliraya Street, Holiday Homes, San Pedro, Laguna, ten (10)
Prudential Bank checks, specifically, check nos. 0002284, 0002285, 0002286,
 0002287, 0002288, 0002289, 0002290, 0002291, 0002292, and 0002293 all
postdated June 17, 1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total amount
of P50,000.00. Accused represented to complainant Solis that the checks were
fully funded. When private complainant deposited the checks for encashment
however, they were dishonored for the reason account closed. Private complainant
verbally and thereafter, thru demand letter (Exhibit A) formally demanded that
accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused
Montaner failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private complainant
Reynaldo Solis filed the instant complaint for estafa. In connection with this
complaint, private complainant Solis executed a sworn statement (Exhibit D).
 
Ruel Allan Pajarito, Branch Cashier O-I-C of Prudential Bank testified that they
placed the mark account closed on the ten (10) checks issued in the account of
accused Montaner considering that at the time the same were presented to them,
the account of accused Montaner was already closed. Witness Pajarito further
testified that as per their records, the account of accused Montaner, account no.
00099-000050-4 was closed on July 11, 1996. The checks were returned on
October 4, 1996 for the reason account closed.
 
Accused, thru counsel initially manifested that she is intending to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, her right to file the same was considered waived
in view of her failure to file the demurrer despite due notice.
 
To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P.
Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private
complainants favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by
one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to
Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and payee were left
blank so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation. She further told
Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was filed
against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that
money will not be given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no
knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her by private complainant and
claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the notice of dishonor left for
abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.[5]
 
In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the
crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences accused Virginia Baby P.
Montaner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty-two (22) years of reclusion
perpetua as maximum and to indemnify complainant Reynaldo Solis in the
amount of P50,000.00.[6]
  
 
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling
was merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12,
2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the challenged Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[7]
 
 
Hence, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court and adopted her
Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals, wherein she put forth a single
assignment of error:
 
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.[8]
 
 
Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly
signed in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to
secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable doubt that
she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis) into lending her
money. She further claims that no transaction had ever transpired between her and
Solis. Admitting that she may have been imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her
simple imprudence does not translate to criminal liability.
 
We are not persuaded.
 
Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
 
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
 
xxxx
 
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
 
xxxx
 
 (d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
 
 
The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.[9]
 
In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical testimony, appellant
issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the amount
of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their cash
equivalent. We quote the pertinent portions of the transcript:
 
[On Direct Examination]
 
Q: Mr. Witness, why did you file this complaint against the accused?
A: She issued me checks in exchange for cash, ten postdated checks, maam.
 
Q: When did Mrs. Montaner issue to you these checks?
A: In May 1996, maam.
 
Q: What was the purpose of issuing to you these checks?
A: Because she needed cash, maam.
 
Q: And how many checks did she issue to you?
A: Ten checks, maam.
 
Q: And what is the date of the checks that were issued to you?
A: June 17, 1996, maam.
 
Q: What is the total value of these ten checks?
A: Fifty Thousand Pesos.
 
Q: At the time these checks were issued to you, what if any, was her representation about
them?
A: To deposit those checks on their due date, maam.
  
Q: And aside from telling you to deposit those checks on their due date, what else did she
represent to you regarding these checks?
A: None, maam.
 
Q: Did you deposit these checks?
A: Yes, maam.
 
Q: Where?
A: At the Premier Bank, San Pedro, Laguna.
 
Q: What happened to these checks after depositing the same?
A: The checks bounced, maam.
 
Q: All these checks?
A: Yes, maam, all checks bounced for reason account closed.
 
Q: After these checks were dishonored what did you do?
A: I informed her about that.
 
Q: Thru what, verbal or written?
A: Initially it was verbal, then I informed her thru a demand letter, maam.
 
xxxx
 
Fiscal (continuing):
 
Q: You said that the accused issued to you ten checks in exchange for cash, where
are those checks?
A.                The original checks are with me here, maam.
 
Q. Handed to this representation are checks, Prudential Bank checks Nos. 002284,
002285, 002286, 002287, 002288, 002289, 002290, 002291, 002292, 002293 all
dated June 17, 1996 and all in the amount of P50,000 [should be P5,000.00]
each. Mr. Witness, there appears from these checks a signature at the bottom
portion whose signature is this?
A. The signature of Mrs. Montaner, maam.
 
Q. Why do you say it is her signature?
A. She signed those in my presence, maam.
 
Q. I am showing these checks to the opposing counsel for comparison
 
Atty. Peala
The checks are admitted, your Honor.
 
xxxx
 
[On Cross-Examination]
 
Atty. Peala (continuing):
 
Q: When Mrs. Montaner issued those checks, ten checks were they issued in your
house or in her house?
A: In my house, sir.
 
Q: Mrs. Montaner brought the checks in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: Can you tell us the time of the day when she brought the checks to you?
A: May 17, 1996 at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.
 
Q: Was she alone or including her husband?
A: She was alone, sir.[10]
 
From the circumstances narrated above, it was evident that Solis would not
have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance of the 10
Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly issued by
appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to
encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was
already closed.
 
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996[11] which was
received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks had
bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action from
Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the amount
necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This gave
rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa,
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
 
As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but
signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a
guarantee for a loan, the Court views such statements with the same incredulity as
the lower courts.
 
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The
Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[12]
 
Appellant wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with
her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that
the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellants
assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience.
 
Moreover, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has far less
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[13] We agree with the lower courts that appellants bare denial
cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the
trial court, appellants failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her
story is fatal to her cause.[14] In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in
upholding the conviction of appellant for estafa.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 12, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01162 is hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
  
 
 
 
 
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   

   

   

   

   

   

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
 
 

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 4-10; penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.
[2]
 CA rollo, pp. 19-22.
[3]
 Records, pp. 1-2.
[4]
 Id. at 37.
[5]
 CA rollo, pp. 20-21.
[6]
 Id. at 22.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 10.
[8]
 CA rollo, p. 87.
[9]
 Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
[10]
 TSN, November 25, 1998, pp. 4-8.
[11]
 Records, p. 15.
[12]
 People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004); People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659 (2002).
[13]
 Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing People v. Magbanua, G.R.
No. 133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
[14]
 Records, p. 212.
 Today is Friday, August 11, 2017
Top of Form

FIRST DIVISION

R. No. 134120            January 17, 2005

OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, 

A SAGAN JULIANO, appellant.

DECISION

CUNA, J.:

s case was certified to us for review by the Court of Appeals after finding appellant Lea Sagan Juliano guilty beyond
asonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 2053, and th
proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.

pellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. 2051 a
52, and Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2053. The pertinent
ormation for Estafa reads as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2053

at on or about July 27, 1991, at Kalawag II, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the
sdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, did then and
re, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [purchase] one hundred ninety (190) Bags of Rice from JCT Agro-Development
rporation and in payment thereof, the said accused [did] make or draw and issue in favor of the said Corporation Check N
2254 post-dated July 30, 1991 for a value of EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (₱89,800.00),
ilippine Currency, drawn against the Philippine Commercial International Bank, Isulan Branch, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
owing at the time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said check and when
esented for encashment, the same was dishonored by the said bank for reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds", and on
gust 20, 1991, the said accused again issued PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454 in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 and
9,800.00, respectively, in replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254 which was earlier dishonored, and when the said
placement checks were presented for encashment, the same were again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same
ason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation in the said amount of ₱89,800.00.

ONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.1

hen arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial of the three criminal cases ensued.2

e antecedent facts, as culled from the records,3 are as follows:

about 10:00 a.m. of July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks of milled rice worth ₱89,800 from th
es office of complainant JCT Agro-Development Corporation ("JCT") in Kalawag II, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She issued
stdated Check No. 142254 drawn against the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB), Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
ed July 30, 1991 for ₱89,800 in payment of the goods. The sale was evidenced by Ordered Goods Slip No. 54524 dated
y 27, 1991, with the check number written thereon.

July 30, 1991, Remedios Torres, JCT’s cashier and acting manager, encashed the check, but the drawee bank refused
yment because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Thereafter, Torres requested one Mrs. Graza to tell appellant to vis
T’S office because the check she issued bounced.

pellant went to JCT’s office and Torres showed her the check that bounced. Appellant pleaded that Torres accept two
ecks to replace the first check that was dishonored, and Torres agreed. The replacement checks payable to JCT were (1)
IB Isulan Branch Check No. 1454525 dated August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000; and (2) PCIB Isulan Branch Check No.
54546 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800. The Ordered Goods Slip was then revised upon Torres’ instruction. Torres
rendered the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant when she accepted the two replacement checks.

their due dates, Torres encashed the two replacement checks, but they were dishonored by the drawee bank. The bank
ued two Check Return Slips7 indicating that payment was refused because the checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient
nds." JCT, through Torres, sent a demand letter8 dated August 31, 1991 to appellant informing her of the dishonor of the
placement checks. Appellant received the demand letter on September 6, 1991.

ereafter, appellant went to the office of JCT. Torres brought appellant to one Major Salvador of the PNP, Isulan, Sultan
darat. Before him, appellant executed a promissory note9 dated September 10, 1991 wherein she promised to pay JCT as
ows: (1) ₱20,000 on September 16, 1991; (2) ₱19,800 on September 23, 1991; (3) ₱20,000 on September 30, 1991; (4)
0,000 on October 7, 1991; and (5) ₱10,000 on October 14, 1991, which all amount to ₱89,800.

rough her driver, appellant sent JCT ₱10,000 for the installment due on September 16, 1991. JCT rejected the payment
cause it was short by ₱10,000. Appellant no longer made any payment. JCT then sent her a demand letter10 dated Octobe
1991, through registered mail, reiterating the dishonor of the checks she issued and giving her five days from receipt of
d letter to pay the amount of ₱89,800; otherwise, legal action would be taken against her.

e trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code for
uing PCIB Check No. 142254, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and
5454. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
HEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, guilty beyond
asonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks law, an
he crime of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).

cordingly, the Court hereby sentences:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2051

he accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit;

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2052

he accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of FORTY THOUSAND (₱40,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2053

he accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and
WO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
y to the JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT
UNDRED (₱89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the value of ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190) BAGS of
led rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid; and to pay the costs
t.

IS SO ORDERED.11

pellant appealed her conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2053 to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found
pellant guilty of the offense. It pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on October 22, 1975,
reased the penalty12 provided in Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It held that pursuant to the said
endatory law and considering that the amount of the unpaid check is ₱89,800, appellant should be penalized by reclusion
rpetua. Hence, the Court of Appeals referred the case to us in accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules of
minal Procedure.

pellant raised the following issues:

1. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or a
fraudulent act.

2. Appellant’s failure to deposit the amount of PCI Bank check numbered 142254 for ₱89,800.00 in this case
does not give rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

3. The appellant could not be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code due to the
dishonor of the replacement checks because these were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.13

e trial court held appellant liable for Estafa for the following reasons: (1) The fact that appellant had insufficient funds in th
nk to cover the check at the time she postdated or issued Check No. 142254 is sufficient to make her liable for Estafa; and
appellant’s failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover her check within three days from receipt of notice from the
yee or holder that said check had been dishonored for insufficiency of funds is prima facie evidence of deceit constituting
se pretense or fraudulent act.

he first and second assigned errors, appellant contends that she could not be found guilty of Estafa under Article 315,
ragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she employed deceit
nstituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.

pellant alleges that when she issued postdated PCIB Check No. 142254 on July 27, 1991, she represented that the
eck would be fully funded on July 30, 1991. She stated that when complainant JCT accepted the postdated check
s aware that the funds for the said payment would become available only on the maturity date of the check. JCT
s also aware that the postdated check would be fully funded from the proceeds of another check which had not ye
en cleared for payment.

pellant asserts that when JCT agreed to accept the postdated check, it was aware of and in effect accepted the risk that th
stdated check would not be funded in case the check that was supposed to fully fund the same would not be cleared. She
eges that the officers of JCT must have known that notwithstanding her representation, there was always a chance that th
d check would not be funded on its maturity date for a variety of reasons, among them force majeure. Some of those who
rchased rice on credit from her (appellant) may not pay their obligations. The fact that she (appellant) was mistaken in her
ief that she would be able to fund the check on its maturity date does not prove deceit.

pellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to defraud. After she was notified of the dishonor of t
t check, she did not hide or abscond, but she offered to replace the first check with two checks. Appellant also contends t
en JCT accepted the replacement checks in place of PCIB Check No. 142254, she was relieved of her obligation of fundin
d check. Hence, she alleges that she is not covered by the prima facie presumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph
d), of the Revised Penal Code. She claims that since deceit is absent in this case, she is not liable for Estafa under Article
5, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.

e agree.

icle 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code states:

. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow…:

...

By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of th
ud:

...

By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
ds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to depos
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or payee or holder th
d check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
etense or fraudulent act.

e elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
ntracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has
ds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
rauded.14 Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be established with satisfactory proof to
rrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance
bad check.15 The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the
ount of the check, otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit arises. 16

regards the first reason of the trial court in holding appellant liable for Estafa, we find that appellant did not deceive
mplainant JCT by stating that she had sufficient funds in the bank on the date of issuance of the check. JCT knew
at the postdated check was not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and that it would be funded on July 30,
91. Prosecution witness Remedios Torres testified, thus:

...

PRO. DE PERALTA:

...

Q:- The check which you said … was used by Lea Sagan Juliano which is PCIB Check No. 142254 dated July
30, 1991, why is it dated July 30 when the transaction occurred on July 29?

A: - She placed it post dated with her assurance that she deposited at PCIB and it is not yet cleared and it will
cleared on July 30, 1991.

Q:- You said her deposit was not yet cleared, why, did she tell you that she deposited a check at the PCIB of
Isulan?

A: - Yes, sir."17

As regards the second reason of the trial court for holding appellant liable for Estafa, we note that appellant no
longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal
notice of dishonor of said check because complainant JCT had accepted the replacement checks and
surrendered the first check to appellant, which indicated that JCT no longer held appellant liable for the payme
of her obligation under the first check.

It has been established that after the dishonor of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, Remedios Torres,
JCT’s acting manager, verbally informed appellant at JCT’s office that she was unable to encash said check d
to insufficiency of funds, but she did not demand that appellant make good PCIB Check No. 142254 within thre
days from receipt of said notice. Instead, on the same occasion, Torres accepted PCIB Check No. 145452 dat
August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000 and PCIB Check No. 145454 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800 as the
replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254, which first check she surrendered to appellant. JCT was then holding
appellant liable for payment under the replacement checks, PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454, and no
longer under PCIB Check No. 142254. Torres testified, thus:

...
 PRO. DE PERALTA:

Q: - And since you said PCIB Check No. 142254 in the total amount of ₱89,800.00 [bounced] because of
insufficiency of funds, what did you do next?

A: - I went to the residence of Mrs. Graza to [ask] Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano is she still purchasing from her the
same rice and I found out she had been there very often so I asked Mrs. Graza to help or tell us if ever Mrs. Le
Sagan Juliano to come over and visit our office because the check she issued in payment of the 190 sacks of
rice in the total amount of [P]89,800 [bounced].

...

Q: - When Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano appeared in your Office at Kalawag II, what did you tell her?

A: - When she arrived at our office I showed her the check that [bounced].

Q: - And what transpired next?

A: - Then afterwards she told me she asked for consideration to give or allow certain period to pay that said
check by issuing us again another check to be staggard so that she can be able to pay the amount because o
her pleadings I let her issue by surrendering the previous check and she issued me the two checks dated Aug
20 and 22.

Q: - When you said surrendered the check in the amount of ₱89,800.00, are you referring to PCIB check no.
142254?

A: - That was the check I returned to her.18

accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant instead of demanding payment under
first check (PCIB Check No. 142254) on the same day that JCT’s Acting Manager informed appellant of the dishonor of
first check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary amount to cover the first check
hin three days from the verbal notice of dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellant’s balance in her account with PCIB Isulan
anch was ₱78,400. It is possible that appellant could have deposited ₱11,400 to make good the first check worth ₱89,800
T made it clear that it was demanding payment under the first check.

would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after appellant’s receipt of the verbal notice
honor of the first check, because by then the prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to deposit the
ount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, under Article 315, paragra
d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been established. l^vvphi1.net

der the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first
eck, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against
pellant. For it was due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the first check
appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days
m receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for payment under the said check. The
render of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant would explain why the prosecution failed to submit said
eck in evidence, and merely relied on testimonial evidence to prove the issuance of the check.
 ailing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
lty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.

vertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of ₱89,800, which is the value of the sacks of rice she
rchased.

e third assigned error need not be discussed since the trial court did not convict appellant of Estafa for the issuance of PC
ecks Nos. 145452 and 145454. 1a\^/phi1.net

HEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2053, is s
de and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revis
nal Code. Appellant is ordered to pay JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of Eighty-Nine
ousand Eight Hundred Pesos (₱89,800.00), representing the value of 190 bags of milled rice, with legal rate of interest fro
date of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid.

costs.

O ORDERED.

vide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

otnotes

1
 Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 39.

2
 Trial Court Decision, CA Rollo, p. 8.

3
 TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 7-29; September 19, 1994, pp. 6-20.

4
 Exh. "A," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 155.

5
 Exh. "B," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.

6
 Exh. "C," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.

7
 Exhs. "E" and "F," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 159.

8
 Exh. "G," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 7.

9
 Exh. "1," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 204.

10
 Exh. "2," Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 203.
 11
 Supra, note 2, at 13-14.

12
 P.D. No. 818, Section 1:

"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragrap
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection w
the accessory penalties, which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be
termed reclusion perpetua . . . ."

13
 Rollo, pp. 66, 74, 75.

14
 People v. Holzer, 319 Phil. 196, 203.

15
 People v. Chua , 315 SCRA 326, 336 (1999).

16
 People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58 , June 3, 2004.

17
 TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 12-13.

18
 Id. at 15-16.

e Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134120. January 17, 2005]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LEA SAGAN

JULIANO, appellant.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This case was certified to us for review by the Court of Appeals after finding
appellant Lea Sagan Juliano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 2053, and that
the proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
Appellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing
Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. 2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2053. The pertinent
Information for Estafa reads as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2053

That on or about July 27, 1991, at Kalawag II, Municipality of Isulan, Province of
Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretense, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [purchase] one hundred ninety (190) Bags of
Rice from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment thereof, the said
accused [did] make or draw and issue in favor of the said Corporation Check No.
142254 post-dated July 30, 1991 for a value of EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (P89,800.00), Philippine Currency, drawn against the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, Isulan Branch, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, knowing at the
time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee bank for payment of the said
check and when presented for encashment, the same was dishonored by the said bank
for reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, and on August 20, 1991, the said
accused again issued PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454 in the amounts
of P50,000.00 and P39,800.00, respectively, in replacement of PCIB Check No.
142254 which was earlier dishonored, and when the said replacement checks were
presented for encashment, the same were again dishonored by the drawee bank for the
same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-Development Corporation in
the said amount of P89,800.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines. [1]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial of
the three criminal cases ensued. [2]

The antecedent facts, as culled from the records,  are as follows:

[3]

At about 10:00 a.m. of July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190
sacks of milled rice worth P89,800 from the sales office of complainant JCT Agro-
Development Corporation (JCT) in Kalawag II, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She issued
postdated Check No. 142254 drawn against the Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCIB), Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, dated July 30, 1991 for P89,800 in payment of the
goods. The sale was evidenced by Ordered Goods Slip No. 5452  dated July 27, 1991,
[4]

with the check number written thereon.

On July 30, 1991, Remedios Torres, JCTs cashier and acting manager, encashed
the check, but the drawee bank refused payment because it was drawn against
insufficient funds. Thereafter, Torres requested one Mrs. Graza to tell appellant to visit
JCTS office because the check she issued bounced.
Appellant went to JCTs office and Torres showed her the check that bounced.
Appellant pleaded that Torres accept two checks to replace the first check that was
dishonored, and Torres agreed. The replacement checks payable to JCT were (1) PCIB
Isulan Branch Check No. 145452  dated August 20, 1991 for P50,000; and (2) PCIB
[5]

Isulan Branch Check No. 145454  dated August 22, 1991 for P39,800. The Ordered
[6]

Goods Slip was then revised upon Torres instruction. Torres surrendered the first
check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant when she accepted the two replacement
checks.
On their due dates, Torres encashed the two replacement checks, but they were
dishonored by the drawee bank. The bank issued two Check Return Slips  indicating
[7]

that payment was refused because the checks were Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.
JCT, through Torres, sent a demand letter  dated August 31, 1991 to appellant
[8]

informing her of the dishonor of the replacement checks. Appellant received the
demand letter on September 6, 1991.
 Thereafter, appellant went to the office of JCT. Torres brought appellant to one
Major Salvador of the PNP, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. Before him, appellant executed a
promissory note dated September 10, 1991 wherein she promised to pay JCT as
[9]

follows: (1) P20,000 on September 16, 1991; (2) P19,800 on September 23, 1991;

(3) P20,000 on September 30, 1991; (4) P20,000 on October 7, 1991; and (5) P10,000
on October 14, 1991, which all amount to P89,800.
Through her driver, appellant sent JCT P10,000 for the installment due on
September 16, 1991. JCT rejected the payment because it was short by P10,000.
Appellant no longer made any payment. JCT then sent her a demand letter  dated [10]

October 21, 1991, through registered mail, reiterating the dishonor of the checks she
issued and giving her five days from receipt of said letter to pay the amount of P89,800;
otherwise, legal action would be taken against her.
The trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the Revised Penal Code for issuing PCIB Check No. 142254, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check Nos. 145452 and 145454. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused,
Lea Sagan Juliano, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks law, and of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).

Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences:

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2051

1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of SIXTY THOUSAND

(P60,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit;

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2052

1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of FORTY THOUSAND

(P40,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs of suit.

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2053

1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of
 reclusion temporal, as maximum; to pay to the JCT Agro-Development
Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of EIGHTY NINE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED (P89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, representing the value of ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190)
BAGS of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of
the Information in this case, until fully paid; and to pay the costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. [11]

Appellant appealed her conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2053 to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court found appellant guilty of the offense. It pointed out that
Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on October 22, 1975, increased the
penalty  provided in Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It held that
[12]

pursuant to the said amendatory law and considering that the amount of the unpaid
check is P89,800, appellant should be penalized by reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
Court of Appeals referred the case to us in accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant raised the following issues:

1. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.

2. Appellants failure to deposit the amount of PCI Bank check numbered 142254
for P89,800.00 in this case does not give rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

3. The appellant could not be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised
Penal Code due to the dishonor of the replacement checks because these were issued
in payment of a pre-existing obligation. [13]

The trial court held appellant liable for Estafa for the following reasons: (1) The fact
that appellant had insufficient funds in the bank to cover the check at the time she
postdated or issued Check No. 142254 is sufficient to make her liable for Estafa; and (2)
appellants failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover her check within three days
from receipt of notice from the payee or holder that said check had been dishonored for
insufficiency of funds is prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
In the first and second assigned errors, appellant contends that she could not be
found guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in
the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she employed deceit constituting
false pretenses or any fraudulent act.
 Appellant alleges that when she issued postdated PCIB Check No. 142254 on
July 27, 1991, she represented that the check would be fully funded on July 30,
1991. She stated that when complainant JCT accepted the postdated check, it
was aware that the funds for the said payment would become available only on
the maturity date of the check. JCT was also aware that the postdated check
would be fully funded from the proceeds of another check which had not yet been
cleared for payment.
Appellant asserts that when JCT agreed to accept the postdated check, it was
aware of and in effect accepted the risk that the postdated check would not be
funded in case the check that was supposed to fully fund the same would not be
cleared. She alleges that the officers of JCT must have known that notwithstanding
her representation, there was always a chance that the said check would not be funded
on its maturity date for a variety of reasons, among them force majeure. Some of those
who purchased rice on credit from her (appellant) may not pay their obligations. The fact
that she (appellant) was mistaken in her belief that she would be able to fund the check
on its maturity date does not prove deceit.
Appellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to defraud.
After she was notified of the dishonor of the first check, she did not hide or abscond, but
she offered to replace the first check with two checks. Appellant also contends that
when JCT accepted the replacement checks in place of PCIB Check No. 142254, she
was relieved of her obligation of funding said check. Hence, she alleges that she is not
covered by the prima facie presumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of
the Revised Penal Code. She claims that since deceit is absent in this case, she is not
liable for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow:

...

2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

...

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the

offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false
pretense or fraudulent act.

The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the
payee has been defrauded.  Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense
[14]

and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the
issuance of the bad check.  The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days
[15]

from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check, otherwise,
a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.  [16]

As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding appellant liable for Estafa, we
find that appellant did not deceive complainant JCT by stating that she had
sufficient funds in the bank on the date of issuance of the check. JCT knew that
the postdated check was not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and that it
would be funded on July 30, 1991. Prosecution witness Remedios Torres testified,
thus:

...

PRO. DE PERALTA:

...

Q:- The check which you said was used by Lea Sagan Juliano which is PCIB Check
No. 142254 dated July 30, 1991, why is it dated July 30 when the transaction
occurred on July 29?
A: - She placed it post dated with her assurance that she deposited at PCIB and it is
not yet cleared and it will be cleared on July 30, 1991.
Q:- You said her deposit was not yet cleared, why, did she tell you that she deposited a
check at the PCIB of Isulan?
A: - Yes, sir.[17]
As regards the second reason of the trial court for holding appellant liable for
Estafa, we note that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the
first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of said check
because complainant JCT had accepted the replacement checks and surrendered the
first check to appellant, which indicated that JCT no longer held appellant liable for the
payment of her obligation under the first check.
It has been established that after the dishonor of the first check, PCIB Check No.
142254, Remedios Torres, JCTs acting manager, verbally informed appellant at JCTs
office that she was unable to encash said check due to insufficiency of funds, but she
did not demand that appellant make good PCIB Check No. 142254 within three days
from receipt of said notice. Instead, on the same occasion, Torres accepted PCIB
Check No. 145452 dated August 20, 1991 for P50,000 and PCIB Check No. 145454
dated August 22, 1991 for P39,800 as the replacement of PCIB Check No. 142254,
which first check she surrendered to appellant. JCT was then holding appellant liable for
payment under the replacement checks, PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454, and
no longer under PCIB Check No. 142254. Torres testified, thus:

...

PRO. DE PERALTA:
Q: - And since you said PCIB Check No. 142254 in the total amount of P89,800.00
[bounced] because of insufficiency of funds, what did you do next?
A: - I went to the residence of Mrs. Graza to [ask] Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano is she still
purchasing from her the same rice and I found out she had been there very often
so I asked Mrs. Graza to help or tell us if ever Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano to come
over and visit our office because the check she issued in payment of the 190
sacks of rice in the total amount of [P]89,800 [bounced].

...

Q: - When Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano appeared in your Office at Kalawag II, what did you
tell her?
A: - When she arrived at our office I showed her the check that [bounced].
Q: - And what transpired next?
A: - Then afterwards she told me she asked for consideration to give or allow certain
period to pay that said check by issuing us again another check to be staggard so
that she can be able to pay the amount because of her pleadings I let her issue by
surrendering the previous check and she issued me the two checks dated August
20 and 22.
Q: - When you said surrendered the check in the amount of P89,800.00, are you
referring to PCIB check no. 142254?
A: - That was the check I returned to her.[18]
In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to
appellant instead of demanding payment under the first check (PCIB Check No.
142254) on the same daythat JCTs Acting Manager informed appellant of the dishonor
of the first check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the
necessary amount to cover the  first check within three days from the verbal notice of
dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellants balance in her account with PCIB Isulan Branch
was P78,400. It is possible that appellant could have deposited P11,400 to make good
the first check worth P89,800 if JCT made it clear that it was demanding payment under
the first check.
 It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days
after appellants receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of the first check, because by
then the prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to deposit the
amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have
been established.
Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited
the amount necessary to cover the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the
required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant.
For it was due to complainant JCTs own act of accepting the replacement checks and
surrendering the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit
the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the
verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for payment under the
said check. The surrender of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant
would explain why the prosecution failed to submit said check in evidence, and merely
relied on testimonial evidence to prove the issuance of the check.
In failing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, appellants civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of P89,800,
which is the value of the sacks of rice she purchased.
The third assigned error need not be discussed since the trial court did not convict
appellant of Estafa for the issuance of PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2053, is SET ASIDE and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant is ordered to pay JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, the sum of Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P89,800.00),
representing the value of 190 bags of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date
of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio,
JJ., concur.

[1]
 Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 39.
[2]
 Trial Court Decision, CA Rollo, p. 8.
[3]
 TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 7-29; September 19, 1994, pp. 6-20.
[4]
 Exh. A, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 155.
[5]
 Exh. B, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.
[6]
 Exh. C, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 5.
[7]
 Exhs. E and F, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 159.
[8]
 Exh. G, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 7.
[9]
 Exh. 1, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 204.
[10]
 Exh. 2, Records (Crim. Case No. 2053), p. 203.
[11]
 Supra, note 2, at 13-14.
[12]
 P.D. No. 818, Section 1:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as
defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties, which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua . . . .
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 66, 74, 75.
[14]
 People v. Holzer, 319 Phil. 196, 203.
[15]
 People v. Chua, 315 SCRA 326, 336 (1999).
[16]
 People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004.
[17]
 TSN, March 23, 1994, pp. 12-13.
[18]
 Id. at 15-16.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 163662               February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Under review is the decision promulgated on May 25, 2004,  whereby the Court of Appeals
1

(CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered on January 24, 2002 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Makati City convicting Julie Grace K. Villanueva of estafa
as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal
Code.  The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
2

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Julie Grace K.

Villanueva of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed as hereinabove indicated. The
Resolution of January 15, 2004 granting her bail pending appeal is REVOKED and her
profferred bail bond is REJECTED. Pursuant to Section 13, second paragraph, Rule 124 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the case, inclusive of the entire record
thereof, is CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Supreme Court for review. Costs against the
accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. 3

Antecedents
Villanueva stands charged with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code under the information that reads:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1994, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, following PNB checks,
[to] wit:

Check No. Date Amount

031526 9-02-94 ₱185,000.00
031527 9-17-94 185,000.00
031528 10-02-94 185,000.00
031529 10-17-94 185,000.00
031532 9-16-94 85,000.00
031533 10-16-94 85,000.00
031534 11-16-94 85,000.00

as payment for various jewelries (sic) purchased to (sic) the said complainant, the accused
well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, the said checks have no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount of the said checks, neither will said checks
be honored or paid upon presentment, the bank dishonored and returned the said checks
for the reason "account closed" or "stopped payment" or should have been dishonored for
insufficiency of funds had not the said accused, without any valid reason, ordered her
drawee bank to stop payment and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused to
deposit the amount necessary to cover the aforesaid check or to pay the value thereof, to
the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforesaid amounts.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Version of the Prosecution

In August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Villanueva through a townmate. The latter was
interested in buying jewelry. Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry,
Madarang went to Villanueva's residence at the Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to sell
to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010, 000. 00.  Villanueva made out nine checks
5

drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB), eight of which were postdated. Villanueva
signed a receipt reading as follows: 6

August 16, 1994

Received from MRS. LORETO A. MADARANG the following jewelries (sic) with the
corresponding amount
 1 set diamond
1 set South Sea Black 
w/ necklace & bracelet
1 set heart shape diamond
w/ pendant (4.56 cts)
1 set marquee xxx dia. 2 cts. -
1 bracelet diamond
- ₱70,000
- 220,000
- 450,000
220,000
- 50,000

₱1,010,000

paid by the following checks issued by me

PNB #031501 - August 6, 1994 ₱5,000

PNB #031531 - August 19, 1994 10,000
PNB #031526 - Sept. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031527 - Sept. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031528 - Oct. 2, 1994 185,000
PNB #031529 - Oct. 17, 1994 185,000
PNB #031532 - Sept. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031533 - Oct. 16, 1994 85,000
PNB #031534 - Nov. 16, 1994 85,000

₱1,010,000

with a total of One Million Ten Thousand pesos.

(sgd)
JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA

Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be
honored upon presentment.  However, the drawee bank paid only PNB Check No. 031501
7

and PNB Check No. 131531, the remaining seven checks being dishonored either by
reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.  Madarang tried to call and
8

see Villanueva at her residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was
barred by security guards from reaching Villanueva.  Madarang resorted to sending demand
9

letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile.  After Villanueva did not settle her
10

obligations, Madarang brought the criminal complaint for estafa,  and the corresponding
11

information for estafa was ultimately filed in court on September 4, 1995. On arraignment,
Villanueva pleaded not guilty. 12
 Version of the Defense

Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang three times. The first
was at the residence of Cheng Diaz Davis, where Madarang was then selling jewelry. The
second time was at her residence in the Galeria de Magallanes where Madarang arrived
without prior notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in the evening. Madarang was persistent that
Villanueva buy jewelry on credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the
same if she was dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy
six pieces of jewelry, for which she issued six checks as payment, five of which were
postdated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time to have the
jewelry replaced. Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously issued and replaced
them with another set of postdated checks that were the subject of the criminal case against
her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks were issued as guarantee under
the agreement that they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised Madarang of the
sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did not receive any notice
from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks.  Ruling of the RTC
13

On January 24, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as
charged,  viz:
14

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing this Court finds accused Julie Grace K. Villanueva
GUILTY of the crime of estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2( d) of the Revised Penal
Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818, said crime having been committed in the
manner described in the information filed on September 4, 1995.

As a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for a
period of Fourteen Years Eight Months and One Day to Twenty Years which is within the
range of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and maximum periods.

She is also ordered to pay the private complainant Mrs. Loreto Madarang the sum of Nine
Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (₱995,000.00) plus interest at the legal rate of 12%
per annum until the mount is fully paid with said interest accruing at the time the information
was filed on or October 25, 1995.

The period of accused's detention shall be credited in her favor conformably with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

She shall serve her entire sentence at the Correccional Institute for Women at Mandaluyong
City.

SO ORDERED. 15

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial court, which is 14 years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous.
Said court did not pay obeisance to the teaching of People v. Hernando, viz:

Presidential Decree No. 818 provides:

"SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal of the amount of fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;

x x x x."

"x x x x

Hence, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty two thousand pesos, the penalty of
reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years,
which shall be termed reclusion perpetua. As used herein, reclusion perpetua is not the
prescribed penalty for the offense. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand
(₱22,000.00) pesos.

"Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal
Code, such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense." "The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the
Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the
sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence." Here, complainant was defrauded in the amount of seven hundred
[thousand] (₱700,000.00) pesos. The fact that the amount involved in the instant case
exceeds ₱22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty; instead the matter would be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.
This accords with the rule that penal laws are construed in favor of the accused.
Applying the above-cited provision, accused shall be meted an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum of which shall be taken from the maximum period of the basic penalty, that is,
reclusion temporal, to be imposed in its maximum period, plus one (1) year for each
additional ₱10,000.00 of the amount of the fraud, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty
(30) years. On the other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance nor the incremental penalty for the
amount of the fraud in excess of twenty two thousand (₱22,000.00) pesos. Such penalty is
prision mayor, with a duration of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day to twelve (12) years."

Accordingly, the accused-appellant in the case at bar should be, as she is hereby,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to THIRTY (30) YEARS of reclusion perpetua as maximum.

x x x x. 16

The CA then certified the case to the Court pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, Rules of
Court.

Issues

Villanueva submits the following errors for our consideration:

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE LOWER COURT ORA VEL Y ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO
THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE

ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT POST-DATED CHECKS.

IV

WHETHER THE ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY, BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT, OF EST AF A. 17

Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the postdated checks, averring
that: (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks could only be deposited or
encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt
presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention of the parties.  She argues
18

that estafa under paragraph 2( d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was not
committed because the checks were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the alleged
fraud; and because Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks. 19

Did Villanueva commit estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised
Penal Code in issuing the seven postdated checks?

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the conviction.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa) - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

xxxx

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when: (1) the offender
has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the
postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender
has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.  The deceit should be the efficient cause
20

of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.
21

All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who
confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had
purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not
have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she
barely knew unless Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was
likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element was
also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from
Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would
deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in
Villanueva's account. Villanueva posits that the receipt the Prosecution presented in
evidence did not embody such agreement.

This defense of Villanueva is actually anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the
parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of
an obligation. For instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the
time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash
or present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because
the element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are
not covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise. 22

Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of
the supposed agreement.  The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her
1âwphi1

issuance of the postdated checks by listing the items bought and the postdated checks
issued as payment. If the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only
after notice of the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated
in the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another document
with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection. We simply cannot accept
that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not including the supposed agreement that would
shield her from probable criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a
businesswoman  presumably made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded
23

checks.  All that she is claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of
24

the parties, implying that no written document substantiated her alleged defense. She did
not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing the receipt as written.
Her self-serving statements on the agreement were entirely inadequate to establish her
assertions, for they were not proof. 25

Under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818, the penalty for
estafa when the total value of the checks exceed ₱22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four moths and one day to 20 years), plus one year for
each additional Pl0,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall
be from six years and one day to 12 years of prision mayor. In imposing the indeterminate
sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA correctly applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely describes in this instance the penalty
actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. 26

We note, however, that the CA affirmed the imposition by the RTC of 12% interest accruing
from the time that the information was filed until the full satisfaction of the obligation in the
amount of ₱995,000.00. Conformably with the ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames  applying
27

Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), said
amount should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the information on
September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013
until its full satisfaction. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
May 25, 2004 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION that the amount of
₱995,000.00 shall earn interest 12% per annum from the filing of the information on
September 4, 1995 until June 30, 2013, and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013
until its full satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 29-46; penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez,
1

Jr. (retired/deceased), with Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador (retired)

and Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring.

2
 RTC records, pp. 300-307.

3
 CA rollo, p. 169.

4
 RTC records, p. 1.

5
 TSN dated March 21, 2001, pp. 4-8.
 RTC records, p. 271.
6

 TSN dated March 21, 2001, pp. 8-9.

7

 Exhibits B to H, inclusive; RTC records, pp. 272-274.

8

 TSN dated March 21, 2001, pp. 9-10.

9

10
 Exhibits I and J; RTC records, pp. 275-277.

11
 RTC records, pp. 5-7.

12
 RTC records, p. 41.

13
 TSN dated July 25, 2001, pp. 3-15.

14
 RTC records, pp. 300-307.

15
 RTC records, pp. 306-307.

16
 CA rollo, pp. 40-42.

17
 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

18
 CA rollo, pp. 48-49.

19
 Rollo, pp. 24-26.

20
 People v. Juliano, G.R. No. 134120, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 370, 379.

21
 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book II (2006), p. 784.

 Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126670, December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA
22

595, 605-606.

23
 TSN dated July 25, 2001, p. 3.

 Chua v. People, G.R. Nos. 150926 and 150930, March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 161,
24

168.

25
 Liana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104802, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 27, 34.

26
 Dy v. People, G.R. No. 158312, November 14, 2008, 571SCRA59, 81.

27
 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439.
 The Case:
As was their practice, Cora purchased fabrics from Ruby, and paid for
the same by issuing 22 post dated checks.  When one of the checks
bounced, Ruby presented all the checks for payment; all were
dishonoured for reason “Account Closed” Hence, Ruby filed a case
for Estafa under paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of BP 22 against Cora.  The RTC convicted her for Estafa and
violation of BP 22 with respect to the 14 checks.  Cora elevated her
case all the way to the Supreme Court.  For failure to file her brief, the
Court dismissed her petition; a second motion for reconsideration
where she attached the “Affidavit of Desistance” of the complainant
was also denied.  Cora again filed another motion praying that she be
recommended to the then president, Fidel V. Ramos for executive
clemency.  She argues that she cannot be held liable for Estafa thru
deceit because she never assured Ruby that her checks were funded. 
The latter knew all along that the checks were merely issued to
guarantee future payment.  She had acted in good faith with Ruby for
three years.  Her failure to fund the checks was brought about by the
economic collapse brought about by the Aquino assassination.  Her
business shut down when her customers failed to pay her.  Despite
this, she strove to pay Ruby what she owed.  When she could no
longer pay in cash, she paid in kind.  These, however, were not
enough to pay; still she made every effort to continue paying her
obligation to Ruby and was gradually able to pay her debts to Ruby, a
fact which the latter acknowledged.  Thus, good faith on her part was
a valid defense to rebut the prima facie presumption of deceit when
she issued the checks which she subsequently bounced.  She also
denied receiving any notice of dishonour of the checks; absence a
notice of dishonour, she cannot be convicted for violation of BP 22. 
The Office of the Solicitor General argues otherwise.  There was a
simultaneous exchange of textile materials and checks between Cora
and Ruby, who would not have parted with with her goods had she
known that Cora’s checks would bounce.

The Ruling:
We grant the appeal.

DECEIT AND DAMAGE AS ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA

Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA
4885,1  the elements of estafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof.
Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and must be
established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.2 Thus, the drawer of
the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor to cover the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima
facie presumption of deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima
facie presumption of deceit was successfully rebutted by appellant’s
evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check.3  Good
faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a
payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made
arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated,
the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize
unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se.
The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a
concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the
“criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act
must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena
vs. Sandiganbayan:4 
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved
falsification of public documents and estafa:
“Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting.”
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that
criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the
legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no
embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is
no wrongful purpose.

The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no
intention to convert the money or goods for his personal benefit.5  We are
convinced that appellant was able to prove the absence of criminal intent in
her transactions with Chua. Had her intention been tainted with malice and
deceit, appellant would not have exerted extraordinary effort to pay the
complainant, given her own business and financial reverses.
LACK OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR
We also note that the prosecution presented virtually no evidence to show
that the indispensable notice of dishonor was sent to and received by
appellant. Excerpts from the following testimony of complainant are
significant:

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, when these checks from Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘V’ have
bounced, what steps, did you do?

A I consulted my lawyer and she wrote a Demand Letter.

COURT:
Q What is the name of that lawyer?

A Atty. Virginia Nabora.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, you mentioned a Demand Letter sent by Atty. Virginia Nabor, I am

showing to you this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988, will you kindly
examine the same if this is the same Demand Letter you mentioned a while
ago?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, on this second page of this Demand Letter there is a signature above
the printed name Virginia Guevarra Nabor, do you know the signature, Mrs.
Witness?

A Yes, that is the signature of my lawyer.

ATTY. ANGELES:

May we request that this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988 consisting of
two (2) pages, Your Honor, be marked as Exhibit ‘W’ and that the signature
on the second page of this letter of Virginia Guevarra Nabor be encircled and
be marked as Exhibit ‘W-1’ and that the attached Registry Receipt, Your
Honor, be marked as Exhibit ‘W-2’.

COURT:

Mark them.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, why do you know that this is the signature of Virginia
Guevarra Nabor?

A After preparing that I saw her sign the letter.

Q Now, after sending this Demand Letter, do you know

If the accused herein made payments or replaced

the checks that were issued to you?

COURT:

Q Of course, you assumed that the accused received that letter, that is his
basis on the premise that the accused received that letter?

ATTY. ANGELES:

A Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q What proof is there to show that accused received the letter because your
question is premises (sic) on the assumption that the accused received the
letter?
ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, do you know Mrs. Witness if the accused received the letter?

A There is a registry receipt.

COURT:

Q Now, later on after sending that letter, did you have communication with
the accused?

A I kept on calling her but I was not able to get in touch

with her.

Q But do you know if that letter of your lawyer was received by the accused?

A I was not informed by my lawyer but I presumed that

the same was already received by the accused.

ATTY. ANGELES:

Q Now, aside from sending this Demand Letter, do you know what your
lawyer did?

A We filed a case with the Fiscal’s.6 

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was
made by the prosecution. The prosecution claimed that the demand letter was
sent by registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of the demand
letter as well as the registry return receipt bearing a signature which was,
however, not even authenticated or identified. A registry receipt alone is
insufficient as proof of mailing.7  “Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in
order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.”8 
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that
appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She
was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the
checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the
appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that presumption, her lawyer
filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscal’s office9  without any
confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through registered mail
was actually received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be
held guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellant’s
right to procedural due process. “It is a general rule that when service of
notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove
the fact of service.”10  The burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the
party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction in this
criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it
became incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the demand letter was
indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by
appellant. But it did not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.
This Court therefore cannot, with moral certainty, convict appellant of
violation of BP 22. The evident failure of the prosecution to establish that she
was given the requisite notice of dishonor justifies her acquittal.11 
As held in Lao vs. Court of Appeals:12 
“It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the
violator ‘a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates
to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is
abated.’ This was also compared ‘to certain laws allowing illegal possessors
of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed
firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability.’ In this
light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of
a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner
has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require — that the
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.

Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant;

hence, personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor was necessary.
Consequently, while there may have been constructive notice to appellant
regarding the insufficiency of her funds in the bank, it was not enough to
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under

both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC
prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed
to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor,
BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the
amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor.
Under both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for
estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of dishonor,
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime
(whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda
is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 for estafa and in Criminal
Case Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-66242, 88-66243,
88-66245 to 88-66248 for violation of BP 22.
SO ORDERED.
CORONA, J:
Vitug, Sandov
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

PRIMITIVA DIZON, LIBERTY MARTINEZ, and ANICETA

ANICETA AQUINO, accused-appellant.

 
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee

Salvador T. Reyes and Public Attorney’s Office for accuse

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial

finding accused-appellant ANICETA ("ANNIE") AQUINO gu
in Criminal Case No. C-43198.

On May 6, 1993, accused-appellant Aniceta ("Annie") Aqu

charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 315 parag

"That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1991 in Kalookan City, Metro M
together and mutually aiding one another, defrauded and deceived one MARIE
complainant four hundred (400) sacks of rice valued at P200,000.00 and in pa
checks, to wit:

Check No Date Bank Amount

05410011 12/23/91 Pilipinas Bank P50,000.00

05410013 1/07/92 - do - P50,000.00

05410014 12/23/91 - do - P50,000.00

05410015 01/07/92 - do - P50,000.00

when accused knew fully well at the time that they have
on the date stated on the face thereof and upon presentm
(sic) dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED", tha
notwithstanding repeated demands, the herein accused,
to make good her checks in the total amount of P200,000
the said complainant in the total amount of P200,000.00
Contrary to law."

Of the three accused, only Aniceta ("Annie") Aquino was a

Liberty Martinez remained at large. There was however u
on September 24, 1994. When arraigned, Aniceta Aquino
prosecution presented complainant Marie Antoinette Dac
and other documents to establish its case. Accused Anice
and her evidence consisted mainly of her testimony.

In a decision dated August 18, 1997, the Regional Trial C

"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt o

ANICETA ("ANNIE") AQUINO, guilty as co-principal of the
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, and there bein
commission of the crime, hereby sentences her to suffer a
together with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law
DACUMA jointly and severally with her co-accused Primi
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), without subsidiary im

The bail bond of the accused is hereby cancelled pursuan

Procedure, as amended.

The case against accused PRIMITIVA DIZON and LIBERT

prosecution as soon as said accused shall have been app
returned until the accused are arrested.

With regard to accused LIBERTY MARTINEZ, the Trial Pr

that said accused is already dead, and if found to be affir
attached to the record.

SO ORDERED."3

In meting out the judgment of conviction the trial court c

complainant Marie Antoinette Dacuma delivered 400 sac
PrimitivaDizon, Liberty Martinez and Annie Aquino on De
(Exhibit A); (2) The rice was received by accused Liberty M
on December 22, 1991 accused PrimitivaDizon made and
against Pilipinas Bank, as payment of (sic) the rice; (4) W
dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid tog
 20
 TSN, July 22, 1996, pp. 6-15; 19-20; 25-27.
21
 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
22
 The rule states that "if the inculpatory facts and c
is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused an
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficien
222 SCRA 745; 762; People vs. Maongco, 230 SCRA
23
 People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94; People vs. Cavali
24
 People vs. Cosep, 290 SCRA 378.
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 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119000. July 28, 1997]

ROSA UY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of

Appeals  which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
[1]

32,  finding the accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos.
[2]

84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a),
of the Revised Penal Code in Crim. Case No. 84-32334.
Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by
the husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosas employment she
was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March
1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she
helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between
Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with
Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosas lumber business
and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00
were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business; however, because of
the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued.
Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan,
with the funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But,
unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the
partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the
return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa  and several other Informations for
[3] [4] 

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The offenses were subsequently
consolidated and tried jointly.
Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to
establish that petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount
of P500,000.00 from complainant with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As regards
Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the
Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch, where Rosa Uy maintained an account,
testified on the following transactions with respect to the six (6) checks referred to in
Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were dishonored:

CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR

(1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. G)

(2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. H)

(3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. F)

(4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. E)

(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. A)

(6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment Stopped
(Exh. I)

For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy
maintained that no misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to
construct the building in Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of the subject
checks, petitioner did not deny their existence but averred that these were issued to
evidence the investment of complainant in the proposed partnership between them.
 After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but
convicted her of the charges under B.P. Bldg. 22. [5]

On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review
on certiorari: (a) whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or
for value. [6]

As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of
argument that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent
appellate court, still she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
[7] 

allegations in the complaint or information.  And once it is so shown, the court may
[8]

validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.[9]

In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg.
22 were jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She
maintains that the evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident
of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the
alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in
Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. Taken
altogether, petitioner concludes that the said evidence would only show that none of the
essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. Respondent People of the
Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand argues that even if there is no
showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took place or the offense was
committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over
the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and that the cases for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case.
We disagree with respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily,
for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to
be satisfied.
 In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and
have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.  For violation of the
[10]

Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are
neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker,
drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.  Hence, it is
[11]

incorrect for respondent People to conclude that in as much as the Regional Trial Court
of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over
the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have
to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each
offense have to be satisfied.
In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in
a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of
evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Bldg. 22 had been
acquired. On the contrary, all that the evidence shows is that complainant is a resident
of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of Caloocan City; that the principal place of
business of the alleged partnership is located in Malabon; that the drawee bank is
likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks were deposited for collection
in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered,
dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are
essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the
offense.
Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality
whether the accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It
may be true that B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the
case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in
any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. We note however that
knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover
the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the
instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records that at the time of issue,
petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no basis in upholding
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.
In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction
by estoppel. Respondent posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner
raised the issue of jurisdiction.
 The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that
the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds: x x x (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it
is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of x x x lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged x x x as provided for in paragraph x x x (b) x x x of Section 3 of this
Rule.[12]

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely
questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum  before the Regional Trial
[13]

Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot

countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted
law, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question
the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. [14]

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of
the court and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case  in which [15]

respondent seeks refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the
jurisprudence of the Sibonghanoy case not in point.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,  the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is
[16]

an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action
is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted
concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonhanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel.[17]

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of
jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be
raised for being barred by laches.As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. [18]

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a
matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not
fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction
of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does
not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must
apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court. [19]

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no
jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision
of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24
September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when
warranted.
SO ORDERED
Padilla, (Chairman), and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., on leave.

[1]
 CA-G. R. CR No. 13428, Decision penned by Justice Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros, concurred in by Justices
Jesus M. Elbinias and Bernardo L. Salas.
[2]
 Judge Benjamin P. Martinez presiding.
[3]
 Crim. Case No. 84-32334; Records, pp. 1-2.
[4]
 Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32240; id., p. 1.
[5]
 Rollo, pp. 66-78, with the following disposition:
1. In Criminal Case. No. 84-32334, on reasonable doubt, accused Rosa Uy is hereby acquitted of the
charge of Estafa;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, the court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Accordingly, accused is hereby sentenced as follows:
a. In Criminal Case No. 84-32335, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid;
b. In Criminal Case No. 84-32336, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid;
c. In Criminal Case No. 84-32337, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid;
d. In Criminal Case No. 84-32338, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid;
e. In Criminal Case No. 84-32339, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid;
f. In Criminal Case No. 84-32340, to suffer a definite prison term of six (6) months and to pay the private
complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[6]
 Id., pp. 19-22.
[7]
 U.S. v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376-378 (1913).
[8]
 Colmenares v. Villar, No. L-27124, 29 May 1970, 33 SCRA 186.
[9]
 People v. Galano, No. L-42925, 31 January 1977, 75 SCRA 193.
[10]
 People v. Grospe, G.R. Nos. 74053-54, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 154.
[11]
 Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.
[12]
 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[13]
 Rollo, pp. 103-104.
[14]
 Suy Sui v. People, 49 O.G. 967.
[15]
 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, No. L-21450, 15 April 1968, 23 SCRA 29.
[16]
 No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399; Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, 27 October 1989, 145
SCRA 211.
[17]
 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750, citing Calimlim v. Ramirez, No.
L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399.
[18]
 Ibid.
[19]
 Ibid.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECOND DIVISION
 
GORETTI ONG, G.R. No. 165275
Petitioner,  
  Present:
   
  QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
  CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
  VELASCO, JR., and
  BRION, JJ.
   
   
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 23, 2008
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
DECISION
 
 
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Goretti Ong (petitioner) was, by Information dated August 10, 1995, charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for Estafa, without specification
under what mode in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code the offense was
allegedly committed. The Information alleged as follows:
 
That on or about December 12, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud ROSA CABUSO in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, well knowing that [s]he did not have sufficient funds in the bank,
and without informing the said Rosa Cabuso of such fact, drew, made out
and issued to the latter the following checks, to wit:
Allied Bank Check No. 76000242 dated January 13, 1995 in the amount of
P76,654.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 026265 dated January 15, 1995 in the amount of
P76,654.00;
 
PS Bank Check No. 000928 dated January 18, 1995 in the amount of
P100,000.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 026270 dated January 15, 1995 in the amount of
P100,000.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 026266 dated January 20, 1995 in the amount of
P76,654.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 026267 dated January 25, 1995 in the amount of
P96,494.00;
 
PS Bank Check No. 000927 dated January 31, 1995 in the amount of
P96,494.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 026271 dated January 31, 1995, in the amount of
P100,000.00;
 
Banco de Oro Check No. 26268 dated January 31, 1995 in the amount of
P76,654.00; and
 
PS Bank Check No. 000950 dated January 31, 1995 in the amount of
P144,000.00.
 
all in the total amount of P923,110.00, in payment of assorted pieces of jewelry
which the said accused ordered, purchased and received from the said
complainant on the same day; that upon presentment of the said checks to the
bank for payment, the same were dishonored and payment thereof refused for the
reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and said accused, notwithstanding due notice to
her by said complainant of such dishonor of the said checks, failed and
 refused and still fail[s] and refuse[s] to deposit the necessary amount to cover
the amount of the checks, to the damage and prejudice of the said Rosa
Cabuso in the aforesaid amount of P923,110.00, Philippine [c]urrency.
[1]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
[VAC1] 

Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is owned
and operated by the family of Rosa Cabuso (the private complainant). While she
normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks
to cover the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her
assurance that the checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity,
the checks were deposited, they were returned with the stamp Account Closed.
 
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10
counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 213645-CR to 213654-CR.
 
The evidence presented by the prosecution in the Estafa case consisted
of, inter alia, the 10 dishonored checks and the transcript of stenographic
notes[2] taken during the trial of the B.P. 22 cases, which transcripts included those
of the testimonies of representatives of the drawee banks Allied Bank, PSBank and
Banco de Oro.
 
Petitioner, denying having intended to defraud the private complainant, gave
her side of the case as follows:
 
On December 12, 1994, all the personal checks she had issued matured at
the same time, but as her business was faring poorly, she was not able to fund
those which she issued to the private complainant. On her request, however, the
private complainant allowed her to pay on installment the amounts covered by the
checks and she had in fact paid a total of P338,250, a fact admitted by the
prosecution.
 
 By Decision[3] of March 31, 2003, Branch 8 of the Manila RTC convicted
petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
this wise:
While the parties are of the impression that the accused is charged with
and is being tried for the crime of estafa committed by means of the issuance of
bouncing checks [Art. 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code], this Court is of the
opinion that the Information sufficiently charges estafa through false
pretenses under Paragraph 2(a) of the same article which provides:
 
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another . . .
 
xxxx
 
2.      By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
 
a)      By using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
or by means of similar deceits.[4] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 
 
Thus the trial court disposed:
 
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused
Goretti Ong GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Estafa
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby imposes on said accused the penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS
imprisonment and to pay private complainant Rosa Cabuso the amount
of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY
(P584,860.00) PESOS and cost of suit.[5] (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Petitioner challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals,
raising the issue of whether she could be convicted of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code when she was, in the Information,
charged of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the same Code. She
additionally raised the following issues:
 xxxx
 
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS
VALID EVEN IF IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW;
 
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE
CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT[.][6] (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on appeal but modified the
penalty and the amount of indemnity,[7] disposing as follows:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The appealed decision dated March 31, 2003 of
the trial court in Criminal Case No. 95-144421 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is hereby instead sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the complaining witness in the amount
of P585,514.00.
 
With costs against the accused-appellant.[8]
 
 
Her Motion for Reconsideration[9] having been denied,[10] petitioner filed the
present petition,[11] faulting the appellate court for convicting her of Estafa despite
her good faith and lack of criminal intent, and violating her constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her by affirming the
trial courts decision finding her guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a), when she was charged under paragraph 2(d) of the same Article.[12]
 
The appeal is impressed with merit.
 
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the accused
to adequately prepare for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an
offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.[13]
 
From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged
is determined.17 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the
questioned checks knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund
them despite notice that they were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute
a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as the lower courts found but, under paragraph
2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is committed as follows:
 
xxxx
 
2(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of
the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover this check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall
be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent
act.
 
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses or fraudulent
acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a
bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the
check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima facie presumption of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is not an element of a violation
of paragraph 2(a).
 
Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge
of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent,
which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply
with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist. So holds the 2004 case of People
v. Ojeda.[14]
 
x x x [N]otice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of
the R[evised] P[enal] C[ode] and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that
the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check
within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand,
requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary
for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of
dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no
crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
[15]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
 
Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d)
under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it is a ground for
acquittal thereunder.
 
In affirming the trial courts decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling in the 2003 case of Garcia v. People[16] wherein this Court upheld the
appellate courts affirmance of the trial courts conviction of the accused for Estafa
under Article 315, Section 2(2) [sic] of the Revised Penal Code. In that case, the
accused was charged as follows:
 
That on or about and during the period comprised between June 20, 1995,
and August 15, 1995, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to
said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to the effect that accused has three (3) checks
which according to her have sufficient funds and if encashed, the same will not be
dishonored; and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing the said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to accept the following
checks:
 
Name of Bank Check No. Amount Date Payable to
Phil. Natl. Bank 046884 P28,000.00 6-20-95 Cash
- do - 047416 34,000.00 8-15-95 - do -
Pilipinas Bank 60042087 25,000.00 7-25-95 Garcia Vegetable
Dealer
  
as payments of assorted vegetables which accused purchased and received from
said DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the amount of P87,000.00, said
accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and representations were
all false and untrue as said checks when presented to the bank for payment were
all dishonored for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, and were made
solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain assorted vegetables in
the amount of P87,000.00; which once in her possession and with intent to
defraud, she willingly, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the said assorted vegetables or the value thereof to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P87,000.00, Philippine Currency.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
The therein accused Garcia argued that since, under the above-quoted
Information, she was charged of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, it was error for the appellate court to affirm her conviction by
the trial court under Article 315, paragraph 2(d).
 
The Court in Garcia held that there is no basis for [her] to conclude that she
was convicted under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), but that [e]ven supposing that the
trial court apparently discussed estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), it was
only pointing out the absurdity of [Garcias] argument that she could not be held
liable under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as she was

not the drawer of the therein involved checks. Reliance on Garcia is thus

misplaced.
 
In the case at bar, as priorly stated, petitioner was charged under paragraph
2(d), but there is no evidence that petitioner received notice of dishonor of all,
except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for P76,654), of the questioned
checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks, the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.
 
This leaves it unnecessary to pass on the evidence for the defense. Suffice it
to state that petitioners defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses
to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on notice of the lack of
sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank check, petitioner
offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the amount
covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the
prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which
amount is almost one-third of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the
amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank check.
 
IN FINE, the prosecution having failed to establish all the elements of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, her
acquittal is in order. The judgment bearing on her civil liability stands, however.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. Petitioner, Goretti Ong,
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision bearing on her civil liability
is AFFIRMED, however.
Costs against petitioner.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 
 

 
ATTESTATION
 
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 

[1]
 Records, p. 1.
[2]
 Exhibit A-L, id. at 162-212.
[3]
 Id. at 400-405.
[4]
 Id. at 402-403.
[5]
 Id. at 405.
[6]
 CA rollo, p. 65.
[7]
 Decision of June 11, 2004, penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, id. at 148-158.
[8]
 Id. at 157.
[9]
 Id. at 161-164.
[10]
 Id. at 177.
[11]
 Rollo, pp. 7-34.
[12]
 Id. at 16.
[13]
 Vide People v. Almendral, G.R. No. 126025, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 440, 450-451.
17
 Garcia v. People, 457 Phil. 713, 716 (2003).
[14]
 G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 436.
[15]
 Id. at 449.
[16]
 457 Phil. 713 (2003).
[17]
 Id. at 716-717.

 [VAC1]