1

LEAZ LUMAYAG CLEMEÑA - JD1C

Ass.5
Case no. title [ G.R. No. 175352.]
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO AND SALVADOR
M. VIARI, PETITIONERS, VS. RICHARD J. GORDON,
RESPONDENT
Date January 18, 2011
Ponente LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts  February 23, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon was elected as Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross during his incumbency as a
member of the Senate. Petitioners then filed a petition to declare
Senator Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. They allege
that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
he has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Art.
VI of the Constitution. In his Comment, Senator Gordon asserted that
petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be an
action for quo warranto and that it was already barred by prescription.
He further insisted that the PNRC is not a government owned or
controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer
service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

 Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of

the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what
they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was
elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board
of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

 Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC

Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the
Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a
GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and
held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

 Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1]
held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by
the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or
by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-
run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals.
Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when
he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incum bency as Senator.
 2

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC
to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo
of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for

Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
Issues Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art.VI of the Constitution.
Rulings The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive
portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.

NO. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an

office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of
the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual
fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for
one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC
member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000
for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of
the PNRC. Sec. 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by P.D. No. 1264,
provides that membership in the PNRC shall be open to the entire
population in the Philippines regardless of citizenship. Thus, the PNRC is
a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional
issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui
generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties,
 3

and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it
was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to
when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v.
PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon
a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court
may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

The Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this
matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the
Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which
was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate
under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence
in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264,
and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law
is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that
R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its
enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged
on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

The Court must recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva

Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with
its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of
law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article
XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code
just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost
sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law
and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its
 4

obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the
State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by
international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that
respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position
as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution,
that must be organized under the Corporation Code.

The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies

involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden
refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It
bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national
disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled.

The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and
drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those
who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.

Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The
Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the
second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 5

Case no./title
(G.R. No. 203766)Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list
groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent

Date April 2, 2013

Ponente CARPIO, J.
Facts  In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013,
approximately 280 groups and organizations manifested their desire
to participate in the party-list elections. However, 52 of these groups
were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including some that
were duly registered and accredited as political parties. The reasons
for their exclusion were based on the contention that said groups
failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed
members of the sectors they were seeking to represent. 

 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions with

the SC in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Comelec
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in
its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of
2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees did not come from a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups were not truly representative of the sector
they intend to represent in Congress.
Issues Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups
from participating in the May 2013 elections. 

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying

petitioners from participating in the May 2013 party-list election.

Rulings
No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set
forth by the SC in its earlier rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform
standards and understanding of the party-list system in the Philippines,
the Court provides a lengthy account of the history and dynamics of the
party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned
by the Framers, and institutes new guidelines to be used in resolving
issues of similar nature in the future. 

NO. COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, cases were remanded back to the
COMELEC because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court. In determining who may participate in the
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)

national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
 6

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations

do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they

register under the partylist system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that

represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution? 

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot
win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one
for their choice of legislative district representative, and another for their
choice of party-list representative. But under sectoral representation,
majority of the electorate will only have one vote, which is for their choice
of legislative district representative. In contrast, members of sectoral
communities (e.g. farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communitoes,
etc.) will have two votes: one for their district representative and another
for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral
 7

representation is discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral
groups. The framers intended sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not
the entirety, of the party-list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the
following can take part in party-list elections: national parties and
organizations, regional parties and organizations, and sectoral parties
and organizations.  

Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?

A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and

underrepresented sectors?
A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of
a party-list group, and none of these grounds touches on the failure of a
party to represent the marginalized and underrepresented. For non-
sectoral groups, it is enough that its members are united in their cause or
ideology. But for sectoral groups, a majority of their members must come
from marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and
underrepresented sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. 

Q: Can major political parties join in party-list elections?

A: Yes, but only through their sectoral wings. The initial impression is
that: (a) major political parties do not represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, and (b)  major political parties have well-
defined constituencies. However, the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 7941
allow them to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized
and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined constituencies.
The creation of sectoral wings is allowed as per Section 3 of RA No. 7941.

Q: Should party-list nominees be part of the sector they seek to

represent?
A: In BANAT v. COMELEC, the Court held that party-list nominees must
come from the sector they seek to represent. Thus, a party-list
representing farmers should have farmer nominees, too. This was one of
COMELEC's bases in disqualifying the 52 petitioners. However, the Court
reverses its ruling in BANAT v. COMELEC by instituting new parameters,
including the guidelines for the choice of nominees. Under the new
parameters, a nominee may either be a member of the sector he seeks to
represent or at the very least, should have a track record of advocacy for
such sector.

Q: What are the new parameters that party-list groups should adhere to
according to the Court in the instant case?
 8

A: The Court enumerated six parameters. See last sections of the Court
ruling for the list.

Q: What is the final ruling of the Court in this case?

A: The Court remands the cases back to COMELEC to determine whether
or not the 52 petitioners are qualified to participate in the May 2013
elections using the six parameters laid down by the Court. 
 9

Case no./title G.R. No.190529

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE
FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Date April 29, 2010
Ponente BRION,J.:
Facts  For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc
issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several
party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its Opposition
to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading,
the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a
party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. The
COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.

Issues Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

Rulings POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or
sectoral party

The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections;or(b)fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies,as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate

grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood
to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.This is how
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.

PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner

2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate
in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section
6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in
the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address.The Court
cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary
authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will
offend the principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed exists,
then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures
notice.
 10

On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process was not violated
for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.The essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing. PGBI was not denied due process. In any case,
given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds.

The petition for review is GRANTED.

 11

Case no./title Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597

Date July 16, 2008.
Ponente CARPIO, J
Facts  The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was
created by RA 9054. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 allows
ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM National Assembly, to create
provinces. Thus it enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composed of eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. Comelec and Didagen Dilanganen (Dilanganen)
now questions the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054. They alleged that such law entitles a province to have one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district.

 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional

Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao.  MMA Act 201 provides:

 Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original

nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its
total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s
first legislative district, is not part of the Province of
Maguindanao.

 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City

passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act
201.

 Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of

the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27
February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

 Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao.

 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject

of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming
the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”
Issues The petitions raise the following issues:
     I. In G.R. No. 177597:
         (A) Preliminarily –
 12

           (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902; and
           (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

        (B) On the merits –

           (1)  whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
           (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such province.

     II. In G.R No.  177597 and G.R No.  178628, whether COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first
legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

Rulings Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Section 19,

Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.

9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power
to create provinces and cities.   Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.

Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units –

province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.   Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. 
Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

     There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of

authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
 13

to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,

subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution.  In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.  
However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of
Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

     However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. 

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.”  

     Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district

because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot
also be created without a legislative district.

     This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to

create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or
in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact
such a law.  It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative
bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.  

In view of certiorari and mandamus

     The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus
will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness
     There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s
proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City”
mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of
MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054.  Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the
 14

votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of “Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in the
canvassing of ballots.   However, this incidental consequence is no
reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues
raised here.  The Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the
recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections
for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in
Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.”  

     First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act
No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional
representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for
“creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided
in the Constitution.”

     Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because 

(1) it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special
law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of
the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum
number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution.  
Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. 
Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted
by the ARMM Regional Assembly.  

     What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by

Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to
create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district.
Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by
operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that
“each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives.

     Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative

district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave
Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao.  However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a
population of only 163,849.  

     Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and

independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
 15

criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely:  minimum annual

income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.  The following
scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:

     It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions

cannot prevail over the Constitution.  Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of
regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x
x.”  The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states
that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of
the Constitution.”   This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x
within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”  
 16

Case no./title GR 97710, Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

Date Sept 26, 1991
Ponente GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:
Facts  In the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was proclaimed winner over rival
petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for the position
of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc filed a
protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda after
revision, reexamination and reappreciation of the ballots. Among
the members of the HRET who voted for proclamation of Bondoc
was Rep. Camasura of the LDP. Declaring Camasura to have
committed a complete betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled
from the party and, upon the request of LDP, his election to the
HRET was rescinded. The promulgation of Bondoc as winner was
then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the required
concurrence of five members of the Tribunal. Hence this petition.

 A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by

Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against the respondents who may be
appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner
prayed to annul the decision of the House of Representatives of
March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the
nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Respondent Palacol
alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him
because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to
implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party
for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.
Issues May the House of Representatives, at the request of a political party,
change that party’s representation in the HRET?
Rulings No. The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan
court. To be able to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, the tribunal
must be independent. Its jurisdiction xxx is not to be shared by it with
the Legislature nor with the Courts. They must discharge their
functions with complete xxx independence—even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence “disloyalty to party”
and “breach of party discipline” are no valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Rep. Camasura for having
cast a “conscience vote”, the House of Reps committed a grave abuse
of discretion violative of the Constitution and thus the expulsion is
null and void. To sanction such interference by the House of Reps in
the work of the HRET, would reduce the it to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power.

No.
Ratio Decidendi:
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts. The use of the word "sole" in both
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
 17

Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns

and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
 18

Case no./title G.R. No. 127255, Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Date August 14, 1997
Ponente MENDOZA, J.:
Facts  A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

 The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate

approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared
the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There
being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.

 On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issues Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Rulings Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given
to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
 19

been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.

The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when
the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is

DISMISSED.
 20

Case no./title G.R. No. 132875-76, People vs Jalosjos

Date February 3, 2000
Ponente YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts  Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

 Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He

states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the
duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention
of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

 Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo

v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that –

 The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people.

 Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional

Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave
his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

 Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of

Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since
he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government
to respect his mandate.
Issues Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge
mandate as member of House of Representatives
Ruling NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.

However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.
 21

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of

the House of Representatives, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be

exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public

officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not
apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after

final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are

allowed to all prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to

a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves
from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of
the authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and

committee meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to

Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
 22

elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal

illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and

committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question

of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor
prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that

allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public

officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities

imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not

a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.

Case no./title G.R. No. 190582, ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY

 23

represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO,

Petitioner, -
versus- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
EN BANC,
Date April 8, 2010,
Ponente DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts  The Ang Ladlad is an organization of people who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgenders. It filed a
petition for registration with the Comelec as a party-list.

 The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the

definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs,” even
citing passages from the Bible and Koran.

 In its petition with the Supreme Court, Ang Ladlad argued that the
denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion.

 It also claimed that the assailed Comelec Resolutions

contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Issues Whether Ang Ladlad’s application as a party-list should be granted.
Rulings YES
The Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Rather than relying on religious
belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the Comelec is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.

Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in

ways that have primarily secular effects.

The Court also discussed Ang Ladlad’s invocation of the Yogyakarta

Principles (The Application of International Human Rights Law In
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) as a binding
principle of international law.

The Court said that it was not prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms obligatory on the Philippines, because they
are not reflective of the current
state of international law and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.

Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of

these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true
status. Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are–at best–de lege ferenda–and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
 24

Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized

by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either
State practice or opinio juris.