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HASCOL Scandal - Ethics Project
HASCOL Scandal - Ethics Project
hip (KSBL)
2022
HASCOL FINANCIAL Scandal
1. Hascol Company
The company was listed at PSX in 2014. Its share price increased manifold
within a couple of years – investors were ecstatic. In 2015, Vitol Dubai
Limited (VTL) – a global energy trading giant – bought 15 percent shares
of the company and later increased its holding to 25 percent by 2016. The
company's financials flourished with Vitol on Board. This integrated the
backend supply chain. Everyone was happy and making money.
The dramatic rise was too good to be true. Yet, the Board of directors was
happy – as the company was making money. The banks were happy to
lend as bank spreads were too lucrative.
In its initial years, Hascol made money by importing and selling furnace oil
(FO). FO sales jumped further after Vitol's investment. It purchased FO on
credit and was able to extend credit to its clients. That is how it increased
its market share and used that money to expand its franchises and storage
capacity.
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Hascol
Scandal
Throughout its existence, the company has always managed to increase
revenues. It saw a revenue increase from Rs 10.3 billion in 2009 to Rs 274
billion in 2018, with only a slight dip in 2015. Indeed, between 2010 and
2018, the company saw its revenues climb at an astonishing average of
52.7% per year.
The Covid pandemic did not help either. In June 2020, all OMCs were under
stress when the international oil prices fell, and the government passed
on the benefit to consumers while companies were holding inventories
(as sales were low in April and May due to the lockdown), and they
incurred inventory losses.
The fall was too steep for Hascol. Their high-cost overheads were
becoming visible. The higher throughput charges and substantial
unsecured credit aggravate their situation. There was no cushion from FO
sales. The hour of reckoning was upon it. The company defaulted on its
loans and has not published its latest accounts – thus on the defaulter's
list on PSX.
The year 2020 has been full of controversies for Hascol. For instance, in
October 2020, the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) suspended its
marketing and distribution license in KPK. Hascol had been operating
illegal and unauthorized storage and selling of petroleum products (petrol
and diesel) at Amangarh Depot, despite OGRA's clear directives for the
stoppage of operation of Amangarh Depot.
But perhaps most importantly, the company took a whopping Rs7.6 billion
impairments against receivables and revealed hardly any details on who
the counterparties were.
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Hascol
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3. The Scandal
The total default of 14 banks was Rs54 billion. The default of the NBP was
Rs18 billion alone. FIA inquiry substantiated the following illegalities and
infractions committed by the sponsoring directors and officers of HPL in
collaboration with the then-sanctioning, implementing and monitoring
officers of the NBP. HPL's first significant borrowing relationship was
initiated with the Summit Bank in 2009, which remained its main banker
until the entry of the NBP.
NBP granted its first facility of Rs2 billion to HPL on June 16, 2014, in
response to HPL's request. As if these rapid enhancements were not
enough, the NBP further enhanced its LC facility on October 8, 2018, by
another Rs18 billion and increased the NBP's total sanctioned limits to
Rs21.65 billion.
NBP opened fake LCs to the tune of Rs95 billion for Hascol in favor of Byco
Petroleum. No fuel was underlying for this quantum of LC, and these were
opened only to increase the liquidity in Hascol. Other banks, including the
NBP, opened non-product LCs to Rs540 billion for Hascol. Hascol and Vitol,
through over-invoicing, transferred $42 million illegally outside Pakistan.
Insiders suggest several methodologies were used. They insist that higher
FO margins partly financed credit sales; by selling fuel close to port while
booking sales at far-flung areas to pocket inland freight equalization
margin (IFEM).
The company was opening usance(deferred payment) LC (letter of credit).
OMC business needs higher working capital (WC) financing, which is
extended to LCs. It is a high-margin business, and banks were happy to
lend and make easy money.
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Hascol
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Hascol, in talks with banks, offered to partially convert debt into equity
and restructure all of the company's short-term debt into long-term
facilities. The banks seem to have no choice but to play ball.
Auditors Resign
Most unusually, the company's auditors, EY Ford Rhodes, resigned as co-
auditors. It is always a cause of concern when an auditor resigns –
particularly when it is one of the 'big four' firms: Deloitte, PwC, Ernst &
Young, and KPMG.
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Hascol
Scandal
unwilling to disclose why the auditor resigned, despite multiple attempts
at contact.
Change Management
So much for that. 2020 has been a series of revolving doors for major
management members. First, let us look at the CEOs. On February 19, *-
+2020, Saleem Butt resigned, citing personal reasons. On February 24,
Waheed Ahmed Shaikh was appointed CEO. Shortly afterward, on April 2,
Aqeel Ahmed was appointed as CEO. On September 17, he was
reappointed as CEO. On September 22, just a few days later, he resigned
as the CEO of Hascol Lubricants, a subsidiary, and Adeeb Ahmed was made
the CEO instead.
Now, for the CFO (an important job, considering the state of the
company's financials. On February 19, Khurram Shehzad ceased to be CFO,
and Muhammad Ali took his place. On July 17, the two CFOs were swapped
out (Khurram became CFO again). Then on September 10, Shahid Bhutto
became CFO before resigning from that position on January 22. The
position is yet to be filled.
And finally, the chairman. On March 31, Mumtaz Khan was replaced with
Alan Duncan. He has the most colorful past lives of all the people
mentioned so far: he was a director of Vitol Dubai Ltd., the parent
company.
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Vitol started taking more control of the company by acquiring shares of
the then chairman and CEO and brought in new management that
disclosed to banks that the company's loans must be restructured if the
default was to be avoided.
The consortium of banks is negotiating with the new management. Banks
need to understand that they have to take a haircut. They will live in a
fool's paradise if they expect a full recovery. The other problem with banks
is that each tries to undercut the other by insisting that it has the first
charge. Each bank wants to recover its full amount, but in the process,
everyone would lose. It has happened in the past, and it can happen now.
In game theory, it is referred to as the prisoner's dilemma.
The other problem is that banks have to trust Vitol. The company must
restructure. Banks will convert part of their debt into equity and part of it
into long-term financing. Then the company would need working capital
to revive. For this to happen, banks would need to put more money into
the company. They are contemplating putting good money into bad in
anticipation of turning bad into good.
HPL used to siphon off funds through mediators to bribe their bankers. In
just one such instance, cheques for Rs117 million were issued by HPL to
Tahir Ali and his several companies without any underlying contract(s).
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NBP credit heads Reema Athar and Irtiza Kazmi were the key players in
maintaining credit lines for HPL; Reema Athar remained a director in
Clover Pvt Ltd, a company owned by Saleem Butt, and also remained a
director on the Board of Fossils Energy, a subsidiary of Saleem Butt (CEO
of HPL).
Two NPB presidents, Syed Iqbal Ahmed Ashraf and Saeed Ahmed, have
prima facie abused their official position as public servants while
sanctioning through their credit committees the above huge financial
facilities to the HPL.
7. Literature Review:
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A business organization that embraces ethical ways of conducting its
business affairs is more likely to achieve employees' commitment, loyalty,
and satisfaction which in turn lead to quality of work and increased
performance and this can happen Vice versa as well if the company
doesn’t value ethics in general or indulges in unethical business practices.
The company had its assets frozen by the High Court of Sindh upon the
request of the company's creditors. In addition, the company also lost its
good fill and trust among internal and external stakeholders. Hascol
denied all allegations and accepted resign for its external auditor.
The company has resumed its operations but its goodwill and trust have
been badly hampered. It has become a high-risk investment option. Hascol
Petroleum Ltd real-time share price is equal to 6.800 PKR at 2022-12-20,
but the current investment may be devalued further in the future.
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