Mind Association

Wittgenstein's Theory of Universals

Author(s): Richard I. Aaron
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 74, No. 294 (Apr., 1965), pp. 249-251
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252051
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 WITTGENSTEIN'STHEORY OF UNIVERSALS
MR. RENFORD BAMBROUGH contributes an interesting article, en-
titled 'Universals and Family Resemblances', to the Proceedings
of the AristotelianSociety,1960-61,pp. 207-222,in which he discusses
Wittgenstein'scontributionto the problemof universals. He holds
that Wittgenstein solved this problem once and for all, that the
solution is implied in what he says about family resemblances,but
that his argumentis not set out in the traditional language and so
its full significanceis apt to be missed. These are importantclaims.
Bambroughtakes as his text two-well known passages from the
Blue Book (pp. 17-18) and Philosophical Investigations(??66-67)
respectively, in which Wittgenstein speaks of family resemblances.
In the former passage Wittgenstein deplores' the tendency to look
for something in common to all the entities which we commonly
subsume under a general term'. For instance, is there anything
commonto all the differentproceedingsthat we call ' games' ? If
we look at the various games 'we see a complicated network of
similaritiesoverlappingand criss-crossing; sometimesoverall simi-
larities, sometimessimilaritiesof detail'. We do not see a common
feature. Freq4uently,all we can find is an ' overall similarity'.
This is just like a family resemblance,'for the variousresemblances
between the members of a family; build, features, colour of eyes,
gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-crossin the same
way'. There may be no observed, detailed point of similarity,
but there is overall similarity, Bambrough puts the point more
formally. In five instances which are grouped together because of
their overall similaritytheir features may be a b c d, a b c e, a b d e,
a c d e and b c d e. In these instances no feature common to the
five is observedand yet, as everyonewill recognise,there is sufficient
overall similarity for us to group them. There may well be, too,
considerablyless detailed similarity than this, and yet we recognise
the family resemblance. ' In fact it now becomes clear', says Mr.
Bambrough,'that there is a good sense in which no two members
of the Churchillfamily need have any feature in common in order
for all the members of the Churchillfamily to have the Churchill
face' (p. 211).
Mr: Bambroughthinks that the two passagesmentioned ' contain
the essence of Wittgenstein's solution of the problem of universals'
(p. 211). He emphasises that they do not exhaust Wittgenstein's
account of the topic, but they give the essence of his solution, and
for the purposesof this note I shall take this to be so. The theory
set out in them, Bambroughcontends, ' can be related to the tradi-
tional theories and . . . then . . . shown to deserve to supersede
the traditionaltheories' (p. 212).
The essence of the solution lies in the doctrine of family resem-
blances. Instances of family resemblances may have no feature
or featuresobservedto be commonand yet they are seen to resemble
249
250 R. I. AARON:

one another. Theoristsmay admit this, but whenthey do they think

they have admitted something queer and irregular. The concepts
thus engenderedare ' rogues and vagabonds in the realm of con-
cepts, to be contrastedwith the generalrun of law-abidingconcepts
which do mark the presenceof commonelements in their instances'
(p. 215). Now Wittgenstein does away with this contrast. The
presence or absence of common elements is not the essential point.
Are the instances observedto have a family resemblance? If they
are they can be 'subsumed under a generalterm', and it does not
matter whether they have, or have not, elements in common. The
realist is wrong in insisting on commonfeatures. What is common
to games is just that they are games. The nominalist is wrong in
claiming that the name is what is common. For games are
games and not merely calledgames. The correcttheory shows how,
on the basis of observationsof either detailed or overallresemblance,
instances can (or cannot) be 'subsumed under a generalterm'.
This, if I am right, is Mr. Bambrough'smain point, but I would
refer the readerdirectly to his paper, which is brief and very clearly
argued,and with much of which I am in completeagreement. What
surprisesme, however, is that Mr. Bambroughshould think this a
novel solution of the problem of universals. Surely this is a re-
statement of the Resemblance Theory. We observe resemblances
between objects, persons,situations and events, and on the strength
of such observationsgroupthem together and ' subsumethem under
a general term'. Wittgenstein's theory as here set forth is a form
of the Pesemblance Theory.
It is, I should agree, a fresh and novel statement of that theory,
though it happens that when I first heard of it it did not seem
wholly novel to me then, largely because there is a like theory in
ProfessorPrice's Perception. I do not know which of these doctrines
came first. They are not used in precisely the same way but the
theories of universalsimplicit in them are very much alike. They
are connectedin my mind, too, with earlierdiscussionsin the twen-
ties about the relation between universals and generic images and
such topics.
Moreimportant than the question of novelty in this sense, how-
ever, is the other questionwhetherthis new statement of the Resem-
blance Theory put forward so forcibly by Wittgenstein alters that
theory in essentials. Does it do so, for instance, in respect to the
point which Bambroughthinks all-important,that entities may be
observedto resembleone another even though no commonelements
are observed, and that observingthe common elementis not, there-
fore, the essential basis of ' subsumption' ? I do not think it does.
For, emphatically, supporters of the Resemblance Theory would
readily have acknowledgedthat the resemblance observed might
have been 'overall ' ratherthan ' detailed '. Thingsmight be seen
to resembleone another, or persons, or, again, situations and occur-
rences,and they might be seen to resembleone anothereven though
 WITTGENSTEIN S THEORY OF UNIVERSALS 251

detailed resemblancescould not be picked out. It was never the

purpose of the Resemblance Theory to argue that the observation
of resemblingfeatures alone guides us in grouping. The point
stressedin the family resemblancetheory was presentin the Resem-
balance Theory; admittedly, it was not so forciblybrought out.
As to validity, there remains the whole question of whether we
can accept the Resemblance Theory in this or any form. Before
Mr. Bambrough can convince us that Wittgenstein finally solved
the problemof universalshe must show that all the objectionshave
been met. There are standard criticisms of the Resemblance
Theory. At the end of his paper Mi. Bambroughrefers to one of
them (applicable, in his view, only to the 'nominalist' theory),
namely, that resemblance is unintelligible except as resemblance
in a respect. He clearly does not think this criticism applicableto
the theory implicit in Wittgenstein, but I do not know whether we
can agreewith him on this point. In any case there are far weightier
argumentsthan this against the ResemblanceTheory, and not one
of these has been consideredby Mr. Bambrough.

UniversityCollegeof Wales RICHARD I. AARON

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