Rule 70 Forcibly Entry and case it is forcible

entry, which does not

Unlawful Detainer require prior demand.
FE UD (RIANO 2016
Deprivation of Unlawful withholding ed., p. 353-354)
physical possession of possession of any The plaintiff must The plaintiff need not
of any land or land or building prove that he was in have been in Prior
building by FISTS, After the expiration prior physical physical possession.
Which shall include Or termination of the possession of the
Every situation or right to hold premises until he was
condition under which possession by virtue deprived by
one person of any contract, the defendant.
can wrongfully enter express or implied. The 1 year period is A) in an expired lease
upon real generally counted agreement: The 1
property and from the date of year period is
exclude another, who actual entry on the counted from the
has had property. date of last demand.
prior possession,
therefrom XPN: stealth- from XPN: When
the knowledge or subsequent demands
“FORCE does not discovery Were merely
have to be an act of reminders of the
war.” Original demand, the
The possession of The possession of 1-year period starts
the defendant is the defendant, which from the original
unlawful from the was lawful demand.
beginning; issue In the beginning,
Is which party has Becomes illegal by B) mere tolerance -
Prior de facto reason of the From the date of
possession. expiration or revocation of permit
termination of his (i.e. demand to
right to the vacate
possession of
the property.
Ud- REAL PROPERTY
The law does not Plaintiff must first
Require previous make such demand If personal property – replevin.
demand for The which is jurisdictional
defendant to vacate. in nature. Must be verified pleadings.
Period to answer – 30 days (expedited
XPN when:
a. The purpose of the rules)
action is to terminate
the lease because of
expiry of term and not Allegation in the complaint
because of failure to  The allegation in the complaint that
pay rentals; there was unlawful withholding of
b. Purpose of suit is possession is sufficient to make out a
not for ejectment but case for unlawful detainer
for enforcement of
terms of contract; or  In actions for forcible entry, two
c. When the allegations are mandatory for the MTC
defendant is not a to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff
tenant but a mere must allege his prior physical
intruder. In which possession of the property; and second,
 he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.
Three (3) Kinds of Actions Available to
Recover Possession of Real Property
1. Accion interdictal - An action where the issue
is the right of physical or material possession of
the subject real property independent of any
claim of ownership. This includes forcible entry
and unlawful detainer;
2. Accion publiciana - It is plenary action to
recover the legal right of possession whichmay
be brought when the dispossession has lasted
for more than one (1) year. If at more than one
(1) year had elapsed, the action should be not
forcible entry or unlawful detainer but an accion
publiciana; and
3. Accion reivindicatoria - This action involves
not
only possession but recovery of ownership of the
property
NOTE:
In SCA, it is only 2: FE/UD
Accion publiciano – not SCA
Action interdictal
Summary proceedings
Resolve issue of physical possession (de
facto v. de jure)
HOW TO STAY THE IMMEDIATE
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
1. Perfect an appeal;
2. File a supersedeas bond to pay for the
rents, damages and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment
appealed from; and
3. Deposit periodically with the RTC,
during the pendency of the appeal, the
adjudged amount of rent due under the
contract as determined in the judgment
of the MTC, or if there be no contract,
the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises. (Sec. 19,
Rule 70)
Note: The judgment is immediately executory
only when the judgment is against the
defendant. If the judgment is in favor of the
defendant, such is not immediately executory
and can be executed only after the lapse of the
regular 15-day period to appeal without the
plaintiff having perfected the same.
Jurisprudential Requisites for Forcible Entry
(PDF)
1. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior
physical possession of the property;
2. Second, they must also assert that they were
deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and
3. Third, the action must be filed within one year
from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of Physical
possession of the land or building.
Jurisprudential Requisites for Unlawful
Detainer (CIRD)
1. Initially, possession of property by The
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint For ejectment.
NOTE: Subj to special rules.
Rules are suppletorily.
Notes: demand letter- vacate and pay
Bugayong-Santiago v. Bugayong, G.R.
No. 220389, 6 December 2017
DOCTRINE:
What determines the cause of action is the
nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the
entry is illegal, then the action which may be
filed against the intruder within one (1) year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
became illegal, the case is one of unlawful
detainer which must be filed within one (1) year
from the date of the last demand.
Here, the petitioner filed for unlawful detainer,
however, stated that the defendant entered
without consent and knowledge, thus, tolerated.
Since a requisite for an action for unlawful remedies for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
detainer is that the possession was originally are laid down in Section 1, Rule 70.
lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess. What determines the cause of action is the
nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the
The case is dismissed. entry is illegal, then the action which may be
filed against the intruder within one (1) year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
FACTS: the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
Petitioner Teresita Bugayong-Santiago and her became illegal, the case is one of unlawful
husband, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, detainer which must be filed within one (1) year
bought the land originally owned by Teresita’s from the date of the last demand.
parents.
Forcible entry Unlawful detainer
15 February 2008: petitioners sent a letter to one is deprived of one unlawfully
respondent Teofilo, Teresita's brother, physical possession withholds possession
demanding him to vacate the subject property of land or building by thereof after the
within 15 days from receipt of the letter and to means of force, expiration or
pay the amount of P3,000 monthly. intimidation, threat, termination of his
20 February 2008: Respondent received the strategy, or stealth. right to hold
letter on but refused to vacate the property. possession under
15 March 2008: Petitioners filed a Complaint for any contract, express
Unlawful Detainer with the MCTC. Petitioners or implied
alleged that since 2002, they have been the possession is the possession was
tolerating the stay and occupation of Teofilo over illegal from the originally lawful but
the two-third (2/3) eastern portion of the land beginning and the became unlawful by
and a part of the commercial building without basic inquiry centers the expiration or
paying any lease rental. Petitioners added that on who has the prior termination of the
Teofilo had been harassing Teresita. possession de facto right to possess,
hence the issue of
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Teofilo alleged rightful possession is
that prior to his parents’ death, the late spouses decisive for, in such
executed a Deed of Quitclaim dated 21 action, the defendant
December 1995 in favor of all their six children. is in actual
Further, Teofilo contended that he had been in possession and the
actual possession and enjoyment of the subject plaintiff's cause of
property long before the execution of the action is the
assailed Deed of Absolute Sale between his termination of the
parents and Teresita and Edgardo. defendant's right to
continue in
MCTC: ordered Teofilo to vacate the property. possession.
The MCTC resolved the question of ownership
in order to resolve the issue of possession. The
MCTC reasoned that the Deed of Absolute Sale In the present case, petitioners filed an unlawful
dated 24 November 1993 should be given effect detainer case against respondent before the
and validity since it was executed before the MCTC.
Deed of Quitclaim was executed. Petitioners insist that Teofilo entered the
property without their knowledge and consent.
ISSUE: Meaning, Teofilo's entry into the property had
Whether the unlawful detainer case against been illegal from the beginning. Later on, when
respondent shall be dismissed. - YES they found out that he occupied the subject
property, petitioners merely tolerated his stay
RULING: there.
Ejectment or accion interdictal takes on two
forms: forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The
The Rules are clear that if the entry into the
property is illegal, the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry and this
action must be brought within one (1) year from
the illegal entry. But if the entry is originally legal
then became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, an unlawful
detainer case may be brought within one (1)
year from the date of the last demand. This
action will only prosper in a case where the
plaintiff allows the defendant to use the property
by tolerance without any contract, and the
defendant is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate on demand.
However, based on the records, petitioners
claimed that respondent entered the property
"without their knowledge and consent" on one
hand, and by mere "tolerance" on the other. It
can be concluded then that respondent occupied
the subject property without petitioners'
knowledge and consent and thereafter
petitioners tolerated respondent's stay in the
property for many years. Thus, there was illegal
entry into the property at
the start.
Since there was forcible entry at the beginning
and tolerance thereafter, an action for unlawful
detainer cannot prosper since a requisite for an
action for unlawful detainer is that the
possession was originally lawful, but turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess.
HOW COMPLAINT MUST BE STATED
The complaint was not clear on how entry into
the subject property was effected and how or
when dispossession started. The complaint
merely states that "since 2002, plaintiff Teresita
B. Santiago and her late husband have been
tolerating the stay and occupation of the
defendant, brother of plaintiff Teresita B.
Santiago, over the two-third (2/3) eastern portion
of the lot and portion of the commercial house
thereon, without paying [any] lease rental." 19
However, in succeeding pleadings, petitioners
insisted that respondent entered the property
without their knowledge and consent. Also, no
contract, whether express or implied, existed
between the parties and there were no other
details submitted or evidence presented by
petitioners to show how respondent exactly
entered the property and when petitioners
were dispossessed of such.
The complaint should embody such statement
of facts as to bring the case clearly within the
class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. Thus, since the complaint
fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the
court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
respondent, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of petitioners' complaint and
both the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed
the unlawful detainer case against respondent.
However, on a final note, this ruling is limited
only to the determination of whether the
complaint for unlawful detainer was properly filed
and whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the
case. This adjudication is not a final
determination of the issue of possession or
ownership and thus, will not bar any party from
filing a case in the proper RTC for (1) accion
publiciana, where the owner of the property who
was dispossessed failed to bring an action for
ejectment within one (1) year from
dispossession, or (2) accion reivindicatoria
alleging ownership of the property and seeking
recovery of its full possession.
Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Sps.
Perlabarbarona, G.R. No. 195814, 4
April 2018
DOCTRINE:
(1)A case for unlawful detainer must state the
period from when the occupation by tolerance
started and the acts of tolerance exercised by
the party with the right to possession. If it is
argued that the possession was illegal from the
start, the proper remedy is to file an action
publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the
right of possession.
(2)Moreover, while an ejectment case merely
settles the issue of the right of actual
possession, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally passed upon if the issue of
possession cannot be resolved without it. Any
final disposition on the issue of ownership,
however, must be resolved in the proper forum.
FACTS:
Eversley is a public health facility operated by
the Department of Health to administer care and
treatment to patients suffering from Hansen's
Disease. The Spouses Barbarona allege that
they are the owners of the land being occupied
by Eversley.
the Spouses Barbarona filed a Complaint for
Ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court. The
Spouses Barbarona alleged that they had sent
demand letters and that the occupants were
given until April 15, 2005 to vacate the premises.
They further claimed that despite the lapse of
the
period, the occupants refused to vacate; hence,
they were constrained to file the Complaint.
In their Answer, the occupants alleged that since
they had been in possession of the property for
more than 70 years, the case was effectively
one for recovery of possession, which was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court. They likewise claimed that the Spouses
Barbarona
were guilty of laches since it took more than 60
years for them to seek the issuance of a Torrens
title over the property. They also averred that the
Spouses Barbarona's certificate of title was void
since they, the actual inhabitants of the property,
were never notified of its issuance.
MTC: ordered the occupants to vacate the
property.
RTC: affirmed MTC
Eversley filed a Petition for Review with CA
arguing that the Municipal Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the action.
CA: denied their petition.
ISSUE:
whether the Spouses Barbarona's complaint
against Eversley Childs Sanitarium was for
accion publiciana or for unlawful detainer. –
ACCION PUBLICIANA
RULING:
By its very nature, an ejectment case only
resolves the issue of who has the better right of
possession over the property. The right of
possession in this instance refers to actual
possession, not legal possession. While a party
may later be proven to have the legal right of
possession by virtue of ownership, he or she
must still institute an ejectment case to be able
to dispossess an actual occupant of the property
who refuses to vacate.
In this instance, respondents anchor their right of
possession over the disputed property on TCT
No. 53698 59 issued in their names. It is true
that a registered owner has a right of possession
over the property as this is one of the attributes
of ownership. Ejectment cases, however, are not
automatically decided in favor of the party who
presents proof of ownership,
Here, respondents alleged that their right of
ownership was derived from their predecessors-
in-interest, the Spouses Gonzales, whose
Decree No. 699021 was issued on March 29,
1939. 62 The Register of Deeds certified that
there was no original certificate of title or owner's
duplicate issued over the property, or if there
was, it may have been lost or destroyed during
the Second World War. The heirs of the
Spouses Gonzales subsequently executed a
Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights,
Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full Waiver
of Title and Interest on March 24, 2004 in
respondents' favor. Thus, respondent Anastacio
Barbarona succeeded in
having Decree No. 699021 reconstituted on July
27, 2004 and having TCT No. 53698 issued in
respondents' names on February 7, 2005.
Blinded by respondents' allegedly valid title on
the property, the three (3) tribunals completely
ignored how petitioner came to occupy the
property in the first place.
Petitioner, a public hospital operating as a
leprosarium dedicated to treating persons
suffering from Hansen's disease, has been
occupying the property since May 30, 1930.
“donated by the late Mr. Eversley Childs of New
York, USA, hence the name, Eversley Childs
Sanitarium, in honor of the late donor.”
Proclamation No. 507 was issued on October
21, 1932, "which reserved certain parcels of land
in Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu as additional
leprosarium site for the Eversley Childs
Treatment Station." 70 Petitioner's possession of
the property, therefore, pre-dates that of
respondents' predecessors-in-interest, whose
Decree No. 699021 was issued in 1939.
It is true that defects in TCT No. 53698 or even
Decree No. 699021 will not affect the fact of
ownership, considering that a certificate of title
does not vest ownership. The Torrens system
"simply recognizes and documents ownership
and provides for the consequences of issuing
paper titles.
Without TCT No. 53698, however, respondents
have no other proof on which to anchor their
claim. The Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights,
Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full Waiver
of Title and Interest executed in their favor by
the heirs of the Spouses Gonzales is insufficient
to prove conveyance of property since no
evidence was introduced to prove that
ownership over the property was validly
transferred to the Spouses Gonzales' heirs upon
their death.
Moreover, Proclamation No. 507, series of 1932,
reserved portions of the property specifically for
petitioner's use as a leprosarium. Even
assuming
that Decree No. 699021 is eventually held as a
valid Torrens title, a title under the Torrens
system is always issued subject to the annotated
liens or encumbrances, or what the law warrants
or reserves.
Portions occupied by petitioner, having been
reserved by law, cannot be affected by the
issuance of a Torrens title. Petitioner cannot be
considered as one occupying under mere
tolerance of the registered owner since its
occupation was by virtue of law. Petitioner's right
of possession, therefore, shall remain
unencumbered subject to the final disposition on
the issue of the property's ownership.
II
There are three (3) remedies available to one
who has been dispossessed of property:
(1) an action for ejectment to recover
possession, whether for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry;
(2) accion publiciana or accion plenaria de
posesion, or a plenary action to recover the right
of possession; and
(3) accion reivindicatoria, or an action to recover
ownership
Although both ejectment and accion publiciana
are actions specifically to recover the right of
possession, they have two (2) distinguishing
differences.
 The first is the filing period. Ejectment
cases must be filed within one (1) year
from the date of dispossession.
 If the dispossession lasts for more than
a year, then an accion publiciana must
be filed.
 The second distinction concerns
jurisdiction. Ejectment cases, being
summary in nature, are filed with the
Municipal Trial Courts.
 Accion publiciana, however, can only be
taken cognizance by the Regional Trial
Court.
Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by
the allegations stated in the complaint.
Here, no mention has been made as to how
petitioner came to possess the property and as
to what acts constituted tolerance on the part of
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to
allow petitioner's occupation.
Respondents failed to state when petitioner's
possession was initially lawful, and how and
when their dispossession started. All that
appears from the Complaint is that petitioner's
occupation "is illegal and not anchored upon any
contractual relations with [respondents.]"
This, however, is insufficient to determine if the
action was filed within a year from
dispossession, as required in an ejectment case.
On the contrary, respondents allege that
petitioner's occupation was illegal from the start.
The proper remedy, therefore, should have been
to file an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria to assert their right of possession
or their right of ownership.
Considering that respondents filed the improper
case before the Municipal Trial Court, it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Any disposition made,
therefore, was void.
Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, 20
July 2011
DOCTRINE:
CARETAKER (BARRIENTOS) A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the same
upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
FACTS:
Respondent Mario Rapal acquired a 235 square
meter parcel of land through a Deed of Transfer
of Possesory Right.
Thereafter, he constructed a semi-concrete
house on the lot and took actual possession of
the property by himself and through his
caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.
Sometime in 1993, respondent allowed
petitioner Bienvenido Barrientos and his family
to stay on the subject property as caretakers on
the condition that petitioner shall vacate the
premises when respondent would need the
property. However, when respondent demanded
petitioner
to vacate the subject property, the last of which
was made on July 14, 1997, petitioner refused to
leave the lot. The parties later underwent
barangay conciliations, but to no avail.
respondent filed a case for Unlawful Detainer
against the petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC)
when elevated, the CA touched upon the issue
of
ownership since both claimed ownership over
the disputed property. The CA found that both
parties presented weak evidence of ownership.
Hence, the CA determined who between the
parties was first in possession and concluded
that respondent was, indeed, first in possession
of the lot.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the issue of ownership can be
initially resolved for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.
YES
(2) Whether the respondent's document
purporting to be a transfer of possessory
right can prevail over the petitioner's
claim of ownership and the latter's actual
possessory right over the property. YES
RULING:
I Having settled the issue of ownership, it was but
Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful
detainer — are summary proceedings designed
to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who
is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de fact and
not to the possession de jure. It does not even
matter if a party's title to the property is
questionable. 13 In an unlawful detainer case,
the sole issue for resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the parties. Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass
upon the same in order to determine who has
the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property.
In the case at bar, both petitioner and
respondent were claiming ownership over the
subject property. Hence, the CA correctly
touched upon
the issue of ownership only to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the
subject property.
True, as found by the CA, both petitioner and
respondent presented weak evidence of
ownership. Respondent on his part based his
claim of ownership over the subject property on
the strength of a notarized Deed of Transfer of
Possessory Right from a certain Antonio
Natavio.
however, this Court has declared null and void in
the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of
Appeals as such, respondent could not derive
any right therefrom.
Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his
contention that he has a better right to possess
the property on the fact that he is in actual
possession of the property and that he was
awarded a Certificate of Project Qualification by
the Office of the President through the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council.
However, although petitioner claimed ownership
over the subject lot, he failed to adduce sufficient
evidence therefor, or even sufficient reason on
the manner by which he acquired ownership.
just and proper for the CA to have reminded the
courts a quo to have settled the case by
restricting their resolution to the basic issue of
possession.
II
respondent is entitled to the possession of the
subject lot.
Thus, based on the evidence presented by the
respondent, it can be deduced that petitioner's
occupation of the subject lot was by mere
tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted
by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker.
Petitioner even admitted this fact in his
Beneficiar
Evaluation and Qualification Form. Moreover, all
other supporting evidence, such as the Census
Survey Certificate 17 and construction material
receipts, 18 bolster the fact that respondent was
in prior possession of the property before
petitioner entered the same by mere tolerance of
the respondent.
Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent
clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer,
since petitioner's occupation of the subject
property was by mere tolerance. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the same
upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits,
under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, are
designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one
who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings. These actions are
intended to avoid disruption of public order by
those who would take the law in their hands
purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession. In these cases, the issue is pure
physical or de facto possession, and
pronouncements made on questions of
ownership are provisional in nature. The
provisional determination of ownership in the
ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development,
G.R. No. 194880, 20 June 2012
DOCTRINE:
(1) PetCert under R65 is a prohibited
pleading.
(2) Complaint for unlawful detainer was
correctly filed. All allegations were
sufficiently filed and the period is within
1yr from last demand.
FACTS:
Republic and National Power Corporation (NPC)
are registered co-owners of several parcels of
land located along Pasong Tamo Extension and
Vito Cruz in Makati City. While the respondent
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
(Sunvar) occupied one of the properties by virtue
of sublease agreements, through TRCFI.
31 December 2002, the expiration date of
TRCFI's main lease contract with petitioners.
TRFCI was eventually dissolved.
26 April 2002, less than a year before the
expiration of the main lease contract and the
sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote
to PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent
expressed its desire to exercise the option to
renew the sublease over the subject property
and proposed an increased rental rate and a
renewal period of another 25 years. However, it
was decided not to renew the contract. Hence,
the contract expired.
Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to
occupy the property.
22 February 2008 six years after the main lease
contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised
respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the
subject property within thirty (30) days.
03 February 2009: respondent Sunvar received
from respondent OSG a final notice to vacate
within 15 days. 27 When the period lapsed,
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the
property and continued to
occupy it.
petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May
2009 for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC)
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the
Complaint and argued that the allegations of
petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an
action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of
contract existed between them. 31 In the
alternative, it also argued that petitioners' cause
of action was more properly an accion
publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, and not the MeTC, considering that the
petitioners' supposed dispossession of the
subject property by respondent had already
lasted for more than one year.
the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and
directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary
proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar
filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the
RTC
of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC
of respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
RULING:
I publiciana lodged with the RTC.
the Court find that it was erroneous for the RTC
to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition
of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on
Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief
for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC.
Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is
annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a
certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an
interlocutory order issued by the court in a
summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.
The prohibition is plain enough, and its further
exposition is unnecessary verbiage. 53 The RTC
should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvar's Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already
alerted the RTC of this legal bar and
immediately prayed for the dismissal of the
certiorari Petition. 54 Yet, the RTC not only
refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, 55 but
even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on
the merits.
to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to
"extraordinary circumstances" is misplaced. In
both cases, there were peculiar and specifi
circumstances that justified the filing of the
mentioned prohibited pleadings under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure —
conditions that are not availing in the case of
respondent Sunvar.
When confronted with the MeTC's adverse
denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment
case, the expeditious and proper remedy for
respondent
should have been to proceed with the summary
hearings and to file its answer.
Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the
RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary
ejectment proceeding was not only prohibited.
The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity
on account of respondent's having already taken
advantage of a speedy and available remedy by
filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its
claim of extraordinary circumstances that would
constrain this Court to apply the exceptions
ii
whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is
properly an action for unlawful detainer within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed
themselves of an action for unlawful detainer
and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold
possession may —
by virtue of any express or implied contract, and
within one year after the unlawful deprivation —
bring an action in the municipal trial court
against the person unlawfully withholding
possession, for restitution of possession with
damages and costs. 60 Unless otherwise
stipulated, the action of the lessor shall
commence only after a demand to pay or to
comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a
written notice of that demand is served upon the
person found on the premises, and the lessee
fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the
case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.
a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it states the following
elements:
(1) Initially, the possession of the property
by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff.
(2) Eventually, the possession became
illegal upon the plaintiff' notice to the
defendant of the termination of the
latter's right of possession.
(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the latter's enjoyment.
 (4) Within one year from the making of the
last demand on the defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the
Complaint for ejectment
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the
plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional
trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. In
other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint, more than one year had elapsed
since defendant had turned plaintiff out of
possession or defendant's possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of
forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana."
Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to
possess the subject property from its sublease
agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF.
However, with the expiration of the lease
agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent
lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the
property for almost seven years thereafter. It
was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners
made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar
to turn over the property. What is disputed,
however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful
detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise
availing in this case, and that the one-year
period should be counted from the final demand
made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC, 65 the
one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case
is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract
on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand
for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period
for determining the one-year period in an action
for unlawful detainer. "Such one year period
should be counted from the date of plaintiff's last
demand on defendant to vacate the real
property, because only upon the lapse of that
period does the possession become unlawful."
From the time that the main lease contract and
sublease agreements expired (01 January
2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any
possessory right over the subject property.
Absent any express contractual renewal of the
sublease agreement or any separate lease
contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best,
was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the
registered owners — petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvar's possession became
unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03
February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant
of the land of petitioners, and without any
contract between them, respondent is
"necessarily bound by an implied promise" that it
"will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them." Upon service of the final
notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should
have vacated the property and, consequently,
petitioners had one year or until 02 February
2010 in which to resort to the summary action for
unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their
Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July
2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier
served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008,
which could have possibly tolled the one-year
period for filing an unlawful detainer suit.
Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have
waived their right of action against respondent
Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation
of the subject property. That they sent a final
Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave
respondent another opportunity to comply with
their implied promise as occupants by mere
tolerance. Consequently, the one year period for
filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with
the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest
demand to vacate.
If the subsequent demands were merely in the
nature of reminders of the original demand, the
one-year period to commence an ejectment suit
would be counted from the first demand. 72
However, respondent failed to raise in any of the
proceedings below this question of fact as to the
nature of the second demand issued by the
OSG.
PLDT v. Citi Appliance, G.R. No.
214546, 9 October 2019
DOCTRINE:
An action for forcible entry must be filed within
one (1) year from the date of actual entry on the
land. However, when the entry was done
through
stealth, the one-year time bar is reckoned from
the time the entry was discovered. 1 In contrast
to unlawful detainer suits, no previous demand
to
vacate is required before an action for forcible
entry may be filed.
FACTS:
The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi
Appliance to construct a one level parking area
consisting of 26 parking slots. To comply with
this
requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a deep
excavation to lay the foundation of the parking
lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines,
cables, and manholes underground, which had
been placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983.
These encroached on Citi Appliance's property,
preventing it from excavating the land.
Citi Appliance applied for exemption from the
parking requirement, which the Cebu City
Zoning Board initially granted on May 22, 2003.
8 However, upon reconsideration, the Cebu City
Zoning Board denied the exemption and
required Citi Appliance to pay the parking
exemption fee
of P3,753,600.00.
Citi Appliance wrote PLDT, demanding that it
remove the underground telephone lines,
cables, and manholes, or to shoulder the parking
exemption fee. On May 28, 2004, Citi Appliance
made a final demand on PLDT to comply until
June 15, 2004; otherwise, it would file an
appropriate action in court. When PLDT still
refused to comply, Citi Appliance filed a
complaint for ejectment against PLDT.
In its Answer, PLDT alleged that the case should
be dismissed since the action for forcible entry
had prescribed. It expounded in its Position
Paper that the one-year prescriptive period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry
based on stealth should be reckoned from the
discovery of
the alleged unlawful entry, not the last demand
to vacate.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the issue on lack of jurisdiction
was deemed waived by petitioner
Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company;
(2) whether or not the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities has jurisdiction over the case,
subsumed under which are the issues
of: (1) whether or not the element of
prior physical possession is present; and
(2) whether the one-year prescriptive
period of an action for forcible entry
through stealth should be reckoned from
the time the unlawful entry is discovered
or from the last demand to vacate;
RULING:
I
the source of jurisdiction over the subject matter
is generally conferred by law. 56 This is why the
doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be
waived by the parties. Laws can only be
amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that
parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter
can be raised even for the first time on appeal,
not simply because it is jurisdiction over the
subject matter, but mainly because it is the law
that prescribes it.
subject matter" in jurisdiction over the subject
matter can refer to: (a) the cause of action, or
the breach of legal right or legal duty;
or (b) the res, or the thing over which the legal
right or duty breached subsists. In forcible entry
or unlawful detainer actions, the subject matter
refers to a breach of the general right to actual
possession, which is an attribute of ownership
and the res which is always real property.
The key to the first issue in this case is,
therefore, determining whether the one-year
requirement within which to file forcible entry or
unlawful detainer is provided only by the Rules
of Court rather than by law. Certainly, this
pertains to jurisdiction over the remedy.
Generally, therefore, objections to this type of
jurisdiction must be seasonably made.
In cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
the Rules of Court provides the one-year
prescriptive period. Under Rule 70, Section 1, a
party may file a complaint for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer "at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, . . . against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for
the restitution of such possession[.]"
The Civil Code also provides the prescriptive
period for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
suits. Particularly, Article 1147 provides that an
action
must be filed within one (1) year.
In this case, petitioner is not barred from raising
the issue of lack of jurisdiction. It raised the
issue when it filed its Amended Answer with
leave
of court before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities. Thus, the issue of the court's jurisdiction
was seasonably raised.
II
There are two (2) kinds of actions that fall under
summary ejectment, namely: (1) forcible entry;
and (2) unlawful detainer.
With respect to possession, in forcible entry, the
possession of the intruder is illegal at the outset
because his or her "possession thereof is made
against the will or without the consent of the
former possessor." 71 In unlawful detainer, by
contrast, the possession is previously legal but
becomes unlawful upon the expiration of one's
right to possess the property after, for instance,
the termination or violation of a lease contract.
72
Another difference rests in terms of a demand to
vacate: "in an action of forcible entry, no
previous demand to vacate is required by law
before the
filing of the action," 73 while such demand is
required in unlawful detainer.
This Court reiterated these differences in
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals adding that "in
forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the
complaint and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until he
was deprived thereof by the defendant, but in
unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have
prior physical possession of the property[.]"
For forcible entry, the one-year prescriptive
period is generally reckoned from the date of
actual entry on the land. 77 However, if forcible
entry is done through stealth, the period is
counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the
entry. 78 In marked contrast, the one-year
period in unlawful detainer is counted from the
date of the last demand to vacate.
Thus, the three (3) elements that must be
alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to
prosper are the following:
(a) that they have prior physical possession of
the property;
(b) that they were deprived of possession either
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and,
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year
from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of the physical
possession of the property. 80 (Citation omitted)
In this case, petitioner contends that two (2)
elements of forcible entry are absent: first,
respondent has no prior physical possession of
the property; and second, the action was filed
beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
This Court agrees with petitioner.
Ii A
Possession in ejectment cases means nothing
more than physical or material possession, not
legal possession. 84 It is not required that the
complainant is the owner of the property. 85 If
the issue of ownership is raised, the court may
resolve this question only to determine the
question of possession.
Here, petitioner claims that when it installed the
lines and cables beneath the property, the
property was not yet owned by respondent.
Hence, it concludes that respondent had no prior
physical possession of the property. However, in
ruling that there was prior physical possession,
the Court of Appeals held that the complaint
"contains specific allegations of possession and
ownership" 87 and referred to respondent's
allegation
A cursory reading of the complaint shows that
respondent failed to allege its prior physical
possession over the property. It merely
submitted
proof of ownership over the property, which is
not sufficient to prove prior physical possession.
Hence, in claiming that it had prior physical
possession by virtue of its absolute ownership
over the land, respondent is mistaken. 92 An
allegation of prior physical possession must be
clearly stated in a complaint for forcible entry. It
cannot equate possession as an attribute of
ownership to the fact of actual prior physical
possession.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to rule that
respondent's allegation of prior physical
possession is sufficient, the action for forcible
entry must still fail for being filed beyond the
one-year prescriptive period.
Iib
the one-year time bar in forcible entry cases is
reckoned from the date of discovery of the
encroachment, not from the date of the last
demand to vacate.
The discussion on possession by tolerance,
which is only applicable in unlawful detainer
cases, was a patent error. In cases of forcible
entry through stealth, there can be no
possession by tolerance precisely because the
owner could not have known beforehand that
someone else possessed his or her property;
thus, he or she could not have tolerated the
possession
of the intruder
Here, a review of respondent's own narration of
facts reveals that it discovered the underground
cables and lines in April 2003 when it applied
for exemption from the parking slot requirement
with the Cebu City Zoning Board.
Counting from this date, the one-year
prescriptive period to file the forcible entry suit
had already lapsed sometime in April 2004.
Thus, by the
time the complaint for forcible entry was filed on
October 1, 2004, the period had already
prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
therefore, no longer had jurisdiction to resolve
the case.
Sarmienta, et al. v. Manalite, G.R. No.
182953, 11 October 2010
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
a complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer" filed by respondent Manalite
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against
AMARA W. CIGELSALO Association (AMARA)
and its members.
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner.
Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and
stealth, petitioners entered the premises and
constructed their temporary houses and an
office building. 9 Petitioners likewise even filed a
civil case to annul MAHA's title on September 2,
1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial
court. After said dismissal, MAHA demanded
that petitioners vacate the land.
Petitioners pleaded that they be given one year
within which to look for a place to transfer, to
which request MAHA acceded. The said one-
year period, however, was repeatedly extended
due to the benevolence of MAHA's members.
Later on, petitioners came up with a proposal
that they become members of MAHA so they
can be qualified to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the Community
Mortgage Program (CMP). 10
MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners'
possession, giving them until December 1999 to
comply with the requirements to avail of the
CMP
benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to
comply with said requirements.
Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal
demand letters to petitioners to vacate the
property. Upon the latter's refusal to heed the
demand, MAHA filed the complaint for "Forcible
Entry/Unlawful Detainer.
They claimed that as the years went by, they
established the AMARA and bought the subject
property from Julian Tallano. The property later
became known as the Tallano Estate
MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action.
The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one
of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the
jurisdictional requirement of prior physical
possession in its complaint.
ISSUE:
whether the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to make up a case of unlawful detainer;
whether or not the CA was correct in affirming
the RTC's decision finding a case of unlawful
detainer.
RULING:
two entirely distinct and different causes of
action under the aforequoted rule, to wit:
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to
recover possession of a property from the
defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal
from the beginning as he acquired possession
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an
action for recovery of possession from the
defendant whose possession of the property
was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract
(express or implied) with the plaintiff, but
became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the
complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute
until he was deprived thereof by the defendant
by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy
or stealth. 20 In unlawful detainer, there must be
an allegation in the complaint of how the
possession of defendant started or continued,
that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and
that defendant holds possession of the land or
building "after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied."
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the
complaint would reveal that the allegations
clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA
acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners' stay and gave them the option to
acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. Petitioners' continued stay
on the premises was subject to the condition that
they shall comply with the requirements of the
CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfil their
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for
them to vacate the property as their right of
possession had already expired or had been
terminated. The moment MAHA required
petitioners to leave, petitioners became
deforciants illegally occupying the land. 23 Well
settled is the rule that a person who occupies
the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them,
is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. 24 Thus, the RTC and
the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
Union Bank v. Philippine Rabbit, G.R.
No. 205951, 4 July 2016
DOCTRINE:
An ejectment case is not limited to lease
agreements or deprivations of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It
is as well an available remedy against one who
withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right of possession under an
express or implied contract, such as a contract
to sell.
FACTS:
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines is the
owner of two parcels. Respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. was the former owner of
the lots but it lost the same by foreclosure to
petitioner; nonetheless, respondent continued to
occupy the same.
petitioner and respondent executed a Contract
to Sell covering the subject property. payable
within seven years in quarterly installments
(principal and interest)
The contract to sell stipulated, among others,
that "[a]ll payments required under this Contract
to Sell shall be made by the [buyer] without need
of
notice, demand, or any other act or deed, at the
principal office address of the [seller];" 7 and that
should respondent fail to fully comply with the
agreement or in case the contract is canceled or
rescinded, all its installment payments "shall
also be forfeited by way of penalty and liquidated
damages" 8 and "applied as rentals for [its] use
and possession of the property without need for
any judicial action or notice to or demand upon
the [buyer] and without prejudice to such other
rights as may be available to and at the option of
the [seller] such as, but not limited to bringing an
action in court to enforce payment of the
Purchase Price or the balance thereof and/or for
damages, or for any causes of action allowed by
law." 9
Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated
price in the contract to sell. Petitioner thus sent a
December 10, 2003 notarized demand letter
“demand letter with Rescission of Three (3)
Contracts to Sell”
it appears that after petitioner sent its December
10, 2003 letter demand to pay the amount of
P9,940,197.36, respondent was unable to pay
and petitioner rescinded the contract to sell on
February 28, 2004. Despite the fact that the
contract to sell has been rescinded, respondent
proposed to continue with the same and issued
and tendered to the petitioner three postdated
checks in the amount of P1.5 million as
payment. However, only one check in the
amount of P500,000.00 cleared. Petitioner thus
sent another March 17, 2004 letter to
respondent stating that the said P500,000.00
has been applied as rental payment; respondent
replied in an April 16, 2004 letter proposing to
proceed with the sale. Petitioner thereafter sent
the above May 24, 2004 letter-demand to
vacate, which respondent received on May 26,
2004.
petitioner filed an ejectment case against
respondent before the MTCC Ejectment with
Prayer for Fixation of Rentals"
respondent prayed for dismissal, claiming that
petitioner had no cause of action for ejectment
and the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case
because it involved breach of contract and
rescission of the contract to sell, which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (RTC);
that since the case is one for rescission, there
should be mutual restitution, but the amounts
involved — payments, interests and penalties —
should be properly computed; that the demand
to
vacate was not unequivocal and was improperly
served; and that the verification and certification
on non-forum shopping in the Complaint were
defective for lack of proper authority.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint is properly vested with
MTC. – YES.
RULING:
an ejectment case is not limited to lease
agreements or deprivations of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It
is as well available against one who withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of
his right of possession under an express or
implied contract, such as a contract to sell.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules,
"a . . .
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at
any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution
of such possession, together with damages and
costs." In such cases, it is sufficient to allege in
the plaintiff's complaint that —
1. The defendant originally had lawful
possession of the property, either by virtue of a
contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, the defendant's possession of the
property became illegal or unlawful upon notice
by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or
the termination of the defendant's right of
possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Upon an examination of the Complaint and
evidence in Civil Case No. 2171, it appears that
petitioner complied with the above requirements.
It alleged that respondent acquired the right to
occupy the subject property by virtue of the
November 8, 2001 Contract to Sell; that
respondent failed to pay the required
amortizations and thus was in violation of the
stipulations of the agreement; that petitioner
made a written "Demand to Pay with Rescission
of Three (3) Contracts to Sell dated November 8,
2001," but respondent was unable to heed the
demand; that respondent lost its right to retain
possession of the subject property, and it was
illegally occupying the premises; that petitioner
made another demand, this time a written
demand to vacate on May 24, 2004, which
respondent received on May 26, 2004; that
respondent refused to vacate the premises; that
on May 26, 2005, or within the one-year period
required by the Rules, the ejectment case was
filed; and that there is a need to determine the
rents and damages owing to petitioner.
It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to
require a demand to pay prior to filing of the
ejectment case. This is not one of the requisites
in an ejectment case based on petitioner's
contract to sell with respondent. As correctly
argued by petitioner, the full payment of the
purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive
suspensive condition whose non-fulfillment is not
a breach of contract, but merely an event that
prevents the seller from conveying title to the
purchaser; in other words, the non-payment of
the purchase price renders the contract to sell
ineffective and without force and effect. 33
Respondent's failure and refusal to pay the
monthly amortizations as agreed rendered the
contract to sell without force and effect; it
therefore lost its right to continue occupying the
subject property, and should vacate the same.
Rule 62 Interpleader
Nature of Interpleader
An interpleader is a remedy whereby a person
who has property whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, or
claims an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to
court and asks that the persons who claim said
property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be
required to litigate among themselves, in order
to
determine finally who is entitled to one or the
other thing. (Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No.
147812, 2005)
Purpose of Remedy
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a
lessee against those who have conflicting claims
over the rent due for the property leased. This
remedy is for the lessee to protect himself or
herself from “double vexation in respect of one
liability. He or she may file the interpleader case
to extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent,
remove him or her from the adverse claimants’
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting
claims to litigate among themselves. (Lui
Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma,
G.R. No. 193494, 2014)
REQUISITES FOR INTERPLEADER
1. There must be two or more claimants with
adverse or conflicting interests to a property in
the custody or possession of the plaintiff;
2. The plaintiff in an action for interpleader has
no claim upon the subject matter of the adverse
claims or if he has an interest at all, such interest
is not disputed by the claimants;
3. The subject matter of the adverse claims must
be one and the same.
When To File The Complaint
General Rule: Within a reasonable time after a
dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants.
Illustration:
1. a warehouseman who has custody of
goods claimed to be owned by two or
more persons who do not have the
same interests. He may file an action for
interpleader and pass on to the court the
determination as to who is the rightful
owner is.
a. The basis of the need to file an
interpleader, in the case of
warehouseman, us actually the
substantive law provisions of the
Warehouse Receipts Law.
Under said law, where a
warehouseman delivers the
goods to one who is not in fact
entitled to possession, the
warehouseman shall be liable
for conversion.
b. The warehouseman has actually
an interest in the goods
deposited to the extent of his
lien on the goods deposited or
on the proceeds thereof in his
hands. The interest, however,
does not preclude him from the
 filing a complaint in interpleader in the subject matter or an interest which in
because such interest is one whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants
that is not disputed by the
claimants. SUBJECT MATTER MUST BE THE SAME AND
2. An insurer may also file a complaint for DERIVED FROM THE SAME SOURCE.
interpleader when confronted by
conflicting claims on the proceeds of an FACTS:
insurance policy. A complaint for interpleader was filed by
Continental Development Corporation (CDC)
Court with jurisdiction shall depend upon the against Benito Gervacio Tan and Zoila Co Lim,
subject matter. praying that said defendants be directed to
MTC RTC interplead and litigate their respective claims
300,000 or less over the shares of stock in its possession. CDC
alleged that, since both defendants claim
ownership of the shares of stock, is it not in a
INTERPLEADER v. INTERVENTION position to justly and correctly determine the
conflicting claims; that it cannot dispose of the
INTERPLEADER INTERVENTION shares of stock as both defendants threatened
A special civil action, Not an original action but to take punitive measure against it should it
independent and original merely ancillary and adopt steps the may prejudice their respective
depended upon the interest; and that it has no interest over the
existence of a pending
action. subject matter of the complaint.
Commenced by the filing of Commenced by a motion
a complaint for leave to intervene filed Benito Tan’s source: recorded in the book of the
in a pending case complainant
attaching thereto the
pleading-in-intervention Zoila Lim’s source: from her deceased mother.
Filed by a person who has Filed by a person who has Alleging that Benito’s funds are transferred as
no interest in the subject legal interest in any of the trust to her mother.
matter of the action or if he following:
has an interest, the same a. Subject matter of
is not disputed by the the litigation RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
claimants b. Success of of action.
either of the
parties ISSUE:
c. An interest
against both Whether the complaint for interpleader shall be
d. He may given merit. – YES.
adversely
affected by the RULING:
disposition or
distribution of the The Supreme Court held that an active conflict
property in the of interests over the shares of stock exist
custody of the between the defendants, and the court a quo
court or of an gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
officer thereof.
The defendants are If a complaint-in-
complaint for interpleader without giving full
brought into the action intervention is filed, the opportunity to defendants to litigate their
because they are sued and defendants are already respective claims, which dismissal has the effect
impleaded as such in the parties to an existing suit, of determining the question of ownership in favor
complaint. not because of the
intervention, but because
of defendant Benito Gervacio Tan.
of the original suit.
An interpleader merely demands as a sine
qua non element that
Lim v. Continental Development, G.R. 1. there be two or more claimants to the
No. L-41818, 18 February 1976 fund or thing in dispute through separate
DOCTRINE: and different interests. The claims must
The only indispensable requisite required by this be adverse before relief can be granted
rule is that conflicting claims upon the same and the parties sought to be
subject matter are may be made against plaintiff- interpleaded must be in a position to
in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever make effective claims" (33 C.J. 430).
 2. the fund, thing, or duty over which the
parties assert adverse claims must be
one and the same and derived from the
same source
Indeed, petitioner corporation is placed in the
same situation as a lessee who does not know
the person to whom he will pay the rentals due
to
the conflicting claims over tine property leased,
or a sheriff who finds himself puzzled by
conflicting claims to a property seized by him. In
these examples, the lessee (Pangkalinawan vs.
Rodas, 80 Phil. 28) and the sheriff (Sy-Quia vs
Sheriff, 46 Phil. 400) were each allowed to file a
complaint in interpleader to determine the
respective rights of the claimants.
Petition granted with costs.
Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, 6
April 2005
DOCTRINE:
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby
a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right in
both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability
Lessor-lessee. Lessee didn’t pay rentals saying
that she doesn’t know who to pay,
FACTS:
Ocampo was alleged to be the owner of the
land. The possession and administration of the
subject land are claimed to be already in
Ocampo's management even though the TCT is
not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is
a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.
Tirona alleged that the subject premises was
declared under area for priority development,
she is invoking her right of first refusal and in
connection thereto and she will temporarily stop
paying her monthly rentals until and unless the
National Housing Authority have processed the
pertinent papers as regards the amount due to
Ocampo.
When Tirona refused to pay, Ocampo filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against Tirona before the MTC.
The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any
reason to suspend payment of rents until after
PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and
1968, is implemented in her favor. Tirona's non-
payment of rents rendered her occupation of the
subject land illegal. As owner of the subject land,
Ocampo is entitled to its use and enjoyment, as
well as to recover its possession from any
person unlawfully withholding it.
ISSUE:
Whether Ocampo has a right to eject leonora
tirona, and demand payment of rentals from her
for the use and occupancy of the lot Involved in
the present case.
RULING:
Yes.
The elements to be proved and resolved in
unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and
expiration or violation of its terms. To support
their conclusion that there was an existing lease,
the MTC and RTC found that:
1. Ocampo informed Tirona through a
letter dated 1 March 1995 that he
bought the subject land, upon which
Tirona's house stands, from the previous
owner and lessor Rosauro Breton;
2. Tirona's continued occupancy of the
subject land signifie Tirona's acceptance
of Ocampo's conditions of lease stated
in the 1 March 1995 letter; 26 and
3. In asserting her right to possess the
subject land, Tirona admitted that
Ocampo is her lessor. In the 5 July 1995
letter, Tirona was referred to as "the
hereinmentioned tenant of yours."
Tirona is estopped from denying her possession
under a lease and that there was a violation of
the lease agreement.
II. Tirona raised the issue of ownership.
However, the SC ruled that it is not essential to
an action for unlawful detainer. The facts of the
lease and the expiration of its term are the only
elements of the action.
III. Interpleader
Tirona need not have awaited actual institution
of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a
bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is
proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on
the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby
a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right in
both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with
the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability.
When the court orders that the claimants litigate
among themselves, there arises in reality a new
action and the former are styled interpleaders,
and in such a case the pleading which initiates
the action is called a complaint of interpleader
and not a cross-complaint.
Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the
subject land. All the elements required for an
unlawful detainer case to prosper are present.
Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the
subject land from Tirona's lessor.
Tirona's continued occupation of the subject
land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo's
terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to
pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dison, G.R. No.
136409, 14 March 2008
DOCTRINE:
Consignation shall be made by depositing the
things due at the disposal of a judicial authority,
before whom the tender of payment shall be
proved in a proper case, and the announcement
of the consignation in other cases.
FACTS:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and
petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease
whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease
to the latter several Units.
Eventually, Pasricha failed to pay the rent that
lead to Don Luis to file a complaint for ejectment.
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the
stipulated rent for the leased premises starting
July until November 1992, but claimed that such
refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the
person authorized to receive payment. (because
the representative of Don Luis in dealing with the
contract kept on changing). To further justify
their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged
that they were prevented from using the units
(rooms) subject matter of the lease contract,
except Room 35.
ISSUE:
Whether they are justified for their non-payment.
RULING.
No, they should have availed of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines on the
consignation of payment and of the Rules of
Court on interpleader.
Consignation shall be made by depositing the
things due at the disposal of a judicial authority,
before whom the tender of payment shall be
proved in a proper case, and the announcement
of the consignation in other cases.
In the instant case, consignation alone would
have produced the effect of payment of the
rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid
the performance of an obligation becoming more
onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not
imputable to him. Petitioners claim that they
made a written tender of payment and actually
prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But
that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender
of payment.
Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it
would not constitute payment for want of
consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the
rule that tender of payment must be
accompanied by consignation in order that the
effects of payment may be produced.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is
proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right
to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect
a person against double liability but to protect
him against double vexation in respect of one
liability.
Notably, instead of availing of the above
remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from
making payments. Neither can petitioners validly
invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38
as a justification for non-payment of rentals.
Although the two contracts embraced the lease
of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the contracts —
with their particular reference to specific rooms
and the monthly rental for each — easily raise
the inference that the parties intended the lease
of each room separate from that of the others.
There is nothing in the contract which would lead
to the conclusion that the lease of one or more
rooms was to be made dependent upon the
lease of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the
use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the
corresponding obligation to pay the monthly
rental for the same. Notably, respondent
demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms
actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners.
**
The elements to be proved and resolved are the
fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its
terms. Specifically, the essential requisites of
unlawful detainer are:
1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract,
express or implied;
2) the expiration or termination of the
possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the
land or building after the expiration or
termination of the right to possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental
or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate
the premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the
date of the last demand received by the
defendant.
Here, the petitioners and respondent entered
into two separate contracts of lease involving
nine (9) rooms of the San Luis Building.
Records, likewise, show that respondent
repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the
premises, but the latter refused to heed the
demand; thus, they remained in possession of
the premises. Here there was a violation of the
lease agreement when it failed to pay the
rentals.
The evidence of petitioners' non-payment of the
stipulated rent is overwhelming. Petitioners,
however, claim that such non-payment is
justified
by the following: 1) the refusal of respondent to
allow petitioners to use the leased properties,
except room 35; 2) respondent's refusal to turn
over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondent's
refusal to accept payment tendered by
petitioners.
Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig, G.R. No.
193494, 7 March 2014
DOCTRINE:
Litis pendentia is not present.
FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma
Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of
lease.
Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the
Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to
be the new owner of the leased property, the
bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly
to it.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui
Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of
Communications' claim. Lui Enterprises wrote to
Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect
the leased property's
rent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises
and the Philippine Bank of Communications over
the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma
alleged that it already consigned in court
P604,024.35 as rental payments. Zuellig
Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in
court its succeeding monthly rental payments
and that Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications be ordered to litigate their
conflicting claims.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed
nullification of deed of dation in payment case
pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
barred the filing of the interpleader case. Lui
Enterprises filed this nullification case against
the Philippine Bank of Communications with
respect
to several properties it dationed to the bank in
payment of its obligations.
The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was
among those allegedly dationed to the Philippine
Bank of Communications.
In the nullification of deed of dation in payment
case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which
corporation had the better right over the rental
payments. Lui Enterprises argued that the same
issue was involved in the interpleader case. To
avoid possible conflicting decisions of the Davao
trial court and the Makati trial court on the same
issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the
subsequently filed interpleader case be
dismissed.
Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of
deed of dation in payment with the Regional
Trial Courts of Davao. It sought to nullify the
deed of dation in payment through which the
Philippine Bank of Communications acquired
title over the leased property. Lui Enterprises
argued that this
pending nullification case barred the Regional
Trial Court of Makati from hearing the
interpleader case. Since the interpleader case
was file subsequently to the nullification case,
the interpleader case should be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether the annulment of deed of dation in
payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao barred the subsequent filing of the
interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati;
RULING:
No. The nullification of deed in dation in payment
case did not bar the filing of the interpleader
case.
Litis pendentia is not present in this case.
Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit." It
exists when "another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of
action . . .
The subsequent action is "unnecessary and
vexatious" and is instituted to "harass the
respondent [in the subsequent action]."
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
1. Identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both
actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and
3. The identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other.
All of the requisites must be present.
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since
there is (1) no identity of parties in the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case
and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not
a party to the nullification case file in the Davao
trial court.
There is also (2) no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the
first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment
it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently
filed the interpleader case to consign in court the
rental payments and extinguish its obligation as
lessee. The interpleader case was necessary
and was not instituted to harass either Lui
Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of
Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar
the filing of the interpleader case.
In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case was filed by Lui Enterprises
against the Philippine Bank of Communications.
The interpleader case was filed by Zuellig
Pharma against Lui Enterprises and the
Philippine Bank of Communications. A different
plaintiff filed the interpleader case against Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications.
Thus, there is no identity of parties, and the first
requisite of litis pendentia is absent.
As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed the
nullification of deed of dation in payment to
recover ownership of the leased premises.
Zuellig Pharma file the interpleader case to
extinguish its obligation to pay rent. There is no
identity of reliefs prayed for, and the second
requisite of litis pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are
absent, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case.
Lui Enterprises alleged that the Regional Trial
Court of Davao issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Regional Trial Court of Davao
allegedly enjoined the Regional Trial Court of
Makati from taking cognizance of the
interpleader case. Lui Enterprises argued that
the Regional Trial Court of Makati "should have
respected the
orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not
enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Makati from
hearing the interpleader case.
RULE 63 DECLARATORY
RELIEF
Declaratory relief is an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution,
to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument..
GR: an action must be justified, as no other
adequate relief or remedy is available.
Purpose:
1. Determine any question of construction
or validity arising from the subject of the
action
2. Seek for a declaration of the petitioner’s
rights
2 types of actions:
 Action for declaratory relief
 Similar remedies
o Action for reformation of an
instrument – despite meeting of
minds of the parties as to the
object and cause of the contract
the instrument does not reflect
their true agreement. Cannot be
brought for: simple donations
inter vivos; wills; when the real
agreement is void.
o Action for quieting of the tile to
real property or remove clouds
therefrom
o Action for consolidation of
ownership – for the registration
of the property
Note: the court may only refuse a judicial
declaration if it is an action for declaratory relief.
Not for similar remedies.
Subject matter in a petition for declaratory relief
are exclusive:
1. Deed
2. Will
3. Contract or other written instrument
4. Statute
5. Executive order or regulation
6. Ordinance
7. Any other governmental regulation.
When not proper:
1. To ask the court to declare his filiation
and consequently his hereditary rights.
The action is not based on a deed, will,
statute..
2. To seek judicial declaration of
citizenship to correct a previous
unilateral registration by petitioner as an
alien.
3. Seeking enlightenment as to the true
import of a judgment. The remedy is to
move for clarificatory judgment.
4. To assail a judgment.
5. Where the contract or statute is clear in
its terms and there is no doubt as to its
meaning and validity.
Who may file:
1. Any person interested;
2. Whose rights are affected.
Other parties:
1. All persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the
declaration;
 2. The rights of persons not made parties
to the action do not stand to be
prejudiced by the declaration.
3. Local prosecutor or attorney of the local
government, where the action involves
the validity of a local government
ordinance.
4. Solicitor General, in any action involving
the validity of the statute, executive
order or regulation, or any other
governmental regulation.
Q: a local ordinance is being challenged through
declaratory relief. Court dismissed because it
failed to notify the SG.
A: if a petition is raises a constitutionality, then
the Court is correct. If not, notification of SG is
not required.
The contract says you will Shaira 6months. But
Shaira, said no, interpretation will pay in 3
months. Di nagbayad kay Shaira. Sinisingil na,
dapat dati ka pa nagbayad. Dapat walang
liability under this contract. You file declaration
relief.
A: convert into ordinary action.
Court with jurisdiction: RTC.
XPN: where the action is one for quieting of title,
which is a similar remedy, the jurisdiction will
depend upon the assessed value.
Q: Title of property
A: par 2 expressly covers other remedies.
Declaratory relief – discretionary to judicial
determination
Other similar remedies – cannot be refused.
Q: Petition for Rule63, didn’t mention declaratory
relief.
No execution, only interpretation.
Ferrer, Jr. v. Roco, G.R. No. 174219, 5
July 2010
DOCTRINE:
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
1] the subject matter of the controversy must be
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance;
2] the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3] there must have been no breach of the
documents in question;
4] there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse;
5] the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and
6] adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Here, 5th and 6th requisite are lacking in this case
since the application of the private respondents
are yet to be promulgated by the HLRUB.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or Injunction with prayer for TRO
questioning Resolution and Ordinance issued by
the respondents, Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr.
and the members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of
Naga City with RTC. The resolution and
ordinance contain the preliminary approval of the
locational clearance application of the Memorial
parks in Naga city.
RTC: dismissed the petition on the ground that it
is premature as the questioned resolutions and
ordinance were merely promulgated to pave the
way for the endorsement of the application of the
private respondent to the HLURB. It recognized
that the HLURB is the entity which will decide
whether the application of the private respondent
will be granted or not.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for declaratory relief is
premature and having no basis, on the pretext
that the issue raised therein is not yet ripe for
adjudication. – YES.
RULING:
The ordinance and resolution are only
preliminary, subject to approval by HLURB.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any
person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute, and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder.
Requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
1] the subject matter of the controversy must be
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance;
2] the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction;
3] there must have been no breach of the
documents in question;
4] there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse;
5] the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and
6] adequate relief is not available through
other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
In this case, the issue raised by petitioners is
clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Nowhere in the assailed resolutions and
ordinance does it show that the public
respondents acted on private respondent's
application with finality. What appears therefrom
is that the application of private respondent for
development permit has been endorsed to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) for appropriate action, the latter being
the sole regulatory body for housing and land
development.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution
demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such
that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before resort to
the courts is had even if the matter may well be
within their proper jurisdiction.
Phil-Ville Development v. Bonifacio,
G.R. No. 167391, 8 June 2011
DOCTRINE:
Although the petioner filed for a complaint to
quiet the title, all that petitioner prayed for, is for
the court to uphold the validity of its titles as
against that of respondents' that is a nature of
an action for declaratory relief.
FACTS:
The case involves Maysilo Estate, where Phil-
Ville acquires through an Absolute Deed of Sale.
The petitioner Phil-Ville filed for a complaint to
quiet the title of Maysilo Estate since there were
several claimants alleging their rights as the
heirs of the rightful owners over the portion of
the Estate, particularly against Eleuteria
Bonifacio. (this case concerns fake titles with the
intention of land grabbing. This also reached the
Senate which concludes that this is a land title
scam.)
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has availed the proper
remedy.
RULING:
Yes.
An action for declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder.
Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance
therewith, and not to settle issues arising from
an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained
before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached the
state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint
for quieting of title after it was served a notice to
vacate but before it could be dispossessed of
the subject properties. Notably, the Court of
Appeals had earlier set aside the Order which
granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria
Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued
pursuant thereto. And although petitioner's
complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and
Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is for the
court to uphold the validity of its titles as against
that of respondents'. This is consistent with the
nature of the relief in an action for declaratory
relief where the judgment in the case can be
carried into effect without requiring the parties to
pay damages or to perform any act.
Thus, while petitioner was not able to
demonstrate that respondents' TCT No. C-
314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera
constitutes a cloud over its title, it has
nevertheless successfully established
ownership over the subject properties and the
validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory
relief.
**
The nature of an action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the
law in effect when the action was filed
irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only
some of such relief.
(Why Quieting of Title was not considered:
element of the cloud was not present.)
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property.
Two requisites must concur:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
As regards the first requisite, petitioner was able
to establish its title over the real properties
subject of this action. Petitioner submitted in
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale by which it
acquired the
subject property from N. Dela Merced and Sons.
As for the second requisite, the cloud on title
shall consist of: (1) any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the
title sought to be quieted. The fourth element is
not present in the case at bar.
While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the
name of Eleuteria Rivera is an instrument that
appeared to be valid but was subsequently
shown to be invalid, it does not cover the same
parcels of land that are described in petitioner's
titles. Foremost, Rivera's title embraces a land
measuring 14,391.54 square meters while
petitioner's lands has an aggregate area of
only 8,694 square meters. On the one hand, it
may be argued that petitioner's land could be
subsumed within Rivera's 14,391.54-square
meter property. Yet, a comparison of the
its technical descriptions of the parties' titles
negates an overlapping of their boundaries.
Rule 65
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 224974, 3 July
2017
DOCTRINE:
An essential requisite for filing a petition for
certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of
discretion has been define as a "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law."
FACTS:
Cruz and other defendants were charged with
Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band
for unlawfully taking 4 sacks filled with scraps of
bronze metal and a copper pipe. Cruz posted a
bail through a cash bond.
The private complainant filed an Affidavit of
Desistance. Then, the A.Prosec filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was eventually granted.
Cruz, through his bondsman, filed a Motion to
Release Cash Bond but was denied by RTC on
the ground that the case was dismissed through
desistance not through acquittal.
Cruz then filed a petition for Certiorari with CA
but denied on the ground of incorrect remedy.
CA alleged that Cruz should have filed an
appeal instead of Pet Cert.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion
to release cash bond. – YES.
RULING:
In order to determine whether the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is
necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial
Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to
warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari
against
it.
Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in
three (3) instances:
(1) the acquittal of the accused,
(2) the dismissal of the case, or
(3) the execution of the judgment of conviction.
The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation
of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.
Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not a
mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Considering that the trial court blatantly
disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the proper court.
Extra note: The writ of certiorari is not issued to
correct every error that may have been
committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a
remedy specifically to keep lower courts and
tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In
our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent
lower courts and tribunals from committing grave
abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction.
Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal
or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari
may not be issued if the error can be the subject
of an ordinary appeal.
As explained in the jurisprudence, “We remind
that the writ of certiorari — being a remedy
narrow
in scope and inflexible in character, whose
purpose is to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior
court from committing such grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts
(i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority
in law to perform) — is not a general utility tool in
the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to
correct every error committed by a lower court.
Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No.
172299, 22 April 2008
DOCTRINE:
A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a
Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep
the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as
its function is limited to keeping the inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
 "without jurisdiction" means that the
court acted with absolute lack of
authority or want of legal power, right or
authority to hear and determine a cause
or causes, considered either in general
or with reference to a particular matter. It
means lack of power to exercise
authority.
 "Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when
the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority; or results
when an act, though within the general
power of a tribunal, board or officer (to
do) is not authorized, and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding,
because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general
power in respect of it are wanting.
 "Grave abuse of discretion" implies
such capricious and whimsical exercise
 of judgment as to be equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; simply put,
power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal either to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
The orders rendered are already final
disposition, appealable under r45.
FACTS:
Spouses Tagle’s property were foreclosed by
EPCIB. When the latter filed for Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession, Spouses Tagle
countered it with Motion to Stop Writ of
Possession on the ground that the subject
property is a Family Home which is exempt from
execution.
RTC denied.
They filed with CA Pet Cert, however 3 orders
were rendered, denying the Spouse’s petitions.
ISSUE:
whether the present Petition for Certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail
himself of seeking the reversal of the three
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals – No.
RULING:
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the
essential requisites that have to concur are:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board
or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
In the present case, there is no question that the
6 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo's petition
in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 is already a disposition
on the merits. Therefore, said Resolution, as
well as the Resolutions dated 16 February 2006
and 11 April 2006 denying reconsideration
thereof, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in
the nature of a final disposition of CA-G.R. SP
No. 90461 by the appellate court, and which,
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, are
appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that
decisions (judgments), final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to this
Court by filing a petition for review, which would
be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner
Alfredo's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were
final orders. They were not interlocutory because
the proceedings were terminated and left
nothing more to be done by the appellate court.
There were no remaining issues to be resolved
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the
proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo
then was to
file before this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, and not a special civil action for
certiorari
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious
that the third requisite for a petition for certiorari
is wanting; that is, there must be no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course o law . The availability to
petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for
review on certiorari from the assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively
barred his right to resort to a petition for
certiorari.
Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not
issue where the remedy of appeal is available to
an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency.
In this case, appeal was not only available but
also a speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover,
petitioner Alfredo failed to show circumstances
that would justify a deviation from the general
rule as to make available to him a petition for an error of judgment that the Where the error is not
certiorari in lieu of making an appeal. court may commit in the one of jurisdiction, but
exercise of its jurisdiction is of an error of law or
not correct[a]ble through the
Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason fact — a mistake of
original civil action of
judgment — appeal is
why the issue raised in his petition for certiorari certiorari.'
the remedy.
could not have been raised on ordinary appeal
by
As to the Manner of Filing.
certiorari . He simply argued that the appellate
court gravely abuse its discretion which (1) the higher court uses (1)Over an appeal, the
amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its original jurisdiction in CA exercises its
dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 accordance with its appellate jurisdiction
and not finding that the subject property covered power of control and and power of review.
supervision over the
by the Writ of Possession was a Family Home,
proceedings of lower (2)An appeal is thus a
hence, exempt from execution or forced sale. He courts.
did not give a single explanation as to why the continuation of the
original suit,
errors committed by the Court of Appeals cannot
(2) is an original and
possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under Rule independent action that
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. (3)The parties to an
was not part of the trial appeal are the original
that had resulted in the parties to the action.
The remedies of appeal in the ordinary rendition of the judgment
course of law and of certiorari under Rule 65 or order complained of.
of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. (3) the parties to a
Time and again this Court has reminded petition for certiorari are
members of the bench and bar that the special the aggrieved party (who
civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a thereby becomes the
substitute for a lost appeal where the latter petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-
remedy is available; especially if such loss or
judicial agency, and the
lapse was occasioned by one's own negligence prevailing parties (the
or error in the choice of remedies. public and the private
respondents,
respectively).
Certiorari Appeal
As to the Purpose As to the Subject Matter.
a remedy designed for The supervisory Since the issue is Only judgments or
the correction of errors of jurisdiction of a court jurisdiction, an original final orders and
jurisdiction, not errors of over the issuance of a action for certiorari may those that the Rules of
judgment. writ of certiorari cannot be directed against an Court so declared are
be exercised for the interlocutory order of the appealable
purpose of reviewing lower court prior to an
In Pure Foods
the intrinsic appeal from the
Corporation v. NLRC, we
correctness of a judgment; or where there
explained the simple
judgment of the lower is no appeal or any plain,
reason for the rule in this
court — on the basis speedy
light:
'When a court exercises its either of the law or the or adequate remedy.
jurisdiction, an error facts of the case, or of As to the Period of Filing.
committed while so engaged the wisdom or legal On the other hand, a Ordinary appeals
does not deprive it of the soundness of the petition for certiorari should be file within
jurisdiction being exercised decision. Even if the
when the error is committed. should be filed not fifteen days from the
findings of the court later than sixty days from notice of judgment or
If it did, every error
are the notice of judgment, final order appealed
committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction incorrect, as long as it order, or resolution. from. Where a record
and every erroneous has jurisdiction over If a motion for new trial or on appeal is required,
judgment would be a void the case, such motion for the appellant must file
judgment. This cannot be correction reconsideration was a notice of appeal and
allowed. The administration is normally beyond the timely filed, a record on appeal
of justice would not survive province of certiorari.
such a rule. Consequently, the period shall be within thirty days from
 counted from the denial
of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration
A motion for
reconsideration is
generally required prior
to the filing of a petition
for
certiorari, in order to
afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also
that this motion is a plain
and adequate remedy
expressly available under
the law.
the said notice of for failure to attach thereto the pertinent
judgment or final documents.
order. A petition for
review In dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
should be filed and
90461, the appellate court relied on Sec. 1, Rule
served within fifteen
days from the notice of 65, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised
denial of the decision, Rules of Court.
or of the petitioner's
timely filed motion for II
new trial or motion for Failure to comply with the requirement that the
reconsideration. In an petition be accompanied by a duplicate original
appeal by certiorari, or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
the petition should be resolution or ruling being challenged is
filed also within fifteen
sufficient ground for the dismissal of said
days from the notice of
judgment or final petition.
order, or of the denial
of the petitioner's Consequently, it cannot be said that the Court of
motion for Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
new trial or motion for amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
reconsideration. dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461
for non-compliance with Sec. 1, Rule 65, in
relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, of the Revised Rules
Such motion is not
of Court.
required before
appealing a judgment It is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit
or final order. pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest
of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for
review on certiorari particularly (1) if the petition
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari (2) when errors of judgment are
averred;
and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify
the relaxation of the rules.

Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in
filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an
ordinary appeal by certiorari , already a sufficie
justification for dismissing the instant petition.
When the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, it did so
on the ground that petitioner Alfredo failed to
attach
certified true copies of the following: (1) the 4
April 2005 Order of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-
71-2004 denying petitioner Alfredo's Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession; and (2) petitioner
Alfredo's Motion to Stop Writ of Possession
submitted to the RTC. Suitably, therefore, the
proper issue which petitioner Alfredo should
raise before this Court in his instant Petition for
Certiorari should be whether or not the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461
But these exceptions are not applicable to the
present factual milieu. Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule
45
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition of petitioner Alfredo in CA-
G.R. SP No. 90461 by virtue of a Resolution
dated 6 September 2005. Petitioner Alfredo's
Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of
his petition was denied by the appellate court in
its Resolution dated 16 February 2006.
Petitioner Alfredo thus had 15 days from receipt
of the 16 February 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals within which to file a petition for
review. The reckoning date from which the 15-
day period to appeal shall be computed is the
date of receipt by petitioner Alfredo of the 16
February 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, and not of its 11 Apr 2006 Resolution
denying petitioner Alfredo's second motion for
reconsideration, since the second paragraph of
Sec. 5, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is
explicit that a second motion for reconsideration
shall not be allowed. And since a second motion
for reconsideration is not allowed, then
unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of
the period to file an appeal by certiorari .
Petitioner Alfredo made a critical mistake in
waiting for the Court of Appeals to resolve his
second motion for reconsideration before
pursuing an appeal.
III
Another elementary rule of procedure is that
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.
For this reason, petitioner Alfredo's failure to file
this petition within 15 days from receipt of the 16
February 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals
denying his first Motion for Reconsideration,
rendered the same final and executory and
deprived us of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
thereof.
The relaxation of procedural rules may be
allowed only when there are exceptional
circumstances to justify the same. Try as we
might, however, we fail to find the existence of
such exceptional circumstances in this case, and
neither did petitioner Alfredo endeavour to prove
the existence of any. In fact, there is total lack of
effort on petitioner Alfredo's part to at least
explain his inability to comply with the clear
requisites of the Revised Rules of Court.
Worth noting is the observation of respondent E-
PCI that, essentially, petitioner Alfredo is using
the present Petition for Certiorari to seek the
reversal and setting aside of the 4 April 2005
Order of the RTC, and not to assail the three
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. This he
cannot validly do for it is an apparent disregard
of the proper exercise of jurisdiction by the
appellate court. We cannot overlook the ruling of
the Court of Appeals and proceed right away to
a review of the RTC order, absent any error of
judgment or jurisdiction committed by the former
Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067,
11 August 2004
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Madrigal filed for insolvency which was later
granted and RTC declared it insolvent. It later
filed for complaint for damages against
Lapanday and Lorenzo for failing to fulfill its
obligations with the shipping requirements of Del
Monte.
Lapanday and Lorenzo filed a Motion to
Dismiss. RTC granted it on the ground that
there is no cause of action since Madrigal has
already been declared insolvent, it must be the
court assignee who shall file the case.
Madrigal filed for Pet Cert with CA but dismissed
on the ground that there is still other remedy
available.
ISSUE:
Whether the proper remedy is an appeal or a
petition for certiorari. – Appeal.
RULING:
Appeal — not certiorari — was the correct
remedy
to elevate the RTC's Order granting the Motion
to Dismiss. The appeal, which would have
involved a pure question of law, should have
been filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 2(c) of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule
50, Rules of Court
Appeal
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by the
Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of
appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also
provided in Rule 41.
Petition for Certiorari
A petition for certiorari is governed by Rule 65
A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any
other purpose, as its function is limited to
keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board
or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted
with absolute lack of authority.
There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court
transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority.
"Grave abuse of discretion" implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Certiorari Not the Proper Remedy if Appeal Is
Available
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved
party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence,
certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or
error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that
there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587,
16 March 2007
DOCTRINE:
GR: any further prosecution of the accused after
an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.
XPN:
1. when the prosecution is denied due
process of law
2. when the trial court commits grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused's
demurrer to evidence
FACTS:
Employees of Wang were arrested in a buy bust
operation. They tipped off Wang. Wang was
frisked and charged with 3 information.
Wang filed a Demurrer of Evidence which was
later granted by the RTC on the ground that
there was invalid warrantless arrest.
Thus, Republic filed a Pet review Cert with SC.
ISSUE:
whether the prosecution may appeal the trial
court's resolution granting Wang's demurrer to
evidence and acquitting him of all the charges
against him without violating the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy – NO.
RULING:
First off, it must be emphasized that the present
case is an appeal file directly with this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of
the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of
law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of
appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal
directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears
stressing that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be
exercised only in
the manner provided for by law (Velasco v.
Court of Appeals 21 ). Although Section 2, Rule
122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision,
expressly made subject to the prohibition against
putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also
basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole records of the case wide open for review
by the appellate court, that is why any appeal
from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the
accused in double jeopardy.
In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows
appeal by the People from judgments of
acquittal.
An order granting an accused's demurrer to
evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally,
any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. To this general
rule, however, the Court has previously made
some exceptions.
1. when the prosecution is denied due
process of law
2. when the trial court commits grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused's
demurrer to evidence. In point is the
fairly recent case of People v. Uy ,which
involved the trial court's decision which
granted the two separate demurrers to
evidence filed by the two accused
therein, both with leave of court,
resulting in their acquittal of their
respective charges of murder due to
insufficiency of evidence.
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court
may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused's demurrer to evidence.
This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order,
being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is
annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari , the
right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the
Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor
General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the
Court in the present case is an appeal by way of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising a pure question of law, which is different
from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
For being the wrong remedy taken by
petitioner People of the Philippines in this
case, this petition is outrightly dismissible.
The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal
order of the trial court by appeal without violating
private respondent's right against double
jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an
"appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari ,
which definitely this Court has the power to do,
when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, the
instant petition will nevertheless fail on the
merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the
warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial
court granted private respondent's demurrer to
evidence and acquitted him of all the three
charges for lack of evidence, because the
unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of
the evidence gathered from an invalid
warrantless search.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of
its findings that the arrest preceded the search,
and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful
arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is
likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence
acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence.
Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack
of evidence.
Espiritu v. Tankiansee, G.R. No. 164153,
13 June 2011
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Espiritu group and Tan Group filed a Petition for
Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of
Management and Control with RTC against
UOBP Group.
Tankiansee et al filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The intervenors filed a Notice to Take
Deposition. Initially denied by RTC, but then
granted.
Espiritu and Tan Groups filed with CA Pet Cert.
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
denying the petition for certiorari . It ruled that
the Espiritu and Tan Groups failed to adduce
evidence to establish that they filed the notice of
deposition within the period provided under
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies
ISSUE:
What is the proper remedy. Appeal
RULING:
Petitioners' appeal before the Court of Appeals
is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and the
certiorari petition, subject matter of this case,
constitutes forum shopping.
While this case was pending review before the
Court of Appeals or on February 2, 2004, the
trial court rendered a Decision in the main case
(i.e ., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From this
judgment, petitioners, except petitioner
Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice
of appeal.
This case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
83161 and is now pending resolution before the
appellate court. For its part, petitioner Westmont
Investment Corporation filed an Ex Abundanti Ad
Cautelam Notice of Appeal and a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus.
With these developments, the instant petition
should be denied because (1) petitioners' appeal
before the appellate court is the appropriate and
adequate remedy, and (2) the certiorari petition,
subject matter of this case, constitutes forum
shopping.
petitioners' certiorari petition, questioning the
three interlocutory orders which denied their
resort to discovery procedure, has been
superseded by the filing of their subsequent
appeal before the Court of Appeals (i.e. , CA-
G.R. CV No. 83161). As explained above, ac
ertiorari
petition may only be availed of if "there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." 23 We
find that petitioners' appeal from the February 2,
2004 Decision of the trial court in the main case
is the appropriate and adequate remedy in this
case as it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory
orders and the decision in the main case.
Moreover, petitioners' appeal and certiorari
petition effectively seek to annul the February 2,
2004 Decision of the trial court. In their pending
appeal before the appellate court, petitioners
argued, among others, that they were unduly
deprived of their right to avail of modes of
discovery, specifically, the deposition taking
subject matter of this case. 24 This is one of
their arguments in their appeal which prays for
the annulment of the February 2, 2004 Decision
on due process grounds. 25 On the other hand,
petitioners argued in their certiorari petition that
the disallowance of the taking of the subject
depositions deprived them of the opportunity to
bring to fore crucial evidence determinative of
this case. According to petitioners, this brought
about the erroneous February 2, 2004 Decision
issued by the trial court. 26 In fine, the appeal
and certiorari petition raise similar arguments
and effectively seek to achieve the same
purpose of annulling the February 2, 2004
Decision which petitioners perceive to be in
gross error.
Thus, as in Ley Construction & Development
Corporation, the certiorari petition must perforce
be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 223099,
11 January 2018
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was charged and found
guilty of rape. The order of the court was later
recalled due to misapprehension of facts and
mismatch of cases.
The accused-appellant filed a petcert alleging
that the RTC cannot recall the order since it has
already attained finality.
ISSUE:
Whether the pet cert is correct – Yes.
RULING:
We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine,
that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of
the accused against double jeopardy, thus:
Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order
for double jeopardy to attach. For double
jeopardy to attach, the following elements must
concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction of the
crime charged; (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case
was dismissed without his express consent.

Here, all the elements were present. There was
a valid information for two counts of rape over
which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the
accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was
thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25,
2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a
judgment of acquittal was rendered based on
the mistaken notion that the private complainant
failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up
of orders with a different case involving the
same
accused-appellant. This, however, does not
change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had
already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment
of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the
appellate court, is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation. 22
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not
without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there
has been deprivation of due process and where
there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances. We find that these
exceptions do not exist in this case.
Here, there was no deprivation of due process or
mistrial because the records show that the
prosecution was actually able to present their
case and their witnesses.
A mere manifestation also will not suffice in
assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should
have
been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its
nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary
review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy would be violated.
In this case, the acquittal was not even
questioned on the basis of grave abuse of
discretion. It was only through a supposed mere
manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which
was not in the records, that the RTC was
apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.
Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of
the fact that private complainant AAA testified
during the trial, only after it had already rendered
and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The
RTC then realized that had AAA's testimony
been taken into account, the case would have
had a
different outcome. Consequently, the RTC
issued an Order recalling the judgment of
acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error,
and thereafter,
rendered a Decision convicting the accused-
appellant for two counts of rape.
This, however, cannot be countenanced for a
contrary ruling would transgress the accused-
appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right
against double jeopardy.
Bureau of Customs v. Hon. Gallegos,
G.R. No. 220832, 28 February 2018
DOCTRINE:
Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the
tangible representation of the opportunity given
to the office to correct itself. The plain and
adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule
65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision, which in this case, is the RTC's
omnibus order. The purpose of the motion is to
enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes
without the intervention of a higher court. To
dispense with this requirement, there must be a
concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the
failure to comply with the requirement.
FACTS:
Align with the ASW Protocols, the Philippines
integrated a customs systems that will achieve a
paperless processing of customs transactions
while allowing traders a single submission of
data and information.
It was divided into Phase 1 and II. Phase 1 was
already conducted. While for Phase 2, the
consultant will be announced through a public
bidding.
The private respondent Omni Prime Marketing
and Intrasoft International were among the
bidders and awarded as the highest bidder.
The contract negotiation has already
commenced when the new Commissioner of
BOC requested for the discontinuance of the
procurement process alleging that she has the
power to do so pursuant to RA 9184 – when the
award of the contract will not redound to the
benefit of the govt.
Private respondent moved for MR of the Notice
of Cancellation but was denied. Hence, they filed
Pet Cert and Mandamus with RTC.
RTC granted TPO in favor of the private
respondents.
ISSUE:
whether Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos (respondent
Judge) gravely abused in his discretion when he
issued the omnibus order and the injunctive writ.
– No.
RULING:
I the requirement of MR before Pet Cert.
Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the
tangible representation of the opportunity given
to the office to correct itself.
Here, petitioners maintain that since the petition
raises purely questions of law, their failure to file
a motion for reconsideration is not fatal.
Except for this bare allegation, however,
petitioners failed to show sufficie justification for
dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion
for reconsideration. Indeed, "petitioners may not
arrogate to themselves the determination of
whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not."
II Doctrine of Heirarchy of Courts
Likewise, the direct filing of this petition in this
Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among
the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to issue
the writs of certiorari prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not
give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. Stated differently,
although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of
certiorari , direct resort is allowed only when
there are special, extraordinary or compelling
reasons that justify the same.
The Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases
and thus affor time for it to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. 31 Absent any
showing of any special, important or compelling
reason to justify the direct filing of the petition
will
cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this
case.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this
petition is procedurally infirm, and thus,
dismissible.
III Substantive Aspect
The authority to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law. Under
Section 21 34 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
(BP 129), 35 otherwise known as The Judiciary
Organization Act of 1980, the RTC had the
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari ,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of its respective region.
Contrary to petitioners' insistence, R.A. No. 8975
does not apply in this case because the
procurement of PNSW 2 is not considered as an
"infrastructure project" as defined under R.A. No.
8975
Likewise, private respondent correctly pointed
out that the nature of the procurement, subject of
the competitive bidding, is one involving a
"consulting service contract" for the PNSW 2
project of petitioner BOC, which is beyond the
contemplation of R.A. No. 8975.
The project includes design, implementation,
operation, maintenance, and consulting
services. In fact, even the RFEI issued by
petitioner DBM-PS classified the project merely
as "consulting services," indicating therein that
the said project will be governed by R.A. No.
9184 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).
IV respondent Judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion when he issued the injunctive writ
Measured against established rules and
jurisprudence, respondent Judge's disposition to
grant the writ was not without basis and, hence,
could not have been arrived at capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
To be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the
complainant, shows that he has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint."
Here, private respondent amply justified the
grant the provisional relief it prayed for before
the RTC.
First, private respondent as the declared highest
bidder, has a right under R.A. No. 9184 and its
IRR to be awarded the contract upon the BAC's
determination of its compliance with and
responsiveness to the terms and conditions in
the Bidding Documents.
Second , private respondent's right was violated
due to the issuance of the Director Syquia's May
7, 2015 Notice of Cancellation, based his
discretion to abandon the procurement of the
PNSW 2 project simply because he intends "to
conduct a thorough review of its details" such as
its terms of reference, and specifications, among
others. The Notice of Cancellation reveals that
there was no proof, except for Director Syquia's
bare statement, that the project is no longer
economically, financially or technically feasible.
Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.
Third , there is an urgent necessity to preserve
the status quo considering that the unjustified
cancellation would put to naught private
respondent's considerable resources, time and
efforts in order to hurdle the rigorous
requirements in the Bidding Documents. Aside
from this, the records show that the PNSW 2
project had long been overdue and our country
had been lagging behind in its commitment to
the ASEAN under the ASEAN Single Window
Agreement signed back in December 9, 2005.
To
further delay the Philippines' international
commitment by the mere expedient of arbitrarily
canceling the procurement of the said project
would create a deleterious effect in our
international relations with other ASEAN
members.
Therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the respondent Judge when he
issued the WPI.
CLASS NOTES:
Take note what is CTC attached in the Pet Cert
60th day is holiday. When do you file? Next
business day.
Difference of appeal/certiorari
Rtc renders order denying the motion. Challenge
the denial of the motion. The following day, there
is a hearing. If a pet cert was filed, the client
wont allow the hearing in the incidental case,
alleging that the Pet Cert will stop/interrupt.
Wrong: sec 7 says shall not interrupt
Rtc, issued resolution. challenged by CA.
Latin term –
As judge, you file order to comment. (Sec5,
unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court.)
Note: the cert ordered ALL respondents to file
order. Even public respondent didn’t comment.
GR: no order to comment in public respondent
XPN: unless otherwise
When filing Pet cert you need to certify such no
other pleadings.
When filing Pet cert you need verified.
Mtc judge issues resolution. you want to
challenge it. can you file pet cert with CA.
GR: No. doctrine of hierarchy of courts
XPN:
Essential requisite: GADALEJ
Sample of GADALEC
*Extention of 72hr TRO without hearing
*hearing of litigious motion were decided upon of
the same day.
*labor case- NLRC ruled in favor employee
without determining EER
Take note of the laws or rules prohibiting filing
MR before Pet Cert. eg Labor Arbiter

Rule 67 Expropriation
City of Manila v. Te, G.R. No. 169263,
Sept 2011,
DOCTRINE:
No Motion to Dismiss shall be filed.
FACTS:
The then Mayor Atienza approved the Ordinance
allowing the expropriation of the property
including the respondent’s property for the
purpose of low-cost housing.
The first Complaint, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss which the RTC dismissed .
On the 2nd Complaint, the respondent did not file
an answer but submitted his Motion to Dismiss.
RTC again dismissed the Complaint.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the property taken is for public
purpose – Yes.
2. Whether the Motion to Dismiss is proper
- No
RULING:
I. Public Use
The concept of socialized housing, whereby
housing units are distributed and/or sold to
qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms,
has already been included in the expanded
definition of "public use or purpose" in the
context of the State's exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
Urban renewal or development and the
construction of low-cost housing are recognized
as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also
because of specific provisions in the
Constitution.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum, the general
welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but
only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it
is not possible to provide housing for all who
need it, all at once.
II. Expropriation Proceedings
Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding:
first, the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts which
terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of
condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful right
to take the property for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint and
second, the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated.
The Rules provide where the defendant in an
expropriation case conceded to the plaintiff's
right to expropriate (or where the trial court
affirms the existence of such right), the court-
appointed commissioners would then proceed to
determine the just compensation to be paid.
The Supreme Court, in its en banc Resolution in
Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, has
provided that the revisions made in the Rules of
Court were to take effect on July 1, 1997. Thus,
with said amendments, the present state of Rule
67 dispenses with the filing of an
extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that
required before in response to a complaint for
expropriation. The present rule requires the
filing of an answer as responsive pleading to
the complaint.
III What does the defendant need to do:
The defendant in an expropriation case who has
objections to the taking of his property is now
required to file an answer and in it raise all his
available defenses against the allegations in the
complaint for eminent domain. While the answer
is bound by the omnibus motion rule under
Section 8, Rule 15, much leeway is nevertheless
afforded to the defendant because
amendments may be made in the answer
within 10 days from its filing. Also, failure to
file the answer does not produce all the
disastrous consequences of default in ordinary
civil actions, because the defendant may still
present evidence on just compensation.
At the inception of the case at bar with the filing
of the complaint on November 16, 2000, the
amended provisions of Rule 67 have already
been long in force.
Thus, the trial court in this case should have
denied respondent's motion to dismiss and
required her to submit in its stead an answer
within the reglementary period. This, because
whether petitioner has observed the provisions
of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 before
resorting to expropriation, and whether
respondent owns other properties than the one
sought to be expropriated, and whether she is
actually a small property owner beyond the
reach of petitioner's eminent domain powers, are
indeed issues in the nature of affirmative
defenses which require the presentation of
evidence aliunde. Besides, Section 1, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court does not consider these
matters grounds for a motion to dismiss, and an
action can be dismissed only on the grounds
authorized by this provision.
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 147245, 31
March 2005
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
the National Irrigation Administration ("NIA")
bulldozed about ten (10) hectares of the
Property to build two irrigation canals ("canals").
Although
the canals when finished occupied only a portion
of the 10 hectares, the entire area became
prone to flooding two months out of every year
because of the side-burrow method NIA used in
the construction of the canals. NIA completed
the canals without instituting expropriation
proceedings or indemnifying the Property's
owners.
Respondent sought compensation from NIA for
the land affected by the canals, as well as for
losses due to unrealized profits. He submitted
various documents requested by NIA officials
and even traveled to NIA's Manila office to
present his claims.
In 1980, NIA belatedly offered to buy the
portions of the Property occupied by the canals
pursuant to NIA's expansion program.
Respondent and then NIA Acting Administrator
Pelagio Gamad, Jr. signed three deeds of sales
For reasons that neither party has adequately
explained, NIA and respondent did not push
through with the sale. The 1980 deeds of sale
were never implemented. Respondent did not
receive any consideration pursuant to these
deeds.
respondent, as administrator of the Property,
filed an action for damages and just
compensation against NIA. Respondent sought
P10 million from NIA as just compensation, P3
million as unrealized profits or lucro cessante ,
P1 million attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
RTC: in favor of the defendant
1 NIA contends that it was deprived of due
process when the trial court determined the
compensation due to respondent without the
assistance of commissioners. NIA refers to the
procedure found in Section 5, Rule 67 of the
1964 Rules of Court applicable at the time
ISSUE:
1. Whether this Case Should be
Remanded to the Trial Court for the
Appointment of Commissioners – No
2. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in
Affirming the Trial Court's Award of P4
Million - No
RULING:
I NIA never filed an expropriation proceedings.
Rule 67, however, presupposes that NIA
exercised its right of eminent domain by filing a
complaint for that purpose before the
appropriate court.
Judicial determination of the propriety of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain and
the just compensation for the subject
property then follows. The proceedings give
the property owner the chance to object to the
taking of his property and to present evidence on
its value and on the consequential damage to
other parts of his property.
Respondent was not given these opportunities,
as NIA did not observe the procedure in Rule 67.
Worse, NIA refused to pay respondent just
compensation.
The seizure of one's property without payment,
even though intended for public use, is a taking
without due process of law and a denial of
the equal protection of the laws. NIA, not
respondent, transgressed the requirements of
due process.
When a government agency itself violates
procedural requirements, it waives the usual
procedure prescribed in Rule 67.
Like in NPC , the present case is not an action
for expropriation. NIA never filed expropriation
proceedings although it had ample
opportunity to do so.
Respondent's complaint is an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of possession of the
Property or its value, and damages. Under
these circumstances, a trial before
commissioners is not necessary.
The records show that NIA had every
opportunity to argue its case before the trial
court. NIA presented a witness, cross-examined
respondent's witnesses, and submitted
documentary evidence. NIA's officers even went
with respondent on an ocular inspection of the
Property. The trial court took into account the
inspection in arriving at its decision. However,
NIA never raised the appointment of
commissioners as an issue before the trial court.
Though NIA actively participated in the
proceedings below, it did not move for the
appointment of commissioners or object to their
absence at any time. A party cannot raise for the
first time on appeal an issue not raised in the
trial court. 32 NIA is thus estopped from
belatedly protesting the lack of commissioners.
II Remedies of the owner:
 The owner may recover his property if
its return is feasible, or,
 if it is not, the aggrieved owner may
demand payment of just compensation
for the land taken.
The lower courts likewise erred in awarding P4
Million to respondent.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, . . . fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government." 40 This rule
holds true when the property is taken before the
filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the
property owner who brings the action for
compensation.
Just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount due to the property
owner but also payment to him of the amount
due within a reasonable time from the taking.
Respondent is certainly entitled to legal interest
and damages by reason of NIA's inexcusable
delay.
II.1 Respondent is thus entitled to just
compensation for the 22,073 square meter
Canal Sites at 81.39 per square meter, with legal
interest from the time of the taking of the Canal
Sites in 1972 until the amount due is fully paid.
In line with current jurisprudence, we set the
legal interest at 12% per annum order to
eliminate the usual issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of currency
over time.
II.2
The remaining 74,582 square meters
("surrounding land") encircling the Canal Sites is
another matter. NIA took the surrounding land
when NIA bulldozed the area and rendered it
useless for the planting of palay for several
years. Taking occurs not only when the
government actually deprives or dispossesses
the property owner of his property or of its
ordinary use, but also when there is a practical
destruction or material impairment of the value
of his property.
NIA never filed proceedings to expropriate
the surrounding land, nor did it exhibit intent,
or attempt, to purchase it. The 1980 deeds of
sale referred only to the 22,073 square meters
comprising the Canal Sites. There is no showing
that the surrounding land served, or continues to
serve, some public purpose.
In awarding compensation for the surrounding
land affected by NIA's construction activities in
1972, however, the lower courts overlooked
respondent's prayer for recovery of possession.
As we pointed out earlier, possession of the
unpaid property may be returned to the
aggrieved landowner if the circumstances permit
it.
In this case, the return to respondent of a
substantial portion of his Property, specifically,
the 74,582 square meters surrounding the Canal MTC
Sites, is indeed feasible. Petitioner may be any The petitioner is the
voter if he is not person claiming to be
*Side note: entitled to the office entitled to the office.
No need to implead the lower court in appealing Where the person The court determines
in SC. elected is ineligible, who is legally
the court cannot appointed, and can
declare that and ought to declare
candidate occupying the person entitled to
the second place as occupy the office.
elected, even if he
were eligible, since
the law only
authorizes a
Class notes: declaration of
election in favor of
Check of authority the person obtaining
Just compensant the plurality of votes.

QW distinguished from election protest

Writ of possession can be issued despite the
case is still pending – RA for DPWH
The court has final discretion on the just
compensation, not law.
RD where land titles are registered for filing after
winning.
GR: the proper remedy after the proclamation of
the winning candidate for the position contested
would be to file a regular election protest or quo
warranto.
However, a quo warranto petition in an election
of public officials, should not be confused with
an election protest. The cause of action in the
first is the eligibility of the candidate or lack of it,
or his being disloyal to the Republic. The cause
of action in an election protest is the irregularity
in the conduct of the elections.

Take note:
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO Dick Gordon – senator while holding position in
Red Cross
Difference of QW in elective office vv
appointive office.
elective appointive
Governing law is the Rules govern are the
Election Law provisions of the
ROC
The issue is the Legality or illegality of
eligibility or the occupancy of the
ineligibility of the office by virtue of an
person elected or his appointment
loyalty or disloyalty to
the Republic
Petition is filed within Filed within 1 yr from
10 days after the the time the cause of
proclamation of the ouster or right of the
results of the election petitioner to hold the
office or position
arose
Brought in the Brought in the SC,
Comelec, RTC or CA or RTC