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Neri v. Senate Case Disgest
Neri v. Senate Case Disgest
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is
material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid
justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to
order petitioner's arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
“The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under
the separation of powers, by which the court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondence, and discussions in closed-door cabinet meetings”.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, the Court is convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege:
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the doctrine of operational proximity aims to limit the scope of the presidential
communication privilege. The U.S. Court stated that not every person who plays a role in the
development of presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed from the President, can
qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White
House in executive branch agencies. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege
"to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is
absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the
term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
"Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information."
“The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field
of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.” (PMPF
v. Manglapus)
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, the failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need
for the information sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the
accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident. Due to the failure of the respondent
Committees to successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of
presidential communication stands.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not prevent respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
matters that are covered by executive privilege.