Soriano vs Galit, G. R. No.

156295, September 23, 2002

Facts:
 Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo Soriano.
 It is evidence by 4 promissory note payable on different date, Loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage, However, respondent failed to pay, which causes the petitioner to file a
complaint in RTC
 RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the respondent to pay the former.
 The judgement became final and executory and court issued a writ of execution to several
properties of the respondents
o The Certificate of Sale of Execution of Real Property was issued to the petitioner
o The petitioner is the winning highest bidder
o Trial Court issues a writ of possession
 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
o Respondent is questioning the inclusion a certain parcel of land among the list of real
properties in the writ of possession but was not among those sold on execution by
Deputy Sherriff as reflected in the
 CA reversed the decision and declared, that the inclusion of certain parcel of land among the
list of properties in the writ of possession ,is null and void
o Ordered the petitioner and Deputy Sheriff to return the property to respondents

Issue:
 Whether or not the questioned writ of possession is in fact a nullity considering that it includes
property not expressly mentioned in the Certificate of Sale of Real Property
 Whether or not the building can be mortgage apart from the land on which it has been built

Held:
 SC affirmed the decision of the CA
 SC held that the Writ of Possession is null and void
o Appellate court correctly observed that there was a marked difference in the
appearance of the typewrittenwords appearing on the first page of the copy of the
Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds and those appearing at the
dorsal portion thereof.
 The argument that the land on which the buildings levied upon in execution is necessarily
included is incorrect
o According to Article 415 of the Civil Code
 The following are immovable property
 1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil
o While it is true that a mortage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings,
 Still a building by itself may be mortgage apart from the land on which it has
been built. Such
  In this case, what was sold by writ of execution is the STOREHOUSE and BODEGA
constructed on the parcel of land, the building should be regarded as separate and distinct
from the lot on which it stands.

Serg’s Product, Inc. vs PCI Leasing, G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000;

FACTS:
 Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc filed a complaint for a sum of money and an
application for writ of replevin against the petitioner
 JUDGE issued writ of replevin and directed its Sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to the respondent.
 Sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory and seized one machinery and told them that he would
return for the other machines
 Petitioner, on their answer, filed a MOTION FOR SPECIAL PROECTIVE ORDER, invoking
that the court should direct the sheriff to defer from enforcing the writ of repleving
o Invoking that writ of replevin is not applicable since the properties had become a real
property, hence, not subject to such writ.
o Petitioner asserts that the properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in
ARTICLE 415 of the Civil Code.
 That the machines were essential and principal elements of their chocolate
making industry
 Machines become immobilized by detination because they are essential and
principal elements of industry
 Respondent opposed the motion on the grounds that the properties were still personal and
therefore still subject to seizure and writ of replevin.
o The sheriff sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining
properties, however, prevented by the workers from taking.
 Hence, they appeal to CA
o CA agreed with the petitioner citing the agreement of both parties that the machines
were to be treated as personal properties, and that they had only been LEASED, not
owned by petitioners. Rules of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true
intention of the contracting parties

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the machineries purchase and imported by SERG’S became real property by
virtue of immobilization

HELD:
 SC affirmed the CA’s decision
 SC disagreed with the petitioners statement that the machines are not proper subjects of Writ
of Seizure
 As the Court held, contracting parties may VALIDLY STIPULATE that a real property be
considered as personal.
o After the agreement, the parties are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
 o Also, there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected with
the agreement, which is one of the requirement of such agreement

Navarro vs Pineda, G.R. No. L-18456, November 30, 1963.

FACTS:
 Defendants Rufino Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales borrowed from plaintiff Conrado P.
Navarro the sum of P2500 payable in 6 months.
o To secure the debt, Rufino exeuted a real estate mortgage and a chattel mortgage.
Real estate mortgage of a parcel of land belonging to his mother and a chattel
mortgage or a two-story residential house and one motor truck under his name.
 Defendants failed to pay the obligation that became due and demandable.
 Plaintiff filed foreclosure of the mortgage and for damages
 Trial Court decided in favor of the plaintiff
o Ordered to pay the principal sum with compound interest
o Ordered the defendants to deliver immediately to the provincial Sheriff the properties
mentioned in the agreement
 The defendants appealed
o They contend that the lower court committed an error, in holding that the deed of real
estate and chattel mortgages appended to the complaint is valid.
 The house of the defendant Rufino was made the subject of the chattel mortgage
 Erected on a land that belongs to a third person
 That the house is a real property and not a personal property

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the real estate and chattel mortgages is invalid

HELD:
 SC affirmed the decision of the lower court
 It has been held that the parties expressly agreed in the mortgage to consider the house a
chattel “for its smallness and mixed materials of sawali and wood”
o Because of this, the parties are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
 It became a personal property because of the intention of the parties
 In the case at bar, the house in question was treated as personal or movable property by the
parties to the contract themselves.
 The mortgagor himself grouped the house with the truck , which is, inherently a movable
property.

Laurel vs Abrogar, G. R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006.

FACTS:
  PLDT alleges that there is a network fraud committed by BAYNET using alternative calling
patter who violate its network integrity, which is known as ISR.
 voltage regulators.
 PLDT filed a complaint in RTC for the network fraud caused by BAYNET. RTC issued search
warrant and the NBI agents operated the office of BAYNET and arrested its officers. Also the
numerous equipment used for the network fraud were seized such as modems, computers
monitors, CPUS’s, cable wires, etc.
 In an inquest investigation, State prosecutor find probable cause for theft under Art 308 of
RPC. Information was filed by State prosecutor with the crime of theft against the officers of
BAYNET
 RTC decided that BAYNET is guilty of the crime of theft for unlawfully taking the personal
property of PLDT
 Accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations do not constitute crime
under theft under Art 308 RPC. RPC and any special law does not prohibit ISR operations.
The caller merely uses the facilities of PLDT. PLDT is compensated for the caller’s use of its
facilities by way of rental. Thus, no personal property was stolen from PLDT.
 PLDT opposed the motion for the accused unlawfully took personal property belonging to it
such as 1) intangible telephone services offered by PLDT; 2) use of facilities over a period of
time 3)revenues derived in connection with the rendition of such service and use of facilities
o Prosecution asserted that PLDT’s intangible telephone service/facilities allows
electronic voice signal to pass through the same, and to the other party’s number. Such
service is akin to electricity, which, although an intangible property, may nevertheless,
be appropriated and subject for theft. The service of PLDT is also akin to merchandise
which has specific value and capable of appropriatan and subject of theft
o Prosecution also states that business calls and revenues constitute personal property
 RTC issued a resolution denying the motion to quash
 BAYNET filed a motion for reconsideration
o Long distance calls are not personal property and not capable of appropriation
o Prosecution failed to provide proof that PLDT’s personal property was subsequently
loss
 RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
o PLDT, because of ISR, was denied of international long distance fee
o Akin to jumper for stealing electricity

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the international telephone calls by BAYNET using ISR through the
telecommunication services by PLDT are proper subject of theft under ART 308

HELD:
 SC ruled in favor of the petitioner
 The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or material existence
and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of theft.
 SC held that the international telephone calls placed by BAYNET using PLDT services are not
“personal properties under ART 308 of RPC
o It is contrary to the intention of the law
 SC agrees with the respondents that personal properties such as electrical energy and gas are
proper subject of thefts
o Gas and electricity are capable of appropriation
 May be taken away and appropriated
 Valuable article of merchandise
  However, theft, under Art 308, as taking of personal property without the consent of the owner,
could not have contemplated the human voice which is converted into electronic impulses and
transmitted into the network.
o PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the
telephone callers or the electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls.
o Human voice are not susceptible of possession
o PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals

Heirs of Malabanan vs De Castro, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009;

Facts: The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that
the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

 OSG appealed to the judgement of CA arguing that MALABANAN failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of public domain
o RTC erred in finding that the he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for length of time required by the law for imperfect title
 CA reverse the decision
o CENRO-DENR – could not be used for computing Malabanan’s possession of
the property
 Petitioners argue that the property had been converted to a private property by open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
o Converted by prescription of time. They held it for 30 years
Issues:
 Whether or not the petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the subject
land had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted
Ruling:
 SC denied the petition
 the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
 Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
 Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
  Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

MIAA vs CA, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

Facts:
 Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order
No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International
Airport Authority ("MIAA Charter"). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July
1983 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 9091
and 2982 amended the MIAA Charter.
 As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA
approximately 600 hectares of land, 3 including the runways and buildings ("Airport
Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation.

The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall
be disposed of through sale or any other mode
 unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
 On 21 March 1997, the Ofice of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued
Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew
the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real
estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
Issues:
 Whether or not the the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are owned by the State and are
exempted from real estate tax
Ruling:
 SC ruled that MIAA’s airport land and buildings are owned by the State and therefore
exempted from real estate tax
 The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and
thus are properties of public dominion.
o Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very
least intended for public service.
o Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings
are properties of public dominion.
o As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by
the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the
Local Government Code.
Chavez vs PEA and AMARI, G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FACTS:

 The Government through Commission on Public Highways, signed a contract to CDCP -

Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore of MANILA BAY
 President Ferdinand Marcos issued an order creating Public Estates Authority as the central
implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide.
 It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
o PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands.
o PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
AMARI.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:
 No.
 To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs CBAA, G.R. No. 178030, December 15, 2010
Facts:
 The records show that the Lucena Fishing Port Complex (LFPC) is one of the
fishery infrastructure projects undertaken by the National Government under the
Nationwide Fish Port-Package.
 The fish port that was constructed on a reclaimed land with an area of 8.7 hectares
more or less, at a total cost of PHP 296,764,618.77 financed through a loan (L/A
PH-25 and 51) from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan,
dated November 9, 1978 and May 31, 1978, respectively.
 The Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) was created by virtue of
P.D. 977 as amended by E.O. 772, with functions and powers to (m)anage,
operate, and develop the Navotas Fishing Port Complex and such other fishing port
complexes that may be established by the Authority. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner-
Appellant PFDA took over the management and operation of LFPC in February 1992.
  In a letter addressed to PFDA, the City Government of Lucena demanded payment
of realty taxes on the LFPC property for the period from 1993 to 1999 in the total
amount of P39,397,880.00.
 another demand letter was sent by the Government of Lucena City on the same LFPC
property, this time in the amount of P45,660,080.00 covering the period from 1993 to
2000.

Issues:
 Whether or not PFDA is liable for the real property tax assessed on the Lucena Fishing
Port Complex.
Ruling:
 SC grant the petition
 The Lucena Fishing Port Complex, which is one of the major infrastructure projects
undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide Fishing Ports
Package, is devoted for public use and falls within the term "ports."
 The Lucena Fishing Port Complex "serves as PFDA’s commitment to continuously
provide post-harvest infrastructure support to the fishing industry, especially in
areas where productivity among the various players in the fishing industry need to be
enhanced."
o As property of public dominion, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is owned by
the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

Villarico vs Sarmiento, G. R. No. 136439, November 4 2004

Facts:
 Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot which was separated from the (highway) by
a strip of land belonging to the government.
o As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining
areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways
at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to
the highway.
 Vivencio Sarmiento, the respondent, had a building constructed on a portion of said
government land.
o A part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson Corporation and Marites’ Carinderia,
also impleaded as respondents.
 Thereafter,by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30
square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered
in Registry of Deeds
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, a complaint for accion publiciana
against respondents.
o He alleged inter alia that respondents’ structures on the government land closed his
"right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot
covered
Issues:
 Whether or not the respondents have the right to the portion of land belonging to the
government
Ruling:
 SC denied the petition
 Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (
o 1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts;
o (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State;
o (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and
o (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
 Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public
dominion
o Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot claim any right of
possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code.
 In this case, SC held that the, Trial Court and CA mistakenly ruled that respondents
have better right of possession over the subject lot
o neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot
where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs against
petitioner

Republic vs Tan, G. R. No. 199537, February 10, 2016

Facts:
 the respondent ,Tan, applied for the original registration of title of Lot.
o She alleged that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter
parcel of residential land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September
17, 1992.
 After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an
order of general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor
General.
o The land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court confirmed her title over
the subject lot and ordered its registration.
 The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of her application.
 CA denied the appeal and observed that the under Public Land Act, there are 2 kinds of
applicants
o Those who possessed land since June 12, 1945
o Those who already acquired the property through prescription
 RESPONENDT’s application fell under the second category
o CA pointed to the certification issued by CENRO –Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office
 Evidence that the land is classified as alienable and disposable
o CA concluded that TAN already acquired the lot through prescription

Issues:
 Whether or not a declaration of the Government that the land has become alienable and
disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the STATE, making it susceptible
to acquisitive prescription

Ruling:
 SC find the petition meritorious
  While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in
an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not
suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. Before prescription can even
begin to run against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into
patrimonial property:
o 1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;
o 2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;26
o 3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no
longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.
 Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and
peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
 In the present case, the third condition is absent.
o Even though it has been declared alienable and disposable, the property has not been
withdrawn from public use or public service.
o Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been
converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of
man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce
any legal effect.
o In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of the
property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into
ownership.

DENR vs Yap, G. R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008 (BORACAY/SC, NO, not classified)

FACTS:
 This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes.
 (On Nov. 10, 1978,) President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island
as a tourist zone and marine reserve.
o Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
o respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition.

ISSUE:
 Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
 SC ruled in favor of DENR
 There is no proof that the land was classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
 To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
 A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
 All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

Pagkatipunan vs CA, G.R. No. 129682. March 21, 2002.

FACTS:

 Petition for review, nullifying the decision of the CFI which confirmed petitioners’ title over the
subject lots. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of CA.
 Spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires filed in CFI an application for judicial
confirmation and registration of their titlenêt
 CFI promulgated a decision confirming the petitioners title to the property and was issued an OCT
to their name
 Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed
with After 18 years, Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Intermediate Appealate Court an
action to declare the title of petitioner null and void and to cancel their OCT. This is on the ground
that the subject land was part of the public domain.
 The subject land was classified as timberland hence inalienable and not subject to registration
 Petitioners, on the other hand, raised the defense of lapse of time therefore making the title
indefeasibility thus becoming the judgement final and conclusive.
 CA decided that the land was a forest land, hence not registrable. There were no evidence that it
was classified as alienable or disposable land

ISSUE:
 Whether the subject land is inalienable and cannot be subject to registration

HELD:
 SC affirmed the decision of CA
 Applying the Regalian doctrine that all lands of public domain belongs to the state. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the state, it remains part
of inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as title
 In the case at bar, there was no evidence presented to contend the finding that the subject land
was still part of public domain and still not registrable. Even rule on imperfect titles do not apply
unless it has been classified as such