CASE NAME: Stone v.

Mississippi
101 US 814
May 10, 1880
FACTS:
In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the
Mississippi agricultural, educational, and manufacturing aid society. The
society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in
1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state.
John Stone and others associated with the society were arrested in 1874 for
running a lottery. The society claimed they were protected by the provisions
of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement
legislation had repealed the grant.
ISSUE:
Did Mississippi violate the contract clause by repealing the society’s grant?
HELD:
A unanimous court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as
outlawed acts was valid. The state legislature does not have the power to
bind the decisions of the people and future legislatures. The court stated that
no legislation had authority to bargain away the public health and morals.
The contracts protected in the constitution are property rights, not
governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension
of governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter
which can be revoked by the will of the people.
LEAZ L. CLEMEÑA – JD1C

Case No./Title Stone v. Mississippi101 US 814

Date May 10, 1880
Ponente Morrison R. Waite
Facts  1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the
Mississippi agricultural, educational, and manufacturing aid society.
 The society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years;
 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the
state.
 John Stone and others associated with the society were arrested in 1874
for running a lottery. The society claimed they were protected by the
provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent
enforcement legislation had repealed the grant
Issues Whether or not Mississippi violates the contract clause by repealing the
society’s grant
Rulings No, the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was valid. No
legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals. The
people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. The supervision of
both these subjects of governmental power is continuing in its nature, and
they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may
require. That the state might revoke the chartered right of a lottery
company to do business in the state, without violating the contract clause.
Because the company was not subject to the state's reserved police
power to alter or repeal the contract, the

Court relied on the doctrine of inalienable police power, here the power to

protect the public morals by outlawing gambling. The contracts protected in

1
 the constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one
can only obtain temporary suspension of governmental rights (in this case,
the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will of
the people.

Case No/Title G.R. No. 99886, JOHN H. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
OSCAR ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JESUS ESTANISLAO,
in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his
capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; REX V. TANTIONGCO, and
the ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
Date March 31, 1993
Ponente NARVASA, C.J.:
Facts  October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating
a Special Account in the General Fund,designated as the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF).
 The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from
exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of
crude oil.
 OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O.
1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry
of Energy.
 E.O. 1024, the same Executive Order also authorized the investment of
the fund in government securities, with the earnings from such
placements accruing to the fund.
 President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. by promulgating Executive
Order No. 137, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil
companies for possible cost under recovery incurred as a result of the
reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the
under recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
 Comes now, the petitioner avers that the creation of the trust fund
violates Section 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution that “all money
collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a

2
 special fund and paid out for such purposes only xxx”.
 The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D. 1956,
as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust
account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a
special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not
channeled to another government objective.
 Petitioner also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to
the ERB violates Section 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution

 It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised

primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the
State.
Issues 1. Whether or not the funds collected under PD 1956 is an exercise of the
power of taxation.
2. Whether there is an undue delegation of legislative power.

Rulings 1. Supreme Court held that while it seems clear that the funds collected
may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is
plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated
from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as
a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund."
2. The alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that
the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose
additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient
standard by which the authority must be exercised. For a valid
delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must
be
(1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by
the delegate and
(2) it must fix a standard — limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform. As pointed out
in Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be in effect. It is
the criterion by which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgates supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may either be express or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. The Court thus finds no
serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express

3
 purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and
purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient
standard upon which the delegation of power may be justified.

The petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the

reimbursement of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and
DISMISSED in all other respects.

Case No./Title G.R. No. 175356, MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-
SUCAT, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, Respondents.
Date December 3, 2013
Ponente DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts  RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior
citizens 20% discount on certain establishments. To implement the tax
provisions of RA 9257, the Secretaries of DOF and DSWD issued its own
Rules and Regulations.
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of RA 7432 and its IRR
insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount
given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
 They are not questioning the 20% to senior citizen discount but only the
tax deduction scheme. They posit that it contravenes Art. III, Sec. 9 of
the Constitution which provides: “Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
 ” Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the tax deduction
scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.
Issues 1) Whether the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of police power
2) Whether the 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain
Rulings 1) Yes. The State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of
citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted
primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building,
and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-

4
being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority
given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the
law itself. To implement the above policy, the law grants a 20% discount to
senior citizens for certain services for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the 20% discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction. The tax deduction scheme does not fully
reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens.
Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso
for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. The
law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. It has been described as
"the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as
it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same." For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Without sufficient proof that Sec. 4 of RA 9257 is arbitrary, and
that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably
detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative
act. 2) The 20% discount is a valid exercise of police power. Police power is
the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty
and property for public welfare. To be a valid exercise of police power, it
must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of
accomplishing the goal. Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent
power of the State to take or appropriate private property for public use.
The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken
without due process of law and the payment of just compensation. It may
not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is
an exercise of police power or eminent domain. The judicious approach,
therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged
governmental act and decide on the basis thereof. The 20% discount is
intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less
likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It
serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation. In turn, the
subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a
private establishment. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to,
but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on
investment, control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures. The subject regulation differs there from in that:(1) the discount
does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of
their goods and services, and

5
 (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but
only the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the
resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as
belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affect the
profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the
subject regulation is a police power measure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

      

Case no./Tiltle GR No. 152230, JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
Date Aug. 9, 2005 
Ponente CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts  The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos
Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto.
Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
 The municipality then decided to acquire51 square meters out of the
1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,4 which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
 April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance
authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to
acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor;
however, the proprietors rejected the offer.
 July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on
August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation
of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
 The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of
its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but
they refused to sell the same portion.
 The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the
property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property; with
this, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-
92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation,
Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.
 Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a

6
 width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street. When
apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to
intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted
on August 26, 1994.
 In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was
only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, and that property sought to be expropriated is not the best
portion for the road and the least burdensome to it, and the road was
constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real
party-in-interest.
 September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA. In a Decision dated
March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC that the plaintiff
substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
 April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed amotion for reconsideration of the said
decision alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr.
Reyes’ letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not
admitted in evidence by the trial court for being a mere photocopy. The
CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Eventually,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Issues Whether or not the Municipality (now City) of Pasig has the right to
expropriate and take possession of the subject property at all cost under
Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwiseknown as the Local
Government Code
Rulings  The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered
to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the
refiling thereof. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be
an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The exercise of the
right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one
of the harshest proceedings known to the law.
 The Court reviewed the Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, its
meaning, requisites and the Rules and Regulations implemented in
Article 35 of the Local Government Code. The respondent was burdened
to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the
owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter. In addition, the respondent failed to prove that
before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road.
 The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance
with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the
photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr.
Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
 The Supreme Court further asserted that the respondent sought to
prove, through the testimony of its messenger, Rolando Togonon, that
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received the original of the said letter. But
Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he
failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of

7
 Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the
signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte.
 However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not see
Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared that
he did not know and had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte.
 Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and not
elsewhere. Moreover, it shows no record that an ocular inspection was
conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an
ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner
was not notified thereof.
 The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process.
Therefore, Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, though, the
Municipality (now City) of Pasig has the right to expropriate; it is not
exempted to take the process of expropriation in accordance to law.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice
to the refiling thereof.
 

Case no./Title G.R. No. 72126, MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT
Date January 29, 1988
Ponente GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts  This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated April
24,1985 by the former Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, setting aside its earlier decision dated January 10, 1985 and
dismissing the special civil action for expropriation filed by the
petitioner.
 Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with
the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8
meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly
to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various
finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for
ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders
and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
 The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R.
Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the
intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.
 An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with the
Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special
committee of four members to investigate the matter.
 The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of
Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there
was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.

8
  On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed
Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling
Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the
Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid
parcels of land.
 However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor
Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the
purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial
Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.
 Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action
for expropriation.
 Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of
the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1,
1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner.
 The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as
lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court
commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just
compensation for the property.
 The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition
for review. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the
decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that
there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public
road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and
another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court,
taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined
that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's
heavy equipment and finished products.
Issues Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise its power of
eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public
road?
Rulings  This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it
is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public
character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the
legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity thereof. There is absolutely no
showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed
road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the
petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for
another connecting road.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
questioned resolution of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

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Case no./Title G.R. No. 186069 Spouses Jesus L. Cabahug and Coronacion M.
Cabahug, Petitioners, vs.
National Power Corporation, Respondent

Date January 30, 2013

Ponente PEREZ, J.
Facts  The Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land situated in
Barangay Capokpok, Tabango, Leyte, registered in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9813 and T-1599 of the Leyte
provincial registry. They were among the defendants in Special Civil
Action No. 0019-PN, a suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before
the RTC, in connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. The
suit was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with the landowners
by paying an easement fee equivalent to 10% of value of their property
in accordance with Section 3-A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395. In view of
the conflicting land values presented by the affected landowners, it
appears that the Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee, upon request of
NPC, fixed the valuation of the affected properties at P45.00 per square
meter.
 November 09, 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two documents
denominated as Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. For and in
consideration of the easement fees in the sums of P112,225.50 and
P21,375.00, Jesus Cabahug granted NPC a continuous easement of right
of way for the latter’s transmissions lines and their appurtenances over
24,939 and 4,750 square meters of the parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. T-9813 and T-1599, respectively. By said grant, Jesus Cabahug
agreed not to construct any building or structure whatsoever, nor plant
in any area within the Right of Way that will adversely affect or obstruct
the transmission line of NPC, except agricultural crops, the growth of

10
 which will not exceed three meters high. Under paragraph 4 of the
grant, however, Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional
compensation for easement fee, based on the Supreme Court’s 18
January 1991 Decision in G.R. No. 60077, entitled National Power
Corporation v. Spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit, et al.
(Gutierrez).
 September 21, 1998, the Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the
payment of just compensation, damages and attorney’s fees against NPC
which was docketed as Civil Case No. PN0213 before the RTC. Claiming
to have been totally deprived of the use of the portions of land covered
by TCT Nos. T-9813 and T-1599, the Spouses Cabahug alleged, among
other matters, that in accordance with the reservation provided under
paragraph 4 of the aforesaid grant, they have demanded from NPC
payment of the balance of the just compensation for the subject
properties which, based on the valuation fixed by the Leyte Provincial
Appraisal Committee, amounted to P1,202,404.50. In its answer, on the
other hand, NPC averred that it already paid the full easement fee
mandated under Section 3-A of RA 6395 and that the reservation in the
grant referred to additional compensation for easement fee, not the full
just compensation sought by the Spouses Cabahug.
 Acting on the motion for judgment on the pleadings that was filed by the
Spouses Cabahug, the RTC went on to render a Decision dated 14 March
2000. Brushing aside NPC’s reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395, the RTC
applied the ruling handed down by this Court in Gutierrez to the effect
that NPC’s easement of right of way which indefinitely deprives the
owner of their proprietary rights over their property falls within the
purview of the power of eminent domain. As a consequence, the RTC
disposed of the complaint in favor of the Spouses Cabahug and against
NPC.
 Aggrieved by the foregoing decision, the NPC perfected the appeal
which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 67331 before the CA which, on
16 May 2007, rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing and
setting aside the RTC’s appealed decision, finding that the facts of a case
are different from those obtaining in Gutierrez and that Section 3-A of
RA 6395 only allows NPC to acquire an easement of right of way over
properties traversed by its transmission lines.
Issues Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding paragraph 4 of the Grant of
Right of Way whereby Jesus Cabahug reserved the right to seek additional
compensation for easement fee.

Whether or not NPC may still be held liable to pay for the full market value
of the affected property despite the fact transfer of title thereto was not
required by the easement.
Rulings YES The power of Eminent Domain may be exercised although title is not
transferred to the expropriator in easement of right of way. Just
compensation which should be neither more nor less than the money
equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the nature and effect of
the easement is to impose limitations against the use of the land for an
indefinite period and deprive the landowner if ordinary use.
 The CA regarded the Grant of Right of Way executed by Jesus Cabahug
in favor of NPC as a valid and binding contract between the parties, a

11
 fact affirmed by the OSG in its 8 October 2009 Comment to the petition
at bench. Given that the parties have already agreed on the easement
fee for the portions of the subject parcels traversed by NPC’s
transmissions lines, the CA ruled that the Spouses Cabahug’s attempt to
collect further sums by way of additional easement fee and/or just
compensation is violative of said contract and tantamount to unjust
enrichment at the expense of NPC. As correctly pointed out by the
Spouses Cabahug, however, the CA’s ruling totally disregards the fourth
paragraph of the Grant executed by Jesus Cabahug which expressly
states as follows:
 That I hereby reserve the option to seek additional compensation for
Easement Fee, based on the Supreme Court Decision in G.R. No. 60077,
promulgated on January 18, 1991, which jurisprudence is designated as
"NPC vs. Gutierrez" case.
 From the foregoing reservation, it is evident that the Spouses Cabahug’s
receipt of the easement fee did not bar them from seeking further
compensation from NPC. Even by the basic rules in the interpretation of
contracts, we find that the CA erred in holding that the payment of
additional sums to the Spouses Cabahug would be violative of the
parties’ contract and amount to unjust enrichment. Indeed, the rule is
settled that a contract constitutes the law between the parties who are
bound by its stipulations which, when couched in clear and plain
language, should be applied according to their literal tenor. Courts
cannot supply material stipulations, read into the contract words it does
not contain or, for that matter, read into it any other intention that
would contradict its plain import. Neither can they rewrite contracts
because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or
alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the
other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms
which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did
not.
 Considering that Gutierrez was specifically made the point of reference
for Jesus Cabahug’s reservation to seek further compensation from NPC,
we find that the CA likewise erred in finding that the ruling in said case
does not apply to the case at bench. Concededly, the NPC was
constrained to file an expropriation complaint in Gutierrez due to the
failure of the negotiations for its acquisition of an easement of right of
way for its transmission lines. The issue that was eventually presented
for this Court’s resolution, however, was the propriety of making NPC
liable for the payment of the full market value of the affected property
despite the fact that transfer of title thereto was not required by said
easement. In upholding the landowners’ right to full just compensation,
the Court ruled that the power of eminent domain may be exercised
although title is not transferred to the expropriator in an easement of
right of way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor less
than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover, due where the
nature and effect of the easement is to impose limitations against the
use of the land for an indefinite period and deprive the landowner its
ordinary use.
 Even without the reservation made by Jesus Cabahug in the Grant of
Right of Way, the application of Gutierrez to this case is not improper as

12
 NPC represents it to be. Where the right of way easement, as in this
case, similarly involves transmission lines which not only endangers life
and limb but restricts the owner’s use of the land as well traversed
thereby, the ruling in Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied.
It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the
monetary equivalent of the land if, as here, the easement is intended to
perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights
through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free
enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and
limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by
their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or
destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.
Measured not by the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss, just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator.
 Too, the CA reversibly erred in sustaining NPC’s reliance on Section 3-A
of RA 6395 which states that only 10% of the market value of the
property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of
right of way. Since said easement falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain, NPC’s utilization of said provision has been
repeatedly struck down by this Court in a number of cases. The
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a
judicial function and no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Any
valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only
as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding upon this
Court.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the
CA's assailed 16 May 2007 Decision and 9 January 2009 Resolution are,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
REINSTATING the RTC's 14 March 2000 Decision, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the awards of attorney's fees, actual damages
and/or litigation expenses are DELETED.

13
Case No./Title G.R. No. 192100 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH),Petitioner,
v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
Date March 12, 2014
Ponente VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts  Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation (respondent) is the registered
owner of a 17,175-square meter property situated in Barangay Sta.
Monica, Municipality of San Simon, Province of Pampanga.
 March 1, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted expropriation proceedings against
the respondent over a portion of their property. The affected area,
consisting of 2,024 square meters, shall be traversed by the expansion of
the San Simon Interchange, an integral component of the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX
Project).
 In its decision, the trial court ruled that although there was no
documentary evidence attached to substantiate the opinions of the
banks and the realtors indicated in the Commissioners Report, the Court
finds the commissioner's recommendation of the valuation of industrial
lands atP1,000.00 toP1,500.00 to be fair, absent any showing that the
valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. Using the
recommendation of the three (3) commissioners as guide, the Court
finds the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php1,300.00) per square meter as just compensation for the property
subject of expropriation.
 Petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that the just compensation
should not be more thanP300.00 per square meter. After examining the
records, the CA found no reversible error in the trial courts
determination of just compensation and held that the valuation
ofP1,500.00 per square meter is more in consonance with the concept
of just compensation based upon due consideration of all evidence.

14
  Petitioner argues that the evidence for determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases should be on those factors
provided in Section 5 of R.A. 8974. Considering such factors and the
evidence submitted by the parties before the trial court, petitioner
maintains that just compensation for the subject property should be no
more than the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter), and in no
case should it amount to the market value ofP1,300.00 per square meter
adjudged by the trial and appellate courts.

Issues Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision
Rulings Yes. Case remanded to trial court for the proper determination of just
compensation.
 Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value
of expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure
projects.

 SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land

Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. In order to
facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may
consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevant
standards:

(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;

(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;

(c) The value declared by the owners;

(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;

(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or

demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of the
improvements thereon;

(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the
land;

(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as
documentary evidence presented; and

(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have
sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as
those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate
themselves as early as possible.

 In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d). It also found the
commissioners recommended valuation ofP1,000.00 toP1,500.00 per
square to be fair and just despite the absence of documentary
substantiation as said prices were based merely on the opinions of
bankers and realtors.

15
  In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, the recommended price of the city assessor was rejected
by this Court. The opinions of the banks and the realtors as reflected in
the computation of the market value of the property and in the
Commissioners Report, were not substantiated by any documentary
evidence.

 Similarly, in National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal, this Court

rejected the valuation recommended by court-appointed commissioners
whose conclusions were devoid of any actual and reliable basis. The
market values of the subject property's neighboring lots were found to
be mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents,
such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax
declarations or zonal valuation from the BIR for the contiguous
residential dwellings and commercial establishments.

 The trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the
subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as
the zonal valuation, tax declarations and current selling price supported
by documentary evidence. Indeed, just compensation must not be
arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different
factors.

 Nonetheless, petitioners argument that just compensation for the

subject property should not exceed the zonal valuation of P300.00 per
square meter is not correct. The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. The zonal value may be one, but necessarily
the sole index of the value of a realty.

 It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just

compensation can only be made after due ascertainment of the
requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merely based on the
declarations of the parties. Since these requirements were not
satisfactorily complied with, and in the absence of reliable and actual
data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property, remand of
this case to the trial court is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision

dated July 21, 2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90539 are hereby SET ASIDE.

Case No./Title G.R. No. L-10405 WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial
Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.

16
 THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
Date December 29, 1960
Ponente CONCEPCION, J.
Facts  Petitioner Wenceslao, Provincial Governor of Rizal seeks to declare
Republic Act No.920, also known as “An Act Appropriating Funds for
Public Works” as unconstitutional; thatR.A. no 920 contained an item
appropriating P85,000.00 which the petitioner alleged that it was for the
"for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feederroad terminals (Gen. Roxas — Gen.
Araneta — Gen. Lucban — Gen. Capinpin — Gen. Segundo— Gen.
Delgado — Gen. Malvar — Gen. Lim)";
 That, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the
aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio
Subdivision . . . situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal"(according to the tracings
attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, not
far away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54),
which projected feeder roads" do not connect any government property
or any important premises to the main highway"; that the
aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said
feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties of
respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and
approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines;
 May,1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal
Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to improving the property of Jose C.
Zulueta, who a member of the Senate of the Philippines.
 He alleges that the said law was not for public purpose.
Issues Whether R.A. no 920 is unconstitutional
Rulings  Yes. R.A. no 920 is an invalid imposition since it results in the promotion
of a private enterprise, it benefits the property of a particular individual.
The provision that the land shall thereafter be donated to the
government does not cure this defect.
 The rule is that, if the public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in
the promotion of a particular enterprise, such defect shall render the
law invalid. On the other hand, if what is incidental is the promotion of a
private enterprise, the tax law shall be deemed “for public
purpose”. It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose.
 It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of
the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by
the use public money.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records
are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C.

17
 Zulueta. It is so ordered.

Case No./Title G.R. No. 159796

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), petitioners
vs
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
(ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO), respondents.

Date July 17, 2007

Ponente NACHURA, J.
Facts  June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the
validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of
the power of taxation.
 Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all
electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of
the EPIRA Law.
 The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for
government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and
royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy,
environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three years.
 The universal charge shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis
from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp.
through the creation of a special trust fund.
 April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power
Utilities Group8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge
of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-165.9

18
  May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case
No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal
Charge for the Environmental charge of ₱0.0025 per kilowatt-hour
(/kWh), or a total of ₱119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from
the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector
Assets and
 December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 12 in ERC Case No. 2002-
165 provisionally approving the computed amount of ₱0.0168/kWh as
the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary
Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation
(TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-
users on a monthly basis.

Issues 1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
is a tax; and

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on

the part of the ERC.
Ruling  No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an
exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The
universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties
of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue
and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the
states police power thru regulation.
 Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by
the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it
therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC.
The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is
tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress, which
before execution must pass both the completeness test and the
sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA
9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions free from
any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in
form.

To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State’s power of

taxation from the police power.

 The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its

range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against
its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the
principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their
prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory
behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity;
without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of the people.

 On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most

19
 demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The
justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas  (so use your property as not to injure the property
of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually
extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a
host of its regulatory powers.34 We have held that the power to
"regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and
control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons.

 The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three

branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest  (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. 

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

20
Case no./title G.R. No. 155650
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, -versus – COURT
OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARANAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARANAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF
PARANAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARANAQUE, Respondents
Date July 20, 2006,
Ponente CARPIO, J.
Facts  Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City
under Executive Order No. 903. As operator of the international airport,
MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex.
 March 21,1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC opined that the Local Government
Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with
respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the
City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
 June 28, 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to
2001.
 July17, 2001, the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued
notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings.
The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction
the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate
tax delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No.
061.
 August 9, 2001, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC
Opinion No. 061. The OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Local
Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show
proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of the MIAA
Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
 MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition
and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because

21
 MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The City of
Parañaque posted notices of auction sale.
 MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex Parte and Reiteratory Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. On 7 February 2003,
this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective
immediately. MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to
the Airport Lands and Buildings in the name of MIAA. However, MIAA
points out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since
the real owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the
Philippines.
 MIAA also points out that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically
exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate tax.
 Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned
and-controlled corporations" upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code. Respondents also cite the ruling of this Court in
Mactan International Airport v. Marcos where we held that the Local
Government Code has withdrawn the exemption from real estate tax
granted to international airports.
Issues Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws.
Ruling YES
 First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation.
 A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no
members. Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation,
MIAA does not qualify as a governmentowned or controlled corporation.
What then is the legal status of MIAA within the National Government?
 MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government
instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become
a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.
 There is also no reason for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to
inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the
legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the
delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy
considerations. There must be express language in the law empowering
local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. Any
doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.
 Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.

22
 The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion
and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No
one can dispute those properties of public dominion mentioned in
Article 420 of the Civil Code, like "roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State," are owned by the State. The term
"ports" includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings constitute a "port" constructed by the State. Under Article 420
of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of
public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.
 As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
outside the commerce of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly that
properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. As
early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas
that properties devoted to public use are outside the commerce of man.
 Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport
Lands and Buildings from public use, these properties remain properties
of public dominion and are inalienable.
 MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust
for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative
Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties
owned by the Republic.
 The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air
Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership
of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to
reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate
and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the
Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic.
No party claims any ownership rights over MIAA's assets adverse to the
Republic.
 However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases
to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the
land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations
is subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the
beneficial use of such land area for a consideration to a taxable person
and therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax.

23
Case No./Title G.R. No. 135083
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents. [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance]
Date 26 May 1999
Ponente MENDOZA, J.:
Facts  Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold
elective office on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a
Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents.
 May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
§40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. 
 COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.
 May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11,
1998.
 May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private
respondent.
 August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4
to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc  reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Issues Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run
office in the local position.
Rulings No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not
dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not

24
 fall under this disqualification.
No merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made
upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Case No./Title G.R. No. 197450              

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE
KENG, Respondent.
Date March 20, 2013
Ponente MENDOZA, J.:
Facts  August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li
or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of
Intention to Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. On
March 12, 2008 or almost seven months after filing his declaration
of intention, respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization before
the RTC.
 June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondents application for
naturalization as a Filipino citizen. The OSG appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. The OSG argues that the petition for
naturalization should not be granted in view of its patent
jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because: 1) it was filed within
the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of declaration of
intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable to the
validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition;
and 3) respondents failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements set under CA 473.
 The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that although the
petition for naturalization was filed less than one (1) year from the
time of the declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not
fatal. Moreover, contrary to the allegation of the OSG that

25
 respondent did not present his Certificate of Arrival, the fact of his
arrival could be easily confirmed from the Certification, dated
August 21, 2007, issued by the Bureau of Immigration, and from the
stamp in the passport of respondent indicating his arrival on January
26, 1981. The CA further stated that the Republic participated in
every stage of the proceedings below. It was accorded due process
which it vigorously exercised from beginning to end. Whatever
procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint the
proceedings, let alone the Republics meaningful exercise of its right
to due process.

Issues Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision and denying the
appeal by the OSG

Ruling  Yes. CA decision reversed and set aside

Political Law- declaration of intention must be filed one year prior

to the filing of the petition for naturalization
 As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein
is the time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the
qualifications of the applicant. If this period of time is not given to it,
the State will have no sufficient opportunity to investigate the
qualifications of the applicants and gather evidence thereon. An
applicant may then impose upon the courts, as the State would have
no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present to contradict
whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of his
petition." The period is designed to give the government ample time
to screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to
measure the latters good intention and sincerity of purpose.
 Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions
of those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone,
such as, but not limited to, those who are merely interested in
protecting their wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly
come to love the Philippines and its culture and who wish to become
genuine partners in nation building.
 The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be filed one
year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. Republic v.
Go Bon Leelikewise decreed that substantial compliance with the

26
 requirement is inadequate. In that case, Go filed his declaration of
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines on May 23, 1940.
After eleven months, he filed his petition for naturalization on April
18, 1941.
 The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of
intention is specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit:
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration
of intention. Persons born in the Philippines and have received their
primary and secondary education in public schools or those
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the
Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their
application, may be naturalized without having to make a
declaration of intention upon complying with the other
requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that
which establishes that the applicant has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to
any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable
with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has
declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and
dies before he is actually naturalized.
 Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such
exempt individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration
of intention one year prior to the filing of a petition for
naturalization. Contrary to the CA finding, respondents premature
filing of his petition for naturalization before the expiration of the
one-year period is fatal.
 In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a
citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege
extended to him by the State; the applicant does not possess any
natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to
Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given
the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute
confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply

27
 with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of
one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this
necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization
process.
 Petition granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93374 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petition for naturalization of respondent Li Ching Chung, otherwise known as
Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, docketed as Civil Case No. 08-118905
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila, is DISMISSED, without
prejudice.

Case No./Title G.R. No. 195649,

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioners, -versus- COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
EN BANC
Date April 16, 2013
Ponente Sereno, CJ
Facts  Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino
citizenship as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a US
citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On 3 April 2009
Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Thereafter,
Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte. Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
seeking Arnado’s disqualification and/or cancellation of Arnado’s CoC
contending that Arnado is a foreigner. To bolster his claim of Arnado’s
US citizenship, Balua presented evidence indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines
even after his repatriation and execution of affidavit of renunciation.
 Petitioner Casan Maquiling intervened in the instant case after having
garnered the second highest number of votes during the elections.
Issues Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made and affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.
Rulings YES
 By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen,
with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by
the foreign country that granted the citizenship. While the act of using a

28
 foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act that repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
 In this case, when Arnado used his US passport just eleven days after he
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation that he “absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and that he
“divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.” This act of using a foreign
passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.
RATIO DECIDENDI:  The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission on
election offenses as provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of
which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office. Arnado being a non-
candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice
governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the disqualified winning
candidate, not the candidate for the same position who had received the
next highest vote.  

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution

of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is
hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
the 10 May 2010 elections.

29
Case No./Title G.R. No. 125793

JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION
and WILSON SOLUREN, Respondents.
Date August 29, 2006
Ponente VELASCO, JR., J.
Facts  Petitioner Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When
Petitioner was seven years old his father became a naturalized citizen of
U.S.A. By derivative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American
Citizenship.

 In 1995, Petitioner arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a

"balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter the latter was arrested and
detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the
Petitioner on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal
charges has been issued against him, and that his passport has been
revoked.

 Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with

Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 11 on May
29, 1996. At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years
old. While the case was pending, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition
alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171, and that because he is now a
Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent
Bureau.

Issues A. Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA

8171.

B.  Whether petitioner because of his repatriation, has reacquired his

Philippine citizenship; therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to
deportation.

30
Rulings NO. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171

A. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171.

The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;

and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their

Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he

is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship
by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171
is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino
subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his
children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the
citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time
the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child
does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity
to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the
minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately
from their parents.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth.
In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American
citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship.
Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic
repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to
political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a
minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under
RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of
the petition for repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to
political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by
operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his
father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in
deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not

31
his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a
foreign country due to political and economic reasons and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

Petitioner failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine

Citizenship

Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA

8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special
Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process
petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No.
285) dated August 22, 1996.

What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which
he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a
certificate of such registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place
and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos. Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to
process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22,
1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v.
Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for
repatriation before the SCN.

Petitioner failed to prove that that his parents relinquished their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in
the law.

Even if petitioner––now of legal age––can still apply for repatriation under

RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents relinquished their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as
provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he
mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended Rules
and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for
repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost
his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman,
or whether by political or economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born
Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such
political or economic necessity should be specified."

Assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon

him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of
citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine
citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this
crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.

32
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State.
This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which
provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided
by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications,
procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine
if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an
inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can
reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa,
fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the
petition for repatriation.

B. No. As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation

under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the coverage
of the law.

Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening
on summary deportation:

2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe
summary deportation proceedings in cases where the charge against the
alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of
his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board
IV shall merely require the presentation of the alien’s valid passport and
shall decide the case on the basis thereof.

3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue
a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country,
under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et
al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be ‘86461’], 30 May 1989). The automatic
loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the
Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which
shall be immediately executory. 28

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this

Court held:

It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must

possess the necessary documents. One of these documents is a valid
passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to
extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the
alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking
residence elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of
staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper
authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the questioned summary judgment. x x x

Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the
country, became an undocumented alien who can be summarily deported.
His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation especially

33
considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.

34